Tributary system of China

Short description: Network of loose international relations centered on China

China (yellow) and its tributaries (orange), 1820 A mural from the Qianling Mausoleum in Shaanxi, 706. Foreign ambassadors are being received at court. The bald man in the middle is from the West and the man to his right is from Silla.

The tributary system of China (simplified Chinese: 中华朝贡体系, traditional Chinese: 中華朝貢體系, pinyin: Zhōnghuá cháogòng tǐxì), or Cefeng system (simplified Chinese: 册封体制; traditional Chinese: 冊封體制; pinyin: Cèfēng tǐzhì) at its height was a network of loose international relations centered around China which facilitated trade and foreign relations by acknowledging China's hegemonic role within a Sinocentric world order. It involved multiple relationships of trade, military force, diplomacy and ritual. The other states had to send a tributary envoy to China on schedule, who would kowtow to the Chinese emperor as a form of tribute, and acknowledge his superiority and precedence. The other countries followed China's formal ritual in order to keep the peace with the more powerful neighbor and be eligible for diplomatic or military help under certain conditions. Political actors within the tributary system were largely autonomous and in almost all cases virtually independent.[1]

Scholars differ on the nature of China's relations with its neighbors in traditional times. Many describe a system that embodied a collection of institutions, social and diplomatic conventions, and institutions that dominated China's contacts with the non-Chinese world for two millennia, until the collapse of the system around the end of the 19th century.[2] Other scholars like Odd Arne Westad see a variety of relationships that differed in character, not an overall "tributary system". They suggest a Sinocentric system, in which Chinese culture was central to the self-identification of many elite groups in the surrounding Asian countries.[3] By the late 19th century, China had become part of a European-style community of sovereign states and established diplomatic relations with other countries in the world following international law.[4] While some scholars have suggested that the tributary system is a model for understanding international relations in East Asia today, other scholars have argued that the concept is misleading about relations in both early modern times and today.[5]

Tributary system of China

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## Contents

* 1 Definition
* 2 In practice
* 2.1 Legitimacy
* 2.2 Autonomy
* 2.3 Tribute
* 2.4 Culture
* 2.5 Rituals
* 3 History
* 3.1 Korea
* 3.2 Japan
* 3.3 Thailand
* 3.4 Vietnam
* 3.5 Ryukyu Kingdom
* 3.6 Maritime Southeast Asia
* 4 See also
* 5 References
* 5.1 Citations
* 5.2 Sources
* 6 Further reading

## Definition

Envoys from Baekje, Goguryeo, and Silla. Painting produced 7th century AD by Yan Liben (c. 600–673)

The term "tribute system" is a Western invention. There was no equivalent term in the Chinese lexicon to describe what would be considered the "tribute system" today, nor was it envisioned as an institution or system. John King Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu created the "tribute system" theory in a series of articles in the early 1940s to describe "a set of ideas and practices developed and perpetuated by the rulers of China over many centuries."[6] The concept was developed and became influential after 1968, when Fairbank edited and published a conference volume, The Chinese World Order, with fourteen essays on China's pre-modern relations with Vietnam, Korea, Inner Asia and Tibet, Southeast Asia and the Ryukyus, as well as an Introduction and essays describing Chinese views of the world order. The model presents the tribute system as an extension of the hierarchic and nonegalitarian Confucian social order.[7]

"Tribute", points out Peter C. Perdue, the historian of Qing dynasty foreign relations, is "the inadequate translation for gong, a term with multiple meanings in classical Chinese," since its "root meaning of gift giving from inferiors to superiors applied to all personal relationships...." Fairbank's concept of tribute system "turned a flexible practice with multiple meanings into an overly formalized ritual system" in which gong always had the same meanings and gong ritual was exclusively and predominately a marker of foreign relations, whereas the Qing conducted "many diverse forms of tributary ritual".[8]

The Portraits of Periodical Offering of Liang. Song Dynasty copy of 6th-century painting in National Museum of China. Tributary envoys from right to left: Uar (Hephthalites); Persia; Baekje (Korea); Qiuci; Wo (Japan); Langkasuka (in present-day Malaysia); Dengzhi (鄧至) (Qiang) Ngawa; Zhouguke (周古柯), Hebatan (呵跋檀), Humidan (胡密丹), Baiti (白題, similar to the Hephthalite people), who dwell close to Hephthalite; Mo (Qiemo). Original attributed to Xiao Yi.[9]

## In practice

A Ming-era painting of a tribute giraffe, which was thought to be a Qilin by court officials, from Bengal

### Legitimacy

The "tribute system" is often associated with a "Confucian world order", under which neighboring states complied and participated in the "tribute system" to secure guarantees of peace, investiture, and trading opportunities.[10] One member acknowledged another's position as superior, and the superior would bestow investiture upon them in the form of a crown, official seal, and formal robes, to confirm them as king.[11] The practice of investing non-Chinese neighbors had been practiced since ancient times as a concrete expression of the loose reign policy.[12]

The early Ming dynasty actively sought out diplomatic relations with other states within the framework of a tributary relationship to boaster its claims to authority and superiority. In these diplomatic visits, Ming envoys would urge these states to send tributary missions to the Ming capital, asserting the Ming emperor's position as Son of Heaven above all other rulers.[13]

The rulers of Joseon, in particular, sought to legitimize their rule through reference to Chinese symbolic authority. After the defeat of the Yuan dynasty in 1368, King Gongmin of Goryeo terminated tributary relations with the Yuan and sent tribute to the Ming. However, Goryeo also sent military forces to the Ming border region of Liaodong in 1370. After Gongmin was assassinated in 1374, his successor King U of Goryeo was dominated by a pro-Yuan court that re-established tributary relations with Northern Yuan while also sending tribute to the Ming in 1384. In 1388, Goryeo sent an army under deputy commander Yi Seong-gye to attack the Ming due to Ming demands to turn over their northeastern territory, but YI refused to carry out the invasion and instead turned back the army to remove King U from power. In 1392, Yi Seong-gye, also known as Taejo of Joseon, officially founded the state of Joseon, cut off relations with the Mongols and sent tributary envoys to the Ming founder Emperor Hongwu for recognition.[14]

Despite Yi's willingness to become a tributary of the Ming, the Hongwu Emperor did not trust Joseon and forbade Joseon envoys from entering Ming territory by 1397. The militarist faction in Joseon planned to attack the Ming in 1398 with support from the king but their leader, Chŏng Tojŏn, was killed by one of the king's sons, Yi Pangwŏn, who later succeeded his father and became king of Joseon. He then used Neo-Confucian doctrines to solidify his rule over Joseon.[15] Yi Seong-gye was the only king of Joseon who requested but did not receive investiture from the Ming emperor. There is no evidence that Koreans during the Ming era ever questioned the practice of sending tribute to and requesting investiture from the Ming emperor upon the enthronement of a new king. Receiving investiture from the Ming emperor was taken for granted as a source of political legitimacy for the Joseon king who was vulnerable to attacks from their subjects should he not receive recognition. Due to the Confucian outlook of contemporary Korean elites, the Ming emperor was identified as the "Son of Heaven" who embodied Confucian moral authority.[16]

In the aftermath of the Imjin War, Seonjo of Joseon in particular sought symbolic authority from the Ming emperor due to the lack of his own political authority at home. Generals and irregular armies had formed outside of government control during the war and many had personally witnessed Seonjo fleeing from the capital upon the outbreak of the war. He downplayed the accomplishments of his own generals while attributing victory to Ming intervention. Out of fear of rebellion against his own rule, Seonjo doubled down on seeking authority from the Ming through a narrative in which he was central to the Ming's decision to send military aid against the Japanese. However most Koreans at the time understood that the Ming intervention came about from geopolitical concerns that the Japanese would have posed a threat to Ming territory if Joseon had lost the war.[17]

On the opposite side of the tributary relationship spectrum was Japan, whose leaders could hurt their own legitimacy by identifying with Chinese authority.[18] With the exception of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu from 1401-1408, no other modern Japanese ruler accepted official tributary status with China. As the first ruler of unified Japan during the Muromachi period, he may have sought to enhance his own status within Japan by accepting a title from the Ming to solidify his ascendance over the Japanese emperor. None of his successors adopted the same tributary relationship with China.[19] In these politically tricky situations, sometimes a false king was set up to receive investiture for the purposes of tribute trade.[20]

### Autonomy

In practice, the tribute system only became formalized during the early years of the Ming dynasty.[21] Actors within the "tribute system" were virtually autonomous and carried out their own agendas despite sending tribute; as was the case with Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam.[22] Chinese influence on tributary states was almost always non-interventionist in nature and tributary states "normally could expect no military assistance from Chinese armies should they be invaded".[23][24]

### Tribute

The "tribute" entailed a foreign court sending envoys and exotic products to the Chinese emperor. Once foreign envoys reached the Chinese capital, they participated in a series of Confucian ceremonies including the "kowtow". Before meeting the emperor, Chinese officials and foreign envoys gathered to practice a rehearsal ceremony. On the day of the assembly, Chinese officials and foreign envoys moved to their rehearsed positions before the emperor. An official from the Ministry of Rites led the foreign envoys to perform five bows and three sets of kneeling and bows. Afterwards, the foreign envoys would kneel before the emperor while the emperor instructed the Ministry of Rites official to provide them with drinks and meals. The emperor then gave the envoys gifts in return and permitted them to trade in China. Before departing, the envoys would perform another three sets of kneeling and bows. Presenting tribute involved theatrical subordination but usually not political subordination. The political sacrifice of participating actors was simply "symbolic obeisance".[25] Nor were states that sent tribute forced to mimic Chinese institutions, for example in cases such as the Inner Asians, who basically ignored the trappings of Chinese government. Instead they manipulated Chinese tribute practices for their own financial benefit.[26]

The gifts doled out by the Ming emperor and the trade permits granted were of greater value than the tribute itself, so tribute states sent as many tribute missions as they could. In 1372, the Hongwu Emperor restricted tribute missions from Joseon and six other countries to just one every three years. The Ryukyu Kingdom was not included in this list, and sent 57 tribute missions from 1372 to 1398, an average of two tribute missions per year. Since geographical density and proximity was not an issue, regions with multiple kings such as the Sultanate of Sulu benefited immensely from this exchange.[20]

After 1435, the Ming dynasty urged foreign delegations to leave and stopped offering transport assistance for visiting missions. The size of delegations was restricted from hundreds of people to less than a dozen and the frequency of tributary missions was also reduced.[27]

The practice of giving gifts of greater value than the tribute itself was not practiced by the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty court with Goryeo. Gifts conferred by the Yuan were worth a fraction of the tribute offered by Goryeo.[28] Joseon paid the Qing dynasty multiple times per year and were coerced to receive hundreds of diplomatic missions, in turn granting the Qing great influence in their internal affairs, in comparison to Siam who would only send gold and silver to the Qing when requested by the court as a gift rather than a forced payment, often once every decade.[29]

### Culture

Participation in a tributary relationship with a Chinese dynasty could be predicated on cultural or civilizational motivations rather than material and monetary benefits. The Korean kingdom of Joseon did not treat the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, which invaded Joseon and forced it to become a tributary in 1636, in the same way as the Han-led Ming dynasty. Joseon had continued to support the Ming in their wars against the Qing despite incurring military retaliation from the latter. The Manchus were viewed as barbarians by the Korean court, which, regarding itself as the new "Confucian ideological center" in place of the Ming, continued to use the Ming calendar and era names in defiance of the Qing, despite sending tribute missions.[30]

According to historian Ji-Young Lee, Joseon compliance with the Ming tributary system was not merely acceptance of hegemonic practices by the most powerful state, but specifically entrenched in a Confucian worldview that was not shared with the Qing rulers, who the Koreans saw as barbarians. Lee argues that if Korean compliance with Ming hegemony was merely predicated on material interests and fear of Chinese aggression, there would have been greater acceptance of the rising Qing dynasty in the early 17th century. Instead, Joseon envoys refused to attend the Qing emperor's coronation in February 1636, resulting in their beating and imprisonment. When Na Tŏk-hyŏn was ordered by the Manchus to deliver a letter calling the Manchu ruler emperor to the Joseon king, he threw away the letter and chose not to deliver it. Subsequently, Joseon suffered two invasions by the Qing, after which it was forced to become a Qing tributary. Despite this, Joseon officials and intellectuals saw the Manchus' claim on the position of "Son of Heaven" as an attack on socially accepted norms. Joseon envoys to the Qing complained that the Manchus were no different from pigs and dogs, that the Qing emperor's head was shaven unlike previous Sons of Heaven and that the emperor forced them to meet a Tibetan priest, which the envoys described as a barbaric act that the Ming would never have subjected them to. In contrast, Joseon envoys to the Ming emperor seem to have displayed genuine fondness for the ruler. In their personal writings, Ha Gok described himself being overjoyed at seeing the emperor at a close distance, and Hong Ik-han stated that no one dared speak out of turn or make a mistake out of fear and respect. They felt disappointed when they were placed outside the Meridian Gate for the winter solstice ceremony.[31] According to the Joseon historian Choe Bu, Joseon and the Ming were "one family".[32]

Joseon eventually accepted Qing hegemony by sending tribute and accepting a title, but the Qing enjoyed less authority than the Ming. During the Ming dynasty, Joseon kings occasionally sent more than the necessary amount of tribute missions to "show appreciation, offer congratulations to newly enthroned emperors, pay respects to recently deceased members of the imperial family, or make special requests". These missions were voluntary and had benefits for the king's domestic political situation. Joseon kings would even turn to deceased Ming emperors and pay memorial service to them in front of a domestic audience for additional legitimacy. In contrast, Joseon missions to the Qing were kept to a minimum due to the lack of any domestic political benefit.[33] Meanwhile Japan avoided direct contact with Qing China and instead manipulated embassies from neighboring Joseon and Ryukyu to make it falsely appear as though they came to pay tribute.[34]

Another instance of shared cultural affiliation and attraction is Vietnam. Although tributary missions to China have been depicted in modern Vietnamese nationalist history as a cynical practice to appease China, "there is little proof of a consistent or extreme Vietnamese hatred for Chinese culture" throughout history. Instead, Vietnamese elites were generally favorable towards Chinese culture and political norms. A study of poems composed by Vietnamese envoys to China did not find any hostility held towards China but rather that they genuinely felt proud of being part of Sinic civilization. Vietnamese elites prior to French colonization were thoroughly entrenched in Chinese culture. Most Vietnamese elites up to the 19th century do not seem to have written in anything other than Classical Chinese and even criticized attempts to nativise the Chinese script to represent the Vietnamese language. Knowledge of specific Chinese texts was considered to be the equivalent of historical literacy. As late as the 20th century, important Vietnamese literature such as Ho Chi Minh's poem Vọng Nguyệt, which recites the entire history of Vietnam, was written in Classical Chinese.[35][36][37]

Vietnamese envoys to China were heavily invested in their tradition of classical studies shared with their Chinese counterparts and sought to create a parallel Sino-Vietnamese bureaucracy in Vietnam. They were the primary advocates of adopting the Chinese administrative model and constantly petitioned Vietnamese emperors to implement practices they had seen at the Chinese court. Most of them were enthusiastic about visiting China and used such occasions as opportunities for sight seeing or personal exploration, sometimes to the detriment of their other tasks. In 1832, the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mạng criticized Vietnamese envoys for not bothering to describe the conditions of the people in places they had visited, and merely jotted down rough outlines of the distance between places and their names. In 1848, the Vietnamese envoy Nguyễn Siêu spent his trip to and from Beijing searching for places where the Song dynasty Neo-Confucian scholars Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi had lectured at.[38]

In 1841, a Vietnamese envoy to the Qing court, Lý Văn Phức, found his hosts' application of the word yi (barbarian) to his lodgings, which was named "Vietnamese Barbarians' Hostel", to be objectionable. He ordered the sign be taken down, then wrote an essay in Classical Chinese emphasizing the Confucian nature of Vietnam's elite class and presented it to the Daoguang Emperor, suggesting that the Vietnamese were no more barbarian than the Manchus were. After returning to Vietnam, envoys were required to write essays on the deficiencies they had witnessed in China, possibly as a form of psychological cleansing after their trip. In 1840, one of the envoys recounted how the Qing emperor spoke different languages depending on who they were conversing with. If the person was Chinese, they spoke in Chinese, and if the person was Manchu, they spoke in Manchu. The Vietnamese emperor Minh Mạng criticized this behavior on the basis that such discrepancies would cause fear and suspicion among his officials. Earlier in 1835, Minh Mạng had proclaimed that his capital was now the new "Central Domain" and that he was the true successor of the ancient Zhou dynasty, who once ruled the Nine Provinces of ancient China. To legitimize his rule, he constructed nine bronze urns to represent the Nine Provinces and to signify his association with Zhou sovereignty. According to Lydia He Liu, the Vietnamese, Koreans, and Japanese all placed themselves at the center of the Confucian world order and treated the Qing as its periphery.[39][40]

### Rituals

The Chinese tributary system required a set of rituals from the tributary states whenever they sought relations with China as a way of regulating diplomatic relations.[41] The main rituals generally included:

* The sending of missions by tributary states to China[41]
* The tributary envoys' kowtowing before the Chinese emperor as "a symbolic recognition of their inferiority" and "acknowledgment of their status of a vassal state"[41]
* The presentation of tribute and receipt of the emperor's "vassals' gifts"[41]
* The investiture of the tributary state's ruler as the legitimate king of his land[41]

After the completion of the rituals, the tributary states engaged in their desired business, such as trade.[41]

## History

Kyrgyz deliver a white horse as a tribute to the Qianlong Emperor of China (1757), soon after the Qing conquest of Xinjiang. Soon, intensive trade started in Kulja and Chuguchak, Kyrgyz horses, sheep and goats being traded for Chinese silk and cotton fabrics.[42]

Tributary relations emerged during the Tang dynasty, under the reign of Emperor Taizong, as Chinese rulers started perceiving foreign envoys bearing tribute as a "token of conformity to the Chinese world order".[43]

The Ming founder Hongwu Emperor adopted a maritime prohibition policy and issued tallies to "tribute-bearing" embassies for missions. Missions were subject to limits on the number of persons and items allowed.[44]

### Korea

The Old Book of Tang and New Book of Tang recorded Silla sending women, 4 in total, all rejected,[45] gold, silver among other things as tribute to the Tang dynasty.[46][47]

> If Silla indeed served China wholeheartedly by dispatching tributary ships one after another, why did King Beopheung use his own reign title? This is indeed confusing! From then on, Silla maintained this erroneous practice for many more years, even after Emperor Taizong had learned about it and reproved the Silla ambassador. Now, they eventually adopted the Tang reign title. Although a move out of necessity, we may still say that they have been able to correct their mistake[48]

— Kim Pusik (1075–1151) writing on the nature of Silla's tributary relationship with China

Goryeo's rulers called themselves "Great King" viewing themselves as the sovereigns of the Goryeo-centered world of Northeast Asia. They maintained their own Imperial style, in their setup of government institutions, administrative divisions and own tributary system.[49]

After the defeat of the Yuan in 1368, King Gongmin of Goryeo terminated tributary relations with the Yuan and established tributary relations with the Ming. However, Gongmin's relationship with the Ming did not replicate the same kind of close political control that Goryeo was subjected to under the Yuan. Gongmin only paid lip service to the tributary relationship with the Ming and performed rites such as memorial services to Heaven that were only meant for the Son of Heaven (emperor) rather than a king. When Emperor Hongwu sent Ming envoys to erect a tombstone in Goryeo territory to perform a memorial service signifying Goryeo's tributary status, Gongmin excused himself from attending the reception by pretending to be sick. After the Ming envoys left, Gongmin ordered for the tombstone to be dug up and thrown away.[50] Goryeo sent military forces to the Ming border region of Liaodong in 1370 to eliminate pro-Yuan factions that dominated the area, but this also caused the Ming to grow suspicious of Goryeo's intentions. After Gongmin was assassinated in 1374, his successor, King U, was dominated by a pro-Yuan court that re-established tributary relations with Northern Yuan while also sending tribute to the Ming in 1385. Due to these actions, Emperor Hongwu grew suspicious of Goryeo's intentions and withheld investiture from both the Goryeo kings and the Joseon founder. Hongwu demanded heavy tributes reminiscent of the Mongol Yuan tributes but also forbade Goryeo from sending more than one tribute mission every three years due to fear that they were collecting intelligence on the Ming. Goryeo paid an enormous tribute to Ming in February 1385 consisting of five thousand horses, five hundred jin of gold, fifty thousand jin of silver and fifty thousand bolts of cotton fabric. At one point Hongwu declared an end to relations with Goryeo.[51][52]

In 1387, the Ming defeated the Mongol chieftain Naghachu in the Liaodong region and announced their intention to lay claim to northeastern Korea, formerly Ssangsŏng Prefecture under the Yuan dynasty. Goryeo responded by sending a 50,000 strong army under deputy commander Yi Seong-gye to attack the Ming in 1388. When Yi reached Wihwa Island at the border, he refused to carry out the invasion and instead turned back the army to depose King U. In 1392, Yi Seong-gye, also known as Taejo of Joseon, officially founded the state of Joseon, cut off relations with the Mongols and sent tributary envoys to the Ming founder Emperor Hongwu for recognition.[14]

Supporting Yi were two pro-Ming groups, the Neo-Confucian scholar-bureaucrats and his military forces. Yi felt that the campaign was ill-planned and even if they had been victorious in combat, Goryeo's internal conditions would be incapable of sustaining the victory with sufficient supplies. There were also suspicions that the campaign was an excuse to remove Yi from power due to his growing influence. A record called Haedong akpu indicates that General Ch'oe Yŏng was possibly scheming against Yi. The Neo-Confucian scholar class was also in conflict with the pro-Yuan elements at court that came to dominate King U's administration. After Yi returned to the capital, he adopted Ming attire and started using the Ming era name Hongwu. Due to the military coup, neither Yi or the Neo-Confucian scholars held strong domestic support, so they sought recognition by the Ming court to strengthen their power and restrain their opposition. When the Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Saek met with Hongwu, he requested that the Ming send an official to supervise Goryeo's domestic situation. When Yi Seong-gye officially founded Joseon in 1392, he also sought Ming recognition for his new state and him as the new ruler.[53]

### Japan

Early kings of Japan had formal diplomatic inquiries with the Jin dynasty and its successors and were appointed as "King of Wa". The Emperors of China commonly referred to the ruler of Japan as 倭寇王 wōkouwang (wakuō) meaning "King of Wa", while they themselves styled themselves as ōkimi, meaning "Great King" in relation to the Chinese emperor. Internally 天皇 tennō meaning "heavenly king" also used to put the ruler of Japan on the same level as the one of China.

Between 607 and 839, Japan submitted and sent 19 missions to China under the Sui and Tang dynasties (a mission planned for 894 was cancelled). The nature of these bilateral contacts evolved gradually from political and ceremonial acknowledgment to cultural exchanges; and the process accompanied the growing commercial ties which developed over time.[54] Knowledge was the principal objective of each expedition. For example: Priests studied Chinese Buddhism. Officials studied Chinese government. Doctors studied Chinese medicine. Painters studied Chinese painting. Approximately one third of those who embarked from Japan did not survive to return home.[55]

Japan under the Ashikaga shogunate again became a tributary of China under the Ming dynasty in 1401. As a result, in 1402 or 1404, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, who held most of the de facto power in Japan, accepted the title "King of Japan" from the Ming, despite the nominal sovereign of Japan still residing in Kyōto. Yoshimitsu, who bowed three times and while kneeling, read a Ming government document addressing him as the "king of Japan" and instructing him to adopt the Ming calendar. In 1403, Yoshimitsu sent a letter to the Ming emperor addressing himself as "Your subject, the King of Japan". He was the first and only Japanese ruler in the early modern period to accept a Chinese title.[56] None of Yoshimitsu's successors adopted the same stance towards the Ming. The act of submission towards the Ming is viewed negatively by many modern Japanese historians. Tsuji Zennosuke and Kuroita Katsumi described Yoshimitsu's decision as a violation of Japan's national tradition, an act of disloyalty to the Japanese throne, and brought shame and disgrace to Japan. Zuikei Shuho, a contemporary of Yoshimitsu, pointed out that the word "your subject" should only be used to show allegiance to the Japanese emperor. In 1411, Yoshimitsu's successor and son, Ashikaga Yoshimochi, ended Japanese embassies to the Ming and repudiated his predecessor by stating that "ever since antiquity our country has never called itself a vassal of a foreign land".[57] However, there were also supporters of Yoshimitsu's choice to accept official tributary status with the Ming. Arai Hakuseki, a supporter of the military class, wrote in his Tokushi yoron that Yoshimitsu increased his reputation outside Japan by being recognized as the ruler of Japan by the Ming. Haruseki believed that it was proper to use the title "King of Japan" because the shōgun was the de facto ruler rather than the Japanese emperor.[58] Several explanations have been given for why Yoshimitsu accepted tributary relations with the Ming, including: he was not aware of the political significance of his action, he accepted tributary relations to increase trade, he accepted tributary relations to solidify his own position within Japan as its ruler rather than the Japanese emperor.[59]

Tribute missions to the Ming resumed in 1432 under Yoshimochi's brother, Ashikaga Yoshinori, and lasted until 1549 when Japan chose to end its recognition of China's regional hegemony and canceled any further tribute missions.[60] Membership in the tributary system was a prerequisite for any economic exchange with China. In exiting the system, Japan relinquished its trade relationship with China.[61] Under the rule of the Wanli Emperor, Ming China quickly interpreted the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) which failed as a challenge to the Ming centered predominant worldview and order.[62]

### Thailand

Thailand was an important Chinese tributary state from the Sui dynasty (581–618), until the Taiping Rebellion of the late Qing dynasty during the mid-19th century.[63] The Sukhothai Kingdom, the first unified Thai state, established official tributary relations with the Yuan dynasty during the reign of King Ram Khamhaeng, and Thailand remained a tributary of China until 1853.[64]

Wei Yuan, the 19th century Chinese scholar, considered Thailand to be the strongest and most loyal of China's Southeast Asian tributaries, citing the time when Thailand offered to directly attack Japan to divert the Japanese in their planned invasions of Korea and the Asian mainland, as well as other acts of loyalty to the Ming dynasty.[65] Thailand was welcoming and open to Chinese immigrants, who dominated commerce and trade, and achieved high positions in the government.[66]

### Vietnam

Vietnam was ruled by China for 1050 years. When Vietnam gained independence in 939, it became a tributary of China until 1885 when it became a protectorate of France with the Treaty of Huế (1884). The Lê dynasty (1428–1527) and Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945) adopted the imperial Chinese system, with rulers declaring themselves emperors on the Confucian model and attempting to create a Vietnamese imperial tributary system while still remaining a tributary state of China.[67]

Even though Vietnam was the only sinicized country in Southeast Asia, the Ming dynasty treated it with less respect than Korea or the Ryukyu Kingdom.[68] The Hongwu Emperor was firmly opposed to military expeditions in Southeast Asia and only rebuked Vietnam's conquest of Champa, which had sent tribute missions to China seeking help. After the death of Emperor Hongwu, the Chinese intervened after a Vietnamese general, Le Qui Ly, usurped the Vietnamese throne.[69]

The Malacca sultanate sent envoys to China to inform them that while returning to Malacca in 1469 from a trip to China, their ship had been driven by a storm to the coast of Vietnam and the Vietnamese killed, enslaved and castrated the survivors. The Malaccans reported that Vietnam was in control of Champa and that the Vietnamese sought to conquer Malacca, but the Malaccans did not fight back because of a lack of permission from the Chinese to engage in war. Malacca avoided reciprocating hostilities until they received a letter from the Ming dynasty, in which the Ming emperor scolded them, ordering the Malaccans to raise soldiers and retaliate if the Vietnamese attacked.[70]

According to a 2018 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution covering Vietnam-China relations from 1365 to 1841, "the Vietnamese court explicitly recognized its unequal status in its relations with China through a number of institutions and norms." Due to their participation in the tributary system, Vietnamese rulers behaved as though China was not a threat and paid very little military attention to it. Rather, Vietnamese leaders were clearly more concerned with quelling chronic domestic instability and managing relations with kingdoms to their south and west."[71]

### Ryukyu Kingdom

From the late 14th to early 16th centuries, the Ryukyu Kingdom served an important position in the Ming's tributary order, as they became a key intermediary for the Ming's trade with Northeast and Southeast Asia through goods funnelled into Ming-Ryukyu tribute missions. Ryukyu's intermediary role was also facilitated by Chinese diaspora communities who settled in Ryukyu and served positions in the Ryukyu court.[72]

### Maritime Southeast Asia

The Sultanate of Malacca and the Sultanate of Brunei sent tribute to the Ming dynasty, with their first rulers personally traveling to China with the Imperial fleets.[73][74]

In the Philippine islands, trade with China is believed to have begun during the Tang dynasty, and expanded during the Song dynasty;[75] by the second millennium AD, some polities were part of the tributary system of China,[76]: 177–178 among them the Sultanate of Sulu.[77]

## See also

* Emperor of China
* List of recipients of tribute from China
* List of tributary states of China
* Ming dynasty
* List of diplomatic missions of the Qing dynasty
* Tian ("Heaven") / Shangdi ("God")
* Tianxia ("All Under Heaven")
* Tian Chao ("Dynasty of Heaven")
* Tian Kehan ("Khan of Heaven")
* Tian Ming ("Mandate of Heaven")
* Tianzi ("Son of Heaven")
* Pax Sinica
* Tributary state
* Emperor at home, king abroad
* East Asian cultural sphere
* Little China (ideology)
* Mandala (political model)
* Hua–Yi distinction

## References

### Citations

1. ↑ ChuLiu 1994, p. 177.
2. ↑ Zhang, Yongjin, "The Tribute System", Oxford Bibliographies, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0069.xml, retrieved September 27, 2023
3. ↑ Westad (2012), p. 10.
4. ↑ Rowe, William (2010). China's Last Empire - The Great Qing. Harvard University Press. p. 211. ISBN 9780674054554. https://books.google.com/books?id=KN7Awmzx2PAC. Retrieved September 27, 2023.
5. ↑ Perdue (2015), p. 1002.
6. ↑ Lee 2017, pp. 28–29.
7. ↑ Perdue (2015), p. 1005.
8. ↑ Perdue (2009), p. 85.
9. ↑ Zhou 2009, p. 154.
10. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 9.
11. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 13.
12. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 33.
13. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 81-82.
14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Lee 2017, p. 3, 79, 81.
15. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 92.
16. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 44, 67.
17. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 128-131.
18. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 3.
19. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 82, 94-96.
20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Smits 2019, p. 65.
21. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 12.
22. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 15-16.
23. ↑ Smits 2019, p. 35.
24. ↑ de Klundert 2013, p. 176.
25. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 12, 41-42.
26. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 17.
27. ↑ Siu 2023, p. 7-12.
28. ↑ Robinson 2009, p. 48.
29. ↑ Jory, Patrick. "Siam as a ‘tributary state’ of imperial China and the age of empire". Taylor & Francis. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14490854.2021.1916968.
30. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 23.
31. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 42-46.
32. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 44.
33. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 44-46.
34. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 24.
35. ↑ "Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Contemporary Vietnam: Constructing Nationalism, New Democracy, and the Use of "the Other"". Trinity University. https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=infolit_usra.
36. ↑ "Nguyen Thuy Dan, researcher of Han Nom and East Asian history: “Academics must be refined, but not inhumane”". https://www.tatlerasia.com/power-purpose/impact/nguyen-thuy-dan-researcher-of-han-nom-and-east-asian-history-vn-en.
37. ↑ Vu 2016, p. 50.
38. ↑ Woodside 2020, p. 118.
39. ↑ Woodside 2020, p. 117-118, 122.
40. ↑ Liu 2009, p. 90.
41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 41.2 41.3 41.4 41.5 Khong, Y. F. (2013). "The American Tributary System" (in en). The Chinese Journal of International Politics 6 (1): 1–47. doi:10.1093/cjip/pot002. ISSN 1750-8916.
42. ↑ Millward, James A. (2007), Eurasian crossroads: a history of Xinjiang, Columbia University Press, pp. 45–47, ISBN 978-0231139243, https://books.google.com/books?id=8FVsWq31MtMC
43. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 18.
44. ↑ 2014, p. 19. sfn error: no target: CITEREF2014 (help)
45. ↑ Bielenstein 2005, p. 142.
46. ↑ "199". Old Book of Tang. https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/舊唐書/卷199上#新羅. "新罗国...武德四年，遣使朝贡...贞观五年，遣使献女乐二人，皆鬒发美色...开元十六年，遣使来献方物，又上表请令人就中国学问经教，上许之...大历二年，宪英卒，国人立其子干运为王，仍遣其大臣金隐居奉表入朝，贡方物，请加册命...八年，遣使来朝，并献金、银、牛黄、鱼牙纳朝霞䌷等。九年至十二年，比岁遣使来朝，或一岁再至...元和四年，遣使金陆珍等来朝贡。五年，王子金宪章来朝贡...十五年十一月，遣使朝贡...长庆二年十二月，遣使金柱弼朝贡。"
47. ↑ "199". New Book of Tang. https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/新唐書/卷220. "新罗国...贞观五年，献女乐二...玄宗开元中，数入朝，献果下马、朝霞䌷、鱼牙䌷、海豹皮。又献二女。"
48. ↑ Wang 2013, p. 96.
49. ↑ Breuker, Remco E. (2010), Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 918-1170: History, Ideology and Identity in the Koryŏ Dynasty, BRILL, ISBN 9789004183254
50. ↑ 2017, p. 87-88. sfn error: no target: CITEREF2017 (help)
51. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 84.
52. ↑ Robinson, David M. “Rethinking the Late Koryŏ in an International Context.” Korean Studies, vol. 41, 2017, pp. 75–98. JSTOR, JSTOR 44508440. Accessed 11 Dec. 2022.
53. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 88-90.
54. ↑ Fogel, Joshua A. (2009). Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time, pp. 102-107.
55. ↑ Hoffman, Michael. "Cultures Combined in the Mists of Time: Origins of the China-Japan relationship," Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. February 3, 2006; reprinting article in Japan Times, January 29, 2006.
56. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 19, 79-80.
57. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 93.
58. ↑ Ng 2019, p. 173.
59. ↑ Lee 2017, p. 93-95.
60. ↑ Howe, Christopher. The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia. p. 337
61. ↑ Joshua Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) p. 27; Goodrich, Luther Carrington et al. (1976). [https://books.google.com/books?id=JWpF-dObxW8C&pg=PA1316 Dictionary of Ming biography, 1368–1644,, p. 1316, at Google Books; note: the economic benefit of the Sinocentric tribute system was profitable trade. The tally trade (kangō bōeki or kanhe maoyi in Chinese) was a system devised and monitored by the Chinese – see Nussbaum, Louis Frédéric et al. (2005). Japan Encyclopedia, p. 471.
62. ↑ Swope, Kenneth. "Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi's Second Invasion of Korea, 1597–1598". Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies: 761. http://www.kecla.org/data/krhistory/Topics on Korean History II.pdf. Retrieved 2013-09-07. "At this point in 1593, the war entered a stalemate during which intrigues and negotiations failed to produce a settlement. As the suzerain of Joseon Korea, Ming China exercised tight control over the Koreans during the war. At the same time, Ming China negotiated bilaterally with Japan while often ignoring the wishes of the Korean government.".
63. ↑ Gambe, Annabelle R. (2000) (in en). Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship and Capitalist Development in Southeast Asia. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 99. ISBN 9783825843861. https://books.google.com/books?id=ZUfNRG8IR44C&q=Siam+subordinate+vassal+tributary. Retrieved 19 July 2016.
64. ↑ Chinvanno, Anuson (1992-06-18) (in en). Thailand's Policies towards China, 1949–54. Springer. p. 24. ISBN 9781349124305. https://books.google.com/books?id=0vywCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA24. Retrieved 19 July 2016.
65. ↑ Leonard, Jane Kate (1984) (in en). Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World. Harvard Univ Asia Center. pp. 137–138. ISBN 9780674948556. https://books.google.com/books?id=wQCm-bequYgC&pg=PA137. Retrieved 19 July 2016.
66. ↑ Gambe, Annabelle R. (2000) (in en). Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship and Capitalist Development in Southeast Asia. LIT Verlag Münster. pp. 100–101. ISBN 9783825843861. https://books.google.com/books?id=ZUfNRG8IR44C&pg=PA101. Retrieved 19 July 2016.
67. ↑ Alexander Woodside (1971). Vietnam and the Chinese model: a comparative study of Vietnamese and Chinese government in the first half of the nineteenth century (reprint, illustrated ed.). Harvard Univ Asia Center. p. 234. ISBN 0-674-93721-X. https://books.google.com/books?id=0LgSI9UQNpwC&q=chinese+tributary+system&pg=PA234. Retrieved June 20, 2011.
68. ↑ Dreyer, Edward L. (1982). Early Ming China : A political history, 1355-1435. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-1105-0. https://archive.org/details/earlymingchinapo0000drey/page/116/mode/2up.
69. ↑ Edward L. Dreyer (1982). Early Ming China: a political history, 1355-1435. Stanford University Press. p. 117. ISBN 0-8047-1105-4. https://archive.org/details/earlymingchinapo0000drey/page/116/mode/2up. Retrieved 2010-11-28.
70. ↑ Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Straits Branch, Reinhold Rost (1887). Miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China: reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from Dalrymple's "Oriental Repertory," and the "Asiatic Researches" and "Journal" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Volume 1. Trübner & Co.. p. 252. https://books.google.com/books?id=TgkYAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA252. Retrieved 2011-01-09.
71. ↑ David C. Kang, et al. "War, Rebellion, and Intervention under Hierarchy: Vietnam–China Relations, 1365 to 1841." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63.4 (2019): 896-922. online
72. ↑ Geoff Wade (July 2007). "Ryukyu in the Ming Reign Annals 1380s-1580s". Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 93: 13–31.
73. ↑ Anthony Reid (2010). Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. p. 51. ISBN 978-0521872379.
74. ↑ Marie-Sybille de Vienne (2015). Brunei: From the Age of Commerce to the 21st Century. NUS Press. pp. 41–44. ISBN 978-9971698188.
75. ↑ Glover, Ian, ed (2004). Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. London, England: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 267. ISBN 978-0-415-29777-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=6kDm5d3cMIYC.
76. ↑ Scott, William Henry (1994). Barangay: Sixteenth-century Philippine Culture and Society. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press. ISBN 978-971-550-135-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=15KZU-yMuisC. Retrieved October 18, 2015.
77. ↑ Shambaugh, David L. et al. (2008). International Relations of Asia, p. 54 n15., p. 54, at Google Books citing the 1818 Collected Statutes of the Qing Dynasty (DaQing hui-tien)

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## Further reading

Library resources about
Tributary system of China

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* Resources in your library
* Resources in other libraries

* Cohen, Warren I. . East Asia at the Center : Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. ISBN 0231101082.
* Fairbank, John K.; Teng, S.Y. (1941). "On the Ch'ing Tributary System". Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6 (2): 135–246. doi:10.2307/2718006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2718006.
* Kang, David C., et al. "War, Rebellion, and Intervention under Hierarchy: Vietnam–China Relations, 1365 to 1841." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63.4 (2019): 896–922. online
* Kang, David C. "International Order in Historical East Asia: Tribute and Hierarchy Beyond Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism." International Organization (2019): 1-29. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000274
* Liu, Lydia He (2009), The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making, Harvard University Press
* Song, Nianshen (Summer 2012). "'Tributary' from a Multilateral and Multilayered Perspective". Chinese Journal of International Politics 5 (2): 155–182. doi:10.1093/cjip/pos005. https://zenodo.org/record/848759. Retrieved 11 July 2016.
* Smits, Gregory (2019), Maritime Ryukyu, 1050-1650, University of Hawaii Press
* Swope, Kenneth M. "Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592–1596." International History Review 24.4 (2002): 757–782.
* Vu, Tuong (2016), State formation on China’s southern frontier: Vietnam as a shadow empire and hegemon, HumaNetten Nr 37Hösten
* Wang, Zhenping (2013), Tang China in Multi-Polar Asia: A History of Diplomacy and War, University of Hawaii Press
* Wills, John E. Past and Present in China's Foreign Policy: From "Tribute System" to "Peaceful Rise". Portland, ME: MerwinAsia, 2010. ISBN 9781878282873.
* Womack, Brantly. "Asymmetry and China's tributary system." Chinese Journal of International Politics 5.1 (2012): 37–54. online
* Woodside, Alexander Barton (2020), Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, Brill
* Zhang, Yongjin, and Barry Buzan. "The tributary system as international society in theory and practice." Chinese Journal of International Politics 5.1 (2012): 3-36.
* Zhou, Xiuqin (2009), Zhaoling: The Mausoleum of Emperor Tang Taizong, Sino-Platonic Papers

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