Kalam cosmological argument

Short description: Philosophical argument for the existence of God

For the book on the topic by William Lane Craig, see Philosophy:The Kalām Cosmological Argument.

William Lane Craig (born 1949), who revived the Kalam cosmological argument during the 20th and 21st centuries

The Kalam cosmological argument is a modern formulation of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is named after the Kalam (medieval Islamic scholasticism) from which many of its key ideas originated.[1] Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig was principally responsible for revitalising these ideas for modern academic discourse through his book The Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979), as well as other publications.

The argument's central thesis is the metaphysical impossibility of a temporally past-infinite universe and of actual infinities existing in the real world, traced by Craig to 11th-century Persian Muslim scholastic philosopher Al-Ghazali. This feature distinguishes it from other cosmological arguments, such as Aquinas's Second Way, which rests on the impossibility of a causally ordered infinite regress, and those of Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, which refer to the principle of sufficient reason.[2]

Since Craig's original publication, the Kalam cosmological argument has elicited public debate between Craig and Graham Oppy, Adolf Grünbaum, J. L. Mackie and Quentin Smith, and has been used in Christian apologetics.[3][2] According to Michael Martin, the cosmological arguments presented by Craig, Bruce Reichenbach, and Richard Swinburne are "among the most sophisticated and well-argued in contemporary theological philosophy".[4]

## Contents

* 1 Form of the argument
* 1.1 Initial syllogism
* 1.2 Conceptual analysis of the cause
* 2 Historical background
* 3 Contemporary discourse
* 4 Premise one: philosophical objections
* 4.1 Intuition and induction
* 5 Premise one: scientific objections
* 5.1 Quantum indeterminacy
* 5.2 The quantum vacuum
* 6 Premise two: cosmology and physics
* 6.1 Boundary cosmology
* 6.2 Exception classes
* 6.2.1 Emergent cosmology
* 6.2.2 Bounce cosmologies
* 6.2.3 Time reversal at the boundary
* 7 Premise two: philosophical arguments
* 7.1 Actuality of the past
* 7.2 The Symmetry Objection
* 8 Conclusion: "The universe has a cause."
* 8.1 Conceptual analysis of the First Cause
* 9 Theories of time
* 9.1 Neo-Lorentzian relativity
* 9.2 Compatibility with the B-theory
* 10 See also
* 11 References
* 11.1 Sources
* 12 Further reading

## Form of the argument

Template:Existence of God sidebar The most prominent form of the Kalam cosmological argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, is expressed in two parts, as an initial syllogism followed by further philosophical analysis.[5]

### Initial syllogism

The Kalam cosmological argument is a deductive argument. Therefore, if its premises are true, the conclusion follows necessarily.

1\. Premise 1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2\. Premise 2: The universe began to exist.

3\. Conclusion 1: Therefore, the universe has a cause.

### Conceptual analysis of the cause

Craig argues that the cause of the universe necessarily embodies specific properties, in being:[6]

* Uncaused, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise.
* Timeless (therefore changeless), spaceless, immaterial and enormously powerful, in creating spacetime and its contents ex nihilo.
* Personal, possessing non-deterministic agency, in creating the universe from a timeless state (without prior determining conditions).
* Singular, per Occam's razor, in the absence of good reasons to believe in the existence of more than one uncaused cause.

Based upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:[6]

4\. Premise 3: If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans (without) the universe[7] is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
5\. Conclusion 2: (from 3 and 4) Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.

Craig appraises the theological significance of the final conclusion:[8]

> "... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

## Historical background

The origins of the cosmological argument can be traced to classical antiquity, rooted in the concept of the prime mover, introduced by Aristotle. In the 6th century, Syriac Christian theologian John Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570) presented the first known version of the argument based on the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress, postulating that time itself must have had a beginning.[9]

Like other early Christian commentators, Philoponus disputed the Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter, noting that this was inconsistent with the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, he examined the contradiction between Greek conceptions of past eternity and Aristotle's repudiation of the existence of actual infinities.[10] In 529, he presented his critique, On the Eternity of the World Against Proclus, categorising arguments for the finitude of the past, which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God.[9]

Philoponus's ideas would be developed substantially within the proceedings of medieval Islamic scholasticism—or kalam—through the 9th and 12th centuries,[10] refined in the 11th century by Al-Ghazali and in the 12th by Ibn Rushd.[11] In his landmark thesis, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Persian Muslim theologian Al-Ghazali characterised the absurdity of a beginningless universe and of the existence of actual infinities, articulating a prototypical formulation of the modern Kalam cosmological argument:[12]

> "Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins;

>     therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning."

In the 13th century, the cosmological argument was introduced to medieval Christian theology, wherein it would be examined by St. Bonaventure as well as Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica (I, q.2, a.3) and Summa Contra Gentiles (I, 13).[13][14][15] Conceptions of temporal finitism that had been substantiated in Philoponus's—and later, Al-Ghazali's—writings inspired energetic debate between Aquinas and Bonaventure, as well as further generations of scholars up until the 18th century. Craig writes:[16]

> "It finally sputtered to something of an inconclusive end in the thought of the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. Kant held, ironically, that there are rationally compelling arguments for both [the finitude and infinitude of the past], so that the problem is insoluble and exposes the bankruptcy of reason itself."

## Contemporary discourse

According to Quentin Smith:[14]

> "A count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defense of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence."

The Kalam cosmological argument has received criticism from philosophers such as J. L. Mackie, Graham Oppy, Adolf Grunbaum, Michael Martin, Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston and Alex Malpass as well as physicists Sean M. Carroll, Lawrence Krauss and Victor Stenger.[17]

Modern discourse encompasses the fields of both philosophy and science (e.g. the fields of quantum physics and cosmology), which Bruce Reichenbach summarises as:[18]

> "... whether there needs to be a cause of the first natural existent, whether something like the universe can be finite and yet not have a beginning, and the nature of infinities and their connection with reality".

Since the temporal ordering of events is central, the Kalam argument also brings issues of the nature of time into the discussion.[19]

## Premise one: philosophical objections

Premise one: "Everything that begins to exist has a cause."

Craig and James Sinclair offer three reasons to support the first premise, proposing that it is more plausibly true than its negation:[20]

1. Rational intuition: The first premise is self-evidently true, originating in the metaphysical intuition that "something cannot come into being from nothing" (Latin: ex nihilo nihil fit)—characterised in Parmenidean philosophy.
2. Reductio ad absurdum: If false, it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause. To come into being without any cause is to come into being from nothing, which Craig claims is surely absurd.
3. Inductive reasoning from both common experience and scientific evidence, which constantly verifies and never falsifies its truth.

### Intuition and induction

Graham Oppy, J. L. Mackie and Wes Morriston have objected to the intuitiveness of the first premise.[21][22][23] Oppy states:

> "Mackie, [Adolf] Grunbaum, [Quentin] Smith and I—among many others—have taken issue with the first premise: why should it be supposed that absolutely everything which begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist?"

Mackie affirms that there is no good reason to assume a priori that an uncaused beginning of all things is impossible. Moreover, that the Causal Principle cannot be extrapolated to the universe from inductive experience. He appeals to David Hume's thesis (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) that effects without causes can be conceived in the mind, and that what is conceivable in the mind is possible in the real world.[24] This argument has been criticised by Bruce Reichenbach and G.E.M. Anscombe, who point out the phenomenological and logical problems in inferring factual possibility from conceivability.[25][26] Craig notes:[27][28]

> "Hume himself clearly believed in the causal principle. He presupposes throughout the Enquiry that events have causes, and in 1754 he wrote to John Stewart, 'But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause'."

Morriston asserts that causal laws are physical processes for which we have intuitive knowledge in the context of events within time and space, but that such intuitions do not hold true for the beginning of time itself. He states:[29]

> "We have no experience of the origin of worlds to tell us that worlds don't come into existence like that. We don't even have experience of the coming into being of anything remotely analogous to the 'initial singularity' that figures in the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe."

Craig responds that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist", remarking:[30]

> "The history of twentieth century astrophysical cosmology belies Morriston's claim that people have no strong intuitions about the need of a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe."

## Premise one: scientific objections

### Quantum indeterminacy

Paul Davies is unconvinced that the Causal Principle can be defined consistently in fundamental physics, proposing that the phenomenon of quantum indeterminacy contradicts a deterministic model of cause and effect.[31] Craig concedes that quantum indeterminism contradicts the proposition that every event has a cause. Nonetheless, he maintains it is consistent with the causal premise that "everything that begins to exist has a cause", encompassing the more modest view that objects cannot come into existence entirely devoid of causal conditions.[32] Even if quantum events arise without sufficient prior conditions, he affirms at least some necessary conditions are present:[33]

> "The appearance of a particle in a quantum vacuum may thus be said to be spontaneous, but cannot properly be said to be absolutely uncaused, since it has many physically necessary conditions. To be uncaused in the relevant sense of an absolute beginning, an existent must lack any non-logical necessary or sufficient conditions whatsoever."

Wes Morriston inquires whether necessary conditions alone are adequate in defining causation, suggesting further substantiation is necessary when contemplating the causal origin of the universe.[29] For Bruce Reichenbach, the strength of the first premise is grounded in the ontology of quantum indeterminacy. If indeterminism is a fundamental feature of the real world, rather than an epistemic artefact of incomplete knowledge or hidden variables, he suggests its implications for the Causal Principle would be substantially negative.[34]

Craig stresses that the phenomenon of indeterminism is specific to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, remarking that this is only one of several interpretations, some of which are fully deterministic—mentioning Bohmian mechanics[35]—and none of which are as yet known to be true. He concludes that subatomic physics is not a proven exception to the first premise.[36]

### The quantum vacuum

Quantum vacuum phenomena are often expounded to be uncaused in origin, referring to quantum indeterminacy governing the vacuum state and semantics that define the zero-point field as nothing, in an ontological sense.[37] Quentin Smith illustrates the example of virtual particles, which appear and disappear through fluctuations in the quantum vacuum, as evidence of uncaused natural phenomena.[38] In his publication, A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing, Lawrence Krauss proposes that quantum fluctuations can explain how space, time and matter can emerge from 'nothing' (referring to the vacuum state).[39] Michael Martin writes:[40]

> "Even if the universe has a beginning in time, in the light of recently proposed cosmological theories this beginning may be uncaused. Despite Craig's claim that theories postulating that the universe 'could pop into existence uncaused' are incapable of 'sincere affirmation,' such similar theories are in fact being taken seriously by scientists."

David Albert deems the term 'nothing' to be misleading when defining the quantum vacuum. In a critique of Krauss's book, he remarks:[41]

> "Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states—no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems—are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn't this or that particular arrangement of the fields—what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields."

Craig describes the vacuum state as a quantifiable, energetic medium that qualifies as something rather than nothing, rejecting the view of quantum vacuum phenomena as uncaused. On quantum fluctuations, he writes:[42]

> "... virtual particles do not literally come into existence spontaneously out of nothing. Rather the energy locked up in a vacuum fluctuates spontaneously in such a way as to convert into evanescent particles that return almost immediately to the vacuum."

Alexander Vilenkin determines that, even in the "absence of space, time and matter", the laws of physics are still present and require explanation, though this state would be "as close to nothing as you can get". He continues:[43]

> "That makes you wonder, where are these laws? If the laws describe the creation of the universe, that suggests they existed prior to the universe. The question that nobody has any idea how to address is where these laws come from and why these laws in particular?"

## Premise two: cosmology and physics

Premise two: "The universe began to exist."

For scientific confirmation of the finitude of the past, Craig refers to evidence in cosmology and theoretical physics:

1. The standard model of cosmology, which characterises the origin of the universe in the Big Bang.[44]
2. The second law of thermodynamics, which stipulates that the universe must, in a finite duration, reach a state of equilibrium known as heat death. If the universe has an infinite past, he argues, heat death would have already transpired.[45]
3. The Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, according to which any universe that has, on average, been expanding throughout its history cannot have been expanding indefinitely but must have had a past boundary at which inflation began.[46]

### Boundary cosmology

Alexander Vilenkin describes the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem:[47]

> "A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume that gravity is described by Einstein's equations. So, if Einstein's gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value, no matter how small."

According to Vilenkin and co-author Alan Guth, the past boundary described by the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem does not necessarily represent a cosmic beginning, instead the beginning of cosmic inflation.[48] Though it "opens the door" for theories other than an absolute beginning, in a 2012 lecture, Vilenkin would discuss problems with alternative theories that would claim to avoid a cosmological beginning (including eternal inflation, cyclic and emergent models) concluding: "All the evidence we have says that the universe had a beginning".[49] In publications, he would conclude that the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem is sufficient evidence for a beginning of the universe.[50][51][52]

Sean Carroll observes that the theorem assumes a classical spacetime, determining it to be incompatible with the extreme energies and densities that define the Planck era of the early universe, where quantum effects become dominant. Instead of describing a cosmic beginning, he remarks that the theorem's boundary defines the point at which classical mechanics of the universe no longer apply:[53]

> "... the real world is governed by quantum mechanics, and the BGV theorem assumes a classical spacetime, so it says nothing definitive about what actually happens in the universe; it is only a guideline to when our classical description breaks down."

Craig responds that, if anything exists before the past boundary described by the theorem, it would be a non-classical region described by a yet-to-be-determined theory of quantum gravity. This quantum gravity region must also have a beginning, he stipulates, given that its inherent instability would render any quantum regime impossible to endure indefinitely or exist timelessly and changelessly:[54]

> "If there is such a non-classical region, then it is not past eternal in the classical sense. But neither can it exist literally timelessly, akin to the way in which philosophers consider abstract objects to be timeless or theologians take God to be timeless. For this region is in a state of constant flux, which, given the Indiscernibility of Identicals, is sufficient for time. So even if time as defined in classical physics does not exist at such an era, some sort of time would."

He draws on arguments from Anthony Aguirre and John Kehayias, who write:[55]

> "It is very difficult to devise a system, especially a quantum one, that does nothing 'forever', then evolves. A truly stationary or periodic quantum state, which would last forever, would never evolve, whereas one with any instability will not endure for an indefinite time."

### Exception classes

As a purely kinematic theorem—relying solely on the geometric properties of expanding classical spacetime—the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem assumes an average rate of cosmic expansion greater than zero (Havg > 0) on the basis of a linear arrow of time.[46]

Craig and James Sinclair identify 4 exception conditions that bypass this requirement and evade the theorem:[56]

1. Past eternal static state followed by cosmic expansion (Havg = 0) e.g. emergent models.
2. Perpetual cycle of cosmic expansion then contraction (Havg = 0) e.g. cyclic models.
3. Infinite cosmic contraction prior to the current expansion (Havg < 0) e.g. de Sitter cosmology.
4. Reversal of time at the cosmological boundary, e.g. Aguirre–Gratton model.

They contend that these models contradict observational cosmology or confirm the cosmic beginning they were devised to disprove.[57]

#### Emergent cosmology

According to the emergent universe model, the universe existed in a static phase for an infinite duration, then transitioned spontaneously via quantum tunneling to a dynamic expansion phase. The static phase is metastable and, because it endures over infinite time, the universe overall has an average expansion rate of zero (Havg = 0) thereby avoiding the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem.[56]

Metastability in this context refers to a false vacuum state, which is stable according to classical physics, but unstable at the quantum mechanical level in that it can transition spontaneously via quantum tunneling to a more stable true vacuum state. This transition may trigger cosmic inflation, or conversely, collapse of the universe to a hyperdense state.[58] Vilenkin and Audrey Mithani maintain that the metastable state cannot endure indefinitely. Though an event such as cosmic collapse is highly improbable, they argue that over an infinite duration it becomes a mathematical certainty. If the emergent universe cannot exist indefinitely, then it must have had a beginning.[59]

Responding to Vilenkin and Mithani, Rube Goldberg cosmology postulates an emergent model of spacetime that is fully classical, avoiding a quantum gravity era as well as the problems associated with quantum instability. However, the author notes that its composition comes at the cost of a "long chain of highly ad hoc assumptions, akin to a Rube Goldberg machine".[60]

#### Bounce cosmologies

Bounce cosmology refers to any theoretical framework in which the universe rebounds from a preceding phase of contraction to the current phase of expansion, substituting the initial singularity predicted by classical general relativity with a big bounce.

Cyclic universes proceed through an infinite cycle of expansions and contractions. Though the earliest models proposed no net expansion or contraction (Havg = 0), they were noted to be in violation of the second law of thermodynamics given that the universe would eventually reach a state of heat death, rendering an infinite cycle impossible.[61] Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok suggest that cosmic volume could increase with each cycle, causing entropy dilution sufficient to avert heat death.[62] Vilenkin notes, however, that this would put the universe in a state of net expansion, rendering it subject to the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, therefore finite into the past.[52]

De Sitter cosmology describes a universe that contracts for infinite time prior to a point of minimum size, followed by expansion. Though it avoids the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem by averaging net contraction through time (Havg < 0), George Ellis maintains that initial conditions must be inexplicably precise for contraction to rebound into uniform expansion characteristic of the observed universe. This extraordinary fine-tuning must be acausal and assumed as brute fact, he argues, given that it originates in an infinite past.[63] Vilenkin writes:[64]

> "You can evade the theorem by postulating that the universe was contracting prior to some time. ... This sounds as if there is nothing wrong with having contraction prior to expansion. But the problem is that a contracting universe is highly unstable. Small perturbations would cause it to develop all sorts of messy singularities, so it would never make it to the expanding phase."

#### Time reversal at the boundary

The Aguirre–Gratton model postulates a reversal of time at t=0, with spacetime structured as two cosmic expansions evolving in opposite time directions from a point of minimum size. The universe resembles a de Sitter 'bounce', but classifies as a model of eternal inflation by maintaining an inflationary state at every point in time.[65] Among the model's proponents are Victor J. Stenger,[66] as well as Sean Carroll, who presents it as "proof by construction" that a universe without a beginning is conceivable.[67] Vilenkin pronounces a reversal of time at t=0 to make the moment "no less special than a true beginning of the universe."[68] He elaborates to Stenger:[64]

> "Models of this sort have been discussed by Aguirre & Gratton, and by Carroll & Chen. They had to assume though that the minimum of entropy was reached at the bounce and offered no mechanism to enforce this condition. It seems to me that it is essentially equivalent to a beginning."

## Premise two: philosophical arguments

For philosophical evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig refers to:

1. Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel, to illustrate the metaphysical impossibility of actual infinites existing in reality.[69]
2. The Tristram Shandy Paradox, to demonstrate the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.[70][71]

Correspondingly, he argues:

* An infinite series of past events is metaphysically impossible, given that it would represent an actual infinite existing in reality.[1]
* Past events cannot be extended to an infinite past, given that they consist of a series formed by successive addition.[1][72]

Variations of these arguments have been presented by philosopher Andrew Loke, who refers to a modified version of Hilbert's Hotel,[73] and Ben Waters, who has published the story of Methuselah's Diary as a refinement of the diary of Tristram Shandy.[74]

Craig maintains that, though it is metaphysically impossible for actual infinities to exist in the real world, they (and the absurdities that attend their existence in the real world) are describable via mathematics, therefore logically possible.[75] He also distinguishes between actual infinities and potential infinities, stating that it is fully possible for potential infinites to exist in the real world, in contrast to the former:[76]

> "A potential infinite is a series which has a beginning and is growing indefinitely; infinity serves merely as an ideal limit of the series which it never reaches ... That’s impossible, since for any natural number n, n+1 is always a finite number."

### Actuality of the past

Edward Feser observes that the Kalam cosmological argument is based upon a presentist theory of time in which past and future events do not exist, remarking that this would be incompatible with objections against an eternal past based upon Hilbert's Hotel:[77]

> "If the present alone is real, then how can an infinite series of events in time count as an actual infinite? Past moments of time are not actual; they no longer exist ... In the Hilbert’s hotel scenario [the rooms and guests] exist together all at once, at the same time."

Craig affirms that the simultaneous existence of the enumerated objects is irrelevant, so long as past events have been real, thus instantiated in reality, they can be counted.[78][79] He refers to a narrative by Aquinas of a blacksmith who, from an eternal past, has used and broken successive hammers. He writes that the discarded hammers need no longer exist to be counted as an actual infinite.[80] Furthermore, that the absurdities attending the existence of actual infinites in reality still apply if the enumerated objects no longer exist:[81]

> "... in an infinite series of past events, the number of odd-numbered events is the same as the number of all the events, even though the latter collection includes all the odd-numbered events plus an infinite number of even-numbered events as well."

Feser contends that past events are more analogous to abstract objects than concrete objects, such as rooms and guests relevant to Hilbert's Hotel, noting that it is fully tenable for mathematicians to deal with infinite sets of abstract objects, such as natural numbers. For this, he refers to Aristotle's postulate that denies the existence of time independent of objects that change:[82]

> "To speak of time apart from change is a bit like speaking of a universal like redness apart from actual red things—it is to engage in abstraction from the concrete conditions under which the thing in question (redness, or time) can actually exist."

### The Symmetry Objection

Craig proposes that, though a beginningless past would qualify as an actually infinite series of past events, an endless future would qualify only as a potential infinite, given that future events, unlike past events, are yet to be actualised and merely potential.[79]

Wes Morriston and Alex Malpass argue that this asymmetry is arbitrary. They pronounce that future events that will be actual satisfy the same reality condition as past events that are deemed actual in that they have been. Furthermore, they stipulate that natural numbers can be representative of moments in time. Since the set of natural numbers greater than any given value, x, is always an actual infinite, so too, they argue, must future events beyond any given moment in time be actually infinite. They conclude that, if the Hilbert's Hotel paradox disproves an eternal past, so too must it negate an endless future, contradicting the Judeo-Christian doctrine of eternal life.[83]

Commenting in agreement that future events cannot be actually infinite, Craig responds that this objection begs the question and fails to address the ontological distinction between past and future qualified by the objectivity of temporal becoming under presentism.[84][85] He writes:

> "The series of future events can be finite but endless. In such a case the series is potentially infinite. This is a view that is so widespread and commonly accepted in the history of philosophy and science that the objector has a considerable burden of proof to bear if he is to show that this view is untenable."

## Conclusion: "The universe has a cause."

In a critique of Craig's book The Kalām Cosmological Argument, published in 1979, Michael Martin writes:[86]

> "It should be obvious that Craig's conclusion that a single personal agent created the universe is a non sequitur. At most, this Kalam argument shows that some personal agent or agents created the universe. Craig cannot validly conclude that a single agent is the creator. On the contrary, for all he shows, there may have been trillions of personal agents involved in the creation."

Martin adds that Craig has not justified his claim of creation ex nihilo, remarking that the universe may have been created from pre-existing material in a timeless or eternal state. Moreover, that Craig takes his argument too far beyond what his premises allow in stating that the creator is greater than the universe. For this, he cites the example of a parent creating a child who eventually becomes greater than he or she.[87]

### Conceptual analysis of the First Cause

In the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, published in 2009, Craig and James Sinclair present a philosophical analysis of the properties of the cause of the universe, indicating that they follow by entailment from the initial syllogism of the Kalam cosmological argument:[6]

1. The universe must originate ex nihilo in being without natural cause, because no natural explanation can be causally prior to the very existence of the natural world. The cause of the universe is therefore outside of space and time (timeless, therefore changeless, and spaceless) as well as immaterial and enormously powerful, in bringing spacetime and its contents into existence.
2. Even if positing a plurality of causes prior to the origin of the universe, the causal chain must terminate in a cause which is absolutely first and uncaused, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which Craig and Sinclair argue is impossible.
3. Occam's Razor maintains that unicity of the First Cause should be assumed in the absence of specific reasons to believe that there is more than one causeless cause.
4. Agent causation, or volitional action, is the only ontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions. Therefore, only personal, free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a changeless cause.
5. There are two conceivable categories of objects with the potential to be uncaused, spaceless, timeless and immaterial:
* Minds (in some conceptions of mind-body dualism) may be characterised as immaterial and spatially unextended, with the potential to be unembodied, timeless, changeless and beginningless.[88]
* Abstract objects, such as the set of natural numbers, may be described as non-spatial and non-temporal, but do not sit in causal relationships and are therefore causally ineffective.[89]

Based upon their conceptual analysis, Craig concludes:[6]

> "... an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe[7] is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful."

He remarks upon the theological significance of this union of properties:[8]

> "... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

## Theories of time

The Kalam cosmological argument is based on the A-theory of time, also known as the "tensed theory of time" or presentism, in which past and future events do not exist in reality (they have existed, or will exist, but do not exist now) and only the present exists.[90] This is opposed to the B-theory of time, also known as the "tenseless theory of time" or eternalism, in which past, present and future events co-exist and there is no privilege to the present other than as a frame of reference.[91]

Under the A-theory, the passage of time and temporal becoming are objective and real features of the universe, with objects coming into being and going out of being. In the B-theory, temporal passage and becoming are illusions of consciousness. Craig explains:[32]

> "On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived."

### Neo-Lorentzian relativity

Craig has defended the A-theory against objections from J. M. E. McTaggart and hybrid A–B theorists.[92][93] He refers to the neo‐Lorentzian interpretation of the Special Theory of Relativity, which he contends has become tenable in light of recent findings in quantum mechanics concerning Bell's theorem.[94] Similar to Einstein's original interpretation, the Lorentzian view describes a 3-dimensional universe existing through time, with objects in motion demonstrating time dilation and length contraction. However, these relativistic distortions occur relative to a privileged rest frame (an absolute frame of reference for the universe) rather than relative to each observer.[95]

He writes that the Lorentzian interpretation, in postulating an absolute space and absolute time, resolves the fragmentation of reality that characterises Einsteinian relativity, in which observers in relative motion occupy different spaces and times. Importantly, Lorentz's view of time as dynamic, and distinct from space, renders it compatible with the A-theory conception of a tensed universe.[96]

Philosopher Yuri Balashov asserts that both consensus and evidence support Minkowski's interpretation of relativity, which posits a 4D geometric universe inhabited by objects extended in time as well as space.[97] In spurning the notion of a 3D universe existing in time, Minkowskian relativity rejects the A-theory, correlating instead with the B-theory conception of a tenseless spacetime. Balashov remarks:[98]

> "Despite the fact that presentism has the firm backing of common sense and eternalism revolts against it, eternalism is widely regarded as almost the default view in contemporary debates, and presentism as a highly problematic view."

Craig suggests that Balashov underestimates the challenge to Minkowskian relativity presented by recent findings.[95] He criticises Balashov for adopting a verificationist method that overlooks important metaphysical and theological foundations for the A-theory, declaring that correct interpretation of Special Relativity involves not merely scientific, but also metaphysical, inquiry.[96][99]

### Compatibility with the B-theory

In a 2020 interview, Craig proposed that the Kalam cosmological argument could be adapted to the B-theory of time by:[100]

* Abandoning the metaphysical argument against forming an actual infinity by successive addition.
* Modifying the causal premise (replacing its appeal to the concept of 'coming into being' with the concept of 'beginning to exist').

Under the B-theory, scientific evidence for the finitude of the past would still be valid and the argument as a whole would be tenable, though requiring reformulation to correct for the negation of temporal becoming. Craig articulates a B-theory version of its syllogism:[101]

1. If something exists at a time t but it does not exist at any earlier point in time then it has a cause.
2. The universe does exist at time t at which there is no earlier time where the universe existed.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Philosopher Ben Waters has also argued that the Kalam cosmological argument does not require a commitment to the A-theory.[102]

## See also

* Arguments for the existence of God
* Cosmogony
* Natural theology
* Principle of sufficient reason
* Temporal finitism
* Agent causation
* Kalam
* Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd fi 'Ilm al-Kalam

## References

1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 William Lane Craig. "The Kalam Cosmological Argument". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-kalam-cosmological-argument.
2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Reichenbach, 2004
3. ↑ Smith, Graham (2002). "Arguing about the Kalam Cosmological Argument". Philo 5 (1): 34–61. doi:10.5840/philo2002513. https://philarchive.org/rec/OPPAAT.
4. ↑ Martin, 1990: 101
5. ↑ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 102
6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Craig and Moreland, 2009: 193–194
7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Craig, 2001 Craig establishes this caveat on theological grounds distinct from the argument, postulating that God enters into a temporal state at the moment of creation, therefore, no longer embodying the properties of timelessness and changelessness.
8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Craig, 2000: 149
9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Erasmus, Jacobus (2018). The Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Springer. ISBN 9783319734378.
10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Duncan, Steven (2010). Analytic Philosophy of Religion: its history since 1955. Humanities-Ebooks. p. 165.
11. ↑ Averroes, Ibn Rushd (1954). The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al-Tahafut). London: Luzac. p. 58.
12. ↑ Craig, 1994: 80
13. ↑ Kovach, FJ (1974). "The Question of the Eternity of the World in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas – A Critical Analysis". Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5: 141–172. doi:10.5840/swjphil19745233.
14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Smith, 2007: 183
15. ↑ Craig, 2000
16. ↑ William Lane Craig. "How Did the Universe Begin?". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/videos/lectures/how-did-the-universe-begin-saddleback-church.
17. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 4.1
18. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 5.6
19. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 2.
20. ↑ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 92, 182–190
21. ↑ Oppy, G (2002). "Arguing About The Kalam Cosmological Argument". Philo 5 (1): 34–61. doi:10.5840/philo2002513. https://philarchive.org/rec/OPPAAT.
22. ↑ Mackie, 1982: 94
23. ↑ Morriston, W (2002). "Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument". Faith and Philosophy 19 (2): 233–244. doi:10.5840/faithphil200219218.
24. ↑ Mackie, 1982: 85
25. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 3.4
26. ↑ Anscombe, GEM (1974). ""Whatever has a beginning of existence must have a cause": Hume's argument exposed". Analysis XXXIV: 150.
27. ↑ William Lane Craig. "Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/professor-mackie-and-the-Kalam-cosmological-argument.
28. ↑ Grieg, JT (1932). The Letters of David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 187.
29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Morriston, W (2000). "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument". Faith and Philosophy 17: 149. doi:10.5840/faithphil200017215.
30. ↑ William Lane Craig. "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Rejoinder". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/the-existence-of-god/must-the-beginning-of-the-universe-have-a-personal-cause-a-rejoinder.
31. ↑ Davies, Paul (1982). Superforce. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 94.
32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 William Lane Craig. "Objections to the Causal Principle". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/objections-to-the-causal-principle.
33. ↑ Craig, William Lane; Smith, Quentin (1993). Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Clarendon. p. 146. ISBN 978-0-19-826348-7.
34. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 7.1
35. ↑ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 183
36. ↑ Moreland, JP; Craig, WL (2017). Philosophical foundations for a Christian worldview. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity P. p. 469.
37. ↑ Krauss 2012 Ch. 9
38. ↑ Smith, Q (1988). "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe". Philosophy of Science 55: 39–57. doi:10.1086/289415.
39. ↑ Krauss, Lawrence M. (2012). A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing. New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-1-4516-2445-8.
40. ↑ Martin, 1990: 106. Martin lists the following sources as examples: Edward P. Tryon, "Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?" Nature, 246, 14 December 1973, pp. 396–397; Edward P. Tryon, "What Made the World? New Scientist, 8, March 1984, pp. 14–16; Alexander Vilenkin, "Creation of Universes from Nothing," Physics Letters, 117B, 1982, pp. 25–28; Alexander Vilenkin, "Birth of Inflationary Universes," Physical Review, 27, 1983, pp. 2848–2855; L. P. Grishchuck and Y. B. Zledovich, "Complete Cosmological Theories," The Quantum Structure of Space and Time, ed. M. J. Duff and C. J. Isham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 409–422; Quentin Smith, "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe," Philosophy of Science, 55, 1988, pp. 39–57.
41. ↑ David Albert (March 2012). "On the Origin of Everything". https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/a-universe-from-nothing-by-lawrence-m-krauss.html.
42. ↑ Craig, WL (1993). "The Caused Beginning of the Universe: a Response to Quentin Smith". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4): 623–639. doi:10.1093/bjps/44.4.623.
43. ↑ "What Happened Before the Big Bang?". 2012. https://now.tufts.edu/articles/beginning-was-beginning.
44. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 7.4-7.5
45. ↑ William Lane Craig. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-existence-of-god-and-the-beginning-of-the-universe.
46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 Borde, Arvind; Guth, Alan H.; Villenkin, Alexander (2003). "Inflationary Spacetimes Are Incomplete in Past Directions". Physical Review Letters (American Physical Society) 90 (15): 151301. PMID 12732026. Bibcode: 2003PhRvL..90o1301B. https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.151301. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
47. ↑ Vilenkin 2006 p. 175
48. ↑ "Physicists & Philosophers debunk the Kalam Cosmological Argument featuring Penrose, Hawking, Guth". 14 January 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pGKe6YzHiME&t=1972s. See also: Stenger (2011) Ch. 6.2 demonstrating that these views predate Vilenkin publications and lecture defending a cosmic beginning.
49. ↑ Lisa Grossman (2012). "Why Physicists Can't Avoid A Creation Event". https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21328474.400-why-physicists-cant-avoid-a-creation-event.html.
50. ↑ Vilenkin, Alexander (2006). Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes. Hill and Wang. ISBN 0809095238.
51. ↑ Perlov, Delia; Vilenkin, Alexander (2017). Cosmology for the Curious. Springer. ISBN 978-3319570389.
52. ↑ 52.0 52.1 Vilenkin, A (2015). "The Beginning of the Universe". Inference: International Review of Science 1 (4). doi:10.37282/991819.15.18.
53. ↑ Sean M. Carroll (2014). "Post-Debate Reflections". https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/.
54. ↑ William Lane Craig. "God and Cosmology: The Existence of God in Light of Contemporary Cosmology". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/god-and-cosmology-the-existence-of-god-in-light-of-contemporary-cosmol.
55. ↑ Aguirre, A; Kehayias, J (2013). "Quantum Instability of the Emergent Universe". Physical Review D 88 (8): 103504.
56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 William Lane Craig. "Contemporary Cosmology and the Beginning of the Universe". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/contemporary-cosmology-and-the-beginning-of-the-universe.
57. ↑ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 101–201
58. ↑ Coleman, S; De Luccia, F (1980). "Gravitational effects on and of vacuum decay". Physical Review D 21 (12): 3305–3315.
59. ↑ Mithani, AT; Vilenkin, A (2014). "Instability of an emergent universe". Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics 5: 6.
60. ↑ Veklych, B (2025). "Is a quantum gravity era necessary?". Reviews in Physics 13: 100116.
61. ↑ Tolman, R. C. (1987). Relativity, Thermodynamics, and Cosmology. New York: Dover. ISBN 978-0-486-65383-9.
62. ↑ Steinhardt, PJ; Turok, N (2005). "The Cyclic Model Simplified". New Astronomy Reviews 49 (2–6): 43–57. doi:10.1016/j.newar.2005.01.003.
63. ↑ G. F. R. Ellis to James Sinclair, 25 January, 2006, quoted in Craig and Moreland, 2009: 143
64. ↑ 64.0 64.1 William Lane Craig. ""Honesty, Transparency, Full Disclosure" and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/honesty-transparency-full-disclosure-and-the-borde-guth-vilenkin-theorem.
65. ↑ Aguirre, A; Gratton, S (2002). "Steady-State Eternal Inflation". Physical Review D 65 (8): 083507. Bibcode: 2002PhRvD..65h3507A.
66. ↑ Victor J. Stenger (2012-04-28). God and the Folly of Faith: The Incompatibility of Science and Religion. Prometheus Books. ISBN 9781616145996. https://books.google.com/books?id=GUpSDwAAQBAJ.
67. ↑ Carroll, Sean (27 April 2007). "How Did the Universe Start?". https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2007/04/27/how-did-the-universe-start.
68. ↑ Stenger, Victor J. (2011). The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe Is Not Designed for Us. Prometheus Books. p. 244. ISBN 9781616144449. https://books.google.com/books?id=h9BAXtVsfdcC.
69. ↑ Craig, 1994: 118–120
70. ↑ Craig, 1994: 120–124
71. ↑ Reichenbach, 2004: 7.3
72. ↑ William Lane Craig. "A Swift and Simple Refutation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument?". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/the-existence-of-god/a-swift-and-simple-refutation-of-the-kalam-cosmological-argument.
73. ↑ Loke, 2017, 55–61, 67–68
74. ↑ Waters BV (2013). "Methuselah's Diary and the Finitude of the Past". Philosophia Christi 15 (2): 463–469. doi:10.5840/pc201315240. http://philpapers.org/archive/WATMDA-2.pdf.
75. ↑ "Hilbert's Hotel and Infinity". 9 February 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lobeX6ft6PA.
76. ↑ William Lane Craig. "God and Infinity". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/god-and-infinity.
77. ↑ Edward Feser (2 September 2016). "A difficulty for Craig's kalām cosmological argument?". https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/a-difficulty-for-craigs-kalam_2.html.
78. ↑ "Does This Fix the Kalam Cosmological Argument?". 15 November 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFA9WZ7bmL0&t=352s.
79. ↑ 79.0 79.1 William Lane Craig. "Is a Beginningless Past Actually Infinite?". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/is-a-beginningless-past-actually-infinite.
80. ↑ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 116
81. ↑ William Lane Craig. "Past and Future in the Kalam Cosmological Argument". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/past-and-future-in-the-kalam-cosmological-argument.
82. ↑ Edward Feser (8 September 2016). "Yeah, but is it actually actually infinite?". https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/yeah-but-is-it-actually-actually.html.
83. ↑ Malpass, Alex; Morriston, Wes (2020). "Endless and Infinite". Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 830–849. doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa005.
84. ↑ Craig, William Lane (2002). "The Kalām Cosmological Argument". Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 389–405. ISBN 978-0-190-84222-2.
85. ↑ William Lane Craig. "Dialogue with Alex Malpass". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/dialogue-with-alex-malpass.
86. ↑ Martin, 1990: 103
87. ↑ Martin, 1990: 103–14
88. ↑ Craig, 2001b: 43-55
89. ↑ Falguera, José L; Martínez-Vidal, Concha; Rosen, Gideon (2021). "Abstract Objects". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/.
90. ↑ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 183–184
91. ↑ Emery, Nina; Markosian, Ned; Sullivan, Meghan (2020). "Time". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#PresEterGrowBlocTheo.
92. ↑ Oaklander, L. Nathan (2002). "Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience". in Craig Callender. Time, Reality & Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 73–90. ISBN 978-0-521-52967-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=IxIlqbSWg4gC.
93. ↑ Craig, William Lane (2000). The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9345-8. ISBN 978-0-7923-6634-8.
94. ↑ Craig, 2001c
95. ↑ 95.0 95.1 William Lane Craig. "The Triumph of Lorentz". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P80/the-triumph-of-lorentz.
96. ↑ 96.0 96.1 William Lane Craig. "Response to McCall and Balashov". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/exesent-nature-of-god/response-to-mccall-and-balashov.
97. ↑ Balashov, Yuri; Janssen, Michel (2003). "Presentism and Relativity". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2): 327–346. doi:10.1093/bjps/54.2.327.
98. ↑ Balashov, Yuri (2007). "A Future for Presentism". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23018-a-future-for-presentism/.
99. ↑ Craig, William Lane (2000). The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3473-8. ISBN 978-0-7923-6635-5.
100. ↑ "Dr. Craig Answers Questions on the Kalam, Heaven, Free Will, B-Theory, and MORE!". 18 June 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=2134&v=ZhrGWKuhLek.
101. ↑ William Lane Craig. "Questions about A-Theory of Time and Abstract Objects". https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-podcast/questions-about-a-theory-of-time-and-abstract-objects.
102. ↑ Waters, 2015

### Sources

* Craig, William Lane (1979). The Kalām Cosmological Argument. Wipf & Stock Publishers. ISBN 978-1-57910-438-2.
* Craig, William Lane (1994). Reasonable Faith. Moody Press. ISBN 978-0-89107-764-0.
* Craig, William Lane (2000). The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Wipf and Stock Publishers. ISBN 978-1-57910-438-2.
* Craig, William Lane (2001). Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Crossway. ISBN 978-1-58134-241-3.
* Craig, William Lane (2001b). God, Time, and Eternity, The Coherence of Theism II: Eternity. Springer. ISBN 978-1-4020-0011-9.
* Craig, William Lane (2001c). Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity. Springer. ISBN 978-0-521-52967-9.
* Craig, William Lane; Moreland, JP (2009). The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. John Wiley and Sons. ISBN 978-1-4051-7657-6.
* Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-824682-4.
* Martin, Michael (1990). Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press. ISBN 978-0-87722-943-8. https://archive.org/details/atheismphilosoph00mart_0.
* Reichenbach, Bruce (2004). "Cosmological Argument: The Causal Principle and Quantum Physics". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument.
* Smith, Quentin (2007). Martin, Michael. ed. Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism. Cambridge University Press.
* Waters, B. V. (2015). "Toward a new kalām cosmological argument". Cogent Arts and Humanities 2 (1): 1–8. doi:10.1080/23311983.2015.1062461.
* Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2017). God and Ultimate Origins. Springer International. ISBN 9783319575476.

## Further reading

* Moreland, J. P. (1987). Scaling the Secular City: A Defence of Christianity. Baker Academic.
* Craig, William Lane (1996). "Initial Arguments: A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God". Leadership University. http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-smith1.html.
* Copan, Paul; Craig, William Lane (2004). Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration. Baker Academic.
* Vaas, Rüdiger (2004). "Time before Time – Classifications of universes in contemporary cosmology, and how to avoid the antinomy of the beginning and eternity of the world". Bilder aus der Wissenschaft 10: 32–41. Bibcode: 2004physics...8111V.
* Craig, William Lane (2007). "Causal Premiss of the Kalam Argument". Reasonable Faith. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/causal-premiss-of-the-kalam-argument.
* Nowacki, Mark (2007). The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God. Studies in Analytic Philosophy. Prometheus Books. ISBN 978-1-59102-473-6.
* Craig, William Lane (2008). Reasonable Faith. Crossway Books. ISBN 978-1-4335-0115-9.

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* Beauty
* Christological ( Trilemma ) ( Resurrection )
* Consciousness
* Cosmological ( Kalam cosmological ) ( Contingency ) ( Cosmological argument )
* Degree
* Intelligent Design ( Ontogenetic depth )
* Desire
* Experience
* Existential choice
* Fine-tuned universe
* Knowledge
* Love
* Miracles
* Morality
* Natural-law
* Necessary extent ( Seddiqin )
* Nyayakusumanjali
* Ontological ( Anselm ) ( Gödel ) ( Modal ) ( Mulla Sudra )
* Pascal's Wager
* Reason
* Reformed
* Teleological ( Junkyard ) ( Natural law ) ( Watchmaker )
* Transcendental
* Trademark

Against|

* 747 gambit
* Atheist's Wager
* Evil
* Free will
* Hell
* Inconsistent revelations
* Nonbelief
* Noncognitivism
* Occam's Razor
* Omnipotence
* Poor design
* Russell's teapot

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