Deep sea mining

Short description: Mineral extraction from the ocean floor

Not to be confused with Naval mining.

Schematic of a polymetallic nodule mining operation. From top to bottom, the three zoom-in panels illustrate the surface operation vessel, the midwater sediment plume, and the nodule collector operating on the seabed. The midwater plume comprises two stages: (i) the dynamic plume, in which the sediment-laden discharge water rapidly descends and dilutes to a neutral buoyancy depth, and (ii) the subsequent ambient plume that is advected by the ocean current and subject to background turbulence and settling.[1]

Deep sea mining is the extraction of minerals from the seabed of the deep sea. The main ores of commercial interest are polymetallic nodules, which are found at depths of 4–6 km (2.5–3.7 mi) primarily on the abyssal plain. The Clarion–Clipperton zone (CCZ) alone contains over 21 billion metric tons of these nodules, with minerals such as copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese making up roughly 30% of their weight.[2] It is estimated that the global ocean floor holds more than 120 million tons of cobalt, five times the amount found in terrestrial reserves.[3]

Studies have shown that midwater mining techniques causing plumes can trigger bottom-up ecosystems impacts with severe consequences to marine life, extending beyond the initial mining area. [4]

As of July 2024[update], only exploratory licenses have been issued, with no commercial-scale deep sea mining operations yet. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) regulates all mineral-related activities in international waters and has granted 31 exploration licenses so far: 19 for polymetallic nodules, mostly in the CCZ; 7 for polymetallic sulphides in mid-ocean ridges; and 5 for cobalt-rich crusts in the Western Pacific Ocean.[5] There is a push for deep sea mining to commence by 2025, when regulations by the ISA are expected to be completed.[6][7]

In April 2025, U.S. President Trump signed an Executive Order instructing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to expedite permits for companies to mine in both international and U.S. territorial waters, citing the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act of 1980.[8]

Deep sea mining is being considered in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of countries, such as Norway, where in January 2024 the government announced its intention to allow companies to apply for exploration permits in 2025. In December 2024, Norway's plans to begin awarding exploration licenses were temporarily put on hold after the Socialist Left Party (SV) blocked the planned licensing round as part of negotiations over the government budget.[9][10] In 2022, the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority (SBMA) granted three exploration licenses for cobalt-rich polymetallic nodules within their EEZ.[11] In 2025, it was announced that the Cook Islands had signed a deal with China focused on deep-sea mining.[12] Papua New Guinea was the first country to approve a deep sea mining permit in state waters for the Solwara 1 project, despite three independent reviews highlighting significant gaps and flaws in the environmental impact statement.[13]

The most common commercial model of deep sea mining proposed involves a caterpillar-track hydraulic collector and a riser lift system bringing the harvested ore to a production support vessel with dynamic positioning, and then depositing extra discharge down the water column below 2,000 meters. Related technologies include robotic mining machines, as surface ships, and offshore and onshore metal refineries.[14][15] Though largely composed of nickel and manganese which are most widely used as key inputs into the steel industry, wind farms, solar energy, electric vehicles, and battery technologies use many of the deep-sea metals.[14] Electric vehicle batteries are a key driver of the critical metals demand that incentivizes deep sea mining, as well as demands for the production of aerospace and defense technologies, and infrastructure.[16][17]

The environmental impact of deep sea mining is controversial.[18][19] Environmental advocacy groups such as Greenpeace and the Deep Sea Mining Campaign[20] claimed that seabed mining has the potential to damage deep sea ecosystems and spread pollution from heavy metal-laden plumes.[21] Critics have called for moratoria[22][23] or permanent bans.[24] Opposition campaigns enlisted the support of some industry figures, including firms reliant on the target metals. Individual countries like Norway, Cook Islands, India, Brazil and others with significant deposits within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ's) are exploring the subject.[25][26] Additionally, studies have noted the loss of cultural or spiritual value for communities indigenous to the region that have yet to be addressed in international legal frameworks. [27]

As of 2021, the majority of marine mining used dredging operations in far shallower depths of less than 200 m, where sand, silt and mud for construction purposes is abundant, along with mineral rich sands containing ilmenite and diamonds.[28][29]

## Contents

* 1 Deposit types
* 1.1 Polymetallic nodules
* 1.2 Polymetallic sulfides
* 1.3 Cobalt-rich crusts
* 2 Deposit sites
* 2.1 United States
* 3 Deep sea mining projects
* 3.1 Hakurei
* 3.2 Solwara 1
* 3.3 Shell
* 3.4 Licenses
* 3.5 Cook Islands
* 3.6 The Metals Company (TMC)
* 3.7 Norway
* 4 Extraction methods
* 5 Process
* 6 Environmental impacts
* 6.1 Sediment plumes
* 6.2 Benthic disturbance
* 6.3 Noise and light pollution
* 6.4 Ecosystem
* 6.5 Dark Oxygen
* 7 Laws and regulations
* 7.1 Formation of the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea
* 7.2 Legal territorialization of water zones
* 7.3 The International Seabed Authority (ISA)
* 7.4 Extraction and exploitation contracts
* 7.5 State sponsorship
* 7.6 The Two-Year Rule
* 7.7 Republic of Nauru
* 7.8 Environmental Justice in Deep-Sea Mining Governance
* 8 Moratorium debate
* 8.1 Background
* 8.2 Legal arguments
* 8.3 Countries calling for a moratorium
* 8.4 U.S. position and The Metals Company
* 8.5 Scientific concerns
* 8.6 Corporate and financial positions
* 8.7 Arguments for and against
* 8.8 Current status
* 9 Economic perspective
* 9.1 Resource Abundance and Economic Efficiency
* 9.2 Strategic Importance in Global Markets
* 9.3 Opportunities for Developing Nations
* 9.4 Challenges to Economic Viability
* 9.5 Regulatory Frameworks
* 10 Geopolitical aspects of deep sea mining
* 10.1 Geopolitics of deep-sea mining
* 10.2 Power relations, new frontiers and actors
* 11 Distributional aspects of deep-sea mining
* 12 Environmental justice and regulation
* 13 Reasons for deep sea mining
* 13.1 Current state of the global mineral market
* 13.2 New dividing lines within traditional alliance blocs
* 13.3 ISA's structural model and regulatory issues
* 14 Future trends and technologies
* 14.1 Demand and supply uncertainties
* 14.2 Potential recycling to meet demand
* 14.3 Technological uncertainties
* 15 History
* 15.1 2000s
* 15.2 2020s
* 16 Protests
* 16.1 The Indigenous Perspective
* 17 Alternatives
* 18 See also
* 19 References
* 20 Sources
* 21 External links

## Deposit types

Deep sea ore deposits are classified into three main types: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulfide deposits, and cobalt-rich crusts.[30]: 356

### Polymetallic nodules

Polymetallic nodules on the deep seabed in the CCZ Example of manganese nodule that can be found on the sea floor

Polymetallic nodules are found at depths of 4–6 km (2.5–3.7 mi) in all major oceans, though due to their metallic composition those in the Pacific Ocean are of greatest commercial interest.[31][32] Nodules may also be found in shallow waters like the Baltic Sea and in freshwater lakes.[33][34] They are the most readily minable type of deep sea ore.[35] These nodules typically range in size from 4–14 cm (1.6–5.5 in) in diameter, though some can be as large as 15 cm (5.9 in).

Manganese and related hydroxides precipitate from ocean water or sediment-pore water around a nucleus, which may be a shark's tooth or a quartz grain, forming potato-shaped nodules some 4–14 cm (1.6–5.5 in) in diameter. They accrete at rates of 1–15 mm per million years.[36] These nodules are rich in metals including rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel, copper, molybdenum, and yttrium.[37]

The Clipperton fracture zone hosts the world's largest deposit nickel resource. These nodules sit on the seafloor and require no drilling or excavation.[2] Nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese make up nearly 30% of the contents.[2]

Nodule chemical composition from selected areas (wt%)[38] Location  | Manganese  | Iron  | Nickel  | Copper  | Cobalt  | Total REE (incl Yttrium)

|
|
|
|
|
|

CCZ  | 28.4  | 6.16  | 1.30  | 1.07  | 0.210  | 0.0813
Eastern CCZ  | 31.4  | 6.3  | 1.40  | 1.18  | 0.174  | 0.0701
Western CCZ  | 27.56  | 6.1  | 1.36  | 1.08  | 0.250  | 0.0801
Indian Ocean  | 24.4  | 7.14  | 1.10  | 1.04  | 0.111  | 0.1039
Cook Islands  | 16.1  | 16.1  | 0.38  | 0.23  | 0.411  | 0.1678
Peru Basin  | 34.2  | 6.12  | 1.30  | 0.60  | 0.048  | 0.0403

### Polymetallic sulfides

Polymetallic or sulfide deposits form in active oceanic tectonic settings such as island arcs and back-arcs and mid ocean ridge environments.[39] These deposits are associated with hydrothermal activity and hydrothermal vents at sea depths mostly between 1 and 4 km (0.62 and 2.5 mi) and therefore located in shallower waters to other marine mineral types like polymetallic nodules. These minerals are rich in copper, gold, lead, silver and others.[30]: 356

Polymetallic sulphides appear on seafloor massive sulfide deposits. They appear on and within the seafloor when mineralized water discharges from a hydrothermal vent. The ionic metals and sulfides in the hot, mineral-rich water precipitate upon contact with cold seawater.[36] The stock area of the chimney structures of hydrothermal vents can be highly mineralized.

### Cobalt-rich crusts

Cobalt-rich crusts (CRCs) form on sediment-free rock surfaces around oceanic seamounts, ocean plateaus, and other elevated features.[40] The deposits are found at depths of 600–7,000 m (2,000–23,000 ft) and form 'carpets' of metal-rich layers about 30 cm (12 in) thick at the feature surface. Crusts are rich in a range of metals including cobalt, tellurium, nickel, copper, platinum, zirconium, tungsten, and rare earth elements.[30]: 356 Temperature, depth and seawater sources shape how the formations grow.

Cobalt-rich formations exist in two categories depending on the depositional environment:[41]

* hydrogenetic cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts grow at 1–5 mm/Ma, but offer higher concentrations of critical metals.
* hydrothermal crusts and encrustations precipitate quickly, near 1600–1800 mm/Ma, and grow in hydrothermal fluids at approximately 200 °C (392 °F)

Submarine seamount provinces are linked to hotspots and seafloor spreading and vary in depth. They show characteristic distributions. In the Western Pacific, a study conducted at <1500 m to 3500 m bsl reported that cobalt crusts concentrate on less than 20° slopes. The high-grade cobalt crust in the Western Pacific correlated with latitude and longitude, a region within 150°E–140°W and 30°S–30°N.[42]

Deposit types and related depths[43] Type  | Typical depth range  | Resources

|
|

Polymetallic nodules
Manganese nodules | 4,000 – 6,000 m  | Nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese
Manganese crusts  | 800 – 2,400 m  | Mainly cobalt, some vanadium, molybdenum and platinum
Polymetallic sulfide deposits  | 1,400 – 3,700 m  | Copper, lead and zinc, some gold and silver

Diamonds are mined from the seabed by De Beers and others.

## Deposit sites

Deep sea mining sites hold polymetallic nodules or surround active or extinct hydrothermal vents at about 3,000–6,500 meters (10,000–21,000 ft) depth.[44][43] The vents create sulfide deposits, which collect metals such as silver, gold, copper, manganese, cobalt, and zinc.[21][45] The deposits are mined using hydraulic pumps or bucket systems.

The largest deposits occur in the Clarion–Clipperton zone in the Pacific Ocean. It stretches over 4.5 million square kilometers of the Northern Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Mexico.[46] Scattered across the abyssal plain are trillions of polymetallic nodules, potato-sized rocklike deposits containing minerals such as manganese, nickel, copper, zinc, and cobalt.[46]

The Cook Islands contains the world's fourth largest deposit in the South Penrhyn basin close to the Manihiki Plateau.[37]

Though the nodule fields of greatest commercial interest are located in the eastern Pacific,[31][32] polymetallic nodules are also found within the Mid-Atlantic Ridge system, around Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Tonga,[30]: 356 and the Peru Basin.[47]

Cobalt-rich crusts are found on seamounts in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, as well as countries such as the Pacific Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Kiribati.[30]: 356

On November 10, 2020, the Chinese submersible Striver reached the bottom of the Mariana Trench 10,909 meters (35,790 feet). Chief designer Ye Cong said the seabed was abundant with resources and a "treasure map" can be made.[48]

Promising sulfide deposits (an average of 26 parts per million) were found in the Central and Eastern Manus Basin around Papua New Guinea and the crater of Conical Seamount to the east. It offers relatively shallow water depth of 1050 m, along with a nearby gold refinery.[45]

### United States

A 2023 study identified four regions in US territorial waters where deep sea mining would be possible: the Hawaiian Islands, the southeastern Blake Plateau, California, and the Gulf of Alaska. Hawaii has both nodules and CRCs, while the other sites hold CRCs. Each area features distinct risks. Mining Hawaii could generate plumes that could damage important fisheries and other marine life. California's waters host massive ship traffic and communication cables. Alaska waters are rich in bottom-dwelling commercially valuable sea life.[49]

In April 2025, U.S. President Trump signed an Executive Order instructing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to expedite permits for companies to mine in both international and U.S. territorial waters, citing the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act of 1980.[8] This would allow mining of the deep seabed for the first time in the country.

## Deep sea mining projects

### Hakurei

The world's first large-scale mining of hydrothermal vent mineral deposits was carried out by Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) from August to September 2017,[50] using the research vessel Hakurei,[51] at the 'Izena hole/cauldron' vent field within the hydrothermally active back-arc Okinawa Trough, which contains 15 confirmed vent fields according to the InterRidge Vents Database.[52]

### Solwara 1

The Solwara 1 Project was the first time a legitimate legal contract and framework had been developed on deep sea mining.[53] The project was based off the coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG), near New Ireland province. The project was a joint venture between Papua New Guinea and Nautilus Minerals Inc. Nautilus Minerals held a 70% stake and Papua New Guinea purchased a 30% stake in 2011.[54] PNG's economy relies upon the mining industry, which produces around 30–35% of GDP.[55] Nautilus Minerals is a Canadian deep-sea mining company.[53] The project was approved in January 2011, by PNG's Minister for Mining, John Pundari.[53] The company leased a portion of the seabed in the Bismarck Sea.[56] The lease licensed access to 59 square kilometers. Nautilus was allowed to mine to a depth of 1,600 meters for a period of 20 years.[56][55] The company then began the process of gathering the materials and raising money for the project.[57] The intent was to mine a high grade copper-gold resource from a weakly active hydrothermal vent.[58] The target was 1.3 tons of materials, consisting of 80,000 tons of high-grade copper and 150,000 to 200,000 ounces of gold sulfide ore, over 3 years.[55] The project was to operate at 1600 mbsl[58] using remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROV) technology developed by UK-based Soil Machine Dynamics.[59]

Community and environmental activists[22] launched the Deep Sea Mining Campaign[60] and Alliance of Solwara Warriors, comprising 20 communities in the Bismarck and Solomon Seas who attempted to ban seabed mining. Their campaign against the Solwara 1 project lasted for 9 years. Their efforts led the Australian government to ban seabed mining in the Northern Territory.[61] In June 2019, the Alliance of Solwara Warriors wrote the PNG government calling for them to cancel all deep sea mining licenses and ban seabed mining in national waters.[61] They claimed that PNG had no need for seabed mining due to its abundant fisheries, productive agricultural lands, and marine life.[61] They claimed that seabed mining benefited only a small number of already wealthy people, but not local communities and Indigenous populations.[61] Others chose to engage in more artistic forms, such as Joy Enomoto.[62] She created a series of woodcut prints titled Nautilus the Protector. The activist community argued that authorities had not adequately addressed free, prior and informed consent for affected communities and violated the precautionary principle.[63]

In December 2017 the company had difficulties in raising money and eventually could no longer pay what it owed to the Chinese shipyard where the "production support vessel" was docked.[54] Nautilus lost access to the ship and equipment.[54] In August 2019, the company filed for bankruptcy, delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange, and was liquidated.[64] PNG lost over $120 million dollars.[54] Nautilus was purchased by Deep Sea Mining Finance LTD. PNG has yet to cancel the extraction license contract.

### Shell

In the 1970s Shell, Rio Tinto (Kennecott) and Sumitomo conducted pilot test work, recovering over ten thousand tons of nodules in the CCZ.[65]

### Licenses

Licences for mineral exploration in the area beyond national jurisdiction registered with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) are mostly located in the CCZ.[43] As of June 2025, the ISA has entered into 17 contracts with private companies and national governments for polymetallic nodules in the CCZ, one contract with the Government of India in the Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB), and one contract with Chinese contractor Beijing Pioneer Hi-Tech Development Corporation in the Prime Crust Zone (PCZ) in the Western Pacific.[47]

### Cook Islands

In 2019, the Cook Islands passed two deep sea mining laws. The Sea Bed Minerals (SBM) Act of 2019 was to enable "the effective and responsible management of the seabed minerals of the Cook Islands in a way that also...seeks to maximize the benefits of seabed minerals for present and future generations of Cook Islanders."[66] The Sea Bed Minerals (Exploration) Regulations Act and the Sea Bed Minerals Amendment Act were enacted in 2020 and 2021, respectively.[67]

In February 2022, the Cook Islands government Seabed Minerals Agency (SBMA) announced the award of three five-year licences exploration activities in Cook Islands EEZ to private companies Moana Minerals Limited, the Cook Islands Consortium (CIC), and Cook Islands Investment Corporation - Seabed Resources (CIIC-SR).

Moana Minerals is a subsidiary of Ocean Minerals LLC (OML), a US-based private investment firm led by President and CEO Hans Smit. Hans Smit previously led Neptune Minerals, Inc a DSM company interested in SMS exploitation in Papua New-Guinean waters. He also served as managing director of Royal IHC MMP, focused on underwater mining activities, and worked on underwater mining systems used for subsea diamond mining.[68]

In 2023, the SBMA announced the results of a technical report on the polymetallic nodule deposit of the Cook Islands' exclusive economic zone, undertaken on its behalf by RSC Mining and Mineral Exploration. The study was based on the analysis of both historical samples from previous scientific cruises, as well as data from recent work undertaken by SBMA PMN exploration contractors CIIC-SR and Moana. RSC produced a JORC Code (2012)-compliant Mineral Resource Statement for parts of the EEZ totalling 6.7 billion tons of polymetallic nodules (wet), grading 0.44% Co, 0.21% Cu, 17.4% Fe, 15.8% Mn, and 0.37% Ni. Of this total resource, 304 million tons of nodules grading 0.5% Co, 0.15% Cu, 18.5% Fe, 15.4% Mn, and 0.25% Ni, are assessed at Indicated Resource, whereas Inferred Resources account for 6.4 billion tons grading 0.4% Co, 0.2% Cu, 17% Fe, 16% Mn, and 0.4% Ni.[69]

|  |  |  | Metal grades (%)

|
|
|
|

Classification  | Cut-off

(kg/m2)

| Abundance

(wet) kg/m2

| Nodules

Mt (wet)

| Co  | Cu  | Fe  | Mn  | Ni
Indicated  | 5  | 26.7  | 304  | 0.50  | 0.15  | 18.5  | 15.4  | 0.25
Inferred  | 5  | 14  | 6400  | 0.4  | 0.2  | 17  | 16  | 0.4
Global  | 5  | 14.4  | 6700  | 0.44  | 0.21  | 17.4  | 15.8  | 0.37

In 2025, the Cook Islands announced that it had signed a five-year agreement with China focussed on exploration and research into seabed minerals.[12]

### The Metals Company (TMC)

In 2011, the Republic of Nauru sponsored an ISA exploration contract with exploration activities carried out by Nauruan company, Nauru Ocean Resources Inc (NORI).[70] NORI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian company, The Metals Company.[71][72] Since then, The Metals Company has conducted 22 offshore research campaigns on the NORI exploration area as part of its Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.[73] On June 29, 2021, the Republic of Nauru invoked the 'Two-Year Notice' provision of the 1994 Implementation Agreement requiring the ISA to finalize and adopt a Mining Code within two years.[74] This two year deadline elapsed on July 9, 2023, meaning that The Metals Company and other contractors can submit an application for commercial exploitation at any time.[75]

The Metals Company also controls two further ISA exploration licences in the CCZ through Kiribati-based Marawa Research and Exploration Ltd., and through its Tongan subsidiary Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML), which it acquired from Deep Sea Mining Finance Limited in April 2020.[76]

In April 2025, following U.S. President Donald Trump's Executive Order on offshore mining, The Metals Company submitted applications for a commercial recovery permit and two exploration licenses under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act and regulations set by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The commercial recovery permit covers 25,160 square kilometers while the two exploration licence applications cover a combined 199,895 square kilometers.[77]

### Norway

In January 2024 Norway's parliament allowed multiple companies to begin submitting applications to prospect for DSM resources, mainly Seafloor Massive Sulfides (SMS), but also potentially Cobalt-rich crusts in the Norwegian EEZ, as well as on its continental shelf extension, along Mohns and Knipovich ridges Jan Mayen and Svalbard in the North Atlantic.[78]

Norway's Institute of Marine Research recommended five to ten years of research before allowing mining. In late April 2024, the Norwegian Offshore Directorate invited interested parties to nominate blocks in this area for a first round of mineral exploration licences.[79] First licence awards are expected for early 2025.[80]

Three Norwegian start-up companies, Loke Marine Minerals, Green Minerals, and Adepth Minerals were expected to apply for licenses.[81] In March 2023 Loke acquired Lockheed Martin subsidiary UK Seabed Resources Limited (UKSRL). This saw UKSRL's two PMN exploration licences in the CCZ, as well as its 19.9% stake in Ocean Minerals Singapore (OMS), an ISA contractor for PMNs in the CCZ.[82] OMS is majority-controlled by Singaporean state-owned Keppel Offshore & Marine, now part of also Singaporean state-owned Seatrium.[83][84]

Green Minerals is another Norwegian company which has expressed interested in mining seafloor massive sulfide (SMS) deposits in the Norwegian EEZ.[85] In January 2023, Green Minerals signed a memorandum of understanding with the ISA to obtain an exploration licence for PMNs in the CCZ.[86] In its May 2024 Capital Markets Day Presentation, it confirmed its ambitions to commence mining operations on SMS deposits on the Norwegian continental shelf and EEZ by 2028, as well as explore for PMNs in the CCZ in the future.[80]

After in April 2024, the Norwegian government opened up an exploration area in the Norwegian and Greenland Seas, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) declared that it would take legal action against the decision. According to the government, the seabed contains many resources including copper, zinc and cobalt, which are necessary for producing mobile phones, wind turbines, computers and batteries but as for now supplies are controlled by China or "authoritarian countries". In June the energy ministry submitted "a proposal to announce the first licensing round on the Norwegian continental shelf for public consultation." According to the government, the aim is to understand if a sustainable deep sea mining there can occur. Otherwise, "deep-sea mining would not be permitted".[87]

## Extraction methods

Discoverer Inspiration delivers new containment cap to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on 10 July 2010. In the background are the Discoverer Enterprise, GSF Development Driller II, and Helix Producer I

Robotics and AI technologies used to selectively harvest nodules while minimizing disturbances to the deep sea environment are under development.[88]

Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) are used to collect mineral samples from prospective sites, using drills and other cutting tools. A mining ship or station collects the deposits for processing.[59]

The continuous-line bucket system (CLB) is an older approach. It operates like a conveyor-belt, running from the bottom to the surface where a ship or mining platform extracts the minerals, and returns the tailings to the ocean.[89]

Hydraulic suction mining instead lowers a pipe to the seafloor and pumps nodules up to the ship. Another pipe returns the tailings to the mining site.[89]

Borehole Mining is used for mining of natural resources from below the seafloor.

## Process

The three stages of deep-sea mining are prospecting, exploration and exploitation. Prospecting entails searching for minerals and estimating their size, shape and value. Exploration analyses the resources, testing potential recovery and potential economic/environmental extraction impacts. Exploitation is the recovery of these resources.[90]

Resource assessment and pilot mining are part of exploration. If successful, "resources" attain a "reserves" classification.[91] Bottom scanning and sampling use technologies such as echo-sounders, side scan sonars, deep-towed photography, remotely operated vehicles, and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV).

Extraction involves gathering material (mining), vertical transport, storing, offloading, transport, and metallurgical processing.

Polymetallic minerals require special treatment. Issues include spatial tailing discharges, sediment plumes, disturbance to the benthic environment, and analysis of regions affected by seafloor machines.[91]

## Environmental impacts

Deep sea mining has significant environmental impacts. Research on deep-sea polymetallic nodule mining has substantially increased in recent years, but the expected level of environmental impact is still being established.[1] Scientists from MIT examined seafloor sediment plumes generated by a prototype mining collector in the Clarion Clipperton Zone and found that the plume forms a low-lying turbidity current which hugs the seafloor.[92] Another MIT-led study found that modelling can reliably predict plume behaviour in the midwater column, and impact is influenced by the quantity of discharged sediment, and the turbulence of the water upon discharge.[1]

Meta-analysis of 11 separate disturbance and test mining studies showed that impacts are often severe immediately after mining, with major negative changes in density and diversity of most groups occurring. Almost all studies show some recovery in faunal density and diversity for meiofauna and mobile megafauna, often within one year. However, very few faunal groups return to baseline or control conditions after two decades.[93] Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, commissioned by The Metals Company, conducted a life cycle assessment of the environmental impact of producing critical minerals from polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ). The study found that the deep-sea model performed better environmentally than traditional land-based methods, showing 54-70% lower Global Warming Potential (GWP) on average, due to renewable energy use, high metal recovery, and efficient processes.[94] Another study in the Journal of Cleaner Production found that the production of 1 billion electric vehicles using nodules would produce 90% less CO2 equivalent than producing the same amount of vehicles through land-based mining.[95] While some environmental consequences (such as sediment plumes, disturbance of the bottom, and toxic effects) are known, the scientific understanding of deep sea ecosystems is currently insufficient to evaluate all possible impacts.[21]

Technology is under development to mitigate these issues. This includes selective pick-up technology that leaves alone nodules that contain life and leaves behind some nodules to maintain the habitat.[88]

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) emphasizes the need for a comprehensive assessment of the environmental impacts of deep-sea mining, which targets polymetallic nodules at depths of 3–6.5 km (1.9–4.0 mi), polymetallic sulphides at 1–4 km (0.62–2.5 mi), and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts between <400 m and 3.5 km. Researchers and governments have raised significant concerns about the potential impacts on unique and fragile ecosystems, with only 24.9% of the deep seabed mapped. These ecosystems are essential for ocean and carbon cycling and are vulnerable to climate change. There are widespread calls for a moratorium on deep-sea mining until its environmental, social, and economic risks are fully investigated. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) aims to finalize exploitation regulations by 2025, and a new agreement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on marine biodiversity was adopted on 19 June 2023.[96]

### Sediment plumes

Plumes are caused when seawater and sediment separated from nodules at the surface are is returned to the ocean, increasing water turbidity (cloudiness). Plumes differ significantly from traditional mining tailings, as deep-sea sediment primarily consists of naturally occurring, unprocessed material rather than chemically altered waste. Plumes form wherever the sediments are released, typically either near the bottom or near the surface.[43][97] Releasing sediment closer to the surface is cheaper, but allows it to disperse more widely.[98]

When settling on the seafloor, sediments can bury or suffocate animals. Sediments raining down from above can also harm mid-water swimmers such as jellyfish, sea butterflies, and commercially fished animals.[98]

Depending on particle size, water currents, and mining technology, surface plumes can spread widely. Fine particles (small and light) can remain suspended in the water column for extended periods and spread over large areas if released near the surface. [43][89] In shallow water, sediment can resuspend following storms, starting another cycle of damage. In-situ studies show most seafloor sediment settles rapidly, with 90% depositing within 2 km and the vast majority within 9 km, even under extreme conditions, while heavy sediment blanketing remains confined to a small area near the source.[1][99][100]

### Benthic disturbance

Disturbing or, in the case of seafloor massive sulfides and cobalt crusts, removing parts of the sea floor impacts the habitat of benthic organisms, albeit to varying degrees.[43][100]

A study analyzing data from 11 experimental mining simulations found that deep-sea mining activities cause immediate declines in faunal density and diversity, with mobile and small-sized fauna recovering more quickly. Some ecosystems fail to return to pre-disturbance levels after 26 years, while some faunal groups partially rebound, particularly meiofauna and mobile megafauna. Due to limited testing, comparable assessments for seafloor massive sulfides (SMS) and cobalt-rich crusts remain limited.[101][102]

Nodule fields provide hard substrate on the bottom, attracting macrofauna. A study of benthic communities in the CCZ assessed a 350 square mile area with an ROV. They reported that the area contained a diverse abyssal plain megafaunal community.[102] Megafauna (species longer than 20 mm (0.79 in)) included glass sponges, anemones, eyeless fish, sea stars, psychropotes, amphipods, and isopods.[102] Macrofauna (species longer than 0.5mm) were reported to have high species diversity, numbering 80 -100 per square meter. The highest species diversity was found among polymetallic nodules.[102] In a follow-up survey in areas with potential for seabed mining, researchers identified over 1,000 species, 90% previously unknown, with over 50% dependent on polymetallic nodules for survival.[102]

### Noise and light pollution

Deep sea mining generates ambient noise in normally quiet pelagic environments. However, planned operations will not use sonar and are not expected to make dangerously loud noises, with most noise highly localized and similar to that of typical marine shipping operations.[103] Noise pollution affects deep sea fish species and marine mammals, though due to the low surface productivity of its surface waters the Clarion Clipperton Zone is unlikely to be a feeding or breeding site for large marine mammals.[103] Impacts include behavior changes, communication difficulties, and temporary and permanent hearing damage.[104]

Light pollution affects the environment of DSM sites as they are normally pitch dark. Mining efforts may increase light levels to illuminate the bottom. Shrimp found at hydrothermal vents suffered permanent retinal damage when exposed to submersible floodlights.[104] Behavioral changes include vertical migration patterns, ability to communicate, and ability to detect prey.[105]

### Ecosystem

Polymetallic nodule fields are hotspots of abundance and diversity for abyssal fauna.[106] Sediment can clog filter-feeding organisms such as manta rays.[97] As they block the sun, they inhibit growth of photosynthesizing organisms, including coral and phytoplankton. Phytoplankton sit at the bottom of the food chain. Reducing phytoplankton reduces food availability for all other organisms.[43][107] Metals carried by plumes can accumulate in tissues of shellfish.[108] This bioaccumulation works its way through the food web, impacting predators, including humans. Deep-sea mining could impact species that lay eggs on the seabed, but it also poses respiratory risks from debris uprooted by mining.[109]

A recent study claimed that nodules are also important for oxygen production in the absence of light and photosynthesis. Nodules the size of potatoes have shown to be able to produce an electric current that is almost equal to the voltage in an AA-sized battery. This generate electric currents strong enough to perform electrolysis, which splits water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen.[110][111]

One report states that biomass loss stemming from deep sea mining is estimated to be significantly smaller than that from mining on land.[112] One estimate of land ore mining reports that it will lead to a loss of 568 megatons of biomass (approximately the same as that of the entire human population)[113] versus 42 megatons of biomass from DSM. In addition, land ore mining will lead to a loss of 47 trillion megafauna organisms, whereas deep-sea mining is expected to lead to a loss of 3 trillion.

Despite its remote and barren appearance, these portions of the seafloor are teeming with life. These are primarily invertebrates (worms, crustaceans, sea slugs, etc). In recent research referring to the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), they find that these ancient stable ecosystems mean there is great diversity among the species. There are only 438 named species that have been scientifically recognized in the CCZ. There have been over 5,000 identified species that are "unnamed," meaning they are morphotypes or specimens registered as distinct but not formally named. There could be up to 8,000 unrecognized species in these zones. Due to data duplication in the International Seabed Authority, the true biodiversity of these zones is likely undercounted, which increases the danger of mining. Deep sea mining in these zones creates the possibility of irreversible damage to the entire ecosystems and species that remain undescribed and undocumented.[114]

The CCZ biodiversity patterns largely consist of phylogenetic clustering and can create greater vulnerability to mining exploitations. Additionally, species in the area that are locally rare, consisting of small populations in limited distributions, which is when closely related species tend to co-occur. This means if a lineage is extinguished many related species could be vulnerable. Therefore, as a whole they are more vulnerable to extinction through disruption. This stresses the importance of increasing knowledge of the species and phylogenetic clustering with robust biodiversity baselines and assessments, including the structuring of communities. Filling in the knowledge gaps of the taxonomy could help the areas recover after deep sea mining causes damage, as well as create accurate assessments of the biodiversity before mining occurs.[115]

This kind of estimation does not take into account the recoverability of the situation: how long does nature need to reclaim an abandoned site. By contrast, a different study reported that deep sea mining would be approximately 25 times worse for biodiversity than land mining.[116]

The species at the seabed, including those around vents, are not well known. A lot of these species are microbes.[117] These vents have a wide variety of species around them who are adapted to extreme conditions. Therefore, it is possible they are able to handle extreme habitat changes that could result from deep-sea mining, but the full effects are not known yet.[118]

According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature: "Not only is deep-sea mining an energy-intensive industry with high greenhouse gas emissions, but disruption of the ocean floor, which is by far the largest carbon storage reservoir on Earth, can lead to reduced carbon sequestration as well as the release of large amounts of the potent greenhouse gas methane, exacerbating the climate crisis".[119] However, according to the United States Geological Survey, no methane hydrates are known to exist in the Clarion Clipperton Zone where most deep-sea mining activity would take place.[120] Also, a peer-reviewed study published in the Journal of Cleaner Production found that using nodules instead of land-ore mining can reduce CO2 emissions by 80% (Ni), 76% (Cu), 29% (Co), and 22% (Mn).[95]

### Dark Oxygen

A new insight into the complexity of the abyssal environment has been proposed by a team of researchers from the Scottish Society of Marine Sciences. They have found that rising oxygen concentrations in some experiments where manganese nodules were present, and suggest the nodules are producing oxygen.[111] The manganese nodules were proposed to act as a kind of battery due to their composition with different metals, and release oxygen into the environment by electrolysis. The research has since been subject to criticism including data omission and methodological concerns.[121] Researchers from the University of Gothenburg criticized the authors for "poor-quality lander incubation experiments, leading to faulty oxygen flux measurements" and as a result called for the paper to be retracted.[122] An academic at the University of Tokyo also criticized the paper for providing no evidence for electrolysis at the seafloor and for its inconsistency with decades of prior research that failed to report oxygen production, warning in an article in Science that "there is a high probability that the paper is wrong".[123] The rebuttals were synthesised into a peer-reviewed article, which states that polymetallic nodules were not present in some of the experiments that recorded rising oxygen, that the geobattery mechanism is not thermodynamically possible, and that the rising oxygen is likely experimental artefact.[124] The authors involved in the original study have also backed away from the two key claims made in the original article - that the rising oxygen levels can be attributed to polymetallic nodules, and that this is due to the nodules acting like batteries.[125]

## Laws and regulations

Deep-sea mining is governed by the International Seabed Authority, an autonomous international organization, established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to oversee and regulate all mineral resource-related activities in the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction.[126][127][128]

### Formation of the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea

The ocean was traditionally seen as an ungoverned space, reflected in the 17th-century principle of Mare Liberum, or the freedom of the sea, proposed by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. Grotius argued that seas were open to all states for navigation and trade, supporting Dutch maritime expansion. However, as technology advanced and human activity in the ocean grew, tensions over governance arose. This led to the competing framework of Mare Clausum, or the closed sea, proposed by English jurist John Selden in 1635. Mare Clausum advocated for coastal state sovereignty over adjacent waters, aligning with England's goals to control trade routes and fisheries.[126][129][130]

The increasing complexity of maritime use and disputes between Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum highlighted the need for a comprehensive legal framework. Early efforts, including the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I in 1958 and UNCLOS II in 1960), failed due to disagreements over the balance between freedom of the seas and sovereign rights. These issues were addressed with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on December 10, 1982, providing a universally accepted framework. Amendments to the deep seabed provisions led to the 1994 Agreement and the Part XI Implementation Agreement, which entered into force on November 16, 1994, for ratifying states, aligning with the United Nations' role and Sustainable Development Goal 14.[131][132]

UNCLOS, comprising over 400 articles and nine annexes, is the most detailed codification of maritime law ever undertaken by states under the UN.[132][133] Driven by complex historical debates and evolving uses of the sea, the Convention represents a compromise between freedom and territorial control.[129] Adopted after nine years of negotiations, it was celebrated as a milestone in international law, despite challenges over provisions related to reaching a collective consensus over the seabed and areas beyond national jurisdiction.[126]

UNCLOS created three new key institutions, playing distinct yet interrelated roles, ensuring effective governance. First, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), functioning as an independent judicial body with the authority to resolve disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the convention.

Second, is the International Seabed Authority (ISA), an autonomous international organization that oversees and regulates all mineral resource-related activities in the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction (ISA), with a "mandate to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from harmful effects that may arise from deep-seabed-related activities."[128]

Third, is the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), playing a technical and advisory role, particularly in delineating the outer limits of a state's continental shelf.

Fourth, the Meeting of States Parties (MSP), or the Meeting of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention (SPLOS). Convened in accordance with Article 319, paragraph 2(e) of UNCLOS (1982), the MSP serves as a forum for member states to discuss and coordinate the implementation of the convention. It holds significant administrative functions, including the election of ITLOS, and CLCS members.[134][135][130]

### Legal territorialization of water zones

The 20th century saw significant challenges to the free sea order, particularly regarding claims over maritime resources.[136] In 1945, the Truman Doctrine set a precedent by asserting U.S. jurisdiction over the continental shelf's natural resources, .[137][138] This was followed by the 1952 Santiago Declaration, where Chile, Ecuador, and Peru claimed full sovereignty over their seabed and subsoil up to 200 nautical miles, extending this sovereignty to the waters and airspace above.[139] The wave of decolonization also led newly independent states to prioritize control over marine resources for economic development.[126] These declarations influenced the 1982 Law of the Sea, particularly shaping the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf's extent. This development marked a shift towards a zonal approach in international maritime law, dividing ocean spaces into distinct jurisdictional zones governed by the principles of sovereignty and freedom.[129][136]

Under UNCLOS, states have the right and obligation to regulate activities within their coastal waters and continental shelf, structured spatially by legal zoning as follows: The Territorial Sea, extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, where states can regulate laws and resources, with foreign ships granted innocent passage, including warships; the Exclusive Economic Zone stretches up to 200 nautical miles, where the state holds exclusive rights over mineral and economic resources and must preserve the environment, though it cannot restrict foreign ships. The enclosure of the EEZ marked a shift from global commons to state-controlled waters for economic and security reasons; the Extended Continental Shelf, governed by complex criteria and negotiation, allows states to claim up to 350 nautical miles beyond their continental shelf.[138] Articles 76 to 85 of UNCLOS Part VI emphasize the importance of the continental shelf's natural resources, excluding fisheries. Notably, the Area, where the Convention designates over 50 per cent of the seabed as international jurisdiction, recognizing it as the common heritage of humankind, which entails its non-appropriation by states or private entities, its use exclusively for peaceful purposes, and benefits shared equitably.,[133][129][140] Regarding Straits, Article 38 of UNCLOS ensures the right of international navigation, allowing continuous transit without coastal state interference, though states may regulate for safety and environmental protection. Additionally, the flag state holds jurisdiction over its registered ships, ensuring compliance with international laws.[132]

### The International Seabed Authority (ISA)

The International Seabed Authority (ISA) was established under Article 156 of UNCLOS 1982 as an autonomous intergovernmental organization. Following the adoption of the implementing Agreement on July 28, 1994, and its entry into force on November 16, 1994, the ISA held its inaugural meeting in Jamaica. It gained observer status at the United Nations in October 1996, confirming its recognition as a legal entity under international law.[132][133][141]

Under Article 157 of UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement, the ISA is tasked with organizing and controlling activities in the Area, designated as the common heritage of mankind under Article 140 (LOSC 1982, UN 1994). This role has grown in importance with increasing interest in marine mineral exploitation by states and private entities.[126][129] The ISA operates through three main organs: the Assembly, the council, and the Secretariat. All 168 States Parties to UNCLOS, including the EU, are members of the Assembly, which elects the Council and Secretary-General, holds the authority to approve or reject the council's proposals for seabed mining, and oversees the Authority's budget.[142][143]

The United Nations Convention on the Law and the Sea is related to the implementation of part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law and the Sea. This established a legal and regulatory framework governing deep sea mining in areas by the location beyond the limits of the jurisdiction.[144] This convention is considered one of the most successful multilateral treaties in history that governs a wide range of topics such as the limits of continental shelves to the right of the free navigation in water. Under this Convention, the exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals have to be carried out under a contract with the International Seabed Authority and its subject to its rules, regulations, and procedures.[145]

The 36-member Council authorizes contracts for seabed exploration and exploitation and proposes governance regulations subject to the Assembly's approval. It also nominates the Secretary-General, who serves a four-year term as the chief administrative officer of the ISA, supervises staff, and ensures impartiality by refraining from mining-related financial interests.[146][147] Additional advisory bodies include the Legal and Technical Commission, which makes recommendations on mining rules, and the Finance Committee, which addresses budgetary matters. Members are nominated by states and serve in their personal capacities. The Enterprise, the Authority's commercial arm, is empowered to conduct mining operations, initially through joint ventures, to generate revenues for equitable distribution among developing nations.[148][149] However, critics, particularly environmental groups, argue that the ISA faces a conflict of interest as both regulator and potential operator through the Enterprise. The ISA has denied these allegations.[150]

### Extraction and exploitation contracts

Article 153(2) of UNCLOS stipulates that exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals in the Area must occur under a contract with the ISA, adhering to its rules, regulations, and procedures cf. Article 162(2)(b) (UN 1982). Part XI of the Convention and the 1994 Implementation Agreement provide detailed mechanisms for ISA's administration of these contracts, ensuring compliance with international standards.[143]

Contracts are open to both public and private enterprises sponsored by an UNCLOS State Party, provided they meet technological and financial criteria. The Council must evaluate whether economic pressures to exploit deep-sea minerals align with the need to protect marine ecosystems and biodiversity.[147] Section 1(7) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement requires contractors to complete preparatory work, including environmental baseline studies, impact assessments and other obligations, before exploitation. Applications must include an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a program for oceanographic and environmental studies, with exploitation plans requiring detailed information.[143][147] Revenues from deep-seabed mining are intended for equitable distribution for the benefit of mankind, emphasizing support for developing countries lacking resources to participate independently .[138] To assist in its work, the ISA commissioned Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2019 for a comparative study on various economic models to equitably share deep-sea resource revenues.[151]

Since 1994, the ISA has authorized mining exploration contracts in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, focusing on polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulfides, and cobalt crusts found at depths of 400 to 7,000 meters.[149] While regulations include environmental protection measures, scientists warn that mining these deposits risks irreparable harm to critical ecosystems, the ocean's carbon sink functions, and marine biodiversity.[152]

### State sponsorship

Under the ISA licensing framework, only specific entities are eligible to conduct deep seabed mining in the Area I.[153] According to UNCLOS, such activities are restricted to States Parties or entities, state-owned or private, nationally affiliated with or effectively controlled by these states. Sponsorship by a State Party, as required by Article 153(2)(b), is mandatory. Furthermore, Annex III, Article 4(3).[143] specifies that private corporations must secure sponsorship from their home state, and if another state exerts effective control, its sponsorship is also required.[154][155]

A state or a collective number of states must secure sponsorship from the ISA to adopt the regulatory control approach to effective control in granting exploration contracts to private sector companies. To date, the ISA has adopted what is described as a regulator control in granting exploration contracts to private sector companies. In addition, the ISA has focused on the contractor company's location of incorporation, meaning that, in some cases, the text for effective control is whether the ISA has a registered company in the sponsoring state.[156]

Sponsoring states' obligations cannot be fulfilled exclusively through financial and market tools. The required compliance enforcement and accountability mechanisms can only work in practice if there is a meaningful link between the State and the contractor, which is where the notion of 'effective control' comes into play.

To obtain approval, States or State-sponsored entities must submit a plan of work to the ISA, which, upon approval, becomes a binding contract.[155] This framework allows private companies to collaborate with sponsoring states, leveraging their technological resources cf. Article 162(2)(b)[132][143] while operating under ISA's regulatory oversight.[132][143][155][157] The sponsorship requirement ensures entities comply with UNCLOS obligations, as highlighted by ITLOS, binding non-state actors to international and domestic legal responsibilities, cf. Annex III, Article 4(4), and Article 139 in the convention.[132] Sponsorship also reinforces state accountability, ensuring non-state actors operate under domestic legal systems.[154]

Non-parties to UNCLOS and non-state actors associated with such states are excluded from deep seabed mining activities. This exclusion underscores UNCLOS's role as the prevailing legal framework for regulating seabed resource activities, with alternative regimes likely deemed inconsistent with international law.[154][132]

### The Two-Year Rule

UNCLOS, as amended by the 1994 Implementing Agreement, provides the legal framework for regulating activities in the Area and tasks the ISA with developing and enforcing rules, regulations, and procedures for exploring and exploiting mineral resources.[132][133]

A contentious provision within UNCLOS, referred to as the two-year rule, established in Section 1(15) of the Annex to the 1994 Implementation Agreement,[133] permits any Member State of ISA, who's national intends to submit a plan of work for exploitation, to request the ISA Council to complete and adopt the necessary regulatory framework within two years.[133] If the Council fails to finalize the exploitation regulations within the prescribed period, it is nonetheless required to "consider" and "provisionally approve" the submitted application, even in the absence of a fully developed regulatory structure, cf. Section 1(15)(c) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement on Implementation.[133] As further prescribed in Article 162(2)(o)(ii), UNCLOS though requires the ISA Council to adopt and temporarily apply rules, regulations, and procedures for activities like prospecting, exploration, and exploitation in the seabed area. These temporary rules must then be reviewed and approved by the Assembly, as outlined in Article 160(2)(e)(ii).[133][147]

The council's decisions on these regulations must be reached by consensus, meaning no formal objections can be raised. Unlike most Council decisions, this rule, while ensuring broad agreement, enables any single objection to block progress, potentially leading to deadlock.[143][158] In such cases, the council is required to pursue dispute resolution, including compulsory conciliation. This requirement for consensus is crucial, hence without agreed-upon regulations, the council is not authorized to evaluate applications for exploration or exploitation, effectively stalling activities in the Area.[143][159][160]

Section 1(15) offers a pathway to circumvent such deadlocks, particularly when a small group of members obstructs progress. However, this mechanism is less effective when legitimate concerns exist about the adequacy of the regulatory framework, which may require more time to ensure a precautionary and thorough approach to resource exploitation.[147]

### Republic of Nauru

In June 2021, the Republic of Nauru partnered with The Metals Company to extract deep-sea minerals, driven by the need for renewable energy to support its energy sector.[161] While deep sea mining could provide vital resources, its extraction requires significant energy and capital, and may cause environmental and social impacts on the island. Although it offers some relief, deep sea mining alone is unlikely to meet long-term demand.[162][163]

By July 2023, Nauru's two-year rule expired, yet UNCLOS ensures that extraction beyond national jurisdiction should benefit developing states,[163][164][165] This highlights the ongoing tension and key ocean paradigms, underpinning the discussing discourse between resource access, ocean health and equitable distribution, compounded by the challenges of crafting universally binding agreements under competing interests.[166]

Since Nauru's application in 2021, the ISA has not established a clear legal process for mining, despite efforts since 2016 to create a Mining Code. The ISA aims to adopt a new code by 2025, which will offer a stronger regulatory framework, but concerns remain about legal gaps until then.[167][168][169] Critics argue for a precautionary morato-rium or ban, with support from over 900 experts,[152][170][171] but experts note that issuing mining licenses is complicated until the Mining Code is finalized.[172]

### Environmental Justice in Deep-Sea Mining Governance

Within deep-sea mining policies, environmental justice involves ensuring that decision-making processes, benefits, and costs are equally distributed or accessible among both current and future generations.[173] Environmental justice in deep-sea mining is closely tied to human rights. Unequal distribution of environmental harms and benefits can undermine internationally recognized rights to health, food security, and participation in decision-making.[173] Marginalized groups, including small island developing states and Indigenous peoples, are disproportionately affected when marine ecosystems are degraded.[174] Integrating human rights principles into ocean governance frameworks emphasizes that environmental protection is not only an ecological concern but also a matter of fundamental human rights. This illustrates the need for transparent procedures, inclusive participation, and equitable benefit-sharing to ensure that deep-sea mining policies respect both environmental justice and human rights obligations.

Deep sea mining policies can perpetuate environmental injustice by giving financial benefits to small groups of mining operators while the public must take on the environmental burdens.[175][176] Historically, negotiations surrounding deep sea mining policies have overlooked environmental impacts and overestimated economic benefits.[175][176] This increases inequities in environmental burdens and undermines international environmental commitments. States that support deep sea mining despite its environmental risks create a potential for liability and legal challenges.[175] The focus on economic exploitation over environmental protection and the exclusion of affected communities from decision-making processes contribute to the environmental injustice in deep sea mining. Deep-sea mining also threatens human rights due to overlooked human rights obligations in public participation at the International Seabed Authority.[174] Enhancing public participation and independent review is necessary to protect human rights and the marine environment.

## Moratorium debate

### Background

In June 2021, the Pacific island nation of Nauru notified the ISA of its intent to sponsor a mining application by The Metals Company, triggering a provision in UNCLOS known as the "two-year rule".[177] This provision required the ISA to either complete regulations for exploitation within two years or consider mining applications under existing rules.[178] The deadline passed in July 2023 without finalised regulations, and as of late 2025, the Mining Code remains incomplete.[179]

The two-year rule created urgency in what had been a slow-moving regulatory process, sparking intense debate about whether commercial mining should proceed before comprehensive environmental safeguards are in place.[180] Since then, a growing number of countries, scientists, and companies have called for a moratorium or precautionary pause.[181][182]

### Legal arguments

Supporters of a moratorium argue it is consistent with UNCLOS and may even be legally required. Article 145 of UNCLOS requires states to protect the marine environment from harmful effects of seabed activities.[183] Article 140 requires that activities in the Area be carried out for the benefit of humanity as a whole.[184] Legal scholars have argued that if these obligations cannot currently be met due to insufficient scientific knowledge or regulatory capacity, a pause is necessary.[180]

A 2023 legal opinion commissioned by The Pew Charitable Trusts concluded that deferring deep seabed mining is required by international law, citing three reasons: the current lack of science on deep-sea ecosystems, the absence of completed regulations, and the ISA's limited institutional capacity.[185] The opinion stated that "a moratorium or precautionary pause is not only consistent with UNCLOS, but is actually required by it."[185]

Critics have also noted that public participation in ISA decision-making remains weak, with some scholars arguing that effective participation is a legal precondition for legitimate governance, not merely a voluntary option.[186]

Opponents counter that UNCLOS explicitly permits exploitation applications even without finalised regulations.[187] The 1994 Implementation Agreement allows the ISA to consider and provisionally approve plans of work for exploitation.[178] Some legal commentators argue the precautionary principle is not binding customary international law and cannot override the Convention's clear terms.[188]

### Countries calling for a moratorium

As of December 2025, approximately 40 countries have called for a moratorium, precautionary pause, or ban on deep seabed mining.[189] These include Pacific Island nations like Palau, Fiji, Samoa, and the Marshall Islands, as well as European countries including France, Germany, the UK, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden.[190] In 2022, Palau's President Surangel Whipps Jr. launched an Alliance for a Deep-Sea Mining Moratorium at the UN Ocean Conference in Lisbon.[190]

Norway initially moved toward opening its Arctic waters for mining after parliament approved exploration in January 2024.[191] However, following sustained pressure from environmental groups and budget negotiations, Norway halted all licensing until at least 2029 and cut public funding for seabed mineral mapping.[192] UN experts praised the decision as aligning with the precautionary principle and states' obligations under international law.[193]

### U.S. position and The Metals Company

The United States has not ratified UNCLOS and is not a member of the ISA. In April 2025, President Trump signed an executive order directing federal agencies to expedite permits for deep seabed mining under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA), a U.S. law predating the ISA.[194]

Days later, The Metals Company, a Canadian mining firm, submitted applications to NOAA for exploration licenses and a commercial recovery permit covering over 25,000 square kilometres in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.[195] The ISA responded that it remains the only legal authority to regulate mineral activities in international waters and that bypassing its framework would violate international law.[189] France's ocean minister called the plan "environmental piracy", and China's foreign ministry stated that deep sea mining must comply with UNCLOS.[196]

### Scientific concerns

Over 940 marine scientists and policy experts from more than 70 countries have signed a statement calling for a pause on deep seabed mining.[197] They argue that scientific knowledge of deep-sea ecosystems remains insufficient to assess or mitigate environmental impacts.[197] Environmental management approaches such as regional planning and adaptive monitoring exist but remain incomplete without clear thresholds for defining "serious harm" to the marine environment.[198]

A 2023 study found that over 90% of species observed in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone are undescribed by science.[199] Research published in 2025 examined the aftermath of a 2022 mining test in the Pacific. Scientists found that animal numbers dropped 37% and species diversity declined 32% in areas disturbed by mining equipment.[200] A separate study of a 1970s test site showed that biological impacts persisted four decades later, though some organisms had begun to recolonise.[201]

### Corporate and financial positions

Over 65 companies and financial institutions have endorsed a moratorium on deep seabed mining.[202] In 2021, BMW, Volvo, Samsung SDI, and Google pledged not to source minerals from the seabed and to exclude such materials from their supply chains.[203] Other companies making similar commitments include Renault, Volkswagen, Rivian, Apple, Microsoft, Salesforce, and Philips.[202]

A group of 40 financial institutions representing over €3.8 trillion in assets has urged governments not to proceed with deep seabed mining.[204] The European Investment Bank has classified deep-sea mineral extraction as environmentally unacceptable.[205]

### Arguments for and against

The moratorium debate reflects competing narratives: proponents of mining frame it as necessary for decarbonization and mineral security, while opponents highlight epistemic uncertainty and argue that the deep sea should be left undisturbed.[182]

Those supporting a moratorium argue that: scientific knowledge is insufficient to assess environmental risks; deep-sea ecosystems may take decades or centuries to recover from mining; metals can be obtained through recycling, improved efficiency, and responsible terrestrial mining; and the "common heritage of mankind" principle requires protecting the deep sea for future generations.[206]

Opponents argue that: UNCLOS permits exploitation and a moratorium contradicts the treaty's terms; deep-sea minerals are needed for the clean energy transition; exploration provides essential scientific data; and contractors have legitimate expectations based on existing frameworks.[189][187]

### Current status

At its July 2025 session, the ISA completed a second reading of draft exploitation regulations but significant disagreements remain.[207] No Mining Code was adopted and no deadline was set for completion.[208] The Council agreed to launch an investigation into possible non-compliance following The Metals Company's U.S. application, sending a message that attempts to bypass the ISA would not be tolerated.[208] Negotiations continue, with the next session scheduled for 2026.[179]

## Economic perspective

This section incorporates text from a large language model. It may include hallucinated information, copyright violations, claims not verified in cited sources, original research, or fictitious references. Any such material should be removed, and content with an unencyclopedic tone should be rewritten. (April 2025) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

|

Deep-sea mining offers significant economic potential, driven by the growing demand for critical minerals needed for green technologies such as batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), and renewable energy systems. Estimates suggest that the global economic opportunity from seabed mining could reach $20 trillion.[209] For instance, mining 75,000 square kilometers of the seabed could generate $21–$42 billion in gross metal value over two decades.[210][211]

Since Deep-sea mining represents a transformative $20 trillion economic opportunity to support the global energy transition. To fully realize its potential, it is essential to address challenges including significant costs, environmental risks, and regulatory uncertainties. Achieving sustainability and inclusivity in this emerging industry will require strategic investments, robust international cooperation, and effective governance mechanisms.[211][212]

### Resource Abundance and Economic Efficiency

The economic viability of deep-sea mining is underpinned by the abundance of high-value resources. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific Ocean contains 3.4–5 times more cobalt and 1.8–3 times more nickel than global land-based reserves, making it a critical area for meeting future energy demands.[212] These minerals are essential for producing low-carbon technologies, including EV batteries and renewable energy storage systems, as well as for producing steel which is widely used in infrastructure to support global development.[212][211]

In addition to resource abundance, deep-sea mining benefits from high-grade deposits and lower operational costs compared to terrestrial mining due to reduced overburden removal. Optimizations such as reduced trench depth can cut mining time by 26% and increase deposit value by 53%.[213] The process is also less carbon-intensive, offering both environmental and economic advantages.[214] A study published in the Journal of Cleaner Production found that producing battery metals sufficient for the production of 1 billion electric vehicles using nodules will produce 90% less CO2 equivalent than producing the same amount of metals through land-based mining.[95]

Economically, deep-sea mining has become more and more popular. Since deep-sea mining is used to get rare metals, it has become a new way to manage the rising demand for these metals. Some ways that these metals are used are for laptops, phones, electronic cars, technology for renewable energy, and storage of electricity.[215]

### Strategic Importance in Global Markets

From an economic perspective, deep-sea mining offers a way to diversify global mineral supply chains and reduce dependence on terrestrial mining. Nations with access to seabed resources could gain a competitive edge in securing materials essential for modern technologies.[216] Sustainable seabed mining could also alleviate the environmental impact of land-based extraction.[212]

### Opportunities for Developing Nations

Deep-sea mining presents a unique economic opportunity for developing nations, particularly small island states. Revenue from resource exploitation can provide much-needed funding for economic growth and development in vulnerable regions. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) emphasizes equitable profit sharing to ensure that economically disadvantaged nations benefit from deep-sea mining activities.[217][212] This revenue could provide essential income for economically vulnerable island nations, helping to address global economic inequalities and foster inclusive economic growth.[214]

### Challenges to Economic Viability

Despite its promise, deep-sea mining faces economic challenges. High initial investments in technology and infrastructure, coupled with ongoing operational costs, pose barriers to entry for many nations and companies.[211][212] The financial viability of mining operations depends on external factors such as global mineral prices and the availability of marine assets.[213]

See also: Deep sea mining § Environmental impacts

Environmental impacts pose long-term economic risks. Habitat destruction and the disruption of ecosystem services, including carbon cycling and biodiversity, could result in costs exceeding $465 billion in lost natural capital.[218][212] Critics argue that these risks may outweigh the immediate financial benefits of mining operations.[218][217]

### Regulatory Frameworks

See also: Deep sea mining § Laws and regulations

To maximize its economic potential, deep-sea mining requires effective governance. The ISA's Mining Code aims to balance economic gains with environmental protection, ensuring sustainable and equitable practices.[217][212] Without robust regulations, unchecked environmental degradation and inequitable profit distribution could undermine the sector's economic advantages.

## Geopolitical aspects of deep sea mining

Academic research on deep-sea mining (DSM) has traditionally concentrated on technical feasibility, environmental impacts, and economic viability. In recent years, an increasing attention has been paid to the geopolitical and distributional dimensions of DSM.[219] The body of literature examines questions of access to seabed resources,[220] benefit-sharing mechanisms,[221][222] Norwegian or Japanese deep-sea practices and politics,[223][224] allocation of risks,[225][226] and the roles of state and non-state actors in extraction, production, and distribution processes.[227]

Several studies have reviewed DSM-related discourses from different perspectives, including discourse analysis,[228][229] non-human and Anthropocene-oriented approaches,[230] ethical, legal, and environmental justice frameworks,[231] anthropological and ethnographic methodologies,[232] and post-colonial critiques.[233] Other contributions have emphasized interdisciplinarity as a defining feature of DSM research, integrating insights from biology, geology, anthropology, economics, political science, and international relations.[224][223][234]

Within the literature, three interrelated challenges are commonly identified: (a) governance of areas beyond national jurisdiction under the "common heritage of mankind" principle; (b) strategic competition over critical minerals needed for the green transition; and (c) the distribution of benefits and burdens between developed and developing states, particularly small island developing states, as well as Indigenous and coastal communities. These challenges are typically analyzed through three overlapping thematic lenses: 1) geopolitics of control and access to seabed resources, 2) power relations, new frontiers, and the interplay with state actors and non-state actors; and 3) distributional and environmental concerns.

### Geopolitics of deep-sea mining

A growing strand of the literature situates DSM within broader geopolitical dynamics. Scholars argue that DSM has strategic importance because it provides access to minerals such as nickel, cobalt, manganese, and rare earth elements that are critical for renewable energy technologies, batteries, electric vehicles, and wider green transition strategies.[235] Global political developments, including China's Belt and Road Initiative[236] and Russia's invasion of Ukraine,[237] have intensified interest in the strategic implications of seabed resources.

DSM is often framed as part of a green response to defossilization, positioning deep-sea minerals as both an economic input and a geopolitical asset.[237] From this perspective, states view seabed resources not only in terms of supply security but also as tools within broader geopolitical competition, particularly among major powers such as the United States and China, as well as allied states in the Indo-Pacific region.[236] The literature highlights significant uncertainty and risk. Scholars identify technological barriers, environmental unknowns, and regulatory ambiguity as key contributors to both commercial and strategic risk, arguing for integrated approaches that combine innovation, sustainability, stakeholder engagement, and alignment with global sustainability goals.[221] These risks include the possibility of stranded assets, regulatory backlash such as moratoria, and reputational damage.

Some analyses extend beyond state-centric perspectives to include corporate actors. The blue economy agenda has facilitated the expansion of a DSM commodity frontier by promoting regulatory environments favourable to corporate interests, particularly in the metals sector.[238] This perspective suggests that the geopolitics of DSM involves interactions between states, international institutions, and private firms. Others scholars explore how deep-sea mining might be reconciled with sustainable development, and it is argued that its viability hinges on addressing five interdependent challenges: Technological readiness, environmental protection, economic feasibility, robust governance, and social acceptability. Progress requires parallel advancements across all domains.[220]

### Power relations, new frontiers and actors

The geopolitics literature on DSM examines power relations related to access, capacity, and dependency. Key questions include which states hold exploration contracts, which possess the technological and financial means to exploit seabed resources, and which may become dependent on external actors.[220] DSM is often compared to terrestrial critical minerals geopolitics, with competition occurring both in areas beyond national jurisdiction and near EEZs of coastal and island states.[239] In this sense, the "New Frontiers" of the deep sea are constructed as an undiscovered, unexplored, and resourceful area that can be overcomed, conquered and settled upon in order to exploit new findings of resources. The new frontiers of the deep sea is a geopolitical competition between states.[240][241][232]

DSM is often understood and characterized as a new geopolitical frontier shaped by competing imaginaries of resource security, progress, environmental risk, and precaution. Many geopolitical accounts remain grounded in traditional interstate frameworks and insufficiently address the material and ecological specificities of the deep sea. By emphasizing resource temporalities, scholars suggest that DSM geopolitics is not only spatially complex but also shaped by long-term environmental and social time horizons.[242] The temporal dimension is also highlighted in research on Indigenous and local communities. Scholars have tried to analyze how Pacific Island states and respective peoples of these areas have been central to struggles over defining and redefining deep-sea mineral deposits as exploitable resources, framing these processes as forms of ontological politics.[243] Other scholars similarly argue that the concentration of deep-sea minerals in regions such as the Indian Ocean may intensify rivalries over oceanic territories.[244]

Most academic studies of geopolitics have traditionally focused on states as the primary actors shaping international power relations and spatial strategies. A growing body of scholarship advocates for a broader conception of geopolitical agency that moves beyond state-centric frameworks. These scholars argue that geopolitics should account for a wider range of actors and interests operating within, across, and beyond state boundaries, including non-state actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations, social movements, and Indigenous communities, as well as non-human entities and material forces.[245][246]

This expanded perspective emphasizes that geopolitical outcomes are not produced solely through formal state actions but also through complex interactions involving economic networks, technological systems, environmental processes, and ecological constraints. In particular, it aligns with calls for greater scholarly attention to ecological processes and environments, such as oceans, polar regions, and the deep sea, as active components of geopolitical dynamics rather than passive backdrops to human activity.[224] These approaches highlight how environmental systems can shape political power, territorial claims, and resource governance, thereby contributing to a more inclusive and multidimensional understanding of geopolitics.

## Distributional aspects of deep-sea mining

Distributional questions are a central concern in the DSM literature, focusing on how benefits and burdens are allocated among states, corporations, communities, and future generations. In this approach, four competing narratives of the DSM debates can be characterized: 1) a green economy in a blue world, 2) the sharing of DSM profits, 3) uncertainty surrounding deep-sea ecosystems, and 4) arguments for leaving minerals unexploited.[228] These narratives reflect divergent views on who should benefit from DSM and whether such benefits can be equitably distributed.

Within a broader comparative framework of DSM that includes terrestrial and extraterrestrial resource extraction, scholars argue that competition for mineral wealth may exacerbate geopolitical tensions and reinforce sovereign dominance.[247] It is warned that the potential for renewed conflict is driven by resource acquisition across land, sea, and space. A recurring concern is that states hosting deep-sea mineral resources — often developing countries or small island states — may lack the capacity to ensure equitable agreements or long-term benefits. This raises the possibility of a "resource curse" in the deep-sea context. In areas beyond national jurisdiction, the "common heritage of mankind" principle implies that benefits should accrue globally.[247] Other scholars have tried to analyze how historical property rights regimes and contemporary distributional agendas may marginalize Indigenous cultural connections to the deep seabed, with implications for both present and future generations.[248]

Distributional issues in DSM encompass questions concerning the allocation of environmental, social, and economic risks and benefits among different actors and regions. Deep-sea ecosystems remain among the least understood environments on Earth, and scientific research indicates that recovery from physical disturbance is extremely slow,[249] with some impacts potentially irreversible on human timescales. Despite these uncertainties and risks, decision-making authority over DSM activities frequently resides with actors who may be geographically and socially distant from the affected environments, including states, international regulatory bodies, and private corporations.[228] Scholars argue that this governance structure may result in the transfer of environmental burdens to the global commons or to communities with limited political influence, particularly in developing states or regions with constrained participation in international decision-making processes.[250][251] Concerns have also been raised about asymmetries in knowledge production and access to scientific data, which can further reinforce unequal power relations in DSM governance.

In response, researchers emphasize the need for integrated approaches that address economic, environmental, social, and legal dimensions simultaneously, rather than treating them as separate policy domains. Such approaches seek to balance potential economic benefits with precautionary environmental management and social equity considerations. The focus of this scholarship is on how collective global society may benefit from safe and environmentally sound mining practices, while minimizing ecological harm and ensuring fair distribution of risks and benefits across present and future generations.[252]

## Environmental justice and regulation

The regulatory framework governing deep-sea mining (DSM), particularly in areas beyond national jurisdiction, is a major focus of the academic and policy literature. ISA, established under UNCLOS, is mandated to organize, regulate, and control mineral-related activities in the Area on behalf of humankind as a whole. Despite this responsibility, numerous studies emphasize that the ISA's so-called "mining code" remains incomplete, with exploitation regulations still unresolved after decades of negotiation.[253][222][225][250][254] This prolonged regulatory uncertainty has raised concerns about the adequacy of environmental protection, transparency in decision-making, and the ability of existing institutions to manage irreversible ecological risks in the deep sea.

From an environmental justice perspective, the absence of finalized exploitation rules has significant distributional and procedural implications. Unclear regulations affect how benefits from DSM are to be shared, how environmental harm is prevented or remedied, and who bears responsibility and liability for damage to marine ecosystems.[254][222] Scholars argue that weak or ambiguous standards may disproportionately disadvantage developing states and future generations, particularly if irreversible biodiversity loss occurs before robust safeguards are in place.[253] The literature stresses the need for precautionary approaches and enforceable environmental thresholds that reflect not only scientific uncertainty but also ethical considerations regarding intergenerational equity.

Procedural justice is another central concern in discussions of DSM governance. Decision-making processes within the ISA have been criticized for limited transparency and uneven participation, especially for non-state actors, Indigenous groups, and civil society organizations that may be affected indirectly by mining activities.[226] Several authors call for stronger incorporation of environmental justice principles into ocean governance debates, including meaningful stakeholder participation, access to information, and accountability mechanisms that extend beyond sponsoring states and contractors.[226][224][233] Without such measures, DSM regulation risks reinforcing existing global inequalities in ocean governance.

Within EEZs, coastal states exercise greater control over DSM activities and may negotiate directly with mining companies. While this sovereignty allows states to tailor regulatory approaches to national priorities, the literature highlights substantial disparities in regulatory capacity, technical expertise, and bargaining power among coastal states.[254][225] These disparities may result in inequitable contracts, limited environmental oversight, or inadequate revenue-sharing arrangements, particularly in small island developing states and least developed countries. As a result, environmental justice concerns within EEZs often intersect with broader issues of development, governance, and resource dependency.

In contrast, activities in the Area are legally required to be carried out for the benefit of humankind as a whole, with equitable sharing of financial and economic benefits as a core principle.[90] Translating this principle into practice remains contested. The literature notes that global value-chain dynamics can significantly limit the developmental benefits accruing to sponsoring or resource-adjacent states. In particular, the location of refining, processing, and manufacturing facilities in industrialized countries means that much of the economic value generated by DSM may be captured outside host or sponsoring states.[251] This raises questions about whether existing benefit-sharing mechanisms can meaningfully address structural inequalities in the global minerals economy.

The literature frames environmental justice as a critical lens through which to assess DSM regulation. Scholars argue that without clear rules, robust environmental protections, and equitable benefit-sharing arrangements, DSM governance risks privileging commercial and geopolitical interests over environmental integrity and social equity.[253][225] As debates over exploitation regulations continue, environmental justice considerations are increasingly viewed as central to the legitimacy and sustainability of deep-sea mining governance.

## Reasons for deep sea mining

With terrestrial supplies of critical minerals dwindling, countries are seeking to diversify and secure their share of deep-sea mineral resources. As highlighted by the ISA's role in regulating these resources, the demand for seabed mining is driven by several geopolitical factors, including the rise of green technologies, a growing reliance on electronics, and heightened geopolitical tensions, particularly in Europe.[255] According to The U.S. Department of Defense, they set a new record for sales through the foreign military sales system with more than $80 billion in sales and grant assistance, with the main buyers being countries such as Sweden, Poland and the Netherlands.[256]

As nations like the US, Japan, and Norway push for faster exploitation of deep-sea resources, the ISA's structure becomes increasingly critical, especially as countries seek to navigate the balance between economic development and environmental sustainability. The growing focus on energy security and the economic impact of sanctions, such as those imposed on Russia due to the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, further underscores the need for reliable, alternative resource supplies like deep-sea minerals.[257]

### Current state of the global mineral market

The global mineral market is currently dominated by China, which controls approximately 90% of the world's refined critical minerals.[258] This dependency on China has raised concerns, particularly in the U.S., Australia, and Europe, who seek to reduce their reliance on Chinese resources. The global shift is influencing the governance model of the ISA, as countries look for more direct access to seabed minerals. By securing deep-sea mineral resources, states hope to disrupt China's monopoly and gain a stake in the emerging seabed mining market, potentially altering the geopolitical balance in mineral production and supply chains. Meanwhile, China is also trying to secure quick access to the rare materials on the deep seabed.[259]

### New dividing lines within traditional alliance blocs

As seabed mining becomes a more prominent issue, new geopolitical divides are emerging within traditional alliance blocs, including among NATO members. Countries like the US, Japan, and Norway are increasingly aligned in their support for faster seabed resource extraction, driven by their need for critical minerals for green technologies. In contrast, nations such as France and Germany, concerned with environmental protection, call for stronger regulatory frameworks and a more cautious approach to seabed mining.[260] The ISA's role in this divide is critical, as it serves as the body that governs the exploration and exploitation of these resources. The debate within the ISA mirrors broader tensions between economic growth and environmental sustainability, with different nations pushing for contrasting agendas in the regulatory framework.[261]

### ISA's structural model and regulatory issues

The ISA's structural model is increasingly being tested by the growing demand for seabed mining resources. As countries rush to secure deep-sea minerals, the ISA's ability to manage these activities through its existing governance model is under scrutiny. Critics of the ISA point to the organization's reliance on granting exploration and exploitation licenses, which has raised concerns about the speed at which these licenses are being issued and whether adequate environmental safeguards are in place.[262] This issue is highlighted by the differing agendas of member states, with some prioritizing economic development and others, like France and Germany, pushing for more stringent environmental regulations. As these challenges unfold, the ISA's ability to address both the economic and ecological aspects of deep-sea mining becomes a central issue in global resource governance.

## Future trends and technologies

### Demand and supply uncertainties

Deep-sea mining focuses on three primary sources of minerals: polymetallic nodules, The IEA (2022)[263] projects that the clean energy sector will increasingly dominate the demand for metals like copper, nickel, cobalt, rare-earth elements, and lithium. This surge is expected to accelerate over the next two decades, with lithium demand growing particularly fast. This rising demand, alongside limited terrestrial resources, is fueling interest in deep-sea mining as a potential source of these critical materials.[264] The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2022) predicts that the clean energy sector will significantly increase its share of demand for critical raw materials (CRMs) in the coming decades. By 2040, demand for lithium is expected to grow more than 40 times, while demand for graphite, cobalt, and nickel will increase by 20-25 times. This growing demand raises concerns about the availability of CRMs, which are also vital to industries like information technology and defense. The European Commission continues to monitor supply risks for these materials (EC 2020c, 2023).

### Potential recycling to meet demand

Future trends in deep-sea mining are increasingly linked to the potential for recycling critical raw materials (CRM). Recycling could address rising demand, particularly in Europe, where the supply of CRMs like cobalt, nickel, and lithium is crucial for clean energy technologies. By 2050, recycling could meet up to 77% of Europe's metal needs.[265] However, challenges in recycling capacity, collection, and sorting must be addressed. Regulatory frameworks are evolving, with new rules on minimum recycling rates for battery metals, aiming to support this transition.[266]

### Technological uncertainties

Future trends in deep-sea mining are heavily influenced by technological advancements and fluctuating demand for critical materials. While projections for nickel demand by 2050 vary significantly—from 24 to 100 million tones[267] emerging innovations, such as lithium-sulfur and sodium-ion batteries, could reduce reliance on certain minerals like nickel and cobalt. The ISA (2022)[268] forecasts that, by 2035, deep-sea mining could yield up to 36 million tons of nodules annually, meeting a significant portion of global manganese, nickel, and cobalt demand. However, market volatility and advances in recycling could alter the feasibility of these operations.

## History

In the 1960s, the prospect of deep-sea mining was assessed in J. L. Mero's Mineral Resources of the Sea.[45] Nations including France, Germany and the United States dispatched research vessels in search of deposits. Initial estimates of DSM viability were exaggerated. Depressed metal prices led to the near abandonment of nodule mining by 1982. From the 1960s to 1984 an estimated US$650 million was spent on the venture, with little to no return.[45]

A 2018 article argued that "the 'new global gold rush' of deep sea mining shares many features with past resource scrambles – including a general disregard for environmental and social impacts, and the marginalisation of indigenous peoples and their rights".[269][270]

### 2000s

* In 2001, China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA), received China's first exploration license.[7]

### 2020s

This section is an excerpt from Timeline of sustainable energy research 2020–present § Seabed mining[ edit ]

## Protests

In December 2023, the research vessel MV Coco was disrupted by Greenpeace activists blocking the collection of data to support a mining permit.[271] Obstructing canoes and dinghies were countered by water hoses. The mining ship was conducting research for The Metals Company.[271] The vessel MV Coco is owned by Magellan.[272]

BMW pledged not to use DSM materials in its cars. In October 2023, the UK joined Canada and New Zealand in calling for a moratorium.[85] In the beginning of August 2024, 32 countries were against the immediate commencement of deep sea mining.[273] In December 2025, Norway decided to stop deep sea mining projects in its territory, at least until 2029.[274]

### The Indigenous Perspective

For many Indigenous communities, the ocean is a central part of their origin story. Even for those without such direct connection, the ocean is often connected to sacred cultural practices.[275] In the Pacific Island States, navigation of the oceans is a traditional practice that relies on several factors including color of the ocean, the shape of the waves, and the migratory patterns of sea creatures that could be negatively impacted by deep sea mining.[276] Despite the cultural relevance Indigenous communities have in discussions of ocean sovereignty and deep sea mining, they have been left out of many important international conversations.[277] In 2021, seventy-two indigenous groups from around the world came together as the Blue Climate Initiative, and called for an immediate ban on deep sea mining.[278] In a similar statement, the Saami people of the Norwegian peninsula have urged the Norwegian government to stop deep sea mining operations and seek out Indigenous communities' perspectives and knowledge to ensure sustainability.[279]

## Alternatives

The environmental organization "The Oxygen Project" generally proposes, as an alternative to deep sea mining, "system change to sustainable alternative economic models that don't require infinite resource extraction from our environment".[280] The Environmental Justice Foundation and Greenpeace proposed circular economy, public transport, and less car dependency, energy efficiency and resource efficiency.[281][282]

A possible alternative would be to reduce the weight of the mining tools. Ideally, this would mitigate some of the environmental issues with plumes, disturbing the sea floor, and other forms of underwater habitat destruction. Other alternatives include adding a collection device that would minimize debris and water columns or strip-mining, which would leave some sections, or strips, of the sea floor undisturbed with the intention of spacing out environmental disturbances. Other environmental mitigation options include changing the ways that the materials are processed, transferred, and transported. Many issues such as improper waste disposal, spilling of materials, and oil spills happen at this stage in the mining process. Properly following regulations regarding these activities as well as careful attention to these issues is suggested to reduce the amount of waste at this level.[283]

## See also

* Earth:Seabed mining - Extracting minerals from the seabed
* Earth:Blue economy - Economy based on exploitation and preservation of the marine environment
* Social:Blue justice
* Copper mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
* Deepsea mining in Namibia
* Biology:Human impact on marine life
* Earth:Ocean colonization - Type of ocean claim
* Earth:Ocean development - Establishing of human activities at sea and use of the ocean

## References

1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Muñoz-Royo, Carlos; Peacock, Thomas; Alford, Matthew H.; Smith, Jerome A.; Le Boyer, Arnaud; Kulkarni, Chinmay S.; Lermusiaux, Pierre F. J.; Haley, Patrick J. et al. (27 July 2021). "Extent of impact of deep-sea nodule mining midwater plumes is influenced by sediment loading, turbulence and thresholds". Communications Earth & Environment 2 (1): 148. doi:10.1038/s43247-021-00213-8. Bibcode: 2021ComEE...2..148M.
2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 "Massive deposit of battery-grade nickel on deep-sea floor gets confidence boost with new data" (in en-US). 2021-01-27. https://deep.green/massive-deposit-of-battery-grade-nickel-on-deep-sea-floor-gets-confidence-boost-with-new-data/.
3. ↑ (in en) ﻿Mineral commodity summaries 2024﻿ (Report). U.S. Geological Survey. 2024. p. 63. doi:10.3133/mcs2024. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2024.
4. ↑ Dowd, Michael H.; Assad, Victoria E.; Cazares-Nuesser, Alexus E.; Drazen, Jeffrey C.; Goetze, Erica; White, Angelicque E.; Popp, Brian N. (2025-11-06). "Deep-sea mining discharge can disrupt midwater food webs" (in en). Nature Communications 16 (1): 9575. doi:10.1038/s41467-025-65411-w. ISSN 2041-1723. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-65411-w.
5. ↑ "Exploration Contracts". International Seabed Authority - International Seabed Authority. International Seabed Authority. 17 March 2022. https://www.isa.org.jm/exploration-contracts/.
6. ↑ "Deep-sea mining's future still murky as negotiations end on mixed note". 2 April 2024. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/04/deep-sea-minings-future-still-murky-as-negotiations-end-on-mixed-note/.
7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Kuo, Lily (October 19, 2023). "China is set to dominate the deep sea and its wealth of rare metals" (in en). Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-deep-sea-mining-military-renewable-energy/.
8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Bearak, Max; Dzombak, Rebecca; Stevens, Harry (April 24, 2025). "Trump Takes a Major Step Toward Seabed Mining in International Waters". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/climate/trump-seabed-mining.html.
9. ↑ "Greenpeace responds to Norway's proposal to licence first Arctic areas for deep sea mining". 26 June 2024. https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/68021/greenpeace-responds-to-norways-proposal-to-licence-first-arctic-areas-for-deep-sea-mining/.
10. ↑ McVeigh, Karen (December 2, 2024). "Norway forced to pause plans to mine deep sea in Arctic". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/dec/02/norway-deep-sea-mining-mine-arctic.
11. ↑ "Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority - Map". https://www.sbma.gov.ck/map-of-applications.
12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Inayatullah, Saim Dušan (February 22, 2025). "Cook Islands announces deep sea minerals deal with China". Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/cook-islands-announces-deep-sea-minerals-deal-with-china/a-71711275.
13. ↑ "Campaign Reports" (in en-US). 2011-11-19. http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/report/.
14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 SPC (2013). Deep Sea Minerals: Deep Sea Minerals and the Green Economy . Baker, E., and Beaudoin, Y. (Eds.) Vol. 2, Secretariat of the Pacific Community
15. ↑ "Breaking Free From Mining". https://seas-at-risk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Breaking-Free-From-Mining.pdf.
16. ↑ Shukman, David (2019-11-13). "Electric car future may depend on deep sea mining" (in en-GB). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-49759626.
17. ↑ "Securing Critical Minerals Vital to National Security, Official Says" (in en-US). 2025-01-10. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4026144/securing-critical-minerals-vital-to-national-security-official-says/.
18. ↑ Kim, Rakhyun E. (August 2017). "Should deep seabed mining be allowed?". Marine Policy 82: 134–137. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.010. Bibcode: 2017MarPo..82..134K.
19. ↑ Costa, Corrado; Fanelli, Emanuela; Marini, Simone; Danovaro, Roberto; Aguzzi, Jacopo (2020). "Global Deep-Sea Biodiversity Research Trends Highlighted by Science Mapping Approach". Frontiers in Marine Science 7. doi:10.3389/fmars.2020.00384. Bibcode: 2020FrMaS...7..384C.
20. ↑ Rosenbaum, Helen (November 2011). "Out of Our Depth: Mining the Ocean Floor in Papua New Guinea". MiningWatch Canada, CELCoR, Packard Foundation. http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/report/.
21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Halfar, Jochen; Fujita, Rodney M. (18 May 2007). "Danger of Deep-Sea Mining". Science 316 (5827): 987. doi:10.1126/science.1138289. PMID 17510349. Bibcode: 2007Sci...316..987H.
22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Doherty, Ben (2019-09-15). "Collapse of PNG deep-sea mining venture sparks calls for moratorium" (in en-GB). The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/collapse-of-png-deep-sea-mining-venture-sparks-calls-for-moratorium.
23. ↑ McVeigh, Karen (2020-03-12). "David Attenborough calls for ban on 'devastating' deep sea mining" (in en-GB). The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/12/david-attenborough-calls-for-ban-on-devastating-deep-sea-mining.
24. ↑ "Google, BMW, Volvo, and Samsung SDI sign up to WWF call for temporary ban on deep-sea mining" (in en). Reuters. 2021-03-31. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mining-deepsea-idUSKBN2BN0I6.
25. ↑ "SPC-EU Deep Sea Minerals Project - Home". https://dsm.gsd.spc.int/.
26. ↑ "The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) has refused an application by Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited (CRP)". 2015. https://deepwatergroup.org/epa-refuses-marine-consent-application-by-chatham-rock-phosphate-ltd/.
27. ↑ "Shibboleth Authentication Request". https://login.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/login?qurl=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-020-0558-x.pdf.
28. ↑ John J. Gurney, Alfred A. Levinson, and H. Stuart Smith (1991) Marine mining of diamonds off the West Coast of Southern Africa, Gems & Gemology, p. 206
29. ↑ "Seabed Mining" (in en-US). 2010-08-07. https://oceanfdn.org/seabed-mining/.
30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 Petterson, Michael G.; Kim, Hyeon-Ju; Gill, Joel C. (2021). "Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas, and Marine Resources". Geosciences and the Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainable Development Goals Series. pp. 339–367. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-38815-7_14. ISBN 978-3-030-38814-0.
31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Hein, James R.; Mizell, Kira; Koschinsky, Andrea; Conrad, Tracey A. (January 2013). "Deep-ocean mineral deposits as a source of critical metals for high- and green-technology applications: Comparison with land-based resources". Ore Geology Reviews (International Association on the Genesis of Ore Deposits) 51: 1–14. doi:10.1016/j.oregeorev.2012.12.001. Bibcode: 2013OGRv...51....1H. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S016913681200234X. Retrieved May 20, 2025.
32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Verlaan, Philomene A.; Cronan, David S. (April 2022). "Origin and variability of resource-grade marine ferromanganese nodules and crusts in the Pacific Ocean: A review of biogeochemical and physical controls". Geochemistry (Elsevier) 82 (1). doi:10.1016/j.chemer.2021.125741. Bibcode: 2022ChEG...82l5741V. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0009281921000039. Retrieved May 20, 2025.
33. ↑ Glasby, G. P.; Emelyanov, E. M.; Zhamoida, V. A.; Baturin, G. N.; Leipe, T.; Bahlo, R.; Bonacker, P. (January 1997). "Environments of formation of ferromanganese concretions in the Baltic Sea: a critical review". Geological Society, London, Special Publications 119 (1): 213–237. doi:10.1144/GSL.SP.1997.119.01.14. Bibcode: 1997GSLSP.119..213G.
34. ↑ Dean, W.E.; Moore, W.S.; Nealson, K.H. (November 1981). "Manganese cycles and the origin of manganese nodules, Oneida Lake, New York, U.S.A.". Chemical Geology 34 (1–2): 53–64. doi:10.1016/0009-2541(81)90071-1. Bibcode: 1981ChGeo..34...53D.
35. ↑ SPC (2013). Deep Sea Minerals: Manganese Nodules, a physical, biological, environmental, and technical review . Baker, E., and Beaudoin, Y. (Eds.) Vol. 1B, Secretariat of the Pacific Community
36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Gollner, Sabine; Kaiser, Stefanie; Menzel, Lena; Jones, Daniel O.B.; Brown, Alastair; Mestre, Nelia C.; van Oevelen, Dick; Menot, Lenaick et al. (August 2017). "Resilience of benthic deep-sea fauna to mining activities". Marine Environmental Research 129: 76–101. doi:10.1016/j.marenvres.2017.04.010. PMID 28487161. Bibcode: 2017MarER.129...76G. http://www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/64/313264.pdf.
37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 Petterson, Michael G.; Tawake, Akuila (January 2019). "The Cook Islands (South Pacific) experience in governance of seabed manganese nodule mining". Ocean & Coastal Management 167: 271–287. doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.09.010. Bibcode: 2019OCM...167..271P.
38. ↑ Kuhn, T; Wegorzewski, A; Vink, A (2017). "Composition, Formation, and Occurrence of Polymetallic Nodules". in Sharma, Rahul (in en). Deep-Sea Mining: Resource Potential, Technical and Environmental Considerations. Springer International Publishing. pp. 30–33. ISBN 978-3-319-52556-3.
39. ↑ SPC (2013). Deep Sea Minerals: Sea-Floor Massive Sulphides, a physical, biological, environmental, and technical review . Baker, E., and Beaudoin, Y. (Eds.) Vol. 1A, Secretariat of the Pacific Community
40. ↑ SPC (2013). Deep Sea Minerals: Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts, a physical, biological, environmental, and technical review . Baker, E. and Beaudoin, Y. (Eds.) Vol. 1C, Secretariat of the Pacific Community
41. ↑ Hein, James R.; Mizell, Kira; Koschinsky, Andrea; Conrad, Tracey A. (June 2013). "Deep-ocean mineral deposits as a source of critical metals for high- and green-technology applications: Comparison with land-based resources". Ore Geology Reviews 51: 1–14. doi:10.1016/j.oregeorev.2012.12.001. Bibcode: 2013OGRv...51....1H.
42. ↑ Fuyuan, Zhang; Weiyan, Zhang; Kechao, Zhu; Shuitu, Gao; Haisheng, Zhang; Xiaoyu, Zhang; Benduo, Zhu (August 2008). "Distribution Characteristics of Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crust Resources on Submarine Seamounts in the Western Pacific". Acta Geologica Sinica - English Edition 82 (4): 796–803. doi:10.1111/j.1755-6724.2008.tb00633.x. Bibcode: 2008AcGlS..82..796Z.
43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 43.2 43.3 43.4 43.5 43.6 Ahnert, A.; Borowski, C. (2000). "Environmental risk assessment of anthropogenic activity in the deep-sea". Journal of Aquatic Ecosystem Stress and Recovery 7 (4): 299–315. doi:10.1023/A:1009963912171.
44. ↑ Beaudoin, Yannick; Baker, Elaine. Deep Sea Minerals: Manganese Nodules, a physical, biological, environmental, and technical review (Vol. 1B ed.). Secretariat of the Pacific Community. p. 8. https://dsm.gsd.spc.int/public/files/meetings/TrainingWorkshop4/UNEP_vol1B.pdf. Retrieved 1 February 2021.
45. ↑ 45.0 45.1 45.2 45.3 Glasby, G. P. (28 July 2000). "Lessons Learned from Deep-Sea Mining". Science 289 (5479): 551–553. doi:10.1126/science.289.5479.551. PMID 17832066. Bibcode: 2000Sci...289..551G.
46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 "The Clarion–Clipperton Zone". 15 December 2017. http://pew.org/2o4se1P.
47. ↑ 47.0 47.1 "Minerals: Polymetallic Nodules". International Seabed Authority - International Seabed Authority. International Seabed Authority. 17 March 2022. https://www.isa.org.jm/exploration-contracts/polymetallic-nodules.
48. ↑ "China breaks national record for Mariana Trench manned-dive amid race for deep sea resources". November 11, 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/11/asia/china-record-dive-mariana-trench-intl-hnk/.
49. ↑ Shabahat, Elham (February 16, 2024). "In Graphic Detail: Deep-Sea Mining in the United States" (in en). https://hakaimagazine.com/videos-visuals/in-graphic-detail-deep-sea-mining-in-the-united-states/.
50. ↑ "Japan successfully undertakes large-scale deep-sea mineral extraction". The Japan Times. Kyodo. 26 September 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/26/national/japan-successfully-undertakes-large-scale-deep-sea-mineral-extraction/.
51. ↑ "Deep Sea Mining Watch" (in en). http://deepseaminingwatch.msi.ucsb.edu/.
52. ↑ "Vent Fields | InterRidge Vents Database Ver. 3.4". https://vents-data.interridge.org/ventfields?order=name_3&sort=desc&page=7.
53. ↑ 53.0 53.1 53.2 "Papua New Guinea awards first deep sea mining licence to Nautilus". BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific. 5 August 2010. ProQuest 734893795.
54. ↑ 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 "How PNG lost US$120 million and the future of deep-sea mining" (in en-AU). 2020-04-27. https://devpolicy.org/how-png-lost-us120-million-and-the-future-of-deep-sea-mining-20200428/.
55. ↑ 55.0 55.1 55.2 "Deep sea mining plans for Papua New Guinea raise alarm" (in en-US). 2016-11-18. https://news.mongabay.com/2016/11/deep-sea-mining-plans-for-papua-new-guinea-raise-alarm/.
56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 "A lease is granted for the first ever deep-sea mining project". http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1687865153&Country=Papua New Guinea&topic=Econo_9.
57. ↑ Om, Jason (25 August 2014). "Concerns for marine life near deep sea mining project". ABC News. ProQuest 1555634379. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-25/concerns-for-sea-life-near-png-deep-sea-mining-project/5695644.
58. ↑ 58.0 58.1 "Solwara 1 Project – High Grade Copper and Gold". Nautilus Minerals Inc. 2010. http://www.nautilusminerals.com/s/Projects-Solwara.asp.
59. ↑ 59.0 59.1 "Treasure on the ocean floor". Economist 381 (8506): p. 10. 30 November 2006. https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2006/12/02/treasure-on-the-ocean-floor.
60. ↑ "About the Deep Sea Mining Campaign". Deep Sea Mining: Out Of Our Depth. 19 November 2011. http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/about/.
61. ↑ 61.0 61.1 61.2 61.3 "Sinking Seabed Mining: Papua New Guinean, Australian and New Zealand civil society welcome ban on seabed mining in Northern Territory". MiningWatch Canada. 11 February 2021. https://miningwatch.ca/news/2021/2/11/sinking-seabed-mining-papua-new-guinean-australian-and-new-zealand-civil-society.
62. ↑ Shewry, Teresa (2017). "Going Fishing: Activism against Deep Ocean Mining, from the Raukūmara Basin to the Bismarck Sea". South Atlantic Quarterly 116 (1): 207–217. doi:10.1215/00382876-3749625.
63. ↑ "About the Deep Sea Mining campaign | Deep Sea Mining: Out Of Our Depth". 19 November 2011. http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/about/.
64. ↑ Doherty, Ben (15 September 2019). "Collapse of PNG deep-sea mining venture sparks calls for moratorium". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/collapse-of-png-deep-sea-mining-venture-sparks-calls-for-moratorium.
65. ↑ "The Metals Company and Allseas Announce Successful Completion of Harbor Wet-Test Commissioning of Robotic Polymetallic Nodule Collector Vehicle". Mar 22, 2022. https://investors.metals.co/news-releases/news-release-details/metals-company-and-allseas-announce-successful-completion-harbor.
66. ↑ "Sea Bed Minerals Act 2019". https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cca30fab2cf793ec6d94096/t/5d3f683993ea3f0001b7379c/1564436729995/Seabed+Minerals+Act+2019.
67. ↑ "Laws & Regulations". https://www.sbma.gov.ck/laws.
68. ↑ "Executive Management" (in en). https://www.omlus.com/ocean-minerals-llc-executive-management/.
69. ↑ "Seabed Mineral Resource Estimate completed for the Cook Islands" (in en-NZ). 2023-05-10. https://www.sbma.gov.ck/news-3/article-110.
70. ↑ "Seabed Council Approves Four Applications For Exploratory Contracts With Authority In Deep Seabed Area". International Seabed Authority. July 20, 2011. https://www.isa.org.jm/news/seabed-council-approves-four-applications-exploratory-contracts-authority-deep-seabed-area/.
71. ↑ "NORI Project – Nauru Ocean Resources Inc." (in en-US). https://metals.co/nori/.
72. ↑ Weil, Ariel (2023-09-05). "Deep sea mining and killing the seas so you can drive an electric car - Green Prophet" (in en-US). https://www.greenprophet.com/2023/09/deep-sea-mining-and-killing-the-seas-so-you-can-drive-an-electric-car/.
73. ↑ "NORI-D Project – Nauru Ocean Resources Inc.". The Metals Company. https://metals.co/nori/.
74. ↑ Reid, Helen (June 29, 2021). "Pacific island of Nauru sets two-year deadline for U.N. deep-sea mining rules". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/pacific-island-nauru-sets-two-year-deadline-deep-sea-mining-rules-2021-06-29/.
75. ↑ Mehta, Angeli (August 3, 2023). "Policy Watch: After fraught global meeting, future of deep-sea mining still hangs in balance". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/policy-watch-after-fraught-global-meeting-future-deep-sea-mining-still-hangs-2023-08-03/.
76. ↑ "The Metals Company acquires third seabed contract area to explore for polymetallic nodules" (in en-US). 2020-04-07. https://metals.co/deepgreen-acquires-third-seabed-contract-area-to-explore-for-polymetallic-nodules/.
77. ↑ Jamasmie, Cecilia (April 29, 2025). "TMC submits application for deep sea mining under US law". Mining.com. https://www.mining.com/tmc-submits-application-for-deep-sea-mining-under-us-law/.
78. ↑ "Norway to Begin Deep-Sea Mining Exploration in the Arctic" (in en). https://www.soalliance.org/soablog/norway-dsm-vote.
79. ↑ "Nomination of blocks for mineral activities on the seabed" (in en). https://www.sodir.no/en/facts/seabed-minerals/licensing-rounds/1st-round/nomination-of-blocks-for-mineral-activities-on-the-seabed/.
80. ↑ 80.0 80.1 "Green Minerals AS: Capital Markets Day and Q1 report - Green Minerals" (in nb-NO). 2024-05-14. https://greenminerals.no/2024/05/green-minerals-as-capital-markets-day-and-q1-report/.
81. ↑ "10 Deep Sea Mining Companies to Watch in 2024" (in en). https://www.deepseamining.ac/.
82. ↑ Helland, Wenche Rosengren (2023-03-16). "Acquiring licences in the Pacific Ocean" (in nb-NO). https://lokemm.com/acquiring-licences-in-the-pacific-ocean/.
83. ↑ Tan, Cheryl (2022-08-06). "Ocean Mineral Singapore complies with rules for deep sea mining exploration: MTI". The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/ocean-mineral-singapore-complies-with-rules-for-deep-sea-mining-exploration-mti.
84. ↑ "Seatrium is born from Keppel O&M and Sembcorp Marine" (in en). 2023-05-01. https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/shipyards/seatrium-born-keppel-om-and-sembcorp-marine.
85. ↑ 85.0 85.1 Meaker, Morgan (January 12, 2024). "These Mining Companies Are Ready to Raid the Seabed". Wired. https://www.wired.com/story/deep-sea-mining-companies-norway/. Retrieved 2024-02-19.
86. ↑ "Green Minerals AS: MoU for First International License | Industry | News" (in en-gb). 2023-01-24. https://oceanminingintel.com/news/industry/green-minerals-as-mou-for-first-international-license.
87. ↑ Hall, Linda (29 June 2024). "Deep distrust of Norway's deep-sea mining". Euro Weekly. https://euroweeklynews.com/2024/06/29/deep-distrust-of-norways-deep-sea-mining/.
88. ↑ 88.0 88.1 "Impossible Mining". https://impossiblemining.com/.
89. ↑ 89.0 89.1 89.2 Sharma, B. N. N. R. (2000). "Environment and Deep-Sea Mining: A Perspective". Marine Georesources and Geotechnology 18 (3): 285–294. doi:10.1080/10641190051092993. Bibcode: 2000MGG....18..285S.
90. ↑ 90.0 90.1 Willaert, Klaas (2021). Regulating Deep Sea Mining. SpringerBriefs in Law. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-82834-9. ISBN 978-3-030-82833-2.
91. ↑ 91.0 91.1 Abramowski, Tomasz (2016). "Value chain of deep seabed mining". Deep Sea Mining Value Chain: Organization, Technology and Development. Interoceanmetal Joint Organization. pp. 9–18. ISBN 978-83-944323-0-0.
92. ↑ Muñoz-Royo, Carlos; Quillon, Raphael; El Mousadik, Souha; Alford, Matthew H.; Peacock, Thomas (September 21, 2022). "An in situ study of abyssal turbidity-current sediment plumes generated by a deep seabed polymetallic nodule mining preprototype collector vehicle". Science Advances 8 (38). doi:10.1126/sciadv.abn1219. PMID 36129971. Bibcode: 2022SciA....8N1219M.
93. ↑ Jones, Daniel O. B.; Kaiser, Stefanie; Sweetman, Andrew K.; Smith, Craig R.; Menot, Lenaick; Vink, Annemiek; Trueblood, Dwight; Greinert, Jens et al. (February 8, 2017). "Biological responses to disturbance from simulated deep-sea polymetallic nodule mining". PLOS ONE 12 (1). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171750. PMID 28178346. Bibcode: 2017PLoSO..1271750J.
94. ↑ "The Metals Company - Life Cycle Assessment for TMC's NORI-D polymetallic nodule project and comparison to key land-based routes for producing nickel, cobalt and copper". Benchmark Mineral Intelligence. 9 December 2022. https://metals.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/TMC_NORI-D_LCA_Final_Report_March2023.pdf.
95. ↑ 95.0 95.1 95.2 Paulikas, Daina; Katona, Steven; Ilves, Erika; Ali, Saleem H. (December 1, 2020). "Life cycle climate change impacts of producing battery metals from land ores versus deep-sea polymetallic nodules". Journal of Cleaner Production 275. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123822. Bibcode: 2020JCPro.27523822P.
96. ↑ Deep-Sea Mining. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 6 May 2024. ISBN 978-92-807-4124-7. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/45494/deep_sea_mining.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. Retrieved 8 June 2024.
97. ↑ 97.0 97.1 Sharma, R. (October 2005). "Deep-Sea Impact Experiments and their Future Requirements". Marine Georesources & Geotechnology 23 (4): 331–338. doi:10.1080/10641190500446698. Bibcode: 2005MGG....23..331S.
98. ↑ 98.0 98.1 Heffernan, Olive (2024-05-21). The High Seas. Vancouver Berkeley London: Greystone Books. ISBN 978-1-77164-588-1.
99. ↑ Spearman, Jeremy; Taylor, Jonathan; Crossouard, Neil; Cooper, Alan; Turnbull, Michael; Manning, Andrew; Lee, Mark; Murton, Bramley (19 March 2020). "Measurement and modelling of deep sea sediment plumes and implications for deep sea mining". Scientific Reports 10 (1): 5075. doi:10.1038/s41598-020-61837-y. PMID 32193479. Bibcode: 2020NatSR..10.5075S.
100. ↑ 100.0 100.1 Gillard, Benjamin; Purkiani, Kaveh; Chatzievangelou, Damianos; Vink, Annemiek; Iversen, Morten H.; Thomsen, Laurenz (1 January 2019). "Physical and hydrodynamic properties of deep sea mining-generated, abyssal sediment plumes in the Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone (eastern-central Pacific).". Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene 7 (5). doi:10.1525/elementa.343. Bibcode: 2019EleSA...7....5G. https://online.ucpress.edu/elementa/article/doi/10.1525/elementa.343/112485/Physical-and-hydrodynamic-properties-of-deep-sea. Retrieved 29 April 2025.
101. ↑ Hooper, Ellie (5 July 2019). "Deep water: the emerging threat of deep sea mining". Greenpeace Aotearoa. https://www.greenpeace.org/aotearoa/publication/deep-water-the-emerging-threat-of-deep-sea-mining/.
102. ↑ 102.0 102.1 102.2 102.3 102.4 Amon, Diva J.; Ziegler, Amanda F.; Dahlgren, Thomas G.; Glover, Adrian G.; Goineau, Aurélie; Gooday, Andrew J.; Wiklund, Helena; Smith, Craig R. (29 July 2016). "Insights into the abundance and diversity of abyssal megafauna in a polymetallic-nodule region in the eastern Clarion–Clipperton Zone". Scientific Reports 6 (1). doi:10.1038/srep30492. PMID 27470484. Bibcode: 2016NatSR...630492A.
103. ↑ 103.0 103.1 Paulikas, Daina; Katona, Steven; Ilves, Erika; Stone, Gregory; O'Sullivan, Anthony (April 2020), Where Should Metals for the Green Transition Come From, doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.21346.66242
104. ↑ 104.0 104.1 Miller, Kathryn A.; Thompson, Kirsten F.; Johnston, Paul; Santillo, David (10 January 2018). "An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development, Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps". Frontiers in Marine Science 4. doi:10.3389/fmars.2017.00418. Bibcode: 2018FrMaS...4..418M.
105. ↑ Koschinsky, Andrea; Heinrich, Luise; Boehnke, Klaus; Cohrs, J Christopher; Markus, Till; Shani, Maor; Singh, Pradeep; Smith Stegen, Karen et al. (November 2018). "Deep-sea mining: Interdisciplinary research on potential environmental, legal, economic, and societal implications". Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 14 (6): 672–691. doi:10.1002/ieam.4071. PMID 29917315. Bibcode: 2018IEAM...14..672K.
106. ↑ "University of Ghent press bulletin, June 7, 2016". Universiteit Gent. https://www.ugent.be/en/news/bulletin/polymetallic-nodule-fields-are-required-to-preserve-abyssal-fauna.
107. ↑ Nath, B. Nagender; Sharma, R. (July 2000). "Environment and Deep-Sea Mining: A Perspective". Marine Georesources & Geotechnology 18 (3): 285–294. doi:10.1080/10641190009353796. Bibcode: 2000MGG....18..285N.
108. ↑ Mestre, Nélia C.; Rocha, Thiago L.; Canals, Miquel; Cardoso, Cátia; Danovaro, Roberto; Dell'Anno, Antonio; Gambi, Cristina; Regoli, Francesco et al. (September 2017). "Environmental hazard assessment of a marine mine tailings deposit site and potential implications for deep-sea mining". Environmental Pollution 228: 169–178. doi:10.1016/j.envpol.2017.05.027. PMID 28531798. Bibcode: 2017EPoll.228..169M.
109. ↑ Judah, Aaron B.; Mull, Christopher G.; Dulvy, Nicholas K.; Finucci, Brittany; Assad, Victoria E.; Drazen, Jeffrey C. (2025-11-03). "Deep-sea mining risks for sharks, rays, and chimaeras" (in English). Current Biology 35 (21): 5353–5362.e3. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2025.09.019. ISSN 0960-9822. PMID 41043419. Bibcode: 2025CBio...35.5353J. https://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822(25)01189-3.
110. ↑ "Dark oxygen made by deep sea 'batteries'". 22 July 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c728ven2v9eo.
111. ↑ 111.0 111.1 Sweetman, Andrew K.; Smith, Alycia J.; de Jonge, Danielle S. W.; Hahn, Tobias; Schroedl, Peter; Silverstein, Michael; Andrade, Claire; Edwards, R. Lawrence et al. (22 July 2024). "Evidence of dark oxygen production at the abyssal seafloor". Nature Geoscience 17 (8): 737. doi:10.1038/s41561-024-01480-8. Bibcode: 2024NatGe..17..737S.
112. ↑ Paulikas, Dana; Katona, Steven; Ilves, Erika; Stone, Greg; O'Sullivan, Anthony (2020). ﻿Where should metals for the green transition come from? Comparing environmental, social, and economic impacts of supplying base metals from land ores and seafloor polymetallic nodules﻿ (Report). DG. doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.21346.66242. https://deep.green/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/LCA-White-Paper_Where-Should-Metals-for-the-Green-Transition-Come-From_FINAL_low-res.pdf. Retrieved 11 February 2021.
113. ↑ Katona, Steven; Paulikas, Daina (24 July 2020). "Where Should Metals for the Green Transition Come From?". Energy Futures Lab. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=afs38uDU9Is.
114. ↑ "Around 90% of species in prospective deep-sea mining zone are unnamed | Natural History Museum" (in en). https://www.nhm.ac.uk/discover/news/2023/may/90-of-species-in-prospective-deep-sea-mining-zone-are-unnamed.html.
115. ↑ Macheriotou, Lara; Rigaux, Annelien; Derycke, Sofie; Vanreusel, Ann (2020-04-08). "Phylogenetic clustering and rarity imply risk of local species extinction in prospective deep-sea mining areas of the Clarion–Clipperton Fracture Zone" (in en). Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287 (1924). doi:10.1098/rspb.2019.2666. ISSN 0962-8452. PMID 32228410.
116. ↑ "Biodiversity: Deep-sea mining will be 25 times as bad as mining on land". The Hindu. 30 June 2023. https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/biodiversity-deep-sea-mining-land-mining-damage/article67026115.ece.
117. ↑ Orcutt, Beth N.; Bradley, James A.; Brazelton, William J.; Estes, Emily R.; Goordial, Jacqueline M.; Huber, Julie A.; Jones, Rose M.; Mahmoudi, Nagissa et al. (2020). "Impacts of deep-sea mining on microbial ecosystem services" (in en). Limnology and Oceanography 65 (7): 1489–1510. doi:10.1002/lno.11403. ISSN 1939-5590. Bibcode: 2020LimOc..65.1489O. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/lno.11403.
118. ↑ Van Dover, Cindy (2011). "Mining Seafloor Massive Sulphides and Biodiversity: What is at Risk?". ICES Journal of Marine Science 68 (2): 341–348. doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsq086. https://academic.oup.com/icesjms/article-abstract/68/2/341/616315.
119. ↑ "The impact of deep-sea mining on biodiversity, climate and human cultures". https://www.iucn.nl/en/news/the-impact-of-deep-sea-mining-on-biodiversity-climate-and-human-cultures/.
120. ↑ "Gas Hydrates - Primer". 19 March 2018. https://www.usgs.gov/centers/whcmsc/science/gas-hydrates-primer.
121. ↑ ""Sweetman"". EarthArXiv. https://eartharxiv.org/repository/search/sweetman/.
122. ↑ Tengberg, Anders; Hall, Per; Kononets, Mikhail (October 4, 2024). "Rebuttal of Sweetman, A.K., Smith, A.J., de Jonge, D.S.W. et al. Evidence of dark oxygen production at the abyssal seafloor". EarthArXiv. doi:10.31223/x5t708. https://eartharxiv.org/repository/view/7817/. Retrieved April 17, 2025.
123. ↑ Voosen, Paul (September 18, 2024). "Claim of 'dark oxygen' on sea floor faces doubts". Science 385 (6715): 1258–1259. doi:10.1126/science.zr37iom. https://www.science.org/content/article/claim-seafloor-dark-oxygen-faces-doubts. Retrieved April 17, 2025.
124. ↑ Downes, Patrick (2025). "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence: evaluating nodule-associated dark oxygen production". Frontiers in Marine Science 12. doi:10.3389/fmars.2025.1721853. Bibcode: 2025FrMaS..1221853D.
125. ↑ Sweetman, Andrew (19 December 2025). The Dark Oxygen Research Initiative (DORI) project-Investigating Dark Oxygen Production in the deep sea. American Geophysical Union. https://agu.confex.com/agu/agu25/meetingapp.cgi/Paper/1863795. Retrieved 22 December 2025.
126. ↑ 126.0 126.1 126.2 126.3 126.4 Bederman, David J. (2012). "The Sea". The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. pp. 359–380. doi:10.1093/law/9780199599752.003.0016. ISBN 978-0-19-959975-2.
127. ↑ "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (in en-US). 1982-12-10. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
128. ↑ 128.0 128.1 "About ISA" (in en-US). 17 March 2022. https://www.isa.org.jm/about-isa/.
129. ↑ 129.0 129.1 129.2 129.3 129.4 Steinberg, Philip E. (1999). "Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean". Geographical Review 89 (2): 254–264. doi:10.2307/216090. Bibcode: 1999GeoRv..89..254S.
130. ↑ 130.0 130.1 Nye, J. S. (January 1975). "Ocean rule making from a world politics perspective". Ocean Development & International Law 3 (1): 29–52. doi:10.1080/00908327509545557.
131. ↑ UN (2024) https://www.un.org/depts/los/meeting_states_parties/meeting_states_parties.htm4
132. ↑ 132.0 132.1 132.2 132.3 132.4 132.5 132.6 132.7 132.8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, p. [page needed].
133. ↑ 133.0 133.1 133.2 133.3 133.4 133.5 133.6 133.7 "Address by Mr. David Kpomakpor, Chairman of the Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Government of the Republic of Liberia". United Nations. 7 October 1994. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n94/865/70/pdf/n9486570.pdf.
134. ↑ UN (2024) https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm
135. ↑ Treves, Tullio (2008) Introductory Note: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, Audiovisual Library of International Law https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html
136. ↑ 136.0 136.1 Tanaka, Yoshifumi (2004). "Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: Reflections on a Dual Approach in International Law of the Sea". The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19 (4): 483–514. doi:10.1163/1571808053310143.
137. ↑ Truman, Harry S. (1945) Proclamation 2667—Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf
138. ↑ 138.0 138.1 138.2 UN (2005) A Practical Overview of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by Sharveen Persand Project Officer, Mauritius Oceanography Institute United Nations – The Nippon Foundation of Japan Fellow 2005; https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/persand_0506_mauritius.pdf. Accessed Dec. 2024
139. ↑ Heidar, T. H., 2003. Legal aspects of continental shelf limits. Paper presented at the Conference on the Legal and Scientific Aspect of the Continental Shelf Limits in Iceland, June 25–27, 2003. International Energy Agency, IEA (2022), "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transition"
140. ↑ Bourrel, Marie., Thiele, Thorsten., & Currie, Duncan (2016) The common of heritage of mankind as a means to assess and advance equity in deep sea mining. Elsevier articles press Marine Policy. https://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/publications/2017/common-of-heritage-of-mankind-deep-sea-mining.pdf
141. ↑ United Nations General Assembly Session 51 Verbatim Report 40. Observer status for the International Seabed Authority in the General Assembly A/51/PV.40 page 22. 24 October (1996). https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n96/866/14/pdf/n9686614.pdf
142. ↑ UN (2024) https://www.un.org/depts/los/meeting_states_parties/meeting_states_parties.htm
143. ↑ 143.0 143.1 143.2 143.3 143.4 143.5 143.6 143.7 "Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982". United Nations. 17 August 1994. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n94/332/98/pdf/n9433298.pdf.
144. ↑ Xu, Xiangxin (2021-09-21), "Mining Impacts on the Marine Environment and Deep Seabed Mining Regime", Responsibility to Ensure (Brill | Nijhoff): pp. 6–73, doi:10.1163/9789004472341_003, ISBN 978-90-04-47234-1
145. ↑ Abreo, Sam (2023-09-26). "Deep Seabed Mining Insights: The Role and Rights of Sponsoring States under the UNCLOS Regime" (in en-GB). https://www.wfw.com/articles/deep-seabed-mining-insights-the-role-and-rights-of-sponsoring-states-under-the-unclos-regime/.
146. ↑ United Nations, UN (2017) The International Seabed Authority and Deep Seabed Mining, UN Chronicle.
147. ↑ 147.0 147.1 147.2 147.3 147.4 Singh, Pradeep A. (18 July 2022). "The Invocation of the 'Two-Year Rule' at the International Seabed Authority: Legal Consequences and Implications". The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 37 (3): 375–412. doi:10.1163/15718085-bja10098.
148. ↑ ISA (2013) Nautilus Minerals Propose Joint Venture with The Enterprise. Press Released in ISA 12 April 2023; https://www.isa.org.jm/news/nautilus-minerals-propose-joint-venture-enterprise/
149. ↑ 149.0 149.1 United Nations, UN (2017) The International Seabed Authority and Deep Seabed Mining, UN Chronicle
150. ↑ Woody, Todd; Halper, Evan (19 April 2022). "A race to the bottom: In the rush to mine the ocean floor for minerals used in EV batteries, who is looking out for the environment?". Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-04-19/gold-rush-in-the-deep-sea-raises-questions-about-international-seabed-authority.
151. ↑ "MIT comparative study of economic models for polymetallic nodule mining now available online". International Seabed Authority. January 29, 2019. https://www.isa.org.jm/news/mit-comparative-study-economic-models-polymetallic-nodule-mining-now-available-online/.
152. ↑ 152.0 152.1 Deep-Sea Mining Science Statement, DSMSS (2024) Marine Expert Statement Calling for a Pause to Deep-Sea Mining, https://seabedminingsciencestatement.org/
153. ↑ SA (2013) Nautilus Minerals Propose Joint Venture with The Enterprise. Press Released in ISA 12 April 2023; https://www.isa.org.jm/news/nautilus-minerals-propose-joint-venture-enterprise/
154. ↑ 154.0 154.1 154.2 ITLOS https://www.itlos.org/en/
155. ↑ 155.0 155.1 155.2 Dingwall, Joanna (2020). "Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed beyond National Jurisdiction: the International Legal Framework". The Law of the Seabed. Brill. pp. 139–162. ISBN 978-90-04-39155-0.
156. ↑ Oztig, Lacin Idil (August 2025). "Deep Sea Mining in Social Sciences: A Systematic Review" (in en). Journal of International Development 37 (6): 1195–1209. doi:10.1002/jid.70001. ISSN 0954-1748. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.70001.
157. ↑ Røsæg, Erik (2020). "Framework Legislation for Commercial Activities in the Area". The Law of the Seabed. Brill. pp. 163–184. ISBN 978-90-04-39155-0.
158. ↑ RIFS (2022) "Two-year Countdown for Deep Seabed Mining". https://www.rifs-potsdam.de/en/news/two-year-countdown-deep-seabed-mining
159. ↑ Research Institute for Sustainability Helmholtz Centre Potsdam, RIFS (2022) "Two-year Countdown for Deep Seabed Mining". https://www.rifs-potsdam.de/en/news/two-year-countdown-deep-seabed-mining
160. ↑ Silver, Jennifer J.; Gray, Noella J.; Campbell, Lisa M.; Fairbanks, Luke W.; Gruby, Rebecca L. (June 2015). "Blue Economy and Competing Discourses in International Oceans Governance". The Journal of Environment & Development 24 (2): 135–160. doi:10.1177/1070496515580797.
161. ↑ Thaler, Andrew (2022) The Metals Company completes a world-first test of deep-sea mining system. DSM Observer Deep Sea Mining News & Resources. https://dsmobserver.com/2022/12/the-metals-company-completes-a-world-first-test-of-deep-sea-mining-system/
162. ↑ Elbokl, Tamar (2024)Deep sea mining can provide metals for the green transition. Canadian Mining Journal. https://www.canadianminingjournal.com/featured-article/deep-sea-mining-can-provide-metals-for-the-green-transition/
163. ↑ 163.0 163.1 TMC, The Metals Company (2024) Sponsoring states https://metals.co/sponsoring-states/
164. ↑ TMC, The metals Company (2024) NORI https://metals.co/nori/
165. ↑ European Academies' Science Advisory Council (EASAC) (2023) Deep-Sea Mining: assessing evidence on future needs and environmental impacts: Statement. https://easac.eu/publications/details/deep-sea-mining-assessing-evidence-on-future-needs-and-environmental-impacts
166. ↑ Bueger, Christian and Felix Mallin. 2023. Blue Paradigms. Understanding the intellectual revolution in global ocean politics, International Affairs, 99(4), 1719–1739
167. ↑ ISA (2013/2023) Nautilus Minerals Propose Joint Venture with The Enterprise. Press Released in ISA 12 April 2023; https://www.isa.org.jm/news/nautilus-minerals-propose-joint-venture-enterprise/
168. ↑ European Academies' Science Advisory Council (EASAC) (2023) Deep-Sea Mining: assessing evidence on future needs and environmental impacts: Statement. https://easac.eu/publications/details/deep-sea-mining-assessing-evidence-on-future-needs-and-environmental-impactsClingham
169. ↑ Pickens, Chris; Lily, Hannah; Harrould-Kolieb, Ellycia; Blanchard, Catherine; Chakraborty, Anindita (November 2024). "From what-if to what-now: Status of the deep-sea mining regulations and underlying drivers for outstanding issues". Marine Policy 169. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2023.105967. Bibcode: 2024MarPo.16905967P.
170. ↑ Reuters (2021) Google, BMW, AB Volvo, Samsung back environmental call for pause on deep-sea mining.https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/google-bmw-volvo-samsung-sdi-sign-up-wwf-call-temporary-ban-deep-sea-mining-2021-03-31/
171. ↑ Sharma, Abhisek & Ahuja, Udayvir (2024) Undersea geopolitics and international law: Deep-sea mining in the Indo-Pacific. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/undersea-geopolitics-and-international-law-deep-sea-mining-in-the-indo-pacific
172. ↑ Alberts C., Elisabeth (2023) "Deep-sea mining rules delayed two more years; mining start remains unclear". MongaBay: https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/deep-sea-mining-rules-delayed-two-more-years-mining-start-remains-unclear/
173. ↑ 173.0 173.1 Schmidt, Oscar; Rivera, Manuel (2020). "No people, no problem – narrativity, conflict, and justice in debates on deep-seabed mining". Geographica Helvetica 75 (2): 139–150. doi:10.5194/gh-75-139-2020. https://gh.copernicus.org/articles/75/139/2020/gh-75-139-2020.pdf.
174. ↑ 174.0 174.1 Morgera, Elisa; Lily, Hannah (2022). "Public participation at the International Seabed Authority: An international human rights law analysis". RECIEL 31 (3): 374–388. doi:10.1111/reel.12472. Bibcode: 2022RECIE..31..374M. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/reel.12472?trk=public_post_comment-text.
175. ↑ 175.0 175.1 175.2 Singh, Pradeep A. & Aline Jaeckel. 2024. "Undermining by Mining? Deep Seabed Mining in Light of International Marine Environmental Law." Cambridge University Press.
176. ↑ 176.0 176.1 Thompson, Kirsten; Miller, Kathryn; Currie, Duncan; Johnston, Paul; Santillo, David (2018). "Seabed Mining and Approaches to Governance of the Deep Seabed". Frontiers in Marine Science 5. doi:10.3389/fmars.2018.00480. Bibcode: 2018FrMaS...5..480T.
177. ↑ "Pacific Island of Nauru sets two-year deadline for UN deep-sea mining rules". Reuters. 29 June 2021. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/pacific-island-nauru-sets-two-year-deadline-deep-sea-mining-rules-2021-06-29/.
178. ↑ 178.0 178.1 "Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". United Nations. 1994. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm.
179. ↑ 179.0 179.1 "International Seabed Authority holds a landmark 30th session". International Seabed Authority. July 2025. https://www.isa.org.jm/news/international-seabed-authority-holds-a-landmark-30th-session/.
180. ↑ 180.0 180.1 Singh, Pradeep A.; Jaeckel, Aline; Ardron, Jeff A. (2025). "A Pause or Moratorium for Deep Seabed Mining in the Area? The Legal Basis, Potential Pathways, and Possible Policy Implications". Ocean Development & International Law 56 (1): 18–44. doi:10.1080/00908320.2024.2439877.
181. ↑ Axel, Hallgren; Anders, Hansson (2025). "Momentum for a Moratorium". Sustainability 13 (9). doi:10.3390/su13095261.
182. ↑ 182.0 182.1 Hallgren, Arvid; Hansson, Anders (2021). "Conflicting Narratives of Deep Sea Mining". Sustainability 13 (9): 5261. doi:10.3390/su13095261. Bibcode: 2021Sust...13.5261H.
183. ↑ "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". United Nations. 1982. p. Article 145. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
184. ↑ "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". United Nations. 1982. p. Article 140. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
185. ↑ 185.0 185.1 Fisher, Toby; Douglas, Zachary; Heather-Latu, Tiffany (10 February 2023). ﻿In the Matter of a Proposed Moratorium or Precautionary Pause on Deep-Sea Mining Beyond National Jurisdiction (Opinion)﻿ (Report). The Pew Charitable Trusts. https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2023/03/deep-sea-mining-moratorium.pdf.
186. ↑ Willaert, Klaas (2020). "Public Participation in the Context of Deep Sea Mining: Luxury or Legal Obligation?". Ocean and Coastal Management 198. doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105368. Bibcode: 2020OCM...19805368W.
187. ↑ 187.0 187.1 "Deep Seabed Mining Insights: Potential Pitfalls with a 'Precautionary Pause' to Deep Seabed Mining". Watson Farley & Williams. April 2025. https://www.wfw.com/insights/deep-seabed-mining-insights-potential-pitfalls-with-a-precautionary-pause-to-deep-seabed-mining/.
188. ↑ "Deep Sea Mining Uncovered: Part Three". DLA Piper. July 2025. https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/2025/07/deep-sea-mining-uncovered-part-three.
189. ↑ 189.0 189.1 189.2 "Frequently Asked Questions". International Seabed Authority. 2025. https://isa.org.jm/faq-for-media/.
190. ↑ 190.0 190.1 "Governments and parliamentarians". Deep Sea Conservation Coalition. https://deep-sea-conservation.org/solutions/no-deep-sea-mining/momentum-for-a-moratorium/governments-and-parliamentarians/.
191. ↑ "Deep-sea mining: Norway approves controversial practice". BBC News. 9 January 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-67893808.
192. ↑ "Norway Pauses Deep-Sea Mining Plans Until 2029". Polar Journal. 5 December 2025. https://polarjournal.ch/en/2025/12/05/norway-pauses-deep-sea-mining-plans-until-2029/.
193. ↑ "UN experts commend Norway decision to postpone deep-sea mining licensing". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 15 December 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/un-experts-commend-norway-decision-postpone-deep-sea-mining-licensing.
194. ↑ "Executive Order: Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources". The White House. 24 April 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/unleashing-americas-offshore-critical-minerals-and-resources/.
195. ↑ "Deep Seabed Mining: Notice of receipt of applications for deep seabed mining exploration licenses and announcement of public comment period and virtual public hearings". Federal Register. 23 December 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/23/2025-23795/deep-seabed-mining-notice-of-receipt-of-applications-for-deep-seabed-mining-exploration-licenses-and.
196. ↑ "Briefing: International Seabed Authority 30th session". Greenpeace UK. July 2025. https://www.greenpeace.org.uk/resources/briefing-international-seabed-authority-deep-sea-mining/.
197. ↑ 197.0 197.1 "Deep-Sea Mining Science Statement". https://www.seabedminingsciencestatement.org/.
198. ↑ Jones, Daniel O.B.; Durden, Jennifer M.; Murphy, Kevin (2019). "Existing environmental management approaches relevant to deep-sea mining". Marine Policy 103: 172–181. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2019.01.006. Bibcode: 2019MarPo.103..172J.
199. ↑ Rabone, Muriel; Wiethase, Joris H.; Simon-Lledó, Erik; Emery, Aidan M.; Jones, Dan O.B.; Dahlgren, Thomas G.; Bribiesca-Contreras, Guadalupe; Wiklund, Helena et al. (2023). "How many metazoan species live in the world's largest mineral exploration region?". Current Biology 33 (12): 2383–2396. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2023.04.052. PMID 37220748. Bibcode: 2023CBio...33E2383R.
200. ↑ Stewart, Eva C.D.; Dahlgren, Thomas G.; Wiklund, Helena; Bribiesca-Contreras, Guadalupe; Jones, Dan O.B.; Glover, Adrian G. (2025). "Impacts of an industrial deep-sea mining trial on macrofaunal biodiversity". Nature Ecology & Evolution. doi:10.1038/s41559-025-02911-4. PMID 41350401. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-025-02911-4.
201. ↑ Jones, Daniel O.B.; Arias, Maria Belen; Van Audenhaege, Loïc (2025). "Long-term impact and biological recovery in a deep-sea mining track". Nature 642 (8066): 112–118. doi:10.1038/s41586-025-08921-3. PMID 40139245. Bibcode: 2025Natur.642..112J.
202. ↑ 202.0 202.1 "Business Statement on Deep-Sea Mining". Stop Deep Seabed Mining. https://www.stopdeepseabedmining.org/endorsers/.
203. ↑ "Brands Back Call for Moratorium on Deep Seabed Mining". WWF. March 2021. https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?1909966/Brands-Back-Call-for-Moratorium-on-Deep-Seabed-Mining.
204. ↑ "Financial institutions reaffirm statement to governments on deep‑seabed mining". Finance for Biodiversity Foundation. 15 July 2025. https://www.financeforbiodiversity.org/news/financial-institutions-reaffirm-statement-to-governments-on-deep-seabed-mining/.
205. ↑ "EIB Excluded Activities". European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/files/publications/20250132-eib-group-excluded-activities-en.pdf.
206. ↑ "Why Deep-Seabed Mining Needs a Moratorium". The Pew Charitable Trusts. 6 June 2025. https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2025/06/why-deep-seabed-mining-needs-a-moratorium.
207. ↑ "Summary of the 30th Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority". IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin. July 2025. https://enb.iisd.org/international-seabed-authority-isa-council-30-2-summary.
208. ↑ 208.0 208.1 "Global deep-sea mining talks yield mixed verdict". Seas At Risk. 25 July 2025. https://seas-at-risk.org/publications/global-deep-sea-mining-talks-yield-mixed-verdict/.
209. ↑ "Seabed mining: A $20 trillion opportunity | Arthur D. Little" (in en). 2024-08-27. https://www.adlittle.com/en/insights/viewpoints/seabed-mining-20-trillion-opportunity.
210. ↑ Sharma, Rahul (2011-09-01). "Deep-Sea Mining: Economic, Technical, Technological, and Environmental Considerations for Sustainable Development". Marine Technology Society Journal 45 (5): 28–41. doi:10.4031/mtsj.45.5.2. ISSN 0025-3324. Bibcode: 2011MTSJ...45e..28S.
211. ↑ 211.0 211.1 211.2 211.3 Koschinsky, Andrea; Heinrich, Luise; Boehnke, Klaus; Cohrs, J Christopher; Markus, Till; Shani, Maor; Singh, Pradeep; Smith Stegen, Karen et al. (November 2018). "Deep-sea mining: Interdisciplinary research on potential environmental, legal, economic, and societal implications" (in en). Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 14 (6): 672–691. doi:10.1002/ieam.4071. ISSN 1551-3777. PMID 29917315. Bibcode: 2018IEAM...14..672K. https://setac.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ieam.4071.
212. ↑ 212.0 212.1 212.2 212.3 212.4 212.5 212.6 212.7 Levin, Lisa A.; Amon, Diva J.; Lily, Hannah (2020-07-06). "Challenges to the sustainability of deep-seabed mining" (in en). Nature Sustainability 3 (10): 784–794. doi:10.1038/s41893-020-0558-x. ISSN 2398-9629. Bibcode: 2020NatSu...3..784L. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-020-0558-x.
213. ↑ 213.0 213.1 Lesage, Maxime; Juliani, Cyril; Ellefmo, Steinar L. (October 2018). "Economic Block Model Development for Mining Seafloor Massive Sulfides" (in en). Minerals 8 (10): 468. doi:10.3390/min8100468. ISSN 2075-163X. Bibcode: 2018Mine....8..468L.
214. ↑ 214.0 214.1 "Deep-Sea Minerals Dialogue" (in en). https://www.weforum.org/projects/deep-sea-mining/.
215. ↑ "Deep-sea mining: is it an environmental curse or could it save us? | Horizon Magazine" (in en). 2021-08-12. https://projects.research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/en/horizon-magazine/deep-sea-mining-it-environmental-curse-or-could-it-save-us.
216. ↑ Folkersen, Maja Vinde; Fleming, Christopher M.; Hasan, Syezlin (August 2018). "The economic value of the deep sea: A systematic review and meta-analysis" (in en). Marine Policy 94: 71–80. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2018.05.003. Bibcode: 2018MarPo..94...71F. https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0308597X18300940.
217. ↑ 217.0 217.1 217.2 Hallgren, Axel; Hansson, Anders (2021-05-08). "Conflicting Narratives of Deep Sea Mining" (in en). Sustainability 13 (9): 5261. doi:10.3390/su13095261. ISSN 2071-1050. Bibcode: 2021Sust...13.5261H.
218. ↑ 218.0 218.1 webadmin (2024-03-07). "Investing in Deep Sea Mining is a Financial Mistake" (in en-GB). https://planet-tracker.org/investing-in-deep-sea-mining-is-a-financial-mistake/.
219. ↑ Oztig, Lacin Idil (2025). "Deep Sea Mining in Social Sciences: A Systematic Review". Journal of International Development 37 (6): 1195–1209. doi:10.1002/jid.70001.
220. ↑ 220.0 220.1 220.2 Szabó, Loránd (2025). "Deep-Sea Mining and the Sustainability Paradox: Pathways to Balance Critical Material Demands and Ocean Conservation". Sustainability 17 (14): 6580. doi:10.3390/su17146580. Bibcode: 2025Sust...17.6580S.
221. ↑ 221.0 221.1 Fernando, Thisuri; Ranaweera, Poorni; Droohithya, Tirishe; Kuruppu, Gayithri; Dushyantha, Nimila; Dassanayake, Sandun; Ilankoon, I. M. Saman K. (2026). "Deep-Sea Mining Finance: Balancing Investment Risks, Environmental Responsibility and Financial Opportunities for Sustainable Technology and Impacts". Sustainable Development 34: 248–263. doi:10.1002/sd.70174.
222. ↑ 222.0 222.1 222.2 Environmental Issues of Deep-Sea Mining. 2019. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12696-4. ISBN 978-3-030-12695-7.
223. ↑ 223.0 223.1 Jolly, Suyash (2025). "Deep Sea Mining in the Norwegian context: Contradictions and the emergent uncertainties ahead". Nordlandsforskning (Nordland Research Institute): 1–32.
224. ↑ 224.0 224.1 224.2 224.3 Carver, R.; Childs, J.; Steinberg, P.; Mabon, L.; Matsuda, H.; Squire, R.; McLellan, B.; Esteban, M. (2020). "A critical social perspective on deep sea mining: Lessons from the emergent industry in Japan". Ocean & Coastal Management 193. doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105242. Bibcode: 2020OCM...19305242C.
225. ↑ 225.0 225.1 225.2 225.3 Perspectives on Deep-Sea Mining. 2022. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-87982-2. ISBN 978-3-030-87981-5.
226. ↑ 226.0 226.1 226.2 Handbook on Marine Environment Protection. 2018. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60156-4. ISBN 978-3-319-60154-0.
227. ↑ Willaert, Klaas (2022). "Fair Share: Equitable Distribution of Deep Sea Mining Proceeds". The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 37 (2): 217–240. doi:10.1163/15718085-bja10086.
228. ↑ 228.0 228.1 228.2 Hallgren, Axel; Hansson, Anders (2021). "Conflicting Narratives of Deep Sea Mining". Sustainability 13 (9): 5261. doi:10.3390/su13095261. Bibcode: 2021Sust...13.5261H.
229. ↑ 10.1177/2053019625133
230. ↑ Childs, John (2022). "Geographies of deep sea mining: A critical review". The Extractive Industries and Society 9. doi:10.1016/j.exis.2022.101044. Bibcode: 2022ExIS....901044C.
231. ↑ Levin, Lisa A.; Amon, Diva J.; Lily, Hannah (2020). "Challenges to the sustainability of deep-seabed mining". Nature Sustainability 3 (10): 784–794. doi:10.1038/s41893-020-0558-x. Bibcode: 2020NatSu...3..784L.
232. ↑ 232.0 232.1 Gentilucci, Marta (2022). "'On board' deep-sea mining. An ocean-based perspective". Archivio Antropologico Mediterraneo 24 (2). doi:10.4000/aam.6368.
233. ↑ 233.0 233.1 Titifanue, Jason (2025). "Justice washing extractivism: Pacific Island activist perspectives on just transitions and deep-sea mining". Global Environmental Change 94. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2025.103053. Bibcode: 2025GEC....9403053T.
234. ↑ Tilot, Virginie C.; Guilloux, Bleuenn; Willaert, Klaas; Mulalap, Clement Y.; Bambridge, Tamatoa; d'Arcy, Paul; Mawyer, Alexander; Gaulme, François et al. (2021). "The Concept of Oceanian Sovereignty in the Context of Deep Sea Mining in the Pacific Region". Frontiers in Marine Science 8. doi:10.3389/fmars.2021.756072. Bibcode: 2021FrMaS...856072T.
235. ↑ Vamråk Solheim, Astrid; Lesage, Maxime; Asbjørnslett, Bjørn Egil; Erikstad, Stein Ove (2020). "Deep Sea Mining: Towards Conceptual Design for Underwater Transportation". Volume 6B: Ocean Engineering. doi:10.1115/OMAE2020-18655. ISBN 978-0-7918-8438-6.
236. ↑ 236.0 236.1 Vamråk Solheim, Astrid; Lesage, Maxime; Asbjørnslett, Bjørn Egil; Erikstad, Stein Ove (2020). "Deep Sea Mining: Towards Conceptual Design for Underwater Transportation". Volume 6B: Ocean Engineering. doi:10.1115/OMAE2020-18655. ISBN 978-0-7918-8438-6.
237. ↑ 237.0 237.1 Probyn, Elspeth (2023). "Aqua/Geopolitical conjuncture and disjuncture: Invasion, resources, and mining the deep dark sea". Cultural Studies 37 (4): 696–717. doi:10.1080/09502386.2023.2173793.
238. ↑ Murphy, James; Gard, Rowan (2025). "The deep-sea mining commodity frontier: Blue economy agenda in the Pacific Ocean". Academia Environmental Sciences and Sustainability 2. doi:10.20935/AcadEnvSci7520.
239. ↑ Scientific Advisory Board (2024). "Brief of the Scientific Advisory Board on: Deep-Sea Mining". 250403-DSM-Brief-Rev-7.PDF.
240. ↑ Zalik, Anna (2018). "Mining the seabed, enclosing the Area: Ocean grab bing, proprietary knowledge and the geopolitics of the extractive frontier beyond national jurisdiction". International Social Science Journal 68 (229–230): 343–359. doi:10.1111/issj.12159.
241. ↑ Conde, Marta, Aletta Mondré, Kimberley Peters, Philip Steinberg (2022). "Mining questions of 'what' and 'who': deepening discussions of the seabed for future policy and governance". Maritime Studies 21 (3): 327–338. doi:10.1007/s40152-022-00273-2. Bibcode: 2022MarSt..21..327C.
242. ↑ Childs, John (2020). "Extraction in Four Dimensions: Time, Space and the Emerging Geo(-)politics of Deep-Sea Mining". Geopolitics 25: 189–213. doi:10.1080/14650045.2018.1465041.
243. ↑ Lilford, Oliver; Allen, Matthew G. (2023). "The Historical Assembly of Oceania's Deep-Sea Mining Frontier". Routledge Handbook of Global Land and Resource Grabbing. pp. 282–299. doi:10.4324/9781003080916-25. ISBN 978-1-003-08091-6. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003080916-25/historical-assembly-oceania-deep-sea-mining-frontier-oliver-lilford-matthew-allen.
244. ↑ Jayathilleka, U.G.W.R. (2024). "Afanasy Nikitin Seamount: The New Geopolitical Competition in the Indian Ocean". Sri Lanka Military Academy Journal 6: 29–42.
245. ↑ o'Lear, Shannon (2020). "Environmental geopolitics: An introduction to questions and research approaches". A Research Agenda for Environmental Geopolitics. doi:10.4337/9781788971249.00006. ISBN 978-1-78897-124-9.
246. ↑ Connolly, Charlotte (2023). "Under the Arctic Ice: Climate Futurism, Inuit Sovereignty, and Deep Seabed Mining in the Just Transition". Ocean Yearbook Online 37 (1): 311–360. doi:10.1163/22116001-03701015. Bibcode: 2023OceYb..37..311C.
247. ↑ 247.0 247.1 Fox, Sarah Jane (2022). "'Exploiting – land, sea and space: Mineral superpower' In the name of peace: A critical race to protect the depths and heights". Resources Policy: 1–15.
248. ↑ Arato, Julian, Aline Jaeckel, and Lucas Lixinski (2024). "On the cultural stakes of deep sea mining". The American Society of International Law: 67–71.
249. ↑ Amon, Diva J., Lisa A. Levin, Anna Metaxas, Gavin M. Mudd and Craig R. Smith (2022). "Commentary - Heading to the deep end without knowing how to swim: Do we need deep-seabed mining?". One Earth 5, March 18, 2022 - 2022 Elsevier Inc: 1–4.
250. ↑ 250.0 250.1 Sharma, Rahul (2015). "Global Challenges, Policy Framework and sustainable development for mining of mineral and fossil energy resources". Procedia Earth and Planetary Science: 204–211.
251. ↑ 251.0 251.1 Cuyvers, Luc, Whitney Berry, Kristina Gjerde, Torsten Thiele and Caroline Wilhem (2025).. "Deep seabed mining: A rising environmental challenge". IUCN: 1–188.
252. ↑ Koschinsky, Andrea, Luise Heinrich, Klaus Boehnke, J. Christopher Cohrs, Till Markus, Maor Shani, Pradeep Singh, Karen Smith Stegen and Welf Werner (2018) (2018). "Deep-sea Mining: Interdisciplinary Research on Potential Environmental, Legal, Economic, and Societal Implications". Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 14 (6): 672–691. doi:10.1002/ieam.4071. PMID 29917315. Bibcode: 2018IEAM...14..672K.
253. ↑ 253.0 253.1 253.2 Niner, Holly J., Jeff A. Ardron, Elva G. Escobar, Matthew Gianni, Aline Jaeckel, Daniel O. B. Jones, Lisa A. Levin, Craig R. Smith, Torsten Thiele, Phillip J. Turner, Cindy L. Van Dover, Les Watling and Kristina M. Gjerde (2018). "Deep-sea mining with no net loss of biodiversity - an impossible aim". Perspective - Frontiers in Marine Science: 1–12.
254. ↑ 254.0 254.1 254.2 Sharma, Raul (2011). "Deep-sea mining - economic, technical, technological and environmental considerations for sustainable development". Marine Technology Society Journal: 28–41.
255. ↑ Iyke, Bernard Njindan (2024-01-01). "Climate change, energy security risk, and clean energy investment". Energy Economics 129. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2023.107225. ISSN 0140-9883. Bibcode: 2024EneEc.12907225I.
256. ↑ "DOD Has Seen 'Huge' Increase in Military Sales Since Ukraine Invasion" (in en-US). https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-increase-in-military-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/.
257. ↑ Cui, Lianbiao; Yue, Suyun; Nghiem, Xuan-Hoa; Duan, Mei (2023-03-01). "Exploring the risk and economic vulnerability of global energy supply chain interruption in the context of Russo-Ukrainian war". Resources Policy 81. doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103373. ISSN 0301-4207. Bibcode: 2023RePol..8103373C. https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301420723000818.
258. ↑ Jaroni, Marie Sophie; Friedrich, Bernd; Letmathe, Peter (2019-09-22). "Economical Feasibility of Rare Earth Mining outside China" (in en). Minerals 9 (10): 576. doi:10.3390/min9100576. ISSN 2075-163X. Bibcode: 2019Mine....9..576J.
259. ↑ "Why China, Not the United States, Is Making the Rules for Deep-Sea Mining" (in en). https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/why-china-not-the-united-states-is-making-the-rules-for-deep-sea-mining?lang=en.
260. ↑ "Governments and Parliamentarians" (in en-US). https://deep-sea-conservation.org/solutions/no-deep-sea-mining/momentum-for-a-moratorium/governments-and-parliamentarians/.
261. ↑ Odot, Loraine (2024-07-03). "Seabed mining: a new geopolitical divide?" (in en-GB). https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/geopolitics/seabed-mining-a-new-geopolitical-divide/.
262. ↑ Roach, Anna Bianca (2021-11-08). "The Obscure Organization Powering a Race to Mine the Bottom of the Seas" (in en-US). https://www.passblue.com/2021/11/08/the-obscure-organization-powering-a-race-to-mine-the-bottom-of-the-seas/.
263. ↑ IEA (2022), World Energy Outlook 2022, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022, Licence: CC BY 4.0 (report); CC BY NC SA 4.0 (Annex A)
264. ↑ Miller, K. et al. (2018). An overview of seabed mining including the current state of development, environmental impacts, and knowledge gaps. Frontiers in Marine Sciences 4, 418
265. ↑ KU Leuven (2022). Metals for Clean Energy: Pathways to Solving Europe's Raw Materials Challenge. KU Leuven. https://eurometaux.eu/media/20ad5yza/2022-policymake r-summary-report-final.pdf.
266. ↑ Hagelüken, Christian; Goldmann, Daniel (2022). "Recycling and circular economy—towards a closed loop for metals in emerging clean technologies". Mineral Economics 35 (3–4): 539–562. doi:10.1007/s13563-022-00319-1.
267. ↑ Habib, K. et al. (2020). Critical metals for electromobility: global demand scenarios for passenger vehicles, 2015–2050. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 154, 104603.
268. ↑ ISA (2022a). Technical Study 32. Study of the potential impact of polymetallic nodules production in the Area on the economies of developing land-based producers of those metals which are likely to be most seriously affected.
269. ↑ "Broadening Common Heritage: Addressing Gaps in the Deep Sea Mining Regulatory Regime". Harvard Environmental Law Review. 2018-04-16. http://harvardelr.com/2018/04/16/broadening-common-heritage/#_ftn3.
270. ↑ Doherty, Ben (2018-04-18). "Deep-sea mining possibly as damaging as land mining, lawyers say". https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/apr/18/deep-sea-mining-possibly-as-damaging-as-land-mining-lawyers-say.
271. ↑ 271.0 271.1 Gayle, Damien (3 December 2023). "Deep sea miners turn water hoses on Greenpeace activists in the Pacific". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/02/deep-sea-miners-turn-water-hoses-on-greenpeace-activists-in-the-pacific.
272. ↑ "Magellan Calls for Greenpeace to Leave Their Research Vessel Under Increasing Safety Concerns". 30 November 2023. https://www.magellan.gg/magellan-calls-for-greenpeace-to-leave-their-research-vessel/.
273. ↑ Wright, Stephen (1 August 2024). "Nations join ranks to delay deep-sea mining approval by UN regulator". Radio Free Asia (Benar News). https://www.rfa.org/english/news/environment/un-deep-sea-mining-08012024005625.html.
274. ↑ Gilliver, Liam. "Deep-sea mining: Norway halts controversial practice until 2029". https://www.msn.com/en-ph/news/other/deep-sea-mining-norway-halts-controversial-practice-until-2029/ar-AA1RHgSJ.
275. ↑ Arato, Julian; Jaeckel, Aline; Lixinski, Lucas (2024). "On the Cultural Stakes of Deep Seabed Mining". AJIL Unbound 118: 67–71. doi:10.1017/aju.2024.9. ISSN 2398-7723.
276. ↑ Tilot, Virginie C.; Guilloux, Bleuenn; Willaert, Klaas; Mulalap, Clement Y.; Bambridge, Tamatoa; D'Arcy, Paul; Mawyer, Alexander; Gaulme, François et al. (2021-12-03). "The Concept of Oceanian Sovereignty in the Context of Deep Sea Mining in the Pacific Region". Frontiers in Marine Science 8. doi:10.3389/fmars.2021.756072. ISSN 2296-7745. Bibcode: 2021FrMaS...856072T.
277. ↑ Vierros, Marjo K.; Harrison, Autumn-Lynn; Sloat, Matthew R.; Crespo, Guillermo Ortuño; Moore, Jonathan W.; Dunn, Daniel C.; Ota, Yoshitaka; Cisneros-Montemayor, Andrés M. et al. (2020-09-01). "Considering Indigenous Peoples and local communities in governance of the global ocean commons" (in en). Marine Policy 119. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104039. Bibcode: 2020MarPo.11904039V. https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0308597X19309212.
278. ↑ "Say no to deep sea mining | Blue Climate Initiative" (in en). https://www.blueclimateinitiative.org/say-no-to-deep-sea-mining.
279. ↑ "The Saami Council's statement on Deep Sea Mining" (in en-GB). https://www.saamicouncil.net/news-archive/the-saami-councils-statement-on-deep-sea-mining.
280. ↑ Koop, Fermín. "DEEP-SEA MINING BLOCKS TRANSITION TO A SUSTAINABLE WORLD". https://www.theoxygenproject.com/post/deep-sea-mining-blocks-transition-to-a-sustainable-world/.
281. ↑ "STOP DEEP-SEA MINING". https://ejfoundation.org/what-we-do/ocean/stop-deep-sea-mining.
282. ↑ "What EV makers need to do". https://www.racetothetop.app/?fact=what-ev-makers-need-to-do.
283. ↑ Sharma, Rahul (2015). "Environmental Issues of Deep-Sea Mining". Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 11: 204–211. doi:10.1016/j.proeps.2015.06.026. Bibcode: 2015PrEPS..11..204S. https://pdf.sciencedirectassets.com/278707/1-s2.0-S1878522015X00038/1-s2.0-S1878522015000776/main.pdf?X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJP//////////wEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIEmf27i8IeaFYL002CGhfOOB/RErhffNMHO2UBY+6/vUAiAnZf8YX+eJRGdPPq9r1ftOFs3J7GFpS5U7z+xqSBLzGCqzBQhMEAUaDDA1OTAwMzU0Njg2NSIMwu2hrnscKAHf6hviKpAFVx+32nnHhNPUjNjQ4e2P6JWwiUHh8PYbUuinN1yos1PeGeT6VFFf8Vk2EgfxUrKfBxPi3DdkQMSH9hx63StMy3OW4WvEjl7yP/NtQPKpYO9MMCBbpFUXCddRIzyqA6pF2ieasygWS51cCo7IPZ+9LMNy8oU6VMMoAj7j/GCbHZOAGd1XwSwgVqXKGnoWiftqCAKbKDP8SXN97NCpCz9hTaEijahsYcyrVSohMTY3VD14wreky+nE4fOiQ7ukLph69mTo2GtdNsWlZBa85ILQVIzB6OIePi4TvZlsUr/Iwajg8EXA89OCXoxsW1hb+iILwekJ81snnxJNSP8PUYXml77Vgynh9Buyh1YhydqBqiQZrzxwCvy/adzdS3mM7eX0HcFaTvmdFpYtrRLU/saWWopmtVlrmONbiwpgM+m4RUFUE7+FqRpJOXliCIj9l8hKAxZM1uEKnIhokiWiI4qDZuCDirzs+mX6bknkcA43LqzDgtP5Umjlu2k2cx/K7PDC4tgq0HiJKw9uPZJpbvK9hQX9R4ElFTnLm6vfuB6BzFKaGT05QC1jJ7xtAHTLz511UWD8un+9QjjIRPmDY2MNQPOQey+uG3XAfoPbOTYcAh8+RWFWCks1qA1FxndIi1BAELwf3q8Bi5EjvAnd+W/m/yZB2GGusk4dqZY7c8ck4HZ6P7x33Bls+KumecYNZHhJoxKoBuPhrizLbj4OQFwvSqi/Qn2mXyjvT6F7/Nszh9eUw/HGgDqyGKtqtYKsn/3ubKqKLZ9RXBoIj/GJdW4meoaixVs6iGPQ271/vNInVo5TgA8BRkyy+Hl1adYhYeXlZFXbGUsL/NaGP5QoFzd8lkaSL763wH6wHkzG/cPREvsw2ejpxwY6sgEGuAVzjC9TSiCZmy6ywTgTyw14xAlA0l9wT2DbiZzuTFMfUMnAK7SCfVNx7rOpbWIwM/qtGKsg7qgTvbltjz6VrnE/Q7Mr9VElx5xwq6YOqCiltIb6Inbhi5YzSg+SD5+FJvQKfF7LXkRuM3BdVjG2mtZdQN9B0yvM+umQedi4FGL85d6lsbyhESXUbCy8ZKFyJw0cDOXhym66C+4+N6T6JadtpGdMDOvhy6uG1zmmFqD7&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20251023T193226Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQ3PHCVTY32TQO5RD/20251023/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=077940f45dc4fb2b1e08501d8fdc0ee063a8337b5e3087927e4b2397fcbce12e&hash=bc22091427919f6be16d7b159b97307553d4c9fc3c0471c99d1a192e815ff98f&host=68042c943591013ac2b2430a89b270f6af2c76d8dfd086a07176afe7c76c2c61&pii=S1878522015000776&tid=spdf-6d6f8289-a37f-443c-bd0f-69e2df244011&sid=f4c2b2471cbb1945ce9932a-808f0a97790fgxrqa&type=client&tsoh=d3d3LnNjaWVuY2VkaXJlY3QuY29t&rh=d3d3LnNjaWVuY2VkaXJlY3QuY29t&ua=0f175c5a5c5d0e5e5250&rr=9933a9123ece46fd&cc=us.

## Sources

* United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations. 10 December 1982. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

## External links

* Baraniuk, Chris (2025-03-07). "Deep-sea mining tech advances – but doubts remain" (in en-GB). https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg45zwe0v0ro.

* v
* t
* e

Mining techniques

Surface|

* Open-pit
* Quarrying
* Strip
* Placer
* Dredging
* Hydraulic mining
* Mountaintop removal

Sub-surface|

| Classes|

* Hard rock
* Soft rock

|

Directions|

* Drift
* Slope
* Shaft
* Bell pit
* Borehole

Stoping|

* Room and pillar
* Longwall
* Retreat

* v
* t
* e

Pollution

Air pollution|

* Acid rain
* Air quality index
* Atmospheric dispersion modeling
* Chlorofluorocarbon
* Indoor air quality
* Global dimming
* Global distillation
* Global warming
* Ozone depletion
* Atmospheric particulate matter
* Smog

Water pollution|

* Environmental impact of pharmaceuticals and personal care products
* Environmental impact of shipping
* Environmental monitoring
* Eutrophication
* Freshwater environmental quality parameters
* Groundwater pollution
* Hypoxia
* Marine debris
* Marine pollution
* Nutrient pollution
* Ocean acidification
* Oil spill
* Septic tank
* Surface runoff
* Thermal pollution
* Turbidity
* Urban runoff
* Wastewater
* Water quality
* Water stagnation
* Waterborne diseases

Soil contamination|

* Bioremediation
* Electrical resistance heating
* Herbicide
* Open defecation
* Pesticide
* Phytoremediation
* Soil Guideline Values (SGVs)

Radioactive contamination|

* Actinides in the environment
* Bioremediation of radioactive waste
* Environmental radioactivity
* Fission product
* Nuclear fallout
* Plutonium in the environment
* Radiation poisoning
* Radium in the environment
* Uranium in the environment

Other types of pollution|

* Land degradation
* Light pollution
* Pollution from nanomaterials
* Noise pollution
* Radio spectrum pollution
* Urban heat island
* Visual pollution

Pollution response|

* Cleaner production
* Industrial ecology
* Pollutant release and transfer register
* Polluter pays principle
* Pollution control
* Pollution prevention
* Waste minimization
* Zero waste

Inter-government treaties|

* Basel Convention
* CLRTAP
* Kyoto Protocol
* MARPOL Convention
* Montreal Protocol
* OSPAR
* Rotterdam Convention
* Stockholm Convention

Major organizations|

* Basel Action Network
* Central Pollution Control Board (India)
* DEFRA
* Environment Agency (England)
* Scottish Environment Protection Agency
* U.S. EPA
* European Environment Agency
* Greenpeace

0.00

(0 votes)

Original source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep sea mining. Read more

|

Retrieved from "https://handwiki.org/wiki/index.php?title=Earth:Deep_sea_mining&oldid=4421868"
*[v]: View this template
*[t]: Discuss this template
*[e]: Edit this template