Khomeinism

Short description: Ideology of Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Khomeini in the 1970s

Khomeinism (also transliterated Khumaynism) refers to the religious and political ideas of the leader of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeinism may also refer to the ideology of the clerical class which has ruled Islamic Republic of Iran founded by Khomeini, after his death. It can also be used to refer to the radicalization of segments of the Twelver Shia populations of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, and the Iranian government's recruitment of Shia minorities in Afghanistan,[1] Pakistan ,[2] Saudi Arabia[3] and Africa.[4] The word Khomeinist and Khomeinists, derived from Khomeinism, are also used to describe members of Iran's clerical rulers and differentiate them from regular Shia Muslim clerics.

Under Khomeini's leadership, Iran replaced its millennia-old monarchy with a theocratic republic. Khomeini brought about a major paradigm shift in Shia Islam. He declared that Islamic jurists are the true holders of religious and political authority, who must be obeyed as "an expression of obedience to God",[5] and whose rule has "precedence over all secondary ordinances in Islam such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage."[6] Khomeini's doctrines would make a major influence on the landscape of Shia Islam; which traditionally upheld political quietism over a thousand years. Another significant revision was on Mahdism, the messianic belief in the reappearance of their Twelfth Imam and the proper way to wait for Him. Traditional Twelver theologians urged believers to wait patiently for His return, but Khomeini and his followers called upon Shia Muslims to actively pave the way for Mahdi's global Islamic rule.[7]

Since his death, politics in the legal sphere of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been "largely defined by attempts to claim Khomeini's legacy", according to at least one scholar, and "staying faithful to his ideology has been the litmus test for all political activity" there.[8]

According to Vali Nasr, outside Iran, Khomeini's influence has been felt among the large Shia populations of Iraq and Lebanon. In the non-Muslim world, Khomeini had an impact on the West and even Western popular culture where it is said he became "the virtual face of Islam" who "inculcated fear and distrust towards Islam."[9]

## Contents

* 1 Background
* 1.1 Origin of the term
* 2 Tenets
* 2.1 Improvisational ability
* 2.2 Governance
* 2.2.1 Rulers
* 2.2.2 Machinery of government
* 2.3 Sharia (Islamic law)
* 2.4 Mahdism
* 2.5 Conspiracy theories
* 2.6 Populism
* 2.7 Democracy
* 2.8 Third World
* 2.9 Human rights
* 2.10 Economics
* 2.11 Women in politics
* 2.12 Religious philosophy, fiqh, teachings
* 2.12.1 Fiqh
* 2.12.2 Esmat
* 2.12.3 The Prophets
* 2.13 Istishhad
* 2.13.1 Iran–Iraq War
* 2.13.2 Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq
* 2.14 Shia rituals
* 2.15 Mystique
* 2.16 Sternness and austerity
* 2.17 Mysticism
* 3 International tenents
* 3.1 Spread of Islam
* 3.2 Unity of the Ummah
* 3.3 Shia revival
* 3.4 Neither East nor West
* 4 Western reception
* 5 Influences
* 5.1 Rashid Rida
* 5.1.1 Fazlullah Nouri
* 5.2 Fada'ian-e Islam
* 5.3 Sayyid Qutb
* 5.3.1 Gharbzadegi
* 5.4 Ali Shariati
* 5.4.1 Baqir al-Sadr
* 6 Works
* 7 See also
* 8 Notes
* 9 Citations
* 10 Bibliography
* 11 Journals
* 12 External links

## Background

Main article: Religion:Shia Islam

Ayatollah Khomeini was a senior Islamic jurist cleric of Shia (Twelvers) Islam. Shia theology holds that Wilayah or Islamic leadership (political and religious) belongs to a divinely-appointed line of Shia Imams descended from a cousin (Ali) and daughter (Fatima) of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, the last of which is the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi. The God-given (Infallible) knowledge and sense of justice of the Imams makes them the definitive reference for (Shia) Muslims in every aspect of life, religious or otherwise, including governance. However, the twelfth Imam disappeared into what Shia believe is "occultation" (ghaybat) in 939 AD and so has not been present to rule over the Muslim community for over a thousand years.

In the absence of the Imam, Shia scholars/religious leaders accepted the idea of non-theocratic leaders (typically a hereditary monarch such as a sultan, king, or shah) managing political affairs, defending Shia Muslims and their territory, but no consensus emerged among the scholars as to how Muslims should relate to those leaders. Shia jurists have tended to stick to one of three approaches to the state: cooperating with it, becoming active in politics to influence its policies, or most commonly, remaining aloof from it.[10]

For some years, Khomeini opted for the second of these three, believing Islam should encompass all aspects of life, especially the state, and disapproving of Iran's weak Qajar dynasty (1789–1925), the western concepts and language borrowed in the 1906 constitution, and especially the authoritarian secularism and modernization of the Pahlavi Shahs who ruled for many decades starting in 1925. Precedents for this approach included the theory of "co-working with the just sultan" put forward by Sayyed Murtaza during the Buyid era in his work Al-Resala Al-Amal Ma'a Sultan about 1000 years ago, an idea that was developed further by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Clerical political influence was institutionalized during the Safavid Empire about 500 years ago. In modern times the Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi intervened against Nasir al-Din Shah when that Qajar monarch gave a 50-year monopoly over the distribution and exportation of tobacco to a foreign non-Muslim. Shirazi issued the famous fatwa against the usage of tobacco as part of the Tobacco Protest.

In 1970, Khomeini broke from this tradition developing a fourth approach to the state, a revolutionary change in Shia Islam proclaiming that monarchy was inherently unjust, and that religious legal scholars should not just become involved in politics but rule. During this phase, the Egyptian Jihadist ideologue Sayyid Qutb was an important source of influence to Khomeini and the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

### Origin of the term

"Khomeinism" was perhaps first used[note 1] as the title of a book by Ervand Abrahamian (Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, 1993), where Abrahamian argued that it was more useful to think of Khomeini as a populist in the same vein as South American caudillos, than as the "fundamentalist" or traditionalist he was often described as in the West.[12] It is also the title of an unsympathetic report on Khomeini's ideology from a group called "Counter Extremism Project", which emphasized Khomeini's "controversial interpretation" of Shi'ism, his "rejection of Western interference and influence" in the Muslim world, authoritarian rule in Iran, his successors' support for allied militias in Lebanon, Iraq, etc.[11] and is used in the title of a chapter by Mojtaba Mahdavi in a 2014 Cambridge University Press book (A Critical Introduction to Khomeini),[13] which describes "five distinct stages" in the evolution of Khomeini's thought "beginning with political quietism and concluding with political absolutism". [note 2] The title of a PhD. thesis by Mohammad Rezaie Yazdi (Khomeinism, the Islamic Revolution and Anti Americanism), where Yazdi "attempts to show how the Ayatullah" emphasized a clash between the United States and "Iranian national freedom and religious pride"[14]

## Tenets

At least one scholar (Ervand Abrahamian) has argued that Khomeini's "decrees, sermons, interviews, and political pronouncements" have outlasted his theological works because it is the former and not the latter that the Islamic Republic of Iran "constantly reprints." Without the decrees, sermons, interviews, and political pronouncements "there would have been no Khomeinism [ideology]. Without Khomeinism there would have been no revolution. And without the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini would have been no more than a footnote to Iranian history."[15]

### Improvisational ability

Outside of his doctrinal beliefs, Khomeini has also been noted for being a "brilliant tactician,"[16] with a great "ability to improvise."

> Khomeini once protested the shah's enfranchisement of women, and then encouraged women to participate in his revolution and vote for his government when he needed their numbers. He once promised that clerics would hold only temporary positions in government and then allowed them to hold the most senior positions. He pledged to continue the war against Iraq until its defeat and then abruptly made peace. He once said that the fact that "I have said something does not mean that I should be bound by my word." Indeed, it is that suppleness, that ability to improvise that has outlived Khomeini and that continues to pervade the Islamic Republic, keeping it going.[17]

At least one scholar has argued that Khomeini's ability to swing from one "religiopolitical ... perspective to another" has been exploited by followers to advance their various and competing agendas. In particular reformists such as Muhammad Khatami in search of more democracy and less theocracy.[18] Another argues that Khomeini's "ideological adaptability" belie the "label of fundamentalist" applied to him in both the West and in Iran.[19]

### Governance

#### Rulers

As to how jurists should influence governance, Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership changed direction over time as his views on governance evolved. On who should rule and what should be the ultimate authority in governance:

* Khomeini originally accepted traditional Shia political theory, writing in "Kashf-e Asrar" that, "We do not say that government must be in the hands of" an Islamic jurist, "rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's law ... "[20] suggesting a parliament of Shi'a jurists could choose a just king. ( امام خمينى، كشف الاسرار: ۱۸۷ – ص ۱۸۵)[21]
* Later he told his followers that "Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid."[22] Only rule by a leading Islamic jurist (velayat-e faqih) [23] would prevent "innovation" in Sharia or Islamic law and ensure it was properly followed. The need for this governance of the faqih was "necessary and self-evident" to good Muslims.
* Once in power and recognizing the need for more flexibility, he finally insisted the ruling jurist need not be one of the most learned, that Sharia rule was subordinate to interests of Islam (Maslaha – `expedient interests` or `public welfare`),[24] and the "divine government" as interpreted by the ruling jurists, who could overrule Sharia if necessary to serve those interests. The Islamic "government, which is a branch of the absolute governance of the Prophet of God, is among the primary ordinances of Islam, and has precedence over all secondary ordinances such as prayer (salat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj)."[6][25]

#### Machinery of government

While Khomeini was keenly focused on the ulama's right to rule and the state's "moral and ideological foundation", he did not dwell on the state's actually functioning or the "particulars" of its management. According to some scholars (Gheissari and Nasr) Khomeini never "put forward a systematic definition of the Islamic state and Islamic economics; ... never described its machinery of government, instruments of control, social function, economic processes, or guiding values and principles."[26] In his plan for Islamic Government by Islamic Jurists he wrote: "The entire system of government and administration, together with necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. ... Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw up ministerial programs ..."[27]

### Sharia (Islamic law)

In his manifest Islamic Government, Khomeini emphasized the wonder and preciousness of sharia, divine law.

> God, Exalted and Almighty, by means of the Most Noble Messenger (peace and blessing be upon him), sent laws that astound us with their magnitude. He instituted laws and practices for all human affairs ... There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm. [But] ... foreign agents have constantly insinuated that Islam has nothing to offer, that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition ...[28]

and how being divine, no human should ever attempt to change it.

> ... in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. ... No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator ... The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government.` [29]

However, at least one scholar notes a number of ways that Khomeini made sharia (or at least the sharia of Usuli Shi'ism) "subordinate to the revolution".[30]

* traditionally the fatwa pronounced by a grand ayatollah ceased to be in effect when the ayatollah died. Khomeini affirmed fatwa, such as his fatwa calling for the killing of Salman Rushdie, could remain valid.[30]
* Khomeini defrocked a grand ayatollah (Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari) and "promoted clerics as a function of their political allegiance and not their religious rank".[30]

### Mahdism

Khomeini's insistence on a religious state governed by select members of Shia clergy was closely linked to his reformulation of Twelver Shi'ite messianic beliefs on Mahdism. Traditional Twelver Shi'ite belief held that during the occultation of the twelfth Imam when injustice reigned, Muslims should remain aloof from the corruption of politics and wait patiently for the re-emergence of al-Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam. Fundamentally countermanding this tenet, Khomeini asserted that Shias should "prepare for Mahdi’s global revolution" by establishing a religious state. Such a government would be headed by an oligarchy of Shiite clerics, who would rule (Khomeini believed) on behalf of the 12th Imam. This millenarian belief became the core rationale behind the system of Velayat-e-Faqih (guardianship of the jurist).[7][31][32]

Khomeini's ideas on Mahdism would be further developed after his death; most notably by his successor Ali Khamenei and the principalist cleric Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. Yazdi called for cultivating a generation based on Mahdist ideology and values. Building on Khomeni's ideas, Ali Khamenei demarcated five stages as part of the millenarian framework: "an Islamic Revolution, an Islamic regime, an Islamic government, an Islamic society, and an Islamic civilization." The doctrine of Mahdism is taught in Islamist seminaries and it is also a core ideological hallmark of the Basij and the IRGC institutions. Since the emergence of the 2009 Green movement, a "cult of Mahdism" has been heavily promoted by the IRGC and state-backed clergy in an attempt to deter the youth from embracing secular ideas; and it is strongly tied to the inner circle of Ali Khamenei. Mohammadi Golpayegani, chief staff of the Office of Supreme Leader backed the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, claiming that it was a “prelude to the reappearance" of 12th Imam.[7][33][34]

### Conspiracy theories

A major aspect of Khomeini's psyche throughout his political career was the ever-present belief in the existence of plots and conspiracies which were being fomented by foreigners and their Iranian agents against Islam and Muslims. Abrahamian argues that this belief, shared among adherents of most political persuasions in Iran to varying degrees, can be explained by the domination of Iran's politics by foreign powers for the past 200 years until the Islamic revolution, first by Russia and Britain, later by the United States. Foreign agents were involved in all of Iran's three military coups: 1908 [Russian], 1921[British] and 1953 [UK and US].[35]

In his series of speeches in which he argued that Islamic jurists should rule the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, Khomeini explained theocratic rule was essential because (he believed) it was the only form of government that protect the Muslim world from the conspiracies of colonialists who were responsible for

> the decline of Muslim civilization, the conservative `distortions` of Islam, and the divisions between nation-states, between Sunnis and Shiis, and between oppressors and oppressed. He argued that the colonial powers had for years sent Orientalists into the East to misinterpret Islam and the Koran and that the colonial powers had conspired to undermine Islam both with religious quietism and with secular ideologies, especially socialism, liberalism, monarchism, and nationalism.[36]

He claimed that Britain had instigated the 1905 Constitutional Revolution to subvert Islam: "The Iranians who drafted the constitutional laws were receiving instructions directly from their British masters.`"

Khomeini also held the West responsible for a host of contemporary problems. He charged that colonial conspiracies kept the country poor and backward, exploited its resources, inflamed class antagonism, divided the clergy and alienated them from the masses, caused mischief among the tribes, infiltrated the universities, cultivated consumer instincts, and encouraged moral corruption, especially gambling, prostitution, drug addiction, and alcohol consumption.[36]

At least one scholar (Ervand Abrahamian) sees "far-reaching consequences" in legacy of belief in ever-present conspiracy. If conspiracy dominates political action then

> "those with views different from one's own were members of this or that foreign conspiracy. Thus political activists tended to equate competition with treason, ... One does not compromise and negotiate with spies and traitors; one locks them up or else shoots them. ... The result was detrimental for the development of political pluralism in Iran. ... Differences of opinion within organizations could not be accommodated; it was all too easy for leaders to expel dissidents as 'foreign agents'.[37]

Abrahamian believes that what he calls this "paranoid style" paved the way for the mass executions of 1981–82, where "never before in Iran had firing squads executed so many in so short a time over so flimsy an accusation."[38]

### Populism

Another way Khomeini's views changed direction over time was concerning political populism and relations between social classes. While before 1970 Khomeini had had the conventional traditional "paternalistic" religious views on class. Since "God had created both private property and society, society should be formed of a hierarchy of mutually dependent strata (qeshreha)." The poor should not be envious of the rich, and the rich should be grateful to God, avoid any displays of wealth and make generous charitable contributions to the poor.[39] This changed markedly after 1970 when his political movement began to gain momentum. In his writings,

> Khomeini depicted society as sharply divided into two warring classes (tabaqat): the mostazafin (oppressed) against the mostakberin (oppressors); the foqara (poor) against the sarvatmandan (rich); the mellat-e mostazaf (oppressed nation) against hokumat-e shaytan (Satan's government); the zagheh-neshinha (slum dwellers) against the kakh-neshinha (palace dweller); the tabaqeh-e payin (lower class) against the tabaqeh-e bala (upper class); and tabaqeh-e mostamdan (needy class) against the tabaqeh-e a'yan (aristocratic class). In the past, such imagery would have been used by secular leftists rather than by clerical leaders."[39]

At least one scholar (Ervand Abrahamian) argues that while these and other points demonstrate Khomeini "came to power by openly exploiting class antagonisms",[40] at the same time "careful scrutiny" of his writing during this time show him to have been "remarkably vague" on the specifics of how he planned to help the poor -- "especially on the question of private property".[41]

In this way, Abrahamian argues, Khomeini's "ideas, and his movement" despite being Islamic, bear a striking resemblance to populist movements in other countries—particularly those of South America such as Juan Perón and Getúlio Vargas. Like them, Khomeini led a "radical but pragmatic" protest movement "against the established order". The movement was not of the working class and poor, but of the "propertied middle class". "The lower classes, especially the urban poor" were not so much served by his movement as mobilized by Khomeini.[42] These movements attacked "the upper class and foreign powers," but not property rights. They preaching "a return to `native roots` and eradication of `cosmopolitan ideas.`[43] It claimed "a noncapitalist, noncommunist `third way` towards development," [43] but was intellectually "flexible",[44] emphasizing "cultural, national, and political reconstruction," not economic and social revolution."[42]

Like those movements it celebrated the oppressed poor and gave them a label --"mostazafin by Khomeini, descamisados (coatless ones) by Peron, trabalhadores by Vargas. But the actual power flowed from its leader, who was "elevated ... into a demigod towering above the people and embodying their historical roots, future destiny, and revolutionary martyrs."[43]}}

### Democracy

Whether Khomeini's ideas are compatible with democracy and whether he intended the Islamic Republic to be democratic is disputed. Notable Iranians who believe he did not, include Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi (a senior cleric and main theorist of Iranian ultraconservatives who opposes democracy), Akbar Ganji (a pro-democracy activist and writer who is against Islamic government) and Abdolkarim Soroush (an Iranian philosopher in exile), according to Reza Parsa writing in the state-run Aftab News.[45] Other followers of Khomeini who maintain he did support democracy and that the Islamic Republic is democratic include Ali Khamenei,[46] Mohammad Khatami and Morteza Motahhari.[47][48]

Khomeini preached for theocratic rule by jurists to his followers, but not to the public. He made statements before the revolution indicating support for "democracy", but opposition to it once in power.[49] During a pre-revolutionary meeting with Karin Samjabi in Paris in November 1978, claiming that the future government of Iran would be `democratic and Islamic`.[50] But also told a huge crowd of Iranians a month after his return to Iran, "Do not use this term, `democratic.` That is the Western style,`" [51]

One explanation for this change of position is that Khomeini needed the support of the pro-democracy educated middle class to take power.[52] Supporters maintain Khomeini simply had another definition of "democracy" than is commonly meant by the term. According to scholar Shaul Bakhash, when Khomeini told others he wanted Iran to be democratic, it's highly unlikely he meant "Western parliamentary democracy".[note 3]

In drawing up the constitution of his Islamic Republic, he and his supporters agreed to include Western-democratic elements, such as an elected parliament and president, but some argue he believed Islamic elements, not Western-style elected parliaments and presidents, should prevail in government.[55] After the ratifying of the Islamic constitution he told an interviewer that the constitution in no way contradicted democracy because the `people love the clergy, have faith in the clergy, and want to be guided by the clergy` and that it was right that Supreme Leader oversee the work of the non-clerical officials `to make sure they don't make mistakes or go against the law and the Quran.' [56]

As the revolution was consolidated, terms like "democracy" and "liberalism" – considered praiseworthy in the West – became words of criticism, while "revolution" and "revolutionary" were terms of praise.[57]

According to Khomeini, proponents of "democracy" as well as "Islamic democracy" are misguided. He stated in a 1980 interview:

> "But as for ‘democratic,’ we won’t accept it even if you put it next to ‘Islamic.’ Even apart from this, as I said in an earlier talk, to juxtapose “democratic” and “Islamic” is an insult to Islam.[58]

Still another scholar, non-Iranian Daniel Brumberg, argues that Khomeini's statements on politics were simply not "straightforward, coherent, or consistent," and that in particular he contradicted his writings and statements on the primacy of the rule of the jurist with repeated statements on the importance of the leading role of the parliament, such as `the Majlis heads all affairs`,[59] and `the majlis is higher than all the positions which exist in the country.`[60] This, according to Brumberg, has created a legacy where his followers "exploited these competing notions of authority" to advance "various agendas of their own." Reformist seizing on his statements about the importance of majlis, and theocrats on those of rule by the clergy.

Over the decades since the revolution, Iran has not evolved towards a more liberal representative democratic system as some reformists and democrats had predicted, nor has theocratic rule of Islamic jurists spread to other countries as its founder had hoped.

### Third World

According to at least one observer (Olivier Roy), from the overthrow of the shah until the death of Khomeini in 1989,

> sympathy for the third world was a constant ... The Iranian press during [this period] devoted extensive coverage to non-Muslim revolutionary movements (from the Sandinistas to the African National Congress and the Irish Republican Army) and downplayed the role of Islamic movements considered conservative such as the Afghan mujahideen. During this period third world solidarity took precedence over Muslim fraternity in an utter departure from all other Islamic movements.[61]

### Human rights

Before taking power, Khomeini expressed support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "We would like to act according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We would like to be free. We would like independence," he stated.[62] However once in power Khomeini took a firm line against dissent, warning opponents of theocracy for example: "I repeat for the last time: abstain from holding meetings, from blathering, from publishing protests. Otherwise I will break your teeth."[63] Khomeini believed that since Islamic government was essential for Islam, what threatened the government threatened Islam.

> Since God Almighty has commanded us to follow the Messenger and the holders of authority, our obeying them is actually an expression of obedience to God.[64][65]

Iran adopted an alternative human rights declaration, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in 1990 (one year after Khomeini's death), which differs from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, requiring law to be in accordance with Sharia,[66] denying complete equality with men for women, and forbidding speech that violates the "dignity of Prophets", or "undermines moral and ethical values."

One observer, Iranian political historian Ervand Abrahamian, believes that some of the more well-known violations of international human rights initiated by Khomeini—the fatwa to kill British-citizen author Salman Rushdie and the mass executions of leftist political prisoners in 1988—can be explained best as a legacy for his followers. Abrahamian argues Khomeini wanted to "forge unity" among "his disparate followers", "raise formidable – if not insurmountable – obstacles in the way of any future leader hoping to initiate a detente with the West," and most importantly to "weed out the half-hearted from the true believers",[67] such as heir-designate Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri who protested the killings and was dismissed from his position.[68]

### Economics

In the realm of economics, Khomeini was known both for his lack of interest and conflicting views on the subject.[69]

He famously replied to a question before the revolution about how the Islamic Republic would manage Iran's economy by saying economics was "for donkeys"[70] (also translated as "for fools"[71]), and expressed impatience with those who complained about the inflation and shortages following the revolution saying: "I cannot believe that the purpose of all these sacrifices was to have less expensive melons."[72] His lack of attention has been described as "possibly one factor explaining the inchoate performance of the Iranian economy since the 1979 revolution," (along with the mismanagement by clerics trained in Islamic law but not economic science).[73]

Khomeini has also been described as being "quite genuinely of two minds",[69] and of having "ambiguous and contradictory attitudes" on the role of the state in the economy.[43] He agreed with conservative clerics and the bazaar (traditional merchant class) on the importance of strict sharia law and respect for the sanctity of private property, but also made populist promises such as free water and electricity and government-provided homes for the poor, which could only be provided, if at all, by massive government intervention in the economy in violation of traditional Shariah law.[69] While Khomeini was alive the conflict attitudes were represented in the clash between the populists of the Parliament and the conservatives of the Guardian Council.[74]

After his death until 1997, the "bazaari side" of the legacy predominated with the regime of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, emphasized `reconstruction,` `realism,` `work discipline,` `managerial skills,` `modern technology,` `expertise and competence,` `individual self-reliance,` `entrepreneurship,` and `stability.`" [75]

The populist side of Khomeini's economic legacy is said to be found in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who allegedly "mirrored" Khomeini's disdain for the "donkey" science of economics, wearing "his contempt for economic orthodoxy as a badge of honour", and overseeing sluggish growth and rising inflation and unemployment under his administration.[76]

Khomeini strongly opposed Marxism. `Atheistic Marxists` were the one group he excluded from the broad coalition of anti-Shah groups he worked to rally behind his leadership.[77] In his last will and testament, he urged future generations to respect property on the grounds that free enterprise turns the `wheels of the economy` and prosperity would produce `social justice` for all, including the poor.

> Islam differs sharply from communism. Whereas we respect private property, communism advocates the sharing of all things – including wives and homosexuals.[78][79]

What one scholar (Ervand Abrahamian) has called the populist thrust of Khomeini can be found in the fact that after the revolution, revolutionary tribunals expropriated "agribusinesses, large factories, and luxury homes belonging to the former elite," but were careful to avoid "challenging the concept of private property."[80]

On the other hand, Khomeini's revolutionary movement was influenced by Islamic leftist and thinker Ali Shariati, and the leftist currents of the 1960s and 1970s. Khomeini proclaimed Islam on the side of the mustazafin and against exploiters and imperialists.[81] In part for this reason, a large section of Iran's economy was nationalized during the revolution.[82] At least as of 2003, Iran's public sector and government workforce remains very large. Despite complaints by free marketeers, "about 60% of the economy is directly controlled and centrally planned by the state, and another 10–20% is in the hands of five semi-governmental foundations, who control much of the non-oil economy and are accountable to no one except the supreme leader."[83]

### Women in politics

In October 1962 when the shah introduced a plan to (among other things) let women vote for the first time, Khomeini (and other religious people) were enraged: `The son of Reza Khan has embarked on the destruction of Islam in Iran. I will oppose this as long as the blood circulates in my veins.`" Religious Muslims fought the bill and the shah backed down.[84] Historian Ervand Abrahamian also states that Khomeini had argued "for years that women's suffrage was unIslamic."[85]

However, in the late 1970s, before the Revolution, Khomeini changed his stance:

> In an Islamic order, women enjoy the same rights as men – rights to education, work, ownership, to vote in elections and to be voted in. Women are free, just like men to decide their own destinies and activities.[86][87][88]: 152

After the Revolution, Khomeini opposed allowing women to serve in parliament, likening it to prostitution.

> We are against this prostitution. We object to such wrongdoings ... Is progress achieved by sending women to the majlis? Sending women to these centers is nothing but corruption.[89][90][88]: 151

### Religious philosophy, fiqh, teachings

Khomeini made a number of changes to Shia clerical system. Along with his January 1989 ruling that sharia was subordinate to the revolution, he affirmed against tradition that the fatwa pronounced by a grand ayatollah survived that ayatollah (such as the fatwa to kill Salman Rushdie), and defrocked Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari,[91] a political opponent.

#### Fiqh

In Fiqh, (Islamic jurisprudence) some scholars have argued Khomeini championed innovative reinterpretations of doctrine, prompted by the challenges of managing a country of 50 million plus.

* Use of Maslaha, or maslahat (`expedient interests` or `public welfare`). This was a common concept among Sunni, but "before the 1979 revolution most" Shi'ite jurists had "rejected maslahat as a dangerous innovation (Bid‘ah)."[92]
* Wider use of "secondary ordinances". Clerics had traditionally argued that the government could issue these "when addressing a narrow range of contractual issues not directly addressed in the Qur'an." Khomeini called for their use to deal with the deadlock between the Majles and the Council of Guardians[93]

#### Esmat

Esmat is perfection through faith. Khomeini believed not only that truly just and divine Islamic government need not wait for the return of the 12th Imam/Mahdi, but that "divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin" (esmat) was not the exclusive property of the prophets and imams. Esmat required "nothing other than perfect faith"[94] and could be achieved by a Muslim who reaches that state. Hamid Dabashi argues Khomeini's theory of Esmat from faith helped "to secure the all-important attribute of infallibility for himself as a member of the awlia' [friend of God] by eliminating the simultaneous theological and Imamological problems of violating the immanent expectation of the Mahdi."[95] Thus by "securing" this "attribute of infallibility for himself", Khomeini reassured Shia Muslims who might otherwise be hesitant about granting him the same ruling authority due the 12 Imams.

#### The Prophets

Khomeini believed the Prophets have not yet achieved their "purpose". In November 1985 he told radio listeners, "I should say that so far the purpose of the Prophets has seldom been realized. Very little." Aware of the controversial nature of the statement he warned more conservative clerics that "tomorrow court mullahs . . . [should] not say that Khomeini said that the Prophet is incapable of achieving his aims."[96] He also controversially stated that Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad, was superior in status to the prophets of God.[97]

Khomeini's authority and charismatic personality prevented less popular jurists from protesting these changes as un-Islamic Bid‘ah.

### Istishhad

Perhaps the most significant legacy of Khomeini internationally is a broader definition of martyrdom to include Istishhad, or "self-martyrdom".[98] Khomeini believed martyrdom could come not only from "inadvertent" death but "deliberate" as well. While martyrdom has always been celebrated in Islam and martyrs promised a place in heaven, (Q3:169–171) the idea that opportunities for martyrdom were important has not always been so common. Writing in 2006, Vali Nasr states that "until fairly recently" willingness to die for the cause" (with suicide bombing or other means) was seen as a "predominantly Shia phenomenon, tied to the myths of Karbala and the Twelfth Imam",[99] though it has since spread to Sunni Islam.

#### Iran–Iraq War

Khomeini not only praised the large numbers of young Shia Iranians who became "shahids" during the Iran–Iraq War but asserted the war was "God's hidden gift",[100] or as one scholar of Khomeini put it, "a vital outlet through which Iran's young martyrs experienced mystical transcendence."[101] Khomeini explained:

> "If the great martyr (Imam Husayn ibn Ali) ... confined himself to praying ... the great tragedy of Kabala would not have come about ... Among the contemporary ulema, if the great Ayatollah ... Shirazi ... thought like these people [who do not fight for Islam], a war would not have taken place in Iraq ... all those Muslims would not have been martyred."[102]

Death might seem like a tragedy to some but in reality ...

> If you have any tie or link binding you to this world in love, try to sever it. This world, despite all its apparent splendor and charm, is too worthless to be loved[103]

Khomeini never wavered from his faith in the war as God's will, and observers have related a number of examples of his impatience with those who tried to convince him to stop it. When the war seemed to become a stalemate with hundreds of thousands killed and civilian areas being attacked by missiles, Khomeini was approached by Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, a grand ayatollah and former student with family ties to Khomeini. He pleaded with Khomeini to find a way to stop the killing saying, "it is not right for Muslims to kill Muslims." Khomeini answered reproachfully, asking him, "Do you also criticize God when he sends an earthquake?"[104] On another occasion Khomeini showed his distain for a delegation of Muslim heads of state who had come to Tehran to offer to mediate an end to the war by keeping them waiting for two hours, and speaking to them for only ten minutes without providing a translator before getting up and leaving.[105]

Vali Nasr writes that necessity may have been a motivator for use of martyrdom by "hundreds of thousands of volunteers" at least early on in the war when many of the "most seasoned officers" in Iran's military had been purged and the hostage crisis "left Iran internationally isolated" and "conventional means of repelling the Iraqi invasion were hard to come by."[106]

#### Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq

While suicide bombings did not win the Iran–Iraq War for Iran, it did spread to Lebanon, where it won victories for the Iraqi Islamic Da'wa party, Shia 'allies' of the Islamic Revolution there. The 1983 bombings against U.S. and French peacekeeping troops by Hizballah killed over 300 and drove the US and French from Lebanon. Another longer bombing campaign did likewise to the Israeli army. Khomeini is credited by some with inspiring these "suicide bombers".[107]

The power of suicide operations as a military tactic has been described by Shia Lebanese as an equalizer where faith and piety are used to counter superior military power of the Western unbeliever:

> You look at it with a Western mentality. You regard it as barbaric and unjustified. We, on the other hand, see it as another means of war, but one which is also harmonious with our religion and beliefs. Take for example, an Israeli warplane or, better still, the American and British air power in the Gulf War. .... The goal of their mission and the outcome of their deeds was to kill and damage enemy positions just like us ... The only difference is that they had at their disposal state-of-the-art and top-of-the-range means and weaponry to achieve their aims. We have the minimum basics ... We ... do not seek material rewards, but heavenly one in the hereafter.[108]

The victory of Hezbollah is known to have inspired Hamas in Palestine,[109] and al-Qaeda in its worldwide bombing campaign.[110] In the years after Khomeini's death, "Martyrdom operations" or "suicide bombing" have spread beyond Shia Islam and beyond attacks on military and are now a major force in the Muslim world.[111] According to one estimate, as of early 2008, 1,121 Muslim suicide bombers have blown themselves up in Iraq alone.[112]

Ironically and tragically, by the early twenty first century, thousands of Muslims, particularly Shia, have become victims, not just initiators, of martyrdom operations.[113] In the Iraq civil war, Salafi Jihadi ideologue Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi declared "all-out war" on Shia Muslims in Iraq in 2005 in response to a US-Iraqi offensive on the town of Tal Afar.[114] Sunni suicide bombers targeted not only thousands of civilians,[115] but mosques, shrines,[116] wedding and funeral processions,[117] markets, hospitals, offices, and streets.[118]

From at least 2003 to 2006 attacks were "mostly" by Sunnis against Shia,[119] and "by 2007 some of the Shia ulema have responded by declaring suicide bombing haram:

> "حتي كساني كه با انتحار مي‌آيند و مي‌زنند عده‌اي را مي‌كشند، آن هم به عنوان عمليات انتحاري، اينها در قعر جهنم هستند"
> "Even those who kill people with suicide bombing, these shall meet the flames of hell."[120][121]

### Shia rituals

Khomeini showed little interest in the rituals of Shia Islam such as the Day of Ashura. Unlike earlier Iranian shahs or the Awadh's nawabs, he never presided over any Ashura observances, nor visited the enormously popular shrine of the eighth Imam in Mashad. This discouraging of popular Shia piety and Shia traditions by Khomeini and his core supporters has been explained by at least one observer as a product of their belief that Islam was first and foremost about Islamic law,[122] and that the revolution itself was of "equal significance" to Battle of Karbala where the Imam Husayn was martyred.[123]

This legacy is reflected in the surprise sometimes shown by foreign Shia hosts in Pakistan and elsewhere when visiting Iranian officials, such as Faezeh Rafsanjani, show their disdain for Shia shrines.[122] And perhaps also in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's May 2005 statement that "the Iranian revolution was of the same `essence` as Imam Husayn's movement."[123]

### Mystique

Foreign and domestically targeted Iranian publications celebrated Khomeini,[124] others compared his personality cult to such figures as Joseph Stalin , Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro.[125][126][127] But Khomeini was not just the subject of a personality cult, he became "transformed into a semi-divine figure", according to biographer Baqer Moin.

Vali Nasr writes of "the messianic symbols and language" used Khomeini's network/followers to "give him an aura of power". Khomeini was the first and only Iranian cleric to be addressed as "Imam", a title hitherto reserved in Iran for the twelve infallible leaders of the early Shi'a.[128] He was also associated with the Mahdi or 12th Imam of Shia belief in a number of ways. One of his titles was Na'eb-e Imam (Deputy to the Twelfth Imam). His enemies were often attacked as taghut and Mofsed-e-filarz, religious terms used for enemies of the Twelfth Imam. Many of the officials of the overthrown Shah's government executed by Revolutionary Courts were convicted of "fighting against the Twelfth Imam"—implying that the revolution was the promised return of the Twelfth Imam".[129] An allegedly eight-century Hadith attributed to the Imam Musa al-Kazim was repeated in Iran as a tribute to Khomeini: "A man will come out from Qom and he will summon people to the right path. There will rally to him people resembling pieces of iron, not to be shaken by violent winds, unsparing and relying on God".[130]

> On one occasion a parliamentary deputy asked him if he was the 'promised Mahdi.' Khomeini di not answer. Fearing that Khomeini had not heard, the MP repeated the question. Khomeini still did not answer, astutely neither claiming nor denying that he was the Twelfth Imam.[129]

As the revolution gained momentum, the awe exhibited towards Khomeini spread to some non-supporters, one of which called him "magnificently clear-minded, single-minded and unswerving."[131] His image was as "absolute, wise, and indispensable leader of the nation":[132]

> The Imam, it was generally believed, had shown by his uncanny sweep to power, that he knew how to act in ways which others could not begin to understand. His timing was extraordinary, and his insight into the motivation of others, those around him as well as his enemies, could not be explained as ordinary knowledge. This emergent belief in Khomeini as a divinely guided figure was carefully fostered by the clerics who supported him and spoke up for him in front of the people.[133]

Even many secularists opponents were said to feel the power of his "messianic" appeal.[134] Comparing him to a father figure who retains the enduring loyalty even of children he disapproves of, journalist Afshin Molavi writes that defenses of Khomeini are "heard in the most unlikely settings":

> A whiskey-drinking professor told an American journalist that Khomeini brought pride back to Iranians. A women's rights activist told me that Khomeini was not the problem; it was his conservative allies who had directed him wrongly. A nationalist war veteran, who held Iran's ruling clerics in contempt, carried with him a picture of 'the Imam'.[135]

His mausoleum is said (by Vali Nasr) to have been modeled (by his successors) after the shrine of the Imam Reza in Mashhad, and visitors "actively encouraged to perform rituals usually reserved for visits to an imam's final resting place".[136]

### Sternness and austerity

Companions and followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini have many stories of his disinterest in his personal wealth and comfort and concern for others.[137][138]

While the Imam was sometimes flexible over doctrine, changing positions on divorce, music, birth control,[139] he was much less accommodating with those he believed to be the enemies of Islam. Khomeini emphasized not only righteous militancy and rage but hatred,

> And I am confident that the Iranian people, particularly our youth, will keep alive in their hearts anger and hatred for the criminal Soviet Union and the warmongering United States. This must be until the banner of Islam flies over every house in the world.[140]

Salman Rushdie's apology for his book (following Khomeini's fatwa to kill the author) was rejected by Khomeini, who told Muslims: "Even if Salman Rushdie repents and becomes the most pious man of all time, it is incumbent on every Muslim to employ everything he has got, his life and wealth, to send him to Hell."[141][142]

Khomeini attributed some of his reversals to advisers he claimed had persuaded him to make unwise decisions against his better judgment, appointing people to posts who he later denounced. "I swear to God that I was against appointing Medi Bazargan as the first prime minister, too, but I considered him to be a decent person. I also swear to God that I did not vote for Bani Sadr to become president either. On all these occasions I submitted to the advice of my friends."[143] Before being revised in April 1989,[144] the Iranian constitution called for the supreme leader to be a leading cleric (Marja), something Khomeini says he opposed "since from the very beginning."[145] Others have suggested that Khomeini's refusal to admit to any error came from his belief that as an infallible error was impossible.[citation needed]

He also preached of Islam's essentially serious nature:

> Allah did not create man so that he could have fun. The aim of creation was for mankind to be put to the test through hardship and prayer. An Islamic regime must be serious in every field. There are no jokes in Islam. There is no humor in Islam. There is no fun in Islam. There can be no fun and joy in whatever is serious. Islam does not allow swimming in the sea and is opposed to radio and television serials. Islam, however, allows marksmanship, horseback riding and competition ...[146]

and the all-encompassing nature of Islam, and thus of its law and its government,

> Islam and divine governments ... have commandments for everybody, everywhere, at any place, in any condition. If a person were to commit an immoral dirty deed right next to his house, Islamic governments have business with him. .... Islam has rules for every person, even before birth, before his marriage, until his marriages, pregnancy, birth, until upbringing of the child, the education of the adult, until puberty, youth, until old age, until death, into the grave, and beyond the grave.[147]

### Mysticism

A number of writers have mentioned the importance of mysticism in the thinking of Khomeini.[148][149][150][151][152] According to scholar Vali Nasr, Khomeini's "politics and religious views reflected not so Shia history and theology (indeed, he was something of a theological innovator and maverick) as the authority that he claimed by virtue of his understanding of mystical doctrines. His was a new Shiism, interpreted by someone who claimed direct knowledge of the Truth."[153]

## International tenents

### Spread of Islam

Khomeini strongly supported the spread of Islam throughout the world. In one of his speeches, Khomeini declared:

> We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no god but Allah' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.[154][155][156][88]: 66

Spreading of Islam would not exclude warfare.

> Once we have won the war [with Iraq], we shall turn to other wars. For that would not be enough. We have to wage war until all corruption, all disobedience of Islamic law ceases [throughout the world]. The Quran commands: “War! War until victory!” A religion without war is a crippled religion... Allah be praised, our young warriors are putting this command into effect and fighting. They know that to kill the infidels is one of the noblest missions Allah has reserved for mankind.[157][158][159]: 43

Not just as a faith but as a state.

> Establishing the Islamic state world-wide belong to the great goals of the revolution.[160][161]

Which he believed would replace both capitalism and communism

> ... `We have often proclaimed this truth in our domestic and foreign policy, namely that we have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam and the suppression of the rule of the world conquerors ... We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet ... in the world of arrogance.[162][163][164][165]

Khomeini held these views both prior to and following the revolution. The following was published in 1942 and republished during his years as supreme leader:

> Jihad or Holy War, which is for the conquest of [other] countries and kingdoms, becomes incumbent after the formation of the Islamic state in the presence of the Imam or in accordance with his command. Then Islam makes it incumbent on all adult males, provided they are not disabled and incapacitated, to prepare themselves for the conquest of [other] countries so that the writ of Islam is obeyed in every country in the world... those who study Islamic Holy War will understand why Islam wants to conquer the whole world. All the countries conquered by Islam or to be conquered in the future will be marked for everlasting salvation... Islam says: Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to Paradise, which can be opened only for Holy Warriors! There are hundreds of other [Qur'anic] psalms and Hadiths [sayings of the Prophet] urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all that mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim.[166][167][168][169][159]: 43

Some scholars compared his ideas on using revolution to bring worldwide Islamic rule, to those of Bolshevik revolutionaries. Khomeini saw his revolution as Islamic, not Shia and the Islamic Republic as "the base for a global Islamic movement" led by him, according to Vali Nasr, "in much the same way that Lenin and Trotsky had seen Russia as the springboard country of what was meant to be a global communist revolution." Olivier Roy writes that Khomeini did "extoll" Shiism and see a special role for the Shi'a, but not one of privilege. He thought of Shia, "the way Marx thought of the proletariat: a particular group that brings about the emancipation of all humanity," by leading a revolution to form a new world order.[170]

### Unity of the Ummah

Further information: Religion:Anti-Sunnism

Khomeini made efforts to establish unity among Ummah and "bridge the gap between Shiites and Sunnis", especially during the early days of the Revolution,[171] according to at least Vali Nasr because "he wanted to be accepted as the leader of the Muslim world, period".[172] One way to do this was to focus on issues that united Muslims — anti-Imperialism, anti-Zionism, anti-Americanism, and "the battle against outsiders" — rather than "religious questions that were likely to divide them".[172] He forbade Shia to criticize the Caliphs that preceded Ali (who Shia believe should not have been chosen instead of Ali), and "declared it permissible for Shiites to pray behind Sunni imams."[171][173][174] He supported "Islamic Unity week"[175] (which includes the day when Sunnis believe the prophet Muhammad was born -- 12 Rabi' al-Awwal -- and the day most Shia believe he was -- 17 Rabi' al-Awwal), and International Day of Quds.[176]

Shortly before he died, the famous South Asian Islamist Abul Ala Maududi paid Khomeini the compliment of saying he wished he had accomplished what Khomeini had, and that he would have like to have been able to visit Iran to see the revolution for himself.[177]

In Sunni-Shia unity as in many other issues there was a divide between Khomeini's views before and after 1970. In his early treatise "Kashf al Asrar", Khomeini reportedly expressed anti-Sunni views. Abubakr and Umar, companions of Muhammad highly revered by Sunni Muslims, of kufr (disbelief) and of altering the Qur'an. He called them "ignorant fools, hobos and tyrants" unworthy of being Caliphs and also accused the vast majority of the Companions as being party to their alleged "crimes".[178] In addition, Khomeini reportedly alleged that Sunnis had fabricated hadiths for political purposes and that some Sunni scholars were pawns of the Great Satan. Khomeini had portrayed non-Shia schools in general of being submissive to rulers, while Shias always supported revolution against tyrants.[citation needed] Nevertheless, he called upon the Sunni masses to join hands with the Islamic Revolution against "America and Zionism".[179]

According to Sa`id Hawwa in his book al-Khumayniyya, Khomeini's real aim was to spread Shi'ism through the use of such tactics as taqiyya and anti-Zionist rhetoric.[97]

To accomplish the ideological objectives of Khomeinism, Iran began training thousands of Shia militants across the Arab World and eventually outside the Muslim World as well.[180]

Since the death of Khomeini, Iranian leaders have been more sectarian and Sunnis suffer from systemic discrimination.[181]

Also, Khomeini's "Islamic Brotherhood" did not extend to the Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia, whom he vehemently hated and regarded as apostates. Under his leadership the Iranian government cut off all relations with Saudi Arabia. Khomeini even declared that Iran may one day start good diplomatic relations with the US or Iraq but never with Saudi Arabia. Iran did not re-establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia until March 1991, after Khomeini's death.[182]

### Shia revival

The Iranian revolution "awakened" Shia around the world, who outside of Iran were subordinate to Sunnis. Shia "became bolder in their demands of rights and representations", and in some instances Khomeini supported them. In Pakistan , he is reported to have told Pakistan military ruler Zia ul-Haq that he would do to al-Haq "what he had done to the Shah" if al-Haq mistreated Shia.[183] When tens of thousands of Shia protested for exemption from Islamic taxes based on Sunni law, al-Haq conceded to their demands.[184]

Shia Islamist groups that sprang up during the 1980s, often "receiving financial and political support from Tehran" include the Amal Movement of Musa al-Sadr and later the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, Islamic Dawa Party in Iraq, Hizb-e Wahdat in Afghanistan, Tehreek-e-Jafaria in Pakistan, al-Wifaq in Bahrain, and Hezbollah Al-Hejaz and al-Haraka al-Islahiya al-Islamiya in Saudi Arabia. Shia were involved in the 1979–80 riots and demonstrations in oil-rich eastern Saudi Arabia, the 1981 Bahraini coup d'état attempt and the 1983 Kuwait bombings.[185]

### Neither East nor West

Khomeini strongly opposed alliances with, or imitation of, Eastern (communist) and Western Bloc (capitalist) nations.

> ... in our domestic and foreign policy, ... we have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam ... We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet ...[186][163][164][165]

In the Last Message, The Political and Divine Will of His Holiness the Imam Khomeini, there are no less than 21 warnings on the dangers of what the west or east, or of pro-western or pro-eastern agents are either doing, have done or will do to Islam and the rest of the world.[187]

In particular he loathed the United States

> ... the foremost enemy of Islam ... a terrorist state by nature that has set fire to everything everywhere ... oppression of Muslim nations is the work of the USA ...[188]

and its ally Israel

> the international Zionism does not stop short of any crime to achieve its base and greedy desires, crimes that the tongue and pen are ashamed to utter or write.[188]

Khomeini believed that Iran should strive towards self-reliance. Rather siding with one or the other of the world's two blocs (at the time of the revolution), he favored the allying of Muslim states with each other, or rather their union in one state. In his book Islamic Government he hinted governments would soon fall into line if an Islamic government was established.

> If the form of government willed by Islam were to come into being, none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate.[189]

## Western reception

After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, Khomeini's legacy lives on in the Western world. From the beginning of the Iranian Revolution to the time of his death Khomeini's "glowering visage became the virtual face of Islam in Western popular culture" and "inculcated fear and distrust towards Islam."[9] He is said to have made the word "Ayatollah" "a synonym for a dangerous madman ... in popular parlance."[190] His fatwa calling for the death of secular Muslim author Salman Rushdie in particular was seen by some as a deft attempt to create a wedge issue that would prevent Muslims from imitating the West by "dividing Muslims from Westerners along the default lines of culture."[16] The fatwa was greeted with headlines such as one in the popular British newspaper the Daily Mirror referring to Khomeini as "that Mad Mullah",[191] observations in a British magazine that the Ayatollah seemed "a familiar ghost from the past – one of those villainous Muslim clerics, a Faqir of Ipi or a mad Mullah, who used to be portrayed, larger than life, in popular histories of the British Empire",[192] and laments that Khomeini fed the Western stereotype of "the backward, cruel, rigid Muslim, burning books and threatening to kill the blasphemer."[193] The fatwa indicated Khomeini's contempt for the right to life; for the presumption of innocence; for the rule of law; and for national sovereignty, since he ordered Rushdie killed 'wherever he is found' [194]

This was particularly the case in the largest nation of the Western bloc—the United States (or "Great Satan")—where Khomeini and the Islamic Republic are remembered for the American embassy hostage taking and accused of sponsoring hostage-taking and terrorist attacks—especially using the Lebanese Shi'a Islamic group Hezbollah[195][196]—and which continues to apply economic sanctions against Iran.[citation needed] Popular feeling during the hostage-taking was so high in the United States that some Iranians complained that they felt the need to hide their Iranian identity for fear of physical attack even at universities.[197]

## Influences

Khomeini was "not in the habit of footnoting his works" or acknowledging the influence of others on his ideas, especially if the influences were "foreign or secular".[198] Nonetheless, his ideas as revolutionary and then Supreme Leader of Iran are thought to have been influenced by a number of people: Sunni Islamists, particularly Sayyid Rashid Rida,[199]Hassan al-Banna (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood organization),[200] Sayyid Qutb,[201] and Abul A'la Maududi;[202] and also Shia thinkers and activists included Fazlullah Nouri, Navvab Safavi, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, Ali Shariati, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.

### Rashid Rida

Further information: Rashid Rida

Khomeini's manifesto Islamic Government, Guardianship of the jurist, was greatly influenced (according to Mehdi Khalaji) by Rida's book (Persian: اسلام ناب) and by Rida's analysis of the post-colonial Muslim world.[203] Arguably the first prominent Islamist, Rashid Rida, published a series of articles in Al-Manar titled “The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate” during 1922–1923 in which he advocated for the restoration of the Caliphate ruled by Muslim jurists and proposed Islamic Salafiyya movement revival measures across the globe to reform education and purify Islam.[204]

#### Fazlullah Nouri

Further information: Fazlullah Nouri

Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri (d. 1909), enemy of the 1905-1922 Persian Constitutional Revolution

Fazlullah Nouri, enemy of the 1905-1922 Persian Constitutional Revolution, was praised by Khomeini as an "heroic figure", and some believe Khomeini's own opposition to constitutionalism and a secular government were influenced by Nuri's objections to the 1907 constitution.[205][206][207]

Nouri declared the new constitution contrary to sharia law and spread anti-constitutional propaganda[208] in his newspaper and in leaflets he published.[208] [209] He proclaimed sentiments similar to Khomeini's, such as

> Shari'a covers all regulations of government, and specifies all obligations and duties, so the needs of the people of Iran in matters of law are limited to the business of government, which, by reason of universal accidents, has become separated from Shari'a. ... Now the people have thrown out the law of the Prophet and have set up their own law instead.[210]

He led direct action against his opponents, such as an around-the-clock sit-in in the Shah Abdul Azim shrine by a large group of followers, from three months; recruiting mercenaries to harass the supporters of democracy, and leading a mob towards Tupkhanih Square December 22, 1907 to attack merchants and loot stores.[211]

He was called the "Islamic movement's first martyr in contemporary Iran",[212] and honored to have an expressway named after him and postage stamps issued for him (the only figure of the Constitutional Revolution to be so honored).[212]

### Fada'ian-e Islam

Sayyid Mojtaba Mir-Lohi, known as Navvab Safavi

Fada'iyan-e Islam (1946-1955) was a Shia fundamentalist terrorist group that killed a number of important people,[213] and at least one source (Sohrab Behdad) credits the group and Navvab Safavi with influence on the Islamic Revolution.[214] According to Encyclopaedia Iranica, "there are important similarities between much of the Fedāʾīān's basic views and certain principles and actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Fedāʾīān and Ayatollah Khomeini were in accord on issues such as the role of clerics", (who should be judges, educators and moral guides to the people); of "morality and ethics", (where sharia law should be fully applied, prohibiting all forms of immoral behavior, and all non-Islamic laws abolished); the place of the poor (to be raised up), "the rights of women and religious minorities", (to be kept down), and "attitudes toward foreign powers" (dangerous conspirators to be kept out).[215][216][217][218]

### Sayyid Qutb

Further information: Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb incarcerated

In his 1964 manifesto (Milestones) Egyptian Islamist and jihadist ideologue Sayyid Qutb expressed some of the same ideas as Khomeini in his 1969 work Islamic Government, namely an extremely high regard for the powers of Sharia law, and a belief that a unprovoked aggressive hatred of Islam and Muslims by Non-Muslims has led to suffering and destruction, (sometimes called the "War on Islam").

Qutb preached that the West has a centuries-long "enmity toward Islam" and a "well-thought-out scheme ... to demolish the structure of Muslim society",[219] but at the same time knows its "civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind";[220] Khomeini preached that Western unbelievers want "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches ..."[221]

Qutb considered Sharia a branch of "that universal law which governs the entire universe ... as accurate and true as any of the laws known as the `laws of nature`", physics, biology, etc.[222] Better than that, applying sharia law would bring "harmony between human life and the universe", results otherwise "postponed for the next life", i.e. heaven. (Although the results of sharia would not reach the perfection found "in the Hereafter.")[223] Khomeini doesn't compare Sharia to heaven but does say

> "God, Exalted and Almighty, by means of the Most Noble Messenger (peace and blessing be upon him), sent laws that astound us with their magnitude. He instituted laws and practices for all human affairs ... There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm."[224][225]

The explanation for why these laws are not in effect is that "in order to make the Muslims, especially the intellectuals and the younger generation, deviate from the path of Islam, foreign agents have constantly insinuated that Islam has nothing to offer, that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition ..."[224][226]

Qutb's works enjoyed remarkable popularity in Iran both before and after the revolution as they were translated by Iranian Islamists into Persian. Prominent figures such as current Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his brother Muhammad Ali Khamenei, Aḥmad Aram, Hadi Khosroshahi, etc. translated Qutb's works.[227][228] In 1984, the Islamic Republic of Iran under Khomeini honoured Qutb's "martyrdom" by issuing an iconic postage stamp showing him behind bars.

#### Gharbzadegi

Main article: Social:Gharbzadegi

Jalal Al-e-Ahmad

In 1962, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad clandestinely published a book or pamphlet called Occidentosis (Gharbzadegi): A Plague from the West. It "spearheaded" the search by Western educated/secular Iranians (a group typically immune from calls by the Islamic clergy for repentance) for "Islamic roots", combining a call for a return to Islam, with a "strong Marxist flavor" and an analysis of society "through a class perspective."[229]

At least one historian (Ervand Abrahamian) speculates Al-e-Ahmad may have been an influence on Khomeini's turning away from traditional Shi'i thought towards populism, class struggle and revolution.[229] Fighting Gharbzadegi became part of the ideology of the 1979 Iranian Revolution—the emphasis on nationalization of industry, "self-sufficiency" in economics, independence in all areas of life from both the Western (and Soviet) world. He was also one of the main influences of the later Islamic Republic president Ahmadinejad.[230] The Islamic Republic issued a postage stamp honoring Al-e-Ahmad in 1981.[231]

Al-e-Ahmad, who was from a deeply religious family but had had a Western education and been a member of the Tudeh (Communist) party,[232] argued that Iran was intoxicated or infatuated (zadegi) with Western (gharb) technology, culture, products, and so had become a victim of the West's "toxins" or disease. The adoption and imitation of Western models and Western criteria in education, the arts, and culture led to the loss of Iranian cultural identity, and a transformation of Iran into a passive market for Western goods and a pawn in Western geopolitics.[233][234]

Al-e-Ahmad "was the only contemporary writer ever to obtain favorable comments from Khomeini", who wrote in a 1971 message to Iranian pilgrims on going on Hajj,

> "The poisonous culture of imperialism [is] penetrating to the depths of towns and villages throughout the Muslim world, displacing the culture of the Qur'an, recruiting our youth en masse to the service of foreigners and imperialists..."[235]

### Ali Shariati

Further information: Ali Shariati

Ali Shariati (Persian: علی شریعتی مزینانی; 1933 - 1977)

Like Al-e-Ahmad, Ali Shariati was a late twentieth century Iranian figure from a strongly religious family, given a modern education, exposed to Marxist thought, and who reinvented Shia religiosity for the educated.

Shariati was "the most outspoken representative" of the Socialist or Red Shia movement,[236][237] with "phenomenal popularity" among the "young intelligentsia" of Iran,[238][237] influencing young clerics as well as secular youth.[239] This mattered in Iran because Iran's education system was "substantially superior" to that of its neighbors, and by 1979 had about 175,000 students, 67,000 studying abroad away from the supervision of its oppressive security force the SAVAK. The early 1970s saw a "blossoming of Marxist groups" around the world including among Iranian post-secondary students.[236]

Although a harsh critic of traditional Usuli clergy, he helped open up the "modern middle class" to cleric Khomeini. He and other leftist Shia believed the ulama were standing in the way of the revolutionary potential of the masses,[240] by focusing on mourning and lamentation for the martyrs, awaiting the return of the messiah, when they should have been fighting "against the state injustice begun by Ali and Hussein".[241] But Khomeini was able to "win over his followers by being forthright in his denunciations of the monarchy; by refusing to join fellow theologians in criticizing the Husseinieh-i Ershad; by openly attacking the apolitical and the pro-regime `ulama; by stressing such themes as revolution, anti-imperialism, and the radical message of Muharram; and by incorporating into his public declarations such `Fanonist` terms as the `mostazafin will inherit the earth`, `the country needs a cultural revolution,` and the `people will dump the exploiters onto the garbage heap of history.` [238][note 4]

Socialist Shia believed Imam Hussein was not just a holy figure but the original oppressed one (muzloun), and his killer, the Sunni Umayyad Caliphate, the "analog" of the modern Iranian people's "oppression by the shah".[236] His killing at Karbala was not just an "eternal manifestation of the truth but a revolutionary act by a revolutionary hero".[243] An example of his influence on Khomeini is Khomeini's used of a slogan,[244] a saying from the 19th century that Shariati popularized: 'Every place should be turned into Karbala, every month into Moharram, and every day into Ashara'.[243]

#### Baqir al-Sadr

Further information: Biography:Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr

File:M-SADIR1.JPGMuhammad Baqir al-Sadr

In Iraq, another cleric from a distinguished clerical family, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980), became the ideological founder of the Islamist Islamic Dawa Party (which had similar goals to that of Muslim Brotherhood), and author of several influential works including Iqtisaduna on Islamic economics, and Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy).[245] Like the 1970-1980 version of Khomeini, he sought to combine populism with religious revival, claiming that "the call for return to Islam is a call for a return to God's dispensation, and necessitates a 'social revolution' against 'injustice' and 'exploitation.'"[246]

After a military coup in 1958, a pro-soviet General Abd al-Karim Qasim came to power in Iraq, putting centers of religious learning, such as Najaf were al-Sadr worked under pressure from the Qasim regime's attempts to curb religion as an obstacle to modernity and progress. Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, located in Iraq and one of the leading Shi'i clerics at the time, issued fatwa against communism.[247] Qasim was overthrown in 1963, by the pan-Arabist Ba'ath party, but the crackdown on Shi'i religious centers continued, closing periodicals and seminaries, expelling non-Iraqi students from Najaf. Ayatullah Mohsin al-Hakim called Shias to protest. This helped Baqir al-Sadr's rise to prominence as he visited Lebanon and sent telegrams to different international figures, including Abul A'la Maududi.[248] \-->

## Works

* Wilayat al-Faqih
* Forty Hadith (Forty Traditions)
* Adab as Salat (The Disciplines of Prayers)
* Jihade Akbar (The Greater Struggle)

## See also

* Imam's Line
* Ideology of the Iranian Revolution
* Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
* Hezbollah
* History of the Islamic Republic of Iran
* Human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
* Oppressors-oppressed distinction
* Islamic scholars
* Islam in Iran
* Islamism
* Politics of Iran
* Populism
* Qutbism
* Religious nationalism
* Mahmoud Taleghani
* Hossein-Ali Montazeri
* Tahrir-ol-vasyleh

## Notes

1. ↑ "Khomeini’s Islamist, populist agenda—dubbed 'Khomeinism' by scholar Ervand Abrahamian—has radicalized and guided Shiite Islamists both inside and outside Iran."[11]
2. ↑ Khomeini as the quietist (1920s–1940s); the constitutionalist (1940s–1971); the revolutionary (1971–1979); the vali-ye faqih (1979–1987); and the absolute vali-ye faqih (1987–1989)[13]
3. ↑ Khomeini believed that the huge turnout of Iranians in anti-Shah demonstrations during the revolution meant that Iranians had already voted in a `referendum` for an Islamic republic,[53] and that in Muslim countries Islam and Islamic law,

> truly belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutional monarchy, most of those claiming to be representatives of the majority of the people will approve anything they wish as law and then impose it on the entire population.[54]

4. ↑ Following in the footsteps of Marxists around the world, Iranian revolutionaries attempted to interest the rural poor of Iran to class struggle. After one failed uprising, some of the young revolutionaries, realizing that the religious Iranian masses were not relating to Marxist concepts, began projecting "the Messianic expectations of communist and Third World peoples onto Revolutionary Shi'ism", i.e. socialist Shi'ism.[236] Ali Shariati was "the most outspoken representative of this group", and a figure without equivalent in "fame or influence" in Sunni Islam.[236] He had come from a "strictly religious family" but had studied in Paris and been influenced by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara.[242]

## Citations

1. ↑ Emadi, Hafizullah (6 December 2006). "Exporting Iran's revolution: the radicalization of the Shiite movement in Afghanistan". Middle Eastern Studies Journal 31: pp. 1–12. doi:10.1080/00263209508701037. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263209508701037.
2. ↑ Alex Vatanka,  Influence of iranian revolution in Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy Islamist Influence, I.B.Tauris (1989), pp. 148 & 155
3. ↑ Al-Rebh, Dr. Abdullah F. (29 March 2021). "Radical Shiism and Iranian Influence in Saudi Arabia". European Eye on Radicalization. https://eeradicalization.com/radical-shiism-and-iranian-influence-in-saudi-arabia/.
4. ↑ Citrinowicz, Danny (16 June 2021). "Hezbollah and Iran's Radicalization Efforts in Africa". European Eye on Radicalization. https://eeradicalization.com/hezbollah-and-irans-radicalization-efforts-in-africa/.
5. ↑ Islamic Government Islam and Revolution I, Writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini, 1981, p.91
6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Hamid Algar, `Development of the Concept of velayat-i faqih since the Islamic Revolution in Iran,` paper presented at London Conference on wilayat al-faqih, in June, 1988] [p.135-8]. Also Ressalat, Tehran, 7 January 1988, online http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/khomeini_promises_kept.html#Laws_in_Islam
7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 "Iran's Revolutionary Guard and the Rising Cult of Mahdism: Missiles and Militias for the Apocalypse". 3 May 2022. https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-revolutionary-guard-and-rising-cult-mahdism-missiles-and-militias-apocalypse.
8. ↑ The New Republic "Khamenei vs. Khomeini" by Ali Reza Eshraghi, August 20, 2009, tnr.com dead link quotation from article accessed 9-June-2010
9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Nasr, Vali The Shia Revival, Norton, 2006, p.138
10. ↑ Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam (1985), p. 193.
11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Khomeinism. united against nuclear iran. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/khomeinism. Retrieved 1 February 2023.
12. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. University of California Press. pp. 1–3. ISBN 978-0-520-08503-9. https://archive.org/details/khomeinismessays00erva.
13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Mojtaba Mahdavi (2014), "2. The Rise of Khomeini", A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–68, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511998485.005, ISBN 9781107012677, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/critical-introduction-to-khomeini/rise-of-khomeinism/19FFC1A39D1496C9101C88BD249A5D22
14. ↑ Rezaie Yazdi, Mohammad (2016). Khomeinism, the Islamic Revolution and Anti Americanism. School of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham. pp. abstract. https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/6568/1/RezaieYazdi16PhD.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2023.
15. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. University of California Press. p. 12. ISBN 978-0-520-08503-9. https://archive.org/details/khomeinismessays00erva.
16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Pipes, Daniel (1990). The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West. Transaction Publishers. p. 133. ISBN 978-1-4128-3881-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=ZNpWhrg09C0C&pg=PA133.
17. ↑ Sciolino, Elaine (27 August 2000). "The People's Shah". The New York Times. https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E0D9153EF934A1575BC0A9669C8B63&sec=&pagewanted=all.
18. ↑ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001) p.ix
19. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeiniism, p.3, 13–16
20. ↑ 1942 book/pamphlet Kashf al-Asrar quoted in Islam and Revolution, p.170
21. ↑ "sharghnewspaper.com". http://www.sharghnewspaper.com/840312/html/spc13.htm#s237666.
22. ↑ Velayat-e Faqih, Hokumat-e-Eslami or Islamic Government, quoted in Islam and Revolution p.31
23. ↑ 1970 book Velayat-e Faqih, Hokumat-e-Eslami or Islamic Government, quoted in Islam and Revolution
24. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand, A History of Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.165
25. ↑ Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. translated by Carol Volk. Harvard University Press. p. 177. ISBN 978-1-85043-880-9. https://archive.org/details/failureofpolitic00royo.
26. ↑ Gheissari, Ali Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 86-87
27. ↑ Islamic Government Islam and Revolution I, Writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini, p.137-8
28. ↑ Khomeini, Islamic Government, 1981: p.29-30
29. ↑ Khomeini, Islamic Government, 1981: p.56
30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 30.2 Roy, Failure of Political Islam, 1994: p. 179
31. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.32
32. ↑ Iran Times, 27 March 1982
33. ↑ Haqiqat nejad, Reza (20 April 2019). "طرح پنج‌ مرحله‌ای خامنه‌ای برای ظهور امام زمان؟". رادیو فردا. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/khamenei-and-the-dream-of-Islamic-civilization/29893576.html.
34. ↑ "محمدی گلپایگانی، رئیس دفتر رهبری". https://www.jamaran.news/بخش-سیاست-12/1544405-محمدی-گلپایگانی-رئیس-دفتر-رهبری-در-جنگ-اوکراین-نقشه-داشتند-روسیه-را-گرفتار-کنند-رئیس-جمهور-روسیه-آدم-زرنگی-بود-پیش-دستی-کرد-انشاالله-این-مقدمه-ظهور-حضرت-ولی-عصر-خواهد-بود.
35. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.116
36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.122
37. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. University of California Press. p. 130. ISBN 978-0-520-08503-9. https://archive.org/details/khomeinismessays00erva.
38. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. University of California Press. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-520-08503-9. https://archive.org/details/khomeinismessays00erva.
39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.26
40. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.27
41. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.31
42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.17
43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 43.2 43.3 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.38
44. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.2
45. ↑ Ganji, Sorush and Mesbah Yazdi (Persian)
46. ↑ The principles of Islamic republic from viewpoint of Imam Khomeini in the speeches of the leader (Persian)
47. ↑ About Islamic republic[yes|permanent dead link|dead link}}](Persian)
48. ↑ "Ayatollah Khomeini and the Contemporary Debate on Freedom". http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/18/1/14?ck=nck.
49. ↑ "Democracy? I meant theocracy", by Dr. Jalal Matini, Translation & Introduction by Farhad Mafie, August 5, 2003, The Iranian, http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2003/August/Khomeini/
50. ↑ Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, (1984), p.73
51. ↑ 1979 March 1, quoted in Bakhash, Shaul The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p.72, 73)
52. ↑ Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad. p. 111. "...Khomeini adjusted his political rhetoric in order to appeal to an audience beyond his immediate circle of followers. In 1978 he made no mention of the doctrine of theocracy, which was bitterly contested among the clergy and would have scared away the secular-minded middle class had it known of it and understood its possible consequences."
53. ↑ Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (1984), p.73
54. ↑ Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, (1982), p.56
55. ↑ source: Yusef Sane'i, Velayat-e Faqih, Tehran, 1364/1986, quoted in Moin, Baqer, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, Thomas Dunne Books, c2000, p.226
56. ↑ Fallaci, Oriana. "Interview with Khomeini", New York Times, 7 October 1979.
57. ↑ Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p.228
58. ↑ Algar, Hamid (1981). ISLAM and REVOLUTION: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley: Mizan Press. pp. 337–338. ISBN 0-933782-03-9.
59. ↑ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001) p.1
60. ↑ Address by Ayatollah Khomeini on the Occasion of the Iranian New Year,` broadcast 20 March 1979, FBIS-MEA-80-56, 21 March 1980 quoted in Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001) p.113
61. ↑ Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. translated by Carol Volk. Harvard University Press. p. [1]. ISBN 978-1-85043-880-9. https://archive.org/details/failureofpolitic00royo.
62. ↑ Sahifeh Nour (Vol.2, Page 242)
63. ↑ in Qom, Iran, October 22, 1979, quoted in, The Shah and the Ayatollah : Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution by Fereydoun Hoveyda, Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2003, p.88
64. ↑ Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, (1981), p.91
65. ↑ Khomeini (2013) (in en). Islam and revolution : [the writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini]. Routledge. p. 91. ISBN 978-1-136-18934-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=oTksBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA91.
66. ↑ Mathewson Denny, Frederick. "Muslim Ethical Trajectories in the Contemporary World" in Religious Ethics, William Schweiker, ed. Blackwell Publishers, 2004. ISBN 0-631-21634-0, p.272
67. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions by Ervand Abrahamian, University of California Press, 1999, p.218-9
68. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions by Ervand Abrahamian, University of California Press, 1999, p.220-1
69. ↑ 69.0 69.1 69.2 Moin, Khomeini, (2001), p.258
70. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.134
71. ↑ economics is for fools (eqtesad mal-e khar ast) from Gheissari, Ali Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.87
72. ↑ (Khomeini July 1979) [quoted in The Government of God p.111. "see the FBIS for typical broadcasts, especially GBIS-MEA-79-L30, July 5, 1979 v.5 n.130, reporting broadcasts of the National Voice of Iran.
73. ↑ Sorenson, David S. (2009). An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics. Avalon Publishing. p. 206. ISBN 978-0-7867-3251-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=Zrpmm4120OUC&pg=PA206.
74. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, (p.55)
75. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.139
76. ↑ "Economics is for donkeys". 11 September 2008. http://www.newstatesman.com/economy/2008/09/iran-economic-ahmadinejad.
77. ↑ Abrahamian Iran Between Revolutions (1982), p.479
78. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand, History of Modern Iran, Columbia University Press, 2008, p.184
79. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism : essays on the Islamic Republic. University of California Press. p. 42. ISBN 9780520085039. https://archive.org/details/khomeinismessays00erva/page/42.
80. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p.42
81. ↑ Abrahamian Iran Between Revolutions (1982), p.534
82. ↑ "Law for the Protection and Expansion of Iranian Industry" July 5, 1979 nationalization measure reportedly nationalized most of the privately industry and many non-industrial businesses. Mackey, Iranians, (1986) p.340
83. ↑ "Stunted and distorted, Stunted and distorted". The Economist. Jan 18, 2003. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2003/01/18/stunted-and-distorted.
84. ↑ [Nehzat by Ruhani vol.1 p.195.] quoted in Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah by Baqer Moin (Thomas Dunne Books), c2000, (p.75)
85. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993, pp.33-34
86. ↑ Pithy Aphorism: Wise Sayings and Counsels (by Khomeini), quoted in The Last Great Revolution by Robin Wright c2000, p.152
87. ↑ Hiro, Dilip (2009) (in en). The Iranian Labyrinth: Journeys Through Theocratic Iran and Its Furies. PublicAffairs. p. 336. ISBN 978-0-7867-3871-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=Lbo_4m0U6SoC&pg=PA336.
88. ↑ 88.0 88.1 88.2 Wright, Robin (2010) (in en). The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-307-76607-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=25_l12OBeYkC.
89. ↑ Speech in Qom quoted in Esfandiari, Iran: Women and Parliaments Under the Monarch and Islamic Republic pp.1–24, quoted in The Last Great Revolution by Robin Wright c2000, p.151
90. ↑ Beck, Lois; Nashat, Guity (2004) (in en). Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic. University of Illinois Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-0-252-07189-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=tLRgXf_e_CEC&pg=PA138.
91. ↑ Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. translated by Carol Volk. I.B.Tauris. p. 179. ISBN 978-1-85043-880-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=mjijSP5DeAoC&pg=PA177.
92. ↑ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001), p.61
93. ↑ `Khomeyni Addresses Majlis Deputies January 24` broadcast 24 January 1983, quoted in Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001), p.129
94. ↑ Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, p. 463, quoting Khomeini, Jehad-e Akbar (Greater Jihad), pp. 44
95. ↑ (Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, p. 465
96. ↑ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini p.133
97. ↑ 97.0 97.1 Ofra Bengio; Meir Litvak (8 Nov 2011). The Sunna and Shi'a in History: Division and Ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 212. ISBN 9780230370739.
98. ↑ Ruthven, Malise A Fury For God, Granta, (2002), p.?
99. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, 2006, p.133
100. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000) p.249, 251
101. ↑ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini p.123
102. ↑ `Ayatollah Khomeyni Message to Council of Experts,` broadcast 14 July 1983, FBIS-SAS-83-137, 15 July 1983; Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeinip.130
103. ↑ Islam and Revolution, p.357
104. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.120
105. ↑ Niaz Naik, former Pakistan foreign secretary who accompanied General Zia on trip, in interview with Nasr in Lahore 1990. In Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, 2006, p.141
106. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, 2006, p.131-2
107. ↑ "Comment September 19, 2001 8:20". http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-kramer091901.shtml.
108. ↑ Hassan, a Hezbollah fighter quoted in Jaber, Hala (1997). Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. Columbia University Press. pp. 92–93. ISBN 978-0-231-10834-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=m_ktBrZfuUYC.
109. ↑ Hamas Statement, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (July 23, 2000)
110. ↑ `Bin Laden's Sermon for the Eid al-Adha`, Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series, n. 476 (March 5, 2003)
111. ↑ "Devotion, desire drive youths to 'martyrdom' : Palestinians in pursuit of paradise turn their own bodies into weapons", USA Today, June 26, 2001
112. ↑ March 14, 2008 The Independent/UK "The Cult of the Suicide Bomber" by Robert Fisk  "month-long investigation by The Independent, culling four Arabic-language newspapers, official Iraqi statistics, two Beirut news agencies and Western reports"
113. ↑ According to Scott Atran, in just one year in one Muslim country alone – 2004 in Iraq – there were 400 suicide attacks and 2000 casualties. The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism p.131
114. ↑ Al Jazeera article: "Al-Zarqawi declares war on Iraqi Shia", Accessed Feb 7, 2007. Link
115. ↑ over half of the 20,000 fatalities worldwide from terrorism in 2006 occurred in Iraq according to the American National Counter-terrorism Center Report on Terrorist Incidents 2006 p.3
116. ↑ "Breaking News, World News and Video from Al Jazeera". https://www.aljazeera.com/.
117. ↑ "Iraqi funeral procession bombed; at least 26 killed". cbc.ca. 24 May 2007. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iraqi-funeral-procession-bombed-at-least-26-killed-1.679220.
118. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, (Norton, 2006), p. 203
119. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival (Norton), 2006, p. 168
120. ↑ Feb 2007 interview with Christiane Amanpour of CNN: "تروريست ها در قعر جهنمند (Rooz)". http://www.roozonline.com/archives/2007/02/002139.php.
121. ↑ "Shia-Sunni Conflicts – What are the issues?". http://www.csss-isla.com/iis/iis-index.html. "Ayatollah Yousef Saanei."
122. ↑ 122.0 122.1 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.135
123. ↑ 123.0 123.1 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.136
124. ↑ Sivan, Emmanuel; Friedman, Menachem, eds (1990). Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East (illustrated ed.). State University of New York Press. p. 68. ISBN 978-0-7914-0158-3.
125. ↑ Barry Rubin (2015). The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture. Routledge. p. 427. ISBN 978-1-317-45578-3.
126. ↑ Mikaberidze, Alexander, ed (2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 483. ISBN 978-1-59884-337-8.
127. ↑ Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2014). A Critical Introduction to Khomeini (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 305. ISBN 978-1-107-01267-7.
128. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p.201
129. ↑ 129.0 129.1 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.130-1
130. ↑ (Mackay Iranians, p.277. Source: Quoted in Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p.25
131. ↑ Harney, The Priest and the King (1998) pp. 173–4
132. ↑ Benard/Khalilzad, The Government of God, 1984, p. 121
133. ↑ Moin Khomeini, (2000), p. 297
134. ↑ Wright, In the Name of God, (1989) (p.21-22)
135. ↑ Molavi, The Soul of Iran, (2005), p. 256
136. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.136
137. ↑ Khomeini: life of the Ayatollah, By Baqer Moin
138. ↑ Rays of the Sun: 83 Stories from the Life of Imam Khomeini (ra) "He would never pass on his work to anyone else":
139. ↑ "Khomeini's REVERSALS of Promises". http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/khomeini_promises_kept.html.
140. ↑ Wright, In the Name of God 1989, p. 196
141. ↑ Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p. 284
142. ↑ Hofstee, Wim; Kooij, A. van der (2013) (in en). Religion beyond its Private Role in Modern Society. BRILL. p. 107. ISBN 978-90-04-25785-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=IQJBAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA107.
143. ↑ letter to Montazeri March 1989. Moin Khomeini, (2000), p.289, p.306-7
144. ↑ (Moin Khomeini (2000) p.293
145. ↑ A letter to the president of the Assembly for Revising the Constitution (by Ayatollah Meshkini), setting out his instructions for the future of the leadership" source: Tehran Radio, 4 June 1989, SWB, 6 June 1989] quoted in Moin p.308
146. ↑ source: Meeting in Qom "Broadcast by radio Iran from Qom on 20 August 1979." quoted in The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution (1986), by Amir Taheri, Adler & Adler, p. 259
147. ↑ (statement to his students in Najaf, 28 September 1977. Found in Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Nur, vol.I p.234-235) quoted in Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, (1993), p.476-7
148. ↑ Askari, Mustafa (1 June 2022). "Mysticism, Rationalism In Imam Khomeini's Thought". http://shiastudies.com/en/16160/mysticism-rationalism-imam-khomeinis-thought/.
149. ↑ Seyed-Gohrab. "Khomeini as mystic". https://www.persianstudies.nl/media-ps/blog/146-khomeini-as-mystic.
150. ↑ Farhosh-van Loon, Diede (2016). "The Fusion of Mysticism and Politics in Khomeini's Quatrains". International Journal of Persian Literature 1 (1): 59–88. doi:10.5325/intejperslite.1.1.0059.
151. ↑ Khomeini, Ruhollah. "Home mysticism". http://en.imam-khomeini.ir/en/key/mysticism.
152. ↑ Knysh, Alexander (Autumn 1992). ""Irfan" Revisited: Khomeini and the Legacy of Islamic Mystical Philosophy". Middle East Journal 46 (4): 631–653. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328497. Retrieved 3 June 2023.
153. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.121
154. ↑ 11 February 1979 (according to Dilip Hiro in The Longest War p.32) p.108 from Excerpts from Speeches and Messages of Imam Khomeini on the Unity of the Muslims.
155. ↑ Glenn, Cameron; Nada, Garrett (28 August 2015). "Rival Islamic States: ISIS v Iran" (in en). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/rival-islamic-states-isis-v-iran-0.
156. ↑ Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann (2009). "Islamic Realpolitik: Two-Level Iranian Foreign Policy". International Journal on World Peace 26 (4): 19. ISSN 0742-3640.
157. ↑ Lakoff, Sanford. "Making Sense of the Senseless: Politics in a Time of Terrorism". University of California San Diego. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:qhQsVoGY2FsJ:pscourses.ucsd.edu/ps121/resources/PS121Lec4Islam.doc.
158. ↑ Landes, Richard Allen; Landes, Richard (2011) (in en). Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience. Oxford University Press, USA. p. 446. ISBN 978-0-19-975359-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=seS-0JTykgoC&pg=PA446.
159. ↑ 159.0 159.1 Murawiec, Laurent (2008). The mind of jihad. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521730631. https://epdf.pub/the-mind-of-jihad.html.
160. ↑ Resalat, 25.3.1988) (quoted in The Constitution of Iran by Asghar Schirazi, Tauris, 1997, p.69)
161. ↑ Bonney, Richard (2004) (in en). Jihād : from Qurʼān to Bin Laden. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-230-50142-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=KMAWDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251.
162. ↑ Bayan, No.4 (1990), p.8
163. ↑ 163.0 163.1 Parkes, Aidan (2019). "Power Shifts in the Saudi-Iranian Strategic Competition" (in en). Global Security and Intelligence Studies 4 (1): 32–33. doi:10.18278/gsis.4.1.3. https://www.academia.edu/39617991.
164. ↑ 164.0 164.1 Shakibi, Zhand (2010) (in en). Khatami and Gorbachev : politics of change in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USSR. Tauris Academic Studies. p. 84. ISBN 9781848851399. https://epdf.pub/khatami-and-gorbachev-politics-of-change-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-and-the.html.
165. ↑ 165.0 165.1 Schirazi, Asghar (1998) (in en). The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic. I. B. Tauris. p. 69. ISBN 978-1-86064-253-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=1QlPAAAAYAAJ&q="we+have+set+as+our+goal+the+world-wide+spread+of+the+influence+of+Islam".
166. ↑ Perry, M.; Negrin, Howard E. (2008) (in en). The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism: An Anthology. Springer. pp. 31–32. ISBN 978-0-230-61650-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=9YFaCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA31.
167. ↑ Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah (2008). "Islam is Not a Religion of Pacifists". in Perry, Marvin; Negrin, Howard E. (in en). The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism: An Anthology. Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 29–32. doi:10.1057/9780230616509_5. ISBN 978-0-230-61650-9. https://archive.org/details/theorypracticeis00perr.
168. ↑ Bernstein, Andrew (2017) (in en). Capitalist Solutions: A Philosophy of American Moral Dilemmas. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-53010-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=1K00DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT71.
169. ↑ Warraq, Ibn (1995) (in en). Why I Am Not a Muslim. Prometheus Books. pp. 11–12. ISBN 978-1-59102-011-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=S85VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11.
170. ↑ Roy, Failure of Political Islam, 1994: p.184
171. ↑ 171.0 171.1 Islamonline. Frequently Asked Questions on Iran. Q. Has the Revolution Affected Iran's Relations With Its Neighbors?
172. ↑ 172.0 172.1 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.137
173. ↑ Zulkifli (6 Dec 2013). The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia. ANU E Press. p. 109. ISBN 9781925021301.
174. ↑ Gerhard Böwering; Patricia Crone; Mahan Mirza (2013). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought (illustrated ed.). Princeton University Press. p. 136. ISBN 9780691134840.
175. ↑ Ansari, Hamid, The Narrative of Awakening, The Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the works of the Imam Khomeini, (date?), p.253
176. ↑ Palestine from the viewpoint of the Imam Khomeini, The Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the works of the Imam Khomeini, (date?), p.137
177. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.138
178. ↑ Khomeini, Musavi (2009). Kashf al Asrar. Ketab Corp. pp. 107, 108, 116, 117. ISBN 978-1595842480.
179. ↑ Algar, Hamid (1981). ISLAM and REVOLUTION: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley: Mizan Press. pp. 106, 301, 302, 327. ISBN 0-933782-03-9.
180. ↑ M. Lüthi, Lorenz (2020). "20: The Middle East". Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 491, 505–506. doi:10.1017/9781108289825. ISBN 978-1-108-41833-1.
181. ↑ Paul Vallely (19 February 2014). "The vicious schism between Sunni and Shia has been poisoning Islam for 1,400 years – and it's getting worse". The Independent (London). https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-vicious-schism-between-sunni-and-shia-has-been-poisoning-islam-for-1400-years--and-its-getting-worse-9139525.html.
182. ↑ Dr Christin Marschall (2003). Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami. Taylor & Francis. p. 116. ISBN 978-0-203-41792-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=nyyR7j6vcc8C&pg=PA116.
183. ↑ Interview by Vali Nasr with former Pakistani foreign minister Aghan Shahi, Lahore, 1989. from Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.138
184. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.138-9
185. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.139
186. ↑ Bayan, No.4 (1990), p.8)
187. ↑ The Political and Divine Will of His Holiness the Imam Khomeini
188. ↑ 188.0 188.1 The Prologue to the Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament
189. ↑ Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p.122
190. ↑ "- Qantara.de – Dialogue with the Islamic World". http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1103/i.html.
191. ↑ February 15, 1989
192. ↑ Anthony Harly, "Saving Mr. Rushdie?" Encounter, June 1989, p. 74
193. ↑ Marzorati, Gerald, "Salman Rushdie: Fiction's Embattled Infidel", The New York Times Magazine, January 29, 1989, quoted in Pipes, The Rushdie Affair, (1990)
194. ↑ Geoffrey Robertson, Mullahs without mercy, 2009
195. ↑ Wright, Sacred Rage, (2001), p.28, 33,
196. ↑ for example the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing see:Hizb'allah in Lebanon : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis Magnus Ranstorp, Department of International Relations University of St. Andrews St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, p.54, 117
197. ↑ "Inside Iran". http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2008/09/iran-ahmadinejad-government.
198. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.22
199. ↑ Zhongmin, Liu (2013). "Commentary on "Islamic State": Thoughts of Islamism". Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (In Asia) (Routledge: Taylor & Francis group) 7 (3): 23–28. doi:10.1080/19370679.2013.12023226.
200. ↑ Khalaji 2009.
201. ↑ (in en) Shaykh al Fawzān Warns Against The Books of Sayyid Quṭb | Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al Fawzān, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOvKL2-BNIw, retrieved 2021-04-22
202. ↑ Fuller, Graham E., The Future of Political Islam, Palgrave MacMillan, (2003), p. 120
203. ↑ Khalaji 2009, p. 72.
204. ↑ Willis, John (2010). "Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the Work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad". The International History Review 32 (4): 711–732. doi:10.1080/07075332.2010.534609. ISSN 0707-5332. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25762122.
205. ↑ Rahnema 2005, pp. 81.
206. ↑ Con Coughlin (20 February 2009). Khomeini's Ghost: Iran since 1979. Pan MacMillan. ISBN 978-0-230-74310-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=AJ6i2-s7hoQC&q=khomeini+pepsi+roast+in+the+fires+of+hell&pg=PT107.
207. ↑ Michael Axworthy. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. Oxford University Press. p. 138.
208. ↑ 208.0 208.1 Farzaneh 2015, p. 197.
209. ↑ Martin 1986, p. 182.
210. ↑ Martin 1986, p. 183.
211. ↑ Farzaneh 2015, p. 205.
212. ↑ 212.0 212.1 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.94
213. ↑ Homa Katouzian (2004). "1, "Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History, Arbitrary Rule, Democracy and the 1953 Coup"". in Gasiorowski, Mark J.; Byrne, Malcolm. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press. p. 14.
214. ↑ Behdad 1997.
215. ↑ A. Ferdows, “Religion in Iranian Nationalism: The Study of the Fadaʾiyan-e Isalm,” Ph. D. diss., Indiana University, 1967., pp. 243-53
216. ↑ A. Rahnema and F. Nomani, The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran, London, 1990, pp. 73-96. pp. 83-84
217. ↑ H. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin, Tex., 1982.
218. ↑ FARHAD KAZEMI. "FEDĀʾĪĀN-E ESLĀM". https://iranicaonline.org/articles/fedaian-e-esla.
219. ↑ Qutb, Milestones, 1982, p.116
220. ↑ Qutb, Milestones, 1982, p.7
221. ↑ Khomeini, Islamic Government, 1981: p.34
222. ↑ Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. p. 101. https://ia802803.us.archive.org/3/items/milestones-syedqutb/milestones-f1.pdf. Retrieved 19 April 2023.
223. ↑ Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. p. 104. https://ia802803.us.archive.org/3/items/milestones-syedqutb/milestones-f1.pdf. Retrieved 19 April 2023.
224. ↑ 224.0 224.1 Khomeini, Ruhollah (1981). Algar, Hamid. ed. Islam and Revolution : Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press. pp. 29–30. ISBN 9781483547541.
225. ↑ al-Khomeini, Ruhullah al-Musawi. Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist. Feedbooks. p. 24-5. https://goaloflife.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/ayatollah-sayyed-ruhollah-khomeini-islamic-government1.pdf. Retrieved 20 April 2023.
226. ↑ al-Khomeini, Ruhullah al-Musawi. Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist. Feedbooks. p. 25. https://goaloflife.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/ayatollah-sayyed-ruhollah-khomeini-islamic-government1.pdf. Retrieved 20 April 2023.
227. ↑ Calvert, John (2018). Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. London: C. Hurst & co. (Publishers) ltd.. pp. 3. ISBN 978-1-84904-949-8.
228. ↑ Unal, Yusuf (November 2016). "Sayyid Quṭb in Iran: Translating the Islamist Ideologue in the Islamic Republic". Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies (Indiana University Press) 1 (2): 35–60. doi:10.2979/jims.1.2.04. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/jims.1.2.04.
229. ↑ 229.0 229.1 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.23
230. ↑ Avideh Mayville, "The Religious Ideology of Reform in Iran" in J. Harold Ellens (ed.), Winning Revolutions: The Psychosocial Dynamics of Revolts for Freedom, Fairness, and Rights [3 volumes], ABC-CLIO (2013), p. 311
231. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993: p.22, figure 1
232. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1994, p.23
233. ↑ Ajayi, Akin (2016-04-05). "'Westoxification' and Worse: Probing Iran's Turbulent History" (in en). Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/life/books/.premium-probing-irans-turbulent-history-1.5426808.
234. ↑ Gershon, Livia (2019-09-05). "Progress Is Not the Same as Westernization" (in en-US). https://daily.jstor.org/progress-is-not-the-same-as-westernization/.
235. ↑ "Message to the Pilgrims" (Message sent to Iranian pilgrims on Hajj in Saudi Arabia from Khomeini in exile in Najaf) February 6, 1971, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, (1981), p.195
236. ↑ 236.0 236.1 236.2 236.3 236.4 Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.107-8
237. ↑ 237.0 237.1 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 129
238. ↑ 238.0 238.1 Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.534
239. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 129-130
240. ↑ Rahnema 2000, pp. 123–124.
241. ↑ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.38
242. ↑ Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p.37
243. ↑ 243.0 243.1 Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), pp. 128
244. ↑ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 1993, p.29
245. ↑ Nasr, Seyyed Husain (1989) (in en). Expectation of the Millennium: Shi'ism in History. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-88706-843-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=btmNZgztDrAC&q=Iqtisaduna+baqir+sadr&pg=PA409. Retrieved March 22, 2020.
246. ↑ Batatu, Hanna (January–February 1982). "The Significance of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr". Middle East Report (102). https://merip.org/1982/01/the-significance-of-muhammad-baqir-al-sadr/. Retrieved 6 May 2023.
247. ↑ Aziz 1993, pp. 208–209.
248. ↑ Aziz 1993, pp. 211–212.

## Bibliography

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* Abrahamian, Ervand (1999). Tortured Confessions by Ervand Abrahamian. University of California Press.
* Aziz, T. M. (May 1993). "The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shi'i Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980". International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (2): 207–222. doi:10.1017/S0020743800058499.
* Bakhash, Shaul (1984). The Reign of the Ayatollahs : Iran and the Islamic Revolution. New York: Basic Books.
* Brumberg, Daniel (2001). Reinventing Khomeini : The Struggle for Reform in Iran. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
* Farzaneh, Mateo Mohammad (March 2015). Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership of Khurasani. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. ISBN 9780815633884. OCLC 931494838. https://press.syr.edu/supressbooks/467.
* Harney, Desmond (1998). The priest and the king : an eyewitness account of the Iranian revolution. I.B. Tauris.
* Khomeini, Ruhollah (1981). Islam and Revolution : Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley: Mizan Press. https://archive.org/details/islamrevolutionw00khom.
* Khomeini, Ruhollah (1980). Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini : political, philosophical, social, and religious. Bantam. ISBN 9780553140323. https://archive.org/details/sayingsofayatoll00khom.
* Mackey, Sandra (1996). The Iranians : Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. Dutton. ISBN 0-525-94005-7.
* Martin, V. A. (April 1986). "The Anti-Constitutionalist Arguments of Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri". Middle Eastern Studies 22 (2): 181–196. doi:10.1080/00263208608700658.
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* Rahnema, Ali (November 1, 2005). Pioneers of Islamic Revival. London, UK: Zed Books. ISBN 9781842776155. https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/pioneers-of-islamic-revival-9781842776155/.
* Rahnema, Ali (2000). An Islamic Utopian - A Political Biography of Ali Shari'ati. London, NY: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1860645526. https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/islamic-utopian-9781780768021/.
* Roy, Olivier (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674291409. https://archive.org/details/failureofpolitic00royo.
* Schirazi, Asghar (1997). The Constitution of Iran. New York: Tauris.
* Taheri, Amir (1985). The Spirit of Allah. Adler & Adler.
* Willett, Edward C. ;Ayatollah Khomeini, 2004, Publisher:The Rosen Publishing Group ISBN 0-8239-4465-4
* Wright, Robin (1989). In the Name of God : The Khomeini Decade. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9780671672355. https://archive.org/details/innameofgodkhome00wrig.
* Wright, Robin (2000). The Last Revolution. New York: Knopf.
* Lee, James (1984). The Final Word!: An American Refutes the Sayings of Ayatollah Khomeini. Philosophical Library. ISBN 0-8022-2465-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=XgoNAAAAIAAJ.
* Dabashi, Hamid (2006). Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-4128-0516-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=sTFdNNQP4ewC.
* Hoveyda, Fereydoun (2003). The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN 0-275-97858-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=bxJgsRRtDsoC.

## Journals

* Behdad, Sohrab (Jan 1997). "Islamic Utopia in Pre-Revolutionary Iran: Navvab Safavi and the Fada'ian-e Eslam". Middle Eastern Studies 33 (1): 40–65. doi:10.1080/00263209708701141. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283846.
* Khalaji, Mehdi (November 27, 2009). "The Dilemmas of Pan-Islamic Unity". Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 9: 64–79. https://www.hudson.org/research/9859-the-dilemmas-of-pan-islamic-unity-.

## External links

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* Sayyid Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini — Islamic Government (Hukumat-i Islami)
* Sayyid Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini — The Last Will...
* Extracted from speeches of Ayatollah Rouhollah Mousavi Khomeini
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* Famous letter of Ayatollah Khomeini to Mikhail Gorbachev, dated January 1, 1989. Keyhan Daily.

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* "What Happens When Islamists Take Power? The Case of Iran". http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/khomeini_promises_kept.html.
* "Ayatollah Khomeini's Gems of Islamism". http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/khomeini_works.html.
* "Modern, Democratic Islam: Antithesis to Fundamentalism". http://islamic-fundamentalism.info/chXV.htm.
* "America Can't Do A Thing". http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/8781.
* "He Knew He Was Right". http://www.nysun.com/article/38866.

Biography of Ayatollah Khomeini

* "The Life and Works of the Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Great Leader of the Islamic Revolution". http://ghadeer.org/english/imam/bio-imam/index.html.

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