Ryan v. Ryan

In Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court interpreted three questions certified to it by a federal court in connection with a legal challenge to the new Florida "no-fault" divorce law. The three certified questions were:

1\. Whether Florida Statutes Chapter 61 which abolished former grounds for divorce and provided as sole ground for divorce that:

(1) the marriage is irretrievably broken, and/or

(2) insanity or mental incompetence

is constitutional in that it does not impair the obligation of the marriage contract nor adversely affect property rights of the parties?

2\. Whether Florida Statute Chapter 61 which provides for the granting of a dissolution of marriage upon the court's finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken is unconstitutional in that it is vague, uncertain and indefinite?

3\. Whether Florida Statute Chapter 61 is unconstitutional because it applies retroactively to marriages entered into prior to July 1, 1971?

The Florida Supreme Court held that marriage does not establish a constitutionally protected property right. The Declaration of Rights (Article I, Section 10) of the Florida Constitution provides that: "No ... law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." But the Florida Supreme Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court for the principle that the only "contracts which were designed to be protected under the constitutional provision are those contracts providing certain, definite and fixed private rights of property which are vested in the contract." The Court held that marriage did qualify for this protection.

The Court disposed of the second objection concerning vagueness by declaring that "no fault" divorce still requires proof of an irretrievably broken marriage. "There must be appropriate evidence (albeit uncorroborated as the statute allows) that in truth and in fact the marriage is irretrievably broken. In Posner I, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla.1970), quoting from Underwood v. Underwood, 12 Fla. 434, we stated the law still to be as follows: (233 So.2d p. 383) '... it 'would be aiming a deadly blow at public morals to decree a dissolution of the marriage contract merely because the parties requested it ...."

The Court found that there was no defect with applying the law retroactively to marriages already in existence, which were previously established. The Court held this to be within the power of the legislature.

In sum, the Court declared:

There is, as we have said, no impairment of contract here. Neither is there denial of due process in the manner in which the machinery is set up for judicial determination regarding termination of the marriage. The law provides that consideration be given to support provisions and to any interest of the wife in property of the husband by way of special equity or otherwise. Due process basically is met upon a provision for notice and opportunity to be heard. Of course these are included in the new law, as such requirements were also included in the law in existence when past marriages were entered into. Accordingly, it cannot be maintained with validity that the new provision regarding the same subject matter is void because it affects "retroactively" those earlier marriage "contracts" and the applicable procedures and remedies, which are subject to proper change from time to time.

One Justice (out of seven) dissented. He emphasized that the doctrine of "unclean hands" should apply in divorce, to prevent a wrongdoer from obtaining a divorce over the objection of the spouse.