Mounted_Troops

"Mounted Troops (see 5.563; r8.939). - Under the term " Mounted Troops " is here included, in the modern text-book senses: (a) Cavalry, mounted on horses and able to fight either mounted or on foot; (b) Mounted rifles, whose characteristics and methods are the same as those of cavalry, except that they are not equipped for mounted combat; (c) Mounted infantry, denoting infantry carried on horses or camels, employing infantry formations when dismounted, and probably insufficiently trained to perform satisfactorily cavalry duties such as reconnaissance; and (d) Cyclists.

In recent years the trend of cavalry ideas has, as regards tactics, undergone very considerable change. In the South African War of1899-1902hardly any instances of shock action by cavalry were seen; and in the years immediately following it a large body of military opinion in England was in favour of relinquishing altogether the idea of charging home with the sword or lance. This opinion was strengthened by the events of the Russo-Japanese War. A little later it was realized that the absence of shock action in S. Africa was due not so much to the power of the rifle and machine-gun as to the peculiar tactics of the Boers, who seldom stood their ground to await the British attack; it was found that, while instances of successful cavalry charges were rare, there was no case in which a mounted attack was prevented by fire from reaching its objective. It was further seen that in Manchuria the nature of the country and the quality of the mounted troops engaged alike were inimical to successful cavalry action.

The pendulum of opinion now swung in the direction of shock action, and for a year or two the training of the British cavalry showed a distinct bias in favour of the arme blanche. From 1909 onwards, however, thanks to the influence of, amongst others, Sir John French, Sir Douglas Haig, and Maj.-Gen. Allenby, the correct balance was struck between fire and shock, and ideas were crystallized into definite, well-understood principles. As the result it may fairly be claimed that, when the World War broke out in 1914, no more highly trained body of troops existed in Europe than the British cavalry. The German cavalry gave the impression of having lost their confidence in the arnae blanche  without having become fully proficient in the tactics of the dismounted attack. The French and Austrian cavalry, on the other hand, probably still relied too much on the arnae blanche.  At the outbreak of the World War the theory of the employment of cavalry was governed by the following broad principles. (i) Before the battle, cavalry locate the enemy by reconnaissance, screen their own infantry from the enemy's observation, and protect them from interference while marching to the battlefield. (2) During the battle they are posted far out, protecting the flanks; act as a mobile reserve, ready to move quickly to fill a gap in the line or confirm a success; and occasionally intervene in the conflict by attacking the enemy on an unprotected flank. (3) After a successful battle they pursue the retreating enemy, effecting captures and preventing him from recovering himself, or, if they are unable to do these things, providing early information of his dispositions in the next line which he takes up. (4) After an unsuccessful battle they cover the retirement of the infantry, giving them time to recover their moral  and to reach the next position which they mean to hold.

In order to provide for the above duties cavalry were formed into three groups: - (r) Independent, for long-distance reconnaissance and for other missions in which cavalry might be employed independently of the rest of the army; (2) Protective,..  for the duty of screening the main infantry columns; (3) Corps  or Divisional, for minor reconnaissances, and for intercommunication and orderly duties inside the infantry coliimn,s.

These groups were intended to be elastic in their composition, and it was correctly foreseen that the requirements of different phases of the campaign or action would often necessitate one group being reinforced at the expense of another. While it was realized that infantry commanders must have some mounted men for their own immediate needs, it was a principle that the minimum number should be allotted to group (3), the bulk being kept as independent or protective cavalry. The reason underlying the division into the two last-named groups was the advisability of separating reconnaissance from protection.

It may be affirmed at once that the above subdivision of cavalry duties still held good in 1921, and that the separation of the duties of reconnaissance and protection is a principle which should underlie the employment of all cavalry bodies.

A reconnoitring detachment, having been asked certain questions, should be free to move in any direction in order to find the answers; moreover, touch with the enemy, once it has been established, should not be relinquished. Protection, on the other hand, entails the detachment regulating its movements to some extent by those of the force which it covers. It follows that, if one detachment is entrusted with a role which includes both these duties, the efficient performance of one or the other of them is likely to suffer.

Cavalry in the World War. - If the events of the World War in the various theatres are studied, and if it is remembered that the whole of the campaign in Flanders and northern France, as well as much of those in Russia and Italy, was really one huge battle with flanks non-existent, it will be found that cavalry were constantly called upon to fulfil each and all of the roles mentioned above. For instance, during the advance into Belgium before the battle of Mons, the British cavalry moved well in advance of the infantry. The latter were thus enabled to reach their battle positions unmolested, and without the extra fatigue of having to deploy for a fight; the cavalry meanwhile had numerous minor skirmishes with the German cavalry, who were fulfilling a similar role, but were unable to penetrate the British"screen.' The plans for the battle of Beersheba in 1917 and those for the final advance in Mesopotamia in 1918 were based very largely on the result of cavalry reconnaissance, in spite of the fact that air reconnaissance had by this time made great strides.

' It seems, indeed, probable that when von Kluck issued his orders for the battle of Mons he was very much in the dark as to the position of the British left flank.

As regards participation in the actual battle, at Mons and Le Cateau the bulk of the British cavalry were posted to the west of the infantry, where they were able to frustrate the German efforts at outflanking. After the fall of Beersheba too, while Sir Philip Chetwode's infantry were wheeling to their left in preparation for the next phase of the operations against the left of the main Turkish position, the mounted troops, placed several miles away to the right, were able to protect the flank of the wheel by defeating several determined counterattacks. Cavalry used in this way can provide ampler elbowroom for manoeuvre than less mobile troops because they can be sent with safety to greater distances.

Of the value of cavalry in battle as a mobile reserve many striking illustrations can be found in the stories of the first and second battles of Ypres and of the German offensive in 1918 on the Somme. On many occasions in these operations they relieved infantry who had been exhausted or practically annihilated by continual heavy fighting; on others, by counter-attacking or by filling a gap defensively, they reestablished the connexion between infantry formations which had drawn apart. In this respect it should be noted that, while the tactical disadvantages of a gap in the line are of course obvious, only those who have had actual war experience can realize the quite disproportionate moral effect on everyone, from the general to the private, of losing touch with the units or individuals on the right and left. Sir Douglas Haig, in his despatch dealing with the German offensive in 1918, writes as follows: " Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive." These words, it may be remarked, refer to a period when tanks were already present in France in fairly plentiful numbers.

It is well to remember that the value of a reserve depends chiefly upon its freshness, and that even where conditions of ground or traffic preclude cavalry, as will often be the case, from moving much faster than infantry, they will invariably arrive on the scene of action less tired. A good illustration of this occurred in the Somme battle of 1916, when two cavalry regiments were ordered to fill the gap between an infantry division which was fighting in Longueval and another which was being launched from reserve against High Wood. The infantry had to advance a few miles only, but the day was a hot one and the shelling heavy. On reaching High Wood they were so exhausted that all efforts to make them dig themselves in were unavailing. The cavalry, owing to the maze of trenches and wire, could not move even as fast as the infantry, but they dug themselves in with such vigour that by the following morning they were completely underground. Nor must it be forgotten that moral is largely a question of physical fatigue.

The most brilliant role which can be allotted to cavalry in battle is that of intervention on an unprotected flank, or on a flank so weakly protected that the cavalry find themselves in great superiority. In the war on the western front no examples occurred of this, for the simple reason that unprotected flanks of sufficient length to give mounted troops the scope they require did not exist. A possible exception is the German break-through in the spring of 1918, but by this time the bulk of the German cavalry had been dismounted. In the more open theatres of the war, however, such as Palestine and Mesopotamia, cavalry often intervened in the battle with very important results. At the action of El Mughar in Palestine in 1917 a yeomanry brigade charged successfully the flank of a position which was holding up an infantry division, and took upwards of a thousand prisoners. Ramadi, in Mesopotamia, in the same year provides an instance of an entirely unprotected flank which enabled the cavalry to place themselves directly across the enemy's only line of retreat. The Turks, after attempting to break out through the cavalry under cover of darkness, surrendered next morning, and a force of 3,500 was thus destroyed. Examples such as these, and several more like them could be given from the campaigns of Mesopotamia and Palestine, show that the value of cavalry on the battle-field can still be decisive, given the right conditions. These conditions are: (a) a theatre of war whose size, in relation to the numbers of troops engaged, admits of wide, open spaces; (b) an enemy who, by reason of inferior numbers, skill, or organization, cannot protect his flanks effectively.

There is no reason to suppose that such conditions will not be met with in the future, even in a European war, as often as those obtaining on the western front from 1914-8; and as regards a war outside Europe, they are typical of the campaigns which have been fought in the past, and which will assuredly be fought again. Still, it cannot be denied that, for the cavalry of Europe at any rate, the size of modern armies and the general use of entrenchments, especially barbed wire, have decreased the chances of distinction in battle, already much reduced by the greater power of missile weapons.

The best example of the part which can be played by cavalry after a successful battle is that of Gen. Allenby's victory in Palestine in 1918. The enemy's flank having been rolled up by means of an infantry attack in great strength near the coast, the Desert Mounted Corps, consisting of three divisions, passed through. After riding due north for about 35 m., mopping up prisoners as they went, they turned north-east over the mountains, where they were just in time to forestall a hostile infantry detachment which was being hurried forward to defend the pass, and debouched at dawn into the Plain of Esdraelon. By five o'clock in the evening of the day after the battle these divisions had marched 70 m. in 3 6 hours, and had placed themselves completely across the Turkish lines of communication. As a result 40,000 prisoners fell into their hands. The remnants of the Turkish army, retreating northwards, were pursued and overtaken. Damascus and Aleppo were successively occupied by the mounted troops, though not without fighting, and the Desert Mounted Troops took altogether 75,000 prisoners out of a total Turkish ration strength of about ioo,000. The division which took Aleppo marched Soo m. in five weeks.

Other instances of successful cavalry pursuits during the World War could be found from the campaigns in Russia and Mesopotamia, and that in Palestine in 1917. And, referring to the end of the war in France, Sir Douglas Haig wrote as follows in his final despatch: " On the morning of the Armistice two British cavalry divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line 10 m. in front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganized retreat would have been turned into a rout." The events of the war in all theatres show clearly enough that a retiring force can march more quickly than one which is advancing and that only a comparatively brief respite is required to enable a beaten force to recover itself. It follows that a force of superior mobility is essential if the fruits of victory are to be gathered and a long succession of pitched battles avoided.

As for pursuit, so also for retreat, the value of cavalry was proved many times in the Russian campaigns. But a good instance is provided by the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force from Mons in 1914. During every day of this operation the British cavalry interposed themselves between the main columns of the army and the pursuing Germans, and so saved the infantry many tiresome rearguard actions and much fatigue. But from the point of view of moral, the services rendered by the cavalry were perhaps even more important. Some idea will be gained of them if it is remembered, once again, that the horse soldier is almost invariably less tired, and consequently less prone to doubts and fears, than the foot soldier, and that he sees over every hedge while the infantryman has to peer through it. Even so, it is difficult for any but an eye-witness to realize the extent to which the infantryman relies on the protection afforded him by the cavalry, the anxiety with which he awaits news, and the relief with which he receives it from his mounted brother, riding past in the dark, on his way to billets.

## Future Organization

Before considering what influence modern inventions are likely to have on the future of mounted troops, it will be well to clear the ground by pointing out the advantages and disadvantages for war of cyclists as compared with horse soldiers. Their chief advantage is that every man can go into the firing line, whereas one horse soldier out of every four has to remain behind to hold the horses. On really good roads in good weather they can move more quickly than horses; and no supply column is required to feed bicycles. On the other hand, they are completely tied to roads, and if the men leave the roads to fight, they must eventually come back to the place where they left their bicycles, which cannot be brought up to them. Cavalry are preferable to cyclists for fighting purposes in all country except that which is so enclosed that horses also are almost confined to roads. And even then the roads must be specially good for cyclists to justify themselves. On the cobblestone roads which are so common in Flanders and northern France, and in other parts of Europe, the pace of cyclists is, in wet weather, reduced almost to that of a walking man. In fact there seems to be no country except Great Britain where they would advantageously take the place of horse soldiers for fighting purposes. For purposes of intercommunication, however, they are extremely valuable, and the attachment of cyclists to an infantry unit will save much expenditure of horseflesh in any country reasonably well provided with roads. That is to say, they can take the place of part of the divisional cavalry. As a rule they should not be attached to the larger cavalry formations. They will often have to move by a different route to that most suitable for cavalry, and, if marching in a column, discomfort results from the fact that their pace is much altered by gradients which are hardly perceived by horses; consequently the saving of horseflesh does not compensate for the extra trouble and complication of orders. But motor cyclists are of incalculable value with cavalry, and will be still more when a machine is produced which can move across country.

The modern invention which, more than anything else, limited the activities of cavalry in the World War was barbed wire. It is doubtful whether this will be the case in the future. Barbed-wire entanglements are an accompaniment of position warfare; it takes much time and much man-power to erect them and this must always be the case except in the unlikely event of some invention arriving which will enable the soldier to produce barbed wire much in the way that the conjurer emits yards of coloured paper from his mouth. Besides, in view of the introduction of the tank and the development of the wire-cutting technique of artillery it is questionable whether barbed wire will ever again play the part which it fulfilled in 1914-17.

The developments most likely to influence the future of the mounted arm are: (r) the tank; (2) the cross-country tractor; (3) the aeroplane; (4) gas.

The tank is thought by some to be likely before long to oust cavalry entirely from warfare, and the views of these persons, though they may be extremists, are entitled to very respectful consideration. They claim, and claim justly, that the evolution of the tank has made very great strides since the signing of the Armistice; and they assert that it will advance nearly as quickly in the future, a statement which is more open to argument. Experimenting with a new arm is a costly process, and, besides, the tank is not a vehicle which can be easily adapted for civil use in times of peace. The paramount question of expense therefore, coupled with the absence of the stimulus of actual or impending war, is likely to slow down the development of tanks, as well as the provision of them in large numbers.

The latest type of tank can, it is understood, go as fast and as far as cavalry in all but very unfavourable country; but it may be a number of years before a machine is produced which is capable of crossing swamps, thick woods, or rocky mountains, and which is thoroughly satisfactory in a tropical climate. It is true that obstacles of this kind affect cavalry also, but tracks invariably exist by which they can surmount them, though they may have to go in single file at a foot pace. And it would be specially dangerous for the British army entirely to replace cavalry by tanks, because conditions unfavourable to tanks are precisely those with which it has most often to contend.

  


Nor would it be safe to rely upon the vulnerability of the tank remaining as low as at present. The history of military invention shows us that the missile and the protection against it alternately obtain the mastery. At present, so far as the tank is concerned, the latter is in the ascendent, but the study of anti-tank methods has hardly been begun. A metal machine, which is as conspicuous as the tank, presents certain very weak points of attack to modern science, with electricity, magnetism, and automatic ranging at its command. It may confidently be asserted that in the future anti-tank methods will develop more quickly than the tank itself; but it must also be pointed out that they have much leeway to make up.

Apart from the above question of development the tank possesses an inherent disadvantage in that the force which it represents is very highly concentrated. Tanks will not be able to hold positions even if they take them. For at night or in fog an enemy, if he chooses to attack in great superiority, will get through any line which is not held continuously by men stationed almost at arm's length from one another. The essence of success, for this reason, lies in the concentration of superior man-power at the decisive point; and in the future, as in the past, the role of all arms other than infantry and cavalry will be the subsidiary one of facilitating that operation. In the actual attack, too, a lucky shot, putting a tank out of action, destroys a much larger proportion of the force than would the same shot striking the equivalent body of cavalry, which would be dispersed. This disadvantage of over-concentration, aggravated as it is by the conspicuous character of the tank, will not disappear until a machine is produced which provides complete protection for single men, and so allows of dispersion; and this is an event which is very far distant.

Nevertheless, where an attack on trenches is concerned, and especially on those protected by wire, the tank is immeasurably superior to cavalry. In war it will often fall to the lot of cavalry formations to make such an attack, and it is here that tanks may well replace a part of the cavalry, the remainder being employed in assailing the weaker parts of the enemy's front, in holding the position when taken, and in rounding up fugitives, for which again dispersion is necessary. In the World War armoured cars were often used with success for conveying special officers from place to place under fire, and for earlymorning reconnaissance, when it was desired simply to locate an enemy with whom touch had been temporarily lost. In the next war fast tanks will replace the armoured car for these purposes. But for the more detailed reconnaissance which usually follows, armoured cars, and tanks also, are unsuitable, by reason of their vulnerability when stationary and the limited range of vision which is obtainable from inside them. In the future then, tanks will not usurp the functions of mounted troops, but on the contrary will widen their scope by relieving them from the necessity of attacking, or of waiting for infantry to attack, organized positions. A force of tanks, fully as mobile in every respect as the horse, will be attached to all higher cavalry formations.

The influence of the second new development, the crosscountry tractor, will be wholly in favour of mounted troops. In the past one of the chief obstacles to the employment of cavalry has been the difficulty of supplying them, and the length of road space which the subsidiaries, artillery, engineers, and rearward services, take up. This probably is one of the reasons for the German cavalry showing up so little during the retreat from Mons, and for their not being employed at all to confirm the success gained in March 1918, when, according to Sir Douglas Haig, " their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task." Cross-country tractors, independent of roads, carrying supplies of all sorts, and perhaps dragging the guns, will greatly enlarge the radius of action.

Of all novelties in warlike organization, the aeroplane is the most serious rival to cavalry. It has already taken over to a great extent the duties of reconnaissance which were formerly performed almost exclusively by mounted troops. The service of discovering the direction of the enemy's principal concentra tions, whether by road or by rail, and of reporting upon his entrenchments, gun positions, and larger activities generally, is now carried out from the air. This was formerly the province of the independent cavalry, which was consequently made as strong as possible. Now, owing to the advent of the aeroplane, the proportion of cavalry allotted to independent work will be relatively smaller, except in the case of a pursuit, and the bulk of the horse soldiers will be employed on missions which are protective in character. It must not be supposed, however, that the service of reconnaissance can be carried out entirely from the air. It is difficult for aeroplanes to observe lesser details or to distinguish between friend and foe; for, if they fly so high as to be invulnerable from the ground, they can distinguish nothing but heavy columns or clearly marked entrenchments and tracks; at medium heights they were, even at the close of the late war, fairly vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons, which are likely to improve in efficiency in the future; and at low altitudes again the very speed which protects them from antiaircraft fire militates also against accurate observation. Therefore, for the service of reconnaissance, cavalry will still be required to supplement aircraft reports; to provide, especially in open warfare where clearly marked trenches do not exist, detailed information as to the enemy's dispositions; to secure identifications by the capture of prisoners; and, above all, to replace the aeroplane under conditions of ground or climate which are unfavourable to air reconnaissance. In this connexion it may be mentioned that, during stationary warfare in the summer of 1918 in the Jordan valley, the very efficient Air Force units attached to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force were found to be of comparatively little value for purposes of tactical reconnaissance. The ground, precipitous, rocky, and very complicated, cast deep shadows in every direction; and in the middle of the day atmospheric conditions over the deep trough of the valley made flying almost prohibitively dangerous.

A matter for much more serious consideration by cavalrymen is the question of attack from the air. Towards the end of the war in France it became clear that troops whose location is not completely hidden are liable to be bombed at any time by day or by night, and, further, that even a superior air force is powerless to prevent such attacks. Much can of course be done by attacking the enemy's aerodromes, but the great radius of action of aircraft increases so much the value of the initiative that it is hopeless to expect, however great the superiority, to get command of the air in the sense that it can be obtained by land or sea. And it is next to impossible to conceal the presence of a large number of horses. Led horses will, of course, be specially vulnerable. Given great superiority in aircraft, it may be feasible to provide protection by having some machines continually overhead. By day this might prove adequate, though it would entail a very great strain on the resources of the Air Force. By night it would be of little value. The true defence against aircraft, other than that of carrying the war into the enemy's country and attacking his aerodromes, is from the ground; and it must be admitted that, against an enemy with an efficient and enterprising air force, the existence in war of mounted troops will become precarious unless a great advance is made in the science of anti-aircraft defence from the ground. They must be prepared, in any case, to deliver their blow from widely separated formations, instead of massing for attack. Means of intercommunication must therefore be very specially studied and developed. It should be noted that, in the case of tanks also, the difficulty of concealment from the air will be great if they are employed in large numbers, but here it may be possible to devise some sort of portable and easily erected covering, which will provide at the same time camouflage and overhead protection. Gas attacks will be particularly dangerous to mounted troops because, though horses are less affected by gas than human beings, it is very much harder, if not impossible, to devise for them an efficient protection against it. However, it is doubtful whether gas will ever become an important factor in mobile warfare; and mounted troops can move comparatively quickly out of a gas area.

The division of mounted troops into three groups - independent, protective, and corps or divisional - has already been explained. The corps or divisional group will consist, in every suitable country, partly of cyclists and partly of mounted men; it will have attached to it a few motor-cyclists and a few light and very fast tanks. These latter would correspond to the present-day armoured car but would be able to move off the roads. They would be used principally for what may be called first reconnaissance purposes, to save horseflesh. Owing to the advent of the aeroplane, the independent group will be smaller, during most of the stages of a war, than formerly was thought likely, but mobile land forces will still be required for detailed reconnaissances and other independent missions.

The composition of the independent and protective groups will be governed by the same principles, since their duties are interchangeable at any time. For both groups, a highly mobile mixed force is required, the ingredients of which will vary in their proportion to one another according to the characteristics of the enemy, the nature of the theatre of war, and the climate. In the different echelons of the ammunition, supply, and medical services the replacement should be aimed at of all horse transport by cross-country mechanical tractors, which might also carry drinking-water for men, if not for horses; the heavier guns too might be drawn by mechanical means. To a division of cavalry at least two squadrons of aeroplanes should be allotted, one for protection against hostile aircraft, and one for coOperating in an attack and for carrying out local reconnaissances required by the cavalry commander for his own information. In certain conditions the use of aeroplanes for supply is most desirable, but machines need not normally be attached to cavalry for this purpose. For intercommunication a liberal supply is needed of motor-cycles, capable if possible of moving across country. Light and fast tanks will be required, in small numbers only, for the reconnaissance purposes already indicated in the case of the corps or divisional mounted troops. Tanks, possessing heavier armour and ordnance - but at least as mobile as the cavalry, will break down lanes through the enemy's wire entanglements and trenches, will increase his disorganization and render him ripe for a cavalry attack, and will crush his resistance where he is still holding out. In a word, where cavalry formerly had to wait for the infantry to come up and provide weight for an attack, the cooperation of tanks will now enable them to press forward at once. Though it is extremely dangerous to dogmatize regarding numbers, the proportion of tanks to cavalry should, in a civilized country against a well-organized enemy, perhaps be as much as two to a squadron, or 54 in a division of nine regiments.

In every case the backbone of the mobile force will still consist of horse soldiers, because they alone of mobile troops can provide the dispersion which is necessary to hold a position or to carry out certain other operations of war, such as the policing of a country in insurrection, the pursuit of an enemy, or the hand-to-hand conflict which is the ultimate object of all battles; and because also, in certain conditions of climate or ground, they alone will retain their mobility. For this latter reason also, part of the artillery should be horse-drawn.

## Future Tactics and Training

Before the World War the principles which have already been enunciated held good in all European armies regarding the employment of mounted troops. It was therefore thought probable that in most cases they would come into conflict with, and have to beat, the hostile mounted troops, before being in a position to fulfil their role. Further, because both sides would be anxious to waste as little time as possible, it was considered likely that this first conflict between the opposing cavalries would, at least as often as not, take the form of a mounted collision. Neither of these conclusions was justified by the events in the western theatre, in Palestine or in. Mesopotamia. The Turkish mounted troops were few in number and despicable in efficiency; the Germans in France and Belgium failed to make much use of their cavalry even during the retreat from Mons. Consequently, so far at least as these three campaigns are concerned, conflicts between mounted troops were somewhat rare. And even when they did occur no mounted collision took place, except in a few instances when very small numbers were engaged. It is thought that, in the future also, mounted collisions will be uncommon, and for the following reasons. Every battle, whatever arm is taking part, resolves itself into a series of minor engagements, in each of which one side is on the offensive and the other on the defensive. It never happens, in these subsidiary fights, that both sides are so confident of victory as to attack simultaneously. Now, in the case of mounted troops, the side which for the moment feels itself to be inferior will of course take to the rifle. It follows then that a mounted collision will not take place unless the inferior side has no time to dismount, that is to say, unless it is completely surprised. And, even if it has neglected to take any precautions itself, it will probably get warning of the impending charge from the protective detachments necessarily thrown out by the other side. In recent years of peace and war the writer knows of only one case of a mounted collision between bodies larger than a squadron which had any semblance of reality. This was on manoeuvres in Berkshire in 1907, when two cavalry brigades met. On this occasion, for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter but which would not arise in war, both sides had almost entirely neglected to protect themselves. Patrols, on the other hand, coming suddenly round corners or over a rise of ground, have often met unexpectedly, and, just as in the case of dismounted patrols at night in No Man's Land, the ground has then remained in the possession of the side which has most quickly made up its mind to charge with the arnae blanche. While, therefore, horse soldiers will often meet in war, collisions on a large scale in which both sides remain mounted will be seldom seen; but single troops or smaller patrols will often succeed best by immediately riding down on the enemy, and will thereby establish a moral ascendency which will be of the utmost value in the subsequent operations.

In the training of cavalry in the past too much attention has been paid to the mounted collision and too little to the mounted attack of infantry or dismounted cavalry. It has been thought apparently that the latter form of attack would be comparatively rare, and that the machine-gun and quick-firing rifle, reinforced by trenches and wire, would nearly always compel the attacker to take to the rifle himself. To take this view is to assume that cavalry will never meet an enemy who is hopelessly inferior in numbers or spirit, or who has run short of ammunition; to suppose that an army will on all occasions have sufficient time, energy and material to dig trenches and erect obstacles; and to ignore the moral effect of a cavalry charge on both the mounted attacker and the dismounted defender. The events of the World War have shown clearly the fallacy of such ideas. At Cerizay, in the retreat from Mons, the British 5th Cavalry Brigade charged some dismounted cavalry who were acting as vanguard to a force of all arms. The advance of this force was stopped for several hours and upwards of 300 of the enemy were killed, wounded or captured, the British casualties being about 40. When the Germans retired from Peronne in the spring of 1917, three regiments of the British 5th Cavalry Div. galloped simultaneously through the villages of Villers Faucon, Guyencourt and Saulcourt and in a few moments had captured them at a negligible cost of life, the hostile rear-guard fleeing on the first appearance of the cavalry. Reference has already been made to the action of El Mughar in Palestine in 1917, in which 1,000 prisoners were taken by the 6th Mounted Brigade at a cost to themselves of under one hundred. In the same theatre of war in 1918 there were numerous successful charges. For instance, two weak squadrons of the 2nd Indian Lancers met a Turkish battalion at Megiddo, killed 46 with the lance and captured 470; near the Jordan two squadrons of the 29th Indian Lancers secured Boo prisoners, with about 30 machineguns, in one charge; north of Damascus the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade struck a retiring column in flank after galloping six miles, and captured a divisional commander and 1,500 men. In these campaigns, which resulted in the capture of Jerusalem and in the expulsion of the Turks from Syria, the successes of the cavalry were in fact most of them gained by mounted attacks against a dismounted enemy. Dismounted attacks usually either failed or took so long to organize and carry through that the mobility of the force was to a very large extent nullified. The advantage of a mounted attack is so great from the point of view of a quick decision that it would be justified even if it were more expensive in life than a dismounted attack. But such is not the case. The fact is that for attack cavalry are useless, either mounted or dismounted, unless the enemy is very much inferior or demoralized, and that wherever a dismounted attack will succeed, a mounted attack will also get home much more quickly and at smaller cost. The only exception to this is in the case of ground which is impassable for horses but passable for men on foot. The speed of the mounted charge more than compensates for the size of the target which it presents; but its comparatively low vulnerability, given ground in any way suitable, is due not so much to this fact as to considerations of moral. By the exhilaration of the gallop, and the instinctive feeling of superiority of the mounted man over the man on his feet, the attacker is steeled in his determination to come to close quarters. The defender, on the other hand, already conscious of an inferiority in numbers or moral, or both, is impressed by the novel sight of several waves of horsemen galloping towards him well opened out, and offering no very satisfactory target. He exaggerates the pace at which they are approaching him and opens fire too soon. At the very moment when they are coming close enough to be really vulnerable, perturbed by the small amount of impression which he has hitherto made on them, he becomes flustered, fails to take deliberate aim, and even forgets to alter his sights. Thus it happens that a mounted charge often achieves the apparently impossible, by which means the most decisive successes in war have always been won.

Shock action therefore is by no means a thing of the past, and mounted troops must carry some arm which they can use while still on their horses. The only sound exception to this rule is in the case of non-regular troops, for the training of whom in mounted action there has been insufficient time. In other words, mounted infantry or mounted rifles should be looked upon as imperfectly developed cavalry, to be evolved into the fully trained article as soon as time allows of it. Now, in the hands of an expert, the most efficient arm for mounted use is undoubtedly the pistol; but in the hands of an insufficiently trained man it is nearly as dangerous to friend as to foe; and the time necessary to produce an expert, or even a safe, shot with a pistol from the back of a horse is such as to be prohibitive, even for regular troops. There remains the shock weapon or acme blanche, of which the three possible forms are the sword, the lance, and the short lance or hogspear. The sword is the least efficient against a dismounted enemy, but its use is more easily taught than that of the lance. The lance, both materially and morally, has more effect than the other two, but is very conspicuous and heavier. The hogspear is nearly as effective against a dismounted enemy as the ordinary lance, is easily carried, and its use soon learnt. Certain difficulties exist, however, in connexion with withdrawing it after the thrust. If these could be got over it would be the best weapon of the three.

The principles of shock action are as follows: (r) In all cases the maximum amount of fire support should be given by artillery and automatic weapons. This fire, which should take the form of a sudden burst of extreme intensity, must be continued up to the last possible moment before the collision, and should therefore usually be delivered from a direction different to that of the charge. (2) Some automatic weapons must follow close behind the charge, to pursue by fire and consolidate the ground gained. (3) Since disorganization is quite inevitable as the result of a charge, a reserve must be kept in hand. (4) In the attack of a mounted enemy, weight is the chief consideration. The charge should therefore be delivered without a moment's hesitation, at full speed, in serried ranks, and, if it can be done without delay, down hill. (5) In the attack of a dismounted enemy, moral effect and avoidance of formations vulnerable to fire must be aimed at. Now the sight of a number of successive lines approaching him impresses the dismounted man more than speed or mere numbers on a broad front. The charge should therefore be delivered in depth, well opened out, and not necessarily at a very great pace. (6) Mounted men are particularly vulnerable to enfilade or oblique fire. Consequently, while depth is the more important consideration, the whole of the enemy's front should be attacked, or, if that is not possible, the heads of the defenders on the part not attacked must be kept down by supporting fire from artillery and machine-guns.

Though a mounted is distinctly preferable to a dismounted attack, it will often happen that the approach to the enemy lies over ground which is impracticable to horses, or that he is sheltering behind an impassable obstacle. Recourse must then be had to the rifle. The typical cavalry dismounted attack consists in utilizing the mobility of the horse to gain a position on the enemy's flank whence he can be devastated by fire. Surprise plays a very important part in such an operation. The cavalry man, moving rapidly, can more easily achieve surprise than the foot soldier; moreover, he can, if his attack fails, break off and try elsewhere, an advantage which is denied to the infantry man, with his more limited range of action. The necessity of keeping the enemy engaged frontally while at the same time turning his flank usually entails a wide extension of the force; the maximum number of rifles is put in the firing line from the outset, and small reserves only are retained. The advance is made mounted up to the last possible moment, and the led horses are kept well forward with a view to a further outflanking movement or a pursuit. The immediate objective of the operation is a fire position. For a purpose such as blocking the retreat of an enemy by bringing fire to bear on a defile these tactics are eminently suitable; but it is doubtful whether they will often be successful in other situations. In modern warfare flanks are hard to find and are seldom left unprotected; the operation therefore usually becomes a frontal attack. Indirect artillery fire and aeroplane observation have greatly increased the vulnerability of led horses, and in practice it usually takes cold steel, or the threat of it, to compel the retreat or surrender of the enemy. For the attackers to succeed mounted, considerable superiority is necessary; for a dismounted attack still greater ascendency is required.

In the World War cavalry were often unable to turn the enemy's flank and found themselves committed to a frontal attack dismounted. It was clear that such a situation demanded the assumption for the moment of infantry tactics. Led horses had to be left some way behind; dispositions had to be made in depth with adequate supports and reserves; artillery and machine-gun bombardments had to be arranged for and the attack driven home with the object, not of gaining a fire position only, but of assaulting the enemy. In the future tanks will, when they are available, free the cavalry from carrying out this kind of operation, for which the latter are not well suited by reason of their small fighting strength when dismounted. Still, tanks may not always be present or able to act, and cavalry must know how to attack dismounted in depth.

This kind of attack is of course valueless without the bayonet, which is also required for use defensively in trenches, and for night attacks dismounted) Cavalry may often be called upon in the future for such tasks. It would not seem to be beyond the limits of human ingenuity to devise a short lance, made in two pieces, which could also be fixed to the rifle as a bayonet.

The tactics of cavalry in defence consist in making full use of their mobility to compensate for their weakness in fire strength. Their mobility gives them over infantry the following advantages: (r) They can counter-attack more rapidly, therefore with more chance of effecting surprise; (2) they can move more quickly to reinforce threatened portions of the line; (3) they can retire more easily to a second position. It follows that they can be pushed out to a greater distance, and can hold a longer front than the equivalent number of infantry. The value of 1 An example of the latter is the successful counter-attack made by the British 12th Lancers, in company with two infantry battalions, at Wytschaete during the first battle of Ypres.

  


this is most apparent when it is remembered that the vulnerable parts of every force are its flanks. The mobility of cavalry is of course best brought into play in a moving defensive, that is to say, in a rear-guard or flank-guard action. The addition in the middle of the war of 12 automatic rifles to a regiment has greatly increased the fire-power of the arm, but it is to be hoped that in the future some weapon will be evolved which will be less susceptible to inaccuracies and stoppages than the Hotchkiss. It is a waste to use cavalry in a continuous defensive line if other troops are available. The proper dispositions for a cavalry defence are: (I) a chain of localities, with gaps between them, held principally by automatic weapons; (2) reconnaissances far out to the front and flanks, to give ample warning of hostile approach; (3) a large proportion of the force in mobile reserve; (4) careful arrangements for withdrawal to a second position if it should become necessary. But, above all, cavalrymen must not be afraid of a very extended line, relying upon greater mobility and moral superiority to compensate for numerical weakness. The soundness of this doctrine needs no more proof than that furnished by the operations of the British cavalry corps in the first battle of Ypres.

The principles governing the conduct of a reconnoitring detachment will appear simple if it is remembered that the information required is, in each locality, ultimately obtained by one pair of eyes or one pair of ears. The role of the rest of the detachment is that of a conveyance, to enable that pair of eyes or ears to arrive at a place whence it can see or hear, and to allow of the news being sent quickly back to the commander.

A reconnoitring detachment, then, fights only in order to arrive at its destination or to keep a road open for messages going back. Its strength is regulated by the amount of opposition which is anticipated, and by the number of messengers which will be required. Sometimes it will act by stealth, when its strength will be reduced to a minimum. More often, however, even if it may be possible to get forward without opposition, the difficulty of maintaining a channel of communication will enforce a fighting role on a reconnaissance; and, as the result of recent experience, cavalry opinion has veered very decidedly towards strong detachments, not less than a troop, and often as much as a squadron or more. It should here be mentioned that since the commander of the force alone knows how much importance he attaches to obtaining information, he, and not a subordinate, should decide upon the strength of a reconnoitring detachment. In principle, the order " Send out a patrol" should always be followed by a statement of the strength, and this should be insisted upon in all tactical exercises.

The advance of a reconnoitring detachment, like that of all other cavalry bodies of every size, is conducted on the principle of successive objectives, or bounds. This principle, which seemed before the war to appertain exclusively to cavalry, has now been adopted by infantry also; but, on account of the difficulty of maintaining control with fast-moving troops, it is particularly important that it should be thoroughly well understood by cavalry. The idea underlying the principle is that of getting as quickly as possible through specially dangerous areas. A series of objectives is chosen, the occupation of which by the enemy might cause inconvenience; such objectives may be a position covering a defile, a village, a cross-road in enclosed country, a simple eminence giving a good field of view, or some other feature of tactical importance. The distance between them varies according to the size of the force; for instance, a squadron acting as vanguard would be given objectives intermediate to those thought necessary for the brigade following as main body. The main body does not leave one objective till the advanced guard has reached the next; the advanced guard does not move on till the main body is close up to it, but meanwhile prepares the advance to its next objective by sending forward reconnnaissances. The movement resembles in fact that of a caterpillar. This principle has very great advantages, though it tends to some extent to retard movement.. In addition to providing security for the main body, it gives to the commander of the advanced guard a definite tactical feature for which to fight should he meet the enemy unexpectedly, and so helps him to make up a plan. Also, in the case of two parallel moving bodies, it ensures the heads keeping more or less level with one another.

The commander of a reconnoitring detachment is given his orders in the form of instructions, the framing of which is an important matter. Once despatched, he will have to act wholly on his own initiative; it will not be possible to overtake him to give him supplementary instructions, and he will often be faced with situations entirely unforeseen. He must therefore be given full information respecting the situation at the moment and the intentions of the commander. It is a truism, but one which is often overlooked, that, in order to get definite answers, one must ask definite questions. Instructions such as " to make good " a certain locality, " to work round," or " to clear up the situation " will result in undecided action and vague information. If negative information is required, the places from which or times at which it is to be sent in should be stated. The reconnaissance commander must know how long he is likely to have to stay out and how far he is to go, whether he is or is not to remain in observation when the enemy is met with, and what he is to do in the event of his reaching his farthest objective without meeting the enemy. These two latter points particularly are often omitted.

Not only reconnaissances, but all other cavalry detachments also, go out to greater distances and are left more to their own resources than is the case in the infantry. For them also, therefore, clear and far-seeing orders are essential if they are to perform their task satisfactorily. And besides this there are certain other matters of staff work which require special attention in cavalry formations. For instance, arrangements for even a simple march have to be particularly carefully thought out by reason of the fact that the mounted men can move slightly faster than the light transport of the formation, and very much faster than the heavy transport; motors, too, complicate the problem. The question has always to be decided: Should the transport move with brigades or what is called divisionalized? If the latter, how is it to be assembled before and dispersed after the march? Should it move off first, allowing the mounted men to overtake and pass it, or last, which usually entails a very late arrival at the destination? In infantry formations the fighting troops and the transport move at the same pace, so that comparatively little difficulty arises. Again, horses have to be fed and watered, and should be offsaddled whenever possible; consequently, unless horsemastership considerations are overruled and the formation is kept in a state of instant readiness, cavalry take longer to get on the move than infantry. This drawback can be minimized by enacting that a portion of the force must be prepared to move off instantly and that the rest must be at some particular length of notice. Much can also be done, on occasion, by issuing warning orders, with the object of shortening the length of the orders to move when the time comes to write them. In the future, too, the cooperation of the component parts of the mobile mixed force will require staff work of a very high order.

  


Lastly, the most brilliant conception of a role, the highest degree of tactical skill, the most unerring staff work - none of these will suffice unless the leader has the requisite personality. It is rare indeed that such a personality is found, and the failures of cavalry in the past can be traced more often to the shortcomings of the commander than to any lack of efficiency elsewhere, or to conditions of ground and armament. It is essential, if the formation is to retain its dash, that the commander should be entirely confident of the role of cavalry. Now, during periods of stationary warfare, entailing inactivity for the mounted troops, it requires a character of exceptional firmness to retain that confidence to the fullest possible extent. But the principal stumbling-block consists in the facts that a cavalry detachment once sent out can be recalled with difficulty only, and that a mounted attack once launched cannot be recalled at all. Evidently mistakes must often be made, and the strength of the enemy sometimes underestimated. The cavalry leader will fail if he ponders too much on contingencies; he will not succeed unless to the confidence engendered by knowledge he joins an instinctive appreciation of the situation. It is the possession of this last faculty which has distinguished all great cavalry leaders. It is a plant which is indigenous to a certain soil only, and the components of that soil are knowledge, confidence and dash.

(R. G. H.-V.)