Military._Motor_Transport

"Military. Motor Transport \- Transport by motor vehicles has very profoundly modified the art of war. Their employment enables a commander - despite the unwieldiness of modern armies - to achieve surprise effects which give him victory. The utilization in modern warfare of the enormous effectives which constitute national armies was made possible only by the railways, which are alone able to assure the supply of food and munitions needed by such a mass of humanity. But steel tracks are by nature rigid, and the employment of motor transport on a large scale has both expanded their functions and rendered them supple. It is by the organized combination of these two means of transport that it is possible to rain on the enemy such rapid and effective blows that he must succumb. Strictly, the railways in times of peace function under conditions quite comparable to those of war. For the economic requirements of peace no less than of war demand incessant and strict attention to ensure railway efficiency. On the other hand, there is only a distant comparison between the use of motor vehicles one by one in times of peace and their employment in compact groups during war operations. There is, therefore, a special interest in trying to trace, after the experience of the World War, the technical facts which would serve as a basis for the employment of motor transport on a large scale in future operations. In the following account, illustrated by practical examples, taken from the use of motor vehicles during the operations of the Allied armies on the French front, there will be discussed the general principles underlying (I.) transport of troops, (II.) transport of materiel and (III.) intensive traffic on roads.

Transport Of Troops The Vehicle. - Troops have sometimes been carried in ordinary touring-cars. During the battle of the Marne (Sept. 9 1914), at the moment when the French army of General Maunoury was massing outside Paris, there were grouped together all available taxicabs to take direct to the front the infantry of a division which, arriving by rail from the Vosges, was detraining in the stations of the northern suburbs of Paris. This method can only be employed in exceptional cases, because the car or taxicab has so small a carrying power, requiring one driver for every three or four combatants carried, while such vehicles for the most part differ in speed. On the other hand, such motor-vehicles as are designed to convey a larger number of passengers in peace-time, e.g. motor omnibuses or ckars-d-bancs, are eminently serviceable. Thus it was in motor omnibuses, which were employed in the first transport groups of the French army, that there were carried to Belgium, at the beginning of Aug. 1914, the detachments of infantry which operated in support of the cavalry. In the same way the British army employed at the outset the London motor omnibuses; and the " Bus Park," which was placed behind the centre of the English armies, was always able to supply rapid transport for reserves behind the front. Motor omnibuses, sightseeing vehicles, private motor cars, and all other vehicles of a similar character utilized in towns in peace-time, have the advantage of being always prepared to carry passengers. They have often, however, the disadvantage of having been built for street use and not for any and every kind of route; moreover, they are useless for any other form of transport except for carrying men, so that they will often remain useless when the army has no need to move troops and yet the need for the transport of materiel is pressing. A park of motor omnibuses represents therefore a collection of drivers and machines that is frequently immobile; one must be very rich in means of transport to enjoy this luxury, and one can never be so rich when operations are active.

The ideal vehicle is the common motor lorry (or truck, as Americans call it). It is necessary to adapt it, i.e. to place in it movable benches, which can be very rapidly installed when it is necessary to carry men, and can be removed without difficulty when it is necessary to carry materiel. In accordance with the capacity of the body, which itself partly depends on its load capacity, the lorry can carry from 16 to 25 men with their arms and equipment. The lorry is designed for travelling long distances over indifferent roads; having solid rubber tires, it does not suffer from breakdowns through punctures.

The method of loading men into lorries also requires consideration, since the efficiency of transport depends considerably on it. One good rule is for the driver or his assistant to supervise the loading, and to get the men on board first, their arms and baggage following them. It is necessary to appoint a " chief of the lorry " who takes charge of the interior and keeps good order. Again, it is advisable to be very careful lest men lie on the floor boards and breathe the exhaust gases: this is a very serious cause of asphyxiation. It is, therefore, necessary to see to the ventilation of the lorry and to ensure that the exhaust pipes are in good condition.

During the World War not only were units of infantry transported but also artillery formations; likewise, in some exceptional cases, cavalry with their horses. How can horses most easily be carried? The body of the lorry must be as large and the bottom as low as possible, to make the loading more easy, and the ceiling must be high enough to prevent the horses from being injured by striking their heads. In accordance with these arrangements, the horses may be placed either lengthwise or crosswise. But they should be close to one another, to save them from bumping; and there should be no difficulty of access to where their heads are, in order that they may eat and drink on the road. These precautions taken, it has been found that horses travel as well by motor lorry as in a railway wagon.

Is it better, generally, to have for transport of troops heavy lorries (of 5 tons or greater freightage) or lighter lorries (of 2-3 tons)? This question has often been the subject of controversy. Experience shows that, with a proper arrangement of movable benches, it is possible to put in a heavy lorry, which has a very large body, many more men in proportion than in a light lorry; and it must not be forgotten that, for the greatest efficiency, one driver and one machine must carry the maximum number of men. On the other hand, if heavy and light lorries are both available, and troops as well as materiel have to be transported, it is better to use the light lorries for the transport of troops.

## Organization of Lorries

Lorries move grouped in formations of varying importance, but two essential conditions must be observed: efficient control and effective maintenance. In proportion as there are built up and put into motion larger and larger masses of lorries, it is necessary to organize a succession of commands in such a way that each will be provided with proper supervision and direction. A type of organization modelled directly on that of infantry or artillery is here unsuitable. The basic unit, the smallest formation to be placed under the orders of an officer, should be formed of 15 to 30 vehicles. The officer who commands this unit is the veritable sheep-dog of his troop of lorries; he must himself have a touring-car (which should be open and not too fast), so as to allow him to follow his lorries when they are on the move, and above all when they are formed into a large column. The officer ought not to lead himself, but be able to keep his attention free, and to jump quickly from his car and speak to his drivers. In a large column the lorries ought to follow one another as closely as possible, because the efficiency of the route is dependent on the continuous progress of the lorries a certain distance must be kept so as to allow the driver of a lorry to take note of what the lorry ahead is doing, and thus avoid collisions. This distance, which tends to increase uphill and decrease downhill, should average ro metres at night, when marching with lights extinguished. The drivers ought to be trained to keep their exact distance. For this purpose it is useful to paint, at the back of the lorry, marks on a white ground, perceptible to the eye even in complete darkness. The use of luminous paint has been found practicable. Next above the basic unit (which takes various names according to the armies, e.g. " section" or " platoon ") is placed the " company " or the " group," normally comprising three or four sections. The commander of the group or company is no longer the sheep-dog of his lorries; he is the shepherd. It is he who guides them in their itineraries, places them in billets and allots them to their work. He must, therefore, have a much more powerful touring-car, so as to be able rapidly to reconnoitre ahead. He should have a liaison officer, with a motor bicycle or cycle-car, to transmit his orders rapidly, and also a second in command, to maintain continuity. There should be as many lorries in a group or company as are needed to transport a battalion of infantry. If the battalion has 1,000 men and the lorry holds 20, there must be so lorries always available. But, as some will always require repair or overhauling, while others must be used as service lorries for replenishing food supply and petrol (and also as workshops), the theoretical number is 65 lorries.

The second point in an organization is to ensure effective maintenance. Automobiles require constant care on a long journey, e.g. 200 km. At least a dozen out of roo lorries will have breakdowns or need repair. Some will even fall out, too seriously damaged to go on, and will have to go to the "automobile park." Minor casualties must be attended to, however, as soon as possible. That is the role of the workshops. If the workshop is to move with the group, it must be on lorries, and have a stock of tools and various spare parts. To form a workshop for 20 lorries, i.e. for a section, means a large drain on workers and materiel, and is only advisable when the section has to remain isolated. If the section remains with the group, it is better to form a stronger workshop for the group, reserving two or three vehicles which can have a real arsenal of spare parts, each having two or three picked mechanics attached, with several skilled assistants to attend them. The commanding officer of the group can delegate to one of his subordinate officers (the most capable from the technical point of view) the direction of the workshop.

As soon as large transport movements have to be carried out, higher control above the group must be organized. The transport of the infantry of a division requires 12 groups. Placed in a column on the road, this would make a file 36 km. in length, a reasonable distance for each group being 3 kilometres. This mass would be formless and incapable of manoeuvring unless vivified by organization.

It is a common saying that the action of a commander ought to be limited to directing four immediate subordinates and no more. Experience of large demands on transport during the war shows, however, that six groups could be united under one control, if the commander in charge was supported by a fully qualified staff. Such was the composition of the grouping in the French army: such or something very near it was the composition of the " Bus Park" of the British army. The grouping of six groups had a capacity for 6,000 infantry. When transport by automobile has reached a further extension, the group becomes in its turn a basic unit; and it is in studying the role of the commander of the grouping and his staff that the working realities of troop transportation can be grasped. It will suffice to note that the groupings ought also, when they are called on to function together, to be united under a superior control. The automobile service of the French army, which comprised 25 groupings in 1918, had a dozen " commanders of transport reserves " to direct them - each reserve comprising two or three groupings.

## Organization of Troop Transports

Let it be supposed that a grouping is ordered to execute the transport of 6,000 infantry, to take them up in their billeting area, and to bring them to the field of battle some roo km. from billets. What problems must be solved in order to accomplish this mission to the greatest advantage? In the first place, the commander must fix the embarkation-points, i.e. the points at which the infantry will be loaded into lorries. In order that this operation may be quickly carried out there must be many loading-points functioning at the same time; to embark one battalion (1,000 men) into a group (80 lorries) requires from 20 minutes to half an hour. The usual procedure of the French automobile service is to place the infantry in column, two deep, and to make them move in this formation. The automobile officer in charge of the embarking-point marshals the drivers of the lorries, at the rate of one per lorry, near to a point where the column of infantry in twos moves out. He divides the column, as it passes him, into small parties, according to the number for each lorry, and assigns each to a lorry driver, who leads his men at the double to the rear of his lorry.

When all the parties are grouped behind the lorries, they embark. At the embarking-office, while the backs of the lorries are closed, the crank-handles are turned and the engines are started up. But even so, with a single embarking-point practically three hours are required for embarking 6,000 men; and in another half-hour the lorries will have covered 8 kilometres.

The six groups will therefore find themselves, on the march, separated by a considerable interval, and the total column will be 48 km. in length - altogether too long. Further, there may be great gaps in the billeting area in which the embarking infantry are stationed; and it would be a mistake to make them cover great distances on foot in order to reach a common embarkingpoint when the lorries can just as well come and pick them up near to their own billets. Consequently it is much preferable, if possible, to have six points of embarkation, each corresponding to a battalion, the hours of embarkation being fixed in such a way that each group of lorries, leaving as soon as the embarkation is completed, will take up its normal position, one behind the other, at the " starting-point " for the common itinerary.

When the commander of an automobile grouping has then prepared the organization of his embarkation-points, he must come to an agreement with the infantry headquarters concerned as to the time and place of embarkation of each battalion; such an agreement is much simplified if the orders of the higher authority responsible for the movement have specified a precise time for the start. The work which devolves upon the command of the lorry grouping in the disembarkation of the troops is generally similar to the above; but there is an additional difficulty, caused by uncertainty as to the exact points of disembarkation, which often depend at the last moment on the military situation. Nevertheless, the procedure must be arranged as early as possible, in close touch with the higher staff which has to fix the disembarkation zone; and an understanding must be arrived at with headquarters as to the probable alternatives, between which a decision will be made later, when the lorries are quite near to the arrival zone. It is not possible for the commander of the grouping to do this work of preparation for arrival and for departure by himself alone; he must have another officer in his confidence to help him. While he is making arrangements and reconnaissance in the zones of departure and arrival, he must also choose (or at least reconnoitre) the itinerary between the two zones. And when the itinerary is reconnoitred, it must be marked out. This is the duty of the officer assisting the commander of the grouping. The " route officer," with his own staff, marks the itinerary by posting up placards (and, for night work, hanging lanterns) bearing the distinguishing mark of the grouping and an arrow indicating the direction of the march and the route to take. The distinguishing mark of the grouping is necessary because, in a period of movement, many other groupings will often wish to use some portion of a route in common. Moreover, any lorry which has become isolated or left behind must be enabled to rejoin by following the arrows.

Further, the commander of a grouping is responsible for the care of the well-being of his personnel and materiel. He has to supply his lorries with petrol and his men with food, and must organize the movement of his service lorries, supply lorries, work lorries, lorries for towing, lorries for cooking. Here again the commander's control of details depends first on his supply officer, and next on his technical officer, the latter being especially concerned with the workshop of the grouping, the repairing organ. It is the technical officer's endeavour to interrupt the grouping as little as possible, and to follow it up, if it is not returning to its previous zone of billets, with any laggard lorries that have needed repair. He must, therefore, organize repairing squads who will follow different columns and leave nothing behind.

## Transport of Complete Divisions

When a larger unit, like a division of infantry, has to be transported, two or three lorrygroupings are required. The same general principles, however, apply. An interesting example occurs when, together with the infantry of a division, it is necessary to transport all or part of their artillery with its horses. This will happen less and less frequently as the artillery itself tends to become an entire automobile arm, since it will then move simultaneously on its own account; but with horse-drawn artillery it may be a very serious matter for a general of a division not to be able to bring up to the battlefield, in support of his infantry, the artillery who are accustomed to manoeuvre with him. It is thus very desirable to be able to transport artillery with horses.

The loading of guns and limbers on lorries does not present any special difficulty; it is sufficient to have fixed rules for putting the materiel in place, and these are the same as the loading-rules for the same materiel on railway wagons. This is true both for heavy artillery and for artillery of small calibre. As for the horses, they accommodate themselves perfectly to this manner of transport. At the time of the different German attacks in 1918, especially in May and July, there were on the French front enormous transportations of complete divisions which attacked as soon as they were unloaded from the lorries. The automobile almost completely takes the place of the railway, securing much quicker travelling and better surprise effect. There is always one condition, that the troops thus transported can live and fight with a limited quantity of baggage, all their supplies being assured by lorries to the complete exclusion of horse transport. An example may be given from experience in 1918, when the Higher Command had under consideration the possibility of obtaining a great success in Italy. A study of this move, developed in every detail, shows that, with the resources in automobiles which were then available for release from the French front, it was possible, after twelve hours' warning, to move three divisions - complete with divisional artillery, machine-guns, cookers and a number of horses equivalent to three pairs per wagon and two per gun - and to transport them in seven days from the region of Chalons in France to the region of Mantua in Italy. Stages of 15 hours (including one hour for a general halt) would have had nine hours of complete rest between. Three distinct routes were prepared, with provision for petrol depots and workshops, guides, police, and so forth. Undoubtedly this unexpected movement of three divisions, so rapidly as to ensure secrecy, would have had a decisive influence. And it is just such possibilities that are bound to enter into the strategic conceptions of the future.

II. Transport Of Materiel Lorries are not specialized for the transport of materiel. The same type is employed as for troops, and therefore the organization is similar. A lorry-group capable of moving a battalion of infantry can alternatively move loo tons of materiel. Experience in the World War has shown that, during the periods of active operations, a division requires an average of 200 tons per day in foodstuffs and ammunition. This is equally true in the case of defensive areas, as at Verdun; in offensive actions of the type of the Somme battles in 1916; or those of July, Aug. and Sept. 1918, on the Marne. Two groups are therefore required for the supply of a division, subject to the distance from the railway being at furthest within a radius of 40 kilometres. Four groups are necessary if the division is 70 km. from a railway. An average of 3 hours must be reckoned for loading at the stations; with allowance for difficulties arising amid intensive operations, 7 or 8 hours are taken up on the journey and 2 hours in unloading. This gives about 13 hours for work, and leaves II hours per day for the maintenance of materiel, feeding and rest. If the traffic operations are to be continued for a number of days, any more than this cannot be demanded of the personnel or of the materiel  without risking excessive wastage. On the day after a journey with loads the vehicles return empty, and on the day after that they recommence the journey loaded. As 200 tons a day are required for a division there must be a double set of two groups, with a total capacity of 400 tons.

There has been much argument as to which is the more efficient type of lorry for the transport of materiel, the light lorry of 2 or 3 tons' capacity, or the heavy lorry of 5 tons. Before the war, military experts in all countries had a marked objection to the heavy lorry, which was gratuitously supposed to be difficult to handle on bad roads and unsuited for average military requirements. This opinion is now out of date. The first objection does not hold good in countries with a network of well-maintained roads, such as is found in western Europe. The second objection has equally fallen to the ground, since the greater part of transport work is concerned with munitions, which represent weight rather than bulk. The full load is never used in a lorry, however light, if it only carries bread; and only the employment of a trailer allows of the maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, the employment of trailers has great inconveniences, notably in the manoeuvring required for loading at stations. Systematic attempts have been made to find a regulation method of yoking a trailer to every 5-ton lorry when it is necessary to transport personnel, or materiel of light weight (forage or bread). These trailers have not been very satisfactory: the motor consumes more, and tires wear more; the rate of movement is slower, and any economy in drivers is an illusion.

To sum up it may be said that, for war service, lorries from 2 to 5 tons of average load are equally useful, but that it is useless, as was done before the war, to give prizes to induce constructors of lorries to design vehicles on the light side. In the organization of transport one obtains the greatest efficiency by giving a preference to the light lorry for the transport of personnel and of light materiel. Non-Specialization of Materiel. - At a general mobilization, like that at the opening of the World War, the resources available for transport are necessarily limited not only by financial conditions, but by the number of vehicles in existence in the country capable of being requisitioned, and by the maximum production of the manufacturing firms. On the other hand, there is no limit to the requirements in lorries, because no general worthy of the name thinks he has a large-enough stock of transport at those critical times when every addition means an increase in his power of manoeuvre. During the 20 days which intervened between May 27 and June 15 1918, the lorries of the French army had to transport about 800,000 tons of foodstuffs and munitions, in order to ensure the supplies of those armies which were making headway against the German attack. And yet during this same period the French Headquarters Staff had transported by automobile the infantry of 63 divisions. It was necessary also to make numerous evacuations of public records, civil populations, hospitals and engineer parks. This wonderful effort was only possible because in the French army the principle of non-specialization was adopted. Every lorry was controlled by the motor transport service of the armies, and was utilized by it foi my  form of transport needed. No vehicle was specially or permanently attached to this or that higher or lower formation. When a higher formation, such as a division, had need of transport, the automobile service arranged the transport, but as soon as it was finished the lorries employed on this service returned and were available for other transport services. In short, the lorry capital never remained unproductive.

Unfortunately, the tendency of every service, and of all units subordinate to it, is always to oppose this idea of nonspecialization, which ought to be the aim of the Higher Command, whose interest is always to obtain the maximum return on lorry capital. In effect, each service desires to have a special allotment which becomes its own property, and calculates always the value of this " indispensable " allotment by the eventual requirements - the day when the work will be heaviest. But if such demands for special attachments are not very energetically resisted, capital fritters away without any profit.

Supposing that ten lorries are united to one definite formation under the pretext that it may have to make rapid moves at a considerable distance, in practice this rapid move will occur perhaps not once in a month, and in the interval the ten lorries will remain in park. During this same month those lorries in normal use would have been able, if they have a capacity of 2-5 tons and travel loo km. per day, to do more than 60,000 km.-tons of work, with allowance for overhaul. They could have moved a depot of munitions of 1,000 tons for 60 km. or have maintained the supply of bread every day for a division. It might be supposed that a wide-awake staff, having made this allotment of 10 lorries, would not let them remain idle, but would order the formation conceived to undertake such and such transport of a general kind. But such a practice is only possible in calm periods. As soon as troublesome times arise everybody is fully occupied; the formation does not wish to lose the ten lorries which it will need - and for the very purpose for which it was given them - at a moment when it will not be able rapidly to replace them; and it is pre cisely at the moment of crisis that the Higher Command will have the greatest need of regaining control of all those resources which it has imprudently dispersed, and it will be entirely unable to do so. On the other hand, if the commander has not made any special allotments, but has kept all his lorries under his immediate care, he will be able to organize the moves which he wishes to effect in accordance with the degree of urgency imposed by the operations he desires to carry out. If he thinks it well to move the formation which was taken as an example, he will allot immediately ter._ lorries for this move, and they will return as soon as the move is completed. If the formation is not to be moved, there will not be ten lorries lying idle.

## The Use and Duties of Depots

The reasons for avoiding the wastage of lorries apply likewise to avoid wastage of movements. The carrying-out of " detail " transports is the principal cause of low efficiency. In the battle of Verdun, March 1916, the supply of munitions was taken by rail to Bar-le-Duc and to Baudonvilliers. Trains of munitions arrived daily at these two stations to supply the artillery of the ten divisions deployed around Verdun, some 60 km. from the stations. If, to supply each of these divisions, there had been allotted a motor formation, which could come to load up at the stations and go as far as the batteries, bringing munitions, the efficiency would have been mediocre and uncertain. In effect each of these motor formations would have been under the constant repercussion of the events at the front and the difficulties of moving about in the front areas. An accident at a depot, an interrupted road, an advance or a check at the front, would set back the whole time-table of the formation, and one would have seen them arriving in the station for loading their lorries in twos and threes in disorder, and at different hours. The whole organization and supervision of traffic would have been impossible.

There can never be efficiency unless there is regularity of movements. It is never possible to have regularity unless the traffic of the back areas, which can be regular, is definitely separated from the traffic of the front areas, which is always uncertain. How can this separation be effected? By the creation of depots depending on the lines-of-communication authorities, and supplied by them where the formations from the front areas come to refill exactly as they would refill from the railway if there were stations at these fronts. On this principle was organized the transport of munitions for the army at Verdun, as well as the very considerable movements of troops which took place in these operations. The troops were disembarked at stations between Revigny and Ligny-en-Barrois, and their transport to Verdun, as well as that of the supplies, was carried out by the single artery formed by the road Bar-le-Duc - Verdun, which came to be known as the "Sacred Way" and formed the route gardee reserved for motors. Through a complete understanding between the motor control at Bar-le-Duc and the railway control at St. Dizier, it was possible to regulate the workings of formations in such a way that the lorries were brought to the stations for loading at the same moment that the troop trains or munition trains arrived there. In continuous movement all formations, when loaded, went via Bar-le-Duc and followed the Sacred Way as far as the unloading point. They at once returned by the same Sacred Way to Bar-le-Duc, and took up their places at their own camp; and after a minimum of time for rest they left for a new town at the order of the regulating staff (" Commission regulatrice automobile," hereafter called the " C.R.A.") of Barle-Duc. Movement was continuous. The question of unloading or disembarking was dominated by the necessity of keeping free the route gardee. It was therefore necessary at the outset completely to alter the location of the munition depots which had been placed along this route - at Neippes, Lemmes and Verdun itself - so as to permit of " sidings " where lorries could be placed for the duration of the unloading process, which consisted in piling up the munitions along the siding. It was necessary to open fresh munition depots more suited to these working methods, and in this way came into existence the circuits of Regret and of Nixeville, about which were organized a series of lorry stations with stores of materiel and supplies of every kind. On the same principle, although at the beginning troops were disembarked in any and every piece of road that led to the Sacred Way, either beyond Verdun or N. of Moulin-Brae, it became the rule later to build veritable " stations " for the personnel.

It was to these stations that the C.R.A. directed its movements of personnel and at these same stations troops due for relief came to embark. There also were collected casuals, leave-men and, in particular, the slightly wounded, who at fixed hours took their places in empty lorries on their return journey to Bar-le-Duc. This situation may be summed up by saying that the employment of the route Bar-le-Duc - Verdun was as strictly conducted as if it were a railway. One looks in vain for any other parallel. The intensity of movements required it, for in addition to the movements mentioned above one must add that of numbers of isolated cars and lorries, of every kind, which entered and circulated on the route gardee from the moment that it was given over to the motor vehicles.

III. Intensive Traffic On Roads The Route Gardee. - The command can only depend on movements by motor transport when they are executed with absolute punctuality and in accordance with programme: they must resemble movements by rail and be based on time-tables, just as in railway work. It is essential that breakdowns, and the resultant lagging behind scheduled times, be notified at once. For the organized employment of automobiles on the roads, like that of railway trains, the essential condition is to be master of the road. If, on a road, this or that mishap can take place without it being in someone's power to neutralize its effects, or if all and sundry are permitted to put columns of troops or vehicles on it, it is useless to attempt to carry out important movements. Congestions multiply, and their effect is reflected farther and farther back, leading to accidents, and increasing delay to the degree of stoppage; so that, whatever maybe the efforts of those in charge of the movement, their transport fails. It is an absolute rule, based on numerous experiences, that it is not possible to launch a big transport movement involving several hundreds of lorries without being absolutely certain of the complete freedom of the road. Nor does it suffice to be certain at any one particular moment; it must be certain during the whole time that the movement will last. Hence the organization of the routes gardees, with their personnel of guards and their traffic orders.

A route gardee is not necessarily reserved exclusively for automobiles, though this may be so, as with the route gardee from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. But there are other cases where one has to admit, under certain conditions, the movement of horse-transport. Such was the route Amiens - Bray. But in every case there must be a responsible authority, having power to give orders and have them carried out. In the French army, during the war, this authority was a motor regulating staff (C.R.A.). In the British army, the control of traffic in France was part of the duties of the Provost Marshal (A.P.M.). The organization of the route, on a railway model, is based on the " block-system." The route is divided into a series of districts, each of which is under the direction of a district chief, having assistants for supervision. The district chief is in constant touch by telephone with the neighbouring districts, and with the office of the C.R.A.; he knows all the movements which affect his district, and also keeps a record of all movements which occur there and all the incidents of the traffic. Thus at the office of the C.R.A. it is always known what the state of the traffic may be on every route gardee, and the necessary arrangements for launching an important movement can be made in given time.

The route orders for the routes gardees are more or less drastic according to the breadth of the road, and whether or not there are relief routes. On the Verdun route, where the traffic was most intense at certain hours (one vehicle every five seconds), the narrowness of the road - seven metres - necessitated very strict rules: every broken-down lorry was thrown off the road; no lorry could range up alongside the preceding lorry, and so on.

The length and the importance of the districts on a route gardee  depend, obviously, on special difficulties which they have to overcome, e.g. the number of adjacent routes, the localities traversed, narrow passages, etc. Between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun there were six " districts " varying in length from 5 to ro km.

It is quite unnecessary to guard in this permanent fashion a route over which there is not continuous traffic. Whenever such a road is needed, for the time being, for an intensive transport, it is sufficient to occupy it immediately and transform it into a route gardee. This requirement leads to the C.R.A. (or any corresponding organization) being given a territorial zone of operation. In each zone it is the immediate business of the C.R.A. concerned to guard any portion of the road over which the transport will be moving. For this purpose the C.R.A. had at its disposal specially organized personnel which may be fairly accurately designated " mobile districts," and which, being in the habit of operating in this way and supplied with the means of rapid installation, can in two or three hours make themselves masters of the traffic on whatever part of the road is entrusted to them. It is well understood that a C.R.A., to whom a zone of operations has been entrusted, prepares as minutely as possible this bringing into action of the mobile districts on a plan of some kind over its route-system. For instance, it installs in advance a network of telephone stations; above all, it establishes and puts into place enormous placard indicators showing the direction of localities, designations of the routes, local traffic, war maps, etc.

A C.R.A. that has organized its zone of operations properly is really master of it; it installs a few permanent districts on the main roads, and has several mobile districts, always at disposal, which are thrown out each day wherever traffic makes it necessary. In the French automobile service system during the war, this role of the C.R.A. was facilitated by the fact that the commissions were at the same time executive transport authorities. The head of the C.R.A. was also commander of several " groupings " of transport, and he was responsible for carrying out all military motor transport work required by the army within the territorial limits of his zone. He was thus the first to be informed of any large movement of automobiles in his zone.

## Maximum Efficiency over a Road System

When one is master of circulation throughout a given region, one is free to aim at maximum efficiency. How is this obtained? Formerly, when the staff proposed to carry masses of troops to a theatre of operations it traced the greatest number of parallel and serviceable roads which led to the zone of action decided on, and there was thrown on each of these roads a column of all arms scientifically echeloned in depth. Thus it was that Napoleon moved from the Rhine to the Main in 1805; thus, also, Moltke moved from the Sarre to the Moselle in 1870.

When this system is applied to present-day conditions the efficiency of the road system is low, because the increase of speed due to the automobile is not turned to account. All modern armies have tractor-drawn heavy and automobile light artillery, and possess the means of transporting the bulk of their infantry by motor lorry. There remain the horse columns, on which it is no longer necessary to impose the speed limitations of marching infantry. In consequence, in coordination with the movements made by railway, the movements by road ought to be organized in the form of special itineraries, on each of which move columns of elements that are homogeneous from the point of view of speed. Thus combination of movements can be worked out in which much time is saved, as compared with the old methods.

We will examine further the conditions of carrying out strategical movements on the road. From the point of view of traffic organization, these considerations lead to the principle of allocating the available routes gardees according to type of traffic. Thus, such a route is reserved for heavy artillery on tractors having a speed of 8-ro km. an hour; another route is allotted to motor field artillery; others for motor lorries, and yet others for horsed columns - a distinction being made between the requirements of light columns (field artillery and trains) and heavy columns (heavy artillery and bridging equipment). One must also remember, in the distribution of these itineraries, the quality of the roads, their breadth and the strength of the road bridges. Thus one is led to a completely new technique in the utilization of the roads, for which one must know the output of each itinerary for the given density of traffic which it is proposed to put on it. One must work out the crossings and the doublings of the columns, and, above all, the way to place all these elements of different speed so as to make as many different " moving stairways " as there are rates of movement.

The existence of regulating commissions in charge of zones of movement, and masters of the traffic, considerably eased the French problem. But the regulating commissions must have control not only of automobile traffic, but of all traffic: in their zones no movements must occur without their having received notice and taken the necessary measures to facilitate the execution of the movements in question. They must be able to arrest all false movements in good time. And they must be in close touch, so as to form a complete network, covering the whole area over which it may be necessary to move any column.

It was by the functioning of an organization of this nature that the French army was able to make its concentrations of considerable numbers of troops at very short notice in March, May and July 1918.

## Strategic Transport by Road

What is a strategic transport, or, in a wider sense, a strategic move? It is a movement capable, by its results, of affecting the present or future situation of a battle. In war, when the forces are equal on both sides, the only way to act effectively on the opponent is by means of surprise - a word that must be interpreted in the widest sense. The problem is not only to dazzle the enemy by unexpected blows, but also to secure that the blows get home. It is necessary to be stronger than the enemy where he believes he can cope with you, and as strong as he is where he believes he can overcome you.

The battlefield of Rocroy was no more than 2 km., that of Austerlitz no more than 10 kilometres. The French front of 1914-8 was 500 km. long. In modern warfare, up to 1914, one counted only on railways for strategic transport for the large higher formations: the plan of concentration was exclusively a plan of transport by rail, and the movements by road leading to the battle were only the immediate consequence of the deployment of these higher formations on their railheads.

As the automobile has brought on the road again the tourist who had deserted it since the middle of the 19th century, so transport by motor lorry has brought into use again strategic movements by road. And, for the production of surprise effect, by adding the roads to the railways, it has been possible to put to full use all available means of communication.

The air alone has not been utilized; but it may be foreseen in the future that it must be utilized for quick transport of combatants. In order that movements by roads should be serviceable, it is necessary for them to be rapid and powerful; this is attained by applying the same principles as in rail movements - that is to say, the temporary break-up of large units for transport.

To understand these principles better, an example maybe taken from the situation of Sept. r6 1918 on the Allied front in the region Toul-Verdun. The American army had at this time, to the E. of St. Mihiel, 8 divisions, which, with corps and army troops, were quite equivalent to 8 French army corps. The orders of Marshal Foch prescribed that this American army should be placed to the N. and N.E. of Verdun, in positions precisely laid down and sharply echeloned in depth, ready to move on the enemy on Sept. 26. Six divisions were coming from different sides, and principally from the region of Chaumont-Neufchateau; eight would be those already mentioned, which, after carrying the salient of St. Mihiel by a brilliant assault, found themselves in very considerable disorder, as large forces rapidly successful in a convergent offensive must. It was calculated that time admitted of seven nights being devoted - for it was desired to conceal the strategic move entirely - to moving these eight army corps 60 km. from their present position and depositing them in order opposite the new objectives. What was the solution? For movement in suitable stages (three in number) there were available two itineraries, constituted by two roads which in part were very narrow and bad. It would be necessary to put four army corps in succession on each road. Such a movement by road in earlier days, even if perfectly regulated, would have represented ten days' marching with its accompanying difficulties and fatigues for the troops. How could the food supplies have been assured for the infantry, as it marched by night and halted by day along the route, so as to hide all movement of troops? There would be serious risks of congestion, and even complete paralysis, at those points where there must be crossings with the columns of the divisions coming up from Revigny and Bar-le-Duc. The most experienced staffs would not have been able to solve such a problem. By rail Boo trains would have to be operated over lines of which one part only was capable of much traffic. At 40 trains a day the move would need 20 days: and what sort of platform would be available for embarkation? What, moreover, would become of the surprise? Besides, there was at such a moment plenty of other work for the railways. The new system now, however, consists in the movement by road with broken-up formations, their elements being apportioned in accordance with their capacity for movement; and the different scattered members are brought together at a concentration point. Let us look at all the conditions which such solution requires. There is, first, the presence of a solid advance guard, which at all costs prevents the enemy breaking into a system which is incapable of defence. This advanced guard, in the present case, is the " front." Secondly, there is absolute control of the traffic on the route, and a certain professional ease in the art of handling all the various elements, putting them on the road, directing them, regrouping them. In this case the necessary skill had been acquired in the development of the regulating organizations at Verdun and on the Somme, during the movements of 1917 (Italy, Peronne) and in 1918 (March, May, July). Lastly, there must be the complete confidence of those who are being carried, who hand themselves over bound hand and foot to their transporters. These conditions being fulfilled, the problem set out above was simplified, thanks to the existence of the two C.R.A.'s of Toul and Souilly, the former having as its sphere of action the zone of departure of the American formations, the latter the zone of arrival. The director of automobile services of the French army placed a delegation at Ligny, which took under its direct orders the two regulating commissions and coordinated their action. This delegation at Ligny dealt with eight groupings of automobiles, with which they carried out the transport of the infantry by lorries.

Let us enter into details, and see what are the different operations with which the delegation at Ligny would have to deal, to organize these movements at the outset.

(1) After a rapid evaluation of the kind and quantity of the effectives to be moved - motor transports of infantry, the American divisional motor convoys, teams of the horse-drawn divisional or corps artillery, motor artillery - this staff sets out on the map the different current-paths in which these elements can be analyzed. In the first place, the great road Toul-Void-Ligny-Bar-le-DucChaumont-sur-Aire-Souilly-Nixeville (or Chaumont-sur-Aire-Chermont-en-Argonne) is reserved for transports of infantry by the French motor reserves. A current of motor artillery traffic is deflected to the S. by Gondrecourt. Lastly, two routes N. of the line Toul-Ligny-en-Barrois are reserved for horse-drawn vehicles and horse artillery. These four streams distribute simultaneously all the units of the four types, arrangements being made for the American divisional motor convoys to follow the French motor convoys of infantry transport.

(2) This being done, arrangements are made for the orders of march of each of the elements following the four itineraries. This work involves specifying the character of the elements, their places of departure (date and hour), their points of transfer from the authority of the C.R.A. of Toul to the charge of the C.R.A. of Souilly, and their points of final destination; and all these arrangements when worked out are submitted for the approval of the operations branch of the American general staff, which draws up all executive orders to be sent for despatch to each unit affected. These orders are sent in duplicate by the delegation at Ligny.

(3) The picking-up of each division by its lorries necessitates the working-out and despatch, by the delegation at Ligny, of orders to the two C.R.A.'s of Toul and Souilly, also to the commanders of the various automobile formations concerned. The order prescribes the day and hour of the picking up; the address of the divisional headquarters staff; the billeting distribution of the division; the routes of empty movement to bring their lorries to the embarkation stations, and the routes loaded which are to bring them to their destination; the place of assembling the empty automobile units after they had unloaded; the limit of a zone within which empty movements must not take place after 8 A.M.; points of liaison either by telephone or motor orderly between the delegation at Ligny and the commander of the automobile formation. In conformity with the standing orders of the directorate of motor services, this order would instruct the commander of the automobile formation to make his plan of transport in conjunction with the C.R.A. of embarkation and C.R.A. of disembarkation.

This manner of operating has the advantage that an officer of the C.R.A., perfectly familiar with his region and its road system, takes part in working out his embarkation plan; it enables the loops to be determined by which the different automobile units arriving at the different places of embarkation will assemble. It was the same for the disembarkation.

(4) The D.S.A. of Ligny, using the preliminary table of the ensemble of the movements, draws up detailed tables of the movements on which figure the place, the date and the hour of departure of each element, whether horse-drawn or motor; the itinerary in the American zone; the point of handing over from one to the other; the itinerary in the French zone; and the final destination. To establish these detailed tables consultation is necessary with the American staff, and also with the staff of the 2nd French Army at Laheycourt which looks after rationing and billeting areas.

(5) In the course of the movements the American operations section made certain modifications in the list of formation units which it had communicated to the delegation at Ligny. These modifications consisted either of omissions or substitutions, as in the case where one division took the place of another in the new order of battle. The desire to deal suitably with the special qualities of each American division necessitated modifications of this nature. In order to maintain the most exact order in the prescriptions concerning the movements, the delegation at Ligny tabulated a general summary for each day, to which was added in the course of the day a numbered series of " additions " or " alterations." The chief table and the supplementary tables were notified immediately to the two C.R.A.'s affected, who in their turn gave orders to their district chief commanders. The principle which served as an absolute guide was at all costs to make good the movements as they were ordered, in establishing as rapidly as possible the liaisons necessary, in particular with the unit in motion, to be certain of the time-table. The difficulty of these transports and movements had been considerably increased by the need of secrecy to cover the operations of concentration. General Pershing, who commanded the American I. Army, had definitely ordered that no movement should be visible to the enemy observers able to fly over the American zone. In consequence all movements, without exception, had to be carried out at night, and it was absolutely forbidden to use any light whatsoever, be it touring-car lamp or lorry back-lights. This applied equally to movements on foot. Thus it was in complete darkness that the elements had to be put on the road, march discipline assured, circulation controlled and liaisons established. On Sept. 25 the concentration was achieved as the C.-in-C. had ordered.

## Combined Use of Railway and Motors

The foregoing was an example of a strategic movement carried out solely on the roads. In the majority of cases, however, use is made of railways and roads in combination. The end to be attained is always a rapid move of powerful forces; the staff should therefore make use simultaneously, and as efficiently as possible, of every means of transport which it possesses. Under what conditions will this simultaneous employment give the best results? Is it better to carry out end-to-end movements, parallel and simultaneously by railway and by roads, or, on the other hand, to make movements by railway for one part of the journey, and to prolong these movements by automobile? The question and the answer apply both to transport of troops and to the transport of materiel.  The weak point in transport by railways is not in their capacity, for this is very considerable if there are available both double railway track and a quantity of locomotives and wagons sufficient for the full exploitation of the system. One must never lose sight of the fact that the efficiency of the railway is much superior to that of the road; a train of 50 wagons is equivalent to 150 lorries. At a speed of 3 o km. an hour, and with 4 departures an hour, one has four trains in a length of 30 km., or the equivalent of 600 lorries. We have seen that 600 lorries form on the road a length of 20 to 25 kilometres. Railway and road have therefore very nearly the same output. But the lorries, going 15 km. an hour, are only half as quick. Further, at the end of loo km. it is necessary for the lorries to stop in order to rest the drivers, for, save in exceptional cases, relief crews are out of the question, while trains travel indefinitely without changing locomotives. The weak point in transport by rail really lies in the necessity of having stations for embarking and for disembarking. Save in quite exceptional cases it is an absolute technical neces sity to load and unload in stations, and even so only in those where there are sidings sufficient to take the military trains so as to leave free the main line during the times of embarking and disembarking. Without this precaution all the traffic will be blocked. Further, when it is a question of loading materiel it is necessary to place it on the platforms. While special platforms or docks are indispensable on the railway, it is always easy, on the road, to find and organize quickly loading-places for lorries; on the railways to install even simple sidings is a serious matter.

Big movements by railway can be made only from a zone A to a zone B, if the two zones A and B are equally rich in loadingplaces. But - apart from those points which come into the initial concentration scheme, and on which therefore work can be done in peace - it is impossible to ensure, in the large movements which military operations may necessitate at any given moment, that the beginning and the end of rail transports shall take place in zones that are rich in loading-places.

On the other hand, it is generally possible to find, within a radius of 50 to ioo km. in the zones A and B under consideration, one or more regions rich in loading-places. The normal combination consists therefore in utilizing motor transport to prolong railway transport, and to carry the troops or materiel (1) from their stationary zone to the places of embarkation, and (2) from their places of disembarkation to the zone of operations. The relatively short movements (50 to 100 km.) it requires are those in which the efficiency of the lorry is at its greatest. And between the two zones of loading thus actually used, the efficiency of the railway will equally be a maximum.

Examples of combined use of rail and road systems were very frequent in the course of the war. In Oct. 1914 all French troops despatched for the Ypres region were carried by rail to the region N.E. of Arras (Doullens, St. Pol, Bethune, Bailleul) and pushed forward from there by automobile to Ypres. Similar arrangements were made on every occasion in the course of the war on which the French army was called upon to put considerable forces into this region. For example, in April 1918, in the movement of reinforcements to Flanders, the French employed three routes gardees, by which, though they cut through the lines of communication of the British armies, formations picked up at the railway stations of disembarkation around Amiens and Arras were despatched to the Ypres region.

Naturally, other combinations are also practicable: for example, that by which, on Nov. 20-21 1917, 3 French divisions were to be carried from Meaux and Chateau-Thierry to Peronne; the infantry, with their machine-guns and cooking-carts, being conveyed in motor lorries, and the artillery by train. The object of these movements, very quickly ordered on Nov. 19, was to reinforce the successful British attack in front of Cambrai with the first use of tanks in mass, and had overwhelming results. While the embarkation of the artillery was proceeding at railway stations in proximity to the divisional billets on the Marne, the C.R.A. of Meaux and Chateau-Thierry loaded up on 3,000 lorries the infantry, etc., of the 3 divisions. The movements of the lorries, made by 3 separate itineraries, came to an end in the neighbourhood of Peronne, where a C.R.A. of disembarkation put the various elements in their places in the zone where the 3 divisions were re-forming. At the same time the British motor service was working with full efficiency on all the routes converging from the N. and W. on this same region of Peronne. In every case there must be the closest liaison between the authorities who regulate the movements of the trains on the railways and those who regulate the movements of motors on the roads. In the case where troops are loaded into lorries on leaving a train, it is necessary that the motor transport should be constantly informed by the rail-transport authorities of the hours of arrival arranged for the trains, in order to have the lorries at the disembarkation platforms in good time for immediate loading-up of the troops. Finally, as in the case of the move to Peronne, where there were parallel moves by rail and roads, there must be a complete understanding between all concerned, so that, both in the zone of departure and in the zone of arrival, the hours of embarking and disembarking should be so arranged as to avoid crossings of columns and overcrowding; and the working-up and reconstitution of higher formations, whose elements are conveyed partly by rail, partly by lorry, partly again by marching, must be minutely worked out and definitely fixed. A final example may be given of the combined use of the automobile and railway. In this instance it is required to make a rapid movement of certain troops to a zone where, for some reason, it is not possible to use the railway system. Here, combination is needed in the disembarkation and reembarkation arrangements at the beginning and the end of the zone; such operations are easy where the two organizing departments of the railways and automobiles are directed by the same superior authority and kept in strict and constant touch. If, after Oct. 1918, the pursuit of the German armies had not been arrested by the Armistice, this problem would have had a thoroughly practical demonstration, for it is probable that the Allies would have been able to take into use the railways existing beyond the devastated zone. In Nov. 1917, at the time of the crossing of the Alps by a portion of the French troops, the C.R.A. of Besancon and of Nice had to deal with an analogous case; viz. to set in motion and to transport over the passes of the Alps those troops which, having been disembarked from the French railways at the foot of the mountains, were to be reloaded on the Italian railways on the other side.

It must be observed that there are many details which complicate considerably the task of the transport officials: such as the question of food supply for the troops during their transportation and at their disembarkation, and the question of moving troops simultaneously with the building-up of the munition dumps which they will require. One last remark should be made: transportation by automobile and by railway, which, we have seen, supplement one another happily in regard to distance, is equally satisfactory in regard to time. Large movements by railway require a concentration of materiel, often difficult to achieve; and, in the case of moves decided on in a hurry, the possibility of motor transports on a large scale assumes very great importance, since it takes 4 or 5 days for the railway to show its full powers.

## Conclusion

The experience of the war shows the role which transport by motors is called upon to sustain becoming more and more important. The Allied armies, together, placed on the French front about 20,000 vehicles of motor propulsion in Oct. 1914; four years later the number exceeded 200,000.

As regards troop transport alone, the power conferred on the command by the employment of lorries had grown enormously during this period of four years. At the time of the Armistice, the inter-Allied transports reserve, the creation of which had just been decided on, was of a size to transport simultaneously 10 divisions of infantry complete, with all their means of fighting, machine-guns and artillery included. This was a fighting mass of more than 10o,000 men, which the Higher Command was able to pick up at short notice and carry at the speed of 100 km. a day to any point where it was required.

As regards the transport of materiel at the end of the war, it had become possible - independently of the resources just mentioned - to keep supplied with food and munitions 40 divisions at a distance of loo km. from the railways.

To show what was actually achieved in those directions, it will be enough to say that, in the French army alone, there were carried by motor transport during July 1918 1,040,000 tons of materiel and 950,000 combatants.

In the future it is to be foreseen that mechanical motive power will replace entirely the animal motive power in the armies. Since the use of special tractors enables the artillery to take up positions in any kind of terrain, there will be no reason for not giving it, on the road, the speed of moving which the automobile allows. And as the support of infantry on the battlefield, i.e.  accompanying guns and also tanks, will in the future be capable of rapid movement on the roads, it will be natural to organize more and more systematically the rapid conveyance by automobile of considerable masses of infantry. The evolution of strategy must always be in the direction of using all available means to surprise and break the enemy by concentrating unexpected strength with unexpected rapidity. (A. D.*)