Explanatory power

Short description: Ability of a theory to explain a subject

Explanatory power is the ability of a hypothesis or theory to explain the subject matter effectively to which it pertains. Its opposite is explanatory impotence.

In the past, various criteria or measures for explanatory power have been proposed. In particular, one hypothesis, theory, or explanation can be said to have more explanatory power than another about the same subject matter[citation needed]

* If more facts or observations are accounted for;
* If it changes more "surprising facts" into "a matter of course" (following Peirce);
* If more details of causal relations are provided, leading to a high accuracy and precision of the description;
* If it offers greater predictive power (if it offers more details about what should be expected to be seen and not seen);
* If it depends less on authorities and more on observations;
* If it makes fewer assumptions;
* If it is more falsifiable (more testable by observation or experiment, according to Popper).
* If it can be used to compress encoded observations into fewer bits (Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference)

Recently, David Deutsch proposed that theorists should seek explanations that are hard to vary. A theory or explanation is hard to vary if all details play a functional role, i.e., cannot be varied or removed without changing the predictions of the theory. Easy to vary (i.e., bad) explanations, in contrast, can be varied to be reconciled with new observations because they are barely connected to the details of the phenomenon of question.

## Contents

* 1 Examples
* 2 Relation to other criteria
* 3 See also
* 4 References

## Examples

Deutsch takes examples from Greek mythology. He describes how very specific, and even somewhat falsifiable theories were provided to explain how the god Demeter's sadness caused the seasons. Alternatively, Deutsch points out, one could have just as easily explained the seasons as resulting from the god's happiness, which would make it a poor explanation because it is so easy to arbitrarily change details.[1] Without Deutsch's criterion, the 'Greek gods explanation' could have just kept adding justifications. The same criterion, of being "hard to vary", may be what makes the modern explanation for the seasons a good one. None of the details about the Earth rotating around the Sun at a certain angle in a certain orbit can be easily modified without changing the theory's coherence.[1][2]

## Relation to other criteria

The philosopher Karl Popper acknowledged it is logically possible to avoid falsification of a hypothesis by changing details to avoid any criticism, adopting the term an immunizing stratagem from Hans Albert.[3] Popper argued that scientific hypotheses should be subjected to methodological testing to select for the strongest hypothesis.[4]

## See also

* Falsifiability
* Razor (philosophy)
* Critical rationalism

## References

1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 David Deutsch, "A new way of explaining explanation"
2. ↑ David Deutsch (2011), The Beginning Of Infinity", ch1, The Reach of Explanations
3. ↑ Ray S. Percival (2012), The Myth of the Closed Mind: Explaining why and how People are Rational, p.206, Chicago.
4. ↑ Karl R. Popper (1934), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.20, Routledge Classics (ed. 2004)

Links to related articles

* v
* t
* e

Philosophy of science

| Concepts|

* Analysis
* Analytic–synthetic distinction
* A priori and a posteriori
* Causality
* Commensurability
* Consilience
* Construct
* Creative synthesis
* Demarcation problem
* Empirical evidence
* Explanatory power
* Fact
* Falsifiability
* Feminist method
* Functional contextualism

* Ignoramus et ignorabimus
* Inductive reasoning
* Intertheoretic reduction
* Inquiry
* Nature
* Objectivity
* Observation
* Paradigm
* Problem of induction
* Scientific law
* Scientific method
* Scientific revolution
* Scientific theory
* Testability
* Theory choice
* Theory-ladenness
* Underdetermination
* Unity of science

|

Metatheory
of science|

* Coherentism
* Confirmation holism
* Constructive empiricism
* Constructive realism
* Constructivist epistemology
* Contextualism
* Conventionalism
* Deductive-nomological model
* Hypothetico-deductive model
* Inductionism
* Epistemological anarchism
* Evolutionism
* Fallibilism
* Foundationalism
* Instrumentalism
* Pragmatism
* Model-dependent realism
* Naturalism
* Physicalism
* Positivism / Reductionism / Determinism
* Rationalism / Empiricism
* Received view / Semantic view of theories
* Scientific realism / Anti-realism
* Scientific essentialism
* Scientific formalism
* Scientific skepticism
* Scientism
* Structuralism
* Uniformitarianism
* Vitalism

Philosophy of|

* Physics
* thermal and statistical
* Motion
* Chemistry
* Biology
* Environment
* Geography
* Social science
* Technology
* Engineering
* Artificial intelligence
* Computer science
* Information
* Mind
* Psychiatry
* Psychology
* Perception
* Space and time

Related topics|

* Alchemy
* Criticism of science
* Epistemology
* Faith and rationality
* History and philosophy of science
* History of science
* History of evolutionary thought
* Logic
* Metaphysics
* Pseudoscience
* Relationship between religion and science
* Rhetoric of science
* Science studies
* Sociology of scientific knowledge
* Sociology of scientific ignorance

Philosophers of science by era

| Ancient|

* Plato
* Aristotle
* Stoicism
* Epicureans

|

Medieval|

* Averroes
* Avicenna
* Roger Bacon
* William of Ockham
* Hugh of Saint Victor
* Dominicus Gundissalinus
* Robert Kilwardby

Early modern|

* Francis Bacon
* Thomas Hobbes
* René Descartes
* Galileo Galilei
* Pierre Gassendi
* Isaac Newton
* David Hume

Late modern|

* Immanuel Kant
* Friedrich Schelling
* William Whewell
* Auguste Comte
* John Stuart Mill
* Herbert Spencer
* Wilhelm Wundt
* Charles Sanders Peirce
* Wilhelm Windelband
* Henri Poincaré
* Pierre Duhem
* Rudolf Steiner
* Karl Pearson

Contemporary|

* Alfred North Whitehead
* Bertrand Russell
* Albert Einstein
* Otto Neurath
* C. D. Broad
* Michael Polanyi
* Hans Reichenbach
* Rudolf Carnap
* Karl Popper
* Carl Gustav Hempel
* W. V. O. Quine
* Thomas Kuhn
* Imre Lakatos
* Paul Feyerabend
* Jürgen Habermas
* Ian Hacking
* Bas van Fraassen
* Larry Laudan
* Daniel Dennett

* Category
*   *

* v
* t
* e

Philosophical logic

Critical thinking and
informal logic|

* Analysis
* Ambiguity
* Argument
* Belief
* Bias
* Credibility
* Evidence
* Explanation
* Explanatory power
* Fact
* Fallacy
* Inquiry
* Opinion
* Parsimony (Occam's razor)
* Premise
* Propaganda
* Prudence
* Reasoning
* Relevance
* Rhetoric
* Rigor
* Vagueness

Theories of deduction|

* Constructivism
* Dialetheism
* Fictionalism
* Finitism
* Formalism
* Intuitionism
* Logical atomism
* Logicism
* Nominalism
* Platonic realism
* Pragmatism
* Realism

0.00

(0 votes)

Original source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory power. Read more

|

Retrieved from "https://handwiki.org/wiki/index.php?title=Explanatory_power&oldid=234723"
*[v]: View this template
*[t]: Discuss this template
*[e]: Edit this template