Battle_Of_The._Marne

"Battle Of The. Marne \- Under this name is included the connected series of actions fought in Sept. 1914 in the area between Paris and Verdun, when the French and British armies, which had been in full retreat from the frontier, turned at bay and inflicted defeat on the Germans, driving them to the Aisne.

To understand the claim of the battle of the Marne to be regarded as a decisive battle of the world, something more than a mere tactical narrative is necessary. The circumstances in which it was fought must be first considered. Tactically, indeed, the result was somewhat of a disappointment. No part of the German host was annihilated, or even immobilized for any length of time; the number both of trophies and prisoners was inconsiderable; the Germans broke off the fight at their own time; no great strategic pursuit such as had succeeded Jena took place; and the Germans were enabled to retire, if not unscathed, at any rate in fair order. Strategically, however, the battle was of immense import. It marked for the Allies the definite turn of the tide of defeat, while for the Germans it signified no less the collapse of the plan with which they had entered the war and on which their Great General Staff had been prepared to hazard the fate of the empire.

In spite of the victories which had marked their entry into France, the situation of the Germans by the end of Aug. 1914 was not without anxiety. The principle underlying their plan of operations had been that France was to be brought to her knees within six weeks; but when two-thirds of this period had expired the French and British armies were still keeping their opponents at arm's length. The German plan had laid down that if the French were to form a great defensive flank resting on Paris the capital was to be turned by forces pushed W. and S. of it; Ersatz divisions were to be dropped for the investment; and the five field armies pivoting on Thionville were to force the whole of the Allied forces against the Swiss frontier. An operation of such a nature, involving the handling of immense masses of men, demanded, however, a supreme direction of the highest order accompanied by most detailed instructions for the frontage of each army so that the general alignment might be preserved and overlapping prevented. These essentials were not forthcoming. Supreme Headquarters were for a time over roc. m. in rear of the German right wing, and the only means of communication were wireless telegraphy - which worked incredibly slowly - and the transmission of orders by officers in motorcars. The inevitable result of indifferent communication was that on the German right the absence of unity of control soon showed itself to a serious extent. Further, the ever-lengthening lines of communication were adding to the supply and transport difficulties of the invaders, and slowly but surely sapping their strength. Maubeuge, too, still held out, and the retention of this fortress by the French denied to the invaders the use of a valuable line of railway. The inevitable wastage involved by a rapid advance in trying weather had made itself felt, and the cavalry horses were in serious need of rest. Nor was there any depth in the advance. From the I. Army two corps had been left in Belgium to mask Antwerp; while from the II. Army the VII. Reserve Corps was immobilized by the siege of Maubeuge. Worse still, two corps had been sent off post-haste to E. Prussia, and of these one had been subtracted from the German right wing where every man was urgently required. Nor had the right wing been drained merely to find troops for Belgium and E. Prussia. Peremptory orders had been given to send off the Ersatz divisions and 70 heavy batteries - earmarked for the investment of Paris - to take part in an attack against the Grand Couronne de Nancy.

On Aug. 28, when German Supreme Headquarters directed that Gen. von Billow's II. Army with the I. Cavalry Corps was to advance E. of the Oise on Paris, while the I. Army of Gen. von Kluck, moving down the opposite bank of that river, was to advance towards the Seine below the capital, it was brought home to the Germans that they had not sufficient troops to carry out their grandiose plan. They " had bitten off more than they could chew "; and the net result of the extension of their line was that the II. Army, in comparative isolation, found itself committed to an advance direct against the great fortress of Paris. So perturbed was Gen. von Billow by his situation that when the French V. Army attacked him on Aug. 29 at the battle of Guise he sent out urgent appeals by wireless messages to the I. and III. Armies to close inwards to his aid. Gen. von Billow's cries for assistance were destined to alter the whole course of the war, for Gen. von Kluck, apparently glad of an excuse to switch off from the elusive British army, during the evening of Aug. 30 telegraphed to Supreme Headquarters to say that his army had wheeled round towards the Oise and would advance on the 3rst by Compiegne and Noyon " to exploit the success of the II. Army." This involved a definite movement S. and S.E. by both these armies; but during the night an answer came by wireless from Supreme Headquarters formally approving of this new operation. In a word, an advance by the right wing against Paris was now postponed, if not definitely written off. Trusting that the newly formed French VI. Army, which had fallen back on Paris, would be chained to the capital, and convinced that the British army was incapable of any action other than licking its wounds, the German General Staff now reduced the scope of their original plan and decreed that the new objective was to be the flank of the " main French forces " in front of the II. Army. Put briefly, while envelopment by the German right wing was still the end in view it was to be an envelopment not of all but of part of the Allied forces. Success was still hoped for; but the colossal Sedan originally aimed at was ruled out of court by the growing difficulties of the strategic situation.

As for the French, the month of Aug. had been marked by a succession of failures which might well have daunted a commander of less resolution than Gen. Joffre. The offensive of their I. and II. Armies S. of Metz had failed, and failed badly; and the failure had necessitated a modification of Gen. Joffre's plan. A new offensive farther N. had begun on the 22nd, but here again failure had dogged the efforts of the French, for owing to misunderstanding and lack of coordination the whole movement collapsed, and the collapse had the effect of completely isolating the V. and British armies in the zone Mons - Charleroi. Even then the cup of failure had not been completely drained. Gen. Joffre's fresh plan, of Aug. 25, of regrouping the Allied forces and strengthening the left wing with a new French army drawn from the E., so as to take the offensive from the general line Verdun - Laon - La Fere - Bray, could not be carried out. On Aug. 31 Amiens fell; the British were definitely cut off from their bases in the Channel ports; and the whole Allied line was withdrawn, pivoting its right on the fortress of Verdun. Paris was now in danger and the newly formed VI. Army, with Gen. Sordet's cavalry corps, was sent back to the capital, where both units were to come under the orders of Gen. Gallieni, the military governor.

Gen. Joffre, however, never wavered in his intention to assume the offensive at the first opportunity, and he decided to continue his retirement merely until the protection of a topographical obstacle would afford his troops a temporary respite during which reorganization could take place and wastage might be made good. The limits of the withdrawal were laid down as the territory immediately S. of the rivers Seine, Aube and Ornain. Tactically the barrier formed by the river lines might reasonably be expected to afford the brief breathingtime required by the Allied troops, but the project was open to the objection that its adoption would mean the abandonment of a further section of French soil and the isolation of the capital.

Meanwhile, inside Paris Gen. Gallieni was labouring with feverish energy to make good the deficiencies of defence caused by the apathy and neglect of successive French Governments. Even in the critical situation of the last days of Aug. the Government of the day was more alive to the danger of alarming the populace than to the necessity of defence, and refused to sanction some of the measures which Gen. Gallieni regarded as indispensable. The actual garrison consisted of four and a half divisions of the Territorial Army (i.e. men of the older classes), some cavalry and field artillery, as well as 5,000 Fusiliers Marins  sent to reinforce the police of the capital; but on Sept. r the newly formed French VI. Army, some 60,000 strong under the command of Gen. Maunoury, was formally placed under the orders of the military governor. In addition to the VI. Army the cavalry corps of Gen. Sordet had been sent back to Paris, and two other reserve divs., the Gist and 62nd, were at Pontoise; but these had been very roughly handled at St. Pol and Arras and had lost most of whatever fighting efficiency they had originally possessed. A far more valuable reinforcement was the 45th Div. from N. Africa, which had just detrained in Paris and was impounded by the military governor.

At six o'clock on the evening of Sept. i Gen. Gallieni issued his first operation orders. In that document he laid down definitely that Paris was to form the point d'appui of the left of the French armies which were retreating towards the south. Gen. Maunoury, in his retirement on Paris, reinforced by the 92nd Territorial Div. and other units, was to cover the entrenched camp from the N. and E., and the cavalry corps of Gen. Sordet was placed at his disposal as a protection to his left. The 45th Div. was to be the general reserve under Gen. Gallieni's own hand, while the actual garrison of Paris itself was to consist of some four territorial divisions. The IV. Corps (from the IV. Army) had been promised by Gen. Joffre, but was not expected to arrive from Verdun until Sept. 4. In touch with the Army of Paris were the British, for the moment on the line Nanteuil-leHaudouin - Betz, but retreating pari passu with the French armies on its right.

Although for more than 48 hours the Germans had renounced the advance on Paris, all through Sept. 2 it was believed in the city that they were still marching straight on the capital. The arrival of the enemy was, indeed, now thought to be but a matter of hours. German agents had notified the U.S. embassy of the forthcoming entry; the embassy had prepared notices to be affixed as safeguards to the residences of American citizens; and the ambassador came formally in person to request sanction for their issue from the military governor. Gen. Gallieni spent the afternoon in a final survey of the positions occupied by the forces under his command, convinced that the morrow would witness the opening of the battle which was to decide the fate of the French capital. What he had seen of the troops on whom the great duty of defending Paris was thrust had by no means reassured him. The VI. Army - largely made up of reserve troops - had not recovered from the disorganization caused by its hurried retreat from the neighbourhood of Amiens. The 45th Div. from Algiers, however, presented a more encouraging sight. Composed of seasoned soldiers, who had not been exposed to the depressing experience of retreat, and admirably equipped, its fort bel aspect gladdened the heart of the military governor on that anxious day; but as for the 92nd Div. of Territoriales its field entrenchments were but half finished, and its personnel was hardly of the class which a commander could put with confidence against first-line German troops. Gen. Gallieni's actual instructions were to defend Paris a outrance so as to save it from the invader; but his military instinct had led him to aim at active defence so as not only to save the capital but to make the fortress a strong support for the left flank of the Allied armies in the field. The task was a formidable one, and Gen. Gallieni was under no illusions as to the gravity of the outlook when he reached his headquarters in Paris in the evening, and heard news which altered the whole situation.

The German glissement towards the S.E. had begun on Aug. 31 and had actually been observed by a French cavalry patrol about noon on that date from a point near St. Maur, but curiously enough the information had never come to Gen. Gallieni's ears. Even as late as the morning of Sept. 3 all the information available had pointed to a German advance on Paris with the Senlis - Paris road as the axis of movement. But by midday the situation had completely changed. Intelligence transmitted by aeroplanes and cavalry patrols showed that the German I. Army had abandoned the march on Paris, and by evening it was clear that the main body of Gen. von Kluck's army was heading S.E. towards the junction of the right of the British with the left of the French V. Army.

Gen. Gallieni's first decision was to verify these reports so as to eliminate all possibility of error. At dawn on the following day all available aircraft ascended from the capital with express instructions to report by ro A.M. on these movements of the German right wing. The information gathered completely confirmed the intelligence of the evening before. The SenlisParis road was free of Germans; Senlis and Creil were in flames; and, with the exception of some cavalry patrols, the country W. of the Senlis road was empty. So much was absolutely definite, and a comparison of the various reports sent in led to the following deduction as to the movements of the German I. Army. The IV. Reserve Corps was acting as a flank guard and was marching in two columns towards Lizy-sur-Ourcq and Meaux, flanked by some cavalry towards Crouy. The II., III., IV. and IX. Corps had crossed the Marne and were at ro A.M. deploying along the Petit Morin from La Ferte-sous-Jouarre to Orbais.

Gen. Gallieni could now turn his attention from the actual defence of the capital to the far wider issue of the war as a whole. The situation in which he now found himself required exceptional power of judgment to ensure a right decision. On the one hand there was the German I. Army making a flank march across the N.E. of Paris, actually inviting attack, and providing a temptation almost impossible to resist; on the other hand there was the fact that Gen. Joffre had prescribed a retirement behind the Upper Seine and Aube as an essential preliminary before any offensive could be attempted. Gen. Gallieni clearly realized that combined action by the armies in the field and the army in Paris might effect immense results in the new state of affairs; but he also saw that a mere sortie by the army of Paris would be an extremely dangerous measure. He realized, in fact, that Paris and the army in the field must sink or swim together. If Gen. Joffre hoped to resume the offensive the time to do so was while his left was still in touch with the capital, which would form a point d'appui for that flank, and before the golden opportunity of striking at the enemy's flank had passed away.

Anticipating the sanction of the commander-in-chief, which he hoped to obtain, Gen. Gallieni at 9 A.M. ordered the commander of the VI. Army to hold his troops in readiness for an advance against the exposed flank of the German I. Army, informing him at the same time that the 45th Div. was now at his disposal. Gen. Gallieni's chief-of-staff then informed G.H.Q. by telephone that the VI. Army had now received orders to move out eastwards in the afternoon, but that it could be directed to operate on the right or left bank of the Marne as required. The next thing was to secure the cooperation of the British, and accordingly at one o'clock Gen. Gallieni started for the headquarters of Sir John French, which were at that time fixed at Melun. The British commander was at the moment with his troops some miles in front, and in his absence it was not possible to arrive at a definite decision on a matter of such importance as the project now suggested. On his return Gen. Gallieni was shown a telegram which had come from Gen. Joffre early in the afternoon. It was to the effect that, while favouring the project of an early offensive in principle, Gen. Joffre considered that the project of carrying the VI. Army to the left bank of the Marne S. of Lagny held out the greatest prospect of success. Gen. Joffre, Gen. Gallieni and Sir John French were all equally desirous of assuming the offensive at the first available opportunity, and any divergence of opinion was but on matters of detail. Further telephonic communication removed from the mind of the commander-in-chief any lingering doubts as to the advisability of adopting Gen. Gallieni's original plan of using the VI. Army N. of the Marne. From all the information gained Gen. Joffre had now realized that a chance not often to be met with in war was offered him. He determined to assume the offensive at the earliest moment, and shortly before midnight he issued his directions in which he stated that advantage was to be taken of the situation of the German I. Army to concentrate against it the efforts of the Allied armies of the extreme left. All necessary preparations were to be carried out during the 5th, and the attack was to be made on Sept. 6. The die was now cast, and it only remained for the Franco-British armies to carry out to the full the tasks assigned them by the French generalissimo.

In detail the orders of Gen. Joffre were as follows: (a) All the available forces of the VI. Army N.E. of Meaux to be ready to cross the Ourcq between Lizy and May-en-Multien, in the general direction of Chateau-Thierry. The available portions of the I. Cavalry Corps which are close at hand to be handed over to Gen. Maunoury for this operation. (b) The British army to establish itself on the line Changis-Coulommiers, facing E., ready to attack in the general direction of Montmirail.

(c) The V. Army to close slightly on its left and take up the general line Courtaeon-Esternay-Sezanne, ready to attack, generally speaking, south to north. The II. Cavalry Corps to ensure connexion between the British army and the V. Army.

(d) The IX. Army to cover the right of the V. Army by holding the southern outlets of the St. Gond marshes and by placing part of its forces on the tableland N. of Sezanne.

In the orders issued by Gen. Joffre on the afternoon of the 4th only the VI., British, V. and IX. Armies had received detailed instructions as to the task before them, but on the 5th supplementary orders were issued, carrying on the scope of operations so as to include the French III. and IV. Armies. These orders were received by the armies concerned at about 7 P.M. on the 5th, and ran as follows: IV. Army. - To-morrow, Sept. 6, our left armies will attack the German I. and II. Armies in front and flank. The IV. Army will cease its southerly movement with that of the III. Army, which will issue N. of Revigny and take the offensive towards the north-west.

III. Army. - The III. Army, covering itself against attack from the N.E., will debouch to the W. to attack the left flank of enemy forces marching W. of the Argonne. It will coordinate its action with that of the IV. Army, which has received orders to attack.

Working from W. to E., the disposition of the armies of France and England between Paris and Verdun, as they stood during Sept. 5, was as follows: - French VI. Army: Gen. Maunoury. VII. Corps (14th Div., 63rd Reserve Div.); IV. Corps (detraining at Cagny and vicinity; considerable delay had been caused by a railway accident en route;  55t h and 56th Res. Divs., Gen. Lamaze; 61st and 62nd Res. Divs., Gen. Ebener; a Moroccan Brigade; I. Cavalry Corps, Gen. Sordet, less the Provisional Cavalry Div., Gen. Cornulier-Luciniere).

(This army had endeavoured to effect its concentration at Amiens, but had been forced to fall back on Paris and now stood on a line covering the capital on the N. and north-east. The 45th Div. did not actually come up until the, evening of the 5th, and was kept in reserve. The I. Cavalry Corps had fallen back S. of the Seine, very exhausted.) British Army: Field-Marshal Sir John French. I. Corps (1st and 2nd Divs.; Gen. Sir Douglas Haig); II. Corps (3rd and 5th Divs.; Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien); III. Corps (4th Div. plus 19th Inf. Bde.; Gen. Pulteney); Cavalry Div. (5 cavalry brigades and horse artillery; Gen. Allenby).

(This army lay behind the Grand Morin on the general line BaillyLa Houssaye-Courpalay, in order, from left to right, III., II., I, and covered by the cavalry.) French V. Army: Gen. Franchet d'Esperey. I., III., X., XVIII. Corps; 37th and 38th (Algerian) Divs.; 51st, 53rd and 69th Reserve Divs.; II. Cavalry Corps (Gen. Conneau).

(The front of this army extended from about Courtacon on the left to between Esternay and Sezanne on the right.) French IX. Army: Gen. Foch. IX. Corps (included Moroccan Div. vice 18th Div.); XI. Corps (included 18th Div.; strength 3 divs.); 42 Div.; 52nd and 60th Res. Divs.; 9th Ca y. Div.

(This army occupied the front Sezanne-Camp-de-Mailly, near Sompuis. The 9th Cavalry Div. was on the right flank.) French IV. Army: Gen. Langle de Cary. II. Corps; XII. Corps; XVII. Corps; Colonial Corps.

(The IV. Army occupied a position from near Sompuis through Humbauville, thence S. of Vitry-le-Francois, as far as Sermaize. It was reinforced on Sept. 9 by the XXI. Corps from the I. Army.) French III. Army: Gen. Sarrail. IV. Corps; sent to VI. Army (IV. Corps); V. Corps; VI. Corps; one brigade of the 54th Div.; 65th, 67th and 75th Res. Divs.; 7th Ca y. Div.

(This army was posted on the line Revigny-Souilly, and on its right it joined up with the mobile garrison of the fortress of Verdun. It was reinforced on Sept. 7 by the XXV. Corps from the II. Army.) On the same date the German armies in France were thus disposed: - I. Army: Gen. von Kluck. II., III., IV., IV. Res. and IX. Corps; 2nd, 4th and 9th Ca y. Divs. under Gen. v. der Marwitz, with three Landwehr brigades on lines of communication.

(The III. Res. Corps of this army had been left behind to watch Antwerp, and the IX. Res. Corps, temporarily held in Germany for the defence of the N.W. coast, was only just beginning its movement to Belgium and France. The IV. Res. Corps was posted on a line S. of Nanteuil and W. of the Ourcq to form a flank guard for the new march of the German I. Army. The main body of that army had its right about Crecy, and the line ran thence generally eastwards through St. Augustine and Sancy to Esternay.) II. Army: Gen. von Billow. Guard, VII., X. and X. Res. Corps; Guard and 5th Cavalry Divs. (under Gen. von Richthofen).

(The headquarters of the II. Arm y were at Montmirail, and its line stretched thence, keeping N. of the marshes of St. Gond, through Congy to Ecury-le-Repos. The VII. Corps was echeloned behind the right rear, N.W. of Montmirail. The VII. Res. Corps of this army had been detached to besiege Maubeuge.) III. Army: Gen. von Hausen. XII., XII. Res., and XIX. Corps, with one Landwehr brigade.

(This army consisted of Saxon troops, and was in position with its right in touch with advanced troops of the II. Army about Ecury-leRepos. Its centre was opposite Sommesous and its left extended towards Vitry-le-Francois. Of the XII. Res. Corps one division - the 24th - had been left investing Givet, and did not rejoin until Sept. 7.) IV. Army: Duke Albrecht of Wiirttemberg. VIII., VIII. Res., XVIII., and XVIII. Res. Corps, with one Landwehr brigade.

(The line of this army ran from near Vitry-le-Francois to Ponthion and thence by Possesse to Somme-Yevre.) V. Army: German Crown Prince. V., V. Res., VI., VI. Res., XIII. and XVI. Corps; 33rd Res. Div., 2nd Landwehr Div. with additional brigades, five in all; 3rd and 6th Cavalry Divs.

(The Crown Prince's army lay in two portions. One part of it - the VI., XIII. and XVI. active corps - faced the French III. Army on the line Charmontoise-Triaucourt-Froidos. The two reserve corps were to the N. of Verdun, the VI. Res. being on the left-hand bank near Montfaucon and the V. Res. on the opposite bank about Consenvoye. The active corps was E. of Verdun, and the 33rd Res. Div. and the Landwehr formed a special force in Woevre and on the Moselle based on Metz.) The French, British and German armies thus enumerated were those immediately concerned in the operations which are now known as the battle of the Marne. Farther to the S.E., between the fortress of Toul and the Swiss frontier, the German VI. (Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria) and VII. (Gen. von Heeringen) Armies had been heavily engaged with the French I. and II. Armies since the middle of August.

The area on which the battle was about to be contested forms roughly a rectangle from E. to W. of 120 m., and as the distance from the southern to the northern edge is 50 m. the battlefield may be said to cover some 6,000 sq. m. of area. Save for the fortress of Verdun the actual battlefield contained no feature, the capture or retention of which would have vitally affected the battle, but it was of a very diversified nature. The western strip is, generally speaking, a large cultivated plain, in which the Marne, flowing through a well-marked valley, receives as tributaries the Ourcq and the two Morins. Like the parent river, the tributaries are slow-moving and unfordable, but well provided with stone bridges and lined with woods and country houses. This sector of the battlefield is fairly open; but an exception must be made of the forests of Villers-Cotterets and Compiegne, where the paths are intricate and blind, and where a force losing direction might find itself in serious difficulties if attacked. East of this sector is a strip bounded generally by N. and S. lines through Soissons and Reims, and roughly bisected by the course of the river Marne. Generally speaking, the terrain here is a plateau cut by the well-marked river valley and marked by copses and plantations which increase in size and frequency towards the east. The eastern edge of the plateau, running from the Montagne de Reims to the Aisne, and thence to Laon and beyond, forms the line of heights known as Les Falaises de Champagne. A tactical feature of some importance is the marshland near Sezanne called Les Marais de Saint Gond, formed by a pocket of clay and extending for about 10-12 m. from E. to W., and 1-2 m. broad. The marshes have been to a Iarge extent reclaimed, and between the acres of grassland the streams which unite to form the Petit Morin run in deep ditches. In fine weather the ground is fairly dry, but in heavy rains the slopes N. and S. drain down to the pocket, the canalized streams overflow, and the clay soil becomes one vast quagmire. Some narrow causeways have been constructed, but these can be brought under artillery fire, particularly from a round-topped hill at Mondement, which is a valuable tactical feature; and since the causeways are neither engineered nor metalled they are all likely in flood time to become as deep in mud as the adjoining marshes. Passing eastward, the third strip of the battlefield is the wide plain of Champagne Pouilleuse. Here are long undulating ridges covered with heath and crowned on top with small fir plantations, moorlands with patches of cultivation, and two large permanent training camps N. and S. of Chalons, the whole forming a fine arena for a conventional battle of the three arms.

East of this immense plain the woods become more frequent and dense, meriting in many cases the larger designation of forests. Chief among these is the Forest of Argonne, a long, densely wooded low ridge running almost N. and S., traversed only by a few paths and by two gaps, through which run two high roads and the St. Menehould - Verdun railway. Between the ridge and the valley of the Meuse lies an upland country, chiefly of pasture-land intersected by numerous narrow ravines; and on the right bank of the Meuse are the abrupt Hauts-de-Meuse (or Cotes de la Meuse), looking down on the plain of the Woevre.

In this sector of the battlefield is situated the fortress of Verdun, which, although it formed a very sharp salient in the French line, yet by its projection served the useful purpose of dividing the Crown Prince's army into two parts. Unlike Namur and Liege, the fortress had been kept in readiness to resist a sudden attack and contained an adequate garrison, including mobile troops distinct from the field armies. Further, the forts of the perimeter had been supplemented by a network of trenches and outworks pushed well out, which greatly minimized the chance of the fortress being quickly crushed by a concentrated storm of heavy artillery fire. In spite of the great use which the Germans made of mechanical transport, the retention of Verdun in French hands was a serious handicap to the invaders, for it prevented their making use of the main line of railway running thence to Germany; and the difficulty of communication was aggravated by the fact that when the battle began Maubeuge was still untaken and the main line of railway from Cologne through Liege and Namur was in consequence blocked. Practically the only line of rail available to supply the i 4 to r million Germans deployed along the general line of the Marne was that which ran N. from Reims to Mezieres and thence by the valley of the Meuse to Dinant and Namur. In lateral communications, however, the Germans were admirably served, the MeauxReims - Verdun and Meaux - Chalons - Verdun railways affording them the means of transferring troops from one portion of the battlefield to another at will. The suddenness and impetuosity of the Allies' attack, however, was to render the advantage a theoretical rather than an actual benefit.

The new " limited envelopment " scheme of the German General Staff held the field for just four days; and, to carry it out, Supreme Headquarters sent out orders on Sept. 3 to the effect that the I. Army was to follow in echelon behind the II. and to be responsible for the protection of the right flank of the whole German front. But at the moment when the orders were issued the situation was far different from that envisaged by Supreme Headquarters. So far from being echeloned behind the II. Army, Gen. von Kluck's columns were hurrying over the Marne, with the II. Army more than a day's march behind upon the Aisne. It has been suggested that Gen. von Kluck was fired by the recollection of Prince Frederick Charles at Mars-la-Tour, in which battle the former had served as a young officer of artillery. Be this as it may, in spite of the orders issued he continued his advance, and Supreme Headquarters quickly came to the conclusion that even the limited envelopment, which had been substituted for the original plan, must be curtailed.

It was during the evening of Sept. 4 that the new directive was brought to the I. Army. The essential point in it was the announcement that the attempt to force the whole French army back in a south-easterly direction, towards the Swiss frontier, was no longer practicable. Intelligence had reached the Germans about movements of French troops westward from Toul and Belfort, which pointed to a concentration on the French left; and further, there was an ominous reference to a collection of troops in the neighbourhood of Paris to threaten the right flank of the German I. Army. How far the initiative had passed from the Germans is revealed by a study of these orders of the evening of Sept. 4. The whole German plan broke down, and the invaders had to reshape their scheme to cope with that of Gen. Joffre. The I. and II. Armies were now to face E. towards Paris, the former between the Oise and the Marne and the latter between the Marne and the Seine; on the left the IV. and V. Armies by a determined advance S.E. were to open a passage across the Moselle for the VI. and VII. Armies, in which region a pianissimo Sedan might still take place, although Supreme Headquarters cautiously stated that " success could not yet be foreseen." The III. Army in the centre was to push S. ready to help either wing as required. Thus Gen. von Moltke was forced to throw to the winds the hopes founded on the great massive wheel of five armies pivoting on Thionville, and, instead, was compelled hurriedly to assign to his armies three divergent axes of march towards the W., S., and S.E.

Gen. von Kluck's contribution towards solving the difficult problem with which Supreme Headquarters were confronted was to disregard his orders. Instead of remaining between the Oise and the Marne he continued to push on over the latter river, increasing at every step his lead over the II. Army, behind which he should have been following. As the French VI. Army had orders to be in a position of readiness N.E. of Paris so as to be able to cross the Ourcq between Lizy and May-en-Multien in the general direction of Chateau-Thierry, early collision between it and the flank guard of the German I. Army was now but a matter of hours. Gen. Joffre had ordered that the offensive was to be begun by the VI., British, and V. Armies on the morning of Sept. 6, but as a matter of fact the battle was brought on earlier by the preliminary movements of the VI. Army.

In view of the forthcoming offensive the French VI. Army, during Sept: 5, began to fill in to its right so as to deploy generally on the line St. Mesmes - Foret d'Ermonville facing north-east. Opposite the right wing of this position and commanding all the neighbouring terrain runs a well-marked ridge which, starting from the high ground of Dammartin, is prolonged towards the S.E. by the hill at Montge, and thence by a succession of isolated knolls, of which the more pronounced are those of Monthyon and Penchard. The attempt by the divisions of Gen. Lamaze, which formed the right wing of the VI. Army, to secure this commanding ground brought on the battle of the Marne.

Almost exactly at noon, when a battalion of the 55th Div. was settling down to its midday meal near the hamlet of Villeroy, it was surprised by a storm of shells from some German batteries beyond Monthyon and Penchard. Some very fierce fighting ensued, and the French line gradually forced its way past Plessis and Iverny towards the Montge - Penchard ridge, while slightly to the S. Neufmontiers fell into the hands of the Moroccan Brigade. The French, however, were not able to hold their gains against the resistance of the German IV. Reserve Corps and during the evening their line in this position of the field was withdrawn to Le Plessis - Iverny - Villeroy - Charny, while to the N. St. Soupplets was held by the 56th Div. The left wing formed by the VII. Corps meanwhile had taken up the line Dammartin - Plailly without incident. Thus the VI. Army after severe fighting in which heavy losses were incurred, had secured but little advantage of ground, although, on the other hand, the possession of St. Soupplets on the Senlis - Marne road was of distinct value.

During the day Gen. von Kluck had drawn up a set of orders in compliance with the instructions he had received from Supreme Headquarters relative to his taking up a position between the Oise and the Marne. This would imply a retrograde movement of the I. Army; but Gen. von Kluck was at the time labouring under the delusion that there was as yet no great danger threatening his right flank, and that a march back to cover it could be carried out without interruption. Consequently his orders fixed no definite time at which the withdrawal across the Marne was to begin, and until late in the night of Sept. 5-6 he seems to have believed that he could still emulate the Red Prince of 1870. The reports which kept coming in, however, eventually undeceived him, and an urgent order was sent to the II. Corps to begin its retrograde movement early on the 6th so as to be in a position to support the IV. Reserve Corps if required, a movement which was to react upon the offensive of the French army.

That army moved out to the attack with both flanks covered by cavalry, on the right being a division under Gen. CornulierLuciniere, while Gen. Sordet's cavalry corps was coming up on the left. The bulk of the day's fighting took place opposite the right wing, especially on the extreme right. The 56th Div., leaving St. Soupplets at daybreak, fought its way without much difficulty to Marcilly, but farther S. the 55th Div. experienced far greater difficulties. Barcy was taken and retaken three times, but had finally to be abandoned, and Chambry was occupied by a portion of the S4th Div. only after several attacks by the 55th had been beaten back. It was now clear that the German IV. Reserve Corps was being reinforced, and the same impression was received on the VI. Army's left. No sooner had the VII. Corps come into action than two enemy columns were signalled as moving upon Vareddes and Lizy, and these were in fact the 3rd and 4th Divs. of the German II. Corps. Thus by the middle of the afternoon, while the divisions of Gen. Lamaze were facing the high ground about Etrepilly and the VII. Corps in the left wing had reached the line Villers St. GenestBregy, the German resistance had considerably hardened.

Gen. von Kluck could, however, only reinforce his right flank at the expense of his front, and, in consequence, opposite the British there was a noticeable slackening in the advance of the German I. Army. Put briefly, the relative situation of that army had changed. What had been its right flank - consisting of the IV. Reserve Corps and a cavalry division - was, by successive reinforcements, to become the front; while the original front, by a corresponding diminution, was transformed into the left flank, and the army as a whole was to face W. instead of S. The orders conveying to the British troops the news that their long retreat was definitely ended were issued during the afternoon of the 5th, although many of the battalions did not know when they left their billets on the morning of the 6th whether or not they were to march southwards to the Atlantic. As soon as the rank and file discovered that their route led northwards, roars of cheering burst forth with such enthusiasm as to leave a lasting impression on those who shared in that memorable day. The hesitation observable in the German advance was soon followed by an unmistakable retrograde movement. The British lost no time in seizing the heights on the Grand Morin S. of Coulommiers, from which German heavy guns had during the morning brought an effective fire to bear, and by evening the British advance guard had reached Villiers-sur-Morin and Crecy (III. Corps), Coulommiers (II. Corps) and Choisy (I. Corps). Save for some fighting early in the morning about Rozoy - an action brought on by the Germans to cover their retreat - the British were not heavily engaged, though a few prisoners and machine-guns were taken.

In the orders issued by Gen. Joffre on Sept. 4, the V. Army of Gen. Franchet d'Esperey had been ordered to close slightly to its left and to take up the general line Courtacon - EsternaySezanne, so as to be ready to attack in a northerly direction. Some progress had been made in accordance with these orders on the 5th. On Sept. 6 the mission of the V. Army was to attack, in the general direction of Montmirail, with its right wing thrown forward, an operation designed to coincide with the advance of the VI. Army on the Ourcq, and to aim at enclosing the whole of the I. and portion of the II. Army of the Germans. Gen. Franchet d'Esperey sent forward his army at dawn. It was disposed, from left to right, as follows: the XVIII. Corps, III. Corps, I. Corps, X. Corps, with the reserve divs. in second line. Immediately a violent battle developed all along the line, due to the fact that the Germans had also received orders to advance and thus precipitated an encounter. In the fighting which ensued the French showed themselves undoubted masters of the enemy. On the left the XVIII. Corps seized Courtacon during the day. It was assisted by Gen. Conneau's II. Cavalry Corps, which was operating on the left flank and maintaining touch with the British army, a task which it performed admirably, finally halting for the night on a line E. and W. through Choisy. In the centre, after a particularly fierce artillery preparation, the III. Corps seized the villages of Montceaux-les-Provins and Courgivaux. On the right the I. Corps gained possession of Chatillon-sur-Morin, which had defied their efforts for several hours, and after darkness had set in they continued their efforts, eventually clearing the Germans out of Esternay. From here the X. Corps carried on the line, with its right thrown well forward, and that flank gained touch with the 42nd and Moorish Divs. of the IX. Army at Villeneuve-lez-Charleville.

The fighting round Sezanne had been long and bitter. The Germans had placed many machine-guns in position, and they thoroughly searched the wooded ridges, from which the French attack was expected to develop, with artillery fire. The French guns replied and an artillery duel went on for some hours, until it seemed that the German guns had been silenced and that it was time for the French infantry to go forward. Against the green background the pantalons rouges of the attackers showed up like scarlet waves as they moved on with the bayonet, and with such a target the German machine-guns were able to do great execution. The French fell " like corn before the sickle," and to complete their discomfiture many were killed by the fire of their own artillery. The check to the French had, however, only been temporary, and after a day of brilliant fighting the front of the V. Army may be said to have been marked by the line Courtacon - Esternay - Villeneuve-lez-Charleville.

The whole French countryside between Paris and Verdun was now ablaze, five French and one British army contending with the five German armies which had set out to pivot on Thionville and roll up the Allied line. South, too, of the fortress of Verdun the fighting round the Grand Couronne de Nancy, though not actually forming part of the series of battles included in the title of the Marne, nevertheless had a direct bearing upon it. For the moment, however, the interest in the struggle is confined to the fighting on the western flank within the area roughly marked out by the towns Betz - Meaux - Cou lommiers-Montmirail-Chateau-Thierry. In this great pocket Gen. von Kluck's soldiers were fighting desperately to hold off the converging attack of their opponents; while, on the side of the Allies, the French VI. Army, the British army and the French V. Army were struggling to nip the German I. Army from the main body of the enemy.

The fighting on the Ourcq on Sept. 7 was, therefore, to be hard and bitter. Each of the opposing commanders had special reasons for vigorous attack. On the French side Gen. Maunoury had rather overestimated the success, reported to him, of the V. Army of Gen. Franchet d'Esperey, and was inclined, in consequence, to believe that the Germans might fight merely a delaying action on the Ourcq. As a matter of fact the exact contrary was the case. Gen. von Kluck clearly realized that not only his task of safeguarding the right of the whole German advance but even the preservation of his own army depended on hurling back the attack launched from the direction of Paris. By an order issued at 5:30 P.M. on the 6th the IV. Corps was withdrawn across the Marne and hurried on through the night to reinforce the new front. Thus on the morning of Sept. 7 the II. Corps, the IV. Reserve Corps (still minus a brigade left at Brussels) and the IV. Corps stood between the Therouane and the Gergogne (a tributary of the Ourcq), with their units intermingled, and covered on the N. by the 4th Cavalry Div. The original right flank had thus been strongly reinforced, but Gen. von Kluck felt that it was no time for half measures. Even at the cost of weakening himself elsewhere, even at the risk of creating a gap between his own and the II. Army, every man must be thrown upon the Ourcq. Merely to repulse the attack from Paris would not be sufficient; the French VI. Army must be defeated by an outflanking counter attack from the N., and accordingly the IX. and III. Corps were ordered to march early on the forenoon of the 7th in the direction of La Ferte-MilonCrouy. These corps had, only the night before, been lent to Gen. von Billow, but the II. Army commander had now perforce to send them off, though not without a protest. The effect of his action was that a gap, soon to yawn into 30 m., was opened between the I. and II. Armies, and into this gap the British army and the left of the French V. Army were rapidly moving. Gen. von Kluck now found himself committed to an isolated battle on the Ourcq, facing W. and with his left and rear exposed. Unless he could hold off Sir John French and Gen. Franchet d'Esperey sufficiently long to enable him to crush the French VI. Army and could then turn against the danger to his left and rear he was a beaten general. The task, however, was to prove too great. He had not the time necessary for the operation, and even if he had he had not the men for it.

So far as the actual fighting of the day is concerned the bulk of it fell upon the French VI. Army. Gen. Maunoury's left flank had been reinforced by Gen. Sordet's cavalry corps as well as by the 61st Reserve Div., which had been railed from Paris. At dawn the army was set in motion, and at first some progress was made, but gradually the weight of the reinforcements reaching the Germans began to tell. The II. and IV. Corps had now become available, and the various divisions had been thrown into the fight as they arrived, without regard to corps organization. Strong enemy columns debouched near Etavigny and Acy-en-Multien, and at the latter village the fighting was especially severe. As has so often happened on French battlefields the cemetery was the scene of desperate fighting, 500 dead being subsequently counted within an area of little more than 200 sq. yd. Around the farm of Nogeon, too - about half-way between Vinoy and Bouoilancy - the battle raged with particular fierceness, and the buildings changed hands several times throughout the day. Here a body of the French 298th Regt. fell to the last man, preferring death to surrender. Two companies of the same regiment after dark avenged the loss of their comrades by a desperate hand-to-hand attack, in which they captured a colour of the 38th Magdeburg Fusiliers decorated with the Iron Cross. After a day of hard fighting the French VI. Army had made some further progress, and its front ran generally from Chambry through Barcy, Marcilly, the high ground N.W. of Brunoy, Pusieux, Acy-enMultien to the hill W. of Etavigny. The moral of the French facing the Ourcq at the close of Sept. 7 was high, and Gen. Maunoury determined to outflank Gen. von Kluck's right wing early next day with the I. Cavalry Corps and the 6rst Div. As the German army commander was committed to a similar attempt to outflank the VI. Army's left the centre of gravity of the fighting in the western sector of the whole Marne battle was now unmistakably shifting to the neighbourhood of Betz.

The reinforcements hurried off to strengthen the German line upon the Ourcq had now left a comparatively small force to withstand the British. The task of holding back the army of Sir John French was now being carried out mainly by German cavalry, reinforced, as was the German custom, by Jager battalions. In Gen. Joffre's initial orders for the battle the direction assigned for the advance of the British army had been practically due E., but the course of the battle since its opening necessitated a change in the original instructions. The French generalissimo had apparently visualized either a continuation of the German advance S. and S.E., or - in the event of a suspension of that operation - a withdrawal of the German I. Army towards the E.; but Gen. von Kluck had on the contrary shown every intention of pushing westwards so as to beat back the French VI. Army. In these circumstances it was clear that a more northerly advance would bring the British quickly on Gen. von Kluck's communications, and the necessary change was decided upon by the two Allied commanders. Orders were consequently issued by Sir John French directing the march upon the Grand Morin river, which was to be passed with all possible speed upon the 7th. The British cavalry acted everywhere with great vigour, particularly on the right of the line where the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was operating beyond Dagny. At Moncel a spirited cavalry action took place, and a charge by a troop and a half of the 9th Lancers effectually dealt with a squadron of Guard Dragoons, the fate of the latter being sealed by dismounted-fire action of the 18th Hussars. Later a squadron of the 18th, holding a position dismounted, was charged by a German squadron, but by well-directed rifle fire the attackers were almost annihilated. A few passed through the firing-line but were accounted for by the horse-holders in rear. Thirty-two dead and wounded Germans were counted on the ground in front of the squadron, and of the 60 or 70 who charged not more than a dozen escaped. By evening the bulk of the German cavalry had fallen back to the Petit Morin, S.E. of La Fertesous-Jouarre, and the British position was roughly as follows: on the left was the III. Corps about La Haute Maison; the II. Corps, in the centre, was round Aulnoy; and on the right flank the I. Corps lay about Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin.

The French V. Army, no less than the British, felt the relaxation of pressure on its front caused by the withdrawal of German troops across the Marne, and the task of its left and centre was really one of pursuit, which was carried out in the general direction of Montmirail. The Germans held their ground stoutly, but finally the XVIII. and III. Corps were able to reach the general line La Ferte Gaucher-Trefols, which represented a. gain of some six miles of ground. Farther to the right the fighting had been considerably more severe, for about noon Gen. Franchet d'Es p erey had received word from Gen. Foch that the left of his (IX.) army was being violently attacked and was in sore need of assistance. The I. and X. Corps were, therefore,. directed to go to the assistance of Gen. Foch.

By the evening of Sept. 7 the original orders of Gen. Joffre " pour profiter de la situation aventuree de la I. Armee allemande "  were three days old, but that army was still in being and fighting tenaciously. Further, the geographical objectives alluded to by the French generalissimo were far from having been reached. The French VI. Army was to force the passage of the Ourcq and then to advance en direction generale de Chateau-Thierry; while the British army was to attack towards Montmirail. But by the evening of the 7th the passage of the Ourcq had still to be accomplished, and until that preliminary step had been taken Chateau-Thierry and Montmirail were mere names. A some what disquieting feature of the day, too, was the apparent intention of the Germans to make another effort to turn the Paris-Verdun line at Nancy and at Troyon, where a successful thrust would very seriously discount the French efforts on the Ourcq. Worse still, Maubeuge fell on the 7th, and the invaders not only gained another rail line of communication but had now another corps available for operations in the field. Against these drawbacks, however, could be set the fact that the gap between the German I. and II. Armies had considerably widened, and into it the British army and the left of the French V. Army were now advancing with speed.

During the night of the 7th-8th Gen. Gallieni took steps to reinforce Gen. Maunoury's army for the struggle which was expected after daybreak. The IV. Corps had been put at Gen. Gallieni's disposal by Gen. Joffre. Of its two divisions one - the 8th - had been acting as the liaison between the French VI. and the British armies, and by the evening of the 7th was in billets S. of Meaux. Orders were issued during the same evening for the remainder of the corps to proceed from Gagny to Gen. Maunoury's left wing, and the artillery and corps cavalry marched by road while the 7th Div. was transported to the neighbourhood of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, one brigade by rail and the other in taxicabs, of which Gen. Gal]ieni had collected over a thousand.

Sept. 8 was remarkable for the violence of the German attacks along the Ourcq. Gen. Maunoury's plan was to attack with his right centre and left, while the VII. Corps in the centre was ordered to hold its line at all costs. That corps was heavily attacked early in the afternoon, and such was the severity of the fighting that a week later the streets of Etrepilly and Trocy were still blocked with the bodies of the slain. To the N. the French outflanking movement was brought to a standstill, while even the superb gallantry of the Zouaves of the 45th Div. on the right centre failed to make any considerable impression on the enemy. During the afternoon Gen. Gallieni visited the commander of the VI. Army at his headquarters at St. Soupplets and found Gen. Maunoury a prey to a certain depression of spirit. The military governor of Paris reassured him somewhat by pointing out that the greater the resistance offered by the Germans on the Ourcq the less opposition would the British meet with in their advance. Nevertheless, Gen. Maunoury considered it advisable to make arrangements for a possible withdrawal on the following day, indicating as the limit of retirement the line Le Plessis-Belleville-St. Soupplets-Monthyon.

Meanwhile, inexorably and methodically the British army was discounting the efforts which Gen. von Kluck was making W. of the Ourcq. After considering alternatives of action by which assistance could be rendered to the VI. Army, Sir John French decided that the best method implied the speedy passage of the Petit Morin and Marne rivers, for after passing the latter the British army would be facing N.W. and thus almost directly threatening the line of retreat of the German I. Army. Orders were accordingly issued for a general attack along the line of the Petit Morin, to begin early on the 8th. At first the march was undisturbed, but on reaching the Petit Morin it was soon realized that the German cavalry would not yield without a struggle, especially as the steep valley covered with small but thick woods distinctly favoured the defence. Some severe fighting ensued, but by evening the British had made good the Petit Morin and were on the line La Noue-Viels Maisons, where they joined up with the II. Cavalry Corps of the French V. Army, the left corps of which extended through Marchais-enBrie to the southern outskirts of Montmirail.

Wednesday, Sept. g - a day of high winds and drenching rains - was to witness Gen. von Kluck's last effort on the Ourcq. His IX. Corps was now in position to initiate an enveloping movement against the left of the French VI. Army. Gen. Maunoury's troops were at the end of their strength, and a determined attack delivered by the Germans from Betz and Anthilly bore down the French resistance. The 8th Div. of the IV. Corps had been summoned from the Marne to reinforce the French left, but it could not be brought effectively into action, and as the Gist Res. and 7th Divs. and the VII. Corps failed to hold the Germans Nanteuil and Villers St. Genest were lost; but later, the 7th Div., in response to an urgent message from Gen. Maunoury about 6 P.M., faced about and struggled northwards towards Nanteuil, flanked by the I. Cavalry Corps. Gen. von Kluck, however, had shot his bolt. During the day the British army crossed the Marne, and on its right the XVIII. Corps of the French V. Army gained possession of Chateau-Thierry. Strangely enough the line of the Marne was not resolutely defended by the Germans, apparently through an error of judgment of the commander of a mixed detachment of the German IX. Corps, specially allotted to reinforce the cavalry already holding the crossings. Thus it came about that British columns advancing at dawn on the gth found that not only were the bridges to the W. of Chateau-Thierry intact but that the enemy had made no attempt to hold this part of the Marne, and reports brought in by airmen all through the afternoon made it clear that the retreat of the German I. Army had begun.

So far this narrative of the battle of the Marne has dealt exclusively with the western section of the struggle, which took place, generally speaking, in the area bounded E. and W. by meridians drawn through Chateau-Thierry and Paris respectively. The story of the fighting must now be transferred to the centre of the whole battle-front, to which N. and S. lines through Chateau-Thierry and Chalons-sur-Marne form boundaries sufficiently accurate for our purpose.

The German Supreme Headquarters had ordered the I. and II. Armies to form front facing Paris, the former between Oise and Marne and the latter between Marne and Seine, ChateauThierry to be the point of junction of the two armies. This order had been disregarded by Gen. von Kluck, who had persisted in his passage over the Marne and in maintaining his position in front of the II. Army. Gen. von Billow, however, endeavoured to comply with the orders of his superiors, and did make an effort to wheel his army to the right with the object of taking up the line Chateau-Thierry (exclusive)- Marigny-le-Grand. The net result of compliance with orders by one army commander and disregard of them by the other was that the right corps of the II. Army was squeezed out of the line by the left corps of the I. In other words, the two armies were acting upon different plans; overlapping had arisen; and the confusion inevitable in such circumstances began to be revealed upon the evening of Sept. 5.

This factor alone was bound to hamper the II. Army, and Gen. von Billow's task was not lightened by the subsequent conduct of his neighbour. When Gen. von Kluck renounced his plunge S.E. he did it with such thoroughness as to lead to the transfer of practically his whole strength to the Ourcq. On Sept. 7 he demanded back the III. and IX. Corps which he had lent Gen. von Billow but the day before. The withdrawal of these units to the Ourcq exposed Gen. von Billow's right flank; a great gap was thus opened between the II. and I. Armies; and Gen. von Kluck, who had on the 5th inconvenienced Gen. von Billow by his undue proximity, was now seriously embarrassing that commander by his aloofness.

This is, however, to anticipate matters somewhat. It is necessary to go back to the initial stages of the battle in the centre of the field, on Sept. 6. The substantial theatre of the struggle to be described was the area between the marshes of St. Gond and the Sezanne-Sommesous high road. The marshes had been largely reclaimed and canalized since they figured in Napoleon's great campaign exactly loo years earlier; but in rainy weather traffic is limited to the three or four good roads crossing them, the chief of these leading from Epernay to Sezanne and Fere Champenoise respectively. The former road is commanded by Mondement and the latter by the high ground of Mont Aoiit. Generally speaking, the task of the IX. Army of Gen. Foch for Sept. 6 was to support the advance of the V. Army with its left flank (which for this purpose had been pushed forward as far as Talus), while maintaining a watching attitude along the rest of its front. Gen. Foch, however, found himself quite unable to carry out even the moderate programme he had drawn up.

Gen. von Billow was endeavouring to wheel into position between Marne and Seine, and on his left the III. Army's orders were to push due south. As a result the French were attacked with considerable vigour all along the line; and so far from the 42nd and Moorish Divs. being able to gain ground on the left, they were forced to abandon Talus to the X. Corps of the German II. Army, and only managed to hold on to Villeneuve-lez-Charleville with some difficulty. The advanced guards of the IX. Corps fared no better against the left wing of the X. Corps and the Guard Corps of the II. Army, for they were driven from their line N. of the marshes and forced to fall back on the main body of the Corps, which, however, by holding the exits was able to maintain its position without difficulty. Farther to the E. the XI. Corps was violently assailed by the XII. Saxon Corps of the German III. Army, and had to swing back its left and take up a position with that flank in the woods S. of Ecuryle-Repos, while E. of Vatry the 9th Cavalry Div. was engaged throughout the day by Saxon cavalry. The close of the day's fighting found the French IX. Army on the line Villeneuve-lezCharleville - southern edge of the marshes - Lenharee, in touch with the Germans all along the line, except where the marshes separated the two fronts.

Although the right of the German II. Army was becoming exposed, Gen. von Billow on the 7th was still able to push on with his centre and left, that flank working in conjunction with the right of the III. Army. Gen. von Billow's left was formed by the Prussian Guard Corps, and, as the III. Army consisted entirely of Saxon troops, memories of the concerted action at St. Privat on Aug. 18 1870 fired the German soldiers to press the French IX. Army to the utmost of their powers. The latter had in consequence to endure a series of very heavy attacks throughout the day. The significance of these efforts was not, however, lost on Gen. Foch, who shrewdly remarked that the very fury of the German onslaught was tantamount to an admission that things could not be going well with them elsewhere on their line. His own orders had contemplated the continuance of the offensive of the day before with his left, and briefly summarized they ran as follows: The 42nd and Moorish Divs. were to preserve connexion with the X. Corps of the V. Army on their left and were to endeavour to renew the offensive from Villeneuve-lez-Charleville towards the north-west. The IX. Corps was to maintain its hold upon the southern edge of the marshes of St. Gond, but was to be ready to advance without delay if called upon. The XI. Corps was to hold the line to which it had been forced back the evening before: but, like the IX. Corps, it was to be ready to advance if required, in which case it would be called upon to move round the eastern edge of the marshes; a reserve division was to be left about Lenharee to protect the right flank. The 9th Cavalry Div. was to be generally S. of the Sommesous - Vitry-le-Francois railway and was to keep touch with the left of the IV. Army about Humbauville.

Early in the morning the Germans attacked all along the line, and E. of the marshes German heavy artillery of the XII. Corps of the III. Army came into action, to which the French replied with similar pieces. E. of the marshes the outlying villages of Morains and Aulnay, held by advanced units of the IX. Corps, were taken by the Germans, the capture of the villages striking at the junction of the French IX. and XI. Corps, while on the left the 42nd and Moroccan Divs. were hard put to it to stave off the weight of the attacks of the German X. Corps. Here the chateau of Mondement, a two-story mansion dating from the sixteenth century, was recognized by both sides as a feature of outstanding tactical importance. Headquarters of the Moroccan Div. were shelled out of the building early in the day, but towards evening a combined attack of the 42nd and Moroccan Divs., with the 77th Regt. of the IX. Corps, restored the situation. Owing to this effect and thanks, too, to the assistance afforded by the X. Corps of the V. Army against Gen. von Billow's exposed right, no ground was lost. So that, after a day of severe fighting, the Germans had made no impression on the French IX. Army, other than to deny it the possibility of making progress to the N. and W.

Before dawn on Sept. 8 from Mondement Hill the French observed enemy troops advancing to the attack. These, belonging to the X. and Guard Corps, were repulsed, and a counterattack which gained a considerable amount of ground was made by the 42nd and Moroccan Divs., aided again by the 77th Regt. of the IX. Corps. Owing, however, to the unfavourable situation developing on the right of the IX. Army it was impossible to exploit this advantage, and a withdrawal was ordered. For, although immediately to the right of this action the IX. Corps still held the line of the southern edge of the St. Gond marshes, beyond that a somewhat serious situation for the French developed during the day. Attacked by the left wing of the Guard Corps of the German II. Army, and by two corps of the III. Saxon Army, the French XI. Corps was driven back as far as the line Cannantre - Corroy - Gourgancon, a circumstance which involved the transfer of Gen. Foch's headquarters from Pleure right back to Plancy on the Aube. Behind the stream La Maurienne, which runs across the greater portion of the front it had now taken up, the XI. Corps re-formed, and, aided by a counter-attack made by one of the reserve divisions with the IX. Army, it was enabled to advance and regain some high ground N. of Oeuvy. The situation had, however, been distinctly disquieting, and to a chief possessed of less imperturbability than Gen. Foch it might have seemed the prelude of disaster. On the extreme right the 9th Cavalry Div. about Mailly had maintained its close connexion with the IV. Army, and had supported an attack made by it near Sompuis.

In spite of the setback to his right during the 8th Gen. Foch was able to review the situation without alarm. The news which came in during the evening as to the progress of the battle E. and W. of him was reassuring. He learnt that the VI. Army, in spite of violent German counter-attacks, was holding its own upon the Ourcq, that the V. Army was making steady progress N.W. of the marshes of St. Gond, and that on his right the III. and IV. Armies were gaining ground towards Vitry-le-Francois and Chalons. His orders, issued shortly before midnight, prescribed generally the offensive for the coming day. The X. Corps, from the V. Army, was now definitely under his orders, and this access of strength prompted him to withdraw the 42nd Div. as a general reserve.

Once more was Mondement the scene of bitter fighting. it was seized at daybreak by a sudden German attack, and some hours later Mont Aout also fell. Nevertheless, in spite of the disquieting events upon his left, Gen. Foch shortly after io A.M. directed the 42nd Div., which had now arrived on the line Linthes - Pleurs, to move farther to the right, where it was to take the offensive with the XI. Corps. The apparent audacity displayed in withdrawing the general reserve of his army from his shaken left to join in an attack from his right flank called forth paeans of praise from critics of the battle. Gen. Foch, however, realized that the danger to his left was more apparent than real. The V. Army, beyond that flank, had reached the line Marchaisen-Brie - Montmirail - right bank of the Petit Morin on the evening of the 8th, and with the great gap which now existed between the right of the German II. Army and Gen. von Kluck any movement of the former S. of Mondement was exceedingly unlikely. As a matter of fact Gen. von Billow's increasing uneasiness as to the state of affairs had reached fever heat over reports as to the forcing of the line of the Marne by British troops during the 9th. He came to the conclusion that retreat was inevitable for Gen. von Kluck, and that, in these circumstances, his own II. Army must fall back at once if it were to avoid envelopment on its right flank. With the object of gaining time to get his long trains safely back over the Marne, the offensive by his left and centre was carried out with vigour during the morning, the French right being driven back to Salon; but early in the afternoon the German II. Army and the right of the III. Army were in full retreat, strong rearguards being left facing the French. Gen. von Billow transferred his headquarters from Montmort to Epernay; and by evening, from Betz to beyond Fere Champenoise, the defeated German right and centre were falling back before the victorious Allies.

The operations of Gen. Foch's army in the centre of the battle of the Marne have been garnished with an embroidery of legend by which the real happenings in that portion of the field have been considerably obscured. He has been represented as being obsessed by an optimism so pronounced as to have led him to the issue of orders which, had they really been so framed, would have been unsoldierly bombast. The counter-attack which he conceived during the forenoon of the 9th has been written up as the decisive factor of the whole battle, " a wedge driven into the German centre " being the description of an operation which, when carried out eventually on Sept. ro, encountered nothing but the resistance of rearguards. And, for long, there persisted a thrilling narrative of the engulfment of thousands of Prussian Guards in the marshes of St. Gond. The operations of the Allies' left, though free from such distortions of truth, have by their dramatic decisiveness focussed upon themselves an immense amount of attention, particularly in England where the advance of the British over the Marne on Sept. 9 will rightly live in history as one of the most decisive achievements by British arms. Unfortunately, however, these results of the centre and left have tended to obscure the lesser known events upon the Allied right. The battle from Fere Champenoise to the Ourcq has somewhat diminished the lustre of the operations of the French armies from Vitry-le-Francois to Verdun. And yet in no quarter of the field was the fighting more severe. In no sector of the battle did the position of the Allied line present greater danger. Nowhere on the whole long front was the tenacity of the French III. and IV. Armies surpassed.

After the shipwreck of the high hopes on which they had entered France the German General Staff had yet one spar to cling to. While the IV. and V. Armies were to press southeastwards the VI. and VII. were to take the offensive against the line of the Moselle between Toul and Epinal, and these coordinated movements might yet bring off a great, if restricted, Sedan. The German idea was, therefore, to cut off Verdun on either side; the Crown Prince with his V. Army was to proceed round the entrenched camp by the W.; the IV. Army with its right passing through Vitry-le-Francois was to bear down across the flatlands of Champagne; on the other side the VI. and VII. Armies were to advance eastwards over the Moselle. Inside this great converging movement the I., II., III., and IV. Armies of the French might be herded together and destroyed. Had these four French armies been able to unite their efforts to a common end their position would have been less full of risk. Such, however, was not the case. The action of Gen. Sarrail's III. Army was to be coordinated rather with that of Gen. Maunoury on the Ourcq than with that of the French II. Army in front of Nancy. In the original orders for the battle of the Marne Gen. Sarrail was to strike westward against the Crown Prince's flank in a movement reciprocal to that by which Gen. Maunoury struck against von Kluck; and this movement, although it would assist in a double flanking movement against the whole German mass between Paris and Verdun, had the disadvantage that it ignored the danger to the III. Army's rear. Behind Gen. Sarrail was the Meuse, held only by a chain of semi-obsolete forts d'arret, and but a few miles farther E. was the great fortress of Metz, within which very large forces might be accumulating from all parts of Germany. The concealment afforded by a large fortress is apt to have a disconcerting effect upon an enemy operating in the vicinity. Paris had surprised the Germans by emitting a strong field army at the critical moment, and it was not impossible that Gen. Sarrail might find himself exposed to a similar danger.

Fortunately for the French the German Crown Prince based his advance upon a misconception. He considered that Verdun would be left to its fate, and in his orders of the 5th prescribed the advance of his army on the following day to the line RevignyBar le Duc. Gen. Sarrail, however, all through the battle kept hold of the fortress with his right; and, further, he arranged with the fortress commander for the cooperation of the mobile garrison with his army, with the result that the Crown Prince, far from being in a position to plunge due S., found himself corn pelled to face generally to the E., while his communications now ran roughly parallel to his front, a disadvantage which needs no comment.

When we come to the details of the struggle in this eastern sector of the battle it must be remembered that the French IV. Army had opposite to it the left of the enemy's III. and the whole of the IV. Army under the Duke of Wurttemberg. Each side had been ordered to attack, and fighting of a particularly severe nature ensued. On the eve of the battle the line of the French IV. Army had run generally from the vicinity of Sompuis on the left, S. of Vitry-le-Francois, to Sermaize upon the right, and when retreat set in on the German side the French IV. Army was practically on the same line as that from which it had started the battle. That it was able to maintain its position against the heavy attacks launched upon it was due to the tenacity of its units, and also to the fact that, on the 9th, it was reinforced and its left strengthened by the XXI. Corps from the I. Army on the extreme French right. When the battle opened the IV. Army was not very favourably placed for assuming the offensive, for, although it was in touch with the III. Army to the right, there was a wide gap between its left and the right of Gen. Foch's IX. Army at Lenharee, which was only imperfectly filled by the 9th Cavalry Div. This fact enabled the Germans to reinforce their own left, with the result that Sermaize was taken on the 7th, and for a time there was a serious risk that the right flank of the IV. Army might be rolled up.. Gen. Langle de Cary was compelled to call upon the III. Army for assistance. Throughout the 8th the IV. Army was overlapped on either flank, but eventually the arrival of the XXI. Corps from the Vosges restored the situation, and upon the 9th Gen. Langle de Cary was able to reinforce his left centre by two more divisions. The fighting had been hard and bitter, and even as late as nightfall on Sept. 9 there was no indication of the Allied victory now clearly revealed in the centre and west.

In Gen. Joffre's instructions of Sept. r the limit of the mouvement de recul behind the Seine implied the march of the French III. Army to the country N. of Bar-le-Duc, and on the following day it was thought that the III. Army might possibly have to fall back as far as Joinville. Gen. Sarrail was strongly opposed to the isolation of the fortress of Verdun, which would result from a complete obedience to the orders of the generalissimo, and took it upon himself to maintain his right in touch with the fortress while refusing his left, and thus bringing his front on to an alignment generally facing west. This attitude on the part of Gen. Sarrail fitted in admirably with the resolution of Gen. Joffre to suspend his retreat and to pass to the offensive. The commander of the III. Army, having refused to separate his right from Verdun, now resolved to issue a positive order to the fortress commander (Gen. Coutanceau) to cooperate with his garrison. The latter, although he might have stood upon his rights as regards the troops allotted for the defence of the place for which he was responsible, felt that his clear duty was to comply. He moved out the 72nd Reserve Div. S.W. of the fortress, and on Sept. 6 these troops attacked enemy trains and parks and threw them into considerable confusion.

The orders to Gen. Sarrail of Sept. 5 directed him to attack westwards, but reconnaissance having established the advance of strong enemy forces E. of the Argonne the sense of the order had to be reversed; for, to avoid exposing his own communications, Gen. Sarrail considered it advisable to attack in a northerly direction with the bulk of his army while maintaining the remainder on the defensive facing W. This led to some friction with French General Headquarters, whose appreciation of the situation led to what was tantamount to an order to assist the IV. Army even at the expense of leaving Verdun to its resources.. Gen. Sarrail was thus in a position of having either to act against his better judgment or to disobey formal orders; luckily the arrival of the XV. Corps - from the II. Army - enabled him to give satisfaction to Headquarters without having to quit his hold upon Verdun.

In the midst of the difficulties caused by severe fighting with the enemy and by the fettering orders of Headquarters Gen.

Sarrail was called upon to deal with a new peril. Early in the afternoon of the 8th a message was received saying: " Fort Troyon violently bombarded this morning by heavy guns of large calibre." The despatch closed with the ominous statement that the state of affairs was critical, and that 48 hours was all the commandant expected to be able to hold out. The situation of Gen. Sarrail was now exceedingly serious. Very violent attacks were in progress against his right and centre; his left was in danger of being rolled up; and now this new peril threatened his rear. Fort Troyon was a small work dating from 1879, of practically obsolete design, the armament of which consisted of four medium guns, twelve smaller, and a couple of mortars, while the garrison numbered some 350 of all ranks. The bombardment was to last for four days - from the 8th to the 12th - and was then succeeded by a thrust which created the wellknown St. Mihiel salient, destined to remain as a dent in the French line until it was flattened out by the Americans four years later. Here it is only necessary to say that the garrison of Fort Troyon put up a stout resistance, and that the fortifications, obsolete though they were, proved sufficient to keep the casualties of the defenders surprisingly low. On the 10th the place was relieved by the arrival of a French cavalry division from Toul; and although upon the following day the Germans renewed their attacks upon it these had lost most of their significance. From Verdun to Paris the five German armies were in full retreat in the centre, and on the right and on the left were manoeuvring to conform to the retirement. The great battle of the Marne had been fought and won.

So far in this narrative of the battle, beyond the mere mention of the retirement of the German right and centre, no reference has been made as to how, when and why the decision to break off the fight was arrived at. For long the matter was one of some perplexity, and rumours were circulated by the Germans that the Saxon III. Army, in the centre of the line, had failed, and by its failure had frustrated the efforts of the Prussians to the E. and W. Recent German literature has dispelled this unjust legend and has allowed the truth to be known. In the German army, so far back as 1870, liaison officers were a distinctive feature of the Higher Command. These were not mere messengers; they were expected to explain orders, and even, within limits, to give orders in the name of the chief of the General Staff. During the battle of the Marne Supreme Headquarters were over 100 m. in rear, and the slow working of the wireless apparatus brought it about that by the 8th von Moltke had completely lost his grip of the battle. In these circumstances a liaison officer - Lt.-Col. Hentsch - was directed to visit the V., IV., III., II. and I. Armies, and to bring back a clear idea of the situation. Should he find that a retrograde movement had already been initiated on the right wing he was instructed to issue such orders as would close the gap between the II. and I. Armies. During the 8th Lt.-Col. Hentsch visited headquarters of the V., IV., and III. Armies, and spent the night at headquarters of the II. Army. During the forenoon of the following day Gen. von Billow was considerably disconcerted by the passage of British columns over the Marne, and came to the conclusion that a retreat on the part of the I. Army was now inevitable and that his own II. Army must also fall back if its right flank were not to be enveloped. Lt.-Col. Hentsch agreed with the conclusion, and proceeded then by motor-car to the headquarters of the I. Army at Mareuil. Gen. von Kluck was absent at the time, and it was his chief-of-staff, Gen. von Kuhl, with whom the liaison officer conferred. His view of the whole general situation was unfavourable, and he gave it as his opinion that the I. Army must fall back. Gen. von Kuhl pointed out the difficulty of breaking off the fight, and also argued that there was still a fair prospect of defeating the French troops on the Ourcq, but in face of the absolutely full powers of Lt.-Col. Hentsch there was nothing to be done but to break off the action and order the withdrawal of the I. Army towards the north. Gen. von Billow had meanwhile telegraphed to the III. Army on his left notifying his retirement, and that army had no option but to comply with the general retrograde movement. Thus, by the late afternoon of the 9th, the whole right and right centre of the German army was falling back. Supreme Headquarters, in ignorance of the fact, had meanwhile prepared instructions for a continuance of the offensive, but events were too strong for them. It was found necessary to bow to the inevitable, and orders were issued during the evening of the 10th for the retreat of all five armies behind the line of the Aisne and Vesle. As to the necessity of renouncing the offensive at this stage opinions are, and will possibly ever remain, at variance. Historical unanimity will, however, probably be reached on two factors - the ineptitude of higher " staff work " on the German side and the serious drawback caused by the absence of a general reserve by which the situation might have been restored upon Sept. 9.

The conduct of Gen. von Kluck had not apparently satisfied Supreme Headquarters, and his army was placed " until further orders " under the command of Gen. von Billow. On the 11th some considerable anxiety was felt upon the German side over the possibility of a French thrust against the centre, and a modification was made to the orders issued the previous day, by which the line of the III., IV. and V. Armies was to be ThuizySuippes - St. Menehould and E. of the latter place. A new VII. Army was formed from the XV. Corps - from the original army of that number in Alsace - and the VII. Reserve Corps set free by the fall of Maubeuge. These units were due to reach the area St. Quentin - Sissy about midday on the 12th, and this army was, like the I., also placed under the orders of Gen. von Billow. The German right wing fell back in good order but in considerable haste, and on the 12th the I. Army was behind the Aisne on the line Attichy - Soissons - Vailly. The French VI. Army, following up through the forest of Compiegne, crossed the river on the following day, while farther E. of this sector an advanced guard of the British 4th Div. seized the bridge at Venizel and moved forward to the crest of the plateau beyond. On the following morning the battle of the Aisne opened for the British army, and the river line was attacked all along the British front. By nightfall all passages except that at Conde were secured and held, and during the hours of darkness all three corps had constructed bridges, the crossing being completed in the face of considerable opposition during Sept. 14.

The gap which had existed between the German I. and II. Armies during the battle of the Marne was still unclosed when the position behind the Aisne was taken up by the German right. Once again the persistent British columns scared Gen. von Billow; but, luckily for him, reinforcements were available, since the VII. Army was now coming to hand, and during the night of the 12th and 13th units of the VII. Reserve Corps were hurried down from the neighbourhood of St. Quentin to fill the gap, achieving their object by the narrowest possible margin of time. This reinforcement, which had such an appreciable effect upon the battle of the Aisne, deserves something more than casual mention. On Sept. 9 the VII. Reserve Corps, leaving a detachment at Maubeuge, was ordered N. against the English reinforcements supposed to be advancing from the Flanders coast against Brussels or Antwerp; later in the day a counter order came for it to march S. towards La Fere, as the situation on the Marne was more strained than even that in the north. At 10 A.M. on the 12th, when near Guise, further orders came for the corps to turn off towards Laon at once. The intelligence that arrived from Gen. von Billow was so alarming that Gen. von Zwehl, the corps commander, marched his divisions on all through the night, rested from about 7 to 10 A.M. and then pressed on again. Thus he managed to arrive on the Chemin des Dames by 2.30 P.M. (British time), and little more than an hour later the leading infantry brigade of the British I. Corps was near Moulins, a mile short of the top of the ridge.

The Allied centre did not experience much opposition in the advance, but on the right the German V. Army gave more trouble. As the pivot of the great German wheel-back the role of the Crown Prince was to mark time, and the duty was carried out with some skill. By the 14th he was on his assigned position. In the temporary deadlock now brought about by the occupation, by the Germans, of a defensive position, each side began the attempt of outflanking the other on the W., with the result that the German front by Sept. 16 was thus traced out: - the neighbourhood of Noyon, the plateaus S. of Vic-sur-Aisne and Soissons, the tableland of Laon, the heights N. and W. of Reims, Ville-sur-Tourbe (N. of), Varennes, to the Meuse near Forges Wood, N. of Verdun.

Mention has been made of German operations, after the battle of the Marne, S. of Verdun, and a brief narrative of them is now required. The brilliant defence made by the French III. Army about Verdun was followed a few days later by a mishap. Thenceforward, until the American offensive in 1918, there existed the " pocket of St. Mihiel," a salient jutting into the French position which affected the course of operations throughout the war in the Verdun - Epinal area.

Owing to the exhaustion of the corps of the French III. Army the pursuit of the German V. Army after the battle of the Marne was not pressed; the main body of the French III. Army halted abreast and W. of Verdun, while its VI. Corps and Gen. Durand's group (the 65th, 67th and 75th Res. Divs.) passed through Verdun and crossed to the right bank of the Meuse. On the 16th the VI. Corps was to move N. towards Mangiennes, while Gen. Durand's three divisions marched parallel and E. of it from Etain towards Spincourt. Thus Gen. Sarrail had divided his army into two parts, separated by the Meuse, and while the right of the III. Army was advancing northwards on a broad front E. of the Meuse by Mangiennes and Spincourt, three German corps, the XIV., Bavarian III. and V. Reserve were moving from W. and S.W. of Metz to attack westwards behind it, in the general direction Toul - St. Mihiel.

The defence of the Hauts-de-Meuse was at this time changing hands. The II. Army was in the process of entrainment on its way to the western flank to extend the battle-front E. of Amiens. The VIII. Corps, however, which had been transferred from the I. to the II. Army on Sept. 15, and had taken over the defence of part of the Hauts-de-Meuse, was at first left in position, but on the 19th it was ordered by the French Higher Command to entrain at once for St. Menehould, whence it was to be transported to join the VI. Army N. of Paris, thus creating a gap which Gen. Sarrail could not fill.

In the meantime, the three reserve divisions were sent off to hold the Hauts-de-Meuse on a broad front between Dieppe, E. of Verdun, and Vigneulles, N.E. of St. Mihiel. The three divisions were thus extended over a front of 20 m., with a wide gap of six miles between Grimaucourt and Tresauvoux. With the VI. Corps Gen. Sarrail intended to retake Etain, and did not appear to suspect the danger approaching the Hauts-deMeuse farther S.; behind the long screen of the reserve divisions along the Hauts-de-Meuse he had no mass of manoeuvre in reserve to meet the unexpected. The gap in the battle-front created by the withdrawal of the VIII. Corps from in front of St. Mihiel therefore remained unfilled.

The Bavarian III. Corps advancing westwards towards Vigneulles and St. Mihiel, N. of the XIV. Corps, therefore found the way practically open for it. On Sept. 20, at 8:30 A.M., Hattonchatel, Hattonville, and Vigneulles were bombarded, and at 5 P.M. the Bavarians entered Vigneulles. During the night Hattonchatel was taken without resistance being offered, and the French retired in disorder on St. Mihiel, abandoning the Hauts-de-Meuse to the Bavarian III. Corps, who were astonished at such an easy victory. The enemy by the morning of the 21st held the entire sector of the Hauts-de-Meuse between Combres and Heudicourt, a front of 12 miles.

On the 21st Gen. Sarrail issued orders for the recapture of the lost sector of the Ha.uts-de-Meuse, but was unable to stop the German offensive on the right bank of the Meuse from Vigneulles on St. Mihiel. He was, however, more successful on the left bank. On the 24th the 65th Res. Div. was brought down by rail from Verdun towards St. Mihiel. It had to detrain at Woimbey, and thence marched to Rupt on the St. Mihiel - Barle-Duc road. Here it was rejoined by the remnants of the 75th Div. from the right bank. These two divisions held up the German advance along the Bar-le-Duc road and forced it back on Chauvoncourt. The VI. Corps, with the 65th Div., was able to remain on the right bank of the Meuse, its front running obliquely from Maizey to St. Remy. It was, however, unable to cut the German communications between St. Mihiel and Vigneulles; and the situation established on Sept. 24 1914 remained unchanged for over three years. (F. E. W.*)