Federalist Papers

Title page of The Federalist as a book publishing the essays in 1788 (note Roman numeral at bottom of page, year: MDCCLXXXVIII).[1]

The Federalist Papers were a series of articles published anonymously in a New York newspaper during 1787–1788 to encourage New York to ratify the U.S. Constitution. They were also collected as a book titled "The Federalist" published as 2 volumes in 1788 as The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787, and reprinted in later years. These articles, 51 by Alexander Hamilton, 29 by James Madison and 5 by John Jay, are often used today in interpreting the Constitution. All three authors wrote the articles under the pen name "Publius", a salute to Roman consul Publius Valerius Publicola.

A portion of the articles are undated, while the dated ones range from November 20, 1787, to April 4, 1788. Originally, they were numbered with Roman numerals but later reprinted with Arabic numerals.

The most famous article is Federalist No. 10 by James Madison, where he argues that a union of the States will better combat factions, even factions within an individual State. In Federalist No. 78 by Alexander Hamilton, he explained why the federal judiciary should always be the "least dangerous" branch. On the Supreme Court, the five most cited Federalist Papers are: Federalist 42, Federalist 78, Federalist 81, Federalist 51, and Federalist 32.[2]

The full text and audio of the Federalist Papers are freely available online.[3]

The Federalist Papers are countered by the Anti-Federalist Papers.

## Contents

* 1 Background
* 2 Authors
* 3 Influences
* 4 Individual papers
* 5 References
* 6 External links

## Background[edit]

During the Constitutional Convention, delegates cited the experience of the past to show, that of all national governments, a democratic one was the most unstable, fluctuating, and short-lived; and that despotism, arising from a centralization of power in the national government on one hand, and anarchy, incident to the instability of democracy - "the levelling spirit of democracy" denounced by Elbridge Gerry as "the worst of political evils" - on the other, were the Scylla and Charybdis between which the republic would, in the opinion of their opponents, be placed, with almost a certainty of being destroyed.

These views were ably combated in a series of political essays written by Hamilton and Madison, with a few numbers by John Jay, which were published in two New York newspapers: The Independent Journal and the New York Packet. The object of these essays being, as stated by Hamilton in the first number, "A discussion of the utility of the Union; the insufficiency of the confederation to preserve that Union;" and "the necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object." These essays; under the general title of The Federalist, were written with uncommon ability, exerted a powerful influence, and present an admirable treatise on the philosophy of our federal constitution.

Long and stormy debates occurred in the state conventions; and it was not until the twenty-first of June, 1788, that New Hampshire, the ninth state in order, ratified the constitution. It then became the organic law of the republic. The Congress, when testimonials of ratification were received from a sufficient number of states, appointed the first Wednesday of January, 1789, for the people of the United States to choose electors of a president in accordance with the provisions of the constitution; the first Wednesday in February following for the electors to meet and make a choice; and the first Wednesday in March ensuing for the new government to meet for organization in the city of New York.[4]

## Authors[edit]

Alexander Hamilton is the principal author of the Federalist, having authored 51 of the papers.

James Madison, pictured to the left, authored 29 of the Federalist.

John Jay, pictured to the left, wrote 4 out of the first 5 essays.

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## Influences[edit]

There were several major influences stated in the Federalist. Among them John Locke (Federalist 2), Montesquieu (Fed. 47), and important English works such as the Magna Carta, The Petition of Right, and the English Bill of Rights (Fed. 84).

## Individual papers[edit]

Paper  |  Date  |  Title  |  Author

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Federalist No. 1 |  October 27, 1787  |  General Introduction  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 2 |  October 31, 1787  |  Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence  |  John Jay
Federalist No. 3 |  November 3, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence  |  John Jay
Federalist No. 4 |  November 7, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence  |  John Jay
Federalist No. 5 |  November 10, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence  |  John Jay
Federalist No. 6 |  November 14, 1787  |  Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 7 |  November 15, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 8 |  November 20, 1787  |  The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 9 |  November 21, 1787  |  The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 10 |  November 22, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 11 |  November 24, 1787  |  The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 12 |  November 27, 1787  |  The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 13 |  November 28, 1787  |  Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 14 |  November 30, 1787  |  Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 15 |  December 1, 1787  |  The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 16 |  December 4, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 17 |  December 5, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 18 |  December 7, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 19 |  December 8, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 20 |  December 11, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 21 |  December 12, 1787  |  Other Defects of the Present Confederation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 22 |  December 14, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 23 |  December 18, 1787  |  The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 24 |  December 19, 1787  |  The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 25 |  December 21, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 26 |  December 22, 1787  |  The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 27 |  December 25, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 28 |  December 26, 1787  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 29 |  January 9, 1788  |  Concerning the Militia  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 30 |  December 28, 1787  |  Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 31 |  January 1, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 32 |  January 2, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 33 |  January 2, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 34 |  January 5, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 35 |  January 5, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 36 |  January 8, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 37 |  January 11, 1788  |  Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 38 |  January 12, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 39 |  January 18, 1788  |  The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 40 |  January 18, 1788  |  The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 41 |  January 19, 1788  |  General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 42 |  January 22, 1788  |  The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 43 |  January 23, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 44 |  January 25, 1788  |  Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 45 |  January 26, 1788  |  The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 46 |  January 29, 1788  |  The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 47 |  January 30, 1788  |  The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 48 |  February 1, 1788  |  These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 49 |  February 2, 1788  |  Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 50 |  February 5, 1788  |  Periodic Appeals to the People Considered  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 51 |  February 6, 1788  |  The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 52 |  February 8, 1788  |  The House of Representatives  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 53 |  February 9, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 54 |  February 12, 1788  |  The Apportionment of Members Among the States  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 55 |  February 13, 1788  |  The Total Number of the House of Representatives  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 56 |  February 16, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 57 |  February 19, 1788  |  The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 58 |  February 20, 1788  |  Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 59 |  February 22, 1788  |  Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 60 |  February 23, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 61 |  February 26, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 62 |  February 27, 1788  |  The Senate  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 63 |  March 1, 1788  |  The Senate Continued  |  James Madison
Federalist No. 64 |  March 5, 1788  |  The Powers of the Senate  |  John Jay
Federalist No. 65 |  March 7, 1788  |  The Powers of the Senate Continued  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 66 |  March 8, 1788  |  Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 67 |  March 11, 1788  |  The Executive Department  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 68 |  March 12, 1788  |  The Mode of Electing the President  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 69 |  March 14, 1788  |  The Real Character of the Executive  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 70 |  March 15, 1788  |  The Executive Department Further Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 71 |  March 18, 1788  |  The Duration in Office of the Executive  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 72 |  March 19, 1788  |  The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 73 |  March 21, 1788  |  The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 74 |  March 25, 1788  |  The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 75 |  March 26, 1788  |  The Treaty Making Power of the Executive  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 76 |  April 1, 1788  |  The Appointing Power of the Executive  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 77 |  April 2, 1788  |  The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 78 |  May 28, 1788  |  The Judiciary Department  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 79 |  May 28, 1788  |  The Judiciary Continued  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 80 |  June 21, 1788  |  The Powers of the Judiciary  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 81 |  June 25, 1788  |  The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 82 |  July 2, 1788  |  The Judiciary Continued  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 83 |  July 5, 1788  |  The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 84 |  July 16, 1788  |  Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered  |  Alexander Hamilton
Federalist No. 85 |  August 13, 1788  |  Concluding Remarks  |  Alexander Hamilton

## References[edit]

1. ↑ Roman numeral MDCCLXXXVIII totals as MDCC=1700 + LXXX=80 + VIII=8 or 1788.
2. ↑ The Most-Cited Federalist Papers, University of Minnesota
3. ↑ http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/
4. ↑ Washington and the American Republic, by Benson John Lossing

## External links[edit]

* The Federalist Papers \- LibriVox
* Federalist Papers in one searchable pdf

v • d • e

Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers, numbered 1 through 85

Authors: Alexander Hamilton • James Madison • John Jay

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Related: Constitutional Convention • Articles of Confederation