Napoleonic military staff

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This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

[edit intro]

## Contents

* 1 Napoleon's transition to a staff model
* 2 Maison
* 2.1 Aides-de-Camp
* 2.2 Secretariat
* 2.3 Bureau de Renseignment
* 2.4 Topographic Bureau
* 3 Grand Etat-Major General
* 4 Intendance
* 5 References

Napoleon Bonaparte, unquestionably a major military innovator, had a very personalized Napoleonic military staff, differing from today's staff organizations.

> In 1805, a new style of operational warfare burst upon the fields of Europe as Napoleon Bonaparte's Grand Army swept from the Rhine to the Danube surrounding the Austrian army at Ulm and initiating a revolution in military affairs (RMA) whose effects are still felt today. The question remains whether this new style of warfare was merely a natural outgrowth of the work of 18th century military thinkers, whose theories were imitated by a dynamic leader, or did Napoleon bring something new to warfare, a true innovation in the conduct of operational warfare?" Not all historians agree Napoleon was, indeed, that much of an innovator. [1]

## Napoleon's transition to a staff model[edit]

It is accepted he did not have a staff on the general model used by modern militaries, which acts as an alter ego for the commander, but was important in the transition between assistants to an individual and a modern staff. His Grand Quartier-General consisted of three main branches:

* Napoleon's Maison
* Aides-de-camp
* Cabinet
* Grand Etat-Major General, headed by Marshal Louis Alexandre Berthier
* Intendance.

## Maison[edit]

The Maison was Napoleon's personal staff, but with an important addition to the usual clerks.

### Aides-de-Camp[edit]

As opposed to the current role of an aide, which is both to relieve the commander of details, but also to learn how high commanders actually worked, Napoleon's aides were experienced general officers, each an expert in his own branch of service, who were 'trained up in Napoleon's own school of war', and capable of significant independent assignments, from a task force of all arms on the battlefield to the negotiating of a treaty.

In modern terms, these aides were a combination of high command observers, but also with delegated authority, even over Marshals of France, and the ability to command task forces. Napoleon had up to 12, although not all were present at every engagement. These officers had their own "little aides-de-camp, [who] were employed by Napoleon when needed."[2]

### Secretariat[edit]

This office was responsible for his correspondence and consisted of civilian secretaries, archivists, and a librarian.

### Bureau de Renseignment[edit]

A military intelligence organization, responsible largely for strategic intelligence, which was passed on to Berthier's cabinet.

### Topographic Bureau[edit]

While this group did keep maps and plans, it was closer to the current intelligence and intelligence reference library of a modern intelligence staff. It kept Napoleon's situation map, but also reference materials on potential areas of operations and their resources.

## Grand Etat-Major General[edit]

Napoleon's principal staff officer, Louis Alexandre Berthier, was trained by Pierrre de Bourcet. Kiley cites Spencer Wilkinson aptly stated, regarding Bourcet, that 'On every occasion when an important decision had to be made Bourcet would write a memorandum in which he analyzed the situation and set forth in detail, with full explanations and reasons, the course which seemed to him best. In very many cases, his suggestions were adopted and were usually justified by success, and when they were rejected the results were seldom fortunate.' Not only was Bourcet the most expert staff officer of his day, he was the first to come up with what is called today an estimate of the situation, as illustrated above. From him, and the staff school at Grenoble, of which he was the director from 1764-1771, came the embryo from which evolved the Napoleonic staff, of which Berthier was the preeminent product.'

> A plan ought to have several branches ... One should ... mislead the enemy and make him imagine that the main effort is coming at some other part. And ... one must be ready to profit by a second or third branch of the plan without giving one’s enemy time to consider it.  -- Pierre de Bourcet[3]

David Chandler maintains that "Napoleon contributed little new." As we struggle today with the implications of a possible revolution in military affairs, RMA, it is important that we fully understand the forces that caused former RMA's to occur. For the historian, it is also important that we get our interpretations of past events as correct as possible. Was this a RMA that would have happened with any energetic leader who strictly followed the teachings of Bourcet and Guibert, as a sort of TTP put together by theorists, or did Napoleon take their theories, and meld them with his own ideas to create a new form of warfare and initiate a RMA? Does a true RMA require more than just theories and doctrine, does it require an inquiring mind on the part of the practitioner as well? [1]

## Intendance[edit]

An organization headed by the Intendant preceded Napoleon. While the preceding two organizations assisted Napoleon in field operations, the Intendance was the permanent governmental military administration, begun by of Louis XIV's minister of war, the Marquis de Louvois (1641-1691). Under Lavois, the French army expanded from 20,000 to 100,000.[4]

## References[edit]

1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Wasson, James N. (21 May 1998), Innovator or Imitator: Napoleon's Operational Concepts and the Legacies of Bourcet and Guibert., School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, ADA357424
2. ↑ Kiley, Kevin (January 2001), The Grand Quartier-General Imperial and the Corps d'Armée: Developments in the Military Art, 1795-1815
3. ↑ Boyd, John R., Organic Design for Command and Control, Defense and the National Interest
4. ↑ Nathan D. Wells (2008), In the Support of Amorality: The Rise of the Staff in the Western Way of War, Military History Online