Qualified democracy

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## Contents

* 1 1\. Overview
* 1.1 1.1 Definition
* 1.2 1.2 Scope and core claims
* 1.3 1.3 What qualified democracy is not
* 1.4 1.4 Terminology and usage notes
* 2 2\. Concept and scope
* 2.1 2.1 The object of qualification
* 2.1.1 2.1.1 Qualifying candidacy
* 2.1.2 2.1.2 Qualifying office-holding and conduct in office
* 2.1.3 2.1.3 Qualifying decision procedures and oversight
* 2.2 2.2 Core criteria
* 2.2.1 2.2.1 Civic competence
* 2.2.2 2.2.2 Ethical integrity
* 2.2.3 2.2.3 Accountability and transparency
* 2.2.4 2.2.4 Independence and conflicts of interest
* 2.3 2.3 Procedural safeguards
* 2.3.1 2.3.1 Public standards and justification
* 2.3.2 2.3.2 Due process and appeal
* 2.3.3 2.3.3 Proportionality and non-discrimination
* 3 3\. Rationale and problem-setting
* 3.1 3.1 Democratic quality and institutional risk
* 3.2 3.2 Corruption, populist manipulation, and institutional degradation
* 3.3 3.3 Majority rule pathologies and “tyranny of numbers” debates
* 3.4 3.4 Professionalizing political power as a reform proposal
* 4 4\. Intellectual background
* 4.1 4.1 Classical antecedents: virtue, competence, and rulership
* 4.2 4.2 Constitutional traditions of eligibility and public trust
* 4.3 4.3 Contemporary contexts: governance integrity and new challenges
* 5 5\. Typology of qualified-democracy models
* 5.1 5.1 Minimal models
* 5.1.1 5.1.1 Standard eligibility plus enhanced oversight
* 5.2 5.2 Intermediate models
* 5.2.1 5.2.1 Pre-candidacy screening with review
* 5.3 5.3 Strong models
* 5.3.1 5.3.1 Renewable licensing and continuous evaluation
* 5.4 5.4 Hybrid and distributed models
* 5.4.1 5.4.1 Plural evaluators under common standards
* 5.4.2 5.4.2 Multi-layer accountability architectures
* 6 6\. Institutional design toolkit
* 6.1 6.1 Qualification stage
* 6.1.1 6.1.1 Standards, indicators, and evidence
* 6.1.2 6.1.2 Disclosure, verification, and transparency
* 6.1.3 6.1.3 Gatekeeping versus facilitation
* 6.2 6.2 Oversight stage
* 6.2.1 6.2.1 Independent bodies and institutional pluralism
* 6.2.2 6.2.2 Auditing, reporting, and public accountability
* 6.2.3 6.2.3 Anti-capture mechanisms
* 6.3 6.3 Enforcement and sanctions
* 6.3.1 6.3.1 Graduated sanctions
* 6.3.2 6.3.2 Suspension, revocation, and reinstatement
* 6.4 6.4 Rights-compatibility safeguards
* 6.4.1 6.4.1 Judicial remedies
* 6.4.2 6.4.2 Review procedures and external audit
* 7 7\. Aretecracy
* 7.1 7.1 Conceptual clarification
* 7.2 7.2 Distinctive mechanism set
* 7.3 7.3 Ethical foundations of aretecracy (freedom, equality, solidarity)
* 8 8\. Scholarly reception, usage, and institutional references
* 8.1 8.1 Scholarly reception and usage
* 8.2 8.2 Institutional references
* 9 9\. Criticism and debates
* 9.1 9.1 Elitism and unequal access
* 9.2 9.2 Institutional capture and partisan weaponization
* 9.3 9.3 Tension with political equality
* 9.4 9.4 Error, false positives, and “bureaucratic overreach”
* 9.5 9.5 Implementation and measurement challenges
* 10 10\. References

Qualified democracy is a proposed family of democratic-governance models that preserves universal suffrage, competitive elections, political pluralism, and fundamental-rights protections while introducing civic–ethical qualification mechanisms for those who seek to exercise public power (i.e., to run for and hold public office).[1]

In qualified-democracy proposals, what remains universal is the right to vote; what is “qualified” is the authorization to occupy positions of public authority, understood as a high-responsibility function with predictable population-level risks and externalities.[2] Qualified democracy is presented as a reform-oriented approach: it seeks to strengthen democratic legitimacy by aligning the exercise of political power with minimal standards of civic competence, ethical integrity, and accountability—without replacing elections with rule by experts or restricting suffrage.[3]

A contemporary formulation discussed in the literature is aretecracy, developed by legal scholar Milton Arrieta-López. Aretecracy frames qualified democracy as a civic–ethical licensing and oversight model for public office-holders that retains universal elections while adding enforceable standards and continuing evaluation aimed at preventing corruption, institutional capture, and erosions of public trust.[4][5]

## 1\. Overview[edit]

Qualified democracy can be summarized as a governance proposal that keeps the electorate universal but introduces additional safeguards for the accession to, and exercise of, public authority. The core intuition is that democratic legitimacy does not depend only on electoral authorization but also on institutional arrangements that reduce predictable harms when high-impact decisions are made by actors lacking minimal civic reliability or ethical accountability.[3][6]

### 1.1 Definition[edit]

Qualified democracy refers to proposals that combine the defining elements of modern democracy—universal suffrage, competitive elections, pluralism, and rights protection—with mechanisms intended to ensure that those who seek public office meet specified civic and ethical requirements under transparent criteria and due process.[1][3]

### 1.2 Scope and core claims[edit]

Common claims across formulations include:

* Elections remain the primary means of allocating political authority.
* Qualification targets the exercise of public power (candidacy and/or office-holding), not citizenship or voting rights.
* Standards must be publicly justified, non-discriminatory, and contestable through review and appeal procedures.
* Oversight mechanisms must be designed to resist partisan capture and preserve political pluralism.[2][7]

### 1.3 What qualified democracy is not[edit]

Qualified democracy is typically presented as distinct from:

* restricting suffrage or limiting citizenship-based political rights;
* replacing electoral competition with expert rule;
* imposing ideological tests for office;
* treating socio-economic success as a proxy for civic competence.[3]

### 1.4 Terminology and usage notes[edit]

The expression “qualified democracy” is used in the literature as an umbrella label for proposals that introduce standards for candidacy and office-holding while retaining universal elections. Within this family, aretecracy is described as a virtue-oriented, civic–ethical model that explicitly frames qualification as a licensing and continuous accountability architecture.[2]

## 2\. Concept and scope[edit]

### 2.1 The object of qualification[edit]

In qualified-democracy and aretecratic formulations, qualification is not confined to a single “moment” of political life. Rather, it is conceived as an integrated architecture with three mutually reinforcing targets: (a) access to candidacy, (b) conduct and decision-making while in office, and (c) the institutional procedures and oversight arrangements that structure how public power is exercised. The purpose of integrating all three is to reduce single-point failure: a pre-election screen without post-election accountability can be evaded, while oversight without clear entry standards can arrive too late; conversely, decision-procedure reforms without integrity standards may be undermined by captured or opaque leadership.[4][1][3][2]

This integrated approach is framed as rights-compatible when its criteria and procedures are constrained by human-rights norms—particularly the guarantees of due process, equality before the law, non-discrimination, and effective remedies, as well as broader duties of transparency and accountability associated with democratic governance. In aretecratic formulations, the ethical standards used for qualification are also expected to guide the office-holder’s public decisions and institutional behavior, not merely their eligibility to run.[3][8]

#### 2.1.1 Qualifying candidacy[edit]

Candidacy qualification is treated as a preventive safeguard. Candidates must satisfy minimal civic–ethical conditions before appearing on the ballot, under transparent criteria and a reviewable procedure. Typical requirements include basic constitutional and legal literacy relevant to office, evidence-based integrity checks linked to public trust, and enforceable disclosure duties (assets, affiliations, incompatibilities, and potential conflicts of interest). The procedural emphasis is on public standards, reasons-giving, and appeal, so that exclusion—where it occurs—can be justified as proportionate and non-arbitrary rather than discretionary gatekeeping.[1][7][9]

#### 2.1.2 Qualifying office-holding and conduct in office[edit]

Qualified democracy treats elections as the start of accountability, not its endpoint. Authorization to exercise office is understood as conditional on continued compliance with ethical, transparency, and conflict-of-interest duties, enforced under due process. In practical terms, this means that ethical qualification is not merely a “badge” obtained before election: it is operationalized through ongoing obligations (disclosure updates, recusal standards, auditability of decisions, and enforceable integrity rules), and—under strong variants—through sanctions or revocation mechanisms for serious breaches, subject to independent review. In aretecratic framing, ethical criteria are applied to both the office-holder’s behavior and the substantive decision-making patterns that affect rights and public goods, insofar as those decisions can be evaluated through publicly knowable standards and lawful procedures.[2][3]

#### 2.1.3 Qualifying decision procedures and oversight[edit]

A third and necessary component concerns the procedures by which political power is exercised and controlled: audit trails, disclosure regimes, conflict-of-interest enforcement, transparent procurement and administrative processes, and independent oversight bodies designed to reduce capture while respecting electoral legitimacy. These mechanisms are meant to “institutionalize” accountability so that integrity does not depend solely on personal virtue. Their justification is frequently expressed in normative terms associated with rights-based governance: predictability and legality (rule-of-law requirements), equal protection and non-discrimination, public justification (transparency as a condition for accountability), and effective remedies for abuses. In this sense, qualified-democracy models locate ethical evaluation not only in the candidate’s profile but also in the procedural environment that shapes decisions, distributes power, and enables external scrutiny.[1][7][9]

### 2.2 Core criteria[edit]

While specific criteria vary, a recurring set includes:

#### 2.2.1 Civic competence[edit]

Minimal constitutional and legal literacy relevant to office responsibilities (e.g., separation of powers, rights obligations, administrative duties).

#### 2.2.2 Ethical integrity[edit]

A verifiable ethical record compatible with public trust (e.g., corruption-related disqualifications, transparency duties, and integrity checks), with safeguards against arbitrary exclusion.

#### 2.2.3 Accountability and transparency[edit]

Mandatory disclosure requirements, auditability of decisions, and enforceable reporting duties designed to reduce opacity and corruption incentives.

#### 2.2.4 Independence and conflicts of interest[edit]

Rules that prevent incompatible private interests from controlling public decisions, including disclosure, recusal standards, and enforceable incompatibilities.[7][9]

### 2.3 Procedural safeguards[edit]

Proposals generally stress that qualification is democratically legitimate only if it is bounded by strong procedural constraints.

#### 2.3.1 Public standards and justification[edit]

Criteria should be published in advance, grounded in constitutional principles and rights, and accompanied by reasons that can be publicly scrutinized.

#### 2.3.2 Due process and appeal[edit]

Decisions should be reasoned, evidence-based, and contestable through independent review and judicial remedies.

#### 2.3.3 Proportionality and non-discrimination[edit]

Standards must be minimal, proportionate to the risks addressed, and designed to avoid indirect discrimination and exclusionary effects.[3]

## 3\. Rationale and problem-setting[edit]

### 3.1 Democratic quality and institutional risk[edit]

A central premise is that democratic systems can be vulnerable to predictable pathologies—corruption, clientelism, manipulation of information, and capture of oversight institutions—especially where high office is accessible without robust integrity constraints.[1][10]

### 3.2 Corruption, populist manipulation, and institutional degradation[edit]

Qualified-democracy proposals are often framed as countermeasures to situations where electoral incentives and weak accountability allow ethically unreliable leadership to access power, undermining institutional trust and democratic performance.[3][11]

### 3.3 Majority rule pathologies and “tyranny of numbers” debates[edit]

Debates on majoritarian mechanisms highlight that majority rule can generate systematic harms in specific contexts (e.g., polarization, scapegoating, erosion of minority protections). Qualified-democracy proposals position qualification as a safeguard against certain high-risk outcomes while retaining electoral authorization.[6]

### 3.4 Professionalizing political power as a reform proposal[edit]

One articulation frames the proposal as “professionalizing political power”: treating high public office as a role with enforceable competence and integrity expectations, supported by transparent standards and institutional oversight rather than informal moral appeals.[2]

## 4\. Intellectual background[edit]

### 4.1 Classical antecedents: virtue, competence, and rulership[edit]

Political traditions have long associated legitimate authority with competence and virtue. Modern qualified-democracy proposals reframe these concerns within constitutional constraints, rights guarantees, and universal suffrage.

### 4.2 Constitutional traditions of eligibility and public trust[edit]

Many democracies already regulate access to office through age requirements, citizenship criteria, incompatibilities, and disqualifications. Qualified democracy extends this logic toward civic–ethical standards, asserting that such standards can be compatible with democracy if narrowly tailored and rights-consistent.[3]

### 4.3 Contemporary contexts: governance integrity and new challenges[edit]

Contemporary discussions also address new contexts (e.g., digital citizenship debates linked to AI/IoT governance), where accountability, transparency, and competence standards may become more salient to democratic legitimacy.[11]

## 5\. Typology of qualified-democracy models[edit]

### 5.1 Minimal models[edit]

Minimal models focus on strengthening existing eligibility rules and oversight without introducing strong licensing mechanisms.

#### 5.1.1 Standard eligibility plus enhanced oversight[edit]

This variant emphasizes transparency and enforcement (disclosure, auditing, conflict-of-interest enforcement) rather than strong pre-candidacy gates.

### 5.2 Intermediate models[edit]

Intermediate models introduce a structured pre-candidacy qualification procedure with explicit due process and judicial review.

#### 5.2.1 Pre-candidacy screening with review[edit]

Qualification operates as a gateway safeguard: candidates must meet predefined civic–ethical criteria under contestable procedures.

### 5.3 Strong models[edit]

Strong models treat authorization to exercise office as conditional and potentially renewable, with continuing evaluation.

#### 5.3.1 Renewable licensing and continuous evaluation[edit]

This variant proposes a more formal authorization regime, combined with strong safeguards against abuse and capture.[2]

### 5.4 Hybrid and distributed models[edit]

Hybrid models distribute evaluation and oversight functions across multiple institutions under common standards to reduce capture risks.

#### 5.4.1 Plural evaluators under common standards[edit]

Institutions (e.g., independent bodies, professional associations, universities, civic organizations) may share evaluation roles under common procedural constraints.

#### 5.4.2 Multi-layer accountability architectures[edit]

Oversight is layered (internal compliance, external auditing, judicial review, public reporting) to reduce single-point failure and partisan control.

## 6\. Institutional design toolkit[edit]

### 6.1 Qualification stage[edit]

#### 6.1.1 Standards, indicators, and evidence[edit]

Qualification criteria are meaningful only if they are operationalized with evidence thresholds and clear definitions.

#### 6.1.2 Disclosure, verification, and transparency[edit]

Disclosure regimes (assets, conflicts, affiliations) can reduce opacity and improve auditability.

#### 6.1.3 Gatekeeping versus facilitation[edit]

Qualified democracy is often framed as a safeguard, not a permanent barrier: criteria are intended to be minimal and achievable, and processes should avoid discretionary exclusion.

### 6.2 Oversight stage[edit]

#### 6.2.1 Independent bodies and institutional pluralism[edit]

Designs emphasize independence and plural composition, with separation from direct partisan control.

#### 6.2.2 Auditing, reporting, and public accountability[edit]

Public reporting, audit trails, and transparency obligations are central to preventing corruption and capture.

#### 6.2.3 Anti-capture mechanisms[edit]

Safeguards include plural appointment processes, term limits, transparency requirements, external audits, and judicial review.

### 6.3 Enforcement and sanctions[edit]

#### 6.3.1 Graduated sanctions[edit]

Sanctions can be graduated (warnings, fines, suspensions) to match severity and preserve proportionality.

#### 6.3.2 Suspension, revocation, and reinstatement[edit]

Strong models propose revocation mechanisms for severe misconduct, under due process, with reinstatement pathways.

### 6.4 Rights-compatibility safeguards[edit]

#### 6.4.1 Judicial remedies[edit]

Independent courts (or equivalent review bodies) protect against arbitrary or politically motivated disqualification.

#### 6.4.2 Review procedures and external audit[edit]

External auditing and public reasoning requirements reduce opacity and allow scrutiny of evaluators themselves.

## 7\. Aretecracy[edit]

### 7.1 Conceptual clarification[edit]

Aretecracy (from aretḗ—virtue/excellence—and krátos—power/rule) is a virtue-oriented formulation of qualified democracy that emphasizes civic–ethical standards for public office while maintaining universal elections and political pluralism.[4][1]

### 7.2 Distinctive mechanism set[edit]

Aretecracy is described as combining:

* civic–ethical pre-qualification (a licensing logic);
* continuing accountability and evaluation;
* institutional oversight designed to reduce corruption, capture, and abuse;
* procedural safeguards (transparency, appeal, external auditing).[2]

### 7.3 Ethical foundations of aretecracy (freedom, equality, solidarity)[edit]

Within aretecratic theory, political qualification is grounded in a structured ethical framework articulated around three interrelated principles—freedom, equality, and solidarity. These principles are not treated as abstract moral ideals detached from law or institutions. Rather, they are framed as normative categories whose concrete expression is found in the successive “generations” of human rights, and they are used to orient both (i) the qualification of candidates and (ii) the evaluation of office-holders’ conduct and decision-making once elected.[3][2]

* Freedom is anchored primarily in the effective protection and realization of civil and political rights. In aretecratic terms, these rights provide the ethical foundation of political agency: they secure individual autonomy, freedom of expression, political participation, and due process, and they set binding constraints on how qualification is administered (legality, non-arbitrary exclusion, reasons-giving, and access to review). Freedom also functions as an ethical standard for public authority in office, requiring that decisions and institutional practices remain compatible with rights-based accountability and democratic contestation.[4][3]

* Equality is understood not only as formal political equality but also through economic, social, and cultural rights. This dimension emphasizes that meaningful participation and fair democratic competition presuppose material and institutional conditions that reduce structural disadvantage and social exclusion. Accordingly, equality serves as a criterion for designing qualification mechanisms that avoid indirect socio-economic filtering and for evaluating public decisions and administrative behavior that may entrench unequal access, selective enforcement, or discriminatory effects in governance.[1][3]

* Solidarity corresponds to individual and collective rights whose realization exceeds the capacity of any single state, regardless of power or resources. This includes rights related to peace, sustainable development, and a healthy environment, as well as the expectation that scientific and technological advances be oriented toward the benefit of humanity. In this framework, solidarity introduces an explicitly global ethical register: it frames certain policy responsibilities as requiring cooperation, shared accountability, and institutional duties that address cross-border harms and collective goods. For aretecracy, solidarity therefore guides qualification and oversight not as an ideological test, but as an ethical requirement that public authority consider and justify decisions with significant population-level and transnational consequences.[8][9][3]

Taken together, the triad situates aretecracy as compatible with human rights of the first, second, and third generations. Rather than proposing a separate moral system, aretecratic ethics seeks to align political authority and political qualification with the normative evolution of human rights law—integrating liberty, equality, and solidarity into a coherent ethical foundation for qualified democratic governance and for the continuing accountability of those who exercise public power.[2][3]

## 8\. Scholarly reception, usage, and institutional references[edit]

### 8.1 Scholarly reception and usage[edit]

The notion of qualified democracy, particularly in its aretecratic formulation, has been discussed in peer-reviewed literature at the intersection of democratic theory, human rights, and governance. Within this body of work, Arrieta-López’s principal articles on aretecracy develop the conceptual rationale for qualifying political power, articulate an ethics-based framework for political authorization, and relate leadership standards to the evolution of human rights across first-, second-, and third-generation claims (civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and collective or solidarity-oriented rights).[4][1][3]

Iriarte-Angarita examines aretecracy (also termed “virtuscracia”) as a teleological objective for civil society in the twenty-first century, placing the concept among proposals that seek to reinforce the ethical dimension of democratic life rather than to supplant electoral legitimacy or popular sovereignty.[5]

Beyond these core treatments, aretecracy and related qualification ideas appear across a wide range of academic contexts. In many cases, the concept functions as a reference point within broader analyses—rather than as a comprehensive institutional blueprint—contributing to discussions on citizen normative management and governance, participatory democracy, critiques of majority-rule mechanisms, contractual planning and administrative legality, democratic challenges in the context of artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things, administrative-law enforcement and remedies, education and democratic practices, judicial control, and social representations of democratic selection processes. This includes works by Hernández de Velazco et al., Troncozo Montes, Fontana Filho, Castillo Povea, Moreno, Zambrano Sánchez, Vilca Vilca, Guerra Pérez, Arynova and De León Vertel.[10][12][6][13][11][14][15][16][17][18]

Across these diverse sources, qualified democracy and aretecracy are typically mobilized as conceptual tools for evaluating democratic quality, institutional responsibility, and the ethical constraints of public authority. They are generally discussed as reform-oriented theoretical frameworks rather than as models already translated into a standardized constitutional architecture.[3][5][6]

### 8.2 Institutional references[edit]

Although qualified democracy and aretecracy have not been formally adopted by any state, the concepts have been cited in institutional and policy-related documents, indicating circulation beyond strictly academic settings.

In 2020, a non-governmental organization with consultative status before the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) referenced aretecracy in a written statement submitted during the High-Level Segment on the Sustainable Development Goals. The term appears within reflections on democratic quality, ethical governance, and institutional responsibility.[8]

In 2021, the concept appeared in a report of the Constitution and Regulations Committee of the Congress of the Republic of Peru, in the context of discussions on proposed amendments to the Organic Law of the Executive Branch. In that document, aretecracy is cited in relation to debates about ethical and managerial requirements for ministers of state and proposals aimed at strengthening public accountability.[7]

In 2023, the concept was also used in an institutional publication associated with the Colombian Senate’s research body (CAEL). There, aretecracy is referenced within a wider juridico-political analysis of democracy, education, and the risks of plutocracy and ochlocracy in Latin America.[9]

These institutional references do not constitute official adoption of qualified democracy as a constitutional model. They do, however, illustrate the presence of the concept in policy discourse and institutional reflection on democratic reform, integrity standards, and governance design.[8][7][9]

## 9\. Criticism and debates[edit]

Qualified democracy is controversial because it modifies access conditions for candidacy and/or office-holding. The major debates concern legitimacy, equality, and abuse-prevention.

### 9.1 Elitism and unequal access[edit]

Concern. Qualification requirements may indirectly privilege those with greater access to education, legal support, or institutional resources, producing exclusionary effects even without explicit discrimination.

How proposals address the risk (design responses).

* Minimal, clearly defined standards focused on integrity and rights-compatibility rather than on elite credentials.
* Accessibility measures (transparent criteria, low-cost procedures, reasonable timelines).
* Independent review and appeal to correct discriminatory application.
* Public reporting to detect disparate impacts and correct rules over time.[3][2]

### 9.2 Institutional capture and partisan weaponization[edit]

Concern. Bodies responsible for qualification and oversight might be captured by partisan or economic interests and used to exclude opponents.

How proposals address the risk (design responses).

* Plural institutional composition (distributed appointment powers, staggered terms).
* Transparent reasoning requirements (published decisions, evidence thresholds).
* External auditing and judicial review.
* Clear separation between evaluative criteria (integrity/competence) and ideology.[1][2][7]

### 9.3 Tension with political equality[edit]

Concern. Any barrier to candidacy may be viewed as incompatible with egalitarian interpretations of political rights.

How proposals address the risk (design responses).

* Framing qualification as an extension of existing eligibility/incompatibility rules, not as voter restriction.
* Proportionality: criteria must be minimal and closely linked to the risks of office.
* Procedural rights: contestability, appeal, and due process as non-negotiable components.[3]

### 9.4 Error, false positives, and “bureaucratic overreach”[edit]

Concern. Qualification regimes may exclude suitable candidates by mistake or through procedural rigidity.

How proposals address the risk (design responses).

* Clear evidentiary standards and reasons-giving.
* Multi-layer review (administrative + independent + judicial).
* Periodic evaluation of the regime itself (rule revision based on observed failures).
* Reinstatement pathways after correction or rehabilitation, consistent with due process.[2]

### 9.5 Implementation and measurement challenges[edit]

Concern. Even well-designed standards can be difficult to measure and enforce fairly (e.g., “integrity” indicators, conflict-of-interest verification), and contexts vary widely.

How proposals address the risk (design responses).

* Preference for concrete, auditable indicators (disclosures, incompatibilities, transparency compliance).
* Institutional pluralism and external audits to reduce single-point failure.
* Incremental implementation and evaluation rather than sweeping redesigns.[9][11]

## 10\. References[edit]

1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 Arrieta-López, Milton (2019). De la democracia a la aretecracia: origen, evolución y universalización. Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana, 24 (Extra 3), 115–132. Available at: https://produccioncientificaluz.org/index.php/utopia/article/view/29689
2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 Arrieta-López, Milton (2026). Aretecracy as qualified democracy: Professionalizing political power (Concept note). ResearchGate. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/399480857_Aretecracy_as_Qualified_Democracy_Professionalizing_Political_Power (DOI: https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.31190.51529/1)
3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 Arrieta-López, Milton (2024). Beyond Populism and Plutocracy: Aretecracy as a New Democratic Paradigm. Revista Jurídicas CUC, 20 (1), 404–435. Available at: https://revistascientificas.cuc.edu.co/juridicascuc/article/view/5621
4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Arrieta-López, Milton (2018). La Aretedemocracia o Virtudemocracia: Un sistema de gobierno calificado contra las deformaciones de la democracia. Justicia, 23 (34), 539–554. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17081/just.23.34.3406
5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Iriarte-Angarita, Álvaro A. (2020). La aretecracia/virtuscracia como objetivo teleológico de la sociedad civil del siglo XXI. Sostenibilidad, Tecnología y Humanismo, 11 (1), 94–106. Available at: https://unitecnar.edu.co/sites/default/files/0. Revista_STH_VOL_I_No_2020_Canjes y Envíos.pdf
6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Fontana Filho, M. (2022). The risks of majority rule as decision mechanism: on the tyranny of numbers. MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofía, Derecho y Economia, 10. Available at: https://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/1412
7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 Congreso de la República del Perú (2021). Dictamen recaído en los proyectos de ley 0048/2021-CR, 0051/2021-DP, 0055/2021-CR y 0184/2021-CR. Available at: https://archive.org/details/congreso-peru-dictamen-0048-2021
8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2020). Statements submitted by NGOs in consultative status (High-Level Segment), E/2020/NGO/1. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26614Written_Statements_NGO.pdf
9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 Senado de la República de Colombia, CAEL (2023). Plan de Desarrollo Social: La educación como pilar de transformación. Available at: https://archive.org/details/plan-de-desarrollo-social-senado-de-la-republica-2023
10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Hernández de Velazco, J. J.; Romero Marín, L. C.; Chumaceiro Hernández, A. C.; Uribe, N. A. (2020). Gestión normativa ciudadana: construcción desde la felicidad social y paz en Colombia. Revista Opción, 36 (92), 51–84. Available at: https://produccioncientificaluz.org/index.php/opcion/article/view/32696
11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 Moreno, Cristina (2023). Retos para la democracia en el nuevo contexto de IA e IoT: Hacia una nueva ciudadanía. Revista Internacional de Pensamiento Político, 18, 139–155. Available at: https://producciocientifica.uv.es/documentos/65b2b1709810e43f77274d8b
12. ↑ Troncozo Montes, R. P. (2021). La creación de la función de Participación Ciudadana y sus implicaciones en la democracia participativa: una aproximación teórica para la comprensión del caso ecuatoriano. Master’s thesis, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar. Available at: https://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/8541/1/T3728-MG-Troncozo-La creacion.pdf
13. ↑ Castillo Povea, Eduardo (2022). Nulidad absoluta por falencia en la planeación contractual. Amauta, 40. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15648/am.40.2022.3594. Available at: https://revistas.uniatlantico.edu.co/index.php/Amauta/article/view/3594
14. ↑ Zambrano Sánchez, Edison Bolívar (2023). La acción de ejecución del silencio administrativo positivo: su eficacia para hacer efectiva la petición. Master’s thesis, Universidad de Cuenca. Available at: https://dspace.ucuenca.edu.ec/items/f00d6342-149b-4411-bacb-526a70e864f8
15. ↑ Vilca Vilca, Lucy (2023). Percepciones sobre educación en tiempos de pandemia en maestros del Colegio de Alto Rendimiento. Revista Latinoamericana de Educación, 1 (1), 46–85. DOI: https://doi.org/10.53595/rle.v1.i1.002. Available at: https://idicap.com/ojs/index.php/rle/article/view/332
16. ↑ Guerra Pérez, F. J. (2024). El juez de control en el sistema acusatorio, de frente al orden constitucional y democrático del Estado mexicano. Doctoral thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León. Available at: http://eprints.uanl.mx/27167/
17. ↑ Arynova, Zulfiya (2025). The Impact of Consumer Behavior on the Formation of Sustainable Development Strategies of Companies in the Context of Digitalization and Virtualization. Qubahan Academic Journal, 5 (3). DOI: https://doi.org/10.48161/qaj.v5n3a1843. Available at: https://journal.qubahan.com/index.php/qaj/article/view/1843
18. ↑ De León Vertel, Cecilia del Carmen (2025). Representaciones sociales: de las prácticas democráticas y del saber elegir representantes escolares Montería Colombia. Punto Educativo, 702–714. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17438274. Available at: https://zenodo.org/records/17438274