Belt and Road Initiative

一带一路

Topographic map of the Belt and Road Economic Corridor and its pathway cities

Abbreviation| BRI
Formation| 2013; 13 years ago (2013) (Inception)
2017; 9 years ago (2017) (Forum)
2019; 7 years ago (2019) (Forum)
2023; 3 years ago (2023) (Forum)
Founder| People's Republic of China
Legal status| Active
Purpose| Promote economic development and inter-regional connectivity
Headquarters| Beijing, China
Location|

* Worldwide

Main organ

| Belt and Road Construction Leadership Group
National Development and Reform Commission
Website| {{{1}}}

The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road

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China

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National leaders
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* Paramount leader: Xi Jinping
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* Head of government: Li Keqiang
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* Conference Chairman: Wang Yang
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Xi Jinping
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Chairman: Xi Jinping

Vice-Chairmen:

Xu Qiliang, Zhang Youxia
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Chairman: Xi Jinping

Vice-Chairmen:

Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu

Office Chief: Ding Xuexiang

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Li Keqiang, Wang Huning, Han Zheng

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* * *

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* Political parties:

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* * *

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Chairman: Li Zhanshu

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* President (list): Xi Jinping

Presidential spouse: Peng Liyuan

* Presidential Office [zh; zh; 中华人民共和国主席办公室]

Chief: Ding Xuexiang
* Vice-President: Wang Qishan

Executive

* State Council (Central People's Government)
* Li Keqiang Cabinet II

Premier (list): Li Keqiang

Vice-Premiers (list)

* Han Zheng
* Sun Chunlan
* Hu Chunhua
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State Councilors

* Wei Fenghe
* Wang Yong
* Wang Yi
* Xiao Jie
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Secretary-General: Xiao Jie

* Cabinet-level departments
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* Central Military Commission (CMC)

Chairman (supreme commander):

Xi Jinping
Vice-Chairmen:

* Xu Qiliang
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Members:

* Wei Fenghe
* Li Zuocheng
* Miao Hua
* Zhang Shengmin

Departments:
1. General Office
2. Joint Staff Dept.

Chief: Li Zuocheng
3. Political Work Dept.

Director: Miao Hua
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6. Training & Administration Dept.
7. National Defense Mobilization Dept.
8. Discipline Inspection Commission

Secretary: Zhang Shengmin
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Chairman: Li Keqiang

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Minister: Wei Fenghe

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* * *

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Leader: Xi Jinping

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* * *

* CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (19th)

Secretary: Zhao Leji
Deputy Secretaries

* Yang Xiaodu
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* Li Shulei
* Xu Lingyi
* Xiao Pei
* Chen Xiaojiang

Secretary-General: Yang Xiaochao
* National Supervisory Commission

Director: Yang Xiaodu
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Leader: Zhao Leji

* * *

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Secretary: Zhang Shengmin

* * *

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* * *

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Secretary: Guo Shengkun

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President: Zhou Qiang

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Prosecutor General: Zhang Jun

People's Procuratorates Judicial Police
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Minister: Zhao Kezhi (State Councilor)

Public Security Organs People's Police
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Minister: Chen Wenqing

State Security Organs People's Police
* Ministry of Justice

Minister: Fu Zhenghua

Judicial Administrative Organs People's Police
* Bureau of Prison Administration [zh; zh; 司法部监狱管理局]
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* * *

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* * *

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* * *

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Publicity

* Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology

Leader: Wang Huning

* Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization

Director: Wang Huning

Deputy Director: Huang Kunming

* Central Publicity (Propaganda) Department

Head: Huang Kunming

* National Press and Publication Administration
* China Film Administration [zh; zh; 国家电影局]
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* * *

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* * *

* Internet in China
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Director: Xi Jinping

Deputy director: Li Keqiang

* Cyberspace Administration of China

Director: Xu Lin

* Hong Kong
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* Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs

Leader: Han Zheng
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Director: Zhang Xiaoming
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* * *

* Hong Kong Basic Law
* Chief Executive: Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor
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* * *

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* Chief Executive: Chui Sai On
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Cross-Strait relations

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* Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
* Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
* Chinese unification

* * *

* Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs

Leader: Xi Jinping
Deputy Leader: Wang Yang
* Taiwan Affairs Office

Director: Zhang Zhijun
* Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits

Foreign relations

* Central Foreign Affairs Commission

Director: Xi Jinping
Deputy Director: Li Keqiang
Secretary-General: Yang Jiechi
* Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister: Wang Yi (State Councilor)
Spokespersons
Diplomatic missions

* * *

* Diplomatic missions of China / in China

* * *

* Foreign aid from China / to China
* International Development Cooperation Agency
* Ministry of Commerce
* Exim Bank of China
* China Development Bank
* Belt and Road Initiative
* Silk Road Fund
* Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
* BRICS
* New Development Bank

* * *

* Ministry of National Defense
* International Military Cooperation Office

* * *

* NPC Foreign Affairs Committee
* CPC International Liaison Department
* State Council Information Office
* State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
* Overseas Chinese Affairs Office

* * *

* Chinese nationality law
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* National Immigration Administration

* * *

* Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
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* One country, two systems

* * *

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* * *

* China–Africa relations
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* China–Pacific relations
* China–Russia relations
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Related topics

* Administrative divisions
* Hukou system
* Family planning
* Ethnic minorities
* Communism

* Other countries

* v
* t
* e

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI or B&R), also known as the One Belt One Road (Chinese: 一带一路; pinyin: Yīdài Yīlù) and sometimes called the New Silk Road, is a global infrastructure and economic development strategy of the government of the People's Republic of China.

The initiative was launched by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping in 2013 while visiting Kazakhstan. It aims to invest in over 150 countries and international organizations through six overland economic corridors and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The BRI is central to Chinese foreign policy, promoting trade connectivity and China's leadership role in global affairs. As of 2025, participating countries account for nearly 75% of the world's population and over half of global GDP, based on aggregated membership and international economic datasets. The initiative is widely described as having the potential to enhance global trade, connectivity, and economic growth, particularly in developing economies. At the same time, it has been associated with concerns regarding environmental impact, human rights and governance standards, debt sustainability, and the dual-use nature of certain infrastructure projects.[1]

## Contents

* 1 History
* 1.1 Initial foreign investments
* 1.2 2013 Silk Road Economic Belt announcement
* 2 Objectives
* 2.1 Initiative name
* 2.2 International relations
* 2.2.1 Military implications
* 2.3 Western regions
* 3 Leadership
* 4 Membership
* 4.1 Current and previous members
* 5 Financing
* 5.1 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
* 5.2 Silk Road Fund
* 5.3 China Investment Corporation
* 5.4 Policy banks
* 5.5 Other financing
* 5.6 Debt sustainability
* 5.7 Effects
* 6 Infrastructure networks
* 6.1 Silk Road Economic Belt
* 6.2 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
* 6.3 Ice Silk Road
* 6.4 Digital Silk Road
* 6.5 Super grid
* 6.6 Additionally proposed
* 7 Projects
* 7.1 Corruption allegations and organized crime
* 7.1.1 Serbia
* 7.2 Ecological issues
* 7.3 Allegations of human rights violations
* 8 Reactions
* 8.1 Support
* 8.2 Opposition
* 8.3 Mixed
* 8.4 Accusations of neo-colonialism and debt-trap diplomacy
* 8.4.1 Accusations
* 8.4.2 Rebuttals
* 8.5 Country-specific
* 9 Belt and Road educational policy
* 10 See also
* 11 Notes
* 12 References
* 13 Further reading
* 14 External links

## History

### Initial foreign investments

Global Chinese investment dates all the way back to the 1950s, shortly after its socialist reform from 1949 to 1952, with projects in North Korea, Vietnam, and numerous African countries.[2] Under the leadership of CCP chairman, Mao Zedong, African independence movements prompted China's interest in the region, accounting for 58% of its economic aid between 1956 and 1969.[3] China funded primarily agricultural projects through companies like the China Merchants Group and China Resources Corporation, for which each built foreign branches. China made these investments alongside tactics of diplomacy to improve Sino-African relations for the sake of future economic cooperation.[2]

Fueled by isolationist political motivations, these investments were relatively small. China's self-reliant aims generally left it incapable of any sizable foreign investment.[2][4] However, following the 1966-1976 Chinese Cultural Revolution, severe economic shortages incentivized a change.[5] Border tensions with the Soviet Union furthermore worried China, as apparent in Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua's 1977 statement, saying that China needed to win the favor of the United States to avoid "revisionist Soviet social-imperialism," which he believed made the USSR China's "archenemy." Other Chinese officials and allies held similar beliefs.[6]: 5 Estimates found that in 1979, China's GDP per capita was $271.20 USD, ranked 162 globally, with foreign exchange reserves at a mere $840 million USD.[4] Just two years later, Chairman of the CPPCC, Deng Xiaoping announced the adoption of the Open Door Policy in December 1978.[7] The policy aimed to open China's economic doors, transitioning the country into a market-based economy, which was considered critical for economic growth.[3]

China's policy of channeling its construction companies abroad began with former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin's Go Out policy.[8]: 67 Xi Jinping's BRI built on and expanded this policy[8]: 67 as well as built on Jiang's China Western Development policy.[9]: 149

### 2013 Silk Road Economic Belt announcement

Xi announced the BRI concept as the "Silk Road Economic Belt" on 7 September 2013 at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan [8]: 75 In October 2013 during a speech delivered in Indonesia, Xi stated that China planned to build a "twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road" to enhance cooperation in Southeast Asia and beyond.[8]: 75

## Objectives

The Belt and Road Initiative addresses an "infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to accelerate economic growth across the Asia Pacific, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe, according to a report from the World Pensions Council.[10]

The initial focus has been infrastructure investment, education, construction materials, railway and highway, automobile, real estate, power grid, and iron and steel.[11] Already, some estimates list the Belt and Road Initiative as one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in history, covering more than 68 countries, including 65% of the world population and 40% of the global gross domestic product as of 2017.[12][13][needs update] The project builds on the old trade routes that once connected China to the west, Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta's routes in the north and the maritime expedition routes of Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He in the south. The Belt and Road Initiative now refers to the entire geographical area of the historic "Silk Road" trade route, which has been continuously used in antiquity.[14]

The stated goals of the BRI were officially presented for the first time in a 2015 document, the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road.[8]: 76 It outlined six economic corridors for trade and investment connectivity would be implemented.[8]: 76

The BRI develops new markets for Chinese firms, channels excess industrial capacity overseas, increases China's access to resources, and strengthens its ties with partner countries.[8]: 34 The initiative generates its own export demand because Chinese loans enable participating countries to develop infrastructure projects involving Chinese firms and expertise.[15]: 43 The infrastructure developed also helps China to address the imbalance between its more developed eastern regions and its less developed western regions.[15]: 43

For developing countries, the BRI is appealing because of the opportunities it offers to alleviate their economic disadvantages relative to Western countries.[8]: 49 The BRI offers them infrastructure development, financial assistance, and technical assistance from China.[16]: 223 The increase in foreign direct investment and increased trade linkages also increases employment and poverty alleviation for these countries.[16]: 224

While some countries, especially the United States, view the project critically because of Chinese government influence, others point to the creation of a new global growth engine by connecting and moving Asia, Europe and Africa closer together.[17]

In the maritime silk road, which is already the route for more than half of all containers in the world, deep-water ports are being expanded, logistical hubs are being built, and new traffic routes are being created in the hinterland. The maritime silk road runs with its connections from the Chinese coast to the south, linking Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Jakarta, then westward linking the Sri Lankan capital city of Colombo, and Malé, capital of the Maldives, and onward to East Africa, and the city of Mombasa, in Kenya. From there the linkage moves northward to Djibouti, through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, thereby linking Haifa, Istanbul, and Athens, to the Upper Adriatic region to the northern Italian hub of Trieste, with its international free port and its rail connections to Central Europe and the North Sea.[18][19][20][21]

As a result, Poland, the Baltic States, Northern Europe, and Central Europe are also connected to the maritime silk road and logistically linked to East Africa, India and China via the Adriatic ports and Piraeus. All in all, the ship connections for container transports between Asia and Europe will be reorganized. In contrast to the longer East Asian traffic via north-west Europe, the southern sea route through the Suez Canal towards the junction Trieste shortens the goods transport by at least four days.[22][23][24]

In connection with the Silk Road project, China is also trying to network worldwide research activities.[25]

Simon Shen and Wilson Chan have compared the initiative to the post-World War II Marshall Plan.[26] It is the largest infrastructure investment by a great power since the Marshall Plan.[15]: 1

China intentionally frames the BRI flexibly in order to adapt it to changing needs or policies, such as the addition of a "Health Silk Road" during the COVID-19 pandemic.[8]: 147 The Health Silk Road (HSR) is an initiative under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed at enhancing public health infrastructure and fostering international cooperation in healthcare. Initiated as part of China's broader strategy to engage in global health governance, the HSR seeks to improve healthcare facilities, enhance disease prevention, and strengthen healthcare cooperation across participating countries. The initiative includes the construction of healthcare facilities, such as hospitals in Pakistan and Laos, and collaborative programs with global organizations like the World Health Organization. Academic Shaoyu Yuan finds that while the HSR contributes to health sector improvements in participating nations, it also prompts discussions regarding the long-term debt sustainability and the transparency of project execution. As the HSR expands, it exemplifies China's role in global health diplomacy, reflecting a complex interplay between development goals and geopolitical strategy.[27]

### Initiative name

The official name for the initiative is the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road Development Strategy (丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路发展战略),[28] which was initially abbreviated as the One Belt One Road (Chinese: 一带一路) or the OBOR strategy. The English translation has been changed to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2016, when the Chinese government considered the emphasis on the words "one" and "strategy" were prone to misinterpretation and suspicion, so they opted for the more inclusive term "initiative" in its translation.[29][30] However, "One Belt One Road" is still the reference term in Chinese-language media.[31]

### International relations

The Belt and Road Initiative is believed by some analysts to be a way to extend Chinese economic and political influence.[13][32] Some geopolitical analysts have couched the Belt and Road Initiative in the context of Halford Mackinder's heartland theory.[33][34][35] Scholars have noted that official PRC media attempts to mask any strategic dimensions of the Belt and Road Initiative as a motivation,[36] while others note that the BRI also serves as signposts for Chinese provinces and ministries, guiding their policies and actions.[37] Academic Keyu Jin writes that while the BRI does advance strategic interests for China, it also reflects the CCP's vision of a world order based on "building a global community of shared future".[38]: 281–282

China has already invested billions of dollars in several South Asian countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan to improve their basic infrastructure, with implications for China's trade regime as well as its military influence. This project can also become a new economic corridor for different regions. For example, in the Caucasus region, China considered cooperation with Armenia from May 2019. Chinese and Armenian sides had multiple meetings, signed contracts, initiated a north–south road program to solve even infrastructure-related aspects.[39] A 2025 academic review of China's role in the Middle East interprets the BRI as not only an infrastructure program but also a diplomatic instrument for expanding Chinese influence through soft power. It notes that China utilizes digital projects, cultural exchange, and educational initiatives to project influence while maintaining strategic ambiguity in regions like the Gulf.[40]

#### Military implications

The BRI has been viewed as part of a strategy to lessen the effect of choke points such as the Strait of Malacca in the event of a military conflict and to blunt the U.S. island chain strategy and the Malacca dilemma.[41][42][43][44] A 2023 study by AidData of the College of William & Mary determined that overseas port locations subject to significant BRI investment raise questions of dual military and civilian use and may be favorable for future naval bases.[45][46]

Writing in 2023, David H. Shinn and academic Joshua Eisenman state that through the BRI, China seeks to strengthen its strategic position and diminish American military influence, but that China's BRI activity is likely not a prelude to American-style military bases or American-style global military presence.[47]: 161 China's construction of ports which could have dual-uses has been characterized as an attempt to avoid the necessity of establishing strictly military bases.[47]: 273 According to academic Xue Guifang, China is not motivated to repeat the model of the People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti.[47]: 273

### Western regions

Economic development of China's less developed western regions, particularly Xinjiang, is one of the government's stated goals in pursuing the BRI.[48][49]: 199 The strategic location of Xinjiang has also been recognized as central. In 2014, state media outlet Xinhua News Agency stated Xinjiang "connects Pakistan, Mongolia, Russia, India, and four other central Asian countries with a borderline extending 5,600 km, giving it easy access to the Eurasian heartland."[50] Some analysts have suggested that the CCP considers Xinjiang's local population, the Uyghurs, and their attachment to their traditional lands potential threats to the BRI's success, or it fears that developing Xinjiang may also open it up to radicalizing Islamic influences from other states which are participating in the BRI.[51][52][53][54]

## Leadership

A leading group was formed sometime in late 2014, and its leadership line-up publicized on 1 February 2015. This steering committee reports directly into the State Council of China and is composed of several political heavyweights, evidence of the importance of the program to the government. Then Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, who was also a member of the 7-man CCP Politburo Standing Committee, was named leader of the group, and Wang Huning, Wang Yang, Yang Jing, and Yang Jiechi named deputy leaders.[55]

On 28 March 2015, China's State Council outlined the principles, framework, key areas of cooperation and cooperation mechanisms with regard to the initiative.[56] The BRI is considered a central element within China's foreign policy, and was incorporated into the CCP's constitution in 2017 during its 19th Congress.[57][47]: 58 The BRI represents a set of policies for Chinese engagement with the global South, including diversifying resource and energy supplies, building loan-funded infrastructure using Chinese companies, creating new markets for Chinese companies, and engaging global South countries simultaneously at bilateral and regional levels.[8]: 6

With regard to China and the African countries, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a significant multilateral cooperation mechanism for facilitating BRI projects.[58] The China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) serves a similar coordinating role with regard to BRI projects in the Arab states.[58]

## Membership

Error creating thumbnail: Countries in the Belt and Road Initiative are in Dark Green, countries that have officially withdrawn are in Light Green, and countries that have  de facto withdrawn but still have active MoU's or other agreements are in yellow.

Countries join the Belt and Road Initiative by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China regarding their participation in it. The Government of China maintains a listing of all involved countries on its Belt and Road Portal,[59] and state media outlet Xinhua News Agency puts out a press release whenever a memorandum of understanding related to the Belt and Road Initiative is signed with a new country.[60] As of May 2025[update], according to observers at Fudan University's Green Finance and Development Center, between 146 and 150 states were members of the Belt and Road Initiative.[61]

### Current and previous members

Countries; Signature, Date of Exit, and Status; & Income Level and Region[62] Country  | Date of Signature[lower-alpha 1] | Date of Exit  | Member Status  | Income Level[lower-alpha 2] | Region

|
|
|
|
|

Afghanistan  | 1 May 2023  | —  | Signatory  | Low income  | South Asia
Albania  | 1 May 2017  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Algeria  | 10 July 2018  | —  | Middle East & North Africa
Angola  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Lower middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Antigua and Barbuda  | 1 June 2018  | —  | High income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina  | 6 February 2022  | —
Armenia  | 1 December 2015  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Austria  | —  | —  | Unclear  | High income
Azerbaijan  | 1 December 2015  | —  | Signatory  | Upper middle income
Bahrain  | 1 July 2018  | —  | High income  | Middle East & North Africa
Bangladesh  | 1 March 2019  | —  | Lower middle income  | South Asia
Barbados  | 1 February 2019  | —  | High income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Belarus  | 1 December 2013  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Benin  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Bolivia  | 1 June 2018  | —  | Lower middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Bosnia and Herzegovina  | 1 May 2017  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Botswana  | 7 January 2021  | —  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Brunei  | 1 November 2018  | —  | High income  | East Asia & Pacific
Bulgaria  | 1 November 2015  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Burundi  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Cabo Verde  | —  | Lower middle income
Cambodia  | 1 December 2013  | —  | East Asia & Pacific
Cameroon  | 1 August 2015  | —  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Central African Republic  | 1 November 2021  | —  | Low income
Chad  | 1 September 2018  | —
Chile  | 6 November 2018  | —  | High income  | Latin America & Caribbean
China  | 1 December 2013  | —  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Colombia  | 14 May 2025  | —  | Latin America & Caribbean
Comoros  | 1 December 2015  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Democratic Republic of the Congo  | 6 January 2021  | —
Republic of the Congo  | —  | —  | Unclear  | Lower middle income
Cook Islands  | 1 November 2018  | —  | Signatory  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Costa Rica  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Latin America & Caribbean
Côte d'Ivoire  | 23 May 2017  | —  | Lower middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Croatia  | 1 May 2017  | —  | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Cuba  | 20 June 2019  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Cyprus  | 1 April 2019  | —  | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Czech Republic  | 1 November 2015  | —
Djibouti  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Lower middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
Dominica  | 13 July 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Dominican Republic  | 1 December 2019  | —
Ecuador  | 1 December 2018  | —
Egypt  | 1 January 2016  | —  | Lower middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
El Salvador  | 1 November 2018  | —  | Latin America & Caribbean
Equatorial Guinea  | 1 April 2019  | —  | Upper middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Eritrea  | 25 November 2021  | —  | Low income
Estonia  | 1 November 2017  | 11 November 2022[lower-alpha 3][66][65] | Exited (de facto from leaving 17+1 and MoU expiration)[66][65] | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Ethiopia  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Signatory  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Fiji  | 1 November 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Gabon  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Sub-Saharan Africa
The Gambia  | —  | Low income
Georgia  | 1 December 2016  | —  | Lower middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Ghana  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Greece  | 1 August 2018  | —  | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Grenada  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Guinea  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Guinea-Bissau  | 24 November 2021  | —
Guyana  | 1 July 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Honduras  | 18 October 2023  | —  | Lower middle income
Hungary  | 1 June 2015  | —  | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Indonesia  | 1 March 2015  | —  | Lower middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Iran  | 1 November 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
Iraq  | 1 December 2015  | —
Italy  | 1 March 2019  | 6 December 2023[lower-alpha 4][62][67][68] | Exited (de facto from MoU expiration)  | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Jamaica  | 1 April 2019  | —  | Signatory  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Jordan  | 2 December 2023  | —  | Middle East
Kazakhstan  | 1 August 2015  | —  | Europe & Central Asia
Kenya  | 1 June 2017  | —  | Lower middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Kiribati  | 1 January 2020
East Asia & Pacific
Kuwait  | 1 September 2018  | —  | High income  | Middle East
Kyrgyzstan  | 1 December 2013  | —  | Lower middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Laos  | 1 September 2018  | —  | East Asia & Pacific
Latvia  | 1 November 2016  | 11 November 2022[65] | Exited (de facto from leaving 17+1and MoU expiration)[65] | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Lebanon  | 1 September 2017  | —  | Signatory  | Upper middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
Lesotho  | 1 June 2019  | —  | Lower middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Liberia  | 1 April 2019  | —  | Low income
Libya  | 1 July 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
Lithuania  | 1 November 2017  | 2 March 2021[69][70][71] | Exited (de facto from leaving 17+1 and MoU expiration)[69][70][71] | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Luxembourg  | 1 March 2019  | —  | Signatory
Madagascar  | 1 March 2017  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Malawi  | 24 March 2022  | —
Malaysia  | 1 May 2017  | —  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Maldives  | 1 August 2017  | —  | South Asia
Mali  | 26 July 2019  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Malta  | 1 November 2018  | —  | High income  | Middle East & North Africa
Mauritania  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Lower middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Micronesia  | 1 November 2018  | —  | East Asia & Pacific
Moldova  | 1 December 2013  | —  | Europe & Central Asia
Mongolia  | —  | East Asia & Pacific
Montenegro  | 1 May 2017  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Morocco  | 1 November 2017  | —  | Lower middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
Mozambique  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Myanmar  | 1 August 2016  | —  | Lower middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Namibia  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Nepal  | 1 May 2017  | —  | Low income  | South Asia
New Zealand  | 1 March 2017  | —  | High income  | East Asia & Pacific
Nicaragua  | 6 January 2022  | —  | Lower middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Niger  | —  | —  | Unclear  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Nigeria  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Signatory  | Lower middle income
Niue  | 1 July 2018  | —  | East Asia & Pacific
North Macedonia  | 1 December 2013  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Oman  | 1 May 2018  | —  | High income  | Middle East & North Africa
Pakistan  | 1 December 2013  | —  | Lower middle income  | South Asia
Panama  | 1 June 2017  | 3 February 2025[72][73] | Exited (de facto from Panamanian desire to decrease Panama-China ties and MoU expiration)[72][73] | High income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Papua New Guinea  | 1 July 2016  | —  | Signatory  | Lower middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Peru  | 1 May 2019  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Philippines  | 1 November 2017  | 2 November 2023[74][75] | Exited (de facto from rising tensions and MoU expiration)[74][75] | Lower middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Poland  | 1 November 2015  | —  | Signatory  | High income  | Europe & Central Asia
Portugal  | 1 December 2018  | —
Qatar  | 1 January 2019  | —  | Middle East & North Africa
Romania  | 1 June 2015  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Russia  | —  | —  | Unclear  | High income
Rwanda  | 1 July 2018  | —  | Signatory  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Samoa  | 1 October 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Saudi Arabia  | 1 August 2018  | —  | High income  | Middle East & North Africa
Senegal  | 1 July 2018  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Serbia  | 1 November 2015  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Seychelles  | 1 September 2018  | —  | High income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Sierra Leone  | 1 August 2018  | —  | Low income
Singapore  | 1 April 2018  | —  | High income  | East Asia & Pacific
Slovakia  | 1 November 2015  | —  | Europe & Central Asia
Slovenia  | 1 November 2017  | —
Solomon Islands  | 1 October 2019  | —  | Lower middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Somalia  | 1 August 2015  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa  | 1 December 2015  | —  | Upper middle income
South Sudan  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income
Sri Lanka  | 1 April 2017  | —  | Lower middle income  | South Asia
Sudan  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Suriname  | 1 July 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Syria  | 6 January 2022  | —  | Low income  | Middle East & North Africa
Tajikistan  | 1 October 2018  | —  | Europe & Central Asia
Tanzania  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Thailand  | 1 December 2014  | —  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Timor-Leste  | 1 April 2017  | —  | Lower middle income
Togo  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Tonga  | 1 March 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Trinidad and Tobago  | 1 May 2018  | —  | High income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Tunisia  | 1 July 2018  | —  | Lower middle income  | Middle East & North Africa
Turkey  | 1 November 2015  | —  | Upper middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Turkmenistan  | 1 June 2017  | —
Uganda  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Ukraine  | 1 December 2017  | —  | Lower middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
United Arab Emirates  | 1 July 2018  | —  | High income  | Middle East & North Africa
Uruguay  | 1 February 2018  | —  | Latin America & Caribbean
Uzbekistan  | 1 June 2015  | —  | Lower middle income  | Europe & Central Asia
Vanuatu  | 1 November 2018  | —  | East Asia & Pacific
Venezuela  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Upper middle income  | Latin America & Caribbean
Vietnam  | 1 November 2017  | —  | Lower middle income  | East Asia & Pacific
Yemen  | —  | Low income  | Middle East & North Africa
Zambia  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Lower middle income  | Sub-Saharan Africa
Zimbabwe  | 1 September 2018  | —  | Low income

## Financing

China's investment in the BRI began at a moderate level in 2013 and increased significantly over 2014 and 2015.[76]: 214 Investment volume peaked in 2016 and 2017.[76]: 214 Afterwards, investments decreased gradually, and then significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic.[76]: 214 The BRI's lowest investment volume was in 2023.[76]: 214

China's investment in the Maritime Silk Road portion of the BRI has grown at a steady pace.[76]: 214 As of 2023, Maritime Silk Road investments were 60% of the BRI's total investment volume.[76]: 214

### Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Prospective members (regional)

Members (regional)

Prospective members (non-regional)

Members (non-regional)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, first proposed in October 2013, is a development bank dedicated to lending for infrastructure projects. As of 2015, China announced that over one trillion yuan (US$160 billion) of infrastructure-related projects were in planning or construction.[77]

The primary goals of AIIB are to address the expanding infrastructure needs across Asia, enhance regional integration, promote economic development and improve public access to social services.[78] At inception, the AIIB was explicitly linked to the BRI.[15]: 166 The AIIB was subsequently broadened to include investments with states that are not involved with the BRI.[15]: 166

Loans through AIIB are accessible on AIIB's website, unlike many other forms of Chinese investment through the BRI.[8]: 85

### Silk Road Fund

For the main article, see Silk Road Fund.

On 29 December 2014, China established the Silk Road Fund with total capital of US$40 billion and ¥100 billion.[16]: 221 The Silk Road Fund invests in BRI infrastructure, resource development, energy development, industrial cooperation, and financial cooperation.[16]: 221 The Karot Hydropower Project in Pakistan was its first project.[16]: 221–222

### China Investment Corporation

China Investment Corporation supports the BRI by investing in its infrastructure projects, participating in other BRI-related development funds, and assisting Chinese corporations with foreign mergers and acquisitions.[79]: 124 China Investment Corporation also invested in the Silk Road Fund.[16]: 221

CIC's domestic subsidiary Central Huijin indirectly supports the BRI through its support of domestic financial institutions, such as policy banks or state-owned commercial banks, which in turn fund BRI projects.[79]: 124

### Policy banks

Policy banks, including the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, have important roles in funding BRI projects.[15]: 167

### Other financing

Between 2015 and 2020, the Bank of China lent over US$185.1 billion for BRI projects.[80]: 143

As of April 2019, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China had lent over US$100 billion for BRI projects.[80]: 143

### Debt sustainability

In 2017, China joined the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing and in 2019 to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment. The Center for Global Development described China's New Debt Sustainability Framework as "virtually identical" to the World Bank's and IMF's own debt sustainability framework.[81][82] According to academic Jeremy Garlick, for many impoverished countries, China is the best available option for development finance and practical assistance.[8]: 6 Western investors and the World Bank have been reluctant to invest in troubled countries like Pakistan, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Montenegro, which China is willing to invest in through the BRI.[8]: 146–147 Generally, the United States and EU have not offered global South countries with investment comparable to what China offers through the BRI.[8]: 147

China is the largest bilateral lender in the world.[83] Loans are backed by collateral such as rights to a mine, a port or money.[84]

This policy has been alleged by the US Government to be a form of debt-trap diplomacy; however, according to the Alibaba-owned South China Morning Post, the term itself has come under scrutiny as analysts and researchers have pointed out that there is no evidence to prove that China is deliberately aiming to do debt-trap diplomacy.[85] Research from Deborah Brautigam, an international political economy professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Meg Rithmire, an associate professor at Harvard Business School, have disputed the allegations of debt-trap diplomacy by China and pointed out that "Chinese banks are willing to restructure the terms of existing loans and have never actually seized an asset from any country, much less the port of Hambantota". In an editorial letter, they argued that it was 'long overdue' for people to know the truth and not to have it be "wilfully misunderstood".[86] Writing in 2023, academic and former UK diplomat Kerry Brown states that China's relationship to the Hambantota port has become the opposite of the theorized debt-trap modus operandi.[87]: 56 Brown observes that China has had to commit more money to the project, expose itself to further risk, and has had to become entangled in complex local politics.[87]: 56 As of 2024, the port has not been a significant economic success, although shipping through the port is on the increase.[15]: 69

In his comparison of BRI loans to IMF loans and Paris Club loans, which have not been very successful in reducing the debt of developing countries, academic Jeremy Garlick concludes that there is no reason to believe the BRI framework is worse for developing countries' debt than Western lending frameworks.[8]: 69

For China itself, a report from Fitch Ratings doubts Chinese banks' ability to control risks, as they do not have a good record of allocating resources efficiently at home. This may lead to new asset quality problems for Chinese banks where most funding is likely to originate.[88]

In August 2022, China announced that it would forgive 23 of its interest-free loans to 17 African nations.[89] The loans had matured at the end of 2021.[89]

A 2025 study by the Lowy Institute found that for 54 developing countries debt repayments to China exceed those owed to Paris Club countries.[90][91][92][93] The study stated that "Chinese lending has been a driver of debt sustainability problems in many countries around the world."[93]

### Effects

An analysis of BRI loans from 2007 to 2022 found that they make other forms of financing on the bond market more expensive for the debtor country.[94]

## Infrastructure networks

The BRI is composed of six urban development land corridors linked by road, rail, energy, and digital infrastructure and the Maritime Silk Road linked by the development of ports.[15]: 1

The Silk Road has proven to be a productive but at the same time elusive concept, increasingly used as an evocative metaphor.[95] With China's 'Belt and Road Initiative', it has found fresh invocations and audiences.[96] These are the belts in the name, and there is also a maritime silk road.[97] Infrastructure corridors spanning some 60 countries, primarily in Asia and Europe but also including Oceania and East Africa, will cost an estimated US$4–8 trillion.[98][99] The land corridors include:[97]

* The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Chinese:中国-巴基斯坦经济走廊; Urdu: پاكستان-چین اقتصادی راہداری) is the most developed land corridor of the BRI, as of at least 2024.[15]: 42 It is a US$62 billion collection of infrastructure projects throughout Pakistan[100][101][102] which aims to rapidly modernize Pakistan's transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and economy.[101][102][103][104] On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia.[105] CPEC and Gwadar port infrastructure is particularly significant because it opens routes independent of the Malacca strait.[106]: 99
* The New Eurasian Land Bridge, which runs from Western China to Western Russia through Kazakhstan, and includes the Silk Road Railway through China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany. Astana, Kazakhstan is a major hub for the BRI, including related financial services and legal services.[15]: 45 Khorgos which straddles the Kazakhstan-China border, is the major dry port for this corridor and is the place where rail cargo switches from the standard gauge used in China to the wider gauge used in the former Soviet Union.[15]: 57
* The China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor,[15]: 39 running from Northern China through Mongolia to the Russian Far East. The Russian government-established Russian Direct Investment Fund and China's China Investment Corporation, a Chinese sovereign wealth fund, partnered in 2012 to create the Russia-China Investment Fund, which concentrates on opportunities in bilateral integration.[107][108]
* The China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor, which will run from Western China to Turkey.
* The China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridor, which will run from Southern China to Singapore.
* The Trans-Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity Network, which will turn Nepal from a landlocked to a land-linked country.

This kind of connectivity is the focus of BRI efforts because China's significant economic growth has been supported by exports and the overland import of major quantities of raw materials and intermediate components.[106]: 98 By 2022, China had built cross-border highways and expressway networks to almost every nearby region.[106]: 99

Railway connectivity is a major focus of the BRI.[15]: 62 Use of BRI-related rail surged after the COVID-19 pandemic, which had congested air freight and sea shipping, and hampered port access.[106]: 99 As of 2024, multiple BRI railway projects were branded as the China Railways Express, which linked approximately 60 Chinese cities to approximately 50 European cities.[15]: 62

### Silk Road Economic Belt

Xi Jinping visited Astana, Kazakhstan, and Southeast Asia in September and October 2013, and proposed jointly building a new economic area, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) (Chinese: 丝绸之路经济带).[109] The "belt" includes countries on the original Silk Road through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The initiative would create a cohesive economic area by building both hard infrastructure such as rail and road links and soft infrastructure such as trade agreements and a common commercial legal structure with a court system to police the agreements.[110]

Besides a zone largely analogous to the historical Silk Road, an expansion includes South Asia and Southeast Asia. The BRI is important from the Southeast Asian perspective because, with the exception of Singapore, Southeast Asian countries require significant infrastructure investment to advance their development.[111]: 210

Three belts are proposed. The North belt would go through Central Asia and Russia to Europe. The Central belt passes through Central Asia and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. The South belt runs from China through Southeast Asia and South Asia and on to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan. The strategy will integrate China with Central Asia through Kazakhstan's Nurly Zhol infrastructure program.[112]

### 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

The "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" (Chinese:21世纪海上丝绸之路), or just the Maritime Silk Road, is the sea route 'corridor.'[110] It is a complementary initiative aimed at investing and fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania and Africa through several contiguous bodies of water: the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, and the wider Indian Ocean area.[113][114][115] It was first proposed in October 2013 by Xi Jinping in a speech to the Indonesian Parliament.[116]

Yangshan Port of Shanghai, China Container terminals in Kwai Chung, Hong Kong

According to estimates in 2019, the land route of the Silk Road remains a niche project and the bulk of the Silk Road trade continues to be carried out by sea. The reasons are primarily due to the cost of container transport. The maritime Silk Road is also considered to be particularly attractive for trade because, in contrast to the land-based Silk Road leading through the sparsely populated Central Asia, there are on the one hand, far more states on the way to Europe and, on the other hand, their markets, development opportunities, and population numbers are far larger. In particular, there are many land-based links, such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM). Due to the attractiveness of this now subsidized sea route and the related investments, there have been major shifts in the logistics chains of the shipping sector in recent years.[117] Due to its unique geographical location, Myanmar is viewed to be playing a pivotal role in China's BRI projects.[118]

From the Chinese point of view, Africa is important as a market, raw material supplier and platform for the expansion of the new Silk Road, so investment in the coasts of Africa (particularly East Africa) is part of its economic strategy. In Kenya's port of Mombasa, China has built a rail and road connection to the inland and to the capital Nairobi. To the northeast of Mombasa, a large port with 32 berths including an adjacent industrial area including infrastructure with new traffic corridors to South Sudan and Ethiopia is being built. A modern deep-water port, a satellite city, an airfield and an industrial area are being built in Bagamoyo, Tanzania. Further towards the Mediterranean, the Teda Egypt special economic zone is being built near the Egyptian coastal town of Ain Sochna as a joint Chinese-Egyptian project.[119][120]

* Suez Canal

* Container ship transiting the Suez Canal

* Mombasa Port on Kenya's Indian Ocean coast

As part of its Silk Road strategy, China is participating in large areas of Africa in the construction and operation of train routes, roads, airports and industry. In several countries, such as Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana, dams have been built with Chinese help. In Nairobi, China is funding the construction of the tallest building in Africa, the Pinnacle Towers. With the Chinese investments of 60 billion dollars for Africa announced in September 2018, on the one hand, sales markets are created, and the local economy is promoted, and, on the other hand, African raw materials are made available for China.[121]

One of the Chinese bridgeheads in Europe is the port of Piraeus. Overall, Chinese companies are to invest a total of 350 million euros directly in the port facilities there by 2026 and a further 200 million euros in associated projects such as hotels.[122] In Europe, China wants to continue investing in Portugal with its deep-water port in Sines, but especially in Italy and there at the Adriatic logistics hub around Trieste. Venice, the historically important European endpoint of the maritime Silk Road, has less and less commercial importance today due to the shallow depth or silting of its port.[123]

The international free zone of Trieste provides in particular special areas for storage, handling and processing as well as transit zones for goods.[124][125] At the same time, logistics and shipping companies invest in their technology and locations in order to benefit from ongoing developments.[126][127] This also applies to the logistics connections between Turkey and the free port of Trieste, which are important for the Silk Road, and from there by train to Rotterdam and Zeebrugge. There is also direct cooperation, for example between Trieste, Bettembourg, and the Chinese province of Sichuan. While direct train connections from China to Europe, such as from Chengdu to Vienna overland, are partially stagnating or discontinued, there are (as of 2019) new weekly rail connections between Wolfurt or Nuremberg and Trieste or between Trieste, Vienna and Linz on the maritime Silk Road.[128][129]

Port of Trieste

There are also extensive intra-European infrastructure projects to adapt trade flows to current needs. Concrete projects (as well as their financing), which are to ensure the connection of the Mediterranean ports with the European hinterland, are decided among others at the annual China-Central-East-Europe summit, which was launched in 2012. This applies, for example, to the expansion of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, the construction of the high-speed train between Milan, Venice and Trieste[130] and connections on the Adriatic-Baltic and Adriatic-North Sea axis. Poland, the Baltic States, Northern Europe and Central Europe are also connected to the maritime Silk Road through many links and are thus logistically networked via the Adriatic ports and Piraeus to East Africa, India and China. Overall the pan is that the ship connections for container transport between Asia and Europe will be reorganized. In contrast to the longer East Asia traffic via northwest Europe, the south-facing sea route through the Suez Canal towards the Trieste bridgehead shortens the transport of goods by at least four days.[131]

According to a study by the University of Antwerp, the maritime route via Trieste dramatically reduces transport costs. The example of Munich shows that the transport there from Shanghai via Trieste takes 33 days, while the northern route takes 43 days. From Hong Kong, the southern route reduces transport to Munich from 37 to 28 days. The shorter route leads to better use of the ships and lower CO2 emissions. Therefore, in the Mediterranean area, where the economic zone of the Liverpool–Milan Axis meets functioning railroad connections and deep-water ports, there are significant growth zones. Henning Vöpel, Director of the Hamburg World Economic Institute, says that the North Range (i.e. transport via the North Sea ports to Europe) will not necessarily remain dominant in the medium term.[132]

From 2025, the Brenner Base Tunnel will also link the upper Adriatic with southern Germany. The port of Trieste, next to Gioia Tauro the only deep water port in the central Mediterranean for container ships of the seventh generation, is therefore a special target for Chinese investments. In March 2019, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signed agreements to promote the ports of Trieste and Genoa. Accordingly, the port's annual handling capacity will be increased from 10,000 to 25,000 trains in Trieste (Trihub project) and a reciprocal platform to promote and handle trade between Europe and China will be created. It is also about logistics promotion between the North Adriatic port and Shanghai or Guangdong. This also includes a state Hungarian investment of 100 million euros for a 32 hectare logistics center and funding from the European Union of 45 million euros in 2020 for the development of the railway system in the port city.[133] Furthermore, the Hamburg port logistics group HHLA invested in the logistics platform of the port of Trieste (PLT) in September 2020.[134] In 2020, Duisburger Hafen AG (Duisport), the world's largest intermodal terminal operator, took a 15% stake in the Trieste freight terminal.[135] There are also further contacts between Hamburg, Bremen and Trieste with regard to cooperation.[136] There are also numerous collaborations in the Upper Adriatic, for example with the logistics platform in Cervignano.[137] In particular, the area of the upper Adriatic is developing into an extended intersection of the economic areas known as the Blue Banana and the Golden Banana. The importance of the free port of Trieste is expected to continue to increase in the coming years due to the planned port expansion and the expansion of the Baltic-Adriatic railway axis (Semmering Base Tunnel, Koralm Tunnel and in the wider area Brenner Base Tunnel).[138][139][140]

### Ice Silk Road

In addition to the Maritime Silk Road, Russia and China are reported to have agreed to jointly build an 'Ice Silk Road' along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic, along a maritime route within Russian territorial waters.[141][142]

China COSCO Shipping Corp. has completed several trial trips on Arctic shipping routes, and Chinese and Russian companies are cooperating on oil and gas exploration in the area and to advance comprehensive collaboration on infrastructure construction, tourism and scientific expeditions.[142]

### Digital Silk Road

In 2015, Xi announced the Digital Silk Road.[15]: 71 The Digital Silk Road is a component of the BRI which includes digital technological development, the development of digital standards, and the expansion of digital infrastructure.[143]: 177–188 Its stated aim is to improve digital connectivity among participating countries, with China as the main driver of the improved digital infrastructure, with the benefit to China of reducing its reliance on American digital technology.[144]: 205 The Digital Silk Road has also been a way to export China's system of mass surveillance and censorship technology of the Great Firewall to multiple countries.[145][146][147] In a 2024 literature review, academics Christopher Foster et al. write that the focus on concerns about the potential negative impacts of Chinese digital expansion in the global south are often speculative, not evidence-based, worries and that there is "virtually no specific evidence as yet about the positive local economic impact of Digital Silk Road."[148]

Like the BRI more broadly, the Digital Silk Road is not monolithic and involves many actors across both China's public and private sectors.[144]: 205 Alibaba supplies a significant amount of technology for the Digital Silk Road.[149]: 272

In an age of increasing separation between the West and China regarding advanced technologies, both sides are working to establish or strengthen their own spheres of influence in technology markets. One notable example of this is China's Digital Silk Road.[150] China frames the Digital Silk Road as part of an effort to create a community of common destiny in cyberspace.[15]: 72 A key component of the strategy is to build digital infrastructure in areas of the global south where private providers have not been willing to develop infrastructure and where local governments do not have the capacity to do so.[15]: 76 China's willingness to develop digital infrastructure in such locations is in part due to the expectation that future population growth will be especially high in global south regions.[15]: 76–77

As part of the Digital Silk Road, China built 34 terrestrial cables and dozens of underwater cables within 12 BRI countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe over the period 2017–2022.[143]: 180 Digital Silk Road-related investments in projects outside China reached an estimated US$79 billion as of 2018.[144]: 205

At the opening ceremony of the first Belt and Road Forum, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of developing a Digital Silk Road through innovation in intelligent cities concepts, the digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and quantum computing.[143]: 77

The Eurasian Economic Union cooperates with China on the development of the Digital Silk Road.[151]: 187 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus are actively involved in the Digital Silk Road while Russia incorporated Chinese technologies into its digital infrastructure.[152]

In February 2024, leaked documents from a Chinese government contractor based in Shanghai called I-Soon provided details into a hacking campaign involving the critical infrastructure of Digital Silk Road partner countries.[153]

### Super grid

The super grid project aims to develop six ultra high voltage electrical grids across China, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. The wind power resources of Central Asia would form one component of this grid.[154][155] Because renewable resources are far from the centres of population, a long-distance transmission system is needed, which needs to be ultra-high voltage to operate efficiently.

### Additionally proposed

The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) was proposed to run from southern China to Myanmar and was initially officially classified as "closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative".[156] Since the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019, BCIM has been dropped from the list of projects due to India's refusal to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.[157]

## Projects

For a more comprehensive list, see List of projects of the Belt and Road Initiative.

China has engaged 149[158] countries and 30 international organizations in the BRI.[159] Infrastructure projects include ports, railways, highways, power stations, aviation and telecommunications.[160] The flagship projects include the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Boten–Vientiane railway in Laos and Khorgos land port.[161][162][163] The launch of the China-Europe Freight Train (CEFT) preceded the BRI but was later incorporated into the BRI.[15]: 120

Train station in Nairobi, Kenya built with BRI funding in 2017

Interpretations of which projects are part of the BRI can differ because the Chinese government does not publish a comprehensive list of projects.[15]: 60–61 The Chinese Academy of Sciences takes a narrow definition, including only projects derived from, or included in, cooperation dialogues between China and other BRI countries.[164]: 223

### Corruption allegations and organized crime

There is limited data on corruption and organized crime involving the BRI in Chinese government sources.[165] However, scholars have recognized an increase in Chinese organized crime syndicate activity in some BRI countries.[166][167][168] BRI projects often support connectivity within and between countries, and rapid development and integration of border areas in some regions has brought security and transnational crime risks.[169][170] In some cases criminal groups have used the branding of the BRI to promote projects that are in fact not endorsed by the Chinese government, such as the Yatai New City project in Myanmar, which has been linked to illegal gambling and online fraud parks.[171]

The Belt and Road initiative. China in red. Members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in orange.[172]

In response to public corruption scandals such as the bribery and money laundering conviction of BRI advocate Patrick Ho, in 2019, the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that it would embed officers in countries participating in the BRI.[173]

A 2021 analysis by AidData at the College of William & Mary found that Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Belarus, were the top countries for reported corruption scandals involving BRI projects.[174]

Canopy of the main railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia, after the Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse

#### Serbia

On 1 November 2024, the concrete canopy of the main railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia, collapsed onto the busy pavement below, killing 15 people. The station building was constructed in 1964, and was renovated from 2021 to mid-2024 with support from China's Belt and Road Initiative. The official cause of the collapse is still under investigation with government corruption and opaque dealings with Chinese contractors blamed.[175] The work was completed by a consortium of the Chinese companies China Railway International Co., Ltd (a subsidiary of China Railway Group Limited) and China Communications Construction Company, Ltd. (together referred to as CRIC-CCCC).[176][177][178] The railway station reconstruction was done as part of the Budapest–Belgrade railway project, the first stage of the planned Budapest–Belgrade–Skopje–Athens railway international connection.[179] The collapse spawned a series of mass protests in Novi Sad, which then spread throughout Serbia, fueled by dissatisfaction with other issues including government corruption and media censorship.[180]

### Ecological issues

Approximately 54% of the BRI's energy projects are in clean energy or alternative energy sectors.[76]: 216

The Belt and Road initiative has attracted attention and concern from environmental organizations. A joint report by the World Wide Fund for Nature and HSBC argued that the BRI presents significant risks as well as opportunities for sustainable development. These risks include the overuse of natural resources, the disruption of ecosystems, and the emission of pollutants.[181] Coal-fired power stations, such as Emba Hunutlu power station in Turkey, are being built as part of BRI, thus increasing greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.[182] Glacier melting as a result of excess greenhouse gas emissions, endangered species preservation, desertification and soil erosion as a result of overgrazing and over farming, mining practices, water resource management, and air and water pollution as a result of poorly planned infrastructure projects are some of the ongoing concerns as they relate to Central Asian nations.[183]

A point of criticism of the BRI overall relates to the motivation of pollution and environmental degradation outsourcing to poorer nations, whose governments will disregard the consequences. In Serbia, for instance, where pollution-related deaths already top Europe, the presence of Chinese-owned coal-powered plants have resulted in an augmentation in the country's dependency on coal, as well as air and soil pollution in some towns.[184] BRI coal projects accounted for as much as 42% of China's overseas investment in 2018,[185] and 93% of energy investments of the BRI-linked Silk Road Fund go to fossil fuels.[186]

The development of port infrastructure and increasing shipping associated with the maritime Belt and Road Initiative could impact sensitive species and marine habitats like coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass meadows and saltmarsh.[187]

A report by the United Nations Development Programme and the China Center for International Economic Exchanges frame the BRI as an opportunity for environmental protection so long as it is used to provide green trade, finance, and investment in alignment with each country's implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.[188] Other proposals include providing financial support for BRI member countries aiming to fulfill their contribution to the Paris Agreement, or providing resources and policy expertise to aid the expansion of renewable energy sources such as solar power in member countries.[189][190]

China views the concept of ecological civilization as part of the BRI.[15]: 85

A solar panel array in Laos built with Chinese Belt and Road Initiative funding

The Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC) was launched during the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019.[47]: 60 It aims to "integrate sustainable development, in particular environmental sustainability, international standards and best practices, across the... priorities of the Belt and Road Initiative".[191][192][193] However, many scholars are unsure whether these best practices will be implemented. All BRI-specific environmental protection goals are outlined in informal guidelines rather than legally binding policies or regulations.[189][194] Moreover, member nations may choose to prioritize economic development over environmental protections, leading them to neglect to enforce environmental policy or lower environmental policy standards.[195] This could cause member nations to become "pollution havens" as Chinese domestic environmental protections are strengthened, though evidence of this currently happening is limited.[196][197]

Based on the most recent report from the Green Finance and Development center, which reports on the environmental progress of Belt and Road Initiative investment, there is evidence which shows that China has been successful in following the informal guidelines laid out by the BRIGC.[198] Many of the southeast Asia and eastern Europe countries that China seeks to work with through the BRI prioritize sustainable development.[15]: 87 China has responded by emphasizing a "Green Silk Road" and promoting harmony between humanity and the environment.[15]: 87 Chinese BRI investment in 2023 show that the year has been China's "greenest" yet since the project's inception when it comes to clean energy investment.[199] China made its largest ever contribution to investment in the green-energy sector, with US$7.9 billion being devoted to solar and wind power development, with projects being built in Brazil and Indonesia.[200][198][201] A further US$1.9 billion was invested in hydropower industry, including BRI hydroelectric dam projects in Cambodia, Pakistan, Uganda, Tajikistan, Georgia, Myanmar and Indonesia.[15]: 86 [198] There are additional solar and wind farm projects in Kazakhstan and Pakistan.[15]: 86

As of 2025[update], renewable energy projects are a focus of BRI projects in the Middle East.[202]: 184 China's BRI cooperation with Saudi Arabia includes a focus on renewable energy, consistent with Saudi national priorities of reducing oil dependence.[202]: 67 Dubai's Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park is also intended as a flagship project in the region.[202]: 184

In September 2021, Xi Jinping announced that his country will "step up support" for developing countries to adopt "green and low-carbon energy" and will no longer be financing overseas coal-fired power plants.[203] Xi has seemingly failed to live up to this pledge, as there has been expressed interest by China in providing financial and technical support for new coal-fired power projects. In January 2023, Pakistan announced that it had approved the construction of a Chinese-funded 300 MW coal-fired power plant in Gwadar, Pakistan.[204] More recently in January 2024, a 380 MW coal-fired power plant started operation in Sulawesi, Indonesia.[198]

### Allegations of human rights violations

A 2021 analysis by AidData at the College of William & Mary found that 35 percent of BRI infrastructure projects have encountered "major implementations problems" such as labor violations, corruption, environmental hazards, and public protests.[205][174]

According to a report by American NGO China Labor Watch, there are widespread human rights violations concerning Chinese migrant workers sent abroad. The Chinese companies allegedly "commit forced labor" and usually confiscate the workers' passports once they arrive in another country, make them apply for illegal business visas and threaten to report their illegal status if they refuse to comply, refuse to give adequate medical care and rest, restrict workers' personal freedom and freedom of speech, force workers to overwork, cancel vacations, delay the payment of wages, publish deceptive advertisements and promises, browbeat workers with high amount of damages if they intend to leave, provide bad working and living conditions, punish workers who lead protests and so on.[206][207]

## Reactions

Generally, it is more important for China to persuade its domestic audiences of the benefits of BRI than it is to persuade foreign audiences at-large.[8]: 148 Academic Jeremy Garlick writes that this is a reason why the Chinese government presents the BRI in a way more intuitively understandable to domestic than global audiences.[8]: 148

Former EU diplomat Bruno Maçães describes the BRI as the world's first transnational industrial policy because it goes beyond national policy to influence the industrial policy of other states.[15]: 165

### Support

As of 2020, more than 130 countries had issued endorsements.[84] UN Secretary General António Guterres has described the BRI as capable of accelerating the UN Sustainable Development Goals.[15]: 164 Institutional connections between the BRI and multiple UN bodies have also been established.[15]: 164

Poland's Prime Minister Beata Szydło and China's paramount leader Xi Jinping during meeting, 2016

In June 2016, Xi Jinping visited Poland and met with Poland's President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Beata Szydło.[208][209] Duda and Xi signed a declaration on strategic partnership in which they reiterated that Poland and China viewed each other as long-term strategic partners.[210]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chinese leader Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022

As a wealthy country, Singapore does not need massive external financing or technical assistance for domestic infrastructure building, but has repeatedly endorsed the BRI and cooperated in related projects in a quest for global relevance and to strengthen economic ties with BRI recipients. It is also one of the largest investors in the project. Furthermore, there is a strategic defensive factor: making sure a single country is not the single dominant factor in Asian economics.[211]

While the Philippines historically has been closely tied to the United States, China sought its support for the BRI in terms of the quest for dominance in the South China Sea. The Philippines adjusted its policy in favor of Chinese claims in the South China Sea under President Rodrigo Duterte.[212]

In 2017, Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek Minister of Finance, wrote in Project Syndicate that his experience with the Belt and Road Initiative has been highly encouraging.[213] He remarked that the Chinese authorities managed to combine their sense of self-interest with a patient investment attitude and a genuine commitment to negotiate over and over again, in order to achieve a mutually advantageous agreement.[213]

In April 2019 and during the second Arab Forum for Environment and Development, China engaged in an array of partnerships called "Build the Belt and Road, Share Development and Prosperity" with 18 Arab countries. The general stand of African countries sees BRI as a tremendous opportunity for independence from foreign aid and influence.[214]

Greece, Croatia, and 14 other Eastern European countries are already dealing with China within the framework of the BRI. In March 2019, Italy was the first member of the Group of Seven nations to join the BRI. The new partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding worth €2.5 billion across an array of sectors such as transport, logistics, and port infrastructure.[215]

Despite initially criticizing BRI, the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad pledged support for the BRI project in 2019.[216]: 54 He stated that he was fully in support of the Belt and Road Initiative and that his country would benefit from BRI. "Yes, the Belt and Road idea is great. It can bring the land-locked countries of Central Asia closer to the sea. They can grow in wealth and their poverty reduced," Mahathir said.[217]

Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov argues that the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and China's Belt and Road Initiative will work together to promote economic integration throughout the region.[218]

### Opposition

Some observers and skeptics, mainly from non-participant countries, including the United States, interpret it as a plan for a Sinocentric international trade network.[219][220] In response the United States, Japan, and Australia had formed a counter initiative, the Blue Dot Network in 2019, followed by the G7's Build Back Better World initiative in 2021.[221][222]

The United States proposes a counter-initiative called the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy" (FOIP). US officials have articulated the strategy as having three pillars: security, economics, and governance.[223] At the beginning of June 2019, there has been a redefinition of the general definitions of "free" and "open" into four stated principles: respect for sovereignty and independence; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade; and adherence to international rules and norms.[224]

Government officials in India have repeatedly objected to China's Belt and Road Initiative.[225] In particular, they believe the "China–Pakistan Economic Corridor" (CPEC) project ignores New Delhi's essential concerns about its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[226]

Former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad had initially found the terms of BRI to be too harsh for most countries and recommended countries avoid joining the BRI, but has changed his stance since.[227][228]

According to a report by Reuters, in 2019 the United States Central Intelligence Agency began a clandestine campaign on Chinese social media to spread negative narratives about the Xi's general secretaryship in an effort to influence Chinese public opinion against the government. The CIA promoted narratives that CCP leaders were hiding money overseas and that the BRI was corrupt and wasteful. As part of the campaign, the CIA also targeted foreign countries where the United States and China compete for influence.[229][230]

### Mixed

Vietnam historically has been at odds with China, so it has been indecisive about supporting or opposing BRI.[231] In December 2023, Vietnam and China agreed a number of cooperation documents, including one related to the BRI.[232]

South Korea has tried to develop the "Eurasia Initiative" (EAI) as its own vision for an east–west connection. In calling for a revival of the ancient Silk Road, the main goal of former President Park Geun-hye was to encourage a flow of economic, political, and social interaction from Europe through the Korean Peninsula. Her successor, President Moon Jae-in announced his own foreign policy initiative, the "New Southern Policy" (NSP), which seeks to strengthen relations with Southeast Asia.[233]

In 2017, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger stressed that cooperation between the US and Chinese governments was preferable to a race towards a new cold war. In his view the United States should embed itself into the Belt and Road Initiative by way of joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which would allow the United States to legitimately object to Chinese diplomatic over-reach.[234][235]

While Italy and Greece have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, other European countries have voiced ambivalent opinions. German chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the BRI "must lead to a certain reciprocity, and we are still wrangling over that bit". In January 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron said, "the ancient Silk Roads were never just Chinese … New roads cannot go just one way."[215] European Commission Chief Jean-Claude Juncker and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed an infrastructure agreement in Brussels in September 2019 to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative and link Europe and Asia to coordinate infrastructure, transport, and digital projects.[236][237]

In 2018, the premier of the south-eastern Australian state of Victoria, Daniel Andrews, signed a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative to establish infrastructure ties and further relations with China.[238][239] Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton described the BRI as "a propaganda initiative from China" that brings an "enormous amount of foreign interference", while arguing that "Victoria needs to explain why it is the only state in the country that has entered into this agreement". Prime Minister Scott Morrison said Victoria was stepping into federal government policy territory, stating "We didn't support that decision at the time [the Victoria State Government and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China] made [the agreement]. National interest issues on foreign affairs are determined by the federal government, and I respect their jurisdiction when it comes to the issues they're responsible for, and it's always been the usual practice for states to respect and recognise the role of the federal government in setting foreign policy". In April 2021, Foreign Minister Marise Payne declared Australia would pull out of the Belt and Road Initiative, cancelling Victoria's agreements signed with China, and pulling out of the "Belt and Road" initiative completely.[240][239][241][242] The federal government's decision to veto the deal reflected the increasingly soured relationship between the Australian Government and the Chinese Government, after China's alleged attempts to employ economic coercion[243] in response to the Australian Government's support for an inquest into the origins of COVID-19,[244] as well as the Australian Government's decision to support the US in several regional disputes opposing China, such as the issue of Taiwan[245] or the South China Sea.[246]

In October 2024, Brazil opted against joining the BRI.[247][248]

### Accusations of neo-colonialism and debt-trap diplomacy

Main article: Finance:Debt-trap diplomacy

#### Accusations

Some, including Western governments,[249] have accused the Belt and Road Initiative of being a form of neocolonialism, due to what they allege is China's practice of debt-trap diplomacy to fund the initiative's infrastructure projects.[250] The concept of debt-trap diplomacy was first coined by an Indian think tank, the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, before being picked up and expanded on by papers by two Harvard students, which subsequently gained media attention in the mainstream press.[251]

China contends that the initiative has provided markets for commodities, improved prices of resources, and thereby reduced inequalities in exchange, improved infrastructure, created employment, stimulated industrialization, and expanded technology transfer, thereby benefiting host countries.[252]

Tanzanian President John Magufuli said the loan agreements of BRI projects in his country were "exploitative and awkward".[253] He said Chinese financiers set "tough conditions that can only be accepted by mad people," because his government was asked to give them a guarantee of 33 years and an extensive lease of 99 years on a port construction. Magufuli said Chinese contractors wanted to take the land as their own, but his government had to compensate them for drilling the project construction.[254]

In May 2021, DRC's President Félix Tshisekedi called for a review of mining contracts signed with China by his predecessor Joseph Kabila,[255] in particular, the Sicomines multibillion-dollar 'minerals-for-infrastructure' agreement.[256][257][258] China's plans to link its western Xinjiang province to Gwadar in the Balochistan province of Pakistan with its US$500m investment in the Gwadar Port has met resistance from local fishermen protesting against Chinese trawlers and illegal fishing.[259][260]

#### Rebuttals

Deborah Bräutigam, a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, described the debt-trap diplomacy theory as a "meme" that became popular due to "human negativity bias" based on anxiety about the rise of China.[261] A 2019 research paper by Bräutigam revealed that most of the debtor countries voluntarily signed on to the loans and had positive experiences working with China, and "the evidence so far, including the Sri Lankan case, shows that the drumbeat of alarm about Chinese banks' funding of infrastructure across the BRI and beyond is overblown" and "a large number of people have favorable opinions of China as an economic model and consider China an attractive partner for their development."[261] She said that the theory lacked evidence and criticized the media for promoting a narrative that "wrongfully misrepresents the relationship between China and the developing countries that it deals with," highlighting the fact that Sri Lanka owed more to Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank than to China.[262] A 2018 China Africa Research Initiative report, co-authored by Bräutigam, remarked that "Chinese loans are not currently a major contributor to debt distress in Africa."[263]

According to New York-based economist Anastasia Papadimitriou, partnering countries are equally responsible when making deals with China. China's alleged "neocolonialist intentions" can be disproved by Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port project on the southeast coast of Sri Lanka, one of the most cited examples of debt-trap diplomacy.[264] After an analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative, Papadimitriou concludes that it is "not so much neocolonialism, rather it is economic regionalism".[264] Additionally, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, a London-based international affairs think tank, asserted that the debt crisis in Sri Lanka was unrelated to Chinese lending, but was instead caused mainly from "the misconduct of local elites and Western-dominated financial markets".[265] It was confirmed by Lowy Institute. A 2019 report by the Lowy Institute said that China had not engaged in deliberate actions in the Pacific which justified accusations of debt-trap diplomacy (based on contemporaneous evidence), and China had not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific; the report expressed concern about the scale of the country's lending, however, and the institutional weakness of Pacific states which posed the risk of small states being overwhelmed by debt.[266] A 2020 Lowy Institute article called Sri Lanka's Hambantota International Port the "case par excellence" for China's debt-trap diplomacy, but called the narrative a "myth" because the project was proposed by former Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa, not Beijing.[267] The article added that Sri Lanka's debt distress was not caused by Chinese lending, but by "excessive borrowing on Western-dominated capital markets."[267]

The Rhodium Group, an American research company, analyzed Chinese debt renegotiations and concluded that China's leverage in them are often exaggerated and realistically limited in power. The findings of their study frequently showed an outcome in favor of the borrower rather than the supposedly predatory Chinese lender. The firm found that "asset seizures are a very rare occurrence" and that instead debt write-off was the most common outcome.[268]

Darren Lim, senior lecturer at the Australian National University, said that the debt-trap diplomacy claim was never credible, despite the first Trump administration pushing it.[269] Dawn C. Murphy, Professor of International Security Studies at the USAF Air War College, concludes that describing China's behavior as "neocolonialist" is an "exaggeration and misrepresentation".[58]: 158

According to political scientist and researcher Zhexin Zhang, the overwhelming enthusiasm of developing countries in the Belt and Road Initiative, as seen first in the "Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation" held in May 2017, is sufficient to invalidate the neo-colonialism argument.[270]

A March 2018 study released by the Center for Global Development, a Washington-based think tank, remarks that between 2001 and 2017, China restructured or waived loan payments for 51 debtor nations, the majority of BRI participants, without seizing state assets.[271] The study concluded that in most cases, it was unlikely that there would be severe problems with debt.[8]: 87 In September 2018, Gyude Moore, a former Liberian public works minister and senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, stated that "[t]he language of "debt-trap diplomacy" resonates more in Western countries, especially the United States, and is rooted in anxiety about China's rise as a global power rather than in the reality of Africa."[272] He also stated that "China has been a net positive partner with most African countries."[273] According to Pradumna Bickram Rana and Jason Ji Xianbai of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, although there is a number of implementation issues confronting the Belt and Road Initiative mostly due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, China's alleged debt-trap diplomacy "more myth than reality".[274] While they acknowledge that various countries are facing difficulties in paying their debts to China, they highlight China's willingness to help these countries restructure their debt through forgiving policies, such as partial debt relief.[274] In eleven cases, China postponed loans for indebted countries, one being Tonga.[269]

Writing in 2023, academic Süha Atatüre stated that United States opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative stems from the fact that it lacks the capacity to implement a rival project.[275]: 40

Publishing in 2023, academic Austin Strange concludes that scholars have challenged the narrative of a Chinese debt-trap and that analysis of BRI projects does not substantiate the debt-trap narrative.[276]: 15–16 On the issue of criticism of the BRI more broadly, Strange writes that unintended negative consequences can result from global infrastructure projects generally (citing examples of issues arising from overseas projects by Japan and South Korea) and are not a BRI-specific or China-specific challenge.[276]: 58–59

Academics Yan Hairong and Barry Sautman stated in a 2024 study that the debt-trap narrative is incorrect, as China does not foreclose on borrower assets.[164]: 223

London School of Economics Professor Keyu Jin writes that the claim that China leads borrowers into a debt trap is misleading.[38]: 280 Jin observes that the majority of BRI countries' debt is owed to international organizations or private institutions like hedge funds, rather than to China.[38]: 280–281 Jin also writes that China has written off many of its loans and also provided debt relief to borrowers.[38]: 281

### Country-specific

Through the BRI, China has a major role in infrastructure development in Cambodia.[216]: 29 In 2017, China financed approximately 70% of Cambodia's road and bridge development.[216]: 29 China built a major expressway between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, which began operating in 2023.[216]: 29 As of at least 2024, the expressway is the largest BRI project in Cambodia.[15]: 132

China aligns its BRI economic cooperation in Egypt with the points of emphasis in Egypt's Vision 2030 national development plan.[202]: 66 China's BRI projects with Egypt therefore focus on developing labor-intensive manufacturing and traditional infrastructure in Egypt.[202]: 66

Chinese leadership describes Ethiopia as a bridge between the Belt and Road Initiative and Africa's development, stating that the relationship between the two countries is a model of South-South cooperation and "a pilot program for China-Africa production capacity cooperation."[164]: 222–223

Greece hosts the most successful BRI port project as of at least 2024, the port at Piraeus.[15]: 67 The port's incorporation as part of the BRI has been one of the mechanisms through which China has strengthened its relationship with Greece, following the increased strain in the European Union-Greece relationship after Greece's bailout.[15]: 67

As of at least 2024, Hungary and Serbia are also two of the major European supporters of the BRI.[277]

Italy was the only G7 country which had been a partner in the development of the BRI, having been involved since March 2019, but in July 2023 declared its intention to quit the BRI.[278] Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated that the project was not of any real benefit to Italy's economy.[279] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China described Italy's actions as "disrupting cooperation and creating divisions".[202]: 71 Publishing in 2025, academic Chuchu Zhang writes that bilateral economic cooperation between Italy and China was not disrupted by Italy's intent to withdraw, and trade between the two countries increased through February 2024.[202]: 70

The China–Laos Railway is one of the most sectorally integrated of the major BRI projects.[15]: 129 It has brought together expertise in large-scale engineering, finance, construction, and economic design.[15]: 129 The Boten-Vientiane Railway is the Laos section of the broader railway, which is in turn part of the China–Laos Economic Corridor.[15]: 129 The railway has reduced travel time from Ventiane to Luang Prabang from a day to two hours.[216]: 39

Due to its opposition to the Gwadar Port City in Pakistan, in 2019 the Baloch Liberation Army targeted Chinese nationals in an attack at the Pearl-Continental Hotel.[15]: 60

During a November 2024 visit by Xi to Peru, Boluarte and Xi celebrated the opening of the Chancay port, which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative.[280] Xi described the port as the beginning of a new maritime-land corridor between China and Latin America.[280] The port was built by COSCO Shipping Ports.[280]

In Thailand, the public views BRI projects, particularly railways, positively.[216]: 34–35

## Belt and Road educational policy

Along with policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade and financial integration, people-to-people bonds are among the five major goals of BRI.[281] BRI's educational component implies mutual recognition of qualifications, academic mobility and student exchanges, coordination on education policy, life-long learning, and development of joint study programmes.[282][283] To this end, Xi Jinping announced plan to allocate funds for additional 30,000 scholarships for SCO citizens and 10,000 scholarships for the students and teachers along the Road.[284] The Silk Road Scholarship is part of China's broader agenda of increasing academic and cultural cooperation with BRI-participating countries.[9]: 158

Among the BRI cooperation priorities is also strengthening people-to-people ties through academic mobility, research cooperation, and student exchanges.[285] Since the beginning of the BRI, China has occupied a key role in shaping how academic, and skilled migration in general, develops along the BRI and increased efforts to attract and retain foreign talents.[285]

The University Alliance of the Silk Road centered at Xi'an Jiaotong University aims to support the Belt and Road initiative with research and engineering.[286] A French think tank, Fondation France Chine (France-China Foundation), focused on the study of the New Silk Roads, was launched in 2018. It is described as pro–Belt and Road Initiative and pro-China.[287][288]

## See also

* Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
* Asian Highway Network
* Blue Dot Network - counter-initiative by the United States
* Build Back Better World - counter-initiative by the G7
* India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
* Eurasian Land Bridge
* Eurasia Continental Bridge corridor
* International North–South Transport Corridor
* Silk Road
* List of the largest trading partners of China
* New Southern Policy (South Korea)
* Trans-Asian Railway

## Notes

1. ↑ Countries join China's Belt and Road Initiative by signing the Memorandum of Understanding.[63]
2. ↑ According to World Bank classifications.[62][64]
3. ↑ Estonia left the 17+1 agreement on 11 August 2022 and the BRI Memorandum of Understanding expired on 27 August 2022.[65]
4. ↑ Italy announced its intent not to renew the BRI's Memorandum of Understanding of 6 December 2023. The Memorandum was up for renewal March 2024, therefore formally causing Italy to not longer be signed to the BRI as of 1 April 2024.[67][68]

## References

1. ↑ "Full Report: Examining Illicit Trade Challenges in the Belt and Road Initiative" (in en). 2025-04-22. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/examining-illicit-trade-challenges-in-the-belt-and-road-initiative_2479316e-en/full-report.html.
2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Zhang, Chunyu (2025-04-03). "The Process and Experience of China's Direct Investment in Africa". International Critical Thought 15 (2): 167–189. doi:10.1080/21598282.2025.2512494. ISSN 2159-8282.
3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Zu, Haoyue (2024-05-14). "China's overseas investment policy: evolution and characteristics" (in en). International Politics. doi:10.1057/s41311-024-00568-7. ISSN 1740-3898. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00568-7.
4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Li, Dongkun; Zhang, Yang (2021-03-01). "Compressed Development of Outward Foreign Direct Investment: New Challenges to the Chinese Government" (in EN). Journal of Asian and African Studies 56 (2): 335–351. doi:10.1177/0021909620927430. ISSN 0021-9096. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620927430.
5. ↑ Phillips, Tom (2016-05-11). "The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion" (in en-GB). The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion.
6. ↑ "The Week: Japanese Socialist Party Delegation". Peking Review 19 (5): 5, 24. 30 January 1976. https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1976/PR1976-05.pdf.
7. ↑ "BBC NEWS". https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/key_people_events/html/8.stm.
8. ↑ 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 8.15 8.16 8.17 Garlick, Jeremy (2024). Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-25231-8.
9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Sun, Yi (2024). "Necessitated by Geopolitics: China's Economic and Cultural Initiatives in Central Asia". in Fang, Qiang. China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. ISBN 9789087284411.
10. ↑ Nicolas Firzli (February 2017). "World Pensions Council: Pension Investment in Infrastructure Debt: A New Source of Capital". World Bank blog World Pensions & Investments Forum World Pensions Council (WPC). http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/pension-investment-infrastructure-debt-new-source-capital-project-finance/.
11. ↑ "Belt and Road in Big Data 2016". General Office of Leading Group of Advancing the Building of the Belt and Road Initiative (Beijing: the Commercial Press). 2016.
12. ↑ "What to Know About China's Belt and Road Initiative Summit". Time. https://time.com/4776845/china-xi-jinping-belt-road-initiative-obor/. Retrieved 30 January 2018.
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231. ↑ Di Lan, Ngo; Vu, Truong-Minh (September 2019). "The Sino-US-Vietnam Triangle in a Belt and Road Era". East Asia 36 (3): 229–241. doi:10.1007/s12140-019-09318-6. ISSN 1096-6838.
232. ↑ "Việt Nam, China sign 36 cooperation documents on diplomacy, trade, defence & sea issues". https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/1637945/viet-nam-china-sign-36-cooperation-documents-on-diplomacy-trade-defence-sea-issues.html.
233. ↑ Hwang, Balbina Y. (26 June 2019). "Northeast Asian Perspectives on China's Belt Road Initiative: the View from South Korea". East Asia 36 (2): 129–150. doi:10.1007/s12140-019-09310-0. ISSN 1096-6838.
234. ↑ Delaney, Robert (27 September 2017). "Kissinger urges greater cooperation with China as 'the world's center of gravity' shifts". https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/world/2024/06/501_237061.html.
235. ↑ Kissinger, Henry; Allison, Graham (11 July 2017). "Henry Kissinger and Graham Allison on the U.S., China, and the Thucydides's Trap". Harvard Club of New York City: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKI6M2UiCGk.
236. ↑ Eva, Joanna (30 September 2019). "Japan and the EU sign infrastructure deal to rival China's Belt and Road". https://www.european-views.com/2019/09/japan-and-the-eu-sign-infrastructure-deal-to-rival-chinas-belt-and-road/.
237. ↑ "Japan and EU ink infrastructure cooperation pact in counter to China's Belt and Road". The Japan Times. 28 September 2019. ISSN 0447-5763. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/28/business/japan-eu-vow-infrastructure-cooperation-counter-china/.
238. ↑ "Memorandum of Understanding between the state of Victoria in Australia and the People's Republic of China". 2014. https://www.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-02/Belt-and-Road-Initiative-MOU.pdf.
239. ↑ 239.0 239.1 Taylor, Josh (2 May 2020). "China's belt and road initiative: what is it and why is Victoria under fire for its involvement?". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/25/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-what-is-it-and-why-is-victoria-under-fire-for-its-involvement.
240. ↑ "Federal government rips up Victoria's controversial Belt and Road agreement with China". SBS News (Special Broadcasting Service). 21 April 2021. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/federal-government-rips-up-victoria-s-controversial-belt-and-road-agreement-with-china.
241. ↑ "Turnbull plays down Belt and Road fears". https://www.sbs.com.au/news/turnbull-plays-down-belt-and-road-fears.
242. ↑ "The pandemic is hurting China's Belt and Road Initiative". The Economist. 4 June 2020. ISSN 0013-0613. https://www.economist.com/china/2020/06/04/the-pandemic-is-hurting-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.
243. ↑ "Summary of Australia's involvement in disputes currently before the World Trade Organization". The Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto/wto-disputes/summary-of-australias-involvement-in-disputes-currently-before-the-world-trade-organization.
244. ↑ Dziedzic, Stephen (20 May 2020). "Australia started a fight with China over an investigation into COVID-19 — did it go too hard?". ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-20/wha-passes-coronavirus-investigation-australia-what-cost/12265896.
245. ↑ "Australia would help US defend Taiwan". Taipei Times. 14 November 2021. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2021/11/14/2003767840.
246. ↑ Thayer, Carl (27 July 2020). "Australia Abandons Its Neutrality on the South China Sea Maritime Disputes". The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/australia-abandons-its-neutrality-on-the-south-china-sea-maritime-disputes/.
247. ↑ Naaz, Fareha (29 October 2024). "China faces setback: Brazil follows in India's footsteps, becomes second BRICS country to reject BRI". Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/brazil-follows-in-indias-footsteps-becomes-second-brics-country-to-reject-bri-in-setback-for-china-11730204408442.html.
248. ↑ Kaufman, Arthur (31 October 2024). "Back from BRICS Summit, Brazil Bucks Belt and Road Initiative" (in en-US). https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/10/back-from-brics-summit-brazil-bucks-belt-and-road-initiative/.
249. ↑ "ISS Today: Lessons from Sri Lanka on China's 'debt-trap diplomacy'". 21 February 2018. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-21-iss-today-lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/.
250. ↑ "Belt and Road: colonialism with Chinese characteristics". https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-colonialism-chinese-characteristics.
251. ↑ Brautigam, D. (2020). "A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': The rise of a meme". Area Development and Policy 5 (1): 1–14. doi:10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828.
252. ↑ Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. (8 February 2018). "Revisiting the Resurrected Debate About Chinese Neocolonialism". The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revisiting-the-resurrected-debate-about-chinese-neocolonialism/.
253. ↑ Tanzania President terms China's BRI port project exploitative (July 2019)
254. ↑ "China is thinking twice about lending to Africa". The Economist. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/06/29/china-is-thinking-twice-about-lending-to-africa.
255. ↑ "DRC's Tshisekedi has secured his power base: now it's time to deliver". The Conversation. 27 October 2021. https://theconversation.com/drcs-tshisekedi-has-secured-his-power-base-now-its-time-to-deliver-170282.
256. ↑ "The Belt and Road Bubble Is Starting to Burst". Foreign Policy. 27 June 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/27/the-belt-and-road-bubble-is-starting-to-burst/.
257. ↑ "Congo Reviews $6.2 Billion China Mining Deal as Criticism Grows". Bloomberg. 28 September 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-28/congo-reviews-6-2-billion-china-mining-deal-as-criticism-grows.
258. ↑ "China Cash Flowed Through Congo Bank to Former President's Cronies". Bloomberg. 28 November 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-28/africa-s-biggest-data-leak-reveals-china-money-role-in-kabila-s-congo-looting.
259. ↑ "Pakistan detains five Chinese trawlers for alleged illegal fishing". 13 July 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/13/pakistan-detains-five-chinese-trawlers-for-alleged-fishing.
260. ↑ Bokhari, Farhan; Parkin, Benjamin (19 December 2021). "Pakistan seeks to calm protesters at Chinese Belt and Road port project". Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/0bd3988d-96d6-47a2-8006-1810cd90c151.
261. ↑ 261.0 261.1 Bräutigam, Deborah (2 January 2020). "A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': the rise of a meme". Area Development and Policy 5 (1): 1–14. doi:10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828. ISSN 2379-2949. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828. Retrieved 19 December 2021.
262. ↑ Bräutigam, Deborah; Rithmire, Meg (6 February 2021). "The Chinese 'Debt Trap' Is a Myth". The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/.
263. ↑ "The Path Ahead: The 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation". http://www.sais-cari.org/s/Briefing-Paper-1-August-2018-Final.pdf.
264. ↑ 264.0 264.1 Papadimitriou, Anastasia (20 October 2019). "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Is it Truly Neocolonialist?". https://www.theworldmind.org/home/2019/10/20/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is-it-truly-neocolonialist.
265. ↑ "Debunking the Myth of 'Debt-trap Diplomacy'". 19 August 2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy.
266. ↑ Rajah, Roland; Dayant, Alexandre; Pryke, Jonathan (21 October 2019). "Ocean of debt? Belt and Road and debt diplomacy in the Pacific". Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ocean-debt-belt-and-road-and-debt-diplomacy-pacific.
267. ↑ 267.0 267.1 Hameiri, Shahar (9 September 2020). "Debunking the myth of China's "debt-trap diplomacy"". The Interpreter (Lowy Institute). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debunking-myth-china-s-debt-trap-diplomacy.
268. ↑ "New Data on the "Debt Trap" Question". 29 April 2019. https://rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question/.
269. ↑ 269.0 269.1 Needham, Kirsty (2 May 2019). "Data doesn't support Belt and Road debt trap claims". https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/data-doesn-t-support-belt-and-road-debt-trap-claims-20190502-p51jhx.html.
270. ↑ Zhang, Zhexin (1 January 2018). "The Belt and Road Initiative: China's New Geopolitical Strategy?". China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 04 (3): 327–343. doi:10.1142/S2377740018500240. ISSN 2377-7400.
271. ↑ Hurley, John; Morris, Scott; Portelance, Gailyn (March 2018), Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, Center for Global Development, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf, retrieved 19 December 2021
272. ↑ Moore, W. Gyude (17 September 2018). "The language of "debt-trap diplomacy" reflects Western anxieties, not African realities". https://qz.com/1391770/the-anxious-chorus-around-chinese-debt-trap-diplomacy-doesnt-reflect-african-realities/.
273. ↑ "China Offers Debt Relief, But Most African Countries Borrow Elsewhere". Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/africa/china-offers-debt-relief-most-african-countries-borrow-elsewhere.
274. ↑ 274.0 274.1 Rana, Pradumna Bickram; Xianbai, Jason Ji (4 November 2020). "BRI's 'Debt Trap Diplomacy': Reality or Myth?". Singapore. p. 3. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/bris-debt-trap-diplomacy-reality-or-myth/?doing_wp_cron=1639831204.9130430221557617187500.
275. ↑ Atatüre, Süha (2023). "The US and China as Main Powers in Multipolar World Order 2.0". China and Eurasian Powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0: Security, Diplomacy, Economy and Cyberspace. Mher Sahakyan. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-003-35258-7. OCLC 1353290533.
276. ↑ 276.0 276.1 Strange, Austin (21 December 2023) (EPUB). Chinese Global Infrastructure. Elements in Global China. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009090902. ISBN 978-1-009-09090-2. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781009090902/type/element.
277. ↑ Vasovic, Aleksander; Sito-sucic, Daria (5 May 2024). "China's Xi Jinping to Visit Serbia on Anniversary of 1999 NATO Bombing". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-jinping-visit-serbia-anniversary-1999-nato-bombing-2024-05-07/.
278. ↑ Folkman, Varg (30 July 2023). "Italy intends to leave China's Belt and Road Initiative, defense minister says". https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-leave-belt-and-road-initiative-china-minister-guido-crosetto/.
279. ↑ Kazmin, Amy (6 December 2023). "Italy formally pulls out of China's Belt and Road Initiative". https://www.ft.com/content/946636dc-2fa1-4b2b-a83b-84478f804a83.
280. ↑ 280.0 280.1 280.2 Baptista, Eduardo; Aquino, Marco; Elliott, Lucinda (15 November 2024). "Starting Latin America trip, Xi Jinping Opens Huge Port in Peru Funded by China". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-arrives-lima-apec-open-pacific-megaport-2024-11-14/.
281. ↑ "Vision And Actions On Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt And 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road". 30 March 2015. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/qwfb/1084.htm.
282. ↑ "Education Action Plan for the Belt and Road Initiative". 12 October 2017. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/30277.htm.
283. ↑ Leskina, Natalia; Sabzalieva, Emma (4 January 2021). "Constructing a Eurasian higher education region: "Points of correspondence" between Russia's Eurasian Economic Union and China's Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia". Eurasian Geography and Economics 62 (5–6): 716–744. doi:10.1080/15387216.2020.1866997. ISSN 1538-7216. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1866997. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
284. ↑ "Xi proposes a 'new Silk Road' with Central Asia". http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/08/content_16952228.htm.
285. ↑ 285.0 285.1 Richter, Eva L (1 September 2020). "Economic Development through Migration: Facilitating Skilled Migration to China through the Belt and Road Initiative". The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 8 (2): 331–350. doi:10.1093/cjcl/cxaa021. ISSN 2050-4802. https://academic.oup.com/cjcl/article/8/2/331/5896818. Retrieved 12 February 2022.
286. ↑ Yojana, Sharma (12 June 2015). "University collaboration takes the Silk Road route". University World News. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20150611130705830.
287. ↑ "OFNRS – Observer, analyser et conseiller". https://observatoirenrs.com/.
288. ↑ "Follow the New Silk Road: China's growing trail of think tanks and lobbyists in Europe". 4 August 2019. https://corporateeurope.org/en/2019/04/follow-new-silk-road-chinas-growing-trail-think-tanks-and-lobbyists-europe.

## Further reading

Library resources about
Belt and Road Initiative

* * *

* Resources in your library
* Resources in other libraries

* Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. (2021). "Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Blues: Powering BRI Research Back on Track to Avoid Choppy Seas". Journal of Chinese Political Science 26: 235–255. doi:10.1007/s11366-020-09717-0.
* Cai, Peter. Understanding China's belt and road initiative (Lowy Institute 2017) online .
* Calabrese, L. (2019): Making the Belt and Road Initiative work for Africa. London: Overseas Development Institute.
* Calabrese, L. (2019): China and global development: what to read ahead of the Belt and Road Forum. London: Overseas Development Institute.
* Chansok, L. (2019): The Belt and Road Initiative and Cambodia's Infrastructure Connectivity Development: A Cambodian Perspective. Cheung FM and Hong Y-Y (eds) Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative. The prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation. London: Routledge, pp. 134–163.
* Chen, Yaowen, et al. "Does the Connectivity of the Belt and Road Initiative Contribute to the Economic Growth of the Belt and Road Countries?." Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 55.14 (2019): 3227–3240.
* Contessi, Nicola P. (2016). "Central Asia in Asia: Charting Growing Transregional Linkages". Journal of Eurasian Studies 7: 3–13. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2015.11.001.
* Chaudhuri (周士理), Debasish (2018). "Book Review: Revitalising the Silk Road—China's Belt and Road Initiative by Richard T. Griffiths". China Report 54 (2): 248–251. doi:10.1177/0009445518761158. online review.
* He, Baogang. "Chinese expanded perceptions of the region and its changing attitudes toward the Indo-Pacific: A hybrid vision of the institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific." East Asia 35.2 (2018): 117–132.
* Ito, Asei. "China's Belt and Road Initiative and Japan's Response: from Non-participation to Conditional Engagement." East Asia 36.2 (2019): 115–128.
* Jones, Lee; Zeng, Jinghan (2019). "Understanding China's 'Belt and Road Initiative': Beyond 'grand strategy' to a state transformation analysis". Third World Quarterly 40 (8): 1415–1439. doi:10.1080/01436597.2018.1559046. https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/55868.
* Kohli, Harinder S., Johannes F. Linn, and Leo M. Zucker, eds. China's Belt and Road Initiative: Potential Transformation of Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Sage, 2019).
* Lai, Karen P.Y., Shaun Lin and James D. Sidaway. "Financing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Research agendas beyond the "debt-trap" discourse." Eurasian Geography and Economics61.2 (2020): 109–124. online.
* Liu, Hong; Lim, Guanie (2019). "The Political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia: Malaysia's Response to the Belt and Road Initiative". Journal of Contemporary China 28 (116): 216–231. doi:10.1080/10670564.2018.1511393.
* Lin, Shaun and Carl Grundy-Warr. "Navigating Sino-Thai 'rocky' bilateral ties: The geopolitics of riverine trade in the Greater Mekong Subregion." Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 38.5 (2020): 826–833.
* Lin, Shaun, Naoko Shimazu and James D. Sidaway. "Theorising from the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路)." Asia Pacific Viewpoint
* Lin, Shaun, James D. Sidaway and Woon Chih Yuan. "Reordering China, respacing the world: Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路) as an emergent geopolitical culture." The Professional Geographer 71.3 (2019): 507–522. online.
* Mark, Siusue; Overland, Indra; Vakulchuk, Roman (2020). "Sharing the Spoils: Winners and Losers in the Belt and Road Initiative in Myanmar". Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39 (3): 381–404. doi:10.1177/1868103420962116.
* Park, Albert. Which Countries Have Benefited the Most from China's Belt and Road Initiative?. (No. 2019-32. HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, 2019) online.
* Scissors, Derek. "The Belt and Road is Overhyped, Commercially." AEI Paper & Studies (American Enterprise Institute, 2019) online
* Shah, Abdur Rehman (2019). "China's Belt and Road Initiative". Asian Survey 59 (3): 407–428. doi:10.1525/as.2019.59.3.407.
* Sidaway, James D.; Rowedder, Simon C.; Woon, Chih Yuan; Lin, Weiqiang; Pholsena, Vatthana (2020). "Introduction: Research agendas raised by the Belt and Road Initiative". Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 38 (5): 795–802. doi:10.1177/2399654420911410. Bibcode: 2020EnPlC..38..795S.
* Sidaway, James D. and Chih Yuan Woon. "Chinese narratives on "One Belt, One Road" (一带一路) in geopolitical and imperial contexts." The Professional Geographer 69.4 (2017) 591-603. online.
* Belt and Road Initiative: China's Most Important Project, 14 July 2022
* Smith, Stephen N. (2021). "China's "Major Country Diplomacy": Legitimation and Foreign Policy Change". Foreign Policy Analysis 17 (2). doi:10.1093/fpa/orab002.
* Tjia, Yin-nor Linda (2020). "The Unintended Consequences of Politicization of the Belt and Road's China-Europe Freight Train Initiative". The China Journal 83: 58–78. doi:10.1086/706743.
* Vakulchuk, Roman; Overland, Indra (2018). "China's Belt and Road Initiative through the lens of Central Asia". Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative. pp. 115–133. doi:10.4324/9780429467172-5. ISBN 9780429467172. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329310641.
* Wahlquist, Hakan. "Albert Herrmann: A missing link in establishing the Silk Road as a concept for Trans-Eurasian networks of trade" Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 38.5 (2020): 803–808.
* Winter, Tim (2020). "Geocultural Power: China's Belt and Road Initiative". Geopolitics 26 (5): 1376–1399. doi:10.1080/14650045.2020.1718656.
* World Pensions Council (WPC) policy paper: Chinese Revolution Could Lure Overseas Investment, Dow Jones Financial News, 12 October 2015.
* The New York Times – "Behind China's $1 Trillion Plan", 13 May 2017.

## External links

* Official website by State Council
* Official website by Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative

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