Munitions_Of_War

"Munitions Of War. \- Under this heading, while it would be impracticable to refer to what was done by all the belligerent countries, the organization of the production of munitions during the World War by the United Kingdom and in the United States, on the one hand, and by the Central Powers on the other, is dealt with. Its history in the United Kingdom is told first.

1.-UNITED KINGDOM The Problem. - When the British army of six divisions took the field in 1914 it possessed about 900 field guns, less than 200 field howitzers, about 60 heavier weapons of 6-in. and upwards and perhaps about 200 obsolescent types, such as the 4.7-in. and the 85-pdr. howitzer, a reserve of ammunition of less than a million rounds weighing some 20,000 tons, and less than 2,000 machineguns. By the end of 1918, the army had received 10,000 field guns, 6,000 other light guns, over 3,000 field howitzers and 7,500 heavier guns and howitzers; 217 million rounds of artillery ammunition weighing 54 million tons and nearly 225,000 machine-guns.

The revolution in the material means of waging war was one which none of the belligerents entirely foresaw. It is true that the German and, to a less extent, the French army had munition reserves on a vastly greater scale than the British; but Germany counted upon a short war, and as she had not made adequate preparation for a continuous industrial effort, her armies were strictly rationed in 1915 while her resources were being mobilized. France was quick to appreciate the significance of the bombardments of the early battles, and in Oct. 1914 set machinery in motion for organizing her industrial resources under the direction of M. Thomas, who was appointed Under-Secretary for War in charge of munitions. For this task France had available a large number of expert officers who had passed through the arsenals, and these were placed in charge of districts in which they combined inspection with control of supplies.

  


Great Britain, on the other hand, was for various reasons slower to realize the change that had occurred, and in any case had a much smaller trained personnel and equipment for producing land munitions than the continental Powers. The Royal Ordnance Factories were, of course, at once set to work at fullest pressure and in October very large orders were placed with the armament firms who were given very wide instructions to expand their production. Mr. Ernest Moir was also sent to France to report on the schemes of the French Government But time was needed to enable the situation to be seen in true perspective, for Great Britain was faced not merely with the task of providing a new and unprecedented scale of equipment, but also with the need of enlarging the expeditionary force into a continental army. On this last point opinion was slowly changing during the winter of 1914, but even in the spring of 1915 a large section of instructed opinion still urged that Britain's best contribution to the Allied cause was to conserve her economic strength and carry on " business as usual." In this environment the authorities at the War Office, many of whose most experienced personnel had been sent to the front, and who were overburdened by the colossal problem of keeping the army supplied with its most urgent daily necessities, failed to appreciate fully the change needed in the standard of equipment and the sweeping character of the plans that would have to be made for dealing with it. At the outbreak of war, for example, the standard of machine-guns was 2 per battalion and it was not until the spring of 1915 that this was raised to 8 per battalion. At the end of the war the standard worked out at 48 per battalion. As regards ammunition a small increase in the number of rounds per gun per day on which the programme of field-gun ammunition was based was made before Christmas 1914; by the early summer of 1915 the basis was raised to 25 rounds per gun per day for field guns and in Sept. 1916 to 50 rounds per gun per day. One reason for this moderation was that in the early months of the war the officers in the War Office who framed the munition programme constantly had in mind the limited capacity of the country for producing munitions, and it was not until the middle of 1915 that this consideration was abandoned.

## War Office Policy

This point of view led to a conservative attitude in the placing of contracts. With its staff both at headquarters and in the inspection departments seriously depleted, the War Office not unnaturally clung to old and tried sources of supply and limited its orders during 1914 to Government factories and the armament firms. It relied for increased supplies on extensions to the Royal Ordnance Factories and at the works of Messrs. Vickers and Armstrong's (for ammunition and other munitions), Coventry Ordnance Works (chiefly for field guns and howitzers) and the Birmingham Small Arms Company (for machine-guns), leaving it to the armament firms to obtain any further increase from the engineering resources of the country by placing their own sub-contracts. The immediate result was a big demand for labour from these armament firms, and while this was at first forthcoming, the continued absorption into the army soon made the position difficult. At the request of the War Office, therefore, the Labour Department of the Board of Trade carried out a brisk campaign in Jan. 1915 for the recruiting of labour for these firms. This canvass produced only small results. It brought to light, however, the strong objection of the ordinary engineering firm against permitting their most essential men to be passed on to the armament firms and the demand that contracts should be more widely distributed.

This claim was constantly pressed by the Board of Trade; but during the spring of 1915 the War Office adhered to the policy of dealing only with the armament firms, and continually pressed for labour to be supplied to them. In March, however, the War Office permitted an exhibition of samples of munitions to be held at the central offices of the labour exchanges in the main towns of the country, and as a result a few small con- tracts were placed with individual firms.

## Armaments and Treasury Committees

The nation was, however, rapidly realizing the need for more drastic treatment of the problem, and at the end of March Lord Kitchener appointed an " Armaments Output Committee " in the War Office under the chairmanship of Mr. George Booth, a shipowner and banker.

A week later the Government appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Lloyd George - known as the " Treasury Committee " - to take charge of munition policy. The " Armaments Output Committee" at the War Office at once became in effect the executive instrument of the Treasury Committee, and one of its first actions was the securing of an order for the Leicester cooperative group. During the months of April and May the Armaments Committee, on which Sir Percy Girouard (a director of Armstrong's) had now joined Mr. Booth, brought into existence several local committees to produce munitions in some cases by cooperative effort and in others to institute national factories to which the various firms would contribute machinery and labour. At first an effort was made to maintain the predominance of the armament firms in certain areas by giving them within these districts a first call on the available engineering labour. Another plan was for the armament firms to " mother " the new contractors and exercise a general supervision over the work of a district. But after much discussion all restrictions in favour of the armament firms were definitely broken down, and by the time the Ministry of Munitions was formed it had become evident that the list of direct contractors must be enormously increased. Following the lead of Woolwich the armament firms thereupon threw open their doors to visiting parties of engineers to learn and study the method of shell, fuze and other armament production.

But while orders could be and indeed had been placed on a large scale, deliveries were not forthcoming. The Armaments Committee endeavoured to deal with some of the difficulties by setting up a machine-tool department in the charge of Sir Alfred Herbert, who at once issued instructions to machinetool makers to give priority to orders in hand for the British Government or for armament contractors. A raw materials section, which was placed in May under the charge of Mr. Leonard Llewellyn, also began an inquiry into the situation as regards copper, brass, aluminium, lead, antimony and spelter.

## Labour

A still greater difficulty was labour. For several months the Board of Trade had been making great efforts to deal with the labour situation, and in particular to check the recruiting of skilled engineers, both from armament and other engineering works. Lord Kitchener's view on this matter was that any man who wished to enlist should be permitted to do so, and it was not until March 1915 that he accepted the principle that it might be of greater national advantage to retain a skilled munition worker at his occupation in the workshop than to allow him to join the army. A beginning was made in April 1915 by scheduling certain occupations in respect of which the recruiting officers were to discourage enlistment, and by issuing badges to men in armament firms to save them from the pressure of public opinion, which at this time was being exerted very forcibly on able-bodied men to join the army.

But the labour shortage in the spring of '915 was approached not only from the point of view of numbers of skilled men in employment. Attempts were also made to increase production by diminishing lost time, suspending such trade-union rules as restricted output, and admitting semi-skilled, unskilled or female labour to do part of the work hitherto done by skilled men. Up to Christmas 1914 negotiations on these points took place between the shipbuilding and engineering employers and employed, but without result. In Jan. and Feb. 1915 a sudden rise in prices and acute competition for labour between the various Government contractors produced considerable migration of labour and a general state of unrest, which found expression in a series of strikes. On March 15 the engineering workpeople agreed with the employers that, to a limited extent and as experience proved necessary, semi-skilled or female labour might be substituted for skilled labour subject to certain conditions, of which the most important was that the substituted workpeople should be paid the district rate of the men replaced. These relaxations were to be withdrawn at the end of the war.

  


This, however, hardly went far enough, and, as the result of a series of conferences held between March 17 and March 27, the trade-union leaders signed the Treasury Agreement, under which they undertook to recommend their constituents to suspend restrictive practices for the period of the war in return for an undertaking that the Government would see that the profit resulting from these suspensions did not go to private employers. This agreement coincided with the passing of a Defence of the Realm Act which authorized the Government to " take over " firms engaged on munition work. It was at first intended that this should involve the actual control of the four big armament firms in the same way that the Government had " taken over " the railways. But after negotiations with these firms the idea of handing over their management to an executive committee was abandoned, and the limitation of profits retained as the only substantial element in " taking over." On the other hand, it was increasingly evident that the same rule would have to apply to a far wider field than the four big armament firms. Hence the agreement was not at this time carried into effect, since the trade-union leaders found it difficult to carry out their part of the bargain in practice, while the negotiations with the firms dragged on until the Ministry of Munitions came into existence. The labour situation was complicated during this period by the efforts of various employers to entice away the skilled labour of their competitors, and considerable loss of output was suffered by the migration of labour.

## Foreign Orders

At a very early stage the inability of contractors to guarantee prompt delivery led to the placing of orders in America and Canada. These orders, though not very large in amount compared with subsequent purchases, had one important result in the conclusion of a commercial agency agreement between the British Government and Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. of New York, who were made solely responsible for the purchase of British munitions in the United States. Orders had been placed by the War Office for 4.7-in. shell and for nitrocellulose powder as early as Oct. 1914, followed in November by orders for rifles, metals and explosives. By the end of the year not only Great Britain but the Allies and the armament firms in all Allied countries were negotiating for munitions, materials or machinery, with the result that considerable confusion and competition existed. Hence, in Jan. 1915, an agreement was arrived at under which Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. were made sole purchasing agents for the British Government on the basis of a commission of 1% on all purchases made. At this time the War Office anticipated that the value of these contracts would not exceed 10 millions sterling, but by the middle of the year it was, in fact, approaching loo millions and by the end of the year was over 200 millions. The large commission payable on these orders subsequently gave rise to some criticism; but Messrs. Morgan had in effect to create a munitions department to deal with this immense volume of business without the powers which the War Office and subsequently the Ministry of Munitions exercised in Great Britain. This organization was placed in charge of Mr. E. R. Stettinius of the Diamond Match Company, and the efficiency of its service and the enterprise shown by the commercial agents in protecting the interests of the British and subsequently of the Allied Governments proved of immense service to the Allied cause. The arrangement continued until shortly after America came into the war, when other machinery was needed for obtaining supplies owing to the institution of farreaching control by the American Government.

## Rifles

During these early months public attention was mainly devoted to the question of ammunition. But in fact an even more urgent problem was that of rifles, the manufacture of which requires not only very specialized machinery, but also demands labour of special experience which could only be slowly increased. On the other hand, the number of rifles required for training and equipping a rapidly growing army as well as for replacing wastage in the field was far in excess of the stock in the country. For training purposes old-pattern rifles were repaired and resighted and a considerable number of rifles borrowed from Japan. But the date at which the new armies took the field was largely governed during the first twelve months of the war by the slow but steady increase in the output of service rifles, most of which were supplied by the Government arsenal at Enfield. Early in 1915 the War Office became seriously disturbed at the slow rate of increase in production, and finally orders for a million rifles of a slightly modified Enfield pattern were placed early in April 1915 in America with the Remington Co. which had already been given a large order for rifles of Russian pattern. This order was subsequently increased and additional orders placed, but though delivery was originally promised for the autumn of 1915, the rifles were not in fact available before the summer of 1916 and on arrival were found to need adjustment before they could be issued for service. As the cumulative output of Enfield and of the private firms in Great Britain had by that time overtaken requirements and the wastage in trench warfare had proved less than was feared, none of these American rifles were ever actually sent into the field with the British army. The effect of these orders was, however, that when America came into the war she had available two or three of the largest and most modern rifle plants in the world, which had just come into full production.

## Situation in May 1915

By May 1915 it was still uncertain how large a force Great Britain would endeavour to put into the field, and the War Office was still far from realizing the great increase that must be made in the standard of equipment. Substantial orders had been placed at home and abroad; and at home, as a result mainly of civilian pressure, a beginning was being made to place these contracts outside the range of the armament firms. It was, however, fast becoming clear that no contractor would, without assistance, be able to steer through the rising confusion of economic disturbance, and that the Government would have to assist contractors with both plant and material. But the War Office had neither the staff nor the experience to institute effective statistical or technical control over so large a commercial business. A treaty had been made with the labour leaders to abolish restrictive practices and to permit the employment of female and unskilled labour, but the arrangement was not being carried out in the shops. Hence the enormous orders which had been given to the armament firms were not being fulfilled, and subsequent events proved that if the goods had been delivered the inspection, storage, and transit organizations would have been unable to cope with them.

## The Ministry of Munitions

The Ministry of Munitions was an inevitable consequence of the failure of contractors g,nd subcontractors to cope with this economic situation, and of the fact that the War Office had not the technical resources, even if it had the will, to create the organization needed for handling so complex and so rapidly changing a problem. It was stated on May 14 by the military correspondent of The Times (approved by G.H.Q., France) that " we had not sufficient high explosive to level the enemy's parapets to the ground after the French practice." It may be noted in passing that, although this comment refers only to H.E., there were two aspects to the problem, namely (1) inadequacy of ammunition as a whole, and (2) the proportion of shrapnel and H.E. respectively to be supplied for field artillery. On the latter question British tradition had always favoured shrapnel, whereas French practice was to use practically all H.E., with their famous 75-mm. field gun.. Experience eventually proved that r8-pdr. H.E. shell, which contained only 13 oz. of H.E., was of little use for destroying deep entrenchments, and it was ultimately limited to use against personnel, against surface works and for wire-cutting.

On the British front the last of these tasks continued mainly to be done by means of shrapnel. Hence, in spite of the fact that, when the initial difficulties had been overcome, the H.E. 18pdr. shell was easier to manufacture in quantity than shrapnel, the British army in France throughout the war fired only 40 million rounds of H.E. compared with 60 million rounds of shrapnel (of which less than 3 million were fired up to the end of 1915). The event in fact proved that the more fundamental deficiency was in heavy artillery firing H.E. shell of large calibre - the standard types of which were ultimately the 60-pdr. shell containing rather more than 6 lb. H.E., the 6-in. howitzer shell weighing loo lb. and containing 122 lb. of H.E., the 8-in. howitzer shell weighing 200 lb. and containing 20 lb. H.E., the 9.2-in. howitzer shell weighing 290 lb. and containing 34 to 52 lb. H.E., and the 12-in. howitzer shell weighing 750 lb. and containing 66 to 105 lb. H.E. In this respect G.H.Q., equally with the authorities at home, were open to the criticism of being slow to see future developments, since at this time they had not put forward any large demand for heavy artillery.

The Times article, backed by the authority of the army in the field, confirmed the growing fear that the British troops were inadequately supplied with ammunition compared with the enemy or even with the Allies. The political crisis which ensued brought the Ministry of Munitions into being, with 1 of 6 Munitions Of War Mr. Lloyd George at its head, and the members and staff of the Armaments Output Committee and of the Treasury Committee as the nucleus of its personnel.

The first year of the Ministry of Munitions was the creative period not only as regards the internal structure of the Ministry itself, but also in regard to its main duties. It was a period in which army demands were defined, manufacturing programmes laid down, methods of dealing with labour formulated and put into effect, large numbers of specialized factories designed for mass production constructed, and devices evolved for exercising control over the industrial life of the country.

The Ministry of Munitions Act, which received the Royal assent on June 9 1915, did little more than create the post of Minister of Munitions. The definition of his functions was left to be fixed by Orders in Council. The Act was therefore followed a week later by an order transferring to the Minister of Munitions the main functions of the Master-General of the Ordnance in relation to contracts and the supply of munitions (including explosives) and the inspection of munitions. The Minister of Munitions was given concurrent power with the War Office under the Defence of the Realm Act which gave authority to take over and regulate the work of any factory. The Minister was also given a general duty to " examine into and organize the sources of supply and the labour available for the supply of any kind of munitions of war, the supply of which is in whole or in part undertaken by him, and by that means, as far as possible, to ensure such supply of munitions for the present war as may be required by the Army Council or the Admiralty or may otherwise be found necessary." In the.. first instance the War Office retained the control of the ordnance factory at Woolwich, the small-arms factory at Enfield, and the Waltham powder factory, and also the right to lay down the standards of inspection to be observed by the inspectors in the factories. Provision was made, however, for the transfer of these or any other functions in the future as might be agreed upon between the Minister of Munitions and the Secretary of State for War or the head of any other interested department, such as the Admiralty.

The ordnance factory at this time and for many months to come was doing the lion's share in supplying the army with munitions, not only because of the volume of its output but even more because its large supply of skilled labour, its staff of technical officers, and the fact that it had drawings and specifications available of all stores in army service, made it the only means of supplying the sudden and of ten small demands which the inadequate and miscellaneous character of the equipment in the field made inevitable. The War Office was therefore unwilling to hand over so vital an institution until the new organization had got on its feet. The transfer was, however, made in Sept. 1915.

## Internal Organization

From the outset the work of the Ministry fell into two main sections: that concerned with the supply of munitions and all that this involved in technical assistance to contractors, supervision of inspection, stores, transport, control of materials and regulation of non-munition work; and, on the other hand, the regulation and control of munition labour. These two functions divided the Ministry into two divisions which were housed in separate buildings and developed along divergent lines of organization. The labour section of the Ministry, staffed largely by personnel drawn from the Labour Exchanges Branch of the Board of Trade, developed its organization on civil-service principles, the heads of departments reporting to the Minister through the general secretary of the Ministry, Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith. The business men, on the other hand, who were called in as heads of the supply departments, had a profound distrust of orthodox Government methods and demanded the right of direct access to the Minister. A brief controversy on this point between the general secretary and the director-general of munition supply (Sir Percy Girouard) ended in the latter's victory. This was perhaps justified by the imperative necessity for prompt action; and as Mr. Lloyd George encouraged the heads of departments to act upon their own responsibility on the basis of general instructions, it enabled a large number of activities to be pressed forward at the same time. It had the effect, however, of making the general secretary practically head of the labour sections only of the Ministry; and moreover, as the right of access was secured not only by Sir Percy Girouard (who was succeeded in August by Sir Frederick Black), but also by the deputy directors - Mr. Glynn West (in charge of ammunition), Mr. Booth (establishment, foreign orders, etc.), Mr. Eric Geddes (small arms), Mr. C. E. Ellis (guns) - and by the heads of the departments of explosives (Lord Moulton) and trench warfare (Gen. Louis Jackson, and Mr. Alexander Roger), and as the number claiming this privilege continued to increase, it gave rise to difficulty in coordinating the work of the various sections. Within the first few weeks, these various heads of departments went to the corresponding sections of the War Office, discussed requirements and gave instructions to the contracts department or placed their own contracts, without reference to the programme of the department as a whole. This difficulty was overcome by setting up a " Requirements and Statistics " department, whose primary duty was to be the sole official channel of communication between the Ministry of Munitions and the War Office on all questions relating to supply. Informal discussion was encouraged, but the various departments were authorized to act only on the formal demand from this new department. Since this department had passing through its hands the programme as a whole, it was also given the duty of compiling the statistics of the Ministry and receiving weekly progress reports from the supply departments.

The diversity of experience in organization among the business men also led to confusion in the mechanical arrangements for distribution and registration of papers, and it was some months before the newcomers grasped the essential difference between acting as head of a section of a large public service which is a part of a still greater whole and acting as head of a private business. These defects, which arose from the very qualities which enabled the Ministry successfully to set rapidly in motion and ultimately to control the immense industrial reserves of the country, finally induced Mr. Lloyd George in March 1916 to change his headquarters from the labour department to the main supply department. In March 1916, Mr. E. B. Phipps was transferred from the Board of Education as second general secretary to take charge of the mechanical organization of the supply departments.

## Munitions of War Act

The first task of Mr. Lloyd George was to make the country realize that the munition effort must be second only in importance to the work of the army in the field, and must override all such ideas, for instance, as of the importance on economic grounds of maintaining the export trade. Hence during June he undertook a campaign of speeches in the chief industrial centres to prepare the minds of both employers and workpeople for the very great restrictions imposed by the Munitions of War Act.

  


The chief provisions of this Act (July 2 1915), which brought to a head the developments in the labour situation seen during the first year of the war, may be summarized as follows: - arbitration in disputes as to wages, hours and conditions of service made compulsory; strikes and lockouts prohibited; Minister authorized to declare factories " Controlled Establishments "; profits of these establishments limited by means of a tax known as the " Munitions Levy"; no wage changes to be made in controlled establishments without consent of Ministry; migration of labour prevented by provision that a controlled establishment must not engage a man unless he held a " leaving certificate " from previous employer; Minister authorized to demand statistical returns; Minister given authority to issue badges which protected men from pressure to join the army and to suppress illicit badges; Minister authorized to create corps of war munition volunteers available for transfer at his discretion; Minister authorized to demand removal of labour from non-munition work. The administration of the labour sections of the Act was placed in the hands of " Munitions Tribunals " set up in all industrial centres. The Act had con siderable success in stabilizing labour conditions, and brought to an end the period of unrest.

Almost immediately the Act was passed a strike occurred in the South Wales mines, and it required a personal visit of the Minister to persuade the men to return. But this was the last serious outbreak for a very considerable period.

In regard to female labour and the abandonment of union rules, the objections of the ordinary trade unionist to permitting unskilled labour to do work previously regarded as skilled had been steadily weakening as the shortage of labour became more acute, and as experience of making shells and fuzes on repetition methods spread through the country it became more obvious that the work was unskilled. Finally the disinclination to surrender pre-war practices had largely arisen from the fact that it was impossible to prevent the changes spreading to private work, and in any case it was extremely difficult to distinguish between Government and private work; but as the year proceeded private work fell more and more into the background. Prejudice on the part both of employers and workpeople against the employment of women in engineering work had still to be overcome. The men's opposition to the women was considerably appeased by the decision that women doing skilled or semi-skilled work should be paid the same rate as the men displaced, while the fixing of a minimum wage for unskilled female labour of £1 a week tended to raise the level of women's wages in general and minimize the possibility of men's wages being prejudiced. A department was started to encourage welfare work in the factories, and in many congested districts housing and hostel schemes were initiated. From the passing of the Act the employment of women on munition work increased continuously until the end of the war. In the succeeding six months, the " badging " system of the Minis try (see Labour Supply And Regulation) caused a decided check to recruiting from the engineering factories. Indeed, at a later stage it appeared that badges had been given rather too freely, and many badged men were ultimately released for service. The plan of mobilizing a corps of war munition volunteers met with only a qualified success at this period, and a great difficulty was experienced in obtaining the release of men from the army. This problem was somewhat simplified after the introduction of compulsory military service.

The " Munitions Levy " was ultimately succeeded by the general Excess Profits Duty, leviable on all firms in the country, and the assessment passed from the Ministry into the hands of the Board of Inland Revenue. This Act, which created the powers exercised by the labour section of the Ministry of Munitions, involved a very extensive interference by Government with the liberty of the individual worker, and was the more remarkable since at this date the army was still dependent upon voluntary enlistment. Its passage was only made possible by the clauses limiting private profit on munition work.

## The Production Programme

Early steps were taken to ascertain the general requirements of the War Office. But the Minister, in view of the circumstances of his appointment, considered himself in no way bound by these demands, and held that he was free to place such orders as would ensure an enormous increase in the munition-making capacity of the country and also to look very far ahead in placing orders abroad.

## Guns

The most notable action of Mr. Lloyd George in this respect was in the matter of heavy artillery. In June 1915 a conference on munitions was held at Boulogne, at which French experts strongly urged the necessity of increasing enormously the proportion of heavy artillery per division. Field artillery had practically no effect on deep trenches, and as the whole front had become a vast entrenchment it was necessary to contemplate having in the field as many heavy guns as field guns. Following upon this conference, Sir John French put forward a demand to the War Office to provide for each division and army corps a definite establishment of heavy guns and howitzers 6 in. and upwards. This standard was worked out on the basis of 50 divisions and put forward as a definite demand. In view, however, of responsibilities in other theatres of war and of pressure from the French Government, the War Office was already laying its plans on the basis of 70 divisions. The gun programme, therefore, before being passed to the Ministry was proportionately increased and an allowance added as reserve. On receipt of this demand the Minister early in July allocated these orders among the armament firms and authorized the necessary extensions to plant and the purchase of the large quantity of machine tools required from English and American manufacturers. It was obvious, however, that the scale of the plant to be developed would determine the date at which these enormous orders could be fulfilled. Mr. Lloyd George had at this time urged the necessity of increasing the British military effort to ioo divisions. Partly with this object in view and partly to broaden the basis of the munition output of Great Britain, which was still far behind that of Germany, he increased the programme on his own responsibility in Aug. 1915 to a ioo-division standard, and ordered all the consequential demands for shell, fuzes, explosives, propellants, steel, etc., to be calculated on this basis. This action was much criticized both on the ground of expense and the alleged impossibility of training personnel to man so vast an armament. But Mr. Lloyd George was supported by the Cabinet, though arrangements were in train in the spring of 1916 for handing over the surplus to the Allies and particularly to Russia if and when it matured.

Within a few days, however, of the opening of the battle of the Somme in July 1916, G.H.Q. revised their ideas and put forward an entirely new basis of equipment. The establishment of 6-in. howitzers, which had seemed large in July 1915, was trebled; the demand for 8-in. and 9.2-in. howitzers was doubled, while a new item was added in the shape of heavy long-range guns. When the programme was examined it was found that the surplus orders of the Ministry covered these increased demands for all heavy howitzers except the 6-in. and that only comparatively small additions to the existing gunmaking capacity would be required to enable the Ministry to cope with the whole of the new programme. So complete a vindication of Mr. Lloyd George's courageous action, with its farreaching consequences in the subsequent campaigns, marks it as one of his great contributions to the Allied cause. Indeed, his contention that gunmaking capacity would be one of the vital factors in the campaign was repeatedly confirmed by subsequent events which involved new calls upon British gunmaking capacity. In the first place French experience at Verdun, and subsequently British experience on the Somme, soon showed not only that wastage by destruction would be far larger than had been anticipated, but also that expenditure of ammunition was on so huge a scale that the number of guns worn out and needing relining would be very large indeed. Secondly, it was decided before Christmas to arm all merchant ships with two guns capable of coping with submarines. Thirdly, an urgent and increasing demand arose for anti-aircraft guns, not only on the front but also for the defence of London and many other strategic points in Great Britain. Finally, the development of the use of tanks on a large scale called for the production of an enormous number of guns of small calibre.

Hence it was not until the middle of 1918 that the output of guns of all kinds became sufficient for these combined requirements, and after the output and importation from America of large-calibre shells had enabled heavy stocks to be accumulated, it became necessary to divert some of the projectile factories from shell-making to the repair of guns.

## Ammunition

The highly technical processes involved in gun manufacture remained for the most part in the hands of a comparatively few firms. The ammunition programme, on the other hand, with its immense drain on materials and plant, until the end of the war absorbed more than half of the energies of the Ministry and of the munition factories, and was the main cause for the control which was ultimately imposed upon the industry of the country. The shell itself, which at first figured so largely in public discussion, is, as its name implies, merely a container of H.E. or of bullets, and the problem of finding sufficient explosive, propellant, fuzes, primers, cartridge cases and the score or so of other components which go to make up a round of ammunition, proved much more difficult than the manufacture of the shell. The balancing of output, including the appropriate provision of the various metals or chemical substances, was not accomplished without much experience; and as from time to time particular items were ahead or in arrears, the Ministry had to provide for the accommodation of large stocks at all stages of production. The programme thus involved the building-up of a colossal stores organization, the burden upon which was greatly increased by the irregularity in the rate of consumption on the front. Moreover, as the Ministry found it necessary to make itself directly responsible for supplying materials to contractors it became not merely a purchasing department but one of the greatest selling organizations in the world.

The ammunition programme was calculated from the enlarged artillery programme on the basis of the expenditure per gun per day asked for by G.H.Q. But as it was impossible accurately to foresee to what extent new firms or new shell factories would produce the output expected from them, there was added to the net shell demand a margin of 50% in the case of light shell (up to 4.5 in.), which had been ordered largely from inexperienced firms, and 33% in the case of heavier natures, which at first were confined to more experienced firms or new factories built for the purpose. Orders for the former were placed to a large extent through the local committees called into existence by the War Office Armaments Committee or by the Ministry during the June publicity campaign. In some cases the orders went to special factories, in others to cooperative groups, the whole organization being bound together by a local office of the Ministry under a special directorate (in charge of Mr. James Stevenson) at headquarters. The supply of heavier shell was met by orders with armament and other selected firms, but when the programme was increased in Aug. 1915, it was decided that " national projectile factories " should be built for the Ministry and managed by the various experienced firms on a commission basis. These factories, laid out for a special purpose, ultimately proved highly efficient in mass production and enabled an enormous saving to be made in. cost. Additional orders for both light and heavy shell were also placed in America and Canada.

Experience proved, however, that light shell could be turned out much more readily than fuzes and other components, and they began to come forward rapidly and before the filling factories were ready to deal with them. The American share of the programme had also been ordered for early delivery. Hence, by the summer of 1916, an enormous stock of light shell had accumulated, partly as a deliberate policy and partly from fortuitous causes. At various dates, therefore, in 1916 light-shell orders in America were allowed to terminate and output at home cut down, and the machinery partly turned on to heavy shell.

The new artillery programme of July 1916, however, based upon experience on the Somme, not only absorbed the surplus Ministry orders for heavy artillery, but also raised the daily ammunition ration for heavy guns. The Minister was still uncertain what output would be attained in the national projectile factories, which were only then coming into production, and therefore almost his last act at the Ministry was to place large orders in America and Canada, in the two natures in which the biggest increase was asked for, viz. 8-in. and 9.2-in. shell.

Shells could be made in any engineering shop; but explosives could only be handled in factories built for the purpose. Hence, as soon as the ammunition programme was settled the ammunition department set to work to plan and to build a dozen large filling factories, which were rapidly completed and began to handle shell in Feb. and March of 1916. The task of these factories was, however, not merely the technical one of filling shell, making cartridges or filling fuzes, but also that of assembling all the necessary components in proper proportion and of handing to the army in complete condition as rapidly as the Ordnance Department could accept delivery. At Christmas 1915 the organization of these filling factories was divided from ammunition manufacture and handed to a new department. During the spring their work was delayed not only by inexperience, but also by the inability of the technicians to find a satisfactory fuze for detonating amatol filled H.E. shell which would avoid the Scylla of over-sensitiveness, with the resulting casualties to the troops through prematures or gunbursts, and the Charybdis of excessive safety, resulting in " blinds " and ineffectiveness against the enemy. Work at the highest possible pressure at Woolwich at last solved the problem, and solved it so satisfactorily that, a year later, British artillery was probably more immune from prematures, etc., than any other. But the constant change of processes during these critical months held back the factories from getting on with bulk production, and it was not until the middle of May that the Ministry began to hand over large supplies to the army. The date of the Somme offensive was largely determined by these considerations.

## Explosives and Propellants

Special steps to develop the production of explosives were taken in 1914 - the problem of increasing the output of tri-nitro-toluol (T.N.T.) and other explosives being remitted to a committee under the presidency of Lord Moulton. Hence, when the Ministry was formed, plans were not only in hand but had already achieved considerable success. Pressure had been put upon gas undertakings throughout the United Kingdom to extract the utmost amount of the by-products of coal distillation at the expense of the illuminating-power of their gas, in order to increase the supply of toluol and of benzol, which Great Britain had begun to supply to France. When the Ministry was formed Lord Moulton's department was transferred, and charged in addition with the supply of propellants. At that time this consisted almost entirely of cordite, of which the supply was fairly ample owing to the large capacity which had been developed for naval purposes.

When, however, the new ammunition programme was decided upon, it was evident that the supply both of H.E. and of propellants would also have to be enormously increased. So far as explosives were concerned it was evident that the world's available supplies were insufficient to enable the programme to be carried through by means of either pure T.N.T. or picric acid. It was known that in theory a mixture of T.N.T. and ammonium nitrate could be made to produce as violent a detonation as pure T.N.T., and that the French army was in fact using a mixture of picric acid and ammonium nitrate. In order not to compete for the supplies of picric acid, it was decided to rely upon a mixture of T.N.T. and ammonium nitrate (amatol), and the design department was set to find a means of satisfactory detonation.

The result of their efforts was that during the war, out of about 625,000 tons of explosive supplied, only 21 0,000 tons (of which 35,000 tons were imported) was T.N.T., less than 80,000 tons picric acid, and the rest ammonium nitrate.

In the case of propellants the stocks and manufacturing capacity for cordite in autumn 1915 were fairly large, and as early steps were taken to increase output its supply never delayed the ammunition programme throughout the war. Its production was, however, limited by the supplies of acetone, and even when an ether-alcohol solvent was used as an alternative to acetone, it was not possible to meet the enlarged programme by cordite alone. The army had accepted as propellant for certain guns a nitro-cellulose powder, which was the standard charge on the Continent before the Ministry came into existence, and since it was not manufactured in England orders had already been placed in America. One of the earliest acts of the Ministry was to place, with Messrs. Dupont of America, enormous additional orders sufficient to justify the manufacturers in making large additions to their plant.

From that date onwards the question between cordite and nitrocellulose continually exercised the minds of the Ministry. The argument for importing finished propellant was the great saving in tonnage involved, since it is necessary to assemble several tons of material for each ton of propellant and nearl y all of the material had to be imported - mostly from very great distances. This advantage had, however, to be balanced against the consideration that, so long as Great Britain remained dependent on a neutral country for a substantial proportion of its propellants, the supplies were out of British control so far as the manufacture was concerned, were liable to serious losses from submarine activity, and in danger of interruption should the United States Government for any reason desire to prohibit the export of munitions. Towards the end of 1916 the last of these considerations assumed considerable importance; and as at that time the use of nitro-cellulose had been adopted for a considerable number of types of artillery, it was decided to commence the manufacture of nitro-cellulose powder in Great Britain. A large factory was projected, but was abandoned when America came into the war.

The novelty of the supply both of explosives and propellants led to the building of large national factories to supplement the limited capacity of the factories in private hands. Indeed, the largest industrial venture of the war was the propellant factory at Gretna, the scale of which is illustrated by the fact that its acid-producing capacity exceeded that of the whole country before the war. As it was considered expedient to build not only out of range of enemy aircraft but also away from industrial centres, it involved building a town to house the workpeople. The factory, which cost £8,000,000 to build, made nearly one-fourth of the cordite required by the army during the war, at a considerable saving of cost.

The relative importance of home sources and of imports of explosives and propellants is shown in Table I, which gives the percentages of the total output during the war: TABLE I.

| 

Trade

| 

National

Factories

| 

Imports

p  
  
---|---|---|---  
  
Picric Acid. ... .

| 

92%

| 

62

| 

%

| 

11%  
  
T.N.T.. .. .

| 

21

| 

63

| | 

16  
  
Ammonium Nitrate

| 

65

| 

30

| | 

5  
  
All Explosives

| 

53

| 

39

| | 

8  
  
Cordite.. .

| 

47

| 

38

| | 

15  
  
Nitro-cellulose

| 

\- 

| 

2 

| | 

98  
  
All Propellants

| 

26

| 

22

| | 

52  
  
The explosive output involved a greatly increased supply of nitrate from abroad. At first this was readily forthcoming, but at an early date Allied competition led to difficulties in Chile, and later, when lack of tonnage made it difficult to spare ships for so long a voyage, an inter-Allied organization was set up to buy for the Allies in common and to ration supplies. In the last year of the war France met her needs to a substantial degree by the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen; but though a plant for this purpose was begun in Great Britain it never reached the production stage.

## Trench Warfare

The stabilizing of the western front led to the employment of a great variety of engines of war subordinate to the artillery, such as mortars, hand grenades, etc., some of which were designed and even produced at the front. These weapons gave great scope for inventive faculties, while the implements themselves did not require the same degree of accuracy as artillery or aeroplanes. Hence they provided an outlet for engineering capacity which was not suitable for more exact munitions, while it enabled civilian enterprise to make substantial contributions on the side of design. The trench warfare department of the Ministry was in fact organized on the principle of setting " design " and " production " side by side. It produced a large number of products which it offered to the army, of which three are of outstanding importance. (1) The first was the Stokes mortar, which was manufactured and sent to the front in spite of a very lukewarm reception by the military authorities. In this case the Ministry proceeded in advance of the sanction of the War Office, but the weapon won its way and became part of the standing equipment in the latter years of the war. (2) The department in the autumn of 1915 experimented with shell filled with lachrymatory gases, and, in the spring of 1916, with poison gases of various kinds. The most powerful of these was at first withheld from use by the army, as the Government was unwilling to go farther in this respect than the Germans; but the experience of the campaign of 1916 finally removed any scruples of this kind. A notable achievement of the trench warfare department in this field was the development of the cast-iron shell as a container for poison gas. This device avoided making an additional call upon the limited supplies of shell steel, and as it could be opened by a less violent explosion than was required with a steel shell there was less likelihood of destroying the properties of the gas and dissipating it too widely. By 1917 the proportion of chemical-filled shell to H.E. shell was rapidly increasing, and as it finally grew from being a small supplement into an integral part of the ammunition programme, the filling of chemical shell was ultimately taken over by the ammunition filling department. In the autumn of 1918, 20% of certain natures and 12% of others were filled with chemical, and the percentage in 1919 would have been immensely greater. (3) During 1916 the department equipped the army with shrapnel-proof helmets, which rapidly became a regular part of the soldier's equipment.

## Tanks

Another feature of Mr. Lloyd George's administration was the commencement of the manufacture of tanks. The design of the first tank was developed (see Tanks) by an Admiralty committee and tested before several members of the Cabinet in Feb. 1916. The design was favourably reported upon by the military representatives present, and a special department was created in the Ministry under Col. Albert Stern to manufacture these new weapons. The secret was well maintained, in spite of the special priority in regard to labour and materials which was given to the manufacturers during 1916. Tanks were first used in the field in Sept. 1916, and thereafter their production assumed its normal place among the other departments of the Ministry.

## Other Activities

During Mr. Lloyd George's administration steps were taken to establish a general system of priority not only in regard to machine tools and the use of raw material, but also in all the work done in engineering and chemical factories; but the carrying-out of the scheme in full belongs to a later date.

## Foreign Purchases

Within a month of his appointment Mr. Lloyd George sent Mr. D. A. Thomas (later Lord Rhondda) to the United States and Canada to report upon the progress of munition output in America. Mr. Thomas reported that although the commission paid to Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. seemed high the work was being well done and he recommended no modification in the arrangement. In Dec. 1915, Sir Ernest Moir was sent to America to exercise a general supervision over deliveries. An organization was set up in New York which kept track of output, followed goods through to port, and reported progress to the Ministry. This organization continued in existence until the end of the war, but became part of the British mission in the United States when America joined the Allies. In Canada Mr. Thomas found an organization in being under Gen. Sam Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia, though Gen. Hughes had no direct control over British orders. Subsequently the Canadian Pacific Railway were made agents for the British Government, and their organization developed into the Imperial Munitions Board, which exercised the functions of the Ministry of Munitions in Canada except that of inspection, which remained under an officer in Ottawa responsible to the head of the inspection department in Great Britain.

## Financial Control

At the commencement of the war it was evident that in the existing state of uncertainty it would be impossible for Parliament to retain control over the details of expenditure, and from Aug. 6 1914 onwards the money for carrying on the war was voted in the form of unallotted votes of credit, whose distribution was placed in the hands of the Treasury. The latter department, however, at once recognized that it was impossible for the spending departments to submit detailed proposals, and it therefore abandoned the machinery by which it normally sanctioned expenditure. This relaxing of control applied first to direct expenditure for the war, but was soon extended to cover advances to contractors, etc.

When the Ministry of Munitions was formed, similar powers were necessarily conferred upon the Minister except as regards the salaries of officials. Nor was it possible for the finance officers of the Ministry to control expenditure in the sense that they could exercise any influence upon the volume of orders to be placed. It has been stated that at the outset the Ministry placed orders largely in excess of War Office requirements in order to increase munition-producing capacity, and at a later date the Ministry discussed the character of the programme put forward by the War Office from the standpoint of the balance between various demands, the extent to which they could be met from stock, or the limitations imposed by lack of materials, tonnage, labour or other limiting factors. But except as regards the limit of money available for foreign purchases, financial considerations did not, in fact, govern the munition programme.

The task of the financial officers of the Ministry, under the assistant financial secretary (Sir Hardman Lever), was, therefore, confined to ascertaining that the public funds were spent as economically as possible. The limitation of contractors' profits to a large extent suspended the normal stimulus to reduce costs of production, and the first and most important enterprise of the finance department of the Ministry was to develop and impose upon contractors an adequate system of " costing " and cost-accounts. These were developed during the first few months of the Ministry's existence, and enabled the officials of the Ministry to negotiate successfully considerable reductions in prices. This costing system, together with the rapidly increasing efficiency of production through experience of manufacture on a large scale, quickly produced substantial reductions in price as compared with the original sums paid for all classes of munitions. In Aug. 1916 it was claimed by Mr. Montagu in the House of Commons that the Ministry had already saved by this means £20,000,000 on home shell contracts alone and that American and Canadian prices for shell had been reduced 15% and 121% respectively.

## Design

A most important expansion of the functions of the Ministry took place in Nov. 1915, when the design department of Woolwich was transferred to the Minister. A new inventions board had already been instituted in the Ministry, but this did not deal with established service articles. It had for many months been a subject of complaint, by those controlling production in the Ministry, that the design department was still working on pre-war traditions and was not sufficiently in touch with the requirements imposed by methods of mass production, nor was it drawing sufficiently upon the experience which was being gained by those actually engaged in this production. The War Office quite properly attached the very greatest importance to questions of design and the accuracy limits in specifications which the safety of the army made necessary, and were unwilling to release control of this department. The matter, however, was decided by the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) in favour of the Minister of Munitions, the transfer was made, and it was laid down that the Army Council should inform the Minister in general terms of the qualities required in a specific supply, that the design department under the Minister should submit its results to the War Office, and that the latter would then indicate the amount of its requirements. The officer in charge of design under the Minister would, however, be responsible for approving the specifications for manufacture. This officer, who in the first instance was also given charge of the inspection staff, thus took over the duty of laying down the standards of inspection.

The work of this department during the first six months of ter its transfer to the Ministry was of an exceedingly difficult character, for it had to solve the problem of successfully detonating artillery shell filled with the new high explosive (amatol).

The transfer of this department, which was put under a military officer with war experience (Maj.-Gen. Du Cane), had the important consequence of creating direct contact between the Ministry and the army in the field, and so enabled the behaviour of the new munitions under service conditions to be known in the workshops.

  


## The Somme Battle

The first period of the Ministry's history ends with the opening of the battle of the Somme. The output of artillery and of ammunition, so long delayed by one difficulty after another, had at last permitted the army to accumulate a substantial stock of shell and to dispose of an artillery equipment with which it could match the standard of expenditure set by the Germans at Verdun. But the stock had only begun to accumulate in the preceding six weeks; and as the preliminary bombardment (which could be heard from the English coast) continued day after day, the rapidly dwindling stock was watched with growing anxiety. When the troops went over the parapet, and while the ground was being consolidated and the guns brought up, there was a momentary respite, but within a few days the barrage broke out again, and before the end of July the army was living from hand to mouth upon the incoming supply from Great Britain. So far as all the heavy natures were concerned, practically the whole of this came from a single filling factory. The fear of an untoward accident to Chilwell or of an interruption to the cross-Channel service was thus added to the normal worries of production and transport. Fortunately, however, everything went according to plan, and the supply steadily grew until the winter brought the offensive to an end.

This achievement was not the first fruits of the formation of the Ministry of Munitions. The army had been living for months past on munitions supplied on previous War Office orders; but these orders would not have materialized had it not been for the help rendered by the Ministry to War Office contractors, in technical matters (gauges, drawings, etc.), in supply of materials, and in control of the labour supply, recruiting, etc.

At the end of 12 months, however, the larger plans initiated by Mr. Lloyd George began to bear fruit and became one of the dominating factors in the war. From the middle of 1916 onwards, there was never a general shortage of munitions, and the special emergencies which arose from time to time were met with increasing facility, as the enormous industrial organism which had been set in motion during this first year became more responsive to control.

## Centralized Administrative Control

The second year of the Ministry of Munitions (Mr. E. Montagu becoming Minister in July 1916, and Dr. Addison in Dec. 1916) saw a very considerable readjustment of and increase in the artillery and ammunition programmes of the Ministry as a result of experience in the battle of the Somme. The increased artillery demand naturally involved consequential increases in the ammunition programme, but in Sept. 1916 the army sent in a demand that the ration of ammunition per gun should also be increased. It was found that the 18-pdr., which at one period was thought might even be superseded altogether, had functions of supreme importance in furnishing the " creeping barrage," in following up before the " heavies " could be moved, and in shelling the enemy as soon as he left his permanent entrenchments.

The daily ration was therefore raised to 50 rounds per gun per day, while the 6-in., 8-in., and 9.2-in. howitzers, whose rations had been 20, 15 and 12 rounds respectively, were raised to a uniform 30. Though these increases added 50% to Mr. Lloyd George's programme, they did not involve any changes in manufacturing policy. They did, however, call for more complete control over materials and processes subsidiary to the ammunition programme, and made necessary increasingly drastic restrictions of non-war work by means of priority certificates, while the growing shortage of labour involved a constant extension of the principles of dilution. These changes involved a tightening of the centralized control of the Ministry over industrial conditions, and made it increasingly difficult for private industry to continue or for other departments to get their contracts fulfilled. It was largely on this account that the Ministry took over a number of additional services, of which the chief were the supply of aircraft, railway material, agricultural machinery and motor vehicles, the last of which was placed in the charge of Sir Albert Stanley.

When the Ministry took over the supply of aircraft, which was placed in the hands of Sir William Weir, the supply of aeroplanes was at the rate of 675 per month and of engines 721 per month. These figures rose to 1,117 and 1,083 respectively per month in the next five months, as new firms came into production and the difficulties with materials were overcome. For the rest of the war, however, it was necessary to give a very high priority to aircraft production, particularly with regard to skilled labour, although the novel character of the work and its consequent freedom from restrictive trade-union practices permitted female labour to be introduced from the outset to a greater extent than in other sorts of munition work.

The progress of " dilution " generally throughout this period is shown by the fact that while in July 1916 employers reported that 336,000 women had replaced men, in July 1917 654,000 women had replaced men. In Government establishments, which had only employed 2,000 women before the war, 69,000 women had replaced men by July 1916 and 191,000 by July 1917.

## Control of Steel and Other Materials

The development of the steel department into one of the most vital sections of the Ministry belongs to this period. Prior to the formation of the Ministry of Munitions the War Office had enlisted the services of a steel expert (Mr. McLellan) to assist them in buying the multitudinous variety of products covered by the contracts department, and in the spring of 1915 the Government bought, on behalf of the Sheffield trade, considerable quantities of Swedish bar iron which they held as a reserve against the possibility of Swedish supplies being cut off. Action had already been taken regarding some of the more rare metals used for ferro-alloys, an arrangement having been made, for example, by the Government to take all the wolfram of the Empire until after the end of the war. But in the first year of the Ministry's history the steel problem was not of critical importance, and the steel section was a branch only of the materials department, separate sections being organized to deal with high-speed and carbon tool steel and with metallurgical coke. In the spring of 1916, as the shell factories began to get to work, and the demand for shell steel to assume large dimensions, three aspects of the steel problem came to the front: namely, the necessity for an increase in the total steel production of the country, the restriction of commercial or less essential war uses of steel, and the regulation of prices. The first scheme for increasing the steel plant was prepared in March 1916. In June 1916 plans for developing pig-iron production by converting and modernizing old blast furnaces and building a few new ones were prepared, while in May 1916 the first control order fixing the maximum prices of iron ore, pig-iron, steel, coke, bricks, etc., was passed. These arrangements were supplemented by the placing of orders for shell steel in the United States, and in June 1916 a representative was sent to that country to arrange for supplies. During this first year some assistance in meeting demands was obtained by a modification of the War Office's specifications. By April 1916 the Army Council had approved the use of steel in shell containing up to. 07% of sulphur and phosphorus. This figure was subsequently increased to. 08%. One other problem which had given rise to difficulty was the supply of foreign ore, as a result of the increase in freights. A committee of ore merchants was summoned in the spring of 1916, and decided upon a uniform freight basis from Bilbao to Great Britain of 17s. per ton, an official ore broker being appointed to take entire charge of chartering ore tonnage. The centralization of chartering had a wholesome effect, and though the price subsequently rose to 38s. the demoralization of the market was prevented. Such was the position when in Aug. 1916 it was decided to form a separate steel department under Sir John Hunter.

The first action of this department was to press forward the plans already prepared for building new steel works and bringing new blast furnaces into operation. These programmes were subsequently enlarged at various times, and ultimately amounted to 166 new steel furnaces and 22 new blast furnaces in addition to the 40 old blast furnaces modernized. At a later date large rolling-mills were commenced, chiefly for increasing the supply of steel plates for ships, tanks, etc., and from time to time substantial improvements were made in the equipment of existing rolling-mills. In all these developments the Government shared the financial burden, not by direct subsidy but by allowing. firms a deduction from their excess-profits-duty payments. A substantial percentage of these extensions were completed before the end of the war, but the programme was considerably delayed by insufficient labour and by difficulties in securing materials.

  


The problem of foreign ore supplies became increasingly difficult. The new department dissolved the existing committee and created a section for dealing with this problem. The purchase of Spanish ore remained in the hands of merchants, but they had: to obtain the permission of the Ministry before placing orders, and thus in effect, though not in form, the purchase was centralized. This action, together with the fact that Germany was no longer in the market, prevented the price of ore in Spain from being unduly raised. Freight rates, however, and the cost of insurance rose to enormous sums; but as the Government bore the excess over the official rate, ore was delivered to British works at a fixed price. This became an important factor in stabilizing the price of steel. As regards Swedish ore large quantities were bought, and supplied to British makers.

The difficulty in securing shipping from Spain and the Mediterranean led to two internal developments. (I) The Cumberland ore mines, which were the only substantial source of non-phosphoric ore in Great Britain, were taken over on the basis of a guarantee to the owners and developed to their maximum output. (2) Under the most favourable conditions, however, no more than a small proportion of acid steel from British ore could be expected. A great effort was accordingly made to develop the manufacture of basic at the expense of acid steel, which had hitherto constituted the larger part of the output of Great Britain. This involved in the first place an attempt to increase the output of the low-grade phosphoric ores of Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire and elsewhere, and in the second place a modification in the programme of steel works extensions, which first had been planned mainly for acid steel.

This question of basic steel, though a technical one, was potentially of great political importance. In peace-time, Great Britain had been content to be dependent on foreign sources of relatively high-grade ore for more than half her steel. The problem in 1916 was whether it was either possible or desirable to become self-dependent in this vital matter. There was much to be said for and against each of three possible courses: - (I) making basic steel from low-grade British ore, (2) making acid steel from imported ore, or (3) importing pig-iron or steel from America. The difficulty of importing ore which required a large tonnage on a submarine-infested area was obvious; but the use of low-grade British ore involved a larger consumption of fuel and therefore of man-power in the coal-mines, and an increased congestion in internal railway transport. Imported American pigiron, on the other hand, utilized neutral labour and economized tonnage, since two tons of Spanish ore are needed to make a ton of pig-iron, but until America came into the war the difficulty of financing purchases and the desire not to become too dependent on the United States caused the Ministry to persevere with home supplies, and even after America joined the Allies the policy could not be materially changed, owing to the large scale of the war demands of the American Government, which left little margin for export. Hence the production figures (Table II) show a steady development in basic output.

TABLE II.

| 

Acid Steel Output

(Ingot tons)

| 

Basic Steel Output

(Ingot tons)  
  
---|---|---  
  
1913\. .

| 

4,860,000

| 

2,804,000  
  
1914

| 

4,478,000

| 

3,357,000  
  
1915\. .

| 

5,111,000

| 

3,439,000  
  
1916

| 

5,468,000

| 

3,523,000  
  
1917

| 

5,772,000

| 

3,945,000  
  
1918 .

| 

4,992,000

| 

4,547,000  
  
The total of 36, 700,000 ingot tons of steel for the four war years 1915-8 (toward the production of which there were imported 26 million tons of ore and over 2 million tons of pig-iron) represents about 28 million tons of finished steel, to which must be added 24 million tons of shell steel imported from the United States and Canada, and a million tons of general steel.

In Nov. 1916, a control order restricting steel consumption for less urgent uses was passed, under which the department was entitled to obtain itemized returns of steel deliveries from every works, and to insist that the orders in hand should be carried out in order of urgency. These returns showed how much steel was being used for each branch of war production; and although at first it was difficult for the various departments of the Government to reduce their demands to a fixed programme and to convert these demands into terms of steel, a system was gradually evolved in which it was possible to balance deliveries against requirements. From July 1917 onwards steel allocations were made at monthly meetings of departments presided over by the controller of steel production.

By this time, however, the balance of needs had been substantially altered. The shell programme had been in effective operation for nearly two years. Stocks of empty shell and of shell steel had accumulated, the orders placed in America had materialized, and it was now possible to deal with the supply of ammunition without providing large margins for contingencies; hence the actual monthly allocation was substantially reduced. On the other hand, a very urgent demand for steel for shipbuilding had arisen, and with increasing demands for tanks, aircraft, military railways and other needs the supply of shell steel dropped to a relatively minor position. The figures for the allocation of steel for the first six months of 1918 (Table III) show the balance between the various departments.

TABLE III. - Steel Programme for First Six Months of 1918. (Weekly average in tons.)  Admiralty (mainly plates and sections) War Office Contracts Department. Ministry of Munitions Explosives .

Guns, large .

Machine-guns and S. A. Trench warfare.. Mechanical warfare. Mechanical transport .

Aircraft.. Steelworks extension. Factory construction. Machine tools and cranes Railways, U.K.. .

Railways, overseas .

Electrical power supply Total M. of M. . 26,272 India Office. .. 492 Other Government Departments and Priority. 19,804 Allies: - France. 6,940' Italy. 7,092 Shell steel: Great Britain land service and Admiralty 21,448 France. 900 Italy. 3,360 Tubes. 7,672 Wire rods 4,808 Grand Total.. 139,880 The actual realization was fairly close to the estimated figures, but in addition an average of 16,400 tons of shell steel was imported from the United States and Canada.

  


In regard to prices the Government, after attempting in 1915 to regulate prices by agreement, found that costs were rising to such an alarming extent that it was faced with the necessity either of raising the price of steel, and so altering the basic figure of vast numbers of Government contracts, or of keeping prices fixed and making good the balance to manufacturers in the form of direct or indirect subsidies. The change in prices would ultimately have been very large, as the subsidies finally amounted to no less than £io per ton on steel made from imported ore. Of this sum, ocean insurance amounted to f5. The event thus justified the decision of the Ministry to adopt the policy of subsidies, for otherwise it would have been faced not merely with the readjustment of numberless contracts, but also with a rise in the general level of prices, involving increased middlemen's profits, wages variations, etc. Moreover, the Government was itself directly or indirectly the purchaser of 98% of the total produced, and, except as regards freight, the increases in steel cost were largely caused by wages advances, which were to a substantial extent controlled by the Government itself. The policy once started involved controlling the materials for production, including ore, coke, pig iron, scrap, ferro-manganese, and magnesite, fire, and silica bricks. Increases in wages in the steel works themselves were met by paying subsidies direct to 37,076' 10,016 ? 556 2,760 900 ? 924 ,4808 1, 33,536376 1,42 4, 46 4 536 the manufacturer, but the bulk of the subsidies were paid not directly to steel manufacturers but to shipowners and mineowners, and in bearing the actual cost of submarine losses at sea. The total amount paid directly or indirectly as subsidy to steel production costs in 1918 reached 45 million pounds sterling.

The only other way in which the stabilization of prices could have been obtained was for the Government to have bought the whole output of iron and steel, and to have sold it to the user; and if the complete character of the control had been envisaged at the outset it is possible this plan would have been adopted; but as control was at first only partial, while the maintenance of private commerce remained important, it was impracticable.

The case of steel is the most representative example of the numerous controls exercised by the Ministry over a wide field, touching the economic life of the community at many points.

Before the Ministry came into existence, some measure of regulation had been adopted in the case of several non-ferrous metals and chemicals. At an early stage in 1915, for example, the Government purchased the whole output of wolfram (the ore used for making tungsten, which is the alloy used in highspeed steel) from imperial sources. The list was added to continuously throughout the war, until at the Armistice it included aluminium (the demand for which enormously increased owing to its use in aircraft, in fuzes, and as a chemical element in smoke powder), antimony (used as an alloy of lead for making shrapnel bullets), chrome ore (the material for the alloy in chrome steel), copper, brass, lead, nickel (for nickel steel and rifle bullets), mica (for magnetos), platinum, potash, resin, shellac, tin and zinc. The long list of the explosives department included acetate of lime, acetic acid, acetone, glycerine, bleach, chlorine, ether, benzol, coal tar, creosote, nitrate, pyrites and sulphuric acid. The new process for making cordite, which was developed at the Gretna factory, was one of the main causes which brought alcohol under control, and ultimately stopped its production for non-industrial purposes; while the control of sulphuric acid, together with the scarcity of nitrate, quickly brought the whole supply of fertilizers within the domain of the explosives department, since control of one or two materials inevitably leads to the control of competing materials. Thus the department became responsible for the supply of superphosphates and basic slag, nitrate and sulphate of ammonia, and potash.

Several of these commodities differed from the case of steel in the fact that the article was imported on a large scale in the form in which it was commonly sold in England. Regulation, therefore, commonly started in two ways: the fixing of a maximum price and the control of importation by licence. The Government early exercised a large influence on the market by reason of very large contracts which it placed abroad, but these were not always sufficient to give adequate control. Hence orders were made under D.O.R.A., giving the Government the right to commandeer all imports on private account. Even this was not always sufficient, since the existence in the country of a large stock of material made allocation difficult and created a small but free market which had a disturbing effect on price. Hence the further step was necessary of prohibiting purchase and sale except under licence. Finally, in all cases where home production was a substantial element, as for example in the case of alcohol, glycerine, etc., the Government commandeered the whole of the internal output. Certain cases, however, such as pyrites, followed the steel precedent, since the stabilizing of the price of sulphuric acid meant that, as the cost of transport and insurance of pyrites from Spain increased, the Government had to bear a large part of the cost of the material.

The period under consideration marked the transition in the great majority of cases from the looser form of control by maximum price to the more complete regulation of all dealings in the commodity and the commandeering on Government account of total available supplies.

## Foreign Orders and American Intervention

When it was decided to place new heavy-shell orders abroad, considerations of finance, together with the desire to avoid becoming too dependent on a country which at any moment might ban the export of munitions, led the Ministry to place as large a proportion of orders as possible in Canada. The failure of the new rifle plants erected in 1915 to make delivery in time to relieve the rifle shortage led to special negotiations for reduction in these contracts, and arrangements were ultimately entered into, under which the total to be delivered was reduced from 2,500,000 to 1,200,000. This, together with other orders, meant that in 1916 the British Government was buying large quantities of material but not much finished munitions from America. When America entered the war, representatives of the Ministry accompanied Mr. Balfour to the United States with the object of giving the U.S. Government the benefit of British munition experience, endeavouring to coordinate the programmes of the Allies, and arranging for any change that might be called for in the organization of the munitions office in America. The American departments were not in fact sufficiently organized as to personnel or duties to enable these objects to be carried very far at that date. In May 1917, Messrs. Morgan gave notice to terminate their commercial agency, and offered to place their organization at the disposal of the U.S. Government. As a temporary arrangement they offered to continue to place orders for the Allies at a reduced commission, but it early became evident that every order would involve negotiations with the Government for financial approval as well as for the necessary priority and export permits. It was clear that these duties could not be appropriately undertaken by an American organization, and on the recommendation of the Balfour mission a British munitions representative was sent out to take charge of a mission in Washington, whose duty would be to carry on negotiations with the American Government for the necessary supplies. This officer subsequently became part of the American war mission under Lord Northcliffe.

## Assistance to Russia

In the autumn of 1916, serious attention was devoted to the possibility of remedying the disparity in the material resources available on the Russian compared with the western front, the need being emphasized by the arrest of the successful offensive of Gen. Brusilov as soon as his troops came up against fortified positions which could only be overcome by heavy artillery. From the beginning of the war, Lord Kitchener had made great efforts to persuade the Russians to place orders abroad, and direct assistance in this task both in England and America was subsequently given by British organizations and British credit. But the possibility of direct material assistance was very limited. Russia was a non-industrial country taking part in a war which was being largely fought by mechanical appliances, and in particular, on the vast extension of the eastern front, by modern means of transit. Russia was ultimately defeated by the failure of her inadequate railway system, which was called upon (r) to provide mobility for the troops at the front, (2) to bring food from the interior of Russia for 15,000,000 men and large numbers of horses normally living on the local produce of the soil, (3) to supply coal and steel from the Caucasus to the munition areas of Petrograd and Moscow which normally got supplies via the Baltic or by the Polish frontier, (4) to carry imports from the ice-bound ports of Archangel and Vladivostok. From Vladivostok it required 120 locomotives to maintain one train a day to Moscow; and though new rolling-stock and engines were put on rail in the Far East, by Christmas 1916 there had accumulated 600,000 tons of war material, including tens of thousands of tons of barbed wire, though many miles of the front had no wire defence at all.

The munitions representatives who accompanied the Allied mission to Russia in Jan. r917 found that, in spite of the completion of the railway from the ice-free port of Murmansk to Petrograd, the ports and railways of Russia could not deal with more than 3,500,000 tons of imports (including coal), compared with minimum demands for 13,000,000 tons. A careful programme based upon the former figure was drawn up, including a substantial supply of heavy artillery and aeroplanes, and a permanent mission was stationed in Petrograd to assist in transport and in the training of personnel, but the revolution prevented the programme from being carried out.

  


## Internal Developments

During this year, efforts were made to improve the internal organization of the Ministry, among whose various parts there was still a lack of coordination. Moreover, the increasing functions had led to still more heads of departments having direct access to the Minister. Mr. Montagu endeavoured to deal with the problem by setting up a committee whose chairman (Sir Arthur Duckham) and vice-chairman (Sir James Stevenson) were relieved of departmental duties; but its powers were purely advisory. At the same time a weekly meeting of heads of departments was inaugurated and continued until the summer of 1917. This was of value in giving all departments a knowledge of general policy; but the numbers were too large for it to be an effective instrument of administration.

More important developments were inaugurated in financial administration, in two directions. The first was the overhauling of all the past accounting transactions of the Ministry, with the view of recovering money that had been temporarily lost through the confusion and deficiencies of the earlier system of records. This bore fruit in " recoveries " to the amount of some 39,- 000,000. The second was the reconstitution of the accounting system on a commercial basis for the future, by substituting double-entry for the old single-entry system, in use before the war in nearly all Government departments. Since the method of departmental bookkeeping was dictated by the prescribed form of accounts rendered to the Treasury and Parliament, this reform led incidentally to proposals for a remodelling of the public accounts themselves. By 1917 the financial staff of the Ministry had established a system of contract-control by means of cost accounts.

Early in 1917 the control of the inspecting staff was reorganized al. an independent department under Sir Sothern Holland. This period also saw a great increase in the size and duties of the priority department, under Sir Edgar Jones. The staff of the Ministry, which had risen to 5,000 under Mr. Lloyd George, rose to 13,000 by July 1917.

## Inter-Allied Coordination

The third and culminating period of the Ministry of Munitions (Mr. Winston Churchill being Minister from July 1917 to Jan. 1919) saw certain important though not fundamental changes in programme. The chief of these were growing aircraft demands, accentuated by the campaign of the Independent Air Force against German industrial centres; a sudden enlargement of the tank programme as a result of their successful employment in the attack on Cambrai in Nov. 1917; and, thirdly, the efforts to emulate the Germans in the production of mustard gas, and to find, if possible, new and more effective poisons.

Further, during 1918 plans were far advanced, in preparation for the 1919 campaign, for increasing the range of an offensive, (a) by adapting the caterpillar principle to the movement across country of troops and stores on a large scale, and (b) by entirely re-equipping the army with longer-range field and other artillery. These measures were carried out by adapting rather than by enlarging the munition-making resources of the country. Indeed, the adequacy of the supply was put to a severe test in March and April 1918, when the army lost 1,000 guns and ioo,000 tons of ammunition in the retreat from St. Quentin, in addition to losses resulting from the intensive attacks made upon British munition dumps in France by bombing aircraft. The artillery and ammunition losses were made good by May, and only in the case of small-arms ammunition, the expenditure of which in machine-guns increased to quite unexpected figures, was any anxiety experienced.

This phase of munition history corresponded with the unrestricted submarine campaign, the active participation in the war by the United States, and an increasing shortage of man-power. It was, therefore, marked by increasing efforts to economize and coordinate effort, (a) within the Ministry, (b) between the Ministry and other British departments, and (c) between Great Britain and the Allies.

## Departmental Reorganizations

Mr. Churchill's first task at the Ministry was to deal with organization. The internal mechanism had never developed on a considered plan, but had been determined partly by personal considerations and partly by the kaleidoscopic changes in the relative importance of various activities as the drama of the war unfolded. Mr. Lloyd George's administration was a period when half a dozen departments of supreme importance were feverishly urging on production in a new field under new conditions. And the business men in charge of them utilized to the full their right of direct access to the Minister - thus making organization extremely difficult.

The complexity became much worse during the next period, as duty after duty was imposed upon the Ministry, and as the task of carrying out the old ones involved control in new directions and the creation of fresh administrative branches. Hence, by the summer of 1917, the number of departments had increased to over so, and although the machinery was in existence for coordinating the programme itself, there was not sufficient cooperation or clear definition of responsibility between the departments. Various attempts had been made to meet this difficulty - as, e.g. by the proposal to attach to the Minister one or more staff officers who would act as liaison officers between the departments, many of which were housed at some considerable distance from headquarters. A more promising scheme was to increase the number of parliamentary secretaries and make all departments report through one or other of them. But this scheme broke down through the complications still caused by exercise of the right of direct access to the Minister on the part of the business heads.

Mr. Churchill solved the problem by the creation of a Muni tions Council, consisting of the Minister, parliamentary secretaries and 12 members, including the secretary to the Ministry. Their duties were to deal in the first instance with all matters requiring decision in the departments entrusted to them; and although the heads of departments in theory retained the right of access to the Minister, in practice it was not exercised and the members of Council became in fact the heads of groups of departments. The reform was accompanied by the rehabilitation of the permanent civil servant. The position of the secretary was strengthened by insistence that papers should pass through his hands to the Minister, and still more by the attachment to each member of Council of a civil servant called a secretarial officer - whose duty was to see that the procedure worked smoothly and uniformly. This machinery came into being and worked with surprisingly little friction.

But in fact the Council did not often meet as such, its work being to a large extent done by a standing " coordinating " committee of the Council, which dealt with all matters arising out of the programme and its execution. A second standing committee of the Council dealt with and prepared plans for demobilization, while matters which did not fall within one or other of these spheres were dealt with by Council committees appointed ad hoc.  The organization of the Munitions Council in its final form was as follows: F. - Finance, contracts, controlled establishments finance, munitions works board, lands branch, central stores, salvage (Sir Gilbert Garnsey).

## D

Design, inspection, inventions (Gen. Sir Francis Bingham).

## S

Iron and steel production, factory construction (Sir John Hunter).

## M

Non-ferrous metals, scrap, railway material, optical munitions, potash, railway and sea transport of munitions and material (Sir Ernest Moir).

## X

Supply of explosives, propellants and chemicals (Sir Keith Price).

## 0

Supply of artillery, gun ammunition, rifles, machine-guns, small-arms ammunition and trench-warfare supplies. Engineering department (Sir James Stevenson).

## A

Aircraft (Sir Arthur Duckham).

## W

Warfare, tanks, poison-gas, etc. (Gen. Seely).

## L

Labour regulation and supply (Sir Stephenson Kent). Sec. - Secretariat, staff and establishment, legal department, etc. (Sir William Graham Greene).

## R

Requirements and statistics, American department, Allied requirements (Mr. W. T. Layton).

## Allies

Head of Paris office and one of the British delegates on Inter-Allied Munition Council (Sir Charles Ellis).

In addition the master-general of the ordnance (Gen. Furse) was made an honorary member representing the War Office.

1024 

|   
---|---  
  
At this stage of the war, coordination of the efforts of various departments of state was even more important than internal reorganization. The British Ministry of Munitions never absorbed the purchasing sections of the Admiralty; and the predominant need of naval supremacy, strengthened by the traditional rights of the senior service, had enabled naval requirements to retain a nominal priority over land requirements. This did not greatly affect munition output when once the munition movement was in full swing - except on occasions, notably, when a sudden decision was made to mount two guns on every merchant ship; when tho losses of ships at sea placed the shipbuilding programme in front of all other demands and by its call upon steel prejudiced other branches of production; and to a less extent after the battle of Jutland, when the decision was made to replace the whole existing naval ammunition supply.

In the case of seaplanes, and a few articles connected with the anti-submarine campaign, anti-aircraft bombs, etc., the Ministry supplied naval as well as army requirements. But the Ministry did not supply the main needs of the Admiralty; and the plan of forming a single Ministry of Supply for both services, including all the goods supplied by the Army Contracts Department, though much discussed when Mr. Churchill came to the Ministry and though recommended by a Treasury committee, was never carried into effect. Moreover, control was gradually developed by the Ministry of Food, and by the mines, timber, paper and other departments, which still remained under the Board of Trade, dealing with various spheres of economic life. There was also a continued demand from the army for specialists to run the repair services, workshops, etc., which were built up behind the front.

Thus there arose keen competition between departments for man-power, for tonnage and for finance (especially dollar credits in the United States and Canada). There also remained the question of the order of priority of work to be done. But experience had proved that no absolute " priority " could be given to any single activity. The word continued in constant use until the end of the war, but in fact the increasing strain upon economic resources, combined with the greater accuracy of demands and forecasts, meant that the conception of placing demands in order of importance was largely superseded by the plan of rationing economic resources. Each of the three factors mentioned was dealt with by a Cabinet committee, which in one case became the province of a new Ministry - that of National Service. In the case of finance the allocation of American dollars was taken out of the hands of the Treasury and assigned to a standing committee called the American Board - an interdepartmental committee under the presidency of Mr. Chamberlain, who with Lord Buckmaster represented Great Britain on the Inter-Allied Committee of Finance. The problem of tonnage also passed out of the hands of a periodical meeting of departmental officers under the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Shipping into the purview of a Cabinet committee, and the programme so approved was coordinated with that of the Allies by the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council.

So far as they affected munitions, the three factors were intimately connected. It was cheaper to manufacture at home than to buy abroad, and a given amount of dollars would carry a larger programme if spent on raw material than if spent on finished articles. But the tonnage needed to import materials was greater than that required for importing articles such as manufactured explosives or ammunition, while there was obviously a saving in British man-power by buying the finished product. On the other hand, munition capacity at home was in a more highly advanced stage of development than in America, and was quickly adaptable, whereas British orders in America had to compete with the enormous programme of the U.S. War Department. Moreover, the reserve of man-power in the United States was intact, and it was evident that the most rapid and effective way in which America could make her weight felt in the world contest was to get that reserve into the field, with the help, if necessary, of British munitions and equipment. The balancing of these considerations, which occupied much of the time of Ministers during the last 18 months of the war, thus broadened out into the problem of coordinating the whole Allied effort. But the final decisions did not radically alter the proportions of British munitions production.

## Man-power

As regards man-power, 53,000 men were withdrawn between March and Nov. 1917 for the army from munitions work, by a continuous process of substitution and dilution without diminishing production. As a result of the German offensive in the spring of 1918, which created a man-power crisis and led to the raising of the age limit for general recruiting, it was decided to make an immediate " clean cut " in the munition factories of all men of 19 and 20 regardless of the nature of their employment, and to take all men of 21, 22 and 23 within a short period. A hundred thousand men were obtained by this plan before the middle of the year; but when the tide of battle turned, Mr. Churchill secured the suspension of the second part of the scheme. Indeed, he secured the release of some of those already enlisted for work upon the new tank programme, for the blast furnaces, and for the manufacture of scientific instruments, etc.

Throughout this period the employment of women steadily increased, and the lack of skilled men was met by pressing them to enroll as war-munition volunteers - thus increasing the reserve of mobile skilled men - and by rationing skilled labour to firms. Protection from recruiting was withdrawn from men not fully employed on skilled work. The embargo on employing more than a certain number of skilled men was at first resisted, and led to a strike at Coventry in July 1918. But the Ministry stood firm and the scheme was carried into effect.

## Tonnage

In the autumn of 1917 a drastic cut was ordered by the Cabinet in the import programmes of the different departments, since the Minister of Shipping, taking the best available estimate of losses from the submarine campaign, anticipated that the imports into Great Britain would drop by 10 million tons. The ration to the Ministry of Munitions was reduced from 12 million to 10 million tons, most of which had to be deducted from iron-ore imports. The steel budget was consequently reduced and pressure put upon the departments to minimize their programme. The Minister, however, took the view that, as other supplies might be uncertain and it would be foolish to keep ships waiting for a cargo, he should be allowed to maintain a surplus stock of metals, materials, etc., on the Atlantic seaboard of America ready for shipment at any moment. Owing partly to the success of anti-submarine measures, partly to the success of the policy of concentrating ships on the shortest (i.e. the Atlantic) route, and partly because other materials were not ready in time, the actual imports of munition materials during 1918 were at the rate of 12 million tons a year. In the autumn of 1917 an arrangement was made with the United States to supply American ships to convey material needed in Great Britain to replace material used in making goods for the U.S. army in Europe. But this scheme of hypothecating ships to convey particular replacement material was not, in fact, carried into effect, being superseded by the plan of reviewing and allocating the tonnage and material resources of the Allies as a whole through the machinery of the Inter-Allied Transport and Munitions Councils.

The orders for heavy shell placed by the Ministry in 1916, which were delivered during the early part of 1917, gave so large a stock that no further orders were necessary except in regard to 6-in.-shell orders, which were placed both in the United States and Canada for delivery in 1918. Apart from this, the main requirements from America were for shell steel, nitro-cellulose powder, copper, spelter, motor lorries and lubricating oil, while as the year progressed substantial orders were also placed for aeroplane spruce and for Liberty engines. The rate of dollar expenditure, however, in 1918 represented less than half of the maximum reached in the first quarter of 1917, while in Canada the purchases dropped to less than 60% of the maximum reached in the second quarter of 1917.

## Inter-Allied Relations

These discussions emphasized the necessity for agreement with the Allies. In the late summer of 1917 the difficulty of financing imports from the United States led to an agreement between the British and French Ministers of Munitions, under which the latter undertook to pay by dollars in America for goods bought in England which involved replacement in American material. Further discussion of the problem, moreover, led the British Minister to insist that the production of shell steel to French specification should cease and that M. Loucheur should buy his shell steel direct from America. France, from a very early stage in the war, had devoted her restricted steel production to the manufacture of more finished products, and had relied on England and America for the overwhelming proportion of her shell steel. The French Minister was anxious to retain some of his supply from European sources as an insurance against an interruption of sea communication; and to meet this difficulty Mr. Churchill agreed to retain a small output of shell steel of French specification. The bulk supply was, however, transferred to the United States. This example illustrates the kind of problem which arose under the conditions at the end of 1917, and which, together with the necessity of coordinating the American munition effort with the Allied needs, gave rise to the formation of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council. Prior to the formation of the British Ministry of Munitions the Allied delegates purchasing in Great Britain on behalf of their respective Governments had been brought together in an international commission under the supervision of an officer of the Board of Trade. This officer and his staff, however, could not keep in touch with the growing supply departments, and their function resolved itself into that of rendering assistance as liaison officers to the foreign purchasing agents in London. In particular their duty was to see that the purchases made were a proper charge against the funds loaned by the British Government to these various countries, and secondly that ships were available for transporting the goods purchased.

When the Ministry of Munitions started, Mr. Lloyd George took an early opportunity of holding a conference with the French Minister of Munitions, and throughout the war such conferences were frequent. In Nov. 1915, at one of these meetings, at which Italian and Russian delegates were present, it was agreed that an Inter-Allied bureau should be formed for the purpose of studying and coordinating the requirements of the Allies. The scheme, however, was never carried into effect, as the Allied nations were not at that time ready to declare the basis of their requirements. In the early summer of 1916 the competition of the Allies in the United States became accentuated, and a few months later it was decided to form a bureau the duty of which was to coordinate the demands made upon New York by the various Ministers of Munitions. The bureau was not, however, sufficiently strongly supported, and it was found that various departments were placing orders without consulting the organization. A third attempt at coordination was made in Nov. 1916, when the campaign of 1917 was discussed in London. At these conferences substantial progress was made in the direction of setting down the complete programme of the different Allies present, and it was agreed that an organization should be set up in Paris to which full information should be supplied, and from which a complete statement of the requirements in the field and the manufacturing requirements of each Ally should be circulated for confidential information to the various Ministers. This organization continued with fluctuating fortunes and with fairly full information about Great Britain and France, but very little about other Allies. Sufficient information was, however, forthcoming to afford a very valuable check upon the demands put forward from time to time by various countries.

Such was the position when a conference was held in Dec. 1917 in Paris to consider the position for 1918. At this conference the European Allies recommended America finally to adopt a European type of artillery, but no definite plan of cooperation emerged from this discussion.

In April 1918 Allied munition officers, including representatives of the American army, again discussed the munition situation in reference to the situation in America, and as a result M. Loucheur, at the suggestion of. the British representative, sent out formal invitations for a conference to meet in June to consider a proposition for the constitution of a permanent Inter-Allied Munitions Council, with a standing secretariat and with authority to discuss and make recommendations upon the programme of the various Allies. This Council was organized into sub-committees dealing with artillery, explosives, tanks, aircraft, tonnage, steel and raw materials. This was nominally an advisory body, but as its chief members were the Ministers themselves it was of sufficient authority to take binding decisions and to negotiate with the Inter-Allied Transport Council and the Financial Council of the Allies as to the tonnage and finance available for munitions, and to arrange between the Allies for the allotment of such resources. It thus represented an important link in the final coordination of Allied efforts.

Its existence enabled a check to be put upon the basis for calculating the production programme of the various Allies, while the general survey which it gave enabled it to make a unanimous recommendation to the United States to give priority for French and British shell steel required over steel for American factories, in view of the depletion of British and French reserves, and the necessity of making them good before the 1919 campaign, which might be expected to start early in the new year. Finally, the representative of the American War Department on the Council, when he received instructions that an enormous increase was to be made in the size of the American army in the field, was able to organize a plan which, by using British and French gun-making capacity, would have enabled this enlarged army to be equipped many months earlier than would have been the case by depending upon American factories.

At the Armistice the numbers employed in the Ministry of Munitions amounted to over 25,000, of whom 60% were women. Some Munition Statistics. - The development of the British munition effort may be illustrated by some additional statistics. The most striking are perhaps the expenditure of gun ammunition on the western front. The figures cannot suitably be shown in numbers of rounds, owing to the change from light to heavy shell during 1916 and 1917, and to a limited extent back to light shell when open warfare was resumed in 1918. The best index is therefore weight in tons.

[[Table Iv]]. - Munition Expenditure on Western Front (in tons).  Eleven Months Aug. 1914 to June 30 1915 1915 3rd Quarter 4th << 1916 Ist 2nd 3rd 1917 Ist 3rd 1918 Ist 2nd 3rd 4th " * 1st Somme battle.

Messines, Arras, Vimy, 3rd Ridge, 1st battle of Cambrai.

$ St. Quentin, 2nd battle of Somme, general advance.

Table IV. shows that the expenditure of ammunition reached its climax in the autumn of 1918. More than io,000 tons a day were fired on 15 successive days, and in the record week ending Sept. 29 3,3 8 3,7 00 rounds, weighing 83,000 tons, were fired.

On Sept. 29, when the Hindenburg line was broken, 943,837 rounds were fired, the cost of a single day's ammunition amounting to £3,871,000.

| 

New Guns and Howitzers

| 

Filled Ammunition (in thousands)  
  
---|---|---  
| 

Light

| 

Medium

| 

Heavy

| 

Heavy

| 

Total

| 

Light

| 

Medium

| 

Heavy

| 

Hearyvy

| 

Total  
  
Up to June 30 1915. .

| 

802

| 

242

| 

6

| 

31

| 

1,081

| 

1,877.3

| 

389.0

| 

26.5

| 

14.0

| 

2,306.8  
  
1915 2nd six months .

| 

1,895

| 

493

| 

4

| 

33

| 

2,425

| 

4,461.7

| 

976'7

| 

134'4

| 

74'5

| 

5,647'3  
  
1916 1st " ". .

| 

1,180

| 

969

| 

205

| 

116

| 

2,470

| 

10,287.1

| 

2,919.2

| 

432.1

| 

213.8

| 

13,852.2  
  
2nd " ". .

| 

1,045

| 

679

| 

495

| 

258

| 

2,477

| 

25,204'3

| 

8,392'6

| 

2,492'7

| 

1,654'7

| 

37,744-3  
  
1917 1st " .

| 

1,547

| 

408

| 

570

| 

253

| 

2,778

| 

30,004.2

| 

9, 88 7.1

| 

4,480.6

| 

2,145.8

| 

46,517.7  
  
2nd " ". .

| 

2,488

| 

603

| 

762

| 

450

| 

2,303

| 

22 ,55 6 '7

| 

9,5 28.8

| 

6,693.1

| 

2,381.1

| 

41,159'7  
  
1918 1st " "

| 

3,990

| 

966

| 

1,164

| 

264

| 

6,384

| 

18,474'6

| 

8,363.1

| 

6,734.6

| 

1,625'4

| 

35,197'7  
  
2nd " ". .

| 

3,056

| 

797

| 

875

| 

270

| 

4,998

| 

1 9, 06 7'7

| 

6 ,4 21.0

| 

7,647'3

| 

1,479'5

| 

34,615'5  
  
| 

16,003

| 

5, 1 57

| 

4,081

| 

1,615

| 

26,916

| 

1 3 1 ,933' 6

| 

4 6, 8 77.5

| 

28,641'3

| 

9,5 88.8

| 

217,041.2  
  
Table V. further shows the progress of the manufacture of guns and ammunition throughout the war; of the 217,000,000 complete rounds delivered, 126,000,000 were filled in new national filling factories built by the Ministry. Of the empty shells delivered during the war, 28% in number came from British 31,500 19,500 21,800 28,500 96,700327,7 00 1 * 2 39 ,2001 174,100 575,000 600,000142 5,5 0 0 5 f 285,000 485,000 641,000 214,000 f battle of Ypres, Paschaendale [[Table V]].-Guns and Gun Ammunition.  The classification is that adopted by the Inter-Allied Munitions Council. In the case of Great Britain it includes under " light " field guns (13-pdr. and 18-pdr.), mountain guns (2.75-in. guns and 3.7-in. howitzers), anti-aircraft guns (13-pdr., 3-in. and 4-in.) and tank and other miscellaneous small guns. The medium guns include the 60-pdr. gun and 4.5-in. howitzer. The heavy include the 6-in. howitzer and gun and the very heavy include 8-in., 9.2-in., 12-in. and 15-in. howitzers and guns.

| | | | 

Rifles

| 

Machine-

G un s

| 

Small-Arms

Ammunition

(Thousands)

| 

nes

Engines

| 

Aeroplanes

| 

Tanks  
  
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
  
Up to June 30 1915

| 

.. .

| 

. .

| 

.. .

| 

364,246

| 

1,486

| 

507,758

| 

1,025

| 

902

| 

..  
  
1915 3rd Quarter

| 

. .

| 

. .

| 

.. .

| 

173,317

| 

1,719

| 

395,881

| 

730

| 

692

| 

..  
  
4th

| | | | 

198,641

| 

3,133

| 

570,029

| 

1,015 

| 

948

| 

..  
  
1916 1st "

| 

.. .

| 

. .

| 

.. .

| 

217,631

| 

5,582

| 

626,566

| 

1,569

| 

1,137

|   
  
2nd

| 

.

| | 

.. .

| 

267,759

| 

7,245

| 

738,355

| 

1,615

| 

1,537

|   
  
3rd "

| 

.. .

| 

. .

| 

.. .

| 

457,732

| 

9,572

| 

811,476

| 

2,054

| 

1,939

| 

110  
  
4th "

| 

.. .

| 

. .

| 

.. .

| 

416,564t

| 

io,80r

| 

803,607

| 

1,989

| 

2,020

| 

40  
  
1917 1st "

| | | | 

793,350$

| 

16,637

| 

697,536

| 

2,704

| 

2,730

| 

loo  
  
2nd

| | | | 

7r7,000§

| 

19,836

| 

250,878

| 

3,567

| 

3,640

| 

324   
  
3rd

| 

.

| | | 

324,423

| 

18,958

| 

355,280

| 

4,342

| 

3,720

| 

506  
  
4th

| | | | 

323,542

| 

24,007

| 

401,408

| 

6,052

| 

4,742

| 

347  
  
1918 1st "

| | | 

.

| 

294,947

| 

29,124

| 

597,006

| 

8,261

| 

7,154 

| 

260  
  
2nd

| | | | 

2 93, 0 39

| 

33,884

| 

954,362

| 

7,873

| 

7,870

| 

507  
  
3rd "

| | | | 

287,096

| 

31,437

| 

866,262

| 

8,016

| 

8,558

| 

36  
  
4th "

| | | | 

186,990

| 

26,419

| 

596,241

| 

7,119

| 

7,200

| 

25  
  
| 

Totals .

| 

. .

| 

.. .

| 

5,316,277

| 

239,840

| 

9,172,645

| 

57,931

| 

54,789

| 

2,818  
  
[[Table Vi]].-Production of Rifles, Machine-Guns, Small-Arms Ammunition, Aeroplanes, Aero-Engines, and Tanks.  * Including 186,000 "Acceptances" of U.S.A. rifles. t Including 154,000 "Acceptances" of U.S.A. rifles.

contractors, 3S% from national projectile or shell factories or through local munition committees, 12% from the United States and 25% from Canada.

Trench Mortars and Trench Ammunition.-When the war broke out, the British army was not furnished with any weapon especially adapted for trench warfare, and in the fourth quarter of 1914 only 12 trench mortars were delivered. The maximum production of trench mortars was attained in the second quarter of 1916 when 2,178 were delivered. The total number of trench mortars delivered during the war period amounted to 19,096 and the output of trench-mortar ammunition to over 17,000,- 000 rounds. The total number of grenades delivered amounted to 100,103,000, and of aerial bombs to 4,738,000.

Table VI. shows, further, the number of rifles, machine-guns, small-arms ammunition, etc., delivered during the war. Of the 5,3 16, 000 rifles manufactured, 3,954,000 were made in Great Britain, and the army was entirely armed with rifles of home manufacture. The maximum home output of rifles was attained in the last quarter of 1917, when 324,000 new rifles were delivered.

A total of 240,000 machine-guns were delivered, and output rose from a total of 211 in the fourth quarter of 1914 to 33,484 in the second quarter of 1918. The total number of rounds of smallarms ammunition manufactured amounted to 9,172,645,000, nine-tenths of which was manufactured in Great Britain.

The number of aeroplanes manufactured amounted to 54,789, the maximum output being attained in the third quarter of 1918. The number of aero-engines delivered was 57,931, the maximum output being attained in the first quarter of 1918. The first tanks were delivered in the third quarter of 1916 and numbered 110. Owing to changes in design, etc., only 40 were delivered in the following quarter and loo in the first quarter of 1917. The maximum output was attained in the second quarter of 1918, when 507 were delivered. The total number of tanks manufactured amounted to 2,818.

Mechanical Transport, Railway Material, etc.-The Ministry became responsible for the supply of motor vehicles on Sept. 1 $ Including 462,000 "Acceptances ' of U.S.A. rifles. § Including 391,000 "Acceptances" of U.S.A. rifles.

1916\. From this date to the end of 1918 there were delivered 33,000 heavy lorries, 2,500 four-wheel-drive lorries, 4,000 light lorries, 4,700 motor-cars, 1,700 ambulances, 4,100 Ford cars, 1,400 Ford ambulances, 12,000 Ford vans, 2,200 caterpillar tractors, 27,700 motor-cycles, 7,000 motor-cycle combinations and 183 armoured cars.

The Ministry of Munitions became responsible for the supply of railway material in Oct. 1916, and from that date supplied 2,300 m. of 75-lb. rails, 4,200 m. of light rails, 750 standardgauge locomotives, Soo locomotives for other gauges, 13,000 petrol tractors and 33,000 railway wagons of various types.

Workers on " Munitions."-It is impossible to state accurately the numbers engaged on the manufacture of munitions at various dates during the war period, because the term " munitions " has never been strictly defined, nor did the Ministry of Munitions undertake any comprehensive inquiry into the numbers of munition workers. The best approximation to the number of munition workers is found in the reports of the Board of Trade on the state of employment in the various industries, where the number engaged on Government work is also shown. The accompanying Table VII. shows the numbers engaged in Government establishments and on Government work in the metal and chemical trades, which may be taken as broadly covering " munition " work.

It will be seen that between April 1915 and July 1918 the number of males engaged on munitions more than doubled while the number of females had increased tenfold. By mid-summer 1916 more than 80% of the workpeople in the metal and chemical trades were on Government work, and by the summer of 1918 more than 90% were on Government work. No figures are available as to the number engaged on Government work prior to the war, but it is considered unlikely that they could have amounted to more than 50,000.

| 

Males

| 

Females

| 

Total

| 

Percentage to total numbers employed

in the metal and chemical trades and

in all Government establishments.  
  
---|---|---|---|---  
| | | | 

Males

| 

Females

| 

Total  
  
April 1915. .. .. .

| 

1,009,000

| 

78,000

| 

1,087,000

| 

55'9

| 

33'5

| 

53.4  
  
July 1915. .. .. .

| 

1,397,000

| 

136,000

| 

1,533,000

| 

74.0

| 

52.8

| 

71.6  
  
July 1916. .. .. .

| 

1,752,000

| 

375,000

| 

2,127,000

| 

84.0

| 

70.8

| 

81.4  
  
July 1917. ... .

| 

1,923,000

| 

707,000

| 

2,630,000

| 

88.0

| 

84.4

| 

86.8  
  
July 1918. .. .. .

| 

2,046,000

| 

825,000

| 

2,871,000

| 

912

| 

89.4

| 

90'7  
  
Allies.-During the war, Great Britain kept Italy and France supplied not only with coal, but with substantial supplies of iron and steel, which, until 1918, when the United States [[Table Vii]]. - Numbers Employed in Government Establishments and on Government Work the Metal and Chemical Trades.  assumed more of this burden, amounted to from 1,000,000 to I,50o,000 tons of iron and steel a year to France and 250,000 tons to Italy. Great Britain also kept France and Italy supplied with benzol, and Italy with T.N.T., picric acid and other explosives. As regards finished munitions there was a certain amount of interchange, Great Britain receiving aero-engines and some anti-aircraft guns from France and motor-cars from Italy, and supplying heavy artillery and ammunition, incendiary and other special small-arms cartridges for use in aeroplanes, and machineguns. British assistance to Russia took the form almost entirely of finished products, including machinery.

## The Last Stage

Under Lord Inverforth, as Minister from Jan. 1919 to March 1921, the last stage was reached. Prior to the Armistice the Demobilization Committee had considered plans for dealing with the situation that would arise when the " cease fire " sounded, and the army in France would suddenly find itself unable to deal with the inflowing tide of munitions. The most difficult problem was to dispose of the daily production of explosives and filled shell from the filling factories. When the Armistice actually arrived immediate orders were given to stop work in these two classes of factories. Some latitude was allowed in the engineering shops, but, as arrangements had been made for paying benefit to men out of work, the rights of the Ministry under the Break Clauses were soon put into operation. Production, in fact, ceased - partly owing to the sudden loss of purpose in munition work and the unwillingness both on the part of the workpeople and of employers to continue making what were obviously useless articles. In the steel works, managers were 10th to put material into articles which would clearly have to be put back into the furnaces, and everyone was anxious to get on to peace work. The Finance and Contracts departments did their utmost to come to friendly agreements with contractors in regard to cancellation, and every effort was made to clear the munition material from the shops.

A similar policy of encouraging a rapid return to peace conditions was adopted in regard to the raw materials controlled by the Ministry. Restrictions on importation and on purchase of steel were rapidly removed, and even where large stocks were held by the Government, control over the market was rapidly relaxed. In order that the metal and chemical markets should know how they stood, the stocks in Government hands were published, and in as many cases as possible bargains were made with trade organizations to take over and dispose of these surpluses, which in several cases amounted to two or three years' supply for peace purposes.

It was at first anticipated that the State would have to place substantial orders to enable industry to start, and large orders in particular were anticipated in connexion with the Government's housing scheme. The Cabinet therefore decided that the plan already discussed for converting the Ministry of Munitions into a Ministry of Supply, which should deal with purchases of all kinds for every department of State, including the Post Office, Office of Works, Admiralty, War Office and the Air Ministry, etc., should be carried into effect. The anticipation that large orders would have to be placed was, however, not fulfilled, and as the need for drastic economy in Government expenditure was slowly realized the scheme was dropped.

Immediately after the Armistice the labour department of the Ministry of Munitions was transferred to the Ministry of Labour, and the design department reverted to the War Office. The Ministry was thus left with two great tasks, that of closing up the accounts of the war and that of disposing of the enormous war stores in the hands of the Government. The surplus stores in Great Britain of the fighting departments were transferred to the charge of the Ministry, as well as the large stocks held abroad. At the end of the financial year 1920 - I these remaining duties were transferred to a liquidation and disposals commission under the direct supervision of the Treasury, and the Ministry of Munitions as a separate entity ceased to exist. (H. I. H. L.; W. T. L.) II. United States No accumulation of war materials in excess of the amounts required for the regular army, which numbered 127,588 on April 6 1917, was made by the United States in anticipation of entry into the World War; and the Director of Munitions, Benedict Crowell, subsequently stated that there were no plans in the War Department for the " necessary mobilization of industry and production of munitions, which proved to be the most difficult phase of the actual preparation for war " (America's Munitions, p. 18). After the declaration, all of the forces of Government, supplemented by voluntary endeavour of citizens, were turned towards the recruiting and supplying of the national army, which 19 months later (Nov. I I 1918) numbered 3,757,624, of whom 2,086,000 had been transported to France.

Men in France fighting .

| | 

,400,000  
  
---|---|---  
  
Men in France behind lines .

| | 

600,000  
  
Men in army in United States .

| 

| 

1,700,000  
  
Men in navy

| 

| 

550,000  
  
Men in war work

| 

| 

7,150,000  
  
Women in war work .

| | 

2,250,000  
  
Men and women not in war work

| | 

44,350,000  
  
Aged and children

| | 

47,000,000  
  
WAR Operations Of Americans 1917-8 Total.. 105,000,000 The total number of American troops placed in the field was larger than could have been equipped with material of American manufacture; the speed in recruiting was made possible by the fact that the great European Allies had in 1917 reached, if not passed, their maximum man-power in the field, whereas their power to produce munitions was unimpaired and growing. They were able to guarantee their surplus for the use of American troops and thus ensure an earlier and more numerous American participation upon the firing line. American divisions were therefore assembled rapidly, even though they were ahead of the munitions programme. The war came to an end before many of the elements in this programme of procurement were expected to be ready in sufficient supply. Many items would have continued to be procured abroad regardless of the length of the war, for the double purpose of saving ocean tonnage and giving profitable occupation. to Allied civilian workers. Some items were delayed by faulty estimates or mistakes at home.

  


## Procurement in Time of Peace

The pre-war agencies for the procurement of munitions in the United States were shaped by the needs of small and permanent armed forces. In the Navy Department there was an old-established system of bureaux in which the needs were estimated and the supplies procured so smoothly that the only requirement of war was to enlarge the personnel of existing offices. In the War Department there was no central system of purchases; in the lack of one, each bureau bought independently for itself, the most important of the purchasers being the quartermaster-general, the chief signal officer, the surgeon-general, the chief of ordnance and the chief of engineers. Each of these departments had its own system of specifications and rules of purchase. Moreover, the revolution in land warfare since 1914 had introduced new weapons of elaborate mechanism for which no department had any established precedents. When war began and efforts were made to expand the army in every direction the various procurement agencies developed duplication of work and inconsistency in standard, and by their competitive entry into the markets increased the scarcity of goods and raised the price.

## Military Organization

The inadequacy of the American military organization was recognized by the War Department as well as by critical observers on the outside, and after the outbreak of the World War numerous efforts were made to induce Congress to provide more completely for national defence. The reluctance of the people to assume military burdens in time of peace and the desire of the national administration to refrain from active war preparations while pressing its policies of neutrality retarded the, movement for preparedness. In the winter of ,1915-6 there was begun a serious attempt to correct deficiencies of the existing system, with the result that Acts of 1916 changed the basis of army, navy and civic cooperation for war. The National Defense Act (June 3 1916) and the Naval Appropriation Act (Aug. 29 1916) were in harmony with earlier American policies. The former left the army to be raised after entry into war, though providing in its officers' training camps a better means for training line officers than had prevailed in earlier wars, while the latter contemplated an effective navy. A naval building programme, covering a three-year period, was undertaken in the latter Act. It called for ten dreadnought battleships and six battle-cruisers; but it was not possible even to begin the construction of most of these until after 1918, and they had no effect upon the outcome of the World War.

## Council of National Defense

A Council of National Defense was provided for in an Act of Aug. 29 1916, constituting a new venture for the United States, based directly upon the experience of the European belligerents with the need to organize the whole of their social and industrial strength for the prosecution of the war. In no earlier war had the national effort involved so nearly the whole national strength as in this. The forces in the field were no more completely fighting the enemy than were the merchant marine, the manufacturers of war munitions, the producing farmers, and the civic agencies that saw to the rationing of national resources and their conservation. The Council of National Defense consisted of six members of the President's Cabinet, the Secretaries of War (chairman), Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour. It was not intended that these ministers, already burdened with the duties of executive departments, should personally undertake the task of mobilization of civic forces for war, but they were authorized to create an Advisory Commission of specialists in various fields of industrial activity who should direct the studies and coordination. As finally organized, the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense consisted of Daniel Willard, railway president and chairman; Bernard M. Baruch, an expert in raw materials; Howard E. Coffin, a manufacturer of motor-cars; Hollis Godfrey, an educator; Samuel Gompers, a veteran labour leader; Franklin H. Martin, an eminent physician; and Julius Rosenwald, a prominent merchant. Walter S. Gifford, an engineer, was selected as director of the Advisory Commission, and each member was made chairman of a committee according to his specialty.

The Council of National Defense did no important work until after the breach with Germany (Feb. 3 1917); between this date and the actual outbreak of war it sat in continuous session upon the problems of the procurement agencies of the Government, and more particularly those of the army, since the needs of the navy were less in amount and simpler in scope. Its special committees brought to Washington the men acquainted with the industrial resources of the United States and the available capacity for the manufacture of war material. There had been a voluntary survey of these resources conducted by a committee of the Naval Consulting Board, which the Navy Department organized in Oct. 1915. In the committee on supplies, of which Julius Rosenwald was chairman, numerous sub-committees were created at once to sit with officers of the Quartermaster's Department of the army in the scrutiny and award of contracts. Munitions Types. - A large part of the munitions needed for maintaining an army of 4,000,000 men could be produced in the United States without difficulty because the articles needed were similar to those called for in time of peace. Such articles as shoes, socks, uniforms, blankets, food and food containers, camp utensils and equipage required only the drafting of specifications and the speeding-up of industry to produce the requisite amounts.

| 

Produced '

| 

Shipped  
  
---|---|---  
  
Blankets. .. .. .

| 

19,419,000

| 

3,127,000  
  
Coats. .. ... .

| 

22,603,000

| 

7,294,000  
  
Drawers. .. .. .

| 

71,884,000

| 

14,701,000  
  
Undershirts. .. .. .

| 

69,764,000

| 

15,693,000  
  
Shirts. .. .. .

| 

22,198,000

| 

6,401,000  
  
Stockings. .. .. .

| 

89,871,000

| 

29,733,000  
  
Shoes. ... .

| 

26,423,000

| 

9,136,000  
  
Breeches and trousers

| 

17,342,000

| 

6,191,000  
  
L Overcoats.. .

| 

7,748,000

| 

1,780,000  
  
Clothing, Etc., Produced And Shipped To The A.E.F. Between April 6 1917 And Nov. II 1918 Up to the point at which they called for more than the visible supply of raw materials they presented few problems different from those of ordinary manufacture. More difficult than these were the heavy manufactures of the material needed in transportation, beginning with ships, locomotives, and rolling-stock, and including the goods to be utilized by the engineers in France and by the construction division around the cantonments and factory towns. The Engineer Corps alone handled 3,225,121 tons of supplies during the 19 months of war; 1,303 locomotives and 18,313 freight cars were shipped to France; 1,002 m. of standardgauge railroad track were constructed there. The manufacture of these goods was difficult, not because of their novelty but because it was often impossible to assemble rapidly the machinery with which to make them, and to build the new plants in which to construct them. In a war lasting only 19 months many of the preliminary processes could not be completed, nor quantity production be reached. Most difficult of all was the problem of manufacture of delicate or heavy ordnance, siege guns, field artillery, machine-guns, rifles, aircraft, tanks and motor transport, in which quantity production depended upon slow and painstaking preparation of the preliminary processes, upon the supply of labour and raw materials, and upon the wise selection of designs and types to be manufactured.

Considerable experience in the manufacture of ordnance and other munitions had been gained by private firms during the period of American neutrality through the fulfilment of contracts placed in the United States by the Allied belligerents. In April 1917 every shipyard had its ways filled with vessels on foreign order. Most of the private capacity to make explosives, rifles, machine-guns and cannon was similarly in use. The experience thus gained was an asset for the United States, but its value was limited by the fact that few of these resources could be diverted to the supply of American armies without endangering the supply of Allied armies already on the firing-line in the common cause.

  


## General Munitions Board

The evolution of the American equivalent of a munitions ministry begins in Howard E. Coffin's committee of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense. Here it was early learned that new factories must be erected for the construction of guns, aircraft, and other munitions of the elaborate type, and that a preliminary determination of standards must precede this in order that the types put into production should be as few in number and as useful as possible. On March 20 1917, the Munitions Standards Board came into existence to advance this work as a sub-committee of the Council of National Defense. Frank A. Scott, a Cleveland engineer, was chairman of this board, and directed its study of requirements with a view to standardization. Within a few days it was learned that the Board must do either more, or nothing, since unless it could get preliminary statements of the needs of the army and navy its work was fruitless. On April 9 it was reorganized as the General Munitions Board, because, said Gifford, the director of the Advisory Commission, " it was necessary, if we were going to give intelligent advice, that somehow we should have a system for clearing the needs of the army and navy, and for having the needs brought before the people." The General Munitions Board included, at first, seven military and eight naval officers, and Baruch, Coffin, Martin and Rosenwald from the Advisory Commission. Its purpose was to coordinate army and navy purchases, to establish precedence of orders between the two departments and the industrial needs of the country, and to determine priority of delivery of materials. It was dependent for its success upon its powers of persuasion. The Secretary of War directed his supply departments to declare their needs to the General Munitions Board when time permitted, but reminded them that the full responsibility of the supply departments remained unchanged.

Within a few weeks of the declaration of war numerous special bodies were created to carry on parts of the munitions work.

A Railroads' War Board (April II) undertook voluntary direction of the operation of railway lines, retaining it until the inauguration of the Railroad Administration (Dec. 26) under Director-General W. G. McAdoo. The Emergency Fleet Corporation (April 16) was created as a construction agency of the U.S. Shipping Board, with Maj.-Gen. George W. Goethals in charge, succeeded in turn by Rear-Adml. W. L. Capps and Charles M. Schwab. The Aircraft Production Board (May 16) under Howard E. Coffin exercised indefinite powers, in conjunction with the Signal Corps of the army, over the designing and execution of the aeroplane programme. It undertook, said the Chief of Staff, in 1919, " an air programme entirely disproportionate to a properly balanced army and, as events showed, impossible of execution. .. practically independently of the rest of the army." Behind all these, the Council of National Defense stood in an advisory capacity, making suggestions, appointing other sub-committees, bringing citizens into contact with the Government bodies, but not generally administering the war agencies except in their initial steps.

The various parts of the munitions programme developed in accordance with estimates as to the number of men that could be put into the line in France. In the spring of 1917 it was hoped to have i,000,000 men there by the end of 1918; but the Allied commanders did not believe that American troops could be of use for independent work even by that date. This programme was frequently revised, until in July 1918 the Chief of Staff recommended preparations to put 3,360,000 American troops in France before July 1 1919. The responsible departments, the special war bodies, and many civic agencies worked with abundant patriotic goodwill, and confusion was perhaps inevitable because of the undefined functions of the new war machines. Among the thousand of items to be procured, those that involved the country in the most uncertainty and controversy were ships, aircraft, gas and appliances for using it, heavy ordnance, artillery, rifles, and machine-guns.

## Ships

When the Emergency Fleet Corporation began work there were 256 shipways in the United States capable of constructing ships of 3,000 deadweight tons' capacity, distributed among 67 yards mostly along the Atlantic coast. The merchant tonnage of the United States was 3,5 6 9, 6 75 gross tons.' An early phase of the shipbuilding work was the designing of standard wooden ships of 3,000-5,000 tons and steel ships of 5,000-8,000 tons. Contracts were placed, before the Armistice, for building 17,399,961 deadweight tons, of which 2,368 new vessels, aggregating 13,616,836 deadweight tons, were retained in the final reduced programme of June 30 1919. By this latter date 1,056 ships of 5,858,164 deadweight tons had been delivered, many of them from new yards or new ways erected in old yards. By the date of the Armistice the merchant tonnage had been increased, in excess of marine losses and enemy destruction, by 498 ships of 1,944,773 gross tons, without counting enemy ships seized or Dutch ships requisitioned.

1 It was the practice of the Shipping Board to compute new tonnage in deadweight tons, representing the actual freight-carrying capacity of the vessel, instead of gross tons, which are derived arbitrarily by dividing the external cubic dimensions by 100 cubic feet. The ratio between deadweight and gross tons varies with the type of vessel; rough formula for conversion is, 1 gross ton equals 160 deadweight tons.

| 

Ships

| 

Gross tons  
  
---|---|---  
  
Strength April 6 1917.. .

| 

1,614

| 

3,569,675  
  
New construction to Nov. I I 1918 .

| 

704

| 

2,z87,034  
  
Ships otherwise acquired to Nov. I I 191

| 

95

| 

274,366  
  
Enemy ships seized in United States

| 

97

| 

648,894  
  
Dutch ships requisitioned. .

| 

87

| 

354,278  
  
Total to Nov. II 1918 .

| 

2,597

| 

7,134,247  
  
Ships lost April 6 1917-Nov. I I 191

| |   
  
By enemy action.. .

| 

103

| 

313,569  
  
By other cause

| 

213

| 

416,578  
  
Strength Nov. II 1918.

| 

2,281

| 

6,404,200  
  
1912-6 .

| | 

$900,000  
  
---|---|---  
  
1916-7 (Urg. Def. Bill)

| | 

500,000  
  
1917 (Army approp.)

| | 

13,281,666  
  
1917 (Milit. aeronautics)

| | 

10,800,000  
  
July 24 1917 .

| 

.

| 

640,000,000  
  
1917-8 (Urg. Def. Bill) .

| | 

43,450,000  
  
The question of building the emergency ships of wood or steel aroused warm controversy between those who saw in the wooden ship a means of putting to use materials and labour that were relatively plentiful, and those who believed that only the steel ship could perform the work required. Contracts for steel ships of standardized design were let in large numbers to existing companies, or to new companies organized to receive contracts. In addition to these, provision was made for making separate parts of ships in numerous inland factories and assembling them in great Government yards, at Hog Island, on the Delaware river below Philadelphia, with 50 erecting ways; at Newark, N.J., with 28; and at Bristol, Pa., with 12. The contract for building the Hog Island yard, in an unimproved but accessible swamp, was signed Sept. 13 1917; the first ship assembled there, the " Quistconck," was launched Aug. 5 1918; a keel was laid on the fiftieth way in Nov. 1918; but in spite of all the speed that patriotic effort and lavish expenditure could produce, not one of the fabricated ships took on a cargo before the Armistice. The results of the ship-building programme could not have been realized before 1919. In addition to the increase of the merchant tonnage through the building of new ships upon contract of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Government requisitioned all American oceangoing vessels, seized enemy ships in American ports, chartered many neutral ships, and requisitioned Dutch ships lying idle in American waters and partly finished vessels that were under construction for foreign owners. The growth of shipping under the American flag (in vessels of 500 gross tons or over) is as follows: - Aircraft. - Prior to April 6 1917, the United States had acquired in all 224 aeroplanes, which were controlled by the Signal Corps of the army, and none of which reflected in their design the lessons of the World War. The appropriations of Congress for military aviation are as follows The funds thus made available were expended first by the Signal Corps in conjunction with the Aircraft Production Board and the Aircraft Board which superseded it Oct. 11917; then by the Bureau of Aircraft Production of the War Department which was created May 20 1918 under John D. Ryan; and after Aug. 28 1918 by the Air Service of the War Department with the same director. The policy was to design a standard type of aeroplane engine, put it into quantity production, and have ready for the campaign of 1918 a fleet of 22,000 effective aeroplanes. By July 4 1917 the first experimental " Liberty Motor," as the standard engine was named, had been constructed. After further refinement of design it was turned over for production to the manufacturers of automobiles in the absence of large aircraft industries in the United States. The first finished Liberty engines were delivered in Dec. 1917, and 15,572 more followed within the next year. The first American squadron, completely equipped by American production, was reported by Gen. Pershing to have crossed the German lines on Aug. 7 1918. The A.E.F. was provided by the French Government with 2,676 aeroplanes, and received from the United States 1,379 planes of the De Haviland type. The delivery of aeroplane engines of all types to the Government in the United States began with 66 in July 1917, and rose to 5,297 in Oct. 1918, with a total of 28,509 to the end of Oct. 1918.

| 

'903

Springfield

| 

1917

Enfield  
  
---|---|---  
  
1917\. .. ... .

| 

128,475

| 

302,887  
  
1918 Jan.. .. .. .

| 

31,570

| 

153,499  
  
Feb.. ... .

| 

9,370

| 

170,857  
  
March. .. .

| 

540

| 

160,142  
  
April. .. .. .

| 

2,631

| 

167,485  
  
May. .. .. .

| 

3,970

| 

181,034  
  
June. .. .. .

| 

6,759

| 

191,354  
  
July. .. .. .

| 

16,879

| 

231,193  
  
Aug.. .. .. .

| 

28,617

| 

191,769  
  
Sept.. .. .. .

| 

33,583

| 

199,635  
  
Oct.. .. .. .

| 

39,176

| 

187,477  
  
Nov. (1-9). .. .

| 

11,308

| 

56,097  
  
Total. .. .. .

| 

312,878

| 

2,506,307  
  
## Toxic Gases

Much of the preliminary work in gas warfare was done in the U.S. Bureau of Mines, which had already made studies in connexion with the safety factor in the operation of mines. The laboratories of leading universities took up experiments before the declaration of war, and there was gathered at the American University in Washington, D.C., a nucleus of experts in the investigation I of problems in gas offence, gas defence, toxicology of gases, and the manufacture of gas and containers. The strictly military study of the use of toxic gases was made in the Trench Warfare Section of the Ordnance Department, but it was necessary to call into the work the officers of the Medical Department. There was no commercial equipment in America for gas manufacture upon the scale needed for the American programme, and the Edgewood Arsenal (3,400 acres) in Maryland was accordingly built to manufacture gas and fill gas shells. In June 1918 the various agencies concerned in gas warfare -A large appropriation (,$12,000,000) for the purchase of machine-guns was made in the Army Act of Aug. 29 1916, and 4,000 Vickers guns (heavy) were ordered shortly thereafter, but the War Deparment had not completed its test of types or made its selection of a light machine-gun on April 6 1917. Before the World War the machine-gun did not play a large part in military equipment, and there were not in existence either patterns of completely satisfactory type, or facilities for wholesale manufacture. An American gun, invented by Col. I. N. Lewis, " was a revelation when it came to the aid of the Allies early in the great war," and capacity for its manufacture was developed in private American plants on Allied order. This, and other types, the Vickers, Benet-Mercie, Maxim, and Colt, were under experiment by the Machine-Gun Board when America entered the war. The board continued its deliberations until satisfied. Since the whole capacity of the Lewisgun factories was contracted for, it was certain to be several months before this or any other gun could be produced on a greatly increased scale. In May 1917, the Machine-Gun Board tested and adopted two newly designed guns, one heavy and one light, both the work of John M. Browning. The first light Brownings were accepted in Feb. 1918; the first heavy Brownings in the following April. Thereafter the new industry gained rapidly in volume, until during Oct. 1918 the War Department accepted 14,639 heavy and 13,687 light Browning guns. By the end of the year 226,557 machine-guns of all types had been accepted by the United States. The production of the Lewis gun was continued, it becoming the standard gun for aircraft. At the Armistice there were enough heavy Brownings in France to equip all American divisions there, but there had not been opportunity to issue them generally to the troops in exchange for the various other guns in use.

Naval Ordnance.-Naval ordnance presented fewer difficult problems than that for the army because the quantities needed were less staggering, and fewer weapons represented novelties in manufacture. The construction of battleships was practically stopped during the war, the whole strength of the navy yards being concentrated on smaller vessels, with destroyers and submarine chasers at the head of the list. The manufacture of the latter led to an experiment with quantity production of a fabricated steel chaser, the " Eagle " type, at a new Ford plant near Detroit.

Much delicate experimentation was done in search for new rangefinders and submarine detectors, various listening devices being brought forward for the latter purpose. The construction of the North Sea mine barrage called for the development of a new mine and anchor and tested the ingenuity and capacity of manufacturers working in a new field. The formal approval by President Wilson of the plan to lay a barrage of anchored contact mines from the Orkney Is. to the Norwegian territorial waters off Udsire Light, a distance of 230 m., was given on Oct. 29 1917, after the British Admiralty had assented to the joint project. The Bureau of Naval Ordnance was already at work upon the mechanism, in advance of approval, and was able to summon the manufacturers to a conference early in November. Contracts for making the various parts were placed with a large number of plants, and the first mines were ready to test by March 1918. Orders were placed for 125,000 mines, of which 56,611 were laid in the barrage by American mine-layers operating from bases in the N. of Scotland, near Inverness. The whole barrage included 70,263 mines, of which 13,652 were British laid, covering a zone of sea from 15 to 35 m. in width, and to a depth sufficient to prevent submarines from diving under it. The complete barrier was in place by July 29 1918, although it was much tightened thereafter. The barrage is known to have destroyed 17 submarines and to have closed the North Sea outlet, particularly after Norway announced a determination to mine her own territorial waters adjacent to the barrage. (Navy Ordnance Activities, World War, 1917-1918, p. 125.) Evolution of the War Government.-The evolution of the munitions programme, as the proportions of the American effort were extended, was simultaneous with the execution of its details. An attempt to give it unity and proportion was made from the start under disadvantages due to the newness of the ad were consolidated by the President, under authority conferred upon him by the Overman Act, and became the Chemical Warfare Service of the army. Additional projects were developed to keep pace with experience in Europe, the programme of American production rising from 545 tons per week (March 1918) to 4,525 tons per week (Aug. 1918). German production of mustard gas, at the date of the Armistice, was believed to be not over 50 tons per week.

The manufacture of gas progressed so rapidly as to get far ahead of the manufacture of empty shells; and these were far ahead of the boosters needed to explode them and scatter the charge. Toxic materials, to the amount of 4,278 tons, were shipped in bulk to Europe to be there loaded into shells, and provided the full equivalent of the gas used in all the gas shells fired by the A.E.F. No American gas was fired in American shells.

1918

| 

Toxic

materials

produce

(in tons)

| 

shell, Grenades,

filed

| 

Toxic

materials

overseas

(in tons)

| 

Shell, shipped

overseas  
  
---|---|---|---|---  
  
Jan. .

| 

10

| 

-

| 

-

| 

-  
  
Feb. .

| 

61

| 

-

| 

-

| 

-  
  
March

| 

211

| 

-

| 

-

| 

-  
  
April .

| 

399

| 

-

| 

-

| 

-  
  
May .

| 

697

| 

-

| 

-

| 

-  
  
June .

| 

993

| 

-

| 

-

| 

-  
  
July .

| 

1,351

| 

73,201

| 

-

| 

-  
  
Aug. .

| 

1,548

| 

354,962

| 

-

| 

-  
  
Sept. .

| 

1,911

| 

374,968

| 

-

| 

-  
  
Oct. .

| 

2,726

| 

459,895

| 

-

| 

-  
  
Nov. .

| 

910

| 

151,043

| 

-

| 

-  
  
Total

| 

10,817

| 

1,414,069

| 

4,278

| 

868.664  
  
GAS Manufacture And Shipment Heavy Ordnance.-There were 97 officers at work in the Ordnance Department at the time America entered the World War, only 10 of whom were experienced in designing artillery weapons. While expanding this commissioned force to i i,000 during the 19 months of war, it was necessary also to design and direct the production of the ordnance for an army of 5,000,000 men. Only six Government arsenals and two private plants had had experience in producing heavy ordnance before 1914; the number was increased by " a score or so" by 1917, because of Allied contracts for artillery, ammunition, rifles, machine-guns, etc.; by Nov. 1918 there were nearly 8,000 plants at work upon ordnance contracts, light or heavy.

The heavy-gun capacity of American makers was all under Allied contract in April 1917, with a year's work ahead. Up to the Armistice 1,102 guns (from 3 in. to 9.5 in.) and 14,623 forgings (from which the finished guns are turned and bored) were thus made in the United States for the Allies. Fifteen additional heavy-gun factories were equipped to meet the American need, and all but three (whose machine tools were delayed) were producing forgings before the Armistice; the rate for Oct. 1918 was above 24,000 guns per year.

In mobile field artillery the French 75-mm. gun was accepted for the standard in quantity production, and its designs, with those for its intricate recuperator, were redrawn to meet American conditions in manufacture. The tolerances, which the French were in the habit of working out in the assembling plant, were reduced to figures and gauges in order to permit the American method of manufacture of separate, interchangeable parts. In Oct. 1918, 464 complete artillery units (guns, carriages and recuperators) were produced and delivered to the army by American manufacturers, with an accumulated total of 2,058 units to the end of the year. But no 75-mm. guns or 155-mm. howitzers of American manufacture were on the front at the date of the Armistice. The French Government provided the A.E.F. with equipment of this sort sufficient for 30 American divisions.

Rifles.-The rifle selected for use in the A.E.F. was the 1917 Enfield, a model adapted from the British rifle which had been developed in quantity production in American factories upon British orders, 1914-7. It was selected, not because it was believed to be superior to the 1903 Springfield (the standard then in use in the American army), but because the Springfields could be made only in the Government arsenals at Springfield, Mass., and at Rock Island, whose capacity had been determined by Congressional action and could not be expanded as rapidly as the emergency required. The factories built for the manufacture of Enfields, on the other hand, had completed their foreign orders and stood available for immediate American use. The decision of the War Department was to adapt the Enfield to shoot the standard rimless .30 calibre Springfield cartridge, to complete the standardization of the Enfield, and to produce it in these private plants. There was no shortage of American-made rifles for overseas use. For the purpose of training, until quantity production should begin, the American troops relied upon the pre-war stock of about 600,000 1903 Springfields and 200,000 of the older Mauser rifles which the Springfield had displaced. The arsenals were kept at work on the 1903 Springfields, raising their production to 2,500 rifles per day at the Armistice. The statistics of rifle production 1 are: 1 America's Munitions, p. 186.

  


ministrative organizations and the uncertainties or difficulty of the work itself. Before the execution of the programme was far advanced further necessity for coordination was seen, as experience developed shortages in capital, labour, raw materials and transportation, and as it came to be recognized that the whole programme would stand or fall upon the proper adjustment of priorities among war and civilian needs. The disrupting haste due to the imminence of invasion was never present, but the object was to make the American addition to the Allied force sufficient in volume to crush the enemy armies.

The General Munitions Board and the various committees on special commodities erected by the Council of National Defense proved themselves less than adequate before midsummer, 1917. A common ground for complaint was the fact that many of the committee-men were loaned to the Government by firms that were bidding for contracts, thus placing the committeemen in the embarrassing position of awarding contracts to themselves. Disappointed bidders complained that there was favouritism in the granting of awards. More than this, the powers of the General Munitions Board were too small to enable it to have the full knowledge essential to a scheme of priorities.

## Purchasing Commission for the Allies

Among the difficulties was the presence in the American market of buyers for all the Allies, spending funds loaned by the United States (under Act of April 24 1917), and bidding both against themselves and against the American army and navy. Allotments of the available supply of raw material were made, not according to needs but upon a competitive basis that produced uneven distribution and rising prices. In Aug. 1917 an agreement was reached with the Allies whereby their buying in the United States was concentrated in a Purchasing Commission (Bernard M. Baruch, Robert S. Brookings, and Robert S. Lovett), and discussions were started that led eventually to the creation of the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance, which began work in London, Dec. 1917. Meanwhile the General Munitions Board had been reorganized upon a broader scale.

## War Industries Board

As early as July 1917 President Wilson served notice that price-fixing powers would be needed by the Government, and Congress conferred the necessary authority upon him by Act of Aug. io 1917. On July 28 the War Industries Board superseded the General Munitions Board, under Frank A. Scott, head of the defunct organization. In addition to the chairman, the War Industries Board included men active on the Council of National Defense, and the whole personnel of the Purchasing Commission for the Allies. Baruch specially represented raw materials, Brookings was in charge of prices, Lovett concerned himself with priorities, Hugh Frayne represented labour, and there were additional representatives from army and navy. A great change in the civilian conduct of the war followed this reorganization. In Nov. Scott, who retired because of bad health, was succeeded by Daniel Willard, chairman of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense; and Willard was in turn succeeded in March by Baruch. The terms of Baruch's authority were conveyed in a letter of March 4 1918 in which President Wilson directed him to make the War Industries Board the agent of the Government in all matters of supply. Between March and Nov. 1918 the War Industries Board became a sort of munitions ministry. It continued a part of the Council of National Defense until after the passage of the Overman Act, May 201918. This Act was demanded by the President in Feb., at a time when his critics were calling for a minister of munitions. He insisted that the full control of the war must be left in the hands of the executive, but urged that he be given power, for the good of the cause and the duration of the war, to make rearrangements in existing bureaus, to re-group or create new bureaus, and to transfer appropriations from one agent of Government to another as needed. The War Industries Board was instantly cut loose from the Council of National Defense upon passage of the Act; the Chemical Warfare Service was launched as an independent agency, and the aviation functions of the Signal Corps were transferred to new bureaus of Aircraft Production and Military Aviation, and later to the Air Service.

  


The chief divisions of the War Industries Board revolved around the Requirements Division, to which representatives of army, navy, emergency fleet, railway administration and Allies reported their programmes of requirement. In order to solve problems of priority in c.elivery, the board created a great series of Commodity Sections, under the direction of civilian experts who were required to divorce themselves from business, and these Commodity Sections encouraged the creation of War Service Committees by the manufacturers in every line of industry. More than five hundred such committees were finally organized, and brought their testimony as to the capacity of their industries to the Commodity Sections, and thence to the Priorities Division of the Board. After the several requirements were cleared by the Clearance Division, upon order of the Requirements Division, the Price-Fixing Committee was brought into action in cases where it was necessary to hold prices down or to raise them enough to stimulate the needed production. This committee, though interlocked with the War Industries Board, was not a part of it but was a separate creation by the President. The work of determining cost of production, as an element in the fixing of prices, was done for the Price-Fixing Committee by the statisticians of the Federal Trade Commission. A Conservation Commission was created to consult with Commodity Sections and War Service Committees upon the proper distribution of the raw materials remaining for civilian use after the military needs were met. A War Finance Corporation (April 5 1918) was created by Congress and authorized to advance funds to banks to cover loans made by them to munitions makers, in order that these might convert their factories or expand them in the public service. A Resources and Conversion Division made surveys of industries that could be converted to war use; a Facilities Division studied the possibilities of creating new establishments for the same purpose. Before the end of the war new construction for non-war use was stopped except in case of minor repairs, and Capital Issues Committees, attached to the Federal Reserve banking system, received authority to pass upon and veto private applications for loans of capital for non-war use. Other sections or divisions were added to complete the war organization of industry under the general supervision of the War Industries Board. (Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917, prepared in the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, 1919.) Other War Boards. - Except in the army and navy, the great agencies of procurement grew up outside the permanent departments of Government. The Shipping Board was the first of the new war boards to begin to function. It was followed by the Food Administration (Aug. 10 1917), under the direction of Herbert Hoover, who had conducted a voluntary Food Administration after May ig, while Congress was debating the projected Food and Fuel Control Act. On Aug. 23 1917, Harry A. Garfield became head of the Fuel Administration. The War Industries Board (July 28) was by no means as pervasive as it became in 1918, but was active from its creation. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act (Oct. 6 1917) the President created on Oct. 12 the War Trade Board, with Vance McCormick as chairman. The function of this body was to supervise imports and exports for the purpose of conserving tonnage, securing the necessary raw materials for the munitions programme, and preventing the enemy from deriving any advantage out of American foreign commerce. The Alien Property Custodian (Oct. 6 1917) transferred alien enemy property into the hands of a trust administrator to prevent the enemy from deriving advantage from American industry. The Railroad Administration (Dec. 26 1917) was the last of the great war boards to be created. During the spring and summer of 1918 the President held frequent conferences with the heads of the six great boards and the Secretaries of War and Navy, this body being spoken of informally as the " War Cabinet." Centralization in the War Department. - The Navy Department made few changes in its basic organization during the war, but the War Department was in continuous readjustment. The several independent buying agencies were rearranged by functions, so that given commodities might be procured for the whole army by a single purchaser, and all military finance pass under a single eye. In Dec. 1917 Maj.-Gen. George W. Goethals was taken into the War Department as Director of Storage and Traffic of the General Staff. The General Staff did not find its wartime chief until Gen. Peyton C. March took charge (March 4 1918), being sent back for that duty from the A.E.F. His immediate predecessor as chief-of-staff was Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, who remained in France at the Supreme War Council; Bliss was preceded by Maj.-Gen. Hugh L. Scott, who was in office at the outbreak of the war, and accompanied the American mission to Russia in 1917.

Goethals reorganized all the procurement agencies of the War Department, taking many of them away from the former bureaus and building up a new organization under himself. In Jan. 1918 Brig.-Gen. Palmer E. Pierce was made Director of Purchase and Supply, while Edward L. Stettinius, a banker who had acted as buyer in America for the Allies, was made Assistant Secretary of War to cooperate with him. In April the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff took over the functions of both of these divisions, and, as " P., S. and T.," under Goethals became the most visible of the War Department agencies at the national capital. Stettinius was sent abroad to the Inter-Allied Munitions Council, and Benedict Crowell became Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions. (Crowell, America's Munitions, 1917-1918, Washington 1919.) The reorganization of the War Department, the expansion of the Navy Department, the creation of the War Boards, and the rise of the War Industries Board as the coordinating agency were simultaneous processes. The condensation of so much activity in a few months makes it difficult to award praise or blame to individual organizations; but at the date of the Armistice the new War Government was functioning, having converted the United States to the single purpose of winning the war. .

## Labour

The six great war boards included all the fundamental elements except labour. By the adoption of the Selective Service Act (May 18 1917), the policy was established of permitting only those to serve with the colours who could be spared from the tasks of production, and before the end of the year the draft registrants were classified according to their industrial importance. Labour was brought into cooperation with the scheme of procurement through the various committees organized by Samuel Gompers for the Advisory Commission, and the Government agreed that, in consideration of an attempt on the part of Labour to keep the work moving, the United States would endeavour to preserve the standards and health of Labour as against the dangers of rising wages, labour scarcity and uneven housing conditions. In each of the larger war agencies some sort of Labor Bureau or adjustment commission was created, and Congress acted upon the initiative of a committee of the Council of National Defense by making appropriations for housing facilities in congested regions, which were administered in part by the U. S. Housing Corporation, and in part by the Shipping Board. Early in 1918 the Department of Labor created a commission of employers and labour to draw up a formal programme for labour treatment. As a result of the report of this body the President created (April 8 1918) the National War Labor Board, presided over by ex-President William H. Taft and Frank P. Walsh, to act as a supreme court for the adjustment of labour disputes. This was followed (May 13 1918) by the appointment of a National War Labor Policies Board, upon which all the producing agencies were represented, whose function was to determine standard policies and eliminate inequalities prevailing in the practices of the numerous production agencies. Within the Department of Labor various labour services were inaugurated or expanded, notably the Children's Bureau, the Woman in Industry Service, and the Employment Service. On Aug. I 1918, by executive order, the Employment Service took over through its own offices the whole task of placing unskilled labour in American industry in order that labour priority orders might be respected and that the employees of one concern might be freed from " wage raids " made by other establishments. All private employment offices were closed, and labour was generally driven out of non-essential occupations by two orders: (1) a ruling of the Provost-Marshal-General denying deferred classification under the draft on grounds of dependency to men engaged in the occupations marked non-essential on his list (May 17); and (2) a classification of industries by the Priorities Division of the War Industries Board grouping industries in the order in which it was important and permitted that they be supplied with fuel, raw materials, transportation and labour (Sept. 3).

## Government-Owned Corporations

In the execution of the munitions programme a device relatively new to American practice was frequently used in the corporations whose capital stock was entirely owned by the Government of the United States. Government production was normally slow and expensive because of the red tape and lethargy inherent in civil service establishments. Financial operations were embedded in legal requirements adopted not to expedite work but to ensure honesty in expenditure. Private business, on the other hand, could make decisions and apply funds with the promptness desired of Government offices in time of war. The Shipping Board Act authorized the creation by the Shipping Board of a corporation all of whose stock should be subscribed by the board out of a fund appropriated by Congress. As stockholders the members of the board elected directors for the corporation (generally themselves); and the directors were at liberty to disregard Govern ment red tape and to act as freely as any private directorate under the general laws of the state granting the charter. The Emergency Fleet Corporation was organized pursuant to this authorization, and the freedom of action thus obtained inspired other war boards to imitate the process. The U.S. Grain Corporation and the Sugar Equalization Board were created by the Food Administration to administer the work of stabilizing the price of flour, sugar and coffee. The Spruce Production Corporation was jointly owned by army and navy aircraft interests and the Allies, who were thus required to pay their share of the overhead charge in producing spruce lumber for aeroplanes. The War Finance Corporation was a subsidiary of the Federal Reserve Board, doing a banking business in buying war-loan paper from individual banks. The War Trade Board Russian Bureau was organized in the closing days of the war when it appeared that Government stimulation of trade with Siberia would be useful. The U.S. Housing Corporation was an operating subsidiary of the Department of Labor. (F. L. P.) III. THE Central Powers No department of army supply gives so clear and comprehensive a picture of the whole war administration of the Central Powers as that of the munitions supply. The error of the peace-time preparations lay in the under-estimation of the length of the war and of the fighting needs, and in the inadequate provision for the mobilization of industry. With this naturally went deficient arangements for building up reserves of raw material. The difficulties were the greater, since, owing to the effects of the blockade, the supply of food for the army and for the civil population were largely parts of one and the same industrial problem, owing to the many points of contact between the respective demands. Quite apart from the question of coal - and taking, for instance, fats, sugar, and alcohol, all needed in the manufacture of explosives - in Austria-Hungary 50,000 tons of sugar had to be withdrawn for that purpose from the food supply in a single year, while in Germany during a like period 900,000 tons of potatoes were used in the production of alcohol for explosives. Military supplies of many other kinds were also greatly affected by the demands of the Munitions Department. Almost the whole of the national economic life had to be adapted to this particular necessity, and in this respect the situation was truly that of a beleaguered fortress. The home industries had to be specially developed in order to meet the pressing need; and it was here especially that Germany took the lead among her allies. Because of her superior strength she had to be responsible for such of their supplies as their own means were inadequate to provide. This amounted to practically the whole in the case of Turkey and Bulgaria. A consideration, either of the war economy as a whole or of the supply of munitions alone, may therefore be properly confined to the performance of the two great Central Powers.

  


At the beginning of the war, and even more in its earlier months, Austria-Hungary depended upon Germany's mightier and more complex production for various kinds of war material, and especially for certain important raw materials. The Danube monarchy was far from being so homogeneously organized as either Germany or France. In contrast to the highly developed and qualitatively important industries of Lower Austria, parts of Steiermark, Bohemia, Moravia, and a few small Hungarian centres, there were vast areas which were entirely impotent in an industrial sense. The form of the political system also prevented complete central control of the whole available strength of land and people. Regions of advanced culture existed side by side with immense tracts which were hardly at all developed. Austria-Hungary was always greatly inferior to Germany in the matter of raw materials. Her sole advantage lay in the naphtha wells of Galicia; and this ceased to exist soon after the beginning of the war, when the Russians invaded that region. The scarcity of coal was always a great difficulty; even in peace-time she was dependent on Germany for supplies. The Austro-Hungarian Empire possessed an iron and steel industry of the first rank as regards quality. Quantitatively, it could not compete with the German industry, chiefly owing to the above-mentioned lack of coal, but qualitatively the product was not only not inferior to that of Germany, but it ranked next to the English high-grade steels in the world-markets. The magnificent armament industry was second only to this well developed, high-grade steel industry. What Krupp and Ehrhardt were to Germany, the Skoda works and the firm of Bailer were to Austria-Hungary; and eventually the Hungarian gun factory at GyOr, which was under the management of Skoda, was added to these. For small arms and rifles Austria-Hungary possessed, in the front rank, the Steyr armament works. All these private sources of production in conjunction with the State factories which, since the time of Uchatius, had been capable of a large output, were soon in a condition to undertake the entire supply of the Austro-Hungarian army, and also to share in the equipment of her weaker allies with guns, small arms and shells.

The chemical industry was, however, totally inadequate, so that in this respect the Danube monarchy was very largely dependent upon Germany, and consequently had difficulty in producing the necessary explosives in sufficient quantity. In fact, the inadequacy of the powder and explosive production of Austria-Hungary made itself felt all through the war, and was the main cause of the crises which occurred from time to time in the munitions supply. The truth is that neither of the Central Powers was at first equipped for coping with the unexpectedly great and urgent demand for munitions, any more than were the rest of the belligerents.

The difficulties created in Germany by the blockade were increased by Austria-Hungary's lack of raw materials, which rendered her almost powerless to offer any compensation for the loss of overseas imports. Only after Gorlice (May 1915) did her petroleum industry begin to contribute to the common war economy, and besides this, strictly. speaking, only her bauxite deposits, magnesium works and timber stocks were worthy of mention beside Germany's extensive contribution.

Nevertheless, Germany succeeded in carrying on the war, which was so largely one of materials, for 42 years, and AustriaHungary's contribution of material (for example, of guns and ammunition). was for a long time in the proportion of 1:3 to that of Germany. These facts afford a proof of the remarkable way 'in which Germany adapted herself to the war necessities, and also of the height of her technical accomplishment; they are no less a sign of the immense vitality of the Dual Monarchy, which was contrary to all expectation even in .Austria-Hungary itself. The achievement of the much weaker Austro-Hungarian industries is perhaps the greater marvel, for the difficulties of obtaining raw materials, of finding the necessary workmen, the transport problem, and, lastly, the very different degrees of development in the various regions weighed heavily indeed. Both the Central Powers achieved seeming impossibilities in utilizing the entire productive capacity of their populations, the more so as all active classes of the people were called up during the war, as in the other belligerent States.

The actual organization of production is dealt with later in this article. Before coming to it, we will describe generally the character of the problem to be faced in respect of the forms of munitions employed by the Central Powers.

## Artillery Ammunition

The two empires had always been entirely independent of one another as regards the development of the whole artillery, small arms, machine-gun, and ammunition production. Only in course of the war did an active interchange of field and factory experience take place. Bulgaria and Turkey, until the war, competed for their weapons in the open market.

The shell, as the shooting agent, is so entirely dependent structurally upon the shooting apparatus, that ammunition can only he dealt with in relation to the guns concerned. The ruling consideration in the manufacture of guns must likewise be their conformity with the possibilities of shell construction.

The Central Powers - like the French on their introduction of the 75-mm. field-gun, which was believed capable of satisfying all requirements - endeavoured'to unify the artillery weapons of the field army as much as possible; that is, to make one type of gun suffice. However, opinion soon came round to the view - the correct one, as the war showed - that both the light and the medium fieldartillery required a high-angle gun. In Austria, particularly, where the mountainous nature of the country had led before the war to the production of conspicuously good high-angle guns and notably mountain guns, the view was held that even the light artillery must have shells of great penetrating power for vertical fire against the covered-in shelters and stone defences to be looked for in mountain warfare. In both the Central Empires judgment went against the artillery experts who were in favour of greater mobility and light er ammunition. However, both armies possessed a medium artillery (up to and including 15 cm.) which was highly effective as regards the individual round. At the beginning of the war Germany already had modern light and heavy howitzers, and also the 21-cm. mortar. It is true that the Austro-Hungarian medium artillery was only equipped with the new patterns after the first few months of the war, the tests being then barely completed; the existing types of howitzer were, however, not inferior, either in shooting effectiveness or in the matter of shells. While the Austro-Hungarian super-heavy howitzers were undoubtedly superior in mobility and effectiveness to that of all the other armies, the German medium and heavy flattrajectory artillery were immensely superior.

The weapons referred to are the 305-cm. mortar (380-kgm. shell; I I kilometres' range), and the 42-cm. howitzer (1,000-kgm. shell; 12 kilometres' range) of Austria-Hungary, already existing in peace time, to which the 38-cm. howitzer and the 21-cm. mortar were added during the war. All three were designed for motor traction. The German long-range gun is also included. At the beginning of the war Germany had also her 42-cm. howitzer, which, however, was inferior in mobility to the Austrian.

The different lines of development of the German and Austrian artillery were determined ' by. the form of their respective main theatres of war. Austria-Hungary, which had to adapt Its artillery to the destruction of the enemy forts distributed through all the important mountain passes and the rocky shelters to be found in the hills, clearly had to make her gun and ammunition construction correspond to this necessity. There was thus more urgent need for shells with solid points, and therefore base-fuzes.

Reviewing the technical triumphs of the World War, it is clear that in the domain of artillery ammunition there was no advance - .: gas ammunition excepted - on the pre-war principles of construction. This applies to all the belligerents. In spite of the efforts at; uniformity, the munitions equipment necessarily became very varied during the war, because it had to conform to the varied character of.. the fighting, of the ground, and, lastly, of the production, which was..:: subject to the supply of raw material and to the capacity of the factories. However, the new products were almost always constructed on the old lines, and all new types which resulted from lack of the customary material appear, when closely examined, as no more than forced solutions of a difficulty. The ammunition, like the gun material, remained unchanged in principle, only tending towards a gradual intensification, without any change in essential character, No new propellant, no new explosive, no new body or driving-band.. material, not even a really new and better fuze, emerged from this unparalleled trial of strength, this world-wide competition in tech_.. nical ability. In two directions only may real improvement be noted the false-cup shell which increased range and brought up fresh ballistic problems in connexion with the upper air, and the shell of the Austrian 30.5 motor-mortar, which was the first high-trajectory projectile combining armour-piercing effect with mine-effect. This latter shell was the product of the very developed native highgrade steel industry. With an explosive charge of 38 kilogrammes, it had (like the mine-shells of the field howitzers) a io% efficiency:: (proportion of explosive to total weight), and yet; with an initial velocity of about 300 metres a second, was able to penetrate 250: millimetres of reinforced nickel-steel armour without deformation:"= This necessitated a resisting capacity, taking pressure alone, equal to 21,600 kilogrammes to the square centimetre, and it was not a thick naval shell, but a thin-walled mine-shell, of which the point and shoulders had to be hardened. The material was a specially reinforced alloy of high-grade steel. The results obtained with this in peace-time had already induced. the German army chiefs to place orders with Austrian works for shells for their 21-cm. mortars.

## Developments in Manufacture

In the case of guns and of ammunition alike, the war-developments in manufacture were of. an industrial nature in both the Central Empires. The militar y authorities exercised an influence over this development through the orders they placed and the experiments they caused to be made.

In Austria-Hungary there was a special Artillery Staff, the officers of which were recruited, like those of the General Staff, from the:: General Staff School, and received, in addition, a special technical training. For this reason, and also because it was in constant touch. with the troops, this corps was able to judge, from both a military and a technical standpoint, what demands should and could be made for any kind of ' military material.. The ammunition - with the exception of special types, as, for example, the Ehrhardt " Universal " shell - was actually designed in the military bureaus of this staff. Hence the Austrian ammunition was from the beginning more uniform in construction, and the work done by the staff in peace-time considerably lightened the task of transforming the artillery equipment - which, excepting the field-guns and the heaviest high-: trajectory guns, was not modern.

j Projectiles: Material and Methods of Production. - The cores of modern artillery projectiles were made from Martin steel by the: Ehrhardt pressure process. A material rich in manganese was desirable, and especially one which should be reasonably workable and not liable to cause much waste from rejections. This process of manufacture by means of shell-presses, and, for larger calibres, by drawing from rough billets of metal, required special establishments:;' The production was therefore confined to specially adapted factories.

  


In Germany, soon after the beginning of the war, a larger number of firms was available. Before the war, in the latter country, 13 firms were available for the manufacture of the pressed-steel shells for the newly constructed experimental guns. There were no more during the early months of the war.

When, after the first few weeks, the unforeseen extent of the demand for munitions was realized, both States had to depart in some measure from the approved methods of manufacture, because it became necessary also to utilize factories not equipped with presses. Between December 1914 and the middle of 1915 production began of shells of grey cast-iron for light, and of cast-steel for medium, calibres. About the same time began the greatly increased demand on the part of the troops for explosive shells in place of shrapnel, which was of very little usQ in position warfare. It was believed that the necessity of the moment was thereby satisfied, but, as might have been anticipated, production on this scale did not in the least respond to the demand. While the shells of Martin steel, formed by pressure, could sustain a firing stress of up to 50 or even 65 kilogrammes to the square millimetre without further treatment, the limit for the castiron shells was at the most 25 kilogrammes to the square millimetre. Moreover, the cast-shells could not be secured against faults occurring in manufacture. The so-called water-pressure test to which, in both Germany and Austria-Hungary, the finished cast-shells were submitted in the acceptance test, really served no purpose except that of silencing the bad consciences of the experts. The consequence was that these shells had to have their walls considerably strengthened, and to be shortened, thereby reducing the proportion of the explosive. Moreover, the risk of explosions in the bore forbade the employment of powerful modern explosives as filling, and caused the adoption of much less effective safety explosives such as dynamon, etc. These shells, therefore, proved entirely inadequate, and their production was in fact soon abandoned owing to the number of guns damaged by the splitting or bursting of the barrel. It was contrived, instead, to effect a substantial increase in the output of shells formed by pressure.

The ever greater demands made on the munitions industry, which had to share its raw material with other departments of war supply, made it necessary to employ Thomas iron in addition to Martin steel, and, as ferro-manganese was scarcer in AustriaHungary after the loss of the Jakobeny mines, to reduce the proportion of manganese in the metal. The chief disadvantage of this was that more defects occurred in the manufacture and so many shells were rejected as seriously to reduce the output.

Nowhere did the harmfulness and illogicality of using inferior materials and cheaper processes manifest itself so plainly as in the manufacture of munitions. The war showed clearly that fewer munitions of good quality are much to be preferred to a larger supply of inferior stuff. For nothing so greatly strengthens the moral of the enemy and weakens that of the home army as ineffective ammunition. To this was added the great wastage of gun-barrels (from barrel explosions) with the attendant danger to the men serving the guns. The troops lost faith in their weapons, and were inclined to overestimate the enemy's artillery and underestimate their own.

## Acceptance Conditions

The kinds of material to be used in shellmanufacture (for test-pieces) were determined in peace-time. For shell-steel a tensile strength of 80 kilogrammes to the square millimetre and an elongation of from 7 to 15 per cent; for shrapnel-steel a tensile strength of 80 kilogrammes to the square millimetre and a 12-per-cent elongation. For shells subjected to high pressure for certain guns exceptional strength was required. In Germany particular attention was given in the tests to the limits of extension. As a rule, none of these specifications was modified in war, except in the case of cast-iron shells. Indeed, the testing of the shells was based even more than in peace-time on their shooting. This became, in fact, the only essential test for shrapnel. Any modification of the conditions laid down and tolerances admitted was only intended to facilitate the necessary mass-production, and no sacrifice of quality was accepted. Several over-careful peace-time stipulations could be dropped without scruple. In those cases in which alloy steel was prescribed as the shell material, unalloyed steel came to be admitted when the super-heavy howitzers began to be used for mankilling purposes (especially in the Carso), as such shells needed no hardening process.

An investigation into the causes of the explosions in the bore, which were the source of much anxiety, showed conclusively that they were seldom to be attributed to the shell-bodies as such, and were therefore usually due to set-up, which in many cases could be very simply obviated by machining down the body. This was the case, for instance, with the Austrian 10-cm. cupola howitzer. The great influence of the brevity of the single effort of resistance required of a shell was demonstrated in an experiment with shells weakened by having the greater part of the circumference sawn through; these were fired with very heavy charges, and all were successful, though the pressure on the dangerous sections must have been greatly in excess of the normal amount. Experiments showed that the calculated admissible pressure on the shell body was far less than that which occasionally occurred without rupture.

In reality, the behaviour of the shell in the bore is ill-understood. The pressures to which the shell is exposed cannot yet be mathematically formulated. The calculations made have only an empirical basis, albeit indispensable. The chief thing is that the material should be of uniform consistency throughout.

## Form of Projectiles

In peace-time the measurements - calibrelength, form of head, base - were usually alike in Germany and Austria for modern types of shell; i.e. average length, 4 calibres; radius of point about 2 calibres. Those of the medium field army artillery were not very different.

For newer types of gun, i.e. the Austrian medium 104-cm. and 15cm., and the German 15-cm., more slender forms were adopted, and consequently the value of improvements in the projectile was more and more recognized, especially in Germany. In order to obtain, with a like weight of shell, the slenderer form and greater calibrelength and at the same time the distribution of mass best suited to rotation, the shells were fitted with ogival caps of thin sheet-metal. These could be removed for the manipulation of time fuzes. The gain in range was 30 to 40 per cent in Germany; in Austria, with the 15-cm. auto-gun it was only 12 per cent. The difference was due to the variations in the ballistic quality of the original shells. Similarly, good results were obtained by Germany for small calibres with the so-called C. shells. The form of these was very carefully defined, and incidentally incorporated a principle which was already being applied by some makers in peace time - the streamlined base. The tests carried out showed the influence of these improvements to be only sensible at muzzle velocities of 500 m/s and upwards.

In certain of the heaviest high-trajectory guns the shells used in field warfare were substantially lightened, so as to obtain a great range without over-straining the gun by use of a heavier charge.

## Painting of Shells

While the German shells were nearly always streaked with paint, those of the Austro-Hungarian army were left bare except for marks of identification. The painting appears to be more useful for this purpose than as a protection against rust. Before the war various experiments had shown that the formation of rust proceeded under the paint. Moreover, the lack of pigments enforced their economy in Austria-Hungary.

## Driving-Bands

Before the war copper was invariably used for driving-bands. Earlier experiments with cupro-nickel and other alloys led to no result. The size and number of the rings and bands employed are determined by the pressure. An effective pressure on the driving edge of from 400 to 600 kg/cm' was found to be best. The form of the rings was only governed by the necessity of good seating of the shell in the bore and by loading convenience. In the case of heavier direct-fire guns a backward strengthening of the bands towards the rear or a gascheck may be advantageous for sealing, according to the shape of the chamber.

The problem of material became especially important when the scarcity of copper began to be felt. The demand could not be met by the internal production, even with the addition of the metal of commandeered domestic articles.

None of the substitutes employed was really of much practical utility. In both Germany and Austria-Hungary the use of a very soft iron resulted in a wearing-out of the barrel after from 60 to 80 shots. Better results were obtained with a pure iron made by an electrolytic process (electrolytic iron), which Germany succeeded in putting to good use as driving-bands; it was, however, difficult to produce in large quantities, and its employment was limited to this one purpose, for which it ranked next to copper in suitability. The wastage of barrels was not excessive. Paper substances gave tolerably good results both in German and Austro-Hungarian experiments; but the fixing of the paper rings on the shell was very troublesome and not always certain. Besides, the paper had a grinding action on the interior of the bore and led to rapid wear.

A compressed zinc-aluminium alloy, very easily worked, was employed to a great extent, as a substitute for copper, with a thin ring behind or in front of the ordinary zinc band which was of the usual form. While in Germany an extensive use of these drivingbands was being made in 1917, Austria-Hungary from that year onwards effected an increased production by using a hollowed-out gascheck of copper behind the zinc. This, however, was not used in great quantities because at that time the output of ammunition was not sufficient to absorb the copper bands already in hand. The zinc alloy was not really satisfactory, or at most only with the small charges of light howitzers. With more powerful charges the zinc bands were considerably burned through, the sealing was inefficient, and the greatly increased dispersion seriously impaired shooting.

  


## Shrapnel and Shell Shrapnel

The equipment of the field-artillery guns with shrapnel and explosive shells respectively was based on the view prevailing before the war that shrapnel, with its more extended effect and lesser dependence on precision, was the best projectile for use against troops. For the light field-guns the proportion of shrapnel was very high. Various efforts were made to arrive at a " universal " shell, in order to simplify ammunition supply. From this attempt arose the various types of H.E. shrapnel, the fuze of which was so contrived that the projectile could be made to act either as shrapnel or shell. In the end the " universal " shell was accepted by AustriaHungary alone of all the great States. The Ehrhardt H.E. shrapnel was found the best and was adopted. Three factories were set up for its manufacture before the war. The projectile had pressed into the shrapnel body a head acting like a shell. The bullets were packed in with trotyl. In time shrapnel fire the shell acted as ordinary shrapnel, and also, on the head striking, as a small explosive shell. The effect of this head against shields was very satisfactory; moreover, the bursting of the head considerably aided the ranging. In percussion fire the effect was not equal to that of a modern high-explosive shell, but greatly surpassed that of ordinary shrapnel. The manufacture was only slightly more troublesome than that of other shrapnel, and the shell effect of the head and the assistance it gave to ranging more than compensated for this, so that, on the whole, the shell was considered satisfactory. Universal shell, in any case, was no substitute for H.E. shell, and as time went on and the use of shrapnel became more and more limited to particular episodes of fighting, universal shell, like ordinary shrapnel, diminished in importance. In practice, however, in both armies and especially in the Austro-Hungarian, a large proportion of the ammunition had still to be in the form of either shrapnel or universal shell, owing to the lack of material, and particularly of explosives. And the practice of packing explosive between the bullets of the universal shell had to be abandoned.

## Iron Bullets

The want of lead caused a substantial falling-off in shrapnel production. In 1916 the manufacture of iron shrapnel bullets had already begun, and from 1917 onwards leaden bullets practically ceased to be made. The bullets were cast or pressed. The former displayed undesirable ridges and corners; the latter were more difficult to produce in large quantities. Another disadvantage was that not only did the lesser specific gravity of the iron bullets in relation to that of the lead-antimony bullets result in a lesser power of penetration, but a much smaller number of the former could be got into a shell than of the latter, which, being smaller and fitting closer together, permitted full utilization of the space. It followed from this that the total weight of the shell was less, so that shooting with the existing sight-graduations became complicated and produced different results. The packing in with explosive, in the AustroHungarian universal shell, became impossible with iron bullets, because of the danger of prematures.

Coloured Smoke-clouds.--The effort to render the smoke of exploding shrapnel more visible, even over snow-fields, led, in AustriaHungary, to the use of a red colouring matter (oxyhydrate of iron), which made the smoke-burst half red. This colouring also facilitated the keeping of a due distance between the shots. In Germany various devices were employed for colouring the smoke of certain shells.

## Fuzes and Ignition

The fuzes ordinarily used by both armies in time shrapnel fire were T and P fuzes of the setting ring class. They were used both for shrapnel and for time fire with nose-fuzed H.E. shell. After the abandonment of H.E. time fire (which was dictated by the necessity of simplifying the mass-production of one of the fuze parts) a simple explosive shell fuze was adopted.

The Austro-Hungarian artillery employed base-fuzes much more than the German. That most in use was one of Krupp manufacture which had an effective ball-safety. The design of Austrian basefuzes differed considerably from that of German as regards the transmission of ignition. Base-fuzes proved quite as satisfactory as nose-fuzes in the war. Explosions in the bore were no longer caused by fuzes, as they appear to have been in peace-time.

Soon after the war opinion changed regarding the relative merits of shrapnel and explosive shell. The estimate of the value of the explosive shells in percussion and time fire likewise varied from time to time according to the nature of the ground being fought over. While H.E. effect was almost entirely lost in the soft soil of Galicia and Poland, on rocky ground (and more especially on the Carso) the effect of this kind of fire was intensified by the splinter effect of the stones and, moreover, blinds seldom occurred. Efforts were directed towards the production of a sensitive instantaneous fuze, especially in the western and eastern theatres of war, where also time explosive fire was more in demand than in the Italian theatre.

Germany's sensitive instantaneous fuze, produced in 1916 and 1917 (see AMMuNIT10N), was of an extremely simple pattern and safe in the bore. It was not very satisfactory, however, for flat angles of descent, being apt to go blind in such cases. By the end of the war Austria-Hungary had also produced a sensitive fuze, constructed on similar principles and exhibiting similar defects. These fuzes were, of course, necessarily nose-fuzes. A device for bringing into the system a long or short delay element, or both, can easily be added; but the question of the instantaneous fuze is still open.

In the western theatre flat-trajectory ricochet fire with long alloy fuzes was very successful on suitable ground. It served as a substitute for H.E. time fire, and was indeed more effective when the burst occurred at the proper height. However, it depended on the coincidence of several favourable conditions. Experiments were made with mechanical time fuzes, especially for use with anti-aircraft guns, in order that the igniting composition of the time fuzes should not be affected by atmospheric conditions. The best results seem to have been obtained with those made by the watchmaking firm of Junghaus, which brought out designs both in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Krupp model was driven by spring power; the Junghaus by a centrifugal device. The success of these designs was not in proportion to the costliness and difficulty of manufacture. These fuzes were but slightly superior to the time-composition fuzes, and on the other hand introduced new sources of error. Moreover, their manufacture depended on the existence of a large-scale clock industry capable of mass production.

## Substitute Metals

The lack of brass, of which fuzes were nearly always made, necessitated the use of substitute metals for this purpose. The best results were obtained, for a number of the fuze parts, with an alloy of zinc and aluminium. Iron was also satisfactory for fuze bodies and other portions. Only certain especially delicate interior parts (such as safety-ferrules) were made of brass as before. Both Central Powers soon became very successful in the employment of other metals for fuzes, so that the use of these substitutes might well be continued without disadvantage even in peace-time, when normal supplies of raw material are available.

## Explosive Charges and Their Filling

Before the war trotyl (T.N.T.) had been completely adopted for shell fillings in both Germany and Austria-Hungary. This was inferior to ekrasit (picric acid) in explosive power, but its greater insensitiveness to shock, and also the fact that its preparation was both easier and less inj urious to health, gave it a considerable advantage. While Germany, owing to the high development of her chemical industry, already had, in peace-time, several establishments for the manufacture of trot y l, Austria-Hungary was dependent on Germany for this substance at the outbreak of the war. A few months later she began to make her own trotyl, and Germany set up a number of additional factories; nevertheless, the supply was soon outdistanced by the enormous demand, owing, once more, to the scarcity of raw material. Not only had recourse to be had to picric acid (known in Austria-Hungary as ekrasit), but a number of other explosives had to be produced from the available raw materials and used as artillery fillings. Some of these were difficult to work, some not over-safe, some inferior in effect. The demand continued to increase, for with the ever-growing multiplication of new fighting devices, such as trench mortars, grenades, air bombs, etc., the use of explosives was being continually extended.

In Germany the satisfaction of the immense demand was less difficult than in Austria-Hungary, where the army administration was dependent for its explosives upon two public and two privately owned factories. At the beginning of the war, with the exception of one privately owned ekrasit plant and one ammonal works, there were no factories for ammunition explosives in the country.

Trotyl was almost invariably poured directly into the shell cavity. To prevent crystallization the stuff was filled under pressure, and constantly stirred till solid. The exploded cavity was made by boring. The projectiles filled by this method proved highly satisfactory, and it was used up to the end of the war for all shells subjected to high stresses, as far as the supply of trotyl permitted. Complaints were made only against " crude trotyl," which contained insufficiently nitrated portions and was apt to " exude." The manufacture of picric acid necessitated great precautions because of high melting-point, and was also very inconvenient by reason of the injurious nature of the fumes and dust. Hence ekrasit  was not poured into the shell in a molten state like trotyl, but after the addition of a " phlegmatizer " (e.g. mononitronaphthalin) was filled in in large masses and pressed down with wooden stemming rods. Later on, in order to simplify the process, it was made into compressed blocks, and these were fixed into the shell with paraffin and resin. For the larger calibres a combined picric and cast-trotyl  filling was used. Picric acid was thus restored to its earlier importance in shell-filling, and, in spite of less strictness in inspection conditions, proved as satisfactory as trotyl up to the end of the war.

The immensity of the demand soon made new expedients necessary. In Germany, dinitrobenzol was used to some extent. It answered well when a more vigorous substance was used with it to start detonation (trotyl blocks). Its troublesome idiosyncrasies in working were considerably lessened by the use of suction apparatus. Trinitro-anisol, more powerful than trotyl, but also more easily exploded, was also used in Germany. Because of its unpleasant physiological effects, it was, however, employed only for the projectiles of trench mortars and trench munitions, and for naval mines.

The most important of the measures taken purely for economy was the use of ammonium-nitrate explosives. These are made by mixing finely powdered ammonium nitrate into the molten mass of a nitrated substance. Hence the explosives of this class actually used 1 were based on trotyl or dinitrobenzol in Germany and trotyl only in Austria-Hungary. By this method explosives very little inferior to trotyl could be obtained and the total production considerably increased. Although the sensitiveness to shock was found to be rather greater, the manufacture was almost as convenient as that of trotyl. Picric acid could not be treated in this way.

In Austria-Hungary there arose a very extensive demand for toluol-ammonal, which consisted of ammonal with from 10 to 30 per cent addition of trotyl. The composition was first compressed into blocks, which were inserted into the projectile in cardboard tubes. Solid-filling by means of molten paraffin or trotyl poured into the interstices between those tubes did not prove satisfactory in the Austro-Hungarian base-fuzed shells, as set-backs occurred on discharge. For this reason the compressed blocks were inserted without the cardboard tubes, and were made to adhere to the shell-wall with a composition of lime, resin, and paraffin, or by means of cast trotyl. The best results were finally obtained by the use of pitch. Hot pitch, in the form of dust, was sprayed onto the shell walls (Fritzsch's process). In the case of a few large calibres trotyl was filled onto a short block of compressed T. ammonal secured by cast trotyl.  Called amatols in Great Britain.

In Germany the cardboard-tube method, on the contrary, answered very well indeed with ammonal explosives. The explanation lay in the very different design of the Austro-Hungarian base-fuzed shells, which made them very liable to accident when the explosive was badly settled in the shell cavity. However, trotyl, ehrasit and 60/40 amatol remained the most satisfactory explosives from the point of view of the manufacture, and hence the least open to objection.

As substitute explosives, ammonium-nitrate explosives and chlorate explosives were used. Among the former, dynamon was used in castiron shells, for reasons of safety as already explained. The scantiness of the smoke produced and the fact that ignition depended upon the density of filling caused this substance to be regarded with disfavour. However, dynamon and (in Germany) a number of similar safety explosives were used in trench-mortar shells and grenades, and for engineer munitions, with good results.

The chlorate mixtures, put out under various names (chiefly in Germany) and intended for various military uses, soon disappeared again in consequence of numerous disasters, which could be traced to over-sensitiveness on discharge, filling dangers, and their liability to disintegrate. The perchlorate explosives were satisfactory as regards safety. They were used with good results for certain trenchmortar bombs, but only in Germany. A radical measure of economy was found in the use of " economical filling." The portion of the shell cavity nearest the fuze was filled with the selected explosive and part of the remaining space with pitch. By the use of very powerful ignition this process gave far better results than might have been expected, but it was never used on a large scale.

Notwithstanding these comprehensive measures the lack of explosives, which, at all events in Austria-Hungary, was chronic, greatly hindered the supply of artillery ammunition, almost as much in fact as did the difficulties of propellant manufacture. Both deficiencies were due to the backward state of the chemical industry in that country. Although the needs of Germany were very much greater than those of Austria-Hungary she was always able to respond to them much more quickly.

## Bore Explosions

Special care was devoted to obviating the bore explosions which were so disastrous both from the point of view of the command and that of the troops. As has been said (except in the case of the unsatisfactory cast-iron shells), these could very seldom be attributed to the shell-material. In the case of very long highpressure guns it is possible that shells on the high limits of tolerance were jammed by the action of the so-called breath of the barrel. More sources of defect were naturally to be found in the fuze, which must inevitably contain a very powerful igniting composition. In Austria-Hungary detonators were regarded as dangerous. The fear does not seem to have been justified, provided they were properly placed and secured, and due precautions observed, but they are yet another source of weakness in mass-production. At all events, there were few bore explosions with the Austro-Hungarian pressed-steel nose-fuzed shells, which had very simple fuzes without detonators - fewer, in fact, than occurred with the German shells. The AustroHungarian base-fuzed shells had the defect that absence of a detonator necessitated the adoption of a long exploder-game, which greatly increased the difficulty of securing the explosive charge against the shock of discharge. Herein also lay a cause of the above explosions, which at one period were occurring with disquieting frequency. It was at first very difficult, especially with toluol-ammonal  fillings, to fix the compressed blocks to the shell-wall firmly enough to prevent their setting back, and disturbing the ignition arrangements. Later on, these causes were discovered and almost entirely eliminated.

These special factors being left out of the question the number of bore explosions cannot be considered to have been abnormal, either in Germany or Austria-Hungary. In peace-time it was reckoned that in every 10,000 H.E. rounds there would be at least one unpreventable " premature." For example, during the Austro-Hungarian gunpractice in the years 1912 and 1913 the percentage was as high as o04; whereas in July 1915, a particularly bad month, the percentage was only 0.023 and in June 1915 only 0.012.

These explosions may be ascribed chiefly to the impossibility, in quantity production, of superintending the work so minutely as to eliminate altogether the possibilities of error in the manufacture of the fuzes, the thorough sealing of the shell-bases, and the filling of the bursting charge. The proper handling of the ammunition, in the depots, during transport, and in loading, was also an important factor in safety.

Cartridge Cases. - Except in a few old types of gun the AustroHungarian artillery always used cartridge-case obturation. All flat-trajectory guns of small calibre used fixed ammunition. All mortars and howitzers, and especially all large calibres, had separate loading. The idea that this unfavourably influenced the rate of fire had led to the attempt, in peace-time, to use fixed ammunition for light howitzers. While the fore part of the case was joined to the shell the nether part was detachable. Later on this method of loading fell into disfavour because of its complication. When the demand arose for reduced charges for field guns, in order to spare the guns and also to adapt them for firing from concealed positions, this problem was taken in hand more seriously, and in Austria-Hungary a very simple and satisfactory contrivance was found, though never made in large quantities.

At first the cartridge cases were always made of sheet brass by drawing and pressing. The cases were recovered after firing and used again, re-manufacture seldom being necessary; but although this salvage enabled a large part of the need of cartridge cases to be met, it soon became necessary to resort to substitutes, owing to the universal lack of brass. At first the deficit was made good by the use of iron bases and brass sides, joined together in a very simple manner. Generally speaking, cartridge-case obturation proved much more trustworthy in practice than was expected. In fact the twopiece construction eliminated one of the greatest sources of defect in the single brass case, i.e. the weakness at the bend between the base and the sides. The danger of burning through in this region was insured against in the design. The kind of material used for the base was not of much importance, cast-iron proving quite satisfactory. In the end iron-plate was used for the cylindrical part, even up to the heaviest calibres, except for use in long-range guns. Conspicuously good results followed, especially in Austria-Hungary, where, finally, a simple case of sheet-iron bent round, with an inward flange at the lower end, was used for the cylinder. It would stand being fired from to to 15 times without re-manufacture. In Germany, also, iron shell cases fully satisfied the requirements, and could be fired 5 or 6 times.

These iron cases replaced the brass ones altogether. The manufacture was simpler. Only the junction of base and shaft needed careful working. Bruises and dents did not matter in the rolled cases; they were smoothed out in firing by the expansion of the gases.

The prevention of rust of course was a difficulty; but this was less important in war, owing to the short time that elapsed before the shells were used. Excellent results were obtained by dipping the cases in oil raised to a temperature of about too ° C., and repeating the process several times. The examination in Austria, in June 1921, of ammunition which had been stored without any special care showed that almost all the cases so heated were still serviceable.

The powder charge was inserted into the cartridge cases in bags of raw silk. As this expensive material soon became scarce, substitutes had to be employed in charges made up of separate elements (with cartridge cases the bag was omitted). Artificial silk proved a satisfactory substitute. Paper substances were also successful in the parts lying away from the primer. No exhaustive trials to determine the chemical effect of the powder on paper were carried out.

## Propellant Powder

The smokeless powder used in the German army as a propellant was almost invariably a nitrocellulose powder. Nitroglycerin was used only in small quantities. In Austria-Hungary, on the contrary, pure nitrocellulose powder was the propellant of small-arms ammunition only. All other propellants were nitroglycerin powders containing a high proportion of the nitroglycerin (up to 40%). The particular composition and the form varied with the purpose in view and the gun concerned.

The Austro-Hungarian guns had in general a smaller chamber space than the German, with a greater energy-content in their powders. The higher combustion temperature of the nitroglycerin and the stronger flash had an extremely bad effect on the interior of the bore, especially when substitute materials were used in the composition of the powder. The use of this powder in the field guns was the main cause of the great wastage in these compared with the German field guns. The Austro-Hungarian steel-bronze guns resisted better; not so, however, the steel guns which came into use because of the scarcity of metals, and of bronze in particular. When, later, a change was made to a powder poor in nitroglycerin, the unsuitable size of the chamber created great difficulties in determining the proper charges.

No new powders were used or produced during the war by either Power. Some simplification of processes was all that was effected. But the German chemical industry energetically attacked the problem of producing the basic products used in powder manufacture, and in this domain new combinations were made and new ways opened. Among partial novelties may be reckoned the development and improvement effected in the preparation of ammon powder, which had been experimented with in Austria before the war, and even used in her navy for a short time.

The use of substitute raw materials had a considerable effect on the production of powder, and some effect, also, on the results obtained by its use. Special importance attached to the nitration of wood cellulose as influencing the quality of the powder.

At first it was impossible to get rid of the papery consistency of the wood cellulose, but, later, direct nitration was successful. Variation in the viscosity of the wood cellulose or in the preparation of nitrogen-content necessitated variations in the dimensioning of the powder. The unequal nitration of the cellulose was particularly marked and produced differences in the degree of nitration which led to unequal gelatinization and a varying energy-content.

The nitrate difficulty disappeared when it became possible to obtain nitrogen from the air in large quantities; but the victory over the alcohol, ether and acetone shortage was won with more difficulty. These substances were required for gelatinization. The acetone obtained from wood distillation was mostly produced in Austria-Hungary, which partly supplied Germany.

  


In consequence of the great demand other products of wood distillation had to be brought into use, and the purity of the acetone suffered. Instead of the solvent method, therefore, the roller or ballistite method was adopted for nitroglycerin powder, and resulted in an economy of material.

Glycerin substitutes were the most difficult to procure. Glycerin made from sugar was inferior to that made from fats. Moreover, sugar also was scarce. But nothing else had quality requirements.

The inferior purity of the materials, already referred to, produced a number of evils. Some of these did not prove any particular drawback in use. A more serious matter, however, was deficient or unevenly distributed gelatinization of the wood cellulose. These irregularities were shown externally by the presence of little white spots, and resulted in the detonation of the powder on discharge. Only by the most drastic inspection could these mishaps be avoided.

A still greater disadvantage lay in the reluctance of these war powders to ignite, which endangered the lives of the gunners by hang-fires. For this reason, in Austria-Hungary, the use of a black powder-priming, which had been discarded in peace-time, was resumed, with certain precautions.

The lesser inflammability caused a quantity of unburned powder to remain in the fore-part of the bore after firing. This was especially the case with the slow-burning tubular powders. In certain guns this occurred in a regular manner; the same amount was always left unconsumed and the effect on the accuracy of the shooting was thus negligible. But if the amount varied the shooting was ineffective.

But the worst consequence of inferiority in the quality of powder was the increased number of barrel-burstings. For reasons already given this was most frequent in the Austro-Hungarian long guns. In the steel-barrelled field guns the length of the gun's life diminished from 1,800 shots to Boo - an impossible state of things. The advantages of the howitzers and mortars here becomes apparent. The 15-cm. howitzer lasted out 14,000 shots, and the 30.5-cm. mortar as many as 2,500. The German guns manifested about the same endurance, thanks mainly to the less eroding nature of the nitrocellulose powder employed.

To find a remedy became an urgent necessity in Austria-Hungary. As one expedient reduced charges were introduced to be used in lieu of the service-charge when the nature of the fighting permitted; as another, following the German example, recourse was had to the preparation of a powder poor in nitroglycerin. The limited size of chamber did not permit the use of pure nitrocellulose powder; but finally success was obtained with powders containing only 13% and 25% of nitroglycerin. The life of the guns rose forthwith to 12,000 shots. But the output of powder declined, because a large number of the batches produced did not give the required density of loading. However, the method was advantageous owing to its economy of glycerin, which was so scarce.

In Germany good results were achieved with ammon powder, which, made by the new method, partly took the place of nitrocellulose powder. It was soon employed for all calibres. This highly hygroscopic powder could be easily made damp-proof in metal cartridge cases. Where - as, for instance, in certain of the footartillery weapons - the powder was made up in bags, the ammon powder was enclosed in a layer of nitroglycerin powder. Ammon powder had the great merit of producing little flame at the muzzle.

The bright flashes of the large calibres, which were so inconvenient at night, by means of anti-flash were reduced by " flash-dampers," i.e. layers of common salt in front of the powder, which covered the light by producing a large volume of smoke. These were added to the cartridges immediately before firing. The manufacture of black powder remained unchanged, and as the output was comparatively small the production was unaffected by the scarcity of raw material.

In Austria-Hungary, especially, all these difficulties, combined with the small output capacity, seriously interfered with extensive mass-production, and moreover, as the powder production nearly always lagged behind that of the other munitions, it was necessary to make use of insufficiently settled and ballistically unstable powder. Moreover, failure to issue the powder charges in batches according to manufacture was the cause of much bad shooting, which the troops erroneously attributed to defects in the guns or the shells.

## Gas Shells

The use of gas in artillery shells, and with special kinds of apparatus, was one of the novelties reserved for the World War. After a semi-experimental stage in the early months of the war the ultimately general and comprehensive employment of gas shell had its beginnings in the cloud method and in the trench-mortar gas shell. It was anything but popular with the German troops, who did not in fact appreciate its value until after long experience.

It was inevitable that the inadequate chemical resources of Austria-Hungary should here play a subordinate part beside the fully matured industry of Germany, whose chemical development had, moreover, been powerfully stimulated by its activities during the war. The Danube monarchy was absolutely dependent on Germany in this respect. For this reason, and also because the enemies mainly confronting the Austro-Hungarians made but small and ineffective use of gas, this form of warfare was less developed on their front, and was not properly appreciated by the troops till nearly the end.

In the early months, to the middle, that is, of 1915, the AustroHungarian artillery was provided with lachrymatory shells in very limited numbers. The filling was T-stoff, a preparation of bromine. The troops did not understand their use at all; they were never fired in large quantities, and very little was achieved by their use.

In Austria-Hungary the issue of gas shells, i.e. of B. and C. shells, was begun in 1916 and 1917, when the newly constituted special battalion were seen to have obtained no appreciable results with cylinder gas.' The B-gas was bromo methylketone or bromacetone, corresponding to the German B-gas. The C-gas was bromo-cyanide.  When C-gas was used the shell walls had to be coated with lead. But if the gas may be called efficacious the shells were not so. The chief cause lay in the fact that effect was not to be expected unless large quantities were used, and the available supply did not allow of this. The troops, therefore, thought very little of this means of fighting, and with reason.

The effect of the German gas-shooting in the West, and especially the brilliant results obtained with gas against the enemy artillery and even against high-sited positions by the German batteries in the combined offensive of Caporetto in 1917, spurred on Austria-Hungary also to the manufacture of gas shells in large quantities. Not only was the production of the B. and C. shells increased, but phosphorus shells were also made, and ultimately the gases adopted were those used by the Germans (blue-cross - yellow-cross - green-cross). As far as the use of these gases was concerned Austria-Hungary was dependent on Germany for her material to the end of the war. Except in the case of the shells previously referred to, the AustroHungarian gas shells were always filled in Germany, as the home establishments were not completed. Hence only Germany's procedure need be considered here. The following information is taken from Lt.-Gen. Schwartz's Technik im Weltkriege.  The first German shell with chemically active gas appeared in October 1914, and was the Ni-geschoss of the 10.5-cm. field howitzer; the filling consisted of double salts of dianisidin firmly pressed in between the bullets, and acted as an irritant when pulverized. The effect was inconsiderable, being limited in range and of short duration. In Jan. 1915 much more effective gases - such as xylylbromide  (T-gas) and mono- and di-bromethylmethylketones (B-gas) - were used at first in the 15-cm. howitzer shells, afterwards for trench mortars. With these only local effects of limited scope could be obtained. The necessary mass-effect could not be attained because of the limited number of howitzers and trench mortars, but chiefly because the best method of working had not yet been discovered.

For the T-gas shells, which could not be used in very cold weather, were substituted the Tand B-gas in the " T-green " shells, partly because the mixture answered better. In the summer of 1915 began the use of K-gas - chlormethyl-chloroformate - which differed from the T-gas in its lower persistency and its greater irritant action on the organs of breathing. This indicates the reason of their respective uses in defence (T-gas) and attack (K-gas).

These shells, which were intended to have splinter effect as well, contained a 1.5-kgm. charge of trotyl. It was a drawback in the manufacture that in order to protect the shell-wall the gas had to be enclosed in leaden flasks secured in paraffin or magnesium cement. Later on porcelain was used. They contained 2 kgm. of the gas.

There followed the period of cylinder gas and of projectors which were first used by the British. Even on the western front the cloudgas did not fulfil expectations; the gas-bombs of trench mortars, however, were used with satisfactory results throughout the war.

During the summer of 1916 the green-cross ammunition was introduced. In that year the German artillery, following the example of the French, at last turned to the manufacture of gas shells filled purely with gas. H.E.-effect being abandoned, masseffects with gas then became possible.

The experiments made led to the adoption of green-cross shells for all calibres. Per-stoff (di-phosgene) was used for the filling, which was as poisonous as the phosgene used by the French, but was unaffected by iron and also stable on explosion. The manufacture and filling were both simple. From May 1916 until the end of the war green-cross ammunition was in use as offensive material. It permitted of large-scale gas effect without being dependent on the direction of the wind as was cylinder gas.

At first the French mask was ineffectual against it. But they soon contrived an efficient gas-mask, and Germany was obliged to bring forward other gases. These were yellow-cross and blue-cross. Yellow-cross, i.e. Sym. dichlordiethylsulphide, which had no actually poisonous properties, was a high-persistency gas and was used to " infect " the terrain for days on end. It was almost odourless and was proof against the action of iron and water. This was the famous " mustard gas." Strict precautions had to be observed in the manufacture of this gas, which was used in all calibres.

The combination of H.E. action with the yellow-cross gas action came to be desired for purposes of surprise. This brought into existence the yellow-cross H.E. shell, in which the chemical and the explosive charge were separated by a diaphragm.

Yellow-cross was at first used in combination with blue-cross in the defensive battle in Flanders in July 1917, and produced a great effect. The latter (blue-cross, diphenylchloroarsine) was an irritant which proved effective in penetrating gas-masks, the German one included. The effect was to force the enemy to take off his mask, and 1 A gas attack, made from the region of St. Michele, near Gorizia, in the summer of 1915, had indeed (as was averred by the prisoners taken) a very great effect; the Italians lost a thousand either killed or overcome by the gas; the circumstances, however, prevented any extensive tactical results.

so expose himself to the effect of green-cross. The blue-cross irritant acted as a fine cloud, with which it was very difficult for the filter of the gas-mask to deal. Blue-cross also combined gas and H.E. effect, and the beginning of the gas attack was covered by the use of a diaphragm, as in the yellow-cross H.E. shells.

The German experience with gas-ammunition was excellent. On their side no instance is known of the enemy being able to advance over ground infected with yellow-cross. No attack ever made with " parti-coloured-cross " (blueand green-cross) in a favourable wind failed to paralyse the enemy artillery either entirely or in great part, even when they were under cover, during the critical hours.

## Special Ammunition

At first the gas shells were also reckoned as " special " ammunition. Later on, however, they came to be considered as part of the ordinary artillery ammunition. The extent of their employment, at all events, in the case of the Germans, often equalled or even exceeded that of the ordinary explosive ammunition. The ricochet shells were used to obtain a specially retarded action.

Against tanks the German artillery used a shell with an armourpiercing head, rather more effective than the ordinary nose-fuzed shell. The projectile had a massive armoured-steel head which was fitted with the steel shell body, and was set in motion by a fuze placed beneath thisi.e. a central fuze.

For anti-aircraft purposes projectiles with tracers were used; experiments with these had been made in peace-time. Krupp produced a model which proved very satisfactory, especially in certain small anti-aircraft guns. The path of a 2-cm. shell was clearly visible from the gun muzzle, that of a 3.7-cm. to 1,500 metres. Tracers were not, however, much used with field guns and large calibres, and were not greatly liked by the anti-aircraft batteries.

Against airships and balloons inflated with gas, a balloon incendiary shell, also of Krupp manufacture, was employed. The projectile which acted like shrapnel and was provided with a time-fuze, shot lumps of incendiary composition out of the shell-case. The old incendiary shrapnel was little used. For signal purposes - e.g. to demand the opening of fire on particular points - shrapnel with various-coloured-smoke producers were used.

In accordance with the demand of the troops message-carrying shells were made. These shells contained written communications, and, on exploding, gave off conspicuous smoke and flame; the message came to ground either by means of a parachute or in a receptacle which broke as it fell. They served to connect points cut off from one another by enemy fire or otherwise.

## Minenwerfer Munitions

The Wurfmine (thrown mine), i.e. the trench-mortar shell which was already included in Germany's equipment at the beginning of the war, differed from the artillery-shell principally in its considerably increased explosive charge. The " efficiency " rose from 30 to 4 0% of its total weight. Consequently the wall of the shell was thinner as the small propellant charge made less demands on its strength. The shape of the projectile was similar to that of the artillery-shell, except that the shape of the head was not of great importance. The shell material was, generally speaking, similar to that of artillery munitions, but economy was more in evidence here. Thus constant use was made of cast-iron in certain types of shells to the detriment of the essential feature, viz. the increased proportion of explosive. In order to economize the most valuable explosives for the artillery-shells, use was soon made of ammonium-nitrate explosive, " safety " explosives, and such like. In Austria-Hungary, for instance, hardly anything but dynamon was used. In Germany perdit for heavy bombs and perchlorate for light was resorted to. Such explosives answered very well for these projectiles. Unlike the artillery-shell, owing to their less accurate flight, they required a fuze which would be effective in every position of fall. This was a very difficult problem to solve, but eventually the Papenberg fuze used in both countries and the Skoda fuze in Austro-Hungary were evolved. In the first and simpler types of mortar a cord friction-lighter was used as tine-fuze. The German standard pre-war minenwerfer had percussion fuzes.

The explosive charge was started in much the same way as in artillery-shell with picric-acid filling. Later on, to economize steel, the game was made of cardboard cases of several thicknesses. As the minen were not air-tight, the great hygroscopicity of the ammonium-nitrate explosive caused a dampness after a time, which affected the cardboard casing and caused a mixing of the two explosives, with the consequent danger of spontaneous explosion.

According to the type of mining weapon - pneumatic, smoothbore, rifled muzzle-loader or rifled breech-loader as the case might be - the method of obtaining rotation was similar to that in the artillery-gun, or to old types of " stud " rotation, or were simply gas checks which had only to seal. Some types of muzzle-loader bombs had concertina-like compressible plates of thin iron which were forced or discharged through the grooves. Some few projectiles obtained stability in the flight by means of vanes. In the end it was the rifled mortar and, for the heaviest calibres, the rifled muzzle-loader which held the field. But a substitute material was always used for the driving-bands of minen mortar bombs - for a short time zinc-aluminium, and then only soft iron, less injurious to the bore.

For the propellant charge smokeless cube and flake powders were used, and in some types for a short time black powder. The charges were comparatively small. To meet the demand of the troops a propellant charge of compressed air was used in some types up to 20cm. calibre. By this means all smoke flash was avoided and the report considerably lessened. Results, however, with regard to rapidity of fire and the weight of the bombs were not satisfactory, and the supply of compressed air was also very tiresome. In 1917 pneumatic mortars were therefore abandoned. Towards the end of the war an attempt was made to get full value out of the gas pressure by using a stepped chamber and stepped shell body.

While Germany even before the war had included both light and heavy minenwerfer in her equipment, it was some considerable time before Austria-Hungary adopted them as a normal weapon. The bombs were at first intended for the destruction of barbedwire entanglements, but in the course of the campaign their true function came to be that of meeting the demand for additional artillery effect and for great mine effect at short distances. In the first instance various improvised models were made in the Pioneer Parks to meet these needs, particularly in Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the Italian campaigns. Improvised types were also used in Germany at the beginning to supplement the insufficient supply of standard trench-mortars. These types all disappeared when the regular types began to be produced in sufficient numbers. Nevertheless, the experience was a guide to future development.

Later on, trench-mortar bombs were charged with gas. In view of the small results gained by this form of gassing it was abandoned in 1917 in favour of gas " projectors." In the case of some special projectiles - e.g. illuminant and message-carrying - trench-mortar types proved more suitable than gun types.

The diminished strain on the body, smaller impact energy and comparatively large space available in the shell facilitated the fittingin of the necessary components for these purposes. Another special bomb was the strongly built armour-piercing bomb which was effective against a 20-cm. armour plate. The difficulties experienced in the production of artillery-shell due to lack of raw materials were intensified in the case of the trench-mortar bomb, which in the table of priority for assignment of material was considerably behind the artillery munitions. And yet, although the conditions were comparatively less exacting as regards quality of material, flight conditions, precision of shooting and effect, their design involved comprehensive work in order to meet the very varied requirements with the simplest ballistic means, manufactured with the simplest tools. The employment of substitutes aggravated the difficulty. For this reason the help of private inventors, which had not answered in the case of artillery munition, here had most successful results.

Hand Grenades were practically unknown during the first months of the war; with the institution of trench warfare the need of a simple high-angle projectile was immediately recognized. Both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary the troops improvised hand bombs of a very varied character in the Pioneer Parks. All were time grenades.

Early in the autumn of 1914 the German Army Administration turned out a simple cast-iron ball grenade, which could be produced in any foundry. Later on, to secure improved range, a change was made to the " egg " hand grenade of similar construction. The latter, together with some other types, were in use until the end of the war. At the same time Austria-Hungary produced the " universal " hand grenade, which as early as October 1914 was used by the troops in trench warfare in Serbia. It consisted of a cast-iron body, serrated for fragmentation, and filled with ekrasit. Ignition was by means of a friction lighter and fuze length and detonation. This hand grenade could be conveniently thrown to a good distance by means of a stirrup-shaped wire " thrower," which could be attached to the waist belt. Later on the hand grenade was the chief weapon of the infantry " assault troops," and to a large extent deposed the rifle from its supremacy. The demand therefore was enormous and production had to meet it. In view of the great burden already placed upon the whole armament industry their design had to be of the simplest so as to bring fresh factories into the effort of production. The classes of explosive employed were the same as those of trenchmortar bombs. In addition to the ever-increasing numbers of " egg " hand grenades Germany also supplied her troops with the " Stiel " (handled) grenades. These stood the test right to the end. AustriaHungary too proceeded to improve her " universal " hand grenade, and produced from 1915-7 two types of tubular hand grenade. A cardboard tube which served at the same time as a handle carried the friction-lighter, time-fuze length, detonator and burster cartridge. The top was surrounded by a heavy ring of cast-iron for fragmentation. These grenades were all timed for 7-8 seconds.

  


In March 1917 Austria-Hungary began to use the handled grenade, which formed part of her equipment until the end of the war. It was similar in principle to the German (separate transport of the detonator was, however, not considered necessary). The endeavour to absolutely safeguard the bomber from the effects of a premature explosion of the grenade led in Germany, for instance, to various methods of igniting the fuze length, including designs in which ignition took place after leaving the hand. On the other hand it was desirable to relieve the operator from the disturbing sensation of the burning grenade in his hand. The time-fuze hand grenade, moreover, on account of its slow combustion, allowed of a return throw by a specially adroit adversary. Both countries, accordingly, experimented with a succession of percussion grenades. The difficulty lay in stabilizing the flight to guarantee the right impact and avoid non-explosion. Streamers, parachute tails, etc., did not solve the problem satisfactorily. Later on always percussion-fuzes were tried. In Germany the Papenberg fuze answered best. In AustriaHungary, a suitable model was found in the Goldmann fuze.

As the handled grenade was on the whole satisfactory, neither Power failed to keep the output at a high level during the war. Austria-Hungary, indeed, introduced towards the end of the war a percussion hand grenade which differed from the handled in having the Goldmann fuze, but its merits had no final judgment. A few hand grenades were also loaded with chemicals, e.g. Stoff. Rifle Grenades. - At first rodded rifle grenades were used, but without really satisfactory results, and eventually Germany took to the discharger cup and a grenade of the V.B. class.

## Grenade Throwers

The grenade werfer (thrower), although not so simple, met much more fully the demand for a greater range. It was the connecting link with the minenwerfer, and indeed was more akin to the latter than to the rifle grenade. Early attempts with throwers of the most varied forms led to no useful results. The first serviceable model was constructed by an Austro-Hungarian inventor. This grenade thrower, called in Germany Priesterwerfer, threw castiron bombs with percussion-fuzes (usually of the vane class). It is described and illustrated under Bombthrowers.

The fundamental idea of the construction was the same as that of an English invention of i, the early 19th century, but it seems to have been practically used for the first time in the World War. A much greater rapidity of fire than could be obtained with this otherwise satisfactory thrower was got with the Granatschnellwerfer, also an Austrian invention, in which the grenades were driven by compressed air through a tube.

Small-Arms Munitions. - Germany's normal infantry and machinegun ammunition was a pointed bullet which, with a muzzle velocity of goo m/sec., was ballistically superior to the round-nosed AustroHungarian bullet which had a muzzle velocity of 650 m/sec. The German cartridge case was cannelured, the Austro-Hungarian rimmed.

Cartridge cases were at first made of brass, but the consumption was so great, especially as the salvage of S.A.A. cartridge cases was small compared to that of artillery empties, that steps had to be taken to find a substitute for brass. This, however, was much more difficult than in the case of artillery munitions, and it was only in the very last stages of the war that it was achieved. The cupro-nickel envelopes of the German bullet were replaced by galvanized copper for the sake of economy.

In both countries a nitrocellulose disc powder was used for the propellant charge. This ammunition has answered well. Amongst the varieties of special ammunition should be noted the German A.P. ammunition (a pre-war design), and the Austro-Hungarian XX. cartridge, likewise armour-piercing. The German bullet, instead of a lead filling, had a core of alloyed (later on unalloyed) steel embedded in lead, the two filling up the interior of the steel-casing. The AustroHungarian envelope bullet was similar - a conical envelope with a steel pin in the lead filling. The German bullet penetrated a 9-mm. high-quality armour plate at a distance of 400 metres, the Austrian a 7.5mm. plate at a distance of 350 metres. Germany possessed in her 13 -mm. tank bullet (similar in design to her other A.P. bullets) a weapon which was effective at a distance of 400 metres against a 21 -mm. plate. The U. munition of Austria-Hungary was another special munition. This was, however, soon withdrawn. It was designed to facilitate ranging by giving on impact a good visible grey smoke. However, the incidental explosive effect brought it under the ban of international law; it was therefore soon discarded.

Later on, for anti-aircraft purposes especially, a demand was made for a tracer-bullet. Both the German and the Austrian types of tracer-bullet were capable also of wounding effect. The German type showed the trajectory by means of a backward-stretching flame visible to about 1,000 metres. Austria-Hungary made use of different types, all constructed by the Adler firm; the F.Z. shell showed the trajectory between ioo and 600 metres.

A special development of infantry tracer-bullets was the phosphorus (P) bullets; they were primarily to set on fire the petrol tanks of aeroplanes, but effect was given in the indication of the trajectory on account of which incidentally they gave good tracer effect so that the old tracer-bullet could be discarded in its favour. The P bullet was not designed solely for air warfare; for short range up to about 1,000 metres it could be fixed on wires with ordinary ammunition. It had a filling of yellow phosphorus, which was heated by the friction of the shell in the gun-barrel. At 80 metres from the muzzle it burst forth from a small opening previously closed by wax or a thin solder and ignited in the air. This phosphorus effect extended to about 400 metres. Both the indication of trajectory and the incendiary effect against fuel tanks were quite satisfactory, but against balloons its value was not conclusively proved. The difficulties of producing small-arms ammunition never assumed great proportions. It was found that the real daily demand per infantry rifle remained considerably below the peace-time estimate. The variety of weapons issued and the almost uninterrupted continuance of trench warfare in fact left less and less work for the rifle. The machine-gun alone gained - and gained enormously - in importance.

## The Production of Munitions

The constructive development of munitions by the Central Powers shows how they succeeded in adapting the available raw materials and in finding substitutes. The behaviour of the ammunition remained good, and even the demands imposed by the ever-changing tactical methods were able to be met. What influenced production much more strongly were the difficulties due to shortage of imported raw materials and to the unexpected volume of the demand. The peace preparations were certainly insufficient, but even if the great demand and the long duration of the war could have been foreseen, it would have been frankly impossible to cover more than a comparatively small proportion of the needs. Had every workshop in the land been given over to the requirements of war, and even an approximately sufficient supply of war stores and imported raw material been accumulated, the national wealth would have been decimated. A higher state of peace preparedness would, indeed, without overstraining the national strength, have smoothed the initial difficulties of production and eased the first munitions crisis. But all else the actual stress of war had to bring about. It alone could force everything into its service. This happened at the moment it became clear that it had become a question of a struggle for economic existence. But both States had neglected to organize the war administration in peace-time and to bring science and industry into the mobilization plan, as had been done with the railways.

In proportion as it came to be recognized that not only the industries actually producing war material, but also all the other departments of economic life, were bound up together by countless veins and formed each a limb of one corporate body, central management came into force.

This did not take place all at once, however, and at first only those regions in which there was a deficiency from the very first were covered. Nor had the Central Powers agreed upon a joint war-industrial policy; indeed, even at the end of the war complete unity of economic control had not been achieved within each State itself. Here political reasons came into play. In Austria-Hungary it was especially difficult, as the Dual Monarchy comprised two economically independent States of different structure.

Of the war needs, the greatest in extent, as also the most imperative, was that of munitions. More and more the enormous consumption made inroads into all the departments of general economic life. Its needs embraced almost all the important raw materials. The peace-time preparation of munitions had been limited to maintaining the supply in the specialized State and private factories at a level sufficient to guarantee to cover the presumed needs of the first three months' campaigning. These selected factories were also kept at a standard level as regards installation, strength of skilled workers, and supplies of raw materials. In some State works arrangements were in existence for expansion. The peace-time supplies of munitions available, calculated on the basis of the numerical demands of the General Staff, were supposed to guarantee a continued supply to the army, for a several months' campaign, until war production should become effective. Before the war 600 to i,000 rounds were considered sufficient for light guns and somewhat less for heavy guns. These figures were not in every case fully attained, especially in Austria-Hungary. The production which was intended to be secured within the first three months was approximately equal to the actual war-material stocks.

At the beginning of the war this proposed production was immediately put in hand. In Austria-Hungary, however, the output of the peace-time demand was not fully realized, because the proposed new works for the production of shrapnel were not yet ready and the arrangements for the production of explosive (trotyl) had not yet been taken in hand.

Later on the monthly production in Germany reached i,000 rounds per light gun, that in Austria-Hungary about boo rounds, and this though meantime the number of guns had multiplied. By the beginning of 1917 the capacity of the munitions industry had in fact increased enormously - it was twenty times greater than during the first months of the war. This was due to technical science, which succeeded in procuring substitutes for the most important raw materials which were lacking.

  


## Central Management and Organization of Output

In peacetime the production of munitions was under the different departments of the War Office. To supervise the construction and guarantee the specified quality an "Artilleriepriifungskommission" (A.P.K.) was attached to the Prussian War Office and the "Technische Militarkomitee " (T.M.K.) to the Austrian War Office, as supplementary departments. These institutions provided the technical-scientific service. The T.M.K in Vienna was, even more than the A.P.K. in Berlin, a link between the technical science and the army administration, since the manufacture of munitions was under this office itself. The supervision of the military industries, which even in peace-time represented very considerable establishments, was in Germany under the Ordnance Department (Feldzeugmeisterei)  and in Austria-Hungary under the Inspector of Technical Artillery, who in the period just before the war was also responsible for keeping the principal war industries up to standard.

In Germany, at the beginning of the war, this organization was unchanged. The armament industry procured all its necessary raw materials itself. -. Industries which had no contracts to produce war material marked time. Their output was at a standstill. The most skilled portion of their workmen and officials hurried,. to the colours. In order to establish uniform policy and -procedure German industry founded the " War Committee: of Berman Industry." Very soon the leading industrial circles :recognized the necessity of making a survey of the most, important raw materials, and during the first months of the war the " Raw Materials of War Department " was established. Out of theoriginal department composed of three collaborators a huge organization developed. Its activities consisted in regulating and supervising the economic use of raw materials necessary for the army's needs in which shortage was threatened, -and it finally embraced almost all the departments of the State;industry. With the long duration. of the war more and more raw materials were absorbed, its sphere of activity increased, and at theend of 1917 this department, which in 1916 was attached to the War Office, employed over 2,000 people, andits subordinate ." War Associations " (Kriegsgesellschaften)  a further.;5,000 employees. Of these " Raw Materials of War Associations. the first founded was " The War Metal Co." which was mainly occupied with the function of purchasing throughout the whole country all metals obtained by requisition, such as copper, zinc, etc. This was done in order to protect the small proprietors from the loss which they suffered through the lying-idle of their requisitioned goods, for which the Government did; not. pay until, it actually used them. Subsequently the: company also undertook the distribution of the metals to industry. - The.., " Raw Materials Associations " were public utility organizations which did not work for profit. Ensuing profits were handed over to the Treasury. On the other hand losses, which were. bound to occur on account of the tight hand kept on maximum prices, were met by the State. The great increase .of outlay this occasioned for the State was amply compensated: by the influence over prices of war munitions which it thus obtained. These companies were distinguished from. other limited companies in that they were under the surveillance of departmental commissaries with a right of veto, and under the control of the War Department for raw materials. - At -the outset of: hostilities the War Ministries of the German States at. once. handed over control of the most important elements 'of war. supply to. the Prussian War Office, which transacted the business through its respective departments. The growing scale of these transactions and the recognized necessity of uniting more closely all the industrial organizations which had come into being, led in Nov. 1916 to the establishment of the " War Office " (Kriegsamt) within the Prussian War Ministry, to which all the departments concerned were subordinated and all the organizations and new offices extending throughout the whole German industry were attached. The establishment of 'the " War Office " marked the creation of a central direction whose task it was to focus all Germany's economic activity, so as both to pool and to allocate raw mate rials and labour resources: As this Office was required to act in. the economic, technical, and social fields alike, it could not, naturally, be constituted on a purely military basis. Suitable representation in it was given to the technicians, the commercial world, and to the labour organizations. Naturally military control dominated, since provision for the army was the chief consideration; but along with this, the " War Office " had to take over provision for the civil population.

The War Office Departments (Kriegsa y ntstellen) distributed throughout the army corps districts and the different States, and the liaison organs between all departments of war industry were subordinated to the military and technical staffs at the War Office. These departments, etc., in their more limited spheres, had the same duties as, and were the representatives of, the offices affiliated to the War Office.

A very great proportion of the organizations that were, little by little, grouped round the War Office were concerned with the production of munitions. The most important ministry in this province was the " Arms and Munition Production Ministry" (Waj%nand Munitionsbesclzaffungsamt - " Wumba"). Next in point of size to the Raw Materials of War Department, it was responsible for the production of the whole army's requirements in arms and munitions. It was created in 1916 out of the departments concerned which were already in existence. Its activities comprised both the equalizing of the existing machinery and adjustment of labour in the metal industry factories. In the already mentioned Kriegsamtstellen and its own Maschinenausgleichstellen the department had its organs distributed over the country. It was the duty of the Wumba to supervise the fixing of prices in its own province. It worked in touch with the Artillerieprufungskomniission (Inspection Department).

To obtain the greatest possible standardization in manufacture, simplification of .;types, fixing of tolerances, definiteness in acceptance conditions and determination by the Taylor method of the working movements which gave maximal output, the Fabrikationsbiiro (Fabo) was set up in Spandau and subordinated to Wumba. The Standards Committee of German Industry (Normenausschuss deutsclier Industrie [Nadi]) instituted by the Union of German Engineers also helped towards securing standardization and economy of labour in the construction of machine parts and tools.

Next in importance to Wumba in the creation of raw materials and munitions was the above-mentioned " Raw Materials of War Department." It was organized in five branches dealing with the various main groups of raw materials and these were subdivided into sections. The branches most important for the activities of Wumba included the Chemical Section with the attached Raw Materials of War Co., War Chemicals Co. and War Phosphate Co., -.the Metal Sections and the Metal Statistics Section, with the Metal Allocation Office, the Metal Mobilization Office (to which the War Metal Co. mentioned earlier was attached) and lastly the Iron Section, with its attached Central Iron Co., and the Manganese Co., and the Raw Steel Allocation Office. Among the other subdivisions may here be mentioned the Coal and Mineral Oil Section.

On account of .the. great importance of the coal and nitrogen production the management of these departments was at an early date combined by means of the Imperial Coal Commission and the Imperial Nitrogen Commission. In 1917 these two departments were also subordinated to the War Office.

As in the beginning the needs of the army and the war industry were supplied by the various departments of the War Office, so the care of the people, at this time not an important task, devolved upon the various civil departments. With the creation of the War Department and its branches, however, active contact was naturally maintained between these departments, the ministries concerned and all authorities. The occupied territories also came under the jurisdiction of the Central Administration, but only in so far as they had to contribute to the supplies of raw material for the Hinterland.

  


With the building-up of this comprehensive organization Germany amply satisfied the need for an all-inclusive Central Administration. It was only in this way that the country could hold its entire forces together. It was complete, and yet all this could have been achieved sooner and with more successful results had the organization existed in peace-time in the form of a mobilization scheme.

The Supreme Command not only assumed control over the economic management of the occupied provinces by means of the L. of C. authorities of armies and the general Governments (which set up their own administrative departments for this) but also provided through the War Office of the War Ministry for the necessary coordination between provisioning the army and the people and the military operations.

## Austria-Hungary

In Austria-Hungary, a few weeks after war began, the Technical Artillery Inspector was entrusted with the entire munition production; and this corresponded to the later Wumba in Germany. He was directly subordinate to the War Minister, and was the organ of the Government in relation to both the State and the private munition industries, the adjustment of which to war production devolved on him. In order to secure. uniformity in the conduct of transactions, the munition section of the Technical Military Committee was handed over to him. Already in 1914 this department combined under one head the functions of both the German Wumba and the German Inspection Department in all questions relating to the production of munitions and adaptations of design to available raw materials and to production. By this means the service was simplified. Provision by the State of raw materials for munitions was concerned at this time chiefly with explosives and their basic substances, which, like all other military requirements, devolved on the appropriate departments of the joint War Ministry in Vienna, just as was the case in Germany. At the beginning of the war the Austro-Hungarian industry was in the same unsettled position as the German. Its interests were safeguarded by the existing Unions of Industry, Chambers of Commerce and such-like institutions. There was at first no new organization upon an elaborate scale.

With the recognition of the dangerous situation regarding raw materials a great extension of the central organization was made in the ministries themselves. The number of departments in the Austro-Hungarian Joint War Ministry were increased and their duties could thus be differentiated. Industry now created organizations similar to the German Kriegsgesellschaften in the form of Central Metal, Leather and other Societies.

The conditions in Austria-Hungary were not favourable for forming a close uniform organization which should embrace the whole country. The two separate Governments in Vienna and Budapest were theoretically independent of each other. The Joint Ministries in this case, the K. and K. Kriegsministerium in Vienna, could of course take measures affecting the whole kingdom, but they could only do so within certain defined limits. The Hungarian Government especially considered that it could not ensure any full subordination to the common interest. So every central organization of the administration that attempted to take over any functions formerly devolving on the separate Governments came to a deadlock half-way. The result was that the administration of certain important raw materials, especially coal and foodstuffs, was carried out for the two States separately by the two Governments. Later on, it is true, it became possible to form a central administration for. iron, (non-ferrous) metals and explosives in the K. and K. Kriegsministerium. The administration of coal and various other stuffs remained, however, in the respective departments.

To obtain closer cohesion of all the industrial departments directly connected with the production of munitions, the various sections of the War Ministry concerned here, in the beginning of 1917, united under the jurisdiction of the I. de T.A., and reorganized as a munition department of the War Ministry.

In addition to the production of munitions this department was, like Wumba, responsible for questions of machinery and supply of labour for the munition industry, and, like certain sections of the German Raw Materials of War Department, for the administration of (non-ferrous) metals and raw material for the production of explosives, coal excluded. For the administration of iron an Austrian and a Hungarian Commission were formed which possessed official authority. In January 1917 a special department in the War Ministry was created to which the Austrian Iron Committee was united. This department undertook the allocation of iron for the Hungarian half of the empire through the Hungarian Iron Committee.

The administration of coal presented great difficulties on account of the extreme dearth from which Austria-Hungary, unlike Germany, suffered. The central distribution lay principally in the hands of the civil ministries in Vienna and Budapest until the end of the war. For each half of the empire a National Coal Commission was set up, similar to the Iron Commission; these were under the respective civil ministries. In 1917 a special section was created in the K. and K. Kriegsministerium  to deal with the State and private works hitherto dependent upon various departments of the War Ministry. It could not, however, extend its operations over such a wide field as the Iron Commission. It was in this region that purely military interests most markedly clashed with those of the Hinterland. Thus the Austro-Hungarian organization in the various major branches of munitions production was by no means as uniform as the German. This made it all the more necessary for the Supreme Command, which was entrusted with the safeguarding of the joint war interests, to interfere if these seemed endangered, so that finally in 1918 all decisions relative to coal and iron lay de facto in the hands of the Supreme Command. The Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, like the German, also controlled the industrial administration of the occupied territories by means of its own organs; for example, communication with the East and with Rumania was directed by the Eastern section of the War Ministry.

## The Adaptation of Industry to War Services

At the time of mobilization at the outbreak of war only those works actually supplying materials of war were given work. As it became clear after the first battles that the stocks of munitions could not last the specified time, and also that the existing armament industry could not satisfy the demand, all works which were in any way suitable for the production of munitions were brought in. Thus, the admission of cast-iron shells had as its only object the employment of the more simply equipped works. Later on the munitions industry included the metal and chemical industry. In Austria-Hungary, for instance, the number of works under the jurisdiction of the Munition Department had mounted to 500, in addition to which there were a large number of smaller businesses acting as sub-contractors to the large firms. The turnover from peace to war production was not achieved without friction. The difficulties in the allotment of labour and in the rational distribution and construction of machinery were only overcome with difficulty through the intervention of the War Ministry (Munition Department).

In spite of various measures, such as the production of the cast-iron shell, delays in output were inevitable.

Subsequently, however, the industry was only hindered in developing its full working capacity by the shortage of coal and certain raw materials, especially from the winter of 1917-8 onwards, when it was difficult to obtain sufficient food for the workers. The State administration on its side had ., of course, in every direction possible, simplified munition design with a view to mass-production.

## Legislation

Simultaneously with the last great increase in the demands made by the Army Commands upon the resources of the Central Powers (Hindenburg programme), the Auxiliary Service Law was enacted in Germany and the War Work Law in Austria-Hungary. These made it possible in 1916 to absorb the entire resources of human labour, and the production of munitions reached its maximum at this time. Already in 1914 both States had gone far in the employment of women. From 1916 on, the larger half of the personnel of the largest munition factories consisted of women.

  


## Raw Materials

The effects of the blockade had, in the nature of things, a great influence on the provision of rad materials. The munition production was most affected, as it used by far the greatest proportion of them. The Central Powers had in no way prepared for the supply of imported raw materials; and only the rigid organization subsequently set up, the technical skill in adaptation, and above all the creations of German chemistry, rendered it at all possible for the Central Powers to continue the struggle after the first three months. This applies especially to the administration of nitrogen and the " husbanded " metals. The extension of the area administered by the Central Powers by the occupation of territory had, apart from the supply of mineral oils, only eased the situation principally in respect of foodstuffs. The production of coal and iron was subjected to the least change in relation to peace-time conditions, as these minerals were far from being purely import materials. Germany herself possessed sufficient coal and iron supplies. It is true that Austria-Hungary, whose peace-time requirements were S4 million tons-4 million imported from Germany - had a desperate struggle for the necessary quantity throughout the whole war, and the failure of supplies was bound to reduce her iron production.

It was particularly on these products that the demand rose in comparison to those of peace-time, and the output from the German mines was not such as to meet the needs of an ally in addition. The lack of coal in Austria-Hungary pressed heavily on all her war industries, but most heavily of all on her munition industry. Had the Supreme Army Command not been able to exploit the Polish coal-mines the production of munitions would have had to be reduced even in 1916. Germany's iron supplies could not everywhere in every case meet the demand for special quality. The substitution of inferior steel for high-quality kinds has already been mentioned. Similar conditions prevailed in Austria-Hungary, intensified by the coal shortage, and only the strictest economy prevented the break-down of the iron industry.

Finally in 1918 the coal shortage, due to the necessary demands of the food industry and the railways, forced such a reduction of iron and explosives production that several works had to close down, and the manufacture of products of a similar nature had to be concentrated in the best-equipped factories.

In both the Central Powers the production of the other metals - the " husbanded metals " - was inadequate. Germany's own production of copper in peace-time amounted to 2,000 tons per month; in war the expenditure rose to 15,000 per month; in Austria-Hungary the production amounted to 150 tons per month as against a war demand of 3,000 tons per month.

For this metal, as well as for nickel, lead, zinc, tin and aluminium, central administration began early. This, with the fact that, at the outbreak of war, supplies were to hand in the industry, and, later on, the requisitioning of all "husbanded" metals even to those used in household utensils, saved munition production from the breakdown that shortage of these metals would infallibly have produced. Even the church bells were utilized. Great electrolysing plants separated the pure copper. Consumption in the munition industry was opportunely reduced to a fraction through the above-mentioned use of substitutes in the designs.

The production of aluminium, of course, was substantially increased through the exploitation of the Austrian bauxite works. At the outbreak of war the production of nitrogen threatened to be the most difficult. Both Powers had procured more than half their peace-time supplies from overseas in the form of Chile saltpetre. Nine-tenths of the whole consumption was consigned to agriculture. The yearly home production amounted in Germany to 1 io,000 tons free nitrogen held in ammonium sulphate from the coke and gas works, and 10,000 tons procured from the air in the form of " lime nitrogen " containing 20% nitrogen by the Caso-Frank method. The processes for obtaining nitric oxide through combustion of the air were, on account of the great demand they made upon electrical energy, dependent upon efficient water-power, and therefore never rose to great importance in Germany. Of minor importance also were the similar Austrian works at Patsch in Tirol.

The Austrian home production was 20,000 tons in peacetime from the coke and gas works, and a small quantity from a lime-nitrogen plant at Sebenico.

At the outbreak of war the situation was frankly deplorable. Both countries had just made their allocations to agriculture. Thus Germany, for example, had only 9,000 tons of nitrogen in hand in July 1914; on account of the lack of the most important raw stuffs the production of explosives seemed doubtful. Moreover, the stock of explosives themselves was extremely small - Austria, for instance, had hardly enough explosive for her 30.5cm. mortar-shells. Apart altogether from this the lack of nitrogen manure must adversely affect the whole food production. Thus the chemical industry had before it a wide field of action and it was in this very sphere that most was accomplished. Of all the achievements of German chemistry during the war the production of nitrogen out of atmospheric air alone is of permanent importance.

The methods of obtaining nitric acid which were in operation at the beginning of the war were of small extent and by no means on an industrial footing. This, however, was put right in a short time, partly according to the Ostwald and Haber and other processes, but mainly according to the Caso-Frank method. Great plants were erected. Austria-Hungary likewise built a large plant.

Germany was able to obtain from the air by the lime-nitrogen method 110,000 tons of nitrogen yearly, and Austria-Hungary 40,000 tons; direct production by combustion of the air or by the method of Prof. Dr. Linde from liquid air was also very largely employed. The combined nitrogen production in both States was finally 21 times the peace-time supply (imports included), and the agricultural industries as well as that of munitions could be kept supplied.

Of the remaining raw materials the most important in relation to production were glycerin, acetone and alcohol. Hitherto glycerin had been produced through the decomposition of fat stuffs. With the growing necessity of preserving these means of subsistence the employment of other methods became imperative; of these, however, only that of extraction from sugar was of importance, and sugar itself was also scarce; therefore, in the interests of economy, the use of powder rich in glycerin was restricted to the uttermost.

The acetone obtained from wood distillation (which had increased considerably, especially in Austria-Hungary) was economized by alterations in her methods of powder manufacture. The same was the case with alcohol. The attempt to produce these stuffs from cellulose certainly produced interesting results, but never attained to a vast production.

In these ways the production of munitions interfered seriously with the nation's food economy.

To increase the production of toluol necessary for the production of T.N.T., and obtained from the derivatives of coal-tar, the Edelmann method was applied, in which toluol was produced from mineral oil. In this way the chemical industry played a considerable role in the supply of explosives, quite apart from the importance it acquired with the coming of gas warfare.

Most of the technical achievements of the industries of the Central Powers in the war lost their significance with the termination of the war. Their great value lay in the wide experience gained in adapting everything to the imperative needs of the situation. But at any rate the setting of nitrogen extraction on an industrial footing was an achievement of permanent significance and value. (J. K.*; W. J.*)