Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Short description: Ongoing military and political conflict in West Asia

Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Part of the Arab–Israeli conflict

Situation in the Israeli-occupied territories, as of December 2011[update], per the United Nations OCHA.[2]
See here for a more detailed and updated map.
| Date| c. 19th century – present

|

Location|

West Asia

Status|

Ongoing

* Israeli–Palestinian peace process (halted)
* Gaza–Israel conflict (intermittent)
* Gaza war
* Gaza genocide

Territorial
changes|

1948–1967:

* Egypt occupies the Gaza Strip

* Establishment of the All-Palestine Protectorate (until 1959)

* Jordan annexes the West Bank

Since 1967:

* Israel occupies the Gaza Strip

* Unilateral disengagement (2005)

* Israel occupies the West Bank

* Establishment of Israeli settlements
* Division of Israeli control and Palestinian control by the Oslo II Accord (1995)

Belligerents

Israel

* Pre-1948:
* Yishuv
* Bar-Giora
* Hashomer
* Haganah
* Irgun
* Lehi
* 1948–present:
* Israeli security forces
* Israeli settlers (since 1967)

Palestinians

* Pre-1948:
* Muslim-Christian Associations
* Palestine Arab Congress
* Arab Higher Committee
* 1948–present:
1948:
* Arab Higher Committee
* All-Palestine Protectorate
* Army of the Holy War
1949–1956:
* Palestinian fedayeen[lower-alpha 1]
1964–2005:
* PLO (1964–2005)[lower-alpha 2]
* UNLU (1987–1993)[lower-alpha 3]
* Palestinian Authority (1994–2005)[lower-alpha 4]
2007–present:
* Hamas government
* Palestinian Joint Operations Room (2018–present)[lower-alpha 5]

Casualties and losses
9,901–10,239 killed|

104,701–110,887 killed 6,373 Israeli[3] and 13,000–16,000 Palestinian deaths in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.[4]
654 Israeli[5] and 19,085 Palestinian and Lebanese deaths in the 1982 Lebanon War in addition to 800–3,500 in the Sabra-Shatila massacre.[6]
1,962 Palestinians[7] and 179–200 Israeli deaths[8] in the First Intifada.
1,010 Israelis[9] and 3,179–3,354 Palestinian deaths in the Second Intifada.[9]
402 Palestinians were killed in the 2006 Gaza–Israel conflict.[10]
1,116[11]–1,417[12] Palestinian deaths in the Gaza War (2008–2009).
2,125–2,310 Palestinian deaths in the 2014 Gaza War.[13]
285 Palestinian and 17 Israeli deaths in the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.[14]

As of 25 February 2026[update], at least 80,692+[15][16][17][18] Palestinians and 2,039+[19][20][21][22] Israelis killed in the Gaza war with a further 1,900,000 Palestinians displaced within Gaza[23] and 135,000 Israeli evacuees.[24] Indirect deaths[lower-alpha 6] likely to be several times higher than those killed by violence,[26] with estimates for total Palestinian deaths in the Gaza war are between 186,000[27]– 335,500[lower-alpha 7]

Israel and the Palestinians are engaged in an ongoing military and political conflict about land and self-determination within the territory of the former Mandatory Palestine.[29][30][31] Key aspects of the conflict include Palestinian refugees, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, security, water rights,[32] the permit regime in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, Palestinian freedom of movement,[33] and the Palestinian right of return.

The conflict has its origins in the rise of Zionism in the late 19th century in Europe, a movement which aimed to establish a Jewish state through colonization in the region of Palestine.[34][35] The Zionist movement garnered the support of an imperial power in the 1917 Balfour Declaration issued by Britain, which promised to support the creation of a "Jewish homeland" in Palestine. Following British occupation of the formerly Ottoman region during World War I, Mandatory Palestine was established as a British mandate. Increasing Jewish immigration led to the rapid growth of the Yishuv, or Jewish population in Palestine, heightening tensions and conflict between Jews and Arabs over land and economic issues.[36][37] The 1936 Arab general strike led to the Peel Commission and the peasant-led Palestinian Revolt (1936–39), which demanded an end to British colonial rule and its support for Zionism.[38][39] Eventually, tensions led to the United Nations adopting a partition plan in 1947, triggering a civil war.

During the ensuing 1948 Palestine war, the State of Israel was founded and more than half of the mandate's predominantly Palestinian Arab population fled or were expelled by Israeli forces. By the end of the war, Israel was established on most of the former mandate's territory, and the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were controlled by Egypt and Jordan respectively.[40][41] Since the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel has been occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, known collectively as the Palestinian territories. Two Palestinian uprisings against Israel and its occupation erupted in 1987 and 2000, the first and second intifadas respectively. Israel's occupation resulted in Israel constructing illegal settlements there, creating a system of institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians under its occupation referred to as Israeli apartheid.[42] This discrimination includes Israel's denial of Palestinian refugees from their right of return and right to their lost properties. Israel has also drawn international condemnation for violating the human rights of the Palestinians.[43]

The international community, with the exception of the United States and Israel who prefer bilateral negotiations, has been in consensus since the 1980s regarding a settlement of the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and a just resolution for Palestinian refugees. In recent years, public support for a two-state solution has decreased, with Israeli policy reflecting an interest in maintaining the occupation, rather than seeking a permanent resolution to the conflict. In 2007, Israel tightened its blockade of the Gaza Strip and made official its policy of isolating it from the West Bank. Since then, Israel has framed its relationship with Gaza in terms of the laws of war, rather than in terms of its status as an occupying power. In a July 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined that Israel continues to illegally occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Since 2006, Israel have fought several wars with the ruling party in the Gaza Strip, Hamas. Attacks by Hamas-led armed groups in October 2023 in Israel, which resulted in nearly 1,200 deaths, were followed by another war, which has caused widespread destruction, loss of life, mass population displacement, a humanitarian crisis, and a famine in the Gaza Strip.[44][45] Israel's actions in Gaza during this war have been described by international law experts, genocide scholars and human rights organizations as a genocide.[46][47]

## Contents

* 1 History
* 1.1 1920s
* 1.2 1936–1939 Arab revolt
* 1.3 1940–1947
* 1.4 1948 Palestine war
* 1.4.1 1947 United Nations partition plan and civil war
* 1.4.2 1948 Arab–Israeli War
* 1.5 1956 Suez Crisis
* 1.6 1967 Six-Day War
* 1.7 1973 Yom Kippur War
* 1.8 1982 Lebanon War
* 1.9 First Intifada (1987–1993)
* 1.10 Second Intifada (2000–2005)
* 1.11 Fatah–Hamas split (2006–2007)
* 1.12 2023–present Gaza war
* 1.12.1 September 2025 developments
* 2 Attempts to reach a peaceful settlement
* 2.1 The peace process
* 2.1.1 Creation of the Palestinian Authority and security cooperation
* 2.2 Oslo Accords (1993, 1995)
* 2.3 Camp David Summit (2000)
* 2.4 Developments following Camp David
* 2.5 Taba Summit (2001)
* 2.6 Road map for peace (2002–2003)
* 2.7 Arab Peace Initiative (2002, 2007, 2017)
* 3 Current status
* 3.1 Apartheid
* 3.2 Occupied Palestinian territory
* 3.2.1 Israeli settlements
* 3.2.2 Israeli military police
* 3.3 Separation of the Gaza Strip
* 3.3.1 Blockade of the Gaza Strip
* 3.4 United Nations and recognition of Palestinian statehood
* 3.5 Incitements to violence
* 4 Issues in dispute
* 4.1 Status of Jerusalem
* 4.1.1 Holy sites and the Temple Mount
* 4.2 Palestinian refugees
* 4.3 Israeli security concerns
* 4.4 Water resources
* 4.4.1 Water infrastructure financing
* 4.5 Agricultural rights
* 4.6 Israel's West Bank barrier
* 4.7 Palestinian violence outside of Israel
* 4.8 Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence
* 4.9 Overriding authority and international status
* 4.10 Economic disputes and boycotts
* 5 Fatalities
* 5.1 Criticism of casualty statistics
* 5.2 Landmines and unexploded ordnance
* 6 Public opinion
* 6.1 Domestic
* 6.2 International
* 7 See also
* 8 Notes
* 9 References
* 9.1 Bibliography
* 10 External links

## History

The 1917 Balfour Declaration from UK Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Walter Rothschild expressing the support of the British government for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."[48]

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the development of political Zionism and the arrival of Zionist settlers to Palestine.[49][50] During the early 20th century, Arab nationalism also grew within the Ottoman Empire. To gain support from the Arab nationalists in the war against the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain promised support for the formation of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the McMahon–Hussein correspondence.[51] The British Empire supplied a large amount of weapons to the Arab revolt in 1916–1918.[52] With support from the Arab revolt the British Empire defeated the Ottoman's forces and took control of Palestine, Jordan and Syria. It later transpired that the British and French governments had secretly made the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 not to allow the formation of an independent Arab state.[53] In July 1920, the short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria, with Emir Faisal (one of the leaders of the Arab revolt) as king and tolerated by Britain, was crushed by French armed forces, equipped with modern artillery.

While Jewish immigration began during this period, it was not until the arrival of more ideologically Zionist immigrants in the decade preceding the First World War that the landscape of Ottoman Palestine would start to significantly change.[54] Land purchases, the eviction of tenant Arab peasants and armed confrontation with Jewish paramilitary units would all contribute to the Palestinian population's growing fear of territorial displacement and dispossession.[41] From early on, the leadership of the Zionist movement had the idea of "transferring" (a euphemism for ethnic cleansing) the Arab Palestinian population out of the land for the purpose of establishing a Jewish demographic majority.[55][56][57][58][59] According to the Israeli historian Benny Morris the idea of transfer was "inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism".[60] The Arab population felt the threat of transfer as early as the 1880s with the arrival of the first aliyah.[41] Chaim Weizmann's efforts to build British support for the Zionist movement would eventually secure the Balfour Declaration, a public statement issued by the British government in 1917 during the First World War announcing support for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.[61]

### 1920s

With the creation of the British Mandate in Palestine after the end of the first world war, large-scale Jewish immigration began accompanied by the development of a separate Jewish-controlled sector of the economy supported by foreign capital.[62] The more ardent Zionist ideologues of the Second Aliyah would become the leaders of the Yishuv starting in the 1920s and believed in the separation of Jewish and Arab societies.[49]

The British colonial government in Mandatory Palestine recognized Zionist organizations, which created the structure of a quasi state, as self-governing institutions that legitimately represented the Jewish population.[63][64] Chief among these organizations was the Jewish Agency for Palestine (originally established in 1908 as the Palestine Office (he) of the Zionist Organization and renamed the Jewish Agency for Israel after the establishment of Israel in 1948), which was extended quasi-official diplomatic status by Britain and the League of Nations, giving the Zionist movement international legitimacy.[63]: 45 The Jewish Agency, by the Mandate for Palestine, was "recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine," and it was entitled to diplomatic representation in the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva, as well as in London and elsewhere.[63] The British colonial government did not similarly recognize the Arab majority in Palestine, which it referred to as "non-Jewish communities," and which did not have any international recognition.[63][64]

Amin al-Husseini, appointed as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem by the British High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, immediately marked Jewish national movement and Jewish immigration to Palestine as the sole enemy to his cause,[65] initiating large-scale riots against the Jews as early as 1920 in Jerusalem and in 1921 in Jaffa. Among the results of the violence was the establishment of the Jewish paramilitary force Haganah. In 1929, a series of violent riots resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs, with significant Jewish casualties in Hebron and Safed, and the evacuation of Jews from Hebron and Gaza.[66]

Alongside political unrest, rural Palestine in the Mandate era experienced demographic and agricultural expansion. Large villages such as Lajjun and Hamama grew in size, reclaimed marginal lands, and integrated into regional markets, reflecting the resilience and transformation of the Palestinian countryside during this period.[67][68][69]

### 1936–1939 Arab revolt

British colonial Palestine Police Force dispersing a crowd in the Jaffa riots, seen as the start of the Arab revolt (1936–1939) in Palestine against British rule and the mass Jewish immigration and rapid expansion of Jewish settlements it allowed.[70] Palestinian Arab-Christian-owned newspaper Falastin, 18 June 1936, caricatured Zionism as a crocodile, protected by a British officer, telling Palestinian Arabs: "Don't be afraid! I will swallow you peacefully..."[71]

The peasant-led popular uprising was a national struggle of Palestinian Arabs against British [70]rule and against the rapid expansion of Jewish settlements that it allowed.[70] It occurred during a peak in the influx of European Jewish immigrants,[72] as rural fellahin faced growing plight and land dispossession, contributing to rural flight and urbanization, which eroded traditional social bonds and failed to alleviate the peasants' abject poverty.[70][73][lower-alpha 8]

In the early 1930s, the Arab national struggle in Palestine had drawn many Arab nationalist militants from across the Middle East, such as Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam from Syria, who established the Black Hand militant group and had prepared the grounds for the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Following the death of al-Qassam at the hands of the British in late 1935, tensions erupted in 1936 into the Arab general strike and general boycott. The strike soon deteriorated into violence, and the Arab revolt was bloodily repressed by the British assisted by the British armed forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, the Jewish Supernumerary Police, and Special Night Squads.[75] The suppression of the revolt would leave at least 10% of the adult male population killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled.[76] Between the expulsion of much of the Arab leadership and the weakening of the economy, the Palestinians would struggle to confront the growing Zionist movement.[77]

The cost and risks associated with the revolt and the ongoing inter-communal conflict led to a shift in British policies in the region and the appointment of the Peel Commission which recommended creation of a small Jewish country, which the two main Zionist leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, accepted on the basis that it would allow for later expansion.[78][79][80] The subsequent White Paper of 1939, which rejected a Jewish state and sought to limit Jewish immigration to the region, was the breaking point in relations between British authorities and the Zionist movement.[81][82]

### 1940–1947

Haganah ship Jewish State carrying illegal Jewish immigrants from Europe at the Haifa Port, Mandatory Palestine, 1947

The renewed violence, which continued sporadically until the beginning of World War II, ended with around 5,000 casualties on the Arab side and 700 combined on the British and Jewish side total.[83][84][85] With the eruption of World War II, the situation in Mandatory Palestine calmed down. It allowed a shift towards a more moderate stance among Palestinian Arabs under the leadership of the Nashashibi clan and even the establishment of the Jewish–Arab Palestine Regiment under British command, fighting Germans in North Africa. The more radical exiled faction of al-Husseini, however, tended to cooperate with Nazi Germany, and participated in the establishment of a pro-Nazi propaganda machine throughout the Arab world. The defeat of Arab nationalists in Iraq and subsequent relocation of al-Husseini to Nazi-occupied Europe tied his hands regarding field operations in Palestine, though he regularly demanded that the Italians and the Germans bomb Tel Aviv.[66] The Jewish Agency for Palestine and Palestinian National Defense Party called on Palestine's Jewish and Arab youth to volunteer for the British Army. 30,000 Palestinian Jews and 12,000 Palestinian Arabs enlisted in the British armed forces during the war, while a Jewish Brigade was created in 1944.[86]

By the end of World War II, a crisis over the fate of Holocaust survivors from Europe led to renewed tensions between the Yishuv and Mandate authorities. By 1944, Jewish groups began to conduct military-style operations against the British, with the aim of persuading Great Britain to accept the formation of a Jewish state. This culminated in the Jewish insurgency in Mandatory Palestine. This sustained Zionist paramilitary campaign of resistance against British authorities, along with the increased illegal immigration of Jewish refugees and 1947 United Nations partition, led to eventual withdrawal of the British from Palestine.[87]

### 1948 Palestine war

#### 1947 United Nations partition plan and civil war

Land ownership

Population distribution

Two maps reviewed by the United Nations in considering partition

On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 181(II)[88] recommending the adoption and implementation of a plan to partition Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the City of Jerusalem.[89] Palestinian Arabs were opposed to the partition.[90] Zionists accepted the partition but planned to expand Israel's borders beyond what was allocated to it by the UN.[91] On the next day, Palestine was swept by violence, igniting the first phase of the Palestine War. For four months, under continuous Arab provocation and attack, the Yishuv was usually on the defensive while occasionally retaliating.[92] The Arab League supported the Arab struggle by forming the volunteer-based Arab Liberation Army, supporting the Palestinian Arab Army of the Holy War, under the leadership of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and Hasan Salama. On the Jewish side, the civil war was managed by the major underground militias – the Haganah, Irgun and Lehi – strengthened by numerous Jewish veterans of World War II and foreign volunteers. By spring 1948, it was already clear that the Arab forces were nearing a total collapse, while Yishuv forces gained more and more territory, creating a large scale refugee problem of Palestinian Arabs.[66]

#### 1948 Arab–Israeli War

Land in the lighter shade represents territory within the borders of Israel at the conclusion of the 1948 war. This land is internationally recognized as belonging to Israel.

Following the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, the Arab League decided to intervene on behalf of Palestinian Arabs, marching their forces into former British Palestine, beginning the main phase of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.[89] The overall fighting, leading to around 15,000 casualties, resulted in cease-fire and armistice agreements of 1949, with Israel holding much of the former Mandate territory, Jordan occupying and later annexing the West Bank and Egypt taking over the Gaza Strip, where the All-Palestine Government was declared by the Arab League on 22 September 1948.[75] The 1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine and 1948 Arab-Israeli War resulted in the ethnic cleansing of 750,000 Palestinian Arabs.[40] In 1950, Israel passed the Law of Return, which allowed Jews and their spouses to become citizens with voting rights, even if they had never lived there before.

### 1956 Suez Crisis

Through the 1950s, Jordan and Egypt supported the Palestinian Fedayeen militants' cross-border attacks into Israel, while Israel carried out its own reprisal operations in the host countries. The 1956 Suez Crisis resulted in a short-term Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and exile of the All-Palestine Government, which was later restored with Israeli withdrawal. The All-Palestine Government was completely abandoned by Egypt in 1959 and was officially merged into the United Arab Republic, to the detriment of the Palestinian national movement. Gaza Strip then was put under the authority of the Egyptian military administrator, making it a de facto military occupation. In 1964, however, a new organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was established by Yasser Arafat.[89] It immediately won the support of most Arab League governments and was granted a seat in the Arab League.

### 1967 Six-Day War

During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel captured the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. Each of these territories except the Sinai remain under Israeli occupation.

In the 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel occupied the Palestinian West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, and two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The war exerted a significant effect upon Palestinian nationalism, as the PLO was unable to establish any control on the ground and ultimately established its headquarters in Jordan, from where it supported the Jordanian army during the War of Attrition. However, the Palestinian base in Jordan collapsed with the Jordanian–Palestinian civil war in 1970, after which the PLO was forced to relocate to South Lebanon.

In the mid-1970s, the international community converged on a framework to resolve the conflict through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. This "land for peace" proposal was endorsed by the ICJ and UN.[93]

### 1973 Yom Kippur War

On 6 October 1973, a coalition of Arab forces consisting of mainly Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Despite this, the war concluded with an Israeli victory, with both sides suffering tremendous casualties.

Following the end of the war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 confirming the land-for-peace principle established in Resolution 242, initiating the Middle East peace process. The Arab defeat would play an important role in the PLO's willingness to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict,[94][95] while many Israelis began to believe that the area under Israeli occupation could not be held indefinitely by force.[96][97]

The Camp David Accords, agreed upon by Israel and Egypt in 1978, primarily aimed to establish a peace treaty between the two countries. The accords also proposed the creation of a "Self-Governing Authority" for the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, excluding Jerusalem, under Israeli control. A peace treaty based on these accords was signed in 1979, leading to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian Sinai Peninsula by 1982.[98][99]

### 1982 Lebanon War

During the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian militants continued to launch attacks against Israel while also battling opponents within Lebanon. In 1978, the Coastal Road massacre led to the Israeli full-scale invasion known as Operation Litani. This operation sought to dislodge the PLO from Lebanon while expanding the area under the control of the Israeli allied Christian militias in southern Lebanon. The operation succeeded in leaving a large portion of the south in control of the Israeli proxy which would eventually form the South Lebanon Army. Under United States pressure, Israeli forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon.[100][101][102][103]

In 1982, Israel, having secured its southern border with Egypt, sought to resolve the Palestinian issue by attempting to dismantle the military and political power of the PLO in Lebanon.[104] The goal was to establish a friendly regime in Lebanon and continue its policy of settlement and annexation in occupied Palestine.[105][106][107] The PLO had observed the latest ceasefire with Israel and shown a preference for negotiations over military operations. As a result, Israel sought to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner.[108][109][110] Most Palestinian militants were defeated within several weeks, Beirut was captured, and the PLO headquarters were evacuated to Tunisia in June by Yasser Arafat's decision.[75]

### First Intifada (1987–1993)

Protests in the Gaza Strip in the early days of the First Intifada in 1987.

The first Palestinian uprising began in 1987 as a response to Israel's military occupation, escalating attacks on Palestinians, and policies of settlement building and collective punishment. The uprising largely consisted of nonviolent acts of civil disobedience and protest, and was largely led by grassroots popular, youth, and women's committees.[111][112] By the early 1990s, the conflict, termed the First Intifada, was the focus of international settlement efforts, in part motivated by the success of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1982. Eventually the Israeli–Palestinian peace process led to the Oslo Accords of 1993, allowing the PLO to relocate from Tunisia and take ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, establishing the Palestinian National Authority. The peace process also had significant opposition among elements of Palestinian society, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who immediately initiated a campaign of attacks targeting Israelis. Following hundreds of casualties and a wave of anti-government propaganda, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli far-right extremist who objected to the peace initiative. This struck a serious blow to the peace process, which in 1996 led to the newly elected government of Israel backing off from the process, to some degree.[66]

### Second Intifada (2000–2005)

Demonstrations against the construction of the West Bank separation barrier in the city of Bil'in, occupied West Bank, in 2005 during the Second Intifada.

Following several years of unsuccessful negotiations, the conflict re-erupted as the Second Intifada in September 2000.[75] The violence, escalating into an open conflict between the Palestinian National Security Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, lasted until 2004/2005 and led to thousands of fatalities. In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon ordered the removal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from Gaza. Israel and its Supreme Court formally declared an end to occupation, saying it "had no effective control over what occurred" in Gaza.[113] However, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and many other international bodies and NGOs continue to consider Israel to be the occupying power of the Gaza Strip as Israel controls Gaza Strip's airspace, territorial waters and controls the movement of people or goods in or out of Gaza by air or sea.[113][114][115]

### Fatah–Hamas split (2006–2007)

In 2006, Hamas won a plurality of 44% in the Palestinian parliamentary election. Israel responded it would begin economic sanctions unless Hamas agreed to accept prior Israeli–Palestinian agreements, forswear violence, and recognize Israel's right to exist, all of which Hamas rejected.[116] After internal Palestinian political struggle between Fatah and Hamas erupted into the 2007 Battle of Gaza, Hamas took full control of the area.[117] In 2007, Israel imposed a naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, and cooperation with Egypt allowed a ground blockade of the Egyptian border.

Aftermath of a Hamas suicide bombing on a bus in Tel Aviv.

In 2011, a Palestinian Authority attempt to gain UN membership as a fully sovereign state failed. In Hamas-controlled Gaza, sporadic rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli air raids continued to occur.[118][119][120][121] In November 2012, Palestinian representation in the UN was upgraded to a non-member observer state, and its mission title was changed from "Palestine (represented by PLO)" to "State of Palestine". In 2014, another war broke out between Israel and Gaza, resulting in over 70 Israeli and over 2,000 Palestinian casualties.[122]

### 2023–present Gaza war

Map of the Gaza war in Gaza and southern Israel

After the 2014 war and 2021 crisis, Hamas began planning an attack on Israel.[123] In 2022, Netanyahu returned to power while headlining a hardline far-right government,[124] which led to greater political strife in Israel[125] and clashes in the Palestinian territories.[126] This culminated in a surprise attack launched by Hamas-led militant groups on southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023, in which more than 1,195 Israeli civilians, military personnel, and other foreign nationals were killed, and 251 were taken hostage into Gaza.[127][128] The Israeli military responded by declaring war on Hamas and conducting an extensive aerial bombardment campaign on Gaza,[129] followed by a large-scale ground invasion with the stated goal of destroying Hamas, freeing hostages, and controlling security in Gaza afterwards.[130] South Africa accused Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice and called for an immediate ceasefire.[131] The court issued an order requiring Israel to take all measures to prevent any acts contrary to the 1948 Genocide Convention,[132][133][134] but did not order Israel to suspend its military campaign.[135]

The war spilled over the Middle East, with Israel engaging in clashes with local militias in the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon and northern Israel, and other Iranian-backed militias in Syria, as well as Iran itself.[136][137][138][139] Iranian-backed militias also engaged in clashes with the United States,[140] while the Houthis blockaded the Red Sea in protest,[141] to which the United States responded with airstrikes in Yemen,[142] Iraq, and Syria.[143] Taking advantage of the weakening position of Iranian-backed militias, Syrian opposition groups initiated an offensive in November 2024 that reignited the Syrian civil war, culminating in the fall of the Assad regime and the establishment of a transitional government in the place of the former Ba'athist government; Israel invaded the area around its demarcated boundaries with Syria shortly afterwards.[144]

Aerial view showing the destruction of Rafah in January 2025

The war has caused widespread destruction, a humanitarian crisis, and an ongoing famine in the Gaza Strip,[44][45] while most of the population was forcibly displaced.[44] Many human rights organizations and scholars of genocide studies and international law say that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, though some dispute this.[46][47] Over 60,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed, almost half of them women and children, and more than 148,000 have been injured.[145][146][147] A study in The Lancet estimated 64,260 deaths in Gaza from traumatic injuries by June 2024, while noting a potentially larger death toll when "indirect" deaths are included.[148][149][150][151] As of May 2025, a comparable figure for traumatic injury deaths would be 93,000.[152]

#### September 2025 developments

On 9 September 2025, Israeli airstrikes targeted senior Hamas leaders in Doha. Reports differed: some sources stated that senior leaders survived, while others reported deaths of lower-level operatives and at least one Qatari officer.[153][154] On 12 September, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration by a vote of 142 in favour, 10 opposed and 12 abstentions. The declaration endorses concrete steps toward a two-state solution and calls for measures to establish a Palestinian government free of Hamas's control as part of a broader political process.[155][156]

## Attempts to reach a peaceful settlement

The PLO's participation in diplomatic negotiations was dependent on its complete disavowal of terrorism and recognition of Israel's "right to exist." This stipulation required the PLO to abandon its objective of reclaiming all of historic Palestine and instead focus on the 22 percent which came under Israeli military control in 1967.[157] By the late 1970s, Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories and most Arab states supported a two-state settlement.[158] In 1981, Saudi Arabia put forward a plan based on a two-state settlement to the conflict with support from the Arab League.[159] Israeli analyst Avner Yaniv describes Arafat as ready to make a historic compromise at this time, while the Israeli cabinet continued to oppose the existence of a Palestinian state. Yaniv described Arafat's willingness to compromise as a "peace offensive" which Israel responded to by planning to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner in order to evade international diplomatic pressure.[160] Israel would invade Lebanon the following year in an attempt to undermine the PLO as a political organization, weakening Palestinian nationalism and facilitating the annexation of the West Bank into Greater Israel.[106]

While the PLO had adopted a program of pursuing a Palestinian state alongside Israel since the mid-1970s, the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence formally consecrated this objective. This declaration, which was based on resolutions from the Palestine National Council sessions in the late 1970s and 1980s, advocated for the creation of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, within the borders set by the 1949 armistice lines prior to 5 June 1967. Following the declaration, Arafat explicitly denounced all forms of terrorism and affirmed the PLO's acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the recognition of Israel's right to exist. All the conditions defined by Henry Kissinger for US negotiations with the PLO had now been met.[161]

Then-Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir stood behind the stance that the PLO was a terrorist organization. He maintained a strict stance against any concessions, including withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories, recognition of or negotiations with the PLO, and especially the establishment of a Palestinian state. Shamir viewed the U.S. decision to engage in dialogue with the PLO as a mistake that threatened the existing territorial status quo. He argued that negotiating with the PLO meant accepting the existence of a Palestinian state and hence was unacceptable.[162]

### The peace process

The term "peace process" refers to the step-by-step approach to resolving the conflict. Having originally entered into usage to describe the US mediated negotiations between Israel and surrounding Arab countries, notably Egypt, the term "peace-process" has grown to be associated with an emphasis on the negotiation process rather than on presenting a comprehensive solution to the conflict.[163][164][165] As part of this process, fundamental issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict such as borders, access to resources, and the Palestinian right of return, have been left to "final status" talks. Such "final status" negotiations along the lines discussed in Madrid in 1991 have never taken place.[165]

The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 built on the incremental framework put in place by the 1978 Camp David negotiations and the 1991 Madrid and Washington talks. The motivation behind the incremental approach towards a settlement was that it would "build confidence", but the eventual outcome was instead a dramatic decline in mutual confidence. At each incremental stage, Israel further entrenched its occupation of the Palestinian territories, despite the PA upholding its obligation to curbing violent attacks from extremist groups, in part by cooperating with Israeli forces.[166]

Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, observed that life became harsher for Palestinians during this period as state violence increased and Palestinian land continued to be expropriated as settlements expanded.[167][168][169][170] Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described the Oslo Accords as legitimizing "the transformation of the West Bank into what has been called a 'cartographic cheeseboard'."[171]

#### Creation of the Palestinian Authority and security cooperation

Core to the Oslo Accords was the creation of the Palestinian Authority and the security cooperation it would enter into with the Israeli military authorities in what has been described as the "outsourcing" of the occupation to the PA.[157] Just before signing the Oslo accord, Rabin described the expectation that the "Palestinians will be better at establishing internal security than we were, because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent [human rights groups] from criticizing the conditions there."[172] Along these lines, Ben-Ami, who participated in the Camp David 2000 talks, described this process: "One of the meanings of Oslo was that the PLO was eventually Israel's collaborator in the task of stifling the Intifada and cutting short what was clearly an authentically democratic struggle for Palestinian independence."[171]

The Wye River Memorandum agreed on by the PA and Israel introduced a "zero tolerance" policy for "terror and violence." This policy was uniformly criticized by human rights organizations for its "encouragement" of human rights abuses.[173][174] Dennis Ross describes the Wye as having successfully reduced both violent and non-violent protests, both of which he considers to be "inconsistent with the spirit of Wye."[175] Watson claims that the PA frequently violated its obligations to curb incitement[176] and its record on curbing terrorism and other security obligations under the Wye River Memorandum was, at best, mixed.[177]

### Oslo Accords (1993, 1995)

A peace movement poster: Israeli and Palestinian flags and the word peace in Arabic and Hebrew Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat during the Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993

In 1993, Israeli officials led by Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leaders from the Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat strove to find a peaceful solution through what became known as the Oslo peace process. A crucial milestone in this process was Arafat's letter of recognition of Israel's right to exist. Emblematic of the asymmetry in the Oslo process, Israel was not required to, and did not, recognize the right of a Palestinian state to exist. In 1993, the Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) was signed and set forward a framework for future Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, in which key issues would be left to "final status" talks. The stipulations of the Oslo agreements ran contrary to the international consensus for resolving the conflict; the agreements did not uphold Palestinian self-determination or statehood and repealed the internationally accepted interpretation of UN Resolution 242 that land cannot be acquired by war.[168] With respect to access to land and resources, Noam Chomsky described the Oslo agreements as allowing "Israel to do virtually what it likes."[178] The Oslo process was delicate and progressed in fits and starts.

The process took a turning point at the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 and the election of Netanyahu in 1996, finally unraveling when Arafat and Ehud Barak failed to reach an agreement at Camp David in July 2000 and later at Taba in 2001.[163][179] The interim period specified by Oslo had not built confidence between the two parties; Barak had failed to implement additional stages of the interim agreements and settlements expanded by 10% during his short term.[180] The disagreement between the two parties at Camp David was primarily on the acceptance (or rejection) of international consensus.[181][182] For Palestinian negotiators, the international consensus, as represented by the yearly vote in the UN General Assembly which passes almost unanimously, was the starting point for negotiations. The Israeli negotiators, supported by the American participants, did not accept the international consensus as the basis for a settlement.[183] Both sides eventually accepted the Clinton parameters "with reservations" but the talks at Taba were "called to a halt" by Barak, and the peace process itself came to a stand-still.[179] Ben-Ami, who participated in the talks at Camp David as Israel's foreign minister, would later describe the proposal on the table: "The Clinton parameters... are the best proof that Arafat was right to turn down the summit's offers".[181]

### Camp David Summit (2000)

In July 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Barak reportedly put forward the following as "bases for negotiation", via the US to the Palestinian President: a non-militarized Palestinian state split into 3–4 parts containing 87–92% of the West Bank after having already given up 78% of historic Palestine.[lower-alpha 9] Thus, an Israeli offer of 91 percent of the West Bank (5,538 km2 of the West Bank translates into only 86 percent from the Palestinian perspective),[184] including Arab parts of East Jerusalem and the entire Gaza Strip,[185][186] as well as a stipulation that 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) would be ceded to Israel, no right of return to Israel, no sovereignty over the Temple Mount or any core East Jerusalem neighborhoods, and continued Israel control over the Jordan Valley.[187][188]

Arafat rejected this offer,[185] which Palestinian negotiators, Israeli analysts and Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described as "unacceptable".[179][189] According to the Palestinian negotiators the offer did not remove many of the elements of the Israeli occupation regarding land, security, settlements, and Jerusalem.[190]

After the Camp David summit, a narrative emerged, supported by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, as well as US officials including Dennis Ross and Madeleine Albright, that Yasser Arafat had rejected a generous peace offer from Israel and instead incited a violent uprising. This narrative suggested that Arafat was not interested in a two-state solution, but rather aimed to destroy Israel and take over all of Palestine. This view was widely accepted in US and Israeli public opinion. Nearly all scholars and most Israeli and US officials involved in the negotiations have rejected this narrative. These individuals include prominent Israeli negotiators, the IDF chief of staff, the head of the IDF's intelligence bureau, the head of the Shin Bet as well as their advisors.[191]

No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense US pressure. Clinton has long blamed Arafat for the collapse of the summit.[192] In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee aiming to identify strategies for restoring the peace process. The committee's findings were published in 2001 with the dismantlement of existing Israeli settlements and Palestinian crackdown on militant activity being one strategy.[193]

### Developments following Camp David

Israeli West Bank barrier in Bethlehem

Following the failed summit Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continued to meet in small groups through August and September 2000 to try to bridge the gaps between their respective positions. The United States prepared its own plan to resolve the outstanding issues. Clinton's presentation of the US proposals was delayed by the advent of the Second Intifada at the end of September.[190]

Clinton's plan, eventually presented on 23 December 2000, proposed the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 94–96 percent of the West Bank plus the equivalent of 1–3 percent of the West Bank in land swaps from pre-1967 Israel. On Jerusalem, the plan stated that "the general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and that Jewish areas are Israeli." The holy sites were to be split on the basis that Palestinians would have sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Noble sanctuary, while the Israelis would have sovereignty over the Western Wall. On refugees, the plan suggested a number of proposals including financial compensation, the right of return to the Palestinian state, and Israeli acknowledgment of suffering caused to the Palestinians in 1948. Security proposals referred to a "non-militarized" Palestinian state, and an international force for border security. Both sides accepted Clinton's plan[190][194][195] and it became the basis for the negotiations at the Taba Peace summit the following January.[190]

### Taba Summit (2001)

The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map at the Taba Summit in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. With Israeli elections looming the talks ended without an agreement but the two sides issued a joint statement attesting to the progress they had made: "The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections." The following month the Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 7 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.[190]

### Road map for peace (2002–2003)

President George W. Bush, center, discusses the peace process with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, left, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Aqaba, Jordan, 4 June 2003.

One peace proposal, presented by the Quartet of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States on 17 September 2002, was the Road Map for Peace. This plan did not attempt to resolve difficult questions such as the fate of Jerusalem or Israeli settlements, but left that to be negotiated in later phases of the process. The proposal never made it beyond the first phase, whose goals called for a halt to both Israeli settlement construction and Israeli–Palestinian violence. Neither goal has been achieved as of November 2015.[196][197][198]

The Israeli proposal of the exchange of territories at the Annapolis conference, according to the Economic Cooperation Foundation think-tank (blue to Israel, green to the Palestinian state)

The Annapolis Conference was a Middle East peace conference held on 27 November 2007, at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, United States. The conference aimed to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and implement the "Roadmap for peace".[199] The conference ended with the issuing of a joint statement from all parties. After the Annapolis Conference, the negotiations were continued. Both Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert presented each other with competing peace proposals. Ultimately no agreement was reached.[200][201]

### Arab Peace Initiative (2002, 2007, 2017)

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meets with an Arab Peace Initiative delegation in Paris, 2013.

The Arab Peace Initiative (Arabic: مبادرة السلام العربية Mubādirat as-Salām al-ʿArabīyyah), also known as the Saudi Initiative, was first proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia at the 2002 Beirut summit. The initiative is a proposed solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict as a whole, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular.[202] The initiative was initially published on 28 March 2002, at the Beirut summit, and agreed upon again at the 2007 Riyadh summit. Unlike the Road Map for Peace, it spelled out "final solution" borders based on the UN borders established before the 1967 Six-Day War. It offered full normalization of relations with Israel, in exchange for the withdrawal of its forces from all the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.[203]

The Palestinian Authority led by Yasser Arafat immediately embraced the initiative.[204] His successor Mahmoud Abbas also supported the plan and officially asked U.S. President Barack Obama to adopt it as part of his Middle East policy.[205] Islamist political party Hamas, the elected government of the Gaza Strip, was deeply divided,[206] with most factions rejecting the plan.[207] Palestinians have criticized the Israel–United Arab Emirates normalization agreement and another with Bahrain signed in September 2020, fearing the moves weaken the Arab Peace Initiative, regarding the UAE's move as "a betrayal."[208]

The Israeli government under Ariel Sharon rejected the initiative as a "non-starter"[209] because it required Israel to withdraw to pre-June 1967 borders.[210] After the renewed Arab League endorsement in 2007, then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave a cautious welcome to the plan.[211] In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed tentative support for the Initiative,[212] but in 2018, he rejected it as a basis for future negotiations with the Palestinians.[213]

## Current status

### Apartheid

In July 2024, the International Court of Justice determined that Israeli policies violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[214] As of 2022, all the major Israeli and international human rights organizations were in agreement that Israeli actions constituted the crime of apartheid.[42] In April 2021, Human Rights Watch released its report A Threshold Crossed, describing the policies of Israel towards Palestinians living in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza constituted the crime of apartheid.[215] A further report titled Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity was released by Amnesty International on 1 February 2022.[216]

In 2018, the Knesset passed the Nation-State law which the Israeli legal group Adalah nicknamed the "Apartheid law." Adalah described the Nation-State law as "constitutionally enshrining Jewish supremacy and the identity of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people." The Nation-State law is a Basic Law, meaning that it has "quasi-constitutional status,"[217] and states that the right to exercise national self-determination in Israel is "unique to the Jewish people".[218]

### Occupied Palestinian territory

See also: Place:Israeli-occupied territories, West Bank § Status, Positions on Jerusalem, and Status of territories captured by Israel

Protest against land confiscation held at Bil'in, 2011

Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories, which comprise the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, since the 1967 Six-Day War, making it the longest military occupation in modern history.[219] In 2024, the International Court of Justice determined that the Palestinian territories constitute one political unit and that Israel's occupation since 1967, and the subsequent creation of Israeli settlements and exploitation of natural resources, are illegal under international law. The court also ruled that Israel should pay full reparations to the Palestinian people for the damage the occupation has caused.[220][221]

Some Palestinians say they are entitled to all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Israel says it is justified in not ceding all this land, because of security concerns, and also because the lack of any valid diplomatic agreement at the time means that ownership and boundaries of this land is open for discussion.[222] Palestinians believe any reduction of their territorial claims is a severe deprivation of their rights. In negotiations, the Palestinian stance is that any moves to reduce the boundaries of this land is a hostile move against their key interests. Israel considers this land to be in dispute and feels the purpose of negotiations is to define what the final borders will be. In 2017 Hamas announced that it was ready to support a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders "without recognising Israel or ceding any rights".[223]

#### Israeli settlements

A neighborhood in the settlement of Ariel in the Israeli occupied West Bank, which is home to the Ariel University Israeli settlers in Hebron, West Bank

The international community considers Israeli settlements to be illegal under international law,[224][225][226][227] but Israel disputes this.[228][229][230][231] Those who justify the legality of the settlements use arguments based upon Articles 2 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as UN Security Council Resolution 242.[232] The expansion of settlements often involves the confiscation of Palestinian land and resources, leading to displacement of Palestinian communities and creating a source of tension and conflict. Settlements are often protected by the Israeli military and are frequently flashpoints for violence against Palestinians. Furthermore, the presence of settlements and Jewish-only bypass roads creates a fragmented Palestinian territory, seriously hindering economic development and freedom of movement for Palestinians.[233] Amnesty International reports that Israeli settlements divert resources needed by Palestinian towns, such as arable land, water, and other resources; and that settlements reduce Palestinians' ability to travel freely via local roads, owing to security considerations.[233]

As of 2023, there were about 500,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank, with another 200,000 living in East Jerusalem.[234][235][236] In February 2023, Israel's Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich took charge of most of the Civil Administration, obtaining broad authority over civilian issues in the West Bank.[237][238] In the first six months of 2023, 13,000 housing units were built in settlements, which is almost three times more than in the whole of 2022.[239]

#### Israeli military police

In a report published in February 2014 covering incidents over the three-year period of 2011–2013, Amnesty International stated that Israeli forces employed reckless violence in the West Bank, and in some instances appeared to engage in wilful killings which would be tantamount to war crimes. Besides the numerous fatalities, Amnesty said at least 261 Palestinians, including 67 children, had been gravely injured by Israeli use of live ammunition. In this same period, 45 Palestinians, including 6 children had been killed. Amnesty's review of 25 civilian deaths concluded that in no case was there evidence of the Palestinians posing an imminent threat. At the same time, over 8,000 Palestinians suffered serious injuries from other means, including rubber-coated metal bullets. Only one IDF soldier was convicted, killing a Palestinian attempting to enter Israel illegally. The soldier was demoted and given a 1-year sentence with a five-month suspension. The IDF answered the charges stating that its army held itself "to the highest of professional standards", adding that when there was suspicion of wrongdoing, it investigated and took action "where appropriate".[240][241]

### Separation of the Gaza Strip

Since 2006, Israel has enforced an official and explicit policy of enforcing "separation" between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[242] This separation policy has involved strict restrictions on imports, exports and travel to and from the Gaza Strip.[243] This policy began to develop as early as the 1950s, but was further formalized with the implementation of an Israeli closure regime in 1991, where Israel began requiring Gazans to obtain permits to exit the Gaza Strip and to enter the West Bank (cancelling the "general exit permit"). By treating the Gaza Strip as a separate entity, Israel has aimed to increase its control over the West Bank while avoiding a political resolution to the conflict.[244][245] The lack of territorial contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank and the absence of any "safe passage" explain the success of Israel's policy of separation.[246] Harvard political economist Sara Roy describes the separation policy as motivated by Israeli rejection of territorial compromise, fundamentally undermining Palestinian political and economic cohesion and weakening national unity among Palestinians.[247][248]

The severing of Gaza from the West Bank hinterland reflects a paradigm shift in the framing of the conflict. After Hamas assumed power in 2007, Israel declared Gaza a "hostile territory," preferring to frame its obligations towards Gaza in terms of the law of armed conflict, over what it presented as a border dispute, as opposed to those of military occupation[246][249] (this framing was rebuffed by the ICJ in 2024 when the court stated that Israel continued to occupy the Gaza Strip even after the 2005 disengagement).[250] Indeed, the intensified blockade policy was presented by Israeli officials as "economic warfare" intended to "keep the Gazan economy on the brink of collapse" at the "lowest possible level."[246] Roy cites an Israeli Supreme Court's decision approving fuel cuts to Gaza as emblematic of the disabling of Gaza; the court deemed the fuel cuts permissible on the basis that they would not harm the population's "essential humanitarian needs."

The executive director of the Israeli human rights organization Gisha described Israeli policy towards Gaza between 2007 and 2010 as "explicitly punitive," controlling the entry of food based on calculated calorie needs to limit economic activity and enforce "economic warfare." These restrictions included allowing only small packets of margarine to prevent local food production. Gaza's GDP dramatically declined during this period as a result of these measures.[251] Indeed, by April 2010 Israel restricted the entry of commercial items to Gaza to a list of 73 products, compared with 4,000 products which had previously been approved. The result was the virtual collapse of Gaza's private sector, which Roy describes as largely completed after the 2008 Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza.[247] According to Gisha, travel restrictions from the Gaza Strip are not based on individual security concerns, rather, the general rule is that travel to Israel or the West Bank from Gaza is not permitted other than in "exceptional" cases.[252] Israeli imposed travel restrictions aim in particular to prevent Gazans from living in the West Bank. Indeed, Israeli policy treats the Gaza Strip as a "terminus" station, with family reunification between the West Bank and Gaza Strip only possible if the family agrees to permanently relocate to the Gaza Strip.[253] The Israeli officials described the blockade as serving limited security value, instead referring to these restrictions as motivated by "political-security."[254]

#### Blockade of the Gaza Strip

See also: Blockade of the Gaza Strip, Structural abuse, and Structural violence

Israel's attack on Gaza in 2009

Although closure has a long history in Gaza dating back to 1991 when it was first imposed, it was made more acute after 2000 with the start of the second intifada. Closure was tightened further after the 2005 disengagement and then again in 2006, after Hamas's electoral victory.[248] Heightened restrictions were imposed on imports and exports as well as on the movement of people, including Gaza's labor force. The total siege of Gaza that was imposed following the Hamas led attack on Israel during 7 October 2023, was part of that same policy of separation and closure, characterized by the destruction of Gaza's infrastructure (especially housing) and the denial of food, water, electricity, and fuel to its population.[246] On 9 October 2023, Israel declared war on Hamas and tightened its blockade of the Gaza Strip.[255] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared, "There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly."[256][257]

Since its initiation[when?], blockade has had a detrimental impact on the private sector in Gaza, the primary driver of economic growth in Gaza. Prior to the blockade, Gaza imported 95% of its inputs for manufacturing and exported 85% of the finished products (primarily to Israel and the West Bank). Employment in this sector dropped to 4% by 2010, with an overall unemployment rate of 40% at this time and 80% of the population living on less than 2 dollars a day.[258] Fewer than 40 commercial items were allowed in to the Gaza Strip by 2009, compared to a list of 4,000 items before the start of the blockade. Fuel imports were restricted such that 95% of Gaza's industrial operations were forced to close, with the rest operating far below capacity. In aggregate, 100,000 out of the 120,000 employed in the private sector lost their jobs as a result of the blockade. Most critically for the economy has been the near complete ban on exports from the Gaza Strip. The number of truckloads carrying exports fell to 2% their pre-blockade numbers. Only exports to the European market were allowed, a far less profitable market for Gazans than Israel and the West Bank. The products approved for export were primarily flowers and strawberries. The first export to the West Bank or Israel did not happen until 2012 and only in very limited quantities: up to four truckloads of furniture manufactured in Gaza were allowed through Israel for an exhibition in Amman.[248]

Even in the early years[year needed] of Israeli imposed closure, the associated increased cost of doing business had a detrimental impact on trade. Goods transferred between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel were required to be loaded onto Palestinian trucks initially and then off loaded onto Israeli trucks at the border even for distances of 50–100 miles. These increased costs include the costs for security checks, clearance, storage, and spoilage, as well as increased transportation costs.[259]

The Military Advocate General of Israel said that Israel is justified under international law to impose a blockade on an enemy for security reasons as Hamas "turned the territory under its de facto control into a launching pad of mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli towns and villages in southern Israel."[260] Media headlines have described a United Nations commission as ruling that Israel's blockade is "both legal and appropriate."[261][262] However, Amnesty International has stated that this is "completely false," and that the cited UN report made no such claim.[263] The Israeli Government's continued land, sea and air blockage is tantamount to collective punishment of the population, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.[264]

In January 2008, the Israeli government calculated how many calories per person were needed to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, and then subtracted eight percent to adjust for the "culture and experience" of the Gazans. Details of the calculations were released following Israeli human rights organization Gisha's application to the high court. Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, who drafted the plan, stated that the scheme was never formally adopted, this was not accepted by Gisha.[265][266][267]

Palestinian protesters in the Gaza Strip during the 2023 Gaza war. Photo by Anas Al-Sharif.

On 20 June 2010, in response to the Gaza flotilla raid, Israel's Security Cabinet approved a new system governing the blockade that would allow practically all non-military or dual-use items to enter the Gaza Strip. According to a cabinet statement, Israel would "expand the transfer of construction materials designated for projects that have been approved by the Palestinian Authority, including schools, health institutions, water, sanitation and more—as well as (projects) that are under international supervision."[268] Despite the easing of the land blockade, Israel will continue to inspect all goods bound for Gaza by sea at the port of Ashdod.[269] Despite these announcements, the economic situation did not substantially change and the virtual complete ban on exports remained in place. Only some consumer products and material for donor-sponsored projects was allowed in.[270]

### United Nations and recognition of Palestinian statehood

State of Palestine

Countries that have recognized the State of Palestine

Countries that have not recognized the State of Palestine

The PLO has campaigned for full member status for the state of Palestine at the UN and for recognition on the 1967 borders. This campaign has received widespread support.[271][272] The UN General Assembly votes every year almost unanimously in favor of a resolution calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.[273] The US and Israel instead prefer to pursue bilateral negotiation rather than resolving the conflict on the basis of international law.[274][275] Netanyahu has criticized the Palestinians of purportedly trying to bypass direct talks,[276] whereas Abbas has argued that the continued construction of Israeli-Jewish settlements is "undermining the realistic potential" for the two-state solution.[277] Although Palestine has been denied full member status by the UN Security Council,[278] in late 2012 the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the de facto recognition of sovereign Palestine by granting non-member state status.[279]

### Incitements to violence

Following the Oslo Accords, which was to set up regulative bodies to rein in frictions, Palestinian incitement against Israel, Jews, and Zionism continued, parallel with Israel's pursuance of settlements in the Palestinian territories,[280] though under Abu Mazen it has reportedly dwindled significantly.[281] Charges of incitement have been reciprocal,[282][283] both sides interpreting media statements in the Palestinian and Israeli press as constituting incitement.[281] Schoolbooks published for both Israeli and Palestinian schools have been found to have encouraged a one-sided narrative and at times hatred of the other side.[284][285][286][287][288][289] Perpetrators of murderous attacks, whether against Israelis or Palestinians, often find strong vocal support from sections of their communities despite varying levels of condemnation from politicians.[290][291][292]

Both parties to the conflict have been criticized by third-parties for teaching incitement to their children by downplaying the other side's historical ties to the area, teaching propagandist maps, or indoctrinating their children to one day join the armed forces.[293][294]

## Issues in dispute

The core issues of the conflict are the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, security concerns, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and borders.[164][168][295][296] With the PLO's recognition of Israel's "right to exist" in 1982,[178] the international community, with the main exception of the United States and Israel,[297][298] has been in consensus on a framework for resolving the conflict on the basis of international law.[299] Various UN bodies and the ICJ have supported this position;[299][164] every year, the UN General Assembly votes almost unanimously in favor of a resolution titled "Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine." This resolution consistently affirms the illegality of the Israeli settlements, the annexation of East Jerusalem, and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It also emphasizes the need for an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 and the need for a just resolution to the refugee question on the basis of UN resolution 194.[273]

Unilateral strategies and the rhetoric of hardline political factions, coupled with violence, have fostered mutual embitterment and hostility and a loss of faith in the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement. Since the break down of negotiations, security has played a less important role in Israeli concerns, trailing behind employment, corruption, housing and other pressing issues.[300] Israeli policy had reoriented to focus on managing the conflict and the associated occupation of Palestinian territory, rather than reaching a negotiated solution.[300][301][169][302][303] The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has led the majority of Palestinians to believe that Israel is not committed to reaching an agreement, but rather to a pursuit of establishing permanent control over this territory in order to provide that security.[304]

### Status of Jerusalem

Main article: Place:Status of Jerusalem

Greater Jerusalem, May 2006. CIA remote sensing map showing what the CIA regards as settlements, plus refugee camps, fences, and walls

In 1967, Israel unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem, in violation of international law. Israel seized a significant area further east of the city, eventually creating a barrier of Israeli settlements around the city, isolating Jerusalem's Palestinian population from the West Bank.[305] Israel's policy of constructing sprawling Jewish neighborhoods surrounding the Palestinian sections of the city were aimed at making a repartition of the city almost impossible. In a further effort to change the demography of Jerusalem in favor of a Jewish majority, Israel discouraged Palestinian presence in the city while encouraging Jewish presence, as a matter of policy. Specifically, Israel introduced policies restricting the space available for the construction of Palestinian neighborhoods, delaying or denying building permits and raising housing demolition orders.[306] Tensions in Jerusalem are primarily driven by provocations by Israeli authorities and Jewish extremists against Arabs in the city.[307]

The Israeli government, including the Knesset and Supreme Court, is seated in the "new city" of West Jerusalem and has been since Israel's founding in 1948. After Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, it assumed complete administrative control of East Jerusalem. Since then, various UN bodies have consistently denounced Israel's control over East Jerusalem as invalid.[306] In 1980, Israel passed the Jerusalem Law declaring "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel."[308] Many countries do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, with exceptions being the United States[309] and Russia.[310] The majority of UN member states and most international organizations do not recognize Israel's claims to East Jerusalem, which occurred after the 1967 Six-Day War, nor its 1980 Jerusalem Law proclamation.[311] The International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory opinion on the "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" described East Jerusalem as "occupied Palestinian territory".[312]

The three largest Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Islam, and Christianity—hold Jerusalem as an important setting for their religious and historical narratives. Jerusalem is the holiest city in Judaism, being the former location of the Jewish temples on the Temple Mount and the capital of the ancient Israelite kingdom. For Muslims, Jerusalem is the third holiest site, being the location of the Isra' and Mi'raj event, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. For Christians, Jerusalem is the site of Jesus' crucifixion and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

#### Holy sites and the Temple Mount

Panorama of the Western Wall with the Dome of the Rock (left) and al-Aqsa mosque (right) in the background

Since the early 20th century, the issue of holy places and particularly the sacred places in Jerusalem has been employed by nationalist politicians.[313]

Israelis did not have access to the holy places in East Jerusalem during the period of Jordanian rule.[314] Since 1975, Israel has banned Muslims from worshiping at Joseph's Tomb, a shrine considered sacred by both Jews and Muslims. Settlers established a yeshiva, installed a Torah scroll and covered the mihrab. During the Second Intifada Palestinian protesters looted and burned the site.[315][316] Israeli security agencies routinely monitor and arrest Jewish extremists that plan attacks, though many serious incidents have still occurred.[317] Israel has allowed almost complete autonomy to the Muslim trust (Waqf) over the Temple Mount.[306]

Palestinians have voiced concerns regarding the welfare of Christian and Muslim holy places under Israeli control.[318] Additionally, some Palestinian advocates have made statements alleging that the Western Wall Tunnel was re-opened with the intent of causing the mosque's collapse.[319]

### Palestinian refugees

Palestinian refugees, 1948

Palestinian refugees are people who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict[320] and the 1967 Six-Day War.[321] The number of Palestinians who were expelled or fled from Israel was estimated at 711,000 in 1949.[322] The descendants of all refugees (not just Palestinian refugees)[323] are considered by the UN to also be refugees. As of 2010 there are 4.7 million Palestinian refugees.[324] Between 350,000 and 400,000 Palestinians were displaced during the 1967 Arab–Israeli war.[321] A third of the refugees live in recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The remainder live in and around the cities and towns of these host countries.[320] Most Palestinian refugees were born outside Israel and are not allowed to live in any part of historic Palestine.[320][325]

Israel has since 1948 prevented the return of Palestinian refugees and refused any settlement permitting their return except in limited cases.[178][326][327] On the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 194, Palestinians claim the right of refugees to return to the lands, homes and villages where they lived before being driven into exile in 1948 and 1967. Arafat himself repeatedly assured his American and Israeli interlocutors at Camp David that he primarily sought the principle of the right of return to be accepted, rather than the full right of return, in practice.[328]

Palestinian and international authors have justified the right of return of the Palestinian refugees on several grounds:[329][330][331] Several scholars included in the broader New Historians argue that the Palestinian refugees fled or were chased out or expelled by the actions of the Haganah, Lehi and Irgun, Zionist paramilitary groups.[332][333] A number have also characterized this as an ethnic cleansing.[334][335][336][337] The New Historians cite indications of Arab leaders' desire for the Palestinian Arab population to stay put.[338]

Home in Balata refugee camp demolished during the second Intifada, 2002

The Israeli Law of Return that grants citizenship to people of Jewish descent has been described as discriminatory against other ethnic groups, especially Palestinians that cannot apply for such citizenship under the law of return, to the territory which they were expelled from or fled during the course of the 1948 war.[339][340][341]

According to the UN Resolution 194, adopted in 1948, "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."[342] UN Resolution 3236 "reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return".[343] Resolution 242 from the UN affirms the necessity for "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"; however, Resolution 242 does not specify that the "just settlement" must or should be in the form of a literal Palestinian right of return.[344]

Historically, there has been debate over the relative impact of the causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus, although there is a wide consensus that violent expulsions by Zionist and Israeli forces were the main factor. Other factors include psychological warfare and Arab sense of vulnerability. Notably, historian Benny Morris states that most of Palestine's 700,000 refugees fled because of the "flail of war" and expected to return home shortly after a successful Arab invasion. He documents instances in which Arab leaders advised the evacuation of entire communities as happened in Haifa although recognizes that these were isolated events.[332][345] In his later work, Morris considers the displacement the result of a national conflict initiated by the Arabs themselves.[345] In a 2004 interview with Haaretz, he described the exodus as largely resulting from an atmosphere of transfer that was promoted by Ben-Gurion and understood by the military leadership. He also claimed that there "are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing".[346] Morris has been criticized by political scientist Norman Finkelstein for having seemingly changed his views for political, rather than historical, reasons.[347]

Shatila refugee camp on the outskirts of Beirut in May 2019

Although Israel accepts the right of the Palestinian Diaspora to return into a new Palestinian state, Israel insists that the return of this population into the current state of Israel would threaten the stability of the Jewish state; an influx of Palestinian refugees would lead to the end of the state of Israel as a Jewish state since a demographic majority of Jews would not be maintained.[348][349][350]

### Israeli security concerns

Remains of an Egged bus hit by suicide bomber in the aftermath of the 2011 southern Israel cross-border attacks. Eight people were killed; about 40 were injured.

Throughout the conflict, Palestinian violence has been a concern for Israelis. Security concerns have historically been a key driver in Israeli political decision making, often expanding in scope and taking precedence over other considerations such as international law and Palestinian human rights.[351][352][353] The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the continued expansion of settlements in those areas have been justified on security grounds.[354]

Israel,[355] along with the United States[356] and the European Union, refer to any use of force by Palestinian groups as terroristic and criminal.[357][358] The United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/45/130 reflects an international consensus (113 out of 159 voting nations voted in favor, 13 voted against[359]) affirming Palestinians' legitimacy, as a people under foreign occupation, to use armed struggle to resist said occupation.[360]

In Israel, Palestinian suicide bombers have targeted civilian buses, restaurants, shopping malls, hotels and marketplaces.[361] From 1993 to 2003, 303 Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Israel. In 1994, Hamas initiated their first lethal suicide attack in response to the cave of the Patriarchs massacre where American-Israeli physician Baruch Goldstein opened fire in a mosque, killing 29 people and injuring 125.[362]

The Israeli government initiated the construction of a security barrier following scores of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in July 2003. Israel's coalition government approved the security barrier in the northern part of the green line between Israel and the West Bank. According to the IDF, since the erection of the fence, terrorist acts have declined by approximately 90%.[363] The decline in attacks can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian Authority during this period.[364] The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967, unilaterally seizing more than 10% of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods and settlement blocs, while splitting Palestinian villages in half with immediate effects on Palestinians' freedom of movement. The barrier, in some areas, isolated farmers from their fields and children from their schools, while also restricting Palestinians from moving within the West Bank or pursuing employment in Israel.[365] [366][367]

In 2004 the International Court of Justice ruled that the construction of the barrier violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense.[368] The ICJ further expressed that the construction of the wall by Israel could become a permanent fixture, altering the status quo. Israel's High Court, however, disagreed with the ICJ's conclusions, stating that they lacked a factual basis. Several human rights organizations, including B'Tselem, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, echoed the ICJ's concerns. The groups suggested that the wall's route was designed to perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel, and that the wall was a means for Israel to consolidate control over land used for illegal settlements. The sophisticated structure of the wall also indicated its likely permanence.[369]

Since 2001, the threat of Qassam rockets fired from Palestinian territories into Israel continues to be of great concern for Israeli defense officials.[370] In 2006—the year following Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip—the Israeli government claimed to have recorded 1,726 such launches, more than four times the total rockets fired in 2005.[355][371] As of January 2009, over 8,600 rockets have been launched,[372][373] causing widespread psychological trauma and disruption of daily life.[374] As a result of these attacks, Israelis living in southern Israel have had to spend long periods in bomb shelters. The relatively small payload carried on these rockets, Israel's advanced early warning system, American-supplied anti-missile capabilities, and network of shelters made the rockets rarely lethal. In 2014, out of 4,000 rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, only six Israeli civilians were killed. For comparison, the payload carried on these rockets is smaller than Israeli tank shells, of which 49,000 were fired in Gaza in 2014.[375]

Since mid-June 2007, Israel's primary means of dealing with security concerns in the West Bank has been to cooperate with and permit United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian Authority's security forces, which with Israeli help have largely succeeded in quelling West Bank supporters of Hamas.[376]

### Water resources

In the Middle East, water resources are of great political concern. Israel receives approximately half of its water from desalination plants.[377] Much of the remainder comes from two large underground aquifers which continue under the Green Line, the use of this water has been contentious in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israel withdraws most water from these areas, but it also supplies the West Bank with approximately 40 million cubic metres annually, contributing to 77% of Palestinians' water supply in the West Bank, which is to be shared for a population of about 2.6 million.[378]

Palestinian villagers purchase water from water trucks in Khirbet A-Duqaiqah in the Hebron Hills. A swimming pool in the Israeli settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, West Bank

While Israel's consumption of this water has decreased since it began its occupation of the West Bank, it still consumes the majority of it: in the 1950s, Israel consumed 95% of the water output of the Western Aquifer, and 82% of that produced by the Northeastern Aquifer. Although this water was drawn entirely on Israel's own side of the pre-1967 border, the sources of the water are nevertheless from the shared groundwater basins located under both West Bank and Israel.[379]

In the Oslo II Accord, both sides agreed to maintain "existing quantities of utilization from the resources." In so doing, the Palestinian Authority established the legality of Israeli water production in the West Bank, subject to a Joint Water Committee (JWC). Moreover, Israel obligated itself in this agreement to provide water to supplement Palestinian production, and further agreed to allow additional Palestinian drilling in the Eastern Aquifer, also subject to the Joint Water Committee.[380][381] The water that Israel receives comes mainly from the Jordan River system, the Sea of Galilee and two underground sources. According to a 2003 BBC article the Palestinians lack access to the Jordan River system.[382]

According to a report of 2008 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, water resources were confiscated for the benefit of the Israeli settlements in the Ghor. Palestinian irrigation pumps on the Jordan River were destroyed or confiscated after the 1967 war and Palestinians were not allowed to use water from the Jordan River system. Furthermore, the authorities did not allow any new irrigation wells to be drilled by Palestinian farmers, while it provided fresh water and allowed drilling wells for irrigation purposes at the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[383]

A report was released by the UN in August 2012 and Max Gaylard, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in the occupied Palestinian territory, explained at the launch of the publication: "Gaza will have half a million more people by 2020 while its economy will grow only slowly. In consequence, the people of Gaza will have an even harder time getting enough drinking water and electricity, or sending their children to school". Gaylard present alongside Jean Gough, of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and Robert Turner, of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The report projects that Gaza's population will increase from 1.6 million people to 2.1 million people in 2020, leading to a density of more than 5,800 people per square kilometre.[384]

#### Water infrastructure financing

Numerous foreign nations and international organizations have established bilateral agreements with the Palestinian and Israeli water authorities. It was estimated that a future investment of about US$1.1bn for the West Bank and $0.8bn for the Gaza Strip Southern Governorates was needed for the planning period from 2003 to 2015.[385]

In late 2012, a donation of $21.6 million was announced by the Government of the Netherlands—the Dutch government stated that the funds would be provided to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), for the specific benefit of Palestinian children. An article, published by the UN News website, stated that: "Of the $21.6 million, $5.7 will be allocated to UNRWA's 2012 Emergency Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territory, which will support programmes in the West Bank and Gaza aiming to mitigate the effects on refugees of the deteriorating situation they face."[384]

### Agricultural rights

The conflict has been about land since its inception.[386] When Israel became a state after the war in 1948, 77% of Palestine's land was used for the creation on the state.[387] The majority of those living in Palestine at the time became refugees in other countries and this first land crisis became the root of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[388] Because the root of the conflict is with land, the disputes between Israel and Palestine are well-manifested in the agriculture of Palestine.

In Palestine, agriculture is a mainstay in the economy. The production of agricultural goods supports the population's sustenance needs and fuels Palestine's export economy.[389] According to the Council for European Palestinian Relations, the agricultural sector formally employs 13.4% of the population and informally employs 90% of the population.[389] Over the past 10 years[when?], unemployment rates in Palestine have increased and the agricultural sector became the most impoverished sector in Palestine. Unemployment rates peaked in 2008 when they reached 41% in Gaza.[390]

Palestinian agriculture suffers from numerous problems including Israeli military and civilian attacks on farms and farmers, blockades to exportation of produce and importation of necessary inputs, widespread confiscation of land for nature reserves as well as military and settler use, confiscation and destruction of wells, and physical barriers within the West Bank.[391]

### Israel's West Bank barrier

The separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank

With the construction of the separation barrier, the Israeli state promised free movement across regions. However, border closures, curfews, and checkpoints has significantly restricted Palestinian movement.[392][393] In 2012, there were 99 fixed check points and 310 flying checkpoints.[394] The border restrictions impacted the imports and exports in Palestine and weakened the industrial and agricultural sectors because of the constant Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza.[395] In order for the Palestinian economy to be prosperous, the restrictions on Palestinian land must be removed.[391] According to The Guardian and a report for World Bank, the Palestinian economy lost $3.4bn (5 of the annual GDP) to Israeli restrictions in the West Bank alone.[396]

### Palestinian violence outside of Israel

Some Palestinians have committed violent acts over the globe on the pretext of a struggle against Israel.[397]

During the late 1960s, groups affiliated with the PLO became increasingly infamous for its use of international terror. In 1969 alone, these groups were responsible for hijacking 82 planes. El Al Airlines became a regular hijacking target.[398][399] The hijacking of Air France Flight 139 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine culminated during a hostage-rescue mission, where Israeli special forces successfully rescued the majority of the hostages.

One of the most well-known and notorious terrorist acts was the capture and eventual murder of 11 Israeli athletes by the Black September Organization during the 1972 Summer Olympics.[400]

### Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence

A demonstration in support of Fatah in Gaza City in January 2013

Fighting among rival Palestinian and Arab movements has played a crucial role in shaping Israel's security policy towards Palestinian militants, as well as in the Palestinian leadership's own policies. As early as the 1930s revolts in Palestine, Arab forces fought each other while also skirmishing with Zionist and British forces, and internal conflicts continue to the present day.[citation needed] In the First Intifada, more than a thousand Palestinians were killed in a campaign initiated by the Palestine Liberation Organization to crack down on suspected Israeli security service informers and collaborators. The Palestinian Authority was strongly criticized for its treatment of alleged collaborators, rights groups complaining that those labeled collaborators were denied fair trials. According to a report released by the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, less than 45 percent of those killed were actually guilty of informing for Israel.[401]

### Overriding authority and international status

Area C, controlled by Israel under Oslo Accords, in blue and red, in December 2011

As far as Israel is concerned, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority is derived from the Oslo Accords, signed with the PLO, under which it acquired control over cities in the Palestinian territories (Area A) while the surrounding countryside came either under Israeli security and Palestinian civil administration (Area B) or complete Israeli civil administration (Area C). Israel has built additional highways to allow Israelis to traverse the area without entering Palestinian cities in Area A. The initial areas under Palestinian Authority control are diverse and non-contiguous. The areas have changed over time by subsequent negotiations, including Oslo II, Wye River and Sharm el-Sheik. According to Palestinians, the separated areas make it impossible to create a viable nation and fails to address Palestinian security needs; Israel has expressed no agreement to withdrawal from some Areas B, resulting in no reduction in the division of the Palestinian areas, and the institution of a safe pass system, without Israeli checkpoints, between these parts.

Under the Oslo Accords, as a security measure, Israel has insisted on its control over all land, sea and air border crossings into the Palestinian territories, and the right to set import and export controls. This is to enable Israel to control the entry into the territories of materials of military significance and of potentially dangerous persons.

The PLO's objective for international recognition of the State of Palestine is considered by Israel as a provocative "unilateral" act that is inconsistent with the Oslo Accords.

### Economic disputes and boycotts

| Parts of this religion (those related to section) need to be updated. Please update this religion to reflect recent events or newly available information. (October 2024)

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In Gaza, the agricultural market suffers from economic boycotts and border closures and restrictions placed by Israel.[402]

After Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Israel imposed economic sanctions against the Palestinian Authority.[403] The sanctions were a result of Hamas refusing to recognize Israel, disavow violent actions, and accept previous agreements between Israel and the PA, including the Oslo Accords.[404] The PA's Minister of Agriculture estimates that around US$1.2 billion were lost in September 2006 because of these security measures. As a result, as of 2007[update], the PA's 160,000 employees had not received their salaries in over one year.[405]

## Fatalities

Israeli and Palestinian deaths from 2008 to 2023 (preceding the Gaza war), as reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs[406][407]

Studies provide aggregated casualty data for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 13,000 Israelis and Palestinians were killed in the conflict between 1948 and 1997.[408] Other estimates give 14,500 killed between 1948 and 2009.[408][409] During the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel killed an estimated 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese, not including the 800–3,500 Palestinians killed in the Sabra-Shatila Massacre.[6]

According to B'tselem, during the first intifada from 1987 until 2000, 1,551 Palestinians and 421 Israelis lost their lives.[410] According to the database of the UNOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory (OCHAoPt), 6,407 Palestinians and 308 Israelis were killed in the conflict from 2008 to September 2023, before the Gaza war.[406][407]

Figures include both Israeli civilians and security forces casualties in West Bank, Gaza and Israel. All numbers refer to casualties of direct conflict between Israelis and Palestinians including in IDF military operations, artillery shelling, search and arrest campaigns, barrier demonstrations, targeted killings, settler violence etc. The figures do not include events indirectly related to the conflict such as casualties from unexploded ordnance, etc., or events when the circumstances remain unclear or are in dispute. The figures include all reported casualties of all ages and both genders.[411]

As reported by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, from 29 September 2000 to the year 2010, a total of 7,454 Palestinian and Israeli individuals were killed due to the conflict. According to the report, 1,317 of the 6,371 Palestinians were minors, and at least 2,996 did not participate in fighting at the time of death. Palestinians killed 1,083 Israelis, including 741 civilians, of whom 124 were minors.[412]

The October 7 attacks in 2023 resulted in the deaths of 1,195 Israelis and foreign nationals, including 815 civilians, and 251 taken hostage.[413] In the ensuing Gaza war, over 71,803 Palestinians in Gaza have been reported as killed,[lower-alpha 10] over half of them women and children, and more than 171,500 Palestinians have been injured.[414][415][416] A study in The Lancet estimated 64,260 deaths due to traumatic injuries by June 2024, while noting a larger potential death toll when "indirect" deaths are included.[417][26] Israel's tightened blockade of Gaza cut off basic necessities, causing a severe hunger crisis with a high risk of famine persisting as of May 2025[update].[418][419][420]

### Criticism of casualty statistics

The Israeli-based International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) claimed that Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups overestimated the percentage of civilians killed since the IDF suspected many of those killed to be possible militants.[421][422]

During Operation Cast Lead, Israeli figures reported the number of Palestinians killed at 1,166 Palestinian, 60 percent were classified as "terrorists" by Israeli officials. This discrepancy is partially due to Israel's classification of Gazan police, who did not take part in hostilities, as combatants. The broad consensus among human rights organizations is that these police were primarily civilians, as they did not actively participate in hostilities nor were they part of armed groups. The accuracy of Israeli casualty figures was further questioned based on the number of children killed. Israel reported 89 Palestinian minors killed, whereas the human rights organization B'Tselem reported 252, substantiating their figures with birth and death certificates and other documents in almost all cases. The Israeli figures also stand out against the figures published by the US Department of State, which reported the number killed "at close to 1,400 Palestinians, including more than 1,000 civilians."[423]

### Landmines and unexploded ordnance

A comprehensive collection mechanism to gather land mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty data does not exist for the Palestinian territories.[424] In 2009, the United Nations Mine Action Centre reported that more than 2,500 mine and explosive remnants of war casualties occurred between 1967 and 1998, at least 794 casualties (127 killed, 654 injured and 13 unknown) occurred between 1999 and 2008 and that 12 people had been killed and 27 injured since the Gaza War.[424] The UN Mine Action Centre identified the main risks as coming from "ERW left behind by Israeli aerial and artillery weapon systems, or from militant caches targeted by the Israeli forces."[424] There are at least 15 confirmed minefields in the West Bank on the border with Jordan. The Palestinian National Security Forces do not have maps or records of the minefields.[424]

## Public opinion

### Domestic

In a Pew Research Center poll in June 2025, Israelis have been found to be more skeptical of peaceful coexistence with Palestinians than before, with a decrease from 50% in 2013 to just 21% in 2025.[425]

In 2021, Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre conducted two polls among Palestinians, one before the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis in April and the other after it in October. The polls showed support for a two-state solution decreased from 39% in April to 29% in October.[426]

The trend of decline in support for the two-state solution have been shown to be similar among both Israeli Jews and Palestinians, with support dropping from 53% and 51% respectively in 2016 to just 34% and 33% in 2022. There are differences within each population, with secular respondents from both sides, supporters of Fatah or third parties among Palestinians, and supporters of the moderate left among Israelis more likely than others to support a two-state solution. Additionally, Arab Israelis have also been shown to generally be much more supportive of a two-state solution compared to Israeli Jews or Palestinians.[427]

### International

In a Gallup poll among Americans in 2016, 62% reported more sympathy towards Israelis relative to 15% for Palestinians and 23% for neither, both, or no opinion. At the same time, 44% of respondents supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, while 37% opposed and 19% had no opinion.[428]

In a Pew Research Center poll in 2022, a majority of Americans view both the Israeli people (67%) and the Palestinian people (52%) positively. However, views of the respective governments are less positive, for both the Israeli government (48%) and Palestinian government (28%). Regarding a resolution of the conflict, 35% support a two-state solution, 27% support some form of a one-state solution, and 37% are unsure.[429]

In a YouGov poll in Western Europe and the United States in July 2023 (before the Gaza war), a majority across respondents in all the countries surveyed reported support for a two-state solution to the conflict, from 51% in Denmark to 61% in Italy. At the same time, a plurality across the respondents by country also reported their belief that a peace deal between Israel and Palestine as either "not very likely" or "not at all likely", ranging from 41% in the United States to 66% in Spain.[430]

A late July 2025 Gallup poll recorded a sharp decline in American public support for Israel's military conduct in Gaza, dropping from 50% to 32% over 17 months. A Quinnipiac survey published in August 2025 found that at least half of respondents considered Israel's actions in Gaza to constitute genocide.[431]

Internationally, a Pew Research Center survey conducted in spring 2025 found that only three countries—Kenya, Nigeria, and India—held more favorable than unfavorable views of Israel. In the other 21 countries surveyed, including the United States, unfavorable views far exceeded favorable ones. Across all countries, the average unfavorable rating was 62%, compared with 29% favorable.[432]

## See also

* Bibliography of the Arab–Israeli conflict
* Children in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
* Gaza genocide
* Gaza–Israel conflict
* History of Israel
* History of the State of Palestine
* History of Zionism
* International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
* Israel–Palestine relations
* Israeli war crimes
* Israeli–Lebanese conflict
* Israeli–Palestinian conflict in Hebron
* Israeli–Palestinian conflict in video games
* Jewish diaspora
* List of Middle East peace proposals
* List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
* Outline of the Gaza war
* Palestinian genocide accusation
* Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel
* Pan-Arabism
* Peace Now
* The Holocaust and the Nakba
* Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
* Legal assessments of the Gaza flotilla raid
* 2023 Israeli–Palestinian prisoner exchange

## Notes

1. ↑ The 1949–1956 Palestinian fedayeen insurgency culminated in the 1956 Suez Crisis.
2. ↑ The Palestinian Authority was created by and is ultimately accountable to the PLO (see Palestinian Authority#Government and politics). Under the administration of Mahmoud Abbas (2005–present), the PA has coordinated security with Israel and worked to suppress anti-Israel militants.[1]
3. ↑ During the First Intifada.
4. ↑ Under the administration of Mahmoud Abbas (2005–present), the PA has coordinated security with Israel and worked to suppress anti-Israel militants.[1]
5. ↑ Consists of the armed wings of Hamas and allied Palestinian militant organizations.
6. ↑ In addition to direct deaths, armed conflicts result in indirect deaths "attributable to the conflict". Mortality due to indirect deaths could be due to a variety of causes, such as infectious diseases.[25]
7. ↑ estimate for year end 2024[28]
8. ↑ 'While the majority of Palestinian fallāḥīn were dependent on bonds of "patrimonialism and elite parochialism" with notable families, these bonds weakened with urbanization as a'yān (the Palestinian notable class) abetted, or were incapable of stopping, land sales and dispossessions.'[74]
9. ↑ Three factors made Israel's territorial offer less forthcoming than it initially appeared. First, the 91 percent land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area of 5,854 square kilometers. Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 km2 near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 km2), and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 km2), which reduces the total to 5,538 km2
10. ↑ 50,021 Palestinians of which have been fully identified as of 24 March 2025.

## References

1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Robinson, Kali (17 January 2024). "Who Governs the Palestinians?". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 18 January 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240118215632/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/who-governs-palestinians.
2. ↑ "Occupied Palestinian Territory: Overview Map | December 2011" (in en). 25 January 2012. http://www.ochaopt.org/content/occupied-palestinian-territory-overview-map-december-2011.
3. ↑ Garfinkle, Adam M. (2000). Politics and Society in Modern Israel: Myths and Realities. M. E. Sharpe. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-7656-0514-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=si1oUnk5N3QC&pg=PA61.
4. ↑
* Laurens, Henry (2005) (in fr). La question de Palestine. Fayard. p. 194. ISBN 9789953455211. https://books.google.com/books?id=rXsztAEACAAJ. Retrieved 4 October 2024.
* Caplan, Neil (2019). The Israel-Palestine Conflict. Wiley. p. 114. ISBN 9781119524014. https://books.google.com/books?id=uXWvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT114. Retrieved 4 October 2024.
* Loewenstein, Antony (2023). The Palestine Laboratory. Verso. p. 12. ISBN 9781839762109. https://books.google.com/books?id=rl28EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT12. Retrieved 4 October 2024.
* Mattar, Philip (2005). Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. Facts On File, Incorporated. p. 329. ISBN 9780816069866. https://books.google.com/books?id=GkbzYoZtaJMC&pg=PA329. Retrieved 4 October 2024.
5. ↑ Uri Ben-Eliezer, War over Peace: One Hundred Years of Israel's Militaristic Nationalism, University of California Press (2019)
6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 "The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon: the casualties". Race & Class 24 (4): 340–343. 1983. doi:10.1177/030639688302400404.
7. ↑ Kober, Avi (2005). "From Blitzkrieg To Attrition: Israel's Attrition Strategy and Staying Power". Small Wars & Insurgencies 16 (2): 216–240. doi:10.1080/09592310500080005.
8. ↑ Nasrallah, Nami (2013). "The First and Second Palestinian intifadas". in Newman, David; Peters, Joel. Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Routledge. pp. 56–68. ISBN 978-0-415-77862-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=kftqQdNNDWAC&pg=PA61.
9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 "Fatalities since the outbreak of the second intifada and until operation "Cast Lead"". B'Tselem. http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/casualties.asp?sD=29&sM=09&sY=2000&eD=26&eM=12&eY=2008&filterby=event&oferet_stat=before.
10. ↑ "Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the Gaza Strip, before Operation "Cast Lead"". B'Tselem. http://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event/gaza/palestinians-killed-by-israeli-security-forces.
11. ↑ Lappin, Yaakov (2009). "IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel/idf-releases-cast-lead-casualty-numbers.
12. ↑ "Confirmed figures reveal the true extent of the destruction inflicted upon the Gaza Strip; Israel's offensive resulted in 1,417 dead, including 926 civilians, 255 police officers, and 236 fighters.". Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. 12 March 2009. Archived from the original on 12 June 2009. https://web.archive.org/web/20090612193512/http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/PressR/English/2008/36-2009.html. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
13. ↑ "Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1" (in en). Human Rights Council. 23 June 2015. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIGaza/A_HRC_CRP_4.doc.
14. ↑ "2021 was the deadliest year since 2014, Israel killed 319 Palestinians in oPt 5-year record in house demolitions: 895 Palestinians lost their homes". B'Tselem. 4 January 2022. https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20220104_in_deadliest_year_since_2014_israel_killed_319_palestinians_in_opt.
15. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
16. ↑ Script error: No such module "cite".
17. ↑ "WHO Health Cluster Dashboard – West Bank and Gaza". World Health Organization. 21 Feb 2026. https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiODAxNTYzMDYtMjQ3YS00OTMzLTkxMWQtOTU1NWEwMzE5NTMwIiwidCI6ImY2MTBjMGI3LWJkMjQtNGIzOS04MTBiLTNkYzI4MGFmYjU5MCIsImMiOjh9. "WHO OPT Dashboards". https://www.emro.who.int/opt/information-resources/dashboards.html.
18. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
19. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
20. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
21. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
22. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
23. ↑ Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle (6 December 2023). "UN rights chief warns of heightened risk of 'atrocity crimes' in Gaza" (in en). https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-rights-chief-warns-heightened-risk-atrocity-crimes-gaza-2023-12-06/.
24. ↑ Lev, Gid'on (27 February 2024). "The Tragedy of Israel's 135,000 Displaced Citizens". https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000.
25. ↑ Garry, S.; Checchi, F. (2020), "Armed conflict and public health: Into the 21st century", Journal of Public Health 42 (3): e287–e298, doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdz095, PMID 31822891
26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Bloxham 2025, pp. 23–24: "A study of traumatic injury deaths in Gaza in The Lancet using multiple data sources and capture-recapture analysis suggested that the MoH's methods, far from producing an exaggerated number, actually under-estimated the death toll by around 41 percent. ... When considering the total 'excess mortality,' we need to add the Palestinians who have died because of the blockade in combination with the IDF's destruction of health and sanitation and food infrastructure. As public health experts noted, in many wars, 'most deaths' are 'due to the indirect [sic] impacts of war: malnutrition, communicable disease, exacerbations of noncommunicable disease, [and] maternal and infant disorders.'117 'Indirect' would be the wrong word for this conflict given the nature of Israeli policies, including the systematic obstruction of supplies into Gaza."
27. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
28. ↑ Sridhar, Devi (5 September 2024). "Scientists are closing in on the true, horrifying scale of death and disease in Gaza". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/sep/05/scientists-death-disease-gaza-polio-vaccinations-israel.
29. ↑ Waxman, Dov (2019). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0190625337.
30. ↑ Gelvin, James L. (2021). The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A History (4th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 6. ISBN 9781108771634.
31. ↑ "A History of Conflict: Introduction". A History of Conflict. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/default.stm.
32. ↑ "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". Government of Canada. http://www.international.gc.ca/name-anmo/peace_process-processus_paix/canadian_policy-politique_canadienne.aspx?lang=eng.
33. ↑ "Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy". World Bank. 9 May 2007. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WestBankrestrictions9Mayfinal.pdf. "Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions"
34. ↑ Khalidi 2020, pp. 7–8.
35. ↑ Shafir 1996, p. xiii: "The goal of Zionism, however, was to successfully colonize Palestine while at the same time justifying the creation of a homogeneous Jewish settlement through an intensifying denial of Palestinian national aspirations."
36. ↑ Neal, Lorena S. (May 1995). "Honors Projects". The Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1882–1914. Illinois Wesleyan University. http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=history_honproj. Retrieved 22 August 2017.
37. ↑ ((The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica)) (26 October 2020). "Balfour Declaration | History & Impact". Encyclopædia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.. https://www.britannica.com/event/Balfour-Declaration. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
38. ↑ Khalidi 2024, p. 108: "The repression of the revolt had an impact not only on the populace, but also on the Palestinians' ability to fight thereafter, and on the already fractured capabilities of their national leadership. A high proportion of the Arab casualties included the most experienced military cadres and enterprising fighters.6 By the end of the revolt, most of the top Arab political leaders and thousands of other cadres, militants, and fighters were imprisoned, interned by the British in the Seychelles, in exile, or dead. The British also confiscated large quantities of arms and ammunition from the Arabs during the revolt, and continued to do so during later years. By the end of the revolt, existing political divisions within the Palestinian polity had become envenomed, leading to profound rifts between the majority supporting the revolt and a minority that had become alienated from the leadership: the consequence was assassinations, infighting, and further weakening of the Palestinian position. The impact of the revolt on the Palestinian economy was also severe, although some of that damage was self-inflicted, as a boycott of British and Jewish goods and of the mandatory government during the strike and the revolt simply opened up opportunities for the already larger Jewish-controlled sector of the economy of Palestine to expand further."
39. ↑ Khalidi 2020, p. 44
40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 Pappé, Ilan (2007). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-1-78074-056-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=Xhq9DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 41.2 Morris 1999
42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Human Rights Watch, "A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution," 27 April 2021, hrw.org; Amnesty International, "Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity," 1 February 2022, amnesty.org; Michael Sfard, The Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and the Crime of Apartheid: Legal Opinion (Yesh Din, June 2022), yesh-din.org; B'Tselem, "A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid," position paper, 12 January 2021, btselem.org
43. ↑ Totten, S. (2017). Last Lectures on the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide. Routledge Studies in Genocide and Crimes against Humanity. Taylor & Francis. p. 64. ISBN 978-1-315-40976-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=TGtQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA64. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
44. ↑ 44.0 44.1 44.2 Dannenbaum, Tom; Dill, Janina (2024). "International Law in Gaza: Belligerent Intent and Provisional Measures". American Journal of International Law 118 (4): 659–683. doi:10.1017/ajil.2024.53. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9f903ef4-702f-4391-ab59-4e7506124964.
45. ↑ 45.0 45.1 "GAZA STRIP: Famine confirmed in Gaza Governorate, projected to expand | 1 July - 30 September 2025". 22 August 2025. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_July_Sept2025_Special_Snapshot.pdf.
46. ↑ 46.0 46.1
* Dumper, Michael; Badran, Amneh (2024). "Introduction". Routledge Handbook on Palestine (1st ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003031994. ISBN 9781003031994. "In this context we should not overlook the latest turning point in the history of Palestine – the attack by Hamas on 7th October 2023 on Israeli settlements adjacent to Gaza and the subsequent genocidal war that the state of Israel has carried out in the Gaza strip"
* Speri, Alice (20 December 2024). "Defining genocide: how a rift over Gaza sparked a crisis among scholars". Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/20/genocide-definition-mass-violence-scholars-gaza.
* Narea, Nicole (25 October 2024). "Is Israel committing genocide? Reexamining the question, a year later.". Vox. https://www.vox.com/politics/378913/israel-gaza-genocide-icj.
* Albanese, Francesca (25 March 2024). ﻿Anatomy of a Genocide: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese﻿ (Report). United Nations Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories. p. 1. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/046/11/pdf/g2404611.pdf. "By analysing the patterns of violence and Israeli policies in its onslaught on Gaza, the present report concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the threshold indicating that Israel has committed genocide has been met"
* Amnesty International (2024). ﻿'You Feel Like You Are Subhuman': Israel's Genocide Against Palestinians In Gaza﻿ (Report). p. 13. https://amnesty.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Amnesty-International-Gaza-Genocide-Report-December-4-2024.pdf. "This report focuses on the Israeli authorities' policies and actions in Gaza as part of the military offensive they launched in the wake of the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023 while situating them within the broader context of Israel's unlawful occupation, and system of apartheid against Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Israel. It assesses allegations of violations and crimes under international law by Israel in Gaza within the framework of genocide under international law, concluding that there is sufficient evidence to believe that Israel's conduct in Gaza following 7 October 2023 amounts to genocide."
* Traverso, Enzo (2024). Gaza Faces History. Other Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-63542-555-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=7-8PEQAAQBAJ. "The only normative definition we have, codified at the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948, accurately describes the current situation in Palestine ... describes exactly what is happening in Gaza today"
* B'Tselem (July 2025). ﻿Our Genocide﻿ (Report). p. 86. https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/202507_our_genocide_eng.pdf. "The review presented in this report leaves no room for doubt: since October 2023, the Israeli regime has been responsible for carrying out genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Killing tens of thousands of people; causing bodily or mental harm to hundreds of thousands more; destroying homes and civilian infrastructure on a massive scale; starvation, displacement, and denying humanitarian aid — all this is being perpetrated systematically, as part of a coordinated attack aimed at annihilating all facets of life in the Gaza Strip."
47. ↑ 47.0 47.1

* Mohyeldin, Ayman; Hamdan, Basel (10 December 2024). "Why Amnesty International and other experts say Israel is committing genocide in Gaza". MSNBC. https://www.msnbc.com/top-stories/latest/israel-gaza-genocide-netanyahu-rcna183485.
* van Laarhoven, Kasper; Peek, Eva; Walters, Derk (14 May 2025). "Zeven gerenommeerde wetenschappers vrijwel eensgezind: Israël pleegt in Gaza genocide" (in nl). NRC. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2025/05/14/zeven-gerenommeerde-wetenschappers-vrijwel-eensgezind-israel-pleegt-in-gaza-genocide-a4893293.
* Tharoor, Ishaan (30 July 2025). "Leading genocide scholars see a genocide happening in Gaza". The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/30/israel-genocide-gaza-scholars-historians.

48. ↑ Schneer, Jonathan (2010). The Balfour Declaration: the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict (1st ed.). New York: Random House. ISBN 978-1-4000-6532-5.
49. ↑ 49.0 49.1 Morris 2008, p. 1.
50. ↑ Masalha, Nur (2012). "1". The Palestine Nakba. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84813-972-5. https://books.google.com/books?id=LgI1EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
51. ↑ "The McMahon Agreement". The History Learning Site. 26 May 2015. Archived from the original on 20 March 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250320222911/https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-middle-east-1917-to-1973/the-mcmahon-agreement/.
52. ↑ T.E Lawrence:Revolt in the Dessert, 1919, 1926
53. ↑ "Sykes-Picot Agreement". 16 May 1916. Archived from the original on 9 April 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250409190228/http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sykes-Picot_Agreement.
54. ↑ Pappé 2022, The Arrival of Zionism
55. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=O-uMJuYdDxwC&pg=PA. "Probably the most appealing article in there commendation of the Commission was that about the 'forced transfer' of Arabs from the future Jewish state. To Ben-Gurion this was an 'unparalleled achievement'. It was 'the best of all solutions', according to Berl Katznelson. 'A distant neighbour', he said, 'is better than a close enemy.' Transfer was such an ideal solution that 'it must happen someday', he concluded. A strategy of phases, admittedly always vague and anything but an articulate plan of action, could only prevail if a solution could be found to the demographic problem. 'Transfer' was the magic formula. The idea of transfer for the Arabs had a long pedigree in Zionist thought."
56. ↑ Masalha, Nur (2012). The Palestine Nakba. Zed Books. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-84813-973-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=px1jDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "Thus the wishful and rather naive belief in Zionism's early years that the Palestinians could be 'spirited across the border', in Herzl's words, or that they would simply 'fold their tents and slip away', to use Zangwill's formulation, soon gave way to more realistic assessments. Between 1937 and 1948 extensive secret discussions of transfer were held in the Zionist movement's highest bodies, including the Zionist Agency Executive, the Twentieth Zionist Congress, the World Convention of Ihud Po'alei Tzion (the top forum of the dominant Zionist world labour movement), and various official and semi-official transfer committees."
57. ↑ Slater 2020, p. 348: "After reviewing Zionism and its consequences, I examined the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1917–47 period, and argued that because the Zionists wanted to ensure a large Jewish majority in the coming state of Israel, their leaders repeatedly discussed the means by which most of the Palestinians could be expelled or induced to flee; the euphemism they employed was "transfer." The scholarship on "transfer"—especially by Israeli historians—leaves no doubt about its importance in the thinking of every major Zionist leader before and after the creation of Israel."
58. ↑ Flapan, Simha (1979). Zionism and the Palestinians. Croom Helm. p. 259. ISBN 978-0-06-492104-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=cJRtAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA. "The concept of population transfer, as a facile solution to the twin problems of the Arab landless peasants and the creation of land reserves for Jewish settlement was for some time in the back of the minds of the 2ionist leadership. In fact, in private discussions with the British, the Zionist leadership put forward population transfer as a tentative suggestion but stopped short of formulating it into a proposal for action."
59. ↑ Finkelstein, Norman G. (2016). "'Born of War, Not By Design'". Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-78478-458-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=55NKCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "'The idea of transfer had accompanied the Zionist movement from its very beginnings', Tom Segev reports."
60. ↑ Morris 2004, p. 60
61. ↑ Gelvin, James (2014). The Israel–Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85289-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=wfIFVze1MqQC&pg=PA81. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
62. ↑ Khalidi 2020, Introduction: "Additionally, a separate Jewish-controlled sector of the economy was created through the exclusion of Arab labor from Jewish-owned firms under the slogan of "Avoda ivrit," Hebrew labor, and the injection of truly massive amounts of capital from abroad."
63. ↑ 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.3 Khalidi, Rashid (2006). The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-8070-0309-1.
64. ↑ 64.0 64.1 Bazelon, Emily (2024-02-01). "The Road to 1948, and the Roots of a Perpetual Conflict" (in en-US). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/02/01/magazine/israel-founding-palestinian-conflict.html.
65. ↑ Sela 2002, p. 361, "al-Husseini, Hajj (Muhammad) Amin"

> He [Husseini] incited and headed anti-Jewish riots in April 1920. ... He promoted the Muslim character of Jerusalem and ... injected a religious character into the struggle against Zionism. This was the backdrop to his agitation concerning Jewish rights at the Western (Wailing) Wall that led to the bloody riots of August 1929...[H]e was the chief organizer of the riots of 1936 and the rebellion from 1937, as well as of the mounting internal terror against Arab opponents.

66. ↑ 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.3 Sela 2002, pp. 58–121, "Arab-Israel Conflict"
67. ↑ Marom, Roy; Tepper, Yotam; Adams, Matthew J. (2025). "Al-Lajjun: A Social and Geographic Account of a Palestinian Village During the British Mandate Period". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 52 (2): 374–400. doi:10.1080/13530194.2025.XXXXX. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/93p3k4hj.
68. ↑ Grossman, David. Rural Arab demography and early Jewish settlement in Palestine: distribution and population density during the late Ottoman and early Mandate periods. Routledge, 2017.
69. ↑ Marom, Roy; Taxel, Itamar (2024). "Ḥamāma: The Palestinian Countryside in Bloom (1750–1948)". Journal of Islamic Archaeology 11 (1): 83–110. doi:10.1558/jia.26586. https://journal.equinoxpub.com/JIA/article/view/26586.
70. ↑ 70.0 70.1 70.2 70.3 Nadan, Amos (26 July 2017). "Economic Aspects of the Peasant-Led National Palestinian Revolt, 1936-39". Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 60 (5): 647–682. doi:10.1163/15685209-12341436. ISSN 0022-4995. https://brill.com/view/journals/jesh/60/5/article-p647_4.xml.
71. ↑ Sufian, Sandy (1 January 2008). "Anatomy of the 1936–39 Revolt: Images of the Body in Political Cartoons of Mandatory Palestine". Journal of Palestine Studies (University of California Press) 37 (2): 23–42. doi:10.1525/jps.2008.37.2.23. ISSN 0377-919X. https://www.academia.edu/13805989. Retrieved 14 January 2008.
72. ↑ Sanagan, Mark (2013). "Teacher, Preacher, Soldier, Martyr". Welt des Islams 53 (3-4): 315–352. doi:10.1163/15685152-5334P0002. ISSN 0043-2539. https://brill.com/view/journals/wdi/53/3-4/article-p315_2.xml.
73. ↑ Yazbak, Mahmoud (July 2000). "From poverty to revolt: economic factors in the outbreak of the 1936 rebellion in Palestine" (in en). Middle Eastern Studies 36 (3): 93–113. doi:10.1080/00263200008701319. ISSN 0026-3206. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263200008701319.
74. ↑ Sanagan 2013, p. 338.
75. ↑ 75.0 75.1 75.2 75.3 "History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". PBS. December 2001. https://www.pbs.org/pov/pdf/promiese/promises-timeline.pdf.
76. ↑ Khalidi 2020, Chapter 1: "Of all the services Britain provided to the Zionist movement before 1939, perhaps the most valuable was the armed suppression of Palestinian resistance in the form of the revolt. The bloody war waged against the country's majority, which left 10 percent of the adult male Arab population killed, wounded, imprisoned, or exiled,55 was the best illustration of the unvarnished truths uttered by Jabotinsky about the necessity of the use of force for the Zionist project to succeed. To quash the uprising, the British Empire brought in two additional divisions of troops, squadrons of bombers, and all the paraphernalia of repression that it had perfected over many decades of colonial wars."
77. ↑ Khalidi 2020, Chapter 1: "IN SPITE OF the sacrifices made—which can be gauged from the very large numbers of Palestinians who were killed, wounded, jailed, or exiled—and the revolt's momentary success, the consequences for the Palestinians were almost entirely negative. The savage British repression, the death and exile of so many leaders, and the conflict within their ranks left the Palestinians divided, without direction, and with their economy debilitated by the time the revolt was crushed in the summer of 1939. This put the Palestinians in a very weak position to confront the now invigorated Zionist movement, which had gone from strength to strength during the revolt, obtaining lavish amounts of arms and extensive training from the British to help them suppress the uprising."
78. ↑ Louis, William Roger (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I. B. Tauris. p. 391. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6.
79. ↑ Morris, Benny (2009). One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict. Yale University Press. p. 66. ISBN 978-0-300-15604-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=6RelhRR-9RUC. Retrieved 27 September 2020.
80. ↑ Morris 2004, p. 48
81. ↑ Cohen, M. J. (1973). "The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939". Journal of Palestine Studies 3: 137–156.
82. ↑ Gelber, Yoav (1990). Palestine and World War II. Cambridge University Press.
83. ↑ Hughes, Matthew (2009a). "The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39". English Historical Review CXXIV (507): 314–354. doi:10.1093/ehr/cep002. ISSN 0013-8266. http://v-scheiner.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/7251/4/The banality of brutality.pdf.
84. ↑ A Survey of Palestine. Jerusalem: Government of Palestine. 1946. pp. 38–49. https://www.bjpa.org/content/upload/bjpa/a_su/A SURVEY OF PALESTINE DEC 1945-JAN 1946 VOL I.pdf. Retrieved 28 January 2024.
85. ↑ Levenberg, Haim (1993). Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3439-5.
86. ↑ Jackson, Ashley (2006). The British Empire and the Second World War. London; New York: Hambledon Continuum. ISBN 978-1-85285-417-1. OCLC ocm62089366. https://www.worldcat.org/title/ocm62089366.
87. ↑ Charters, David A. The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47. Springer, 1989, p. X
88. ↑ "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253.
89. ↑ 89.0 89.1 89.2 Baum, Noa. "Historical Time Line for Israel/Palestine." UMass Amherst. 5 April 2005. 14 March 2013.
90. ↑ Morris 2008, pp. 63–64, "The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arab delegations walked out of the plenum after declaring the resolution invalid. The Arabs failed to understand why the international community was awarding the Jews any part of Palestine. Further, as one Palestinian historian later put it, they could not fathom why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent). Moreover, the Jews had been given the best agricultural lands (the Coastal Plain and Jezreel and Jordan Valleys) while the Arabs had received the 'bare and hilly' parts, as one Palestinian politician, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, told a Zionist agent. 162 More generally, 'the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust. ... [And] they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.'"
91. ↑ Morris 2008, p. 101, "... mainstream Zionist leaders, from the first, began to think of expanding the Jewish state beyond the 29 November partition resolution borders."
92. ↑ Morris 2008, p. 79
93. ↑ Louwerse, Colter (2024). Stern-Weiner, Jamie. ed. Deluge. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9. "During the June 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel came into military occupation of the Palestinian West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. (Israel also occupied the Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, and two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.) Already by the mid-1970s, the international community converged on a framework for resolving the festering conflict. This framework comprised two elements rooted in fundamental principles of international law. The first called for Israel's full withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories in exchange for Palestinian-Arab recognition of Israel. The second called for establishing an independent State of Palestine on the Palestinian territories from which Israel would withdraw, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza, as well as a "just resolution" of the Palestinian refugee question.10 Land for peace and Palestinian self-determination secured through a two-state settlement: these principles for a reasonable if imperfect resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict were eventually endorsed by an overwhelming consensus at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the political organs of the United Nations (UN), and of respected human rights organizations."
94. ↑ Erakat, Noura (2019). Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=Justice_for_Some&pg=PA. "The 1973 War demonstrated that Arabs could work together when needed and that Israel was not as invincible as it had believed. The war left its scars on Israel, which suffered over 2,500 dead, US$4 billion in direct monetary losses, and deflated confidence. Although the Arabs technically lost the war, they won psychologically and diplomatically as the world once again focused on the ongoing conflict.156 In 1973, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, affirming the land-for-peace framework enshrined in Resolution 242 and setting into motion what was to become known as the Middle East peace process. Palestinian control of the PLO and the rise of guerilla warfare, together with the shift ushered in by the 1973 War, would lay the groundwork for the PLO's political agenda and aggressive legal strategy throughout the decade that followed."
95. ↑ Slater 2020, p. 216: "The disastrous defeat of the Arab states in the 1973 war also played a major role in convincing Arafat of the need for a compromise peace settlement. Arafat's decision to start peace negotiations with Israel led to the June 1974 PLO agreement to adopt a new strategy that called for a struggle for "every part of Palestine that is liberated" (emphasis added). Anziska writes that this constituted "an acceptance of a political solution on a limited piece of territory," the first step, however vague, that opened the door for a Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution... In a recent major work, historian Seth Anziska writes that the 1973 war "launched a new phase in the PLO's struggle, oriented toward partition and the acknowledgment of Israel's presence. In the aftermath of the October War, the PLO sought a place within the comprehensive diplomatic negotiations, which required political compromise and the eventual embrace of a state on far less territory than historic Palestine" (Anziska, Preventing Palestine, Kindle 25). Similarly, Bird writes: "By mid-1974 the PLO was rapidly moving away from a strategy of armed struggle and morphing into a political movement seeking international legitimacy" based on a two-state solution (Bird, The Good Spy, Kindle location 2560–75). For similar assessments of the importance of the 1974 PLO program, see Hart, Arafat, 10–11; Weinberger, "The Palestinian National Security Debate"; Nofal, "Yasir Arafat: A Mixed Legacy"; Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Kindle 483–84; and Elgindy, Blind Spot, Kindle 88."
96. ↑ Morris 1999, The Politics of War and Afterffects: "On the other hand, the war had given Israel a stinging slap in the face. The 1948, 1956, and 1967 wars had conditioned them to stunning victories over the Arabs and to Arab military (and political) incompetence; 1973 proved to be something else altogether. Many Israelis were now persuaded that the territories could not be held indefinitely by force and that continued occupation would necessarily lead to further bouts of painful warfare. At last, and for the first time since June 1967, most people were willing to contemplate giving up large chunks of land for peace."
97. ↑ Pappé 2022, pp. 287: "The 1973 war was a traumatic event that promoted the disintegration of Israeli politics and culture. The myth of Israeli invincibility was shattered, and while some saw this as a good reason to become more insistent in the search for peace, others turned to God, toughening their positions on peace and territorial compromise. What added to the confusion and the erosion of self-confidence was the high number of deaths, about 3,000, compared with the few hundred in the 1967 war. A general sense of grief fell on the country and affected the government's prestige."
98. ↑ Khalidi 2013, The First Moment: Begin and Palestinian Autonomy in 1982: "In addition to their central provision, for a peace treaty between the two countries, the Camp David Accords, agreed upon by Israel and Egypt under the aegis of the United States in 1978, called for negotiations for the establishment of a "Self-Governing Authority" (SGA) for the Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem was to be excluded from its provisions. The accords stipulated "full autonomy for the inhabitants," but crucially, this did not apply to the land, which was to remain under full Israeli control. A bilateral peace treaty based on these accords was signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and Israel thereafter began a withdrawal of its forces from the occupied Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, which was completed in the spring of 1982. However, the modalities of the Palestinian-autonomy accords were a continuing source of dispute between the three signatories to the Camp David Accords, as well as with the Palestinians and other Arabs, and in the end they were never implemented."
99. ↑ Shlaim 2015, The Camp David Accords: "The Camp David Accords were signed in an impressive ceremony in the White House on 17 September 1978. The two accords were entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt." The former stated in its preamble, "The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is UN Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts." The framework dealt with the West Bank and Gaza and envisaged nothing less than "the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects." Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people were to participate in the negotiations, which were to proceed in three stages. In the first, the ground rules would be laid for electing a "self-governing authority" for the territories, and the powers of this authority would be defined. In the second stage, once the self-governing authority had been established, a transitional period would begin. Israel's military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn; Israel's armed forces would also be withdrawn and the remaining forces redeployed into specified security locations. In the third stage, not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations would take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations had to recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."
100. ↑ Morris 1999, The Lebanon War: "The aim of "Operation Litani" was to kill as many guerrillas as possible and to destroy the military infrastructure—camps, munitions dumps, artillery pieces. A secondary aim was to expand, and create continuity between, the existing Christian-held enclaves on the Lebanese side of the border. By March 21, the IDF had taken all of the area south of the Litani (except for Tyre and its environs).
101. ↑ Kimmerling, Baruch (2003). Politicide. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-85984-517-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=TE8oCW2J2F4C&pg=PA. "The collaboration was solidified and made public during Begin's first term. Begin was impressed by the pleas and the aristocratic manner of the Maronite leaders and several times declared "Israel will not allow genocide [of the Maronites] in Lebanon." In March 1978, Israeli forces temporarily occupied southern Lebanon, in an attempt to neutralize Palestinian guerilla groups and enlarge the territory controlled by Major Haddad, in an undertaking called Operation Litani (the river that more or less marked the boundary of the Israeli influence)."
102. ↑ Khalidi 2020, The Third Declaration of War: "Nevertheless, after all this and despite an Israeli incursion in 1978—the Litani Operation—which left a swath of south Lebanon under the control of its proxy, the South Lebanese Army, the PLO was still standing. Indeed, it remained the strongest force in large parts of Lebanon, those that were not in the hands of foreign armies or their proxies, including West Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, the Shouf Mountains, and much of the south. It would take one more military campaign to dislodge the PLO, and in 1982, American Secretary of State General Alexander Haig agreed to Ariel Sharon's plans for Israel to finish off the organization and with it Palestinian nationalism."
103. ↑ Cleveland & Bunton 2010: "This was that belt the Israeli government wished to destroy. Its first concerted effort to do so occurred in 1978, when 25,000 Israeli troops invaded Lebanon as far north as the Litani River. The operation failed to dislodge the PLO from its strongholds, although it did cause large-scale demographic disruptions in southern Lebanon as thousands of villagers, mainly Shi'as, fled their homelands for the area of Beirut. Pressure from the United States and the UN eventually compelled Israel to withdraw its troops."
104. ↑ Hourani, Albert Habib (2002). A history of the Arab peoples. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-05819-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=egbOb0mewz4C&pg=PA. "In 1982 the situation acquired a more dangerous dimension. The nationalist government in Israel, having secured its southern frontier by the peace treaty with Egypt, now tried to impose its own solution of the problem of the Palestinians. This involved an attempt to destroy both the military and the political power of the PLO in Lebanon, to install a friendly regime there, and then, freed from effective Palestinian resistance, to pursue its policy of settlement and annexation of occupied Palestine. With some degree of acquiescence from the USA, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. The invasion culminated in a long siege of the western part of Beirut, mainly inhabited by Muslims and dominated by the PLO. The siege ended with an agreement, negotiated through the US government, by which the PLO would evacuate west Beirut, with guarantees for the safety of Palestinian civilians given by the Lebanese and US governments. At the same time, a presidential election resulted in the military head of the Kata'ib, Bashir Jumayyil, becoming president; he was assassinated soon afterwards and his brother Amin was then elected. The assassination was taken by Israel as an opportunity to occupy west Beirut, and this allowed the Kata'ib to carry out a massacre of Palestinians on a large scale in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila."
105. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=O-uMJuYdDxwC&pg=PA. "Destroying the PLO's infrastructure in Lebanon as well as dismantling the last remaining Palestinian springboard in an Arab country for the military struggle against Israel, was the immediate operational objective of the war. But the architects of the invasion had far wider ambitions. They believed that the defeat of the Palestinians in Lebanon would trigger a mass exodus of Palestinians to the East Bank of the River Jordan, which in turn would bring about the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty and the Palestinisation of the kingdom in a way that would allow Israel a free hand to assert her rule in Judaea and Samaria. Israel also believed that her victory in Lebanon would create a new political order in that country with an undisputed Christian hegemony."
106. ↑ 106.0 106.1 Shlaim 2015, The Lebanese Quagmire 1981 –1984: "The real driving force behind Israel's invasion of Lebanon, however, was Ariel Sharon, whose aims were much more ambitious and far-reaching. From his first day at the Defense Ministry, Sharon started planning the invasion of Lebanon. He developed what came to be known as the "big plan" for using Israel's military power to establish political hegemony in the Middle East. The first aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization. The second aim was to establish a new political order in Lebanon by helping Israel's Maronite friends, headed by Bashir Gemayel, to form a government that would proceed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For this to be possible, it was necessary, third, to expel the Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least to weaken seriously the Syrian presence there. In Sharon's big plan, the war in Lebanon was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state. Sharon reasoned that Jordan's conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. Begin was not privy to all aspects of Sharon's ambitious geopolitical scenario, but the two men were united by their desire to act against the PLO in Lebanon."
107. ↑ Morris 1999: "On September 1 an IDF helicopter flew Gemayel to Nahariya, in northern Israel, where he met Begin, who had just been informed of the "Reagan Plan," the new American initiative for Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied territories in exchange for Arab recognition and peace. By invading Lebanon, Begin had hoped to neutralize Palestinian nationalism and facilitate Israeli annexation, at least de facto, of the West Bank. But the invasion had brought home to the Americans the plight of the Palestinians and the imperative of resolving their problem, with Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank among the necessary preconditions. The Reagan initiative ruled out a final settlement that would involve either Israeli annexation of the territories or full-fledged Palestinian statehood."
108. ↑ Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-89608-601-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=aHphMCIkhK0C&pg=PA. "was that "Operation Peace for Galilee"—the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982—was undertaken to protect the civilian population from Palestinian gunners, and that "the rocket and shelling attacks on Israel's northern border" were ended by the operation, though "If rockets again rain down on Israel's northern border after all that has been expended on Lebanon, the Israeli public will be outraged.19 This cannot be correct, given the history which is not challenged (even if unreported, for the most part). When it came to be recognized that the rockets still "rain down," the story was modified: "Israel's two military forays into Lebanon [1978, 1982] were military disasters that failed to provide long-term security for Israel's northern border."20 Security had indeed been at risk, as a result of Israel's unprovoked attacks from 1981, and to a large extent before. The phrase "military disaster" does not refer to the killing of some 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians in 1982, overwhelmingly civilians, the destruction of much of southern Lebanon and the capital city of Beirut, or the terrible atrocities carried out by Israeli troops through the mid-1980s; rather, to Israel's failure to impose the "new order" it had proclaimed for Lebanon and its inability to maintain its occupation in full because of the casualties caused by unanticipated resistance ("terror"), forcing it back to its "security zone." The actual reasons for the 1982 invasion have never been concealed in Israel, though they are rated "X" here.21 A few weeks after the invasion began, Israel's leading academic specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, pointed out that the decision to invade "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed" by the PLO, a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government because it endangered the policy of evading a political settlement. The PLO was gaining respectability thanks to its preference for negotiations over terror. The Israeli government's hope, therefore, was to compel "the stricken PLO" to "return to its earlier terrorism," thus "undercutting the danger" of negotiations. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir later stated, Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger... Not so much a military one as a political one." The invasion was intended to "undermine the position of the moderates within [the PLO] ranks" and thus to block "the PLO 'peace offensive"' and "to halt [the PLO's] rise to political respectability" (strategic analyst Avner Yaniv); it should be called "the war to safeguard the occupation of the West Bank," having been motivated by Begin's "fear of the momentum of the peace process," according to Israeli Arabist and former head of military intelligence General Yehoshaphat Harkabi. U.S. backing for Israel's aggression, including the vetoing of Security Council efforts to stop the slaughter, was presumably based on the same reasoning. After its failure to impose the intended "New Order" in Lebanon in 1982, Israel attempted to hold on to as much of Lebanon as possible, though it was forced to withdraw to its "security zone" as resistance caused too many Israeli casualties. Meanwhile Israel conducted violent terror operations, notably the "iron fist" operations of 1985 under the direction of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. These went on through the 1980s.2"
109. ↑ Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=VaUvqHNd6m0C&pg=PA. "As a result, the PLO did not attack Israel from mid-I98r to mid-I982.16 But in June 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon, and it used aerial bombardment to destroy entire camps of Palestine Arab refugees.17 By these means Israel killed 20,000 persons, mostly civilians,18 and while it occupied southern Lebanon it incarcerated 15,000 persons, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The IDF continued north to Beirut, where it forced the PLO out of Lebanon. Israel claimed self-defense for its invasion, but the lack of PLO attacks into Israel during the previous year made that claim dubious. By invading Lebanon, Israel evidently sought to destroy the extensive Palestinian military and administrative infrastructure in Lebanon19 and, by removing the PLO, to convince the Arabs of the Gaza Strip and West Bank that they would get no help from the PLO.20 In the United States Harold Saunders, a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, said that Israel aimed,"
110. ↑ Slater 2020, p. 354: "For just that reason, though, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon worried that the growing PLO moderation would increase the pressure on Israel to accept the creation of a Palestinian state. To prevent that, in 1982 they seized upon a pretext to again invade Lebanon and attack the PLO, this time on a far larger scale than in previous conflicts. The attacks resulted in tens of thousands of Lebanese civilian casualties; however, the PLO forces in southern Lebanon, still led by Arafat, who escaped Israeli efforts to kill him, were soon reconstituted."
111. ↑ King, Mary E. (2007). A quiet revolution: the first Palestinian Intifada and nonviolent resistance. New York: Nation Books. ISBN 978-1-56025-802-5. OCLC 150378515. https://www.worldcat.org/title/150378515.
112. ↑ Khalidi, Rashid (2022). The hundred years' war on Palestine: a history of settler colonialism and resistance, 1917-2017. New York: Henry Hold and Company. ISBN 978-1-250-78765-1.
113. ↑ 113.0 113.1 Levs, Josh (6 January 2009). "Is Gaza 'occupied' territory?". CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/06/israel.gaza.occupation.question/index.html.
114. ↑ "Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: The conflict in Gaza: A briefing on applicable law, investigations and accountability". Amnesty International. 19 January 2009. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/007/2009/en/.
115. ↑ "Human Rights Council Special Session on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, July 6, 2006" (in en). 5 July 2006. https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/07/05/human-rights-council-special-session-occupied-palestinian-territories-july-6-2006.
116. ↑ Erlanger, Steven (18 February 2006). "Hamas Leader Faults Israeli Sanction Plan" (in en-US). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/18/world/middleeast/hamas-leader-faults-israeli-sanction-plan.html.
117. ↑ Oren, Michael B. (2007). Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. W. W. Norton & Company. p. 607. ISBN 978-0-393-05826-0. https://archive.org/details/powerfaithfantas00oren_1/page/607.
118. ↑ Bohn, Lauren E.. "Hamas: Rockets will stop when Gaza borders are opened". USA Today. Associated Press. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/18/gaza-hamas-israel-demands/1712561/.
119. ↑ "Abbas: No justification for Gaza rocket attacks". The Jerusalem Post. 2 November 2012. https://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=290276.
120. ↑ "Gaza: Palestinian Rockets Unlawfully Targeted Israeli Civilians" (in en). Human Rights Watch. 24 December 2012. https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/24/gaza-palestinian-rockets-unlawfully-targeted-israeli-civilians.
121. ↑ "Seven Truths About Israel, Hamas and Violence". Bloomberg.com. 20 November 2012. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2012-11-20/seven-truths-about-israel-hamas-and-violence.
122. ↑ "Urban battle from past Gaza war offers glimpse of what an Israeli ground offensive might look like" (in en). AP News. 16 October 2023. https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-hamas-military-urban-battle-89e45b149f3b88cd647cf6376dbfe0ac.
123. ↑ "Hamas planned Oct. 7 from before 2014, with final decision made by 5 leaders – report". 10 January 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-planned-oct-7-from-before-2014-with-final-decision-made-by-5-leaders-report/.
124. ↑ "In Israel and the U.S., 'apartheid' is the elephant in the room". The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/11/israel-palestine-apartheid-israel-scholars/.
125. ↑ "Israel judicial reform explained: What is the crisis about?". BBC News. 27 March 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65086871.
126. ↑ "Israeli-Palestinian death toll highest since 2005: UN envoy". UN. 21 August 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139922.
127. ↑ Mills, Andrew; Hassan, Ahmed Mohamed (15 November 2023). "Exclusive: Qatar seeking Israel-Hamas deal to free 50 hostages and 3-day truce". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-seeking-israel-hamas-deal-release-50-hostages-3-day-truce-sources-say-2023-11-15/.
128. ↑ "What we know about the captives taken by Hamas" (in en). Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/3/what-do-we-know-about-the-israeli-captives-held-by-hamas.
129. ↑ "Gaza war inflicts catastrophic damage on infrastructure and economy". Reuters. 17 November 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-war-inflicts-catastrophic-damage-infrastructure-economy-2023-11-17/.
130. ↑ "Has Israel invaded Gaza? The military has been vague, even if its objectives are clear". Associated Press. 31 October 2023. https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-ground-operation-invasion-6ba5bf06f81c315252a9e53735f3de47.
131. ↑ "Proceedings instituted by South Africa against the State of Israel on 29 December 2023". 29 December 2023. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf. ALT Link
132. ↑ "Israel-Hamas War: Update from Patrick Kingsley". The New York Times. 26 January 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/26/world/israel-hamas-gaza-news/333c0a8f-4e98-5a9f-8514-ef9aaf4f1e53.
133. ↑ "Order respecting South Africa's request for provisional measures". 26 January 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf.
134. ↑ Rajvanshi, Astha (26 January 2024). "U.N. Court Says Israel Must Prevent Genocidal Acts in Gaza, But Doesn't Order a Ceasefire". Time. https://time.com/6588931/icj-ruling-israel-genocidal-acts-gaza-south-africa/. Retrieved 26 January 2024.
135. ↑ "World Court stops short of Gaza ceasefire order for Israel". Reuters. 27 January 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-braces-world-court-ruling-focuses-attack-south-gaza-2024-01-26/.
136. ↑ "Netanyahu dismisses international pressure: 'Nothing will stop us' destroying Hamas". The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-dismisses-international-pressure-nothing-will-stop-us-destroy-hamas/.
137. ↑ Turak, Natasha (12 December 2023). "Can Hamas actually be eliminated? This is what military and security analysts think". CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/12/israel-gaza-war-can-hamas-actually-be-eliminated-experts-weigh-in.html.
138. ↑ "Netanyahu says IDF will control Gaza after war, rejects notion of international force". The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-idf-will-control-gaza-after-war-rejects-notion-of-international-force/.
139. ↑ "Twelve-day war: Impact of Iran's strikes censored by Israel" (in en). 5 August 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250805-twelve-day-war-impact-of-iranian-strikes-censored-israel.
140. ↑ "Three US troops killed in drone attack in Jordan, more than 30 injured". CNN. 28 January 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html.
141. ↑ Armstrong, Kathryn (6 February 2024). "Houthis claim new attacks on Red Sea shipping". BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68218901.
142. ↑ "U.S. and U.K. launch new wave of strikes, this time targeting Houthis in Yemen". NBC News. 4 February 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/live-updates-rcna137078.
143. ↑ "What we know about US retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria". BBC News. 3 February 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-68189567.
144. ↑ Krever, Mick (8 December 2024). "Watching with trepidation and glee, Netanyahu orders military to seize Syria buffer zone". CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/08/middleeast/israel-syria-security-implications-golan-intl/index.html.
145. ↑ "How many Palestinians has Israel's Gaza offensive killed" (in en). Reuters. 29 July 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-palestinians-has-israels-gaza-offensive-killed-2025-03-24/.
146. ↑ "Over 60,000 Palestinians killed in the 21-month Israel-Hamas war, Gaza's Health Ministry says". 29 July 2025. https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-death-toll-war-health-ministry-816d592952814db869924f9626ca8876.
147. ↑ "Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (30 July 2025)". Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 30 July 2025. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-30-july-2025.
148. ↑ Jamaluddine, Zeina; Abukmail, Hanan; Aly, Sarah; Campbell, Oona M. R.; Checchi, Francesco (9 January 2025). "Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture–recapture analysis". The Lancet (Elsevier) 405 (10477): 469–477. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02678-3. PMID 39799952.
149. ↑ Bloxham 2025: "A study of traumatic injury deaths in Gaza in The Lancet using multiple data sources and capture-recapture analysis suggested that the MoH's methods, far from producing an exaggerated number, actually under-estimated the death toll by around 41 percent. ... When considering the total 'excess mortality,' we need to add the Palestinians who have died because of the blockade in combination with the IDF's destruction of health and sanitation and food infrastructure. As public health experts noted, in many wars, 'most deaths' are 'due to the indirect [sic] impacts of war: malnutrition, communicable disease, exacerbations of noncommunicable disease, [and] maternal and infant disorders.'117 'Indirect' would be the wrong word for this conflict given the nature of Israeli policies, including the systematic obstruction of supplies into Gaza."
150. ↑ Script error: No such module "Cite".
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152. ↑ "How many people have died in Gaza?". The Economist. 8 May 2025. https://www.economist.com/interactive/middle-east-and-africa/2025/05/08/how-many-people-have-died-in-gaza. "The researchers found that the overlap was so small that the true number of deaths was probably 46-107% higher than the official ministry total. If you assume that the ratio has stayed the same since last June (and not fallen, as systems caught up during the ceasefire, say) and apply them to the current tally, it would suggest that between 77,000 and 109,000 Gazans have been killed, 4-5% of the territory's pre-war population (see chart)."
153. ↑ "Israel targets Hamas leadership in military strikes on Qatar, officials say". Reuters. 9 September 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-targets-hamas-leadership-military-strikes-qatar-officials-say-2025-09-09/.
154. ↑ "Hamas says attack against leaders in Doha won't change Gaza ceasefire demands". Reuters. 11 September 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-says-attack-against-leaders-doha-wont-change-gaza-ceasefire-demands-2025-09-11/.
155. ↑ "UN overwhelmingly endorses two-state solution declaration that condemns Hamas". Reuters. 12 September 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-overwhelmingly-endorses-two-state-solution-declaration-that-condemns-hamas-2025-09-12/.
156. ↑ "General Assembly Endorses New York Declaration, Charting Path to Palestinian Statehood". United Nations. 12 September 2025. https://press.un.org/en/2025/ga12707.doc.htm.
157. ↑ 157.0 157.1 Baconi 2018, Politicide, Containment, and Pacification
158. ↑ Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela (2000). The Palestinian Hamas. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-11674-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=xBRWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA.
159. ↑ Yehuda Lukacs, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A documentary record, 1967–1990 (Cambridge: 1992), pp. 477–479.
160. ↑ Yaniv, Avner (1987). Dilemmas of Security. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-504122-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=NIVtAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA.
161. ↑ Shlaim 2015: "The PLO followed the Algiers resolutions with a concerted attempt to project a more moderate image. It made a special effort to gain respectability by dissociating the PLO from terrorism. Arafat issued a series of statements on the subject, which failed to satisfy the United States, so in the end the State Department virtually dictated the text that Arafat read at the opening of his press conference in Geneva on 14 December. "I repeat for the record," stated Arafat, "that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism. Between Geneva and Algiers we have made our position crystal clear." The statement unconditionally accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 and clearly recognized Israel's right to exist. All the conditions that Henry Kissinger had laid down in 1975 for dealing with the PLO had now been met. One of the last major foreign policy acts of the outgoing Reagan administration was to recognize the PLO and to open a substantive dialogue with it. This dialogue was conducted by the American ambassador in Tunis. President Reagan stated publicly that the special commitment of the United States to Israel's security and well-being remained unshakable."
162. ↑ Shlaim 2015: "To Shamir it was crystal clear, once again, that the PLO had not abandoned the path of terror. For him the PLO had always been and would forever remain a terrorist organization. His response to the momentous changes taking place in the Palestinian camp was a reaffirmation of his previous position: no to withdrawal from the occupied territories, no to recognition of the PLO, no to negotiation with the PLO, no to a Palestinian state. Shamir called the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO a "grave error." He saw it as a threat to the long-standing American-Israeli collaboration in support of the territorial status quo. "For the PLO," explained Shamir, "a Palestinian state is a minimum. Therefore, anyone who engages in negotiations with it in effect accepts this principle. What else can one talk about with the PLO, if not about a Palestinian state?" Vice-Premier Peres described the opening of the U.S.-PLO dialogue as "a sad day for all of us." But he felt that Israel had to come up with its own peace initiative, since it was impossible to preserve the status quo."
163. ↑ 163.0 163.1 Pappé 2022
164. ↑ 164.0 164.1 164.2 Quandt, William B. (2005). Peace Process. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24631-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC&pg=PA.
165. ↑ 165.0 165.1 Khalidi 2020
166. ↑ Slater 2020, Chapter 14: "On the contrary, in August 1996 the PLO honored its commitment to revoke its original charter, which had denied the legitimacy of Israel and called for the armed liberation of all of Palestine. As well, by 1996 the PA and its police forces had become increasingly successful in their efforts to end the terrorism of Hamas and other Islamic extremists, even cooperating with the Israeli forces. As a result, there were now far fewer terrorist attacks than in the preceding few years."
167. ↑ Shlaim 2015, Stonewalling 1988 –1992
168. ↑ 168.0 168.1 168.2 Christison, Kathleen (2000). Perceptions of Palestine. University of California Press. pp. 290. ISBN 978-0-520-21718-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=H6UwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
169. ↑ 169.0 169.1 Cleveland, William L.; Bunton, Martin (2010). A History of the Modern Middle East. ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=hnzxzqau3a8C&pg=PA.
170. ↑ Slater 2020
171. ↑ 171.0 171.1 Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. p. 241. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=x72ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
172. ↑ (in en) Dennis Ross and the Peace Process: Subordinating Palestinian Rights to Israeli "Needs". https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1649446. Retrieved 13 August 2024.
173. ↑ Human Rights Watch, An Analysis of the Wye River Memorandum
174. ↑ Amnesty International, The United States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority
175. ↑ Dennis Ross (2005). The Missing Peace. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-52980-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=DGRvlDWtCggC&pg=PA.
176. ↑ Watson 2000, pp. 211–236: "The Palestinian side has repeatedly run afoul of its obligation to refrain from incitement and hostile propaganda."
177. ↑ Watson 2000, pp. 211–236: "the Palestinian record of compliance with these obligations is at best mixed...the PA's record on security cooperation has been mixed... The PA has a mixed record on fighting terror group."
178. ↑ 178.0 178.1 178.2 Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. pp. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-0-7453-1530-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=aHphMCIkhK0C&pg=PA.
179. ↑ 179.0 179.1 179.2 Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018). Gaza. University of California Press. pp. Chapter 2. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=qo84DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
180. ↑ Kimmerling, Baruch (2003). Politicide. Verso Books. pp. The Road to Sharonism. ISBN 978-1-85984-517-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=TE8oCW2J2F4C&pg=PA.
181. ↑ 181.0 181.1 Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. pp. e-book section 38. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "Camp David failed because of the two sides' conflicting interpretations of the terms of reference of the peace process. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on "international legitimacy" and "all UN relevant resolutions.""
182. ↑ Finkelstein 2007, p. 352
183. ↑ Finkelstein 2007, p. 352: "In a letter to President Clinton, who presided over the proceedings, Palestinian representatives stated that their aim was implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and that "[w]e are willing to accept adjustments of the border between the two countries, on condition that they be equivalent in value and importance." Repeatedly the Palestinian negotiators asked: "Will you accept the June 4border [as the basis of discussion]? Will you accept the principle of the exchange of territories?" The Israeli position was that "[w]e can't accept the demand for a return to the borders of June 1967as a pre-condition for the negotiation," while Clinton "literally yells," in response to the Palestinian view that "international legitimacy means Israeli retreat to the border of 4 June 1967," that "[t]his isn't the Security Council here. This isn't the U.N. General Assembly."
184. ↑ Pressman 2003, pp. 16–17
185. ↑ 185.0 185.1 Karsh, Efraim (2003). Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest. New York: Grove Press. p. 168. "Arafat rejected the proposal"
186. ↑ Morris, Benny. "Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)" (in en). New York Review of Books. ISSN 0028-7504. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2002/06/13/camp-david-and-after-an-exchange-1-an-interview-wi/.
187. ↑ Pressman 2003, pp. 7, 15–19
188. ↑ Malley, Robert; Agha, Hussein (9 August 2001). "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors". New York Review of Books 48 (13). https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/08/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/. Retrieved 5 September 2018.
189. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA. ""I myself am on record as having said, "If I were a Palestinian, I would have rejected what was offered at the Camp David Summit." This book stands by this assertion.""
190. ↑ 190.0 190.1 190.2 190.3 190.4 Pressman, Jeremy (Fall 2003). "Visions in Collision – What Happened at Camp David and Taba". International Security 28 (2): 6. doi:10.1162/016228803322761955. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/pressman.pdf.
191. ↑ Slater 2020: "After Camp David, a new mythology emerged perpetrated by Barak and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, with the support of Dennis Ross, Clinton's secretary of state Madeleine Albright, and to a considerable extent Clinton himself. The mythology holds that at Camp David, Barak made a generous and unprecedented offer to the Palestinians, only to be met by a shocking if not perverse rejection by Arafat who then ordered a violent uprising at just the moment when the chances for peace had never been greater. For example, shortly after the conclusion of Camp David, Ben-Ami gave a long interview with Haaretz, claiming that Arafat did not go to Camp David to reach a compromise settlement but rather treated the negotiations as "a huge camouflage net behind which he sought to undermine the very idea of two states for two nations. ... Camp David collapsed over the fact that [the Palestinians] refused to get in the game. They refused to make a counterproposal ... and didn't succeed in conveying ... that at some point the demands would have an end." The implied premise of Barak and Ben-Ami was that Arafat thought the Palestinians held all the cards, so that if he held out long enough, he would eventually reach his goal: the destruction of Israel in stages and the takeover of all of historic Palestine. This view became widely accepted in US and Israeli public opinion... This and other Camp David mythologies have been rejected, both at the time and in retrospect, by nearly all scholars and knowledgeable journalists and by most Israeli and US officials who participated in the negotiations. In particular, they were challenged in interviews and memoirs by the leading Israeli negotiators, among them Ron Pundak, Yossi Beilin, Oden Era, Shaul Arieli, Yossi Ginosser, Moshe Amirav, and General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, chief of staff of the IDF in 1995–1998. As well, the mythologies were strongly—and subsequently, publicly—rejected by Israel's leading military intelligence officials, including Ami Ayalon, the 2000 head of Shin Bet, and Matti Steinberg, his chief advisor—and by Amos Malka, head of the IDF's military intelligence bureau, and his second in command, Ephraim Lavie."
192. ↑ "Clinton: Arafat changed mind on peace deal" (in en-US). The Washington Times. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/13/clinton-arafat-changed-mind-peace-deal/.
193. ↑ Altman, Alex (22 January 2009). Middle East Envoy George Mitchell. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1873532,00.html. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
194. ↑ "Excerpts: State Dept; Spokesman on Mideast Peace Prospects (Both sides accept Clinton's parameters with reservations)". Embassy of the United States, Israel. http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/january/me0103b.html.
195. ↑ Wren, Christopher (3 January 2001). "Renewed Hope for Peace Talks as Arafat Returns to Mideast". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/03/world/03CND-MIDEAST.html.
196. ↑ Levinson, Chaim (9 November 2015). "Israel moves to green light 2,200 new settlement units, recognizes outposts". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.684929.
197. ↑ "UN: Israeli-Palestinian violence nears 'catastrophe'". Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/israeli-palestinian-violence-151029060544251.html.
198. ↑ "Mapping the dead in latest Israeli-Palestinian violence". Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/10/mapping-dead-latest-israeli-palestinian-violence-151013142015577.html.
199. ↑ Benn, Aluf (14 November 2007). "Annapolis joint declaration to focus on goals of final status talks". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/news/annapolis-joint-declaration-to-focus-on-goals-of-final-status-talks-1.233192.
200. ↑ Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference . Memorial Hall, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland; 27 November 2007
201. ↑ Federman, Josef (19 November 2015). "Abbas admits he rejected 2008 peace offer from Olmert". Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-admits-he-rejected-2008-peace-offer-from-olmert/.
202. ↑ "Saudi Prince al-Faisal tells Haaretz: Desire for peace exists both in Gaza and Ramallah – Israel Conference on Peace TLV". Haaretz. 12 November 2015. https://www.haaretz.com/peace/1.685313.
203. ↑ "The Saudi Arabia peace initiative" (in en). Ynet News. 23 March 2009. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3691148,00.html.
204. ↑ "Support for the Saudi Initiative". The New York Times. 28 February 2002. https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/opinion/support-for-the-saudi-initiative.html.
205. ↑ Stern, Yoav (22 November 2008). "Abbas calls on Obama to enact Arab peace plan as soon as he takes office". Haaretz. Associated Press. https://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1039866.html.
206. ↑ "Hamas' al-Zahar: Arab peace initiative impractical". Ynet News. Associated Press. 1 June 2006. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3257932,00.html.
207. ↑ MacLeod, Scott (17 January 2009). "Time to Test the Arab Peace Offer". Time. http://mideast.blogs.time.com/2009/01/08/time-to-test-the-arab-peace-offer/. Retrieved 20 September 2024.
208. ↑ "Saudi former intel chief slams Palestinian's criticism of UAE-Israel deal". The Jerusalem Post. 6 October 2020. https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/saudi-former-intel-chief-slams-palestinian-leaderships-criticism-of-uae-israel-deal-644678.
209. ↑ "Arabs offer Israel peace plan". BBC News. 28 March 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1898736.stm.
210. ↑ Hoffman, Gil (4 March 2002). "Sharon warns Saudi plan may be Arab plot". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/Editions/2002/03/04/News/News.44486.html.
211. ↑ "Olmert gives cautious welcome to Arab peace plan". 30 March 2007. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/30/israel2.
212. ↑ "Netanyahu backs 'general idea' behind Arab Peace Initiative". Times of Israel. 28 May 2015. http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-endorses-general-idea-behind-arab-peace-initiative/.
213. ↑ "Netanyahu: Israel Will Never Accept Arab Peace Initiative as Basis for Talks With Palestinians". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-06-13/ty-article/pm-netanyahu-israel-cannot-agree-to-2002-arab-league-peace-plan/0000017f-dbbd-d856-a37f-fffd5b200000.
214. ↑ Aeyal Gross, 'The ICJ Just Demolished One of Israel's Key Defenses of the Occupation,' Haaretz 19 July 2024.
215. ↑ Holmes, Oliver (27 April 2021). "Israel is committing the crime of apartheid, rights group says" (in en). The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/27/israel-committing-crime-apartheid-human-rights-watch.
216. ↑ ﻿Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity﻿ (Report). Amnesty International. January 2022. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/MDE1551412022ENGLISH.pdf. Retrieved 8 December 2022.
217. ↑ "Defending the rule of law, enforcing apartheid – the double life of Israel's judiciary" (in en). 13 September 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/defending-the-rule-of-law-enforcing-apartheid-the-double-life-of-israels-judiciary/.
218. ↑ Shlaim, Avi (2023). Three Worlds. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-0-86154-464-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=XTWUEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
219. ↑ "Israel must end its occupation of Palestine to stop fuelling apartheid and systematic human rights violations". Amnesty International. 19 February 2024. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/israel-must-end-its-occupation-of-palestine-to-stop-fuelling-apartheid-and-systematic-human-rights-violations/.
220. ↑ 'Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem:Advisory Opinion,' Unispal 19 July 2023 pp. 6, 73, 79.
221. ↑ Ghousoon Bisharat,'Israel always sold the occupation as legal. The ICJ now terrifies them' +972 magazine 23 July 2024
222. ↑ Sela 2002, pp. 121–147, Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking"
223. ↑ "Hamas presents new charter accepting a Palestine based on 1967 borders". The Guardian. May 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/01/hamas-new-charter-palestine-israel-1967-borders.
224. ↑ Roberts, Adam (1990). "Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967". The American Journal of International Law 84 (1): 85–86. doi:10.2307/2203016. ISSN 0002-9300. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8aaa/455b51d4c49285089a97a08496071e322877.pdf. "The international community has taken a critical view of both deportations and settlements as being contrary to international law. General Assembly resolutions have condemned the deportations since 1969, and have done so by overwhelming majorities in recent years. Likewise, they have consistently deplored the establishment of settlements, and have done so by overwhelming majorities throughout the period (since the end of 1976) of the rapid expansion in their numbers. The Security Council has also been critical of deportations and settlements; and other bodies have viewed them as an obstacle to peace, and illegal under international law... Although East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights have been brought directly under Israeli law, by acts that amount to annexation, both of these areas continue to be viewed by the international community as occupied, and their status as regards the applicability of international rules is in most respects identical to that of the West Bank and Gaza.".
225. ↑ Pertile, Marco (2005). "'Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory': A Missed Opportunity for International Humanitarian Law?". in Conforti, Benedetto; Bravo, Luigi. The Italian Yearbook of International Law. 14. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 141. ISBN 978-90-04-15027-0. "the establishment of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has been considered illegal by the international community and by the majority of legal scholars."
226. ↑ Barak-Erez, Daphne (2006). "Israel: The security barrier—between international law, constitutional law, and domestic judicial review". International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (3): 548. doi:10.1093/icon/mol021. "The real controversy hovering over all the litigation on the security barrier concerns the fate of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Since 1967, Israel has allowed and even encouraged its citizens to live in the new settlements established in the territories, motivated by religious and national sentiments attached to the history of the Jewish nation in the land of Israel. This policy has also been justified in terms of security interests, taking into consideration the dangerous geographic circumstances of Israel before 1967 (where Israeli areas on the Mediterranean coast were potentially threatened by Jordanian control of the West Bank ridge). The international community, for its part, has viewed this policy as patently illegal, based on the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that prohibit moving populations to or from territories under occupation.".
227. ↑ Drew, Catriona (1997). "Self-determination and population transfer". in Bowen, Stephen. Human rights, self-determination and political change in the occupied Palestinian territories. International studies in human rights. 52. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 151–152. ISBN 978-90-411-0502-8. "It can thus clearly be concluded that the transfer of Israeli settlers into the occupied territories violates not only the laws of belligerent occupation but the Palestinian right of self-determination under international law. The question remains, however, whether this is of any practical value. In other words, given the view of the international community that the Israeli settlements are illegal under the law if belligerent occupation, what purpose does it serve to establish that an additional breach of international law has occurred?"
228. ↑ "Public Opinion Poll No (84)" (in en). Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 6 July 2022. http://pcpsr.org/en/node/912.
229. ↑ Harel, Amos (24 October 2006). "Settlements grow on Arab land, despite promises made to U.S.". Haaretz 24 October 2006 (Haaretz). https://www.haaretz.com/news/settlements-grow-on-arab-land-despite-promises-made-to-u-s-1.203258.
230. ↑ Stone, Julius (2004). Lacey, Ian. ed. International Law and the Arab-Israel Conflict: Extracts from "Israel and Palestine Assault on the Law of Nations" by Professor Julius Stone (2nd ed.). Jirlac Publications. ISBN 978-0-975-10730-0.
231. ↑ Byron, Christine (2013). War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-847-79275-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=r4XLCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA107.
232. ↑ Jacob, Aaron (18 June 2009). "Historical, Legal, and Political Aspects of Israeli Settlement Policy". http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=846567&ct=7158483.
233. ↑ 233.0 233.1 "Chapter 3: Israeli Settlements and International Law" (in en). 30 January 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/01/chapter-3-israeli-settlements-and-international-law/.
234. ↑ "Jewish settler population in the West Bank surpasses half a million". Los Angeles Times. 2 February 2023. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-02-02/israeli-settler-population-west-bank-surpasses-500000.
235. ↑ "Israel to ramp up settlement expansion in occupied West Bank". Al-Jazeera. 18 June 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/18/israeli-minister-given-sweeping-settlement-building-powers.
236. ↑ "Far-right Israeli Minister Lays Groundwork for Doubling West Bank Settler Population". Haaretz. 18 May 2023. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-05-18/ty-article/.premium/far-right-israeli-minister-lays-groundwork-for-doubling-west-bank-settler-population/00000188-2de6-d6e4-ab9d-ede74a3e0000.
237. ↑ Sharon, Jeremy (23 February 2023). "Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning". The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-handed-sweeping-powers-over-west-bank-control-over-settlement-planning/.
238. ↑ McGreal, Chris (24 February 2023). "Former US ambassador accuses Israel of 'creeping annexation' of the West Bank". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/former-us-ambassador-accuses-israel-creeping-annexation-west-bank-israel-palestinians.
239. ↑ Sharon, Jeremy (18 June 2023). "Netanyahu hands Smotrich full authority to expand existing settlements". ISSN 0040-7909. https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-hands-smotrich-full-authority-to-expand-existing-settlements/.
240. ↑ "Amnesty says some Israeli West Bank killings may be war crimes" (in en). Reuters. 27 February 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-amnesty-idUSBREA1Q00G20140227.
241. ↑ "Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories: Trigger-happy: Israel's use of excessive force in the West Bank" (in en). 27 February 2014. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/002/2014/en/.
242. ↑ GISHA, What is the Separation Policy?
243. ↑ Roy 2016, De-development Completed
244. ↑ Baconi 2018: "Sharon's plan was the latest in a long series of measures Israel had taken to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank. Although policies of isolation reach back to the 1950s, more contemporary measures began with the "soft quarantining" of Gaza after the signing of the Oslo Accords, including the gradual tightening of border crossings and the construction of barriers to geographically sever the coastal enclave from Israel.9 Sharon's initiative also reflected a continuation of his use of the pretext of security to unilaterally consolidate Israel's grip on the territories while avoiding any form of political engagement with the Palestinians. This goal was explicitly articulated by Sharon's top aide, Dov Weisglass, in an interview several months later. "The disengagement is actually formaldehyde," Weisglass told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. "It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians."
245. ↑ Roy 2016: "But complete control over the West Bank-the obvious goal of the settlement enterprise and the separation barrier-cannot be achieved as long as Gaza remains a source of resistance and as along as the possibility of a unified Palestinian state exists."
246. ↑ 246.0 246.1 246.2 246.3 Stern-Weiner 2024
247. ↑ 247.0 247.1 Roy 2013
248. ↑ 248.0 248.1 248.2 Roy 2016
249. ↑ Gross 2017
250. ↑ "What's the ICJ case against Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine?" (in en). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/19/whats-the-icj-case-against-israels-illegal-occupation-of-palestine.
251. ↑ Bashi 2018
252. ↑ GISHA, A Guide to the Gaza Closure: In Israel's own words
253. ↑ Oxfam International, Cease Failure, p. 7.
254. ↑ Cited in Roy 2016: "This situation has not substantially changed: In late 2012, the World Bank reported that "access to Gaza remains highly controlled, and only consumer goods and construction material for donor-supervised projects are allowed in. Products from Gaza to the West Bank and Israeli markets.. are prohibited. Only small shipments of certain agricultural and manufactured products are exported to other markets through donor-supported projects. East Jerusalem, which is considered a highly lucrative market, is beyond reach." The virtual ban on exports from Gaza has not been lifted to this day (August 2014). Israel has claimed security reasons, but since the prohibitions involved such items as furniture destined for PA schools in the West Bank,» citrus fruit to West Bank grocers, and textiles to Israeli companies," it is difficult not to conclude that the restrictions have little if anything to do with security. Instead, their purpose clearly is to maintain the separation of Gaza and the West Bank. Indeed, Israeli security officials themselves have attribut- ed the export ban "to a political decision to separate Gaza from the West Bank." The government terms the policy a "political-security" necessity.*° Significantly, "decisions regarding [the] sale of goods from Gaza to the West Bank.. could only be made by the prime minister's office.""' Diminution of the Private Sector: Some Statistics Among the consequences of the blockade (worsened by severe economic restrictions and continuing military assaults) is the extreme degradation of Gaza's private sector and productive base...The Israeli government officially justifies closure as a security measure despite the fact that the Israeli security establishment itself has stated that closure is of limited value against extremist attacks."
255. ↑ "Israel announces 'total' blockade on Gaza" (in en). Al Jazeera. 9 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/israel-announces-total-blockade-on-gaza.
256. ↑ "Israel announces 'complete siege' of Gaza, cutting its electricity, food, water, and fuel". Business Insider. 9 October 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-gallant-announces-complete-siege-gaza-no-electricity-food-fuel-2023-10.
257. ↑ "Israel: Unlawful Gaza Blockade Deadly for Children". Human Rights Watch. 18 October 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/18/israel-unlawful-gaza-blockade-deadly-children.
258. ↑ "As World Focuses On Gaza, Grim Lives Go On" (in en). NPR. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127482582.
259. ↑ Roy 2016, pp. 352–359
260. ↑ "Interception of the Gaza flotilla-Legal aspects.". Mag.idf.il. http://www.mag.idf.il/592-4071-en/patzar.aspx.
261. ↑ "Court extends remand of Israelis aboard Gaza ship". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=288686.
262. ↑ "Position paper on the naval blockade on Gaza". 8 September 2010. http://www.mag.idf.il/163-4314-en/patzar.aspx.
263. ↑ Webteam, Web (6 September 2011). "Palmer Report Did Not Find Gaza Blockade Legal, Despite Media Headlines". https://www.amnestyusa.org/updates/palmer-report-did-not-find-gaza-blockade-legal-despite-media-headlines/.
264. ↑ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs The Humanitarian Monitor. December Overview, 2011 , OCHA 31 December 2011
265. ↑ "2,279 Calories per Person: How Israel Made Sure Gaza Didn't Starve" (in en). Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-israel-s-gaza-quota-2-279-calories-a-day-1.5193157.
266. ↑ "Israel used 'calorie count' to limit Gaza food during blockade, critics claim". The Guardian. Associated Press. 17 October 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/israeli-military-calorie-limit-gaza.
267. ↑ "Israel set calorie limit during Gaza blockade". Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/10/20121017115529845399.html.
268. ↑ Benhorin, Yitzhak (20 June 2010). "Cabinet: All non-military items can enter Gaza freely". Ynet News. Associated Press. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3907978,00.html.
269. ↑ Oster, Marcy (21 June 2010). "Reaction mixed to Israeli announcement on easing of Gaza blockade". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. https://www.jta.org/news/article/2010/06/21/2739697/israel-announces-plan-to-ease-gaza-blockade.
270. ↑ Roy 2016, p. xxxi
271. ↑ Staff writers (18 July 2011). "Israeli minister says Palestinians losing UN bid". Almasry Alyoum. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/478436.
272. ↑ Ravid, Barak (28 August 2011). "UN envoy Prosor: Israel has no chance of stopping recognition of Palestinian state". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/un-envoy-prosor-israel-has-no-chance-of-stopping-recognition-of-palestinian-state-1.381062.
273. ↑ 273.0 273.1 Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012). "Notes". Knowing Too Much. New York: London: OR Books. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5. OCLC 794273633.
274. ↑ Benhorin, Yitzhak (13 September 2011). "US to 'adamantly object' PA's UN bid". Ynet News. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4121506,00.html.
275. ↑ Horn, Jordana. "Obama at UN declares 'no shortcuts' to peace". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/Video-Articles/Video/Obama-at-UN-declares-no-shortcuts-to-peace.
276. ↑ Medzini, Ronen (18 September 2011). "Netanyahu: PA attempt to become a permanent UN member will fail". Ynet News. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4123628,00.html.
277. ↑ McGreal, Chris (23 September 2011). "Abbas defies US with formal call for Palestinian recognition by UN". The Guardian (London). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/23/abbas-call-palestinian-recognition-un?intcmp=239.
278. ↑ "Security Council rejects Palestinian statehood resolution". CNN. 31 December 2014. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/30/world/palestinian-statehood-draft-vote/index.html.
279. ↑ "Palestinians win implicit U.N. recognition of sovereign state". Reuters. 29 November 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-statehood-idUSBRE8AR0EG20121129.
280. ↑ Gilead Sher, The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999–2001: Within Reach, Taylor & Francis, 2006 p. 19.
281. ↑ 281.0 281.1 Sales, Ben. "Some experts question extent of Palestinian incitement" (in en-US). Times of Israel. http://www.timesofisrael.com/some-experts-question-extent-of-palestinian-incitement/.
282. ↑ Jesper Svartvik, Jakob Wirén (eds.), Religious Stereotyping and Interreligious Relations, Palgrave Macmillan 2013, pp. 12, 222–224.
283. ↑ Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948, Seven Stories Press, 2011 p. 107.
284. ↑ Sherwood, Harriet (6 August 2011). "Academic claims Israeli school textbooks contain bias – Israel". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/07/israeli-school-racism-claim.
285. ↑ Report on Palestinian Textbooks Georg Eckert Institute (2019–2021)
286. ↑ "EU holds PA funds after reform of antisemitic textbooks fails". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-699378.
287. ↑ "EU moves to stop funding Palestinian terrorists, inciting textbooks". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/eu-moves-to-stop-funding-palestinian-terrorists-inciting-textbooks-666595.
288. ↑ n.a. (1 September 2021). "UNRWA Head Faces Questions at EU Parliament Over 'Hate Speech, Violence' in Palestinian Textbooks" (in en-US). https://www.algemeiner.com/2021/09/01/unrwa-head-faces-questions-at-eu-parliament-over-hate-speech-violence-in-palestinian-textbooks/.
289. ↑ Israeli, Raphael (2012) (in en). The Oslo Idea: The Euphoria of Failure. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-4128-4653-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=Xa0WbLOl2NIC&pg=PA191.
290. ↑ "PA TV glorifies murderers of Fogel family". Jerusalem Post. 30 January 2012. https://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=255695.
291. ↑ "In Israel, an ugly tide sweeps over Palestinians". The National. 25 April 2016. https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/in-israel-an-ugly-tide-sweeps-over-palestinians-1.141422/.
292. ↑ Cohen, Gili (22 April 2016). "Israeli Soldier Indicted for Shooting Wounded Palestinian Assailant Released for Passover". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.715890.
293. ↑ "When Israelis Teach Their Kids To Hate". The Forward. 8 May 2014. http://forward.com/opinion/israel/197866/when-israelis-teach-their-kids-to-hate/.
294. ↑ "Gaza kindergartners want to 'blow up Zionists'". Ynet News. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4241588,00.html.
295. ↑ Stern-Weiner, Jamie (2017). "Introduction". Moment of Truth. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9.
296. ↑ Avineri, Shlomo (2017). "Introduction". The Making of Modern Zionism. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-09479-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=N1UovgAACAAJ&pg=PA.
297. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on 'international legitimacy' and 'all UN relevant resolutions.'"
298. ↑ Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018). "Appendix". Gaza. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=qo84DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA. ""I was the Minister of Justice. I am a lawyer," Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told her Palestinian interlocutors during a critical round of the peace process in 2007, "but I am against law—international law in particular.""
299. ↑ 299.0 299.1 Louwerse, Colter (16 April 2024). "3". Deluge. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=8U9V0AEACAAJ&pg=PA.
300. ↑ 300.0 300.1 Roy, Sara M. (2016). "Preface to the Third Edition". The Gaza Strip extended 3rd edition. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-260-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=X8jsAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA.
301. ↑ Baconi 2018
302. ↑ Scheindlin (2017). "The shrinking Two-State Constituency". Moment of Truth. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9.
303. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). "The Occupation's Traits of Permanence". Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "But the abject submission of the Palestinians and the ever deepening system of occupation and discrimination in the territories are Israel's sole and exclusive responsibility. As brilliantly explained by Michael Sfard, this is a system built on three pillars: the gun, the settlements, and the law that formalizes the network of colonization.1 Under the mantle of security claims, the Jewish state has created in the Palestinian territories one of the most efficient occupation regimes in history, which is, moreover, also cost-effective, for it is the international community's donor money to the Palestinian Authority that saves the occupier the burden of having to directly administer the territories. This leaves Israel free to cater to its insatiable security needs with draconic measures, such as limiting the Palestinians' freedom of movement, erecting walls that separate communities, dotting roads with checkpoints where innocent people are manhandled, activating sophisticated intelligence mechanisms that control the lives of an ever growing number of suspects, conducting surprise searches of private houses in the middle of the night, and carrying out arbitrary administrative detentions. If this were not enough, vigilantes among the settlers, some known as "the Youth of the Hills," constantly harass Palestinian communities, destroy orchard trees, and arbitrarily apply a "price tag" of punishments to innocent civilians for whatever terrorist attack might have been perpetrated by a Palestinian squad. Underlying this very serious problem of the unpardonable depravity of settlers' extremism is the even more serious problem that has to do with the involvement of the entire Israeli body politic in maintaining and continuously expanding a regime of dominance in the territories. For too long, the peace process has served as a curtain behind which the policy of practical annexation has flourished."
304. ↑ "Overview of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians". News Basics. http://news-basics.com/2011/israel-and-the-palestinians/.
305. ↑ Scott-Baumann 2023: "The Israeli government proceeded to annex East Jerusalem. This act violated international law, and the United Nations General Assembly condemned it... Furthermore, Israel confiscated a large swath of land to the east of the city that would, in time, form a barrier of Israeli settlements surrounding the city, thus cutting off the Palestinian population of Jerusalem from its West Bank hinterland."
306. ↑ 306.0 306.1 306.2 Sela 2002, pp. 491–498
307. ↑ Avraham Sela (2002). Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 495. ISBN 978-0-8264-1413-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=YJwsAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA. : "Arab-Jewish tensions stemmed from incidents in and around the Temple Mount (al-haram al-sharif) and provocative actions by Jewish extremists against Arabs. Particularly frustrating from a Palestinian viewpoint were the constant efforts made by the Israeli authorities to settle Jews in purely Arab neighborhoods by purchasing Arab or church property, or to appropriate inhabited Arab property by legal means on the grounds that it had been originally owned by Jews."
308. ↑ "Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (Unofficial translation)" . www.knesset.gov.il. Passed by the Knesset on the 17th Av, 5740 (30 July 1980).
309. ↑ Diamond, Jeremy; Labott, Elise (6 December 2017). "Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital". CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/06/politics/president-donald-trump-jerusalem/index.html.
310. ↑ Ahren, Raphael (6 April 2017). "In curious twist, Russia recognizes West Jerusalem as Israel's capital". Times of Israel (Jerusalem). https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-historic-first-russia-recognizes-west-jerusalem-as-israels-capital/.
311. ↑ "UN security Council Resolution 478". unispal.un.org. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/DDE590C6FF232007852560DF0065FDDB.
312. ↑ Lapidoth, Ruth. "Jerusalem – Some Legal Issues". The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. pp. 21–26. http://www.jiis.org/.upload/lapidoth-jerusalem.pdf. Reprinted from: Rüdiger Wolfrum (Ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, online 2008–, print 2011).
313. ↑ Reiter, Yitzhak (2017). Contested Holy Places in Israel–Palestine: Sharing and Conflict Resolution. Routledge. p. xiii. ISBN 9781351998857.
314. ↑ Breger, Marshall J.; Reiter, Yitzhak; Hammer, Leonard (2010). "Regulation of holy places in the West Bank and Gaza". Holy Places in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Confrontation and Co-Existence. Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9780203867457. "these sites saw simultaneous worship by Jews and Muslims, with the exception of the period of Jordanian rule in the West Bank, between 1948–67, when Jews had no access to these sites"
315. ↑ Gold, Dore (2007). The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. pp. 5–6.
316. ↑ Golden, Jonathan (2004). "Targeting Heritage: The Abuse of Symbolic Sites in Modern Conflicts". in Rowan, Yorke M.; Baram, Uzi. Marketing heritage: archaeology and the consumption of the past. Rowman Altamira. pp. 183–202. ISBN 978-0-7591-0342-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=1W6BWEWdJWQC&pg=PA183. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
317. ↑ "Extremists – Talking With Jewish Extremists | Israel's Next War?". Frontline. PBS. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/israel/extreme/nameof.html.
318. ↑ Peled, Alisa Rubin (2001). Debating Islam in the Jewish State: The Development of Policy toward Islamic Institutions in Israel. State University of New York Press. p. 96. OCLC 929622466. "In general, Israeli policy towards holy places can be considered a success with regard to its primary goal: facilitating Israel's acceptance into the international community of nations. However, the repeated failure of the Muslim Affairs Department to fulfill its mandate of protecting the Muslim holy places in Israel has been a largely forgotten chapter in Israeli history that deserves reexamination"
319. ↑ "Secret tunnel under Al-Aqsa Mosque exposed" (in en). 27 March 2008. https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008%2F03%2F27%2F47501.html.
320. ↑ 320.0 320.1 320.2 Sela 2002, pp. 724–729, Efrat, Moshe. "Refugees."
321. ↑ 321.0 321.1 Peters, Joel; Dajani Daoudi, Mohammed (2011). The Israel–Palestine Conflict Parallel discourses. Routledge. pp. 26, 37. ISBN 978-0-203-83939-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=-ubfEsbawzoC&q=The+Israel-Palestine+Conflict+Parallel+Discourses. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
322. ↑ "General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950". United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. 1950. http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/93037e3b939746de8525610200567883!OpenDocument.
323. ↑ "Refugees" (in en). https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/refugees.
324. ↑ "UNRWA" (in en). United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. https://www.unrwa.org/.
325. ↑ Khalidi 2024, Fateh, the PLO, and the PA: The Palestinian Para-State: "Outside Palestine, meanwhile, live between 4 and 6 million Palestinians (reliable figures are not available). They exist in situations ranging from the utter misery (since 1982) of those in refugee camps in Lebanon, to a wide diversity of conditions, some of them quite comfortable, in various other Arab countries, Europe, and the United States. These Palestinians 'of the diaspora' (al-shatat in Arabic) possess a variety of passports, laissez-passers, and refugee documents, some of which are looked upon with great suspicion by certain states, and some of them face harsh restrictions on their movement in consequence. The largest single group of Palestinians of the diaspora, between 2 and 3 million, carry Jordanian passports, and most of them live in Jordan. What unites the overwhelming majority of these 4 to 6 million people is that they or their parents or grandparents were obliged to leave their homes and became refugees in 1948 or afterward, and that they are barred from living in any part of their ancestral homeland, Palestine."
326. ↑ Slater 2020, p. 265: "Refugees. Israel agreed that the refugee problem was a regrettable humanitarian issue, Barak stated, and would recognize the right of the Palestinians to return to their own state, but that "no right of return to Israeli territory would prevail." However, he continued, Israel was prepared to admit several hundred refugees annually for a ten- to fifteen-year period, under a family unification program. In a later interview, Barak made it clear that the "family unification program" was not based on any Palestinian rights: "No Israeli prime minister will accept even one refugee on the basis of the right of return."
327. ↑ Scott-Baumann 2023
328. ↑ Slater 2020, p. 251: "The Palestinian Position. Since 1948 the official or public position of Arafat, the PLO, Arafat's successor Mahmoud Abbas, and the Palestinian Authority has been—and, rhetorically at least, still is—that the Palestinian refugees as well as their descendants have the right to return to their lands, homes, and villages. Arafat reiterated that "demand" at Camp David, though he and other Palestinian leaders repeatedly assured the Americans and the Israelis that their real goal was Israeli acceptance only of the "principle" of refugee return, as distinct from implementing that "right" in practice."
329. ↑ "Right of return: Palestinian dream?" (in en-GB). 18 February 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/issues/1099279.stm.
330. ↑ Flapan, Simha (Summer 1987). "The Palestinian Exodus of 1948". Journal of Palestine Studies 16 (4): 3–26. doi:10.2307/2536718.
331. ↑ Khalidi, Rashid I. (Winter 1992). "Observations on the Right of Return". Journal of Palestine Studies 21 (2): 29–40. doi:10.2307/2537217.
332. ↑ 332.0 332.1 Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist–Arab conflict, 1881–2001 (1st Vintage Books ed.). New York: Vintage Books. pp. 252–258. ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7. https://archive.org/details/righteousvictims00morr_0/page/252.
333. ↑ Masalha, Nur (1992). Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948 (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies. p. 175. ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5. https://archive.org/details/expulsionofpales00masa/page/175.
334. ↑ Michael Mann (2005). The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109, 519. ISBN 978-0-521-83130-7.
335. ↑ Morris, Benny. "Arab–Israeli War". The Crimes of War Education Project. http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/arab-israeli-war/.
336. ↑ Esber, Rosmarie (2009). Under the Cover of War: The Zionist Expulsion of the Palestinians. Arabicus Books & Media. pp. 23. ISBN 978-0-9815131-3-3.
337. ↑ Pappé, Ilan (2007). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Repr. ed.). Oxford: Oneworld Publications. pp. 2–3. ISBN 978-1-85168-467-0. https://archive.org/details/ethniccleansingo00papp/page/2.
338. ↑ See for example, Masalha, Nur-eldeen (1988). "On Recent Hebrew and Israeli Sources for the Palestinian Exodus, 1947–49". Journal of Palestine Studies 18 (1): 121–137. doi:10.2307/2537599. And Childers, Irskine (12 May 1961). "The Other Exodus". The Spectator (London).
339. ↑ Honig-Parnass, Tikva (2011). The False Prophets of Peace: Liberal Zionism and the Struggle for Palestine. Haymarket Books. p. 5. ISBN 978-1-60846-130-1. "Makdisi rightly argues that almost every law of South African Apartheid has its equivalent in Israel today.18 A significant example is the Law of Return (1950), which even Kretzmer claims is explicitly discriminatory against Palestinian citizens.... The Law of Return, which determines the second-class citizenship of Palestinians, is recognized as a fundamental principle in Israel and "is possibly even its very raison d'etre as a Jewish state."19"
340. ↑ Schmidt, Yvonne (2008). Foundations of Civil and Political Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories. GRIN Verlag oHG. pp. 245–246. ISBN 978-3-638-94450-2. "In any case has the Law of Return, 1950 discriminatory effect for Palestinian Arab people since it allows any Jew to immigrate to Israel, while—at the same time—it deprives all native Palestinian Arab refugees residing outside the borders of the state of Israel of their fundamental right to return to their homes and villages from which they were expelled or took flight in the course of the 1948 war that broke out because of the establishment of Israel."
341. ↑ Kassim, Anis F. (2002). The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 2001–2002: Vol. 11. Brill. p. 150. ISBN 978-3-638-94450-2. "Under the heading of "Discrimination", the Committee cited Israel's Law of Return as discriminatory against Palestinian refugees because of Israel's refusal to readmit them. The committee said: "The Committee notes with concern that the Law of Return which permits any Jew from anywhere in the world to immigrate and thereby virtually automatically enjoy residence and obtain citizenship in Israel, discriminates against Palestinians in the Diaspora upon whom the Government of Israel has imposed restrictive requirements that make it almost impossible to return to their land of birth.""
342. ↑ "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1A752D5C8191389E8525682D00701239.
343. ↑ "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/025974039ACFB171852560DE00548BBE.
344. ↑ Radley, K. René (1978). "The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law". American Journal of International Law 72 (3): 586–614. doi:10.2307/2200460.
345. ↑ 345.0 345.1 "Israel and the Palestinians". The Irish Times. 21 February 2008. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/israel-and-the-palestinians-1.896017.
346. ↑ Shavit, Ari (8 January 2004). "Survival of the Fittest". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/survival-of-the-fittest-1.61345.
347. ↑ Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012). Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel is Coming to an End. New York: OR Books. pp. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5.
348. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=x72ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "A massive repatriation of Palestinian refugees would have clashed irreconcilably with the most vital and fundamental ethos of the new State of Israel, indeed with its very raison d'être, namely the consolidation of a Jewish state through the mass immigration of the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust in Europe and the uprooted and dispossessed Jews of North Africa and the Arab Middle East... No Israeli statesman, either in 1948 or in 2005, would conceive of peace based on the massive repatriation of Palestinian refugees as an offer the Jewish state could accept and yet survive. The ethos of Zionism was twofold; it was about demography—ingathering the exiles in a viable Jewish state with as small an Arab minority as possible—and land."
349. ↑ Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=VaUvqHNd6m0C&pg=PA. "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said that returning Palestinians might be a fifth column and a demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish state."
350. ↑ Erlanger, Steven (31 March 2007). "Olmert Rejects Right of Return for Palestinians" (in en-US). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/world/middleeast/31mideast.html.
351. ↑ Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-89608-601-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=aHphMCIkhK0C&pg=PA. "Evidently, the indigenous population also has a 'security problem'; in fact, the Palestinians have already suffered the catastrophe that Israelis justly fear."
352. ↑ Khalidi 2013, Introduction: "Similarly, in this lexicon, "security" is an absolute priority of Israel's, the need for which is invariably described as rooted in genuine, deep-seated existential fears. "Israeli security" therefore takes precedence over virtually everything else, including international law and the human rights of others. It is an endlessly expansive concept that includes a remarkable multitude of things, such as whether pasta or generator parts can be brought into the Gaza Strip, or whether miserably poor Palestinian villagers can be allowed water cisterns.1 By contrast, in spite of the precarious nature of their situation, Palestinians are presumed not to have any significant concerns about their security. This is the case even though nearly half the Palestinian population have lived for more than two generations under a grinding military occupation without the most basic human, civil, or political rights, and the rest have for many decades been dispersed from their ancestral homeland, many of them living under harsh, authoritarian Arab governments."
353. ↑ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). "The Occupation's Traits of Permanence". Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA. "The Israeli debate over the occupied territories is, then, not just an ideological divide between right and left; it is also overwhelmingly influenced by the all-encompassing "security network" that injects a security rationale into every political move."
354. ↑ Slater 2020, p. 221: "In any event, there was no legitimate security argument at all for the Israeli seizure of Arab East Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 war and for subsequently settling religious fanatics in the West Bank. The real motivating forces for most of the postwar Israeli expansionism into the West Bank and East Jerusalem were clearly "Greater Israel" nationalism and religious messianism. If anything, as many Israeli security experts pointed out at the time, the "need" to defend the settlers was a security liability... Israeli governments have long cited "security" as the reason they need to maintain occupation of Arab territories—but when Israel withdrew from Lebanon and Egyptian territory, the attacks against it ended. It is unlikely that an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories would have a different result—and if it did, there would be little to prevent Israel from reinvading and occupying those territories. Moreover, in those circumstances repression of any continuing Palestinian violence would have a legitimacy that it currently lacks. For these reasons, Israel has a security problem with the Palestinians only in the same way that colonial powers had "security problems" with nationalist uprisings that eventually forced them to withdraw."
355. ↑ 355.0 355.1 "Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000". Israeli Ministry of Internal Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm.
356. ↑ "Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006." Global Legal Information Network. 26 December 2006. 30 May 2009.
357. ↑ Erakat, Noura (2019). "From Occupation to Warfare". Justice for Some. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-1357-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=-zGUDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA.
358. ↑ Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=VaUvqHNd6m0C&pg=PA.
359. ↑ "Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights :: resolution /: adopted by the General Assembly" (in en). 14 December 1990. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/282163?ln=en.
360. ↑ "Right of peoples to self-determination/Struggle by all available means – GA resolution" (in en-US). https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-184801/. ""1. Calls upon all States to implement fully and faithfully all the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence by peoples under colonial and foreign domination; 2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle; 3. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Namibian people, the Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference...""
361. ↑ "Analysis: Palestinian suicide attacks" (in en-GB). BBC News. 29 January 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3256858.stm.
362. ↑ Baconi 2018, Military Resistance Comes Undone: "On February 25, 1994, an American Jewish settler named Baruch Goldstein walked into the Ibrahimi Mosque in the West Bank city of Hebron during prayer time. Standing behind the rows of kneeling figures in front of him, Goldstein opened fire. Within minutes, twenty-nine Muslim worshippers had been killed and close to one hundred injured. The atrocity jolted the nascent Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations that had gathered pace in the wake of the First Intifada, prompted by the PLO's strategic redirection in 1988. Less than six months before the Hebron attack, in September 1993, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin had awkwardly shaken hands in a widely publicized event on the South Lawn of the White House. The leaders had assembled in the American capital to sign the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, popularly known as the Oslo Accords, referring to the capital city where the secretive talks leading to the agreement had taken place. Following the signing, negotiations between Israel and the PLO in the form of a "peace process" were launched.1 Goldstein's attack served as a reminder of the bloody challenges this process faced. Forty-one days after the shooting, once the time allotted for Muslim ritual mourning had been respected, a member of Hamas approached a bus stop in Afula, a city in northern Israel. Standing next to fellow passengers, the man detonated a suicide vest, killing seven Israelis. This was on April 6, 1994, a day that marked Hamas's first lethal suicide bombing in Israel."
363. ↑ "The Security Barrier (Fence)". IDF Military Advocate General. http://www.law.idf.il/351-en/Patzar.aspx.
364. ↑ Scott-Baumann 2023: "Far fewer Israelis were killed in Palestinian suicide bombs after the construction of the barrier (130 in 2003 and fewer than 25 in 2005), convincing most Israelis that it saved the lives of fellow Israelis and was necessary for their security. However, the decline in bombings can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the PA, particularly after the Second Intifada ended in 2005."
365. ↑ Hourani, Albert Habib (2010). A History of the Arab Peoples. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01017-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=A_History_of_the_Arab_Peoples&pg=PA. "In places the barrier separated farmers from their lands, even children from their schools, while preventing Palestinians from travelling within the West Bank or seeking work in Israel."
366. ↑ Shlaim 2015, The Road Map to Nowhere 2003–2006: "The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967."
367. ↑ Baconi 2018, Chapter 3: "Rather than building the wall on Israeli land or along the 1967 borders, however, the structure snaked through Palestinian territories, unilaterally seizing more than 10 percent of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods around East Jerusalem as well as major settlement blocs that were integrated into this de facto border. The structure split whole Palestinian villages in half and had an immediate effect on the freedom of movement for Palestinians within the occupied territories. Jewish settlers living illegally within the same land continued to be linked into Israel through exclusive Jewish-only highways and bypass roads. On July 20, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion ruling that the wall was illegal, to no effect.4 With Israel's planned disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the construction of advanced "security" infrastructure, Sharon was actively restructuring the framework of Israel's occupation."
368. ↑ Erakat, Noura (2019). "Notes". Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=Justice_for_Some&pg=PA. "Its 2004 decision held that the construction of the wall in the West Bank, as opposed to along the 1949 armistice line, violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense. It advised Israel to "terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated." The court also observed that all states had an obligation "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.""
369. ↑ Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012). "Appendix". Knowing Too Much. New York: OR Books. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5. "In its advisory opinion the ICJ voiced concern that "the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a 'fait accompli' on the ground that could well become permanent."115 Taking note of this ICJ concern, Israel's High Court rejoined that the ICJ lacked a "factual basis" for reaching definite conclusions.116 Not just the ICJ, however, but also many respected human rights organizations expressed such worries. B'Tselem concluded that the "underlying reason" of the wall's route was "to establish facts on the ground that would perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel." Likewise, Human Rights Watch concluded that the "existing and planned route of the barrier appears to be designed chiefly to incorporate and make contiguous with Israel illegal civilian settlements." Likewise, Amnesty International concluded that Israel was building the wall to "consolidate its control over land which is being used for illegal Israeli settlements," and that "the very expensive and sophisticated structure of the fence/wall indicates that it is likely intended as a permanent structure."117"
370. ↑ Harel, Amos (7 December 2007). "Defense officials concerned as Hamas upgrades Qassam arsenal". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/932106.html.
371. ↑ Esveld, Bill Van (6 August 2009). ﻿Rockets from Gaza﻿ (Report). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/08/06/rockets-gaza/harm-civilians-palestinian-armed-groups-rocket-attacks. Retrieved 15 November 2023.
372. ↑ "Q&A: Gaza conflict" (in en-GB). BBC News. 18 January 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7818022.stm.
373. ↑ "Gaza's rocket threat to Israel" (in en-GB). BBC News. 21 January 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3702088.stm.
374. ↑ "Playing cat and mouse with Gaza rockets" (in en-GB). BBC News. 28 February 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7270168.stm.
375. ↑ Khalidi 2020, Chapter 6: "However, none of the rockets had a warhead of the size or lethality of the over 49,000 tank and artillery shells fired by Israel in 2014. The Soviet-designed 122mm Grad or Katyusha rocket commonly used by Hamas and its allies normally carried either a 44- or 66-pound warhead (compared with the 96-pound 155mm shells), although many were fitted with smaller warheads to increase their range. Most of the homemade Qassam rockets that were used had considerably smaller warheads. Together, the 4,000 Qassam, Katyusha, Grad, and other missiles that were fired from the Gaza Strip, and that reached Israel (many were so imprecise and poorly manufactured that they fell short and landed within the strip), would have likely had less explosive power in total than a dozen 2,000-pound bombs."
376. ↑ Thrall, Nathan (14 October 2010). "Our Man in Palestine". The New York Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/our-man-palestine/. Retrieved 30 September 2010.
377. ↑ "Growing Israel could need dozens more desalination plants by 2065". 13 January 2023. https://www.waterworld.com/drinking-water-treatment/press-release/14288279/growing-israel-could-need-dozens-more-desalination-plants-by-2065.
378. ↑ Hasson, Nir (30 June 2013). "How many Palestinians actually live in the West Bank?". Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.532703.
379. ↑ Messerschmid, Clemens (2002). "Till the Last Drop: The Palestinian Water Crisis in the West Bank, Hydrogeology and Hydropolitics of a Regional Conflict". http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/en/surveys/palestin/water.pdf.
380. ↑ "Annex III: Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs". Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. https://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/heskemb4_eng.htm.
381. ↑ "Oslo+21 and Water Problems in Palestine: A Story of Failure". https://www.orsam.org.tr/en/oslo-21-and-water-problems-in-palestine-a-story-of-failure/.
382. ↑ "Water war leaves Palestinians thirsty". BBC News. 16 June 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2982730.stm.
383. ↑ "Israel". Aquastat. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2008. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/israel/index.stm.
384. ↑ 384.0 384.1 "Lack of sufficient services in Gaza could get worse without urgent action, UN warns". UN News Centre. 27 August 2012. https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42751#.UP35DaF4YZc.
385. ↑ Assaf, Karen; Attia, Bayoumi; Darwish, Ali; Wardam, Batir; Klawitter, Simone (2004), Water as a human right: The understanding of water in the Arab countries of the Middle East – A four country analysis, Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, p. 229, http://www.emwis.org/countries/fol749974/country045975/countries/PDF/waterbook, retrieved 23 April 2014
386. ↑ Gelvin, James L. (2005). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 100 Years of War. New York: Cambridge University Press.
387. ↑ "From 1947 to 2023: Retracing the complex, tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict". 11 October 2023. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231011-from-1947-to-2023-retracing-the-complex-and-tragic-israeli-palestinian-conflict.
388. ↑ Sa'id, Ahmad; Abu-Lughod, Lila (2007). Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory. New York: Columbia University Press.
389. ↑ 389.0 389.1 "Agriculture in Palestine: a post-Oslo Analysis". 2012. http://thecepr.org/images/stories/pdf/memo agriculture.pdf.
390. ↑ "Poverty and the Labor Market: A Sheer Lack of Jobs?". Coping with Conflict: Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza. pp. 37–61. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_and_Inclusion_in_the_West_Bank_and_Gaza_Chapter3.pdf. Retrieved 28 April 2014.
391. ↑ 391.0 391.1 "Palestinians lose billions to Israeli land bans, says World Bank report". The National. 8 October 2013. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/palestinians-lose-billions-to-israeli-land-bans-says-world-bank-report-1.471782.
392. ↑ Stein, Rebecca (2008). Itineraries in Conflict. Durham: Duke University Press. p. 9.
393. ↑ Hammad, Suzanne Hassan (2023) (in English). Emplaced Resistances in Occupied Palestine: Stories of a Village, Its People, and Their Land. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 20–72. ISBN 978-1-78661-204-5.
394. ↑ Davis, Rochelle (2013). Palestine and the Palestinians in the 21st century. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
395. ↑ "Palestinian Economic Recovery Plan Takes Shape". The National. Agence France-Presse. 12 July 2013. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/palestinian-economic-recovery-plan-takes-shape-1.297420.
396. ↑ Chalabi, Mona (14 October 2013). "How Does Palestine's Economy Work?". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/oct/14/palestine-economy-how-does-it-work.
397. ↑ "Mystery surrounds 'suicide' of Abu Nidal, once a ruthless killer and face of terror – Middle East, World". The Independent. 2 September 2011. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mystery-surrounds-suicide-of-abu-nidal-once-a-ruthless-killer-and-face-of-terror-640464.html.
398. ↑ "Attempt to carry explosives device on El Al flight foiled". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel/attempt-to-carry-explosives-device-on-el-al-flight-foiled.
399. ↑ Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Vol. 3. p. 1228.
400. ↑ Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Vol. 3. M. Leonard, Thomas.
401. ↑ "How Israel builds its fifth column". Christian Science Monitor. 22 May 2002. ISSN 0882-7729. https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0522/p01s04-wome.html/(page)/2.
402. ↑ "From 1947 to 2023: Retracing the complex, tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict". https://press.un.org/en/2022/gaef3574.doc.htm.
403. ↑ "Israel to impose Hamas sanctions". BBC News. 19 February 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4729000.stm.
404. ↑ Erlanger, Steven (18 February 2006). "Hamas Leader Faults Israeli Sanction Plan". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/18/international/middleeast/18mideast.html.
405. ↑ Patience, Martin (19 June 2007). "Q&A: Palestinian Embargo". BBC Jerusalem. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6768931.stm.
406. ↑ 406.0 406.1 "Data on casualties". United Nations. https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.
407. ↑ 407.0 407.1 Alfonseca, Kiara (11 October 2023). "Palestinian civilians suffer in Israel-Gaza crossfire as death toll rises". ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/International/palestinian-civilians-suffer-israel-hamas-crossfire-death-toll/story?id=103828889. "roughly 6,400 Palestinians and 300 Israelis"
408. ↑ 408.0 408.1 "Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls". http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat4.htm.
409. ↑ "All wars in the 20th century, since 1900 | the Polynational War Memorial". http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp.
410. ↑ "Fatalities in the first Intifada" (in en). https://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables.
411. ↑ "The Humanitarian Monitor." United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. December 2007. PDF. Tables on pages 5 and 7, all numbers refer to casualties of the direct conflict as defined therein (p. 23).
412. ↑ "B'Tselem: Since 2000, 7,454 Israelis, Palestinians killed". The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel/btselem-since-2000-7454-israelis-palestinians-killed.
413. ↑ "October 7 Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes by Hamas-led Groups" (in en). Human Rights Watch. 17 July 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/17/october-7-crimes-against-humanity-war-crimes-hamas-led-groups.
414. ↑ "Gaza death toll: how many Palestinians has Israel's offensive killed?" (in en). Reuters. 24 March 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-palestinians-has-israels-gaza-offensive-killed-2025-01-15/.
415. ↑ "51 deaths reported in Gaza from Israeli strikes, bringing the war's Palestinian toll to over 52,000". AP News. 27 April 2025. https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-04-27-2025-484d00da53700e6d08e0e9f360be976f.
416. ↑ "Gaza total death toll rises". 18 May 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/5/18/live-israel-kills-24-in-gazas-al-mawasi-resumes-truce-talks-with-hamas?update=3718087.
417. ↑ Jamaluddine, Zeina; Abukmail, Hanan; Aly, Sarah; Campbell, Oona M R.; Checchi, Francesco (2025). "Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: A capture–recapture analysis". The Lancet 405 (10477): 469–477. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02678-3. PMID 39799952.
418. ↑ "Israel: Starvation Used as Weapon of War in Gaza" (in en). Human Rights Watch. 18 December 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/18/israel-starvation-used-weapon-war-gaza.
419. ↑ "Untangling the reality of famine in Gaza". Refugees International. 12 September 2024. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/untangling-the-reality-of-famine-in-gaza/.
420. ↑ "Gazans face hunger crisis as aid blockade nears two months" (in en). 28 April 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162666.
421. ↑ Mor, Avi, et al. "Casualties in Operation Cast Lead: A closer look." Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. 2009. PDF.
422. ↑ "B'Tselem: 773 of Palestinians killed in Cast Lead were civilians" (in en). Ynet News. 9 September 2009. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3774217,00.html.
423. ↑ Norman Finkelstein (2018). Gaza: An Inquest into Its Martyrdom. Univ of California Pres8. ISBN 978-0-520-96838-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=Gaza&pg=PA. "Israeli officials alleged that total Palestinian deaths came to 1,166, of whom at least 60 percent were "terrorists." The discrepancy in the ratio of Palestinian combatant to civilian deaths partly resulted from disagreement on the proper classification of Gazan police. See Shay Fogelman, "Shock and Awe," Haaretz (31 December 2010). The broad consensus among human rights organizations was that these police should overwhelmingly be classified as civilians because they did not take a direct part in hostilities and were not members of Palestinian armed groups. The veracity of Israeli figures could be tested by scrutinizing the "under 16" subclassification. Whereas Israel alleged that 89 Palestinians under age 16 were killed, B'Tselem reported that 252 Palestinians under 16 were killed and that it had "copies of birth certificates and death certificates along with other documents regarding the vast majority of the minors who were killed." For critical analysis of Israeli casualty figures, see Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI), No Second Thoughts: The changes in the Israeli Defense Forces' combat doctrine in light of "Operation Cast Lead" (2009), pp. 9–11. This study showed that Israel abruptly altered the figures it tabulated for Palestinian deaths, and concluded that "the casualty estimates provided by other sources (around 1,400 killed) are more credible than those provided by the IDF Spokesperson." Even the largely apologetic US Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report put the number of dead "at close to 1,400 Palestinians, including more than 1,000 civilians.""
424. ↑ 424.0 424.1 424.2 424.3 "Country Overviews – Occupied Palestinian Territory". United Nations Mine Action Service. 2009. http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=138.
425. ↑ "Israeli Public Is Increasingly Skeptical About Lasting Peace". Pew Research Center. 3 June 2025. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/israeli-public-is-increasingly-skeptical-about-lasting-peace/.
426. ↑ "Palestinian Public Divided on Statehood Preferences". Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 7 December 2021. https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/blogs/palestinian-public-divided-statehood-preferences.
427. ↑ "The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll, 2022". Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 2022. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928.
428. ↑ Saad, Lydia (29 February 2016). "Americans' Views Toward Israel Remain Firmly Positive". Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/189626/americans-views-toward-israel-remain-firmly-positive.aspx.
429. ↑ "Modest Warming in U.S. Views on Israel and Palestinians". Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. 26 May 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2022/05/26/modest-warming-in-u-s-views-on-israel-and-palestinians/.
430. ↑ "Attitudes to the Israel-Palestine conflict in Western Europe and the USA in 2023". YouGov. 3 July 2023. https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/45869-attitudes-israel-palestine-conflict-western-europe.
431. ↑ "Another poll shows Americans' declining support for Israel". 2025-09-26. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/poll-americans-support-israel/.
432. ↑ Silver, Laura (2025-06-13). "Most people across 24 surveyed countries have negative views of Israel and Netanyahu". https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu/.

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## External links

United Nations

* Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory
* United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

Academic, news, and similar sites (excluding Israeli or Palestinian sources)

* U.S. Attempts at Peace between Israel and Palestine from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
* Gaza\Sderot : Life in spite of everything – a web documentary produced by arte.tv, in which daily video-chronicles (2 min. each) show the life of 5 people (men, women, children) in Gaza and Sderot, on both sides of the border.
* Global Politician – Middle-East Section
* Middle East Policy Council
* Aix Group – Joint Palestinian-Israeli-international economic working group.
* Crash Course World History 223: Conflict in Israel and Palestine – author and YouTube educator John Green gives a brief history lesson (13 minutes) on the conflict.
* The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict—An overview of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians from 1948 through the present day. From the History Guy Website.
* The Media Line – A non-profit news agency which provides credible, unbiased content, background and context from across the Middle East.

Conflict resolution groups

* OneVoice Movement – One Million Voices to End the Conflict
* Seeking Common Ground

Human rights groups

* Human Rights Watch: Israel/Palestine
* B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
* Al-Haq: Palestinian Human Rights Group : West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists
* Palestinian Centre for Human Rights PCHR: Gaza affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists
* Gush-Shalom: Gush-Shalom Israeli Peace Movement

Jewish and Israeli academic, news, and similar sites

* A history of Israel, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
* Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
* Honest Reporting monitoring mideast media
* True Peace – Chabad-Lubavitch site
* What the Fight in Israel Is All About – The Media Line

Jewish and Israeli "peace movement" news and advocacy sites

* The Origin of the Palestine – Israel Conflict, Published by Jews for Justice in the Middle East

Other sites

* Arabs and Israelis held hostage by a common enemy Salom Now! and METalks are two experimental initiatives which sought to rewrite the script of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. However, such popular, grassroots action is held hostage by some common enemies: despair, hatred, antipathy and distrust. (Jan 2007)
* Exchange of friendly fire Anat el-Hashahar, an Israeli and founder of METalks, debates the Arab–Israeli conflict – from Oslo to Lebanon – with Khaled Diab, an Egyptian journalist and writer.
* Website with information (articles, reports, maps, books, links, etc.) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
* Map of Palestinian Refugee Camps 1993 (UNRWA/C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
* Map of Israel 2008 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
* Map of Israeli Settlements in the West Bank Dec. 1993 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
* Map of Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip Dec. 1993 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
* Map of Jerusalem Mar. 1993 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
* Map of Jericho and Vicinity Jan. 1994 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
* Pew Global Research – worldwide public opinion
* Policy publications on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive

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