Iraq Survey Group

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This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

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## Contents

* 1 Conclusions
* 1.1 Strategic intent
* 1.2 Delivery systems
* 1.3 Nuclear program
* 1.4 Biological program
* 1.5 Chemical program
* 2 Methods
* 2.1 Interrogation
* 3 References

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a U.S., Australian and British intelligence organization that entered Iraq early in the Iraq War, searching for weapons of mass destruction, as well as other prohibited weapons such as long-range guided missiles. Its field commander was then-major general Keith Dayton of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Advising it and preparing it were senior advisers to the Director of Central Intelligence, first David Kay and then, after his resignation, Charles Duelfer. It should not be confused with the Iraq Study Group, a subsequent U.S.-only high-level commission evaluating the Iraq War as well as its justification.

In its unclassified form, the "Duelfer Report" was delivered in key findings, three main volumes, and addenda.

* Volume I considered Saddam Hussein's strategic intent, as well as the means of finance and procurement of key materials. [1]
* Volume II dealt with WMD delivery systems and nuclear weapons[2]
* Volume III addressed the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons programs.[3]

## Conclusions[edit]

### Strategic intent[edit]

"Saddam Hussein[4] so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted."

His opinion of the value of WMD was formed during the Iran-Iraq War, and he always regarded Iran as the principal target. After his WMD capability, which was "essentially destroyed in 1991", his intention was to rebuild the capability after sanctions were ended and the Iraqi economy stabilized. A renewed program would have different priorities, with ballistic missiles and tactical chemical weapons, followed by nuclear weapons, as the first and second goals. [5]

Nevertheless, he maintained a posture of strategic ambiguity, probably both as a deterrent against Iran and Israel, and also to avoid suffering the loss of prestige from being disarmed.

### Delivery systems[edit]

From the 1980s on, Saddam sought long-range delivery vehicles. The original effort involved 819 SS-1 SCUD missiles purchased from the Soviet Union, which initially were adapted to increase range. They were used in combat in the Gulf War. ISG formed the opinion that all had been disposed of by late 1991.

### Nuclear program[edit]

### Biological program[edit]

### Chemical program[edit]

## Methods[edit]

### Interrogation[edit]

ISG interrogated high-level Iraqi figures, such as former members of the government. Some of those had been captured by the Joint Special Operations Command Special Mission Unit task force (SMU TF) or conventional units. From the onset, ISG, which its own interrogation staff, had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of detainees.[6]. On August 8, MG Dayton also issued an order that CIA personnel not be allowed to interrogate ISG prisoners without his staff being present, although accounts differ whether this concerned potential abuse, or an issue of responsibility for intelligence. CIA officials said it reinforced a cable sent by the C.I.A's Baghdad station to headquarters on July 16, 2003. That cable expressed concern that SMU TF personnel, on joint teams, had used techniques that had become too aggressive.[7]

## References[edit]

1. ↑ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, vol. I (Revised from September 2004 ed.), Central Intelligence Agency
2. ↑ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, vol. II (Revised from September 2004 ed.), Central Intelligence Agency
3. ↑ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, vol. III (Revised from September 2004 ed.), Central Intelligence Agency
4. ↑ The report uses the transliteration "Saddam Husayn"
5. ↑ Report Volume 1, p. 1
6. ↑ Senate Armed Services Committee (November 20, 2008), Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, SASC November 2008 , pp. 162-164
7. ↑ Douglas Jehl (September 11, 2004), "Conflict in Iraq: Prison Policy; C.I.A. Cites Order on Supervised Interrogations", New York Times