New Medina

Short description: Term which identified Pakistan as a modern equivalent of the Islamic state established in Medina by Muhammad

New Medina (Urdu: نیا مدینہ; Hindi: नया मदीना) was a term coined by the supporters of the Pakistan Movement, which identified Pakistan as a modern equivalent of the Islamic state established in Medina by Muhammad. It was a part of the "Medina strategy" formulated by the Barelvi sect of Sunni Islam that was developed in opposition to the qaumiyat-e-muttahida (composite nation) construct by the Deobandi sect. This strategy envisioned Pakistan as a staging point for the eventual conquest and Islamisation of the rest of Hindu India , similar to Muhammad's conquest of Mecca.

Although originally a Barelvi construct, the "new Medina" analogy also received promotion from a section of the Deobandi clergy. It was extended to brand the Muslim refugees from India and the native Pakistans as modern-day Muhajirun and Ansar respectively. It was opposed by the nationalistic Deobandi clergy which came up with an alternate theory to support its idea of composite nationality, by equating it with the common nationality of Muslims and Jews under the Covenant of Medina.

## Contents

* 1 Background
* 1.1 Hijrah
* 2 Medina strategy
* 3 Opposition
* 3.1 Response
* 4 References
* 5 Bibliography

## Background

There are two major sects of Sunni Islam in the Indian subcontinent: the Barelvis and the Deobandis.[1] The latter occupied the Muslim political space in colonial India by forming the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) which was involved in the Khilafat Movement in alliance with the Indian National Congress (INC).[1][2] The Barelvis, who were aligned with the All India Muslim League (AIML), viewed the INC as a Hindu-dominated party and pronounced an alliance with the Hindus as un-Islamic. As the Pakistan Movement gained traction, pro-separation ulama led by Ashraf Ali Thanawi constantly moved out from the JUH.[1][citation needed]

The AIML advocated the two-nation theory which viewed Hindus and Muslims as two separate nationalities that cannot coexist because of the "conflicting ideas and conceptions" born out of their distinct civilizations.[3] There were polarizing opinions in the Muslim discourse regarding this theory with a section of the Deobandi clergy led by Hussain Ahmed Madani and the Abul A'la Maududi-led Jamaat-e-Islami supporting the qaumiyat-e-muttahida (composite nation) formulation, whereas the Ashraf Ali Thanwi-led Deobandis and the Barelvis led by Hamid Raza Khan and Naeem-ud-Deen Muradabadi supported the qaumiyat-e-judagana (separate nations) formulation.[citation needed]

Due to the lack of organization and unity amongst the Barelvi leadership, the AIML required "theological weight" for combating the highly organized Deobandi opposition at the grassroots-level. This was provided by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), which was a breakaway faction of the JUH founded by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.[4][citation needed] Usmani conceptualized Pakistan as the "New Medina" after drawing similarities with the Hijrah to contest Madani's qaumiyat-e-muttahida formulation.[5]

### Hijrah

The Barelvis wanted to follow the "Medina strategy" which was based on Muhammad's Hijrah (migration) model, which involved migrating to Medina from Mecca in 622 CE. In the Islamic discourse, Hijrah is seen as moving from Dar al-Harb (house of war), a place where the Sharia is not implemented, to the Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) which constitute the countries under Islamic rule.[6] Muhammad later conquered Mecca in 630 CE, and ordered that the Kaaba be "cleansed" of all signs of polytheism and the pagan idols in it be destroyed.[7]

## Medina strategy

In the reconciliation meetings between the Barelvis, the Deobandis, and the Jamaat-e-Islami, the common end-goal of the complete Islamisation of India was repeatedly emphasized.[citation needed] The Deobandis wanted to achieve this through proselytization and believed that the partition will be detrimental to their means. One of the JUH's arguments against the partition was that it will "hinder the missionary activities of the Ulema".[8]

The Barelvis were in favour of following Muhammad's Hijrah model under which Pakistan would be the "New Medina" that will be used for staging an attack against the rest of Hindu India and converting it to Islam, similar to the conquest of pagan Mecca.[citation needed] This strategy was called the "Medina strategy", and it envisioned Pakistan as an Islamic utopia which will succeed the defunct Ottoman Empire as the protector of the entire Muslim world.[9] This strategy was also endorsed by a section of the Deobandi clergy, the most prominent of them being Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. In the January 1946 conference of the JUI in Lahore, Usmani prophesized that just as Medina acted as a base for the Islamic conquest of Arabian Peninsula and the rest of the world beyond it, Pakistan will also lead the way for Islam to be the ruling power in the Indian subcontinent.[10] He argued that even as extensive decentralization of power to the provinces cannot help in the creation of an Islamic state resembling Medina, as the numerical strength of the Hindus in an undivided India will help them in controlling power at the federal level.[11]

A major argument against the creation of Pakistan was the dangerous consequences it could have for the Muslims living in Hindu-majority provinces, such as the United Provinces (UP).[12] Usmani responded by equating the Muslims from the minority provinces such as UP with the Muhajirun (Muhammad's advisors and relatives, who emigrated with him from Mecca to Medina) and the native Pakistanis with the Ansar (local inhabitants of Medina).[13] This analogy later led to the Muslim migrants from India, who settled mostly in the urban areas of Sindh, to be known as the Muhajir people.[14]

Similar Islamic symbolism was invoked by AIML leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah when he announced the Direct Action Day on the 17th day of Ramadan, which is also the day of the Battle of Badr in which Muhammad's army defeated the Meccan Quraysh army.[citation needed]

## Opposition

The Medina strategy was opposed by Hussain Ahmed Madani who too employed Muhammad's government in Medina to support his conceptualization of qaumiyat-e-muttahida. In his 1936 book Composite Nationalism and Islam, he argued that a composite nationality of Hindus, Muslims, and other Indian communities has an "auspicious precedent" in the common nationality of Muslims and Jews under the Covenant of Medina.[15][16] This model was cited as early as 1913 by Abul Kalam Azad in his Karachi address to the INC.[16] Anwar Shah Kashmiri expanded upon this in the 1927 session of the JUH by stressing upon the prophetic precedent of aligning with trustworthy non-Muslims.[17]

### Response

Madani's interpretation was opposed by Ashraf Ali Thanawi on the following points:[18]

* The nationalistic ulema was supporting its stand through a report in the Hadith but could not find support for it in the books of Fiqh.
* The Deobandis believe that there are no mujtahids in the present age, meaning that the nationalistic ulema cannot claim to be performing ijtihad (independent reasoning) and can only plead to taqlid (conformity to legal precedent).
* The narration cited by the nationalist ulema is, according to Thanawi, unauthenticated and thus suspected.
* Even if the narration is authenticated, Thanawi claimed that the deductions being made out of it were invalid. He argued that even though Muslims and their non-Muslim allies were called ummah wahida (one people) in the constitution of Medina, it was clearly stated that the Muslims will be in a leadership role with the Jews following them. Furthermore, it was agreed upon by both Muslims and the Jews that Muhammad would judge any disputes between the two communities. In the absence of such an arrangement with the INC, it was religiously prohibited for the Muslims to ally with it.

The qaumiyat-e-muttahida concept was also targeted by Usmani in his 1946 speech at Lahore, in which he suggested towards Allah's "secret design" for Pakistan by comparing the AIML's 1940 Lahore Resolution with Ahmad Sirhindi's jihad, which was launched in Lahore, against Akbar's newly-formed syncretic religion Din-i Ilahi in the 16th century

“  | It is possible that in his (Sirhindi’s) revelations there may be a pointer in this direction that when in the future, Muttahida Qaumiyat in another form arises, when Din-i-Illahi in the form of Gandhism comes to the fore, it will be Lahore from where the voice for breaking these new idols would issue forth, spread and flourish.  | ”

|
|

— Shabbir Ahmad Usmani[19]

## References

1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Behuria, Ashok K. (27 February 2008). "Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan". Strategic Analysis (Taylor & Francis) 32 (1): 57–80. doi:10.1080/09700160801886330.
2. ↑ Shah, Sabir (19 November 2019). "Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind turns 100 today". The News International (Lahore). https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/571125-jamiat-ulema-e-hind-turns-100-today.
3. ↑ Kermani, Secunder (18 August 2017). "How Jinnah's ideology shapes Pakistan's identity". Islamabad: BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40961603.
4. ↑ Mujahid, Sharif al (18 February 2020). "1945-46 Elections and Pakistan: Punjab's Pivotal Role". Pakistan Perspectives (Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) 14 (1).
5. ↑ Dhulipala, p. 6.
6. ↑ Uberman, Matan; Shay, Shaul (2016). "Hijrah According to the Islamic State: An Analysis of Dabiq". Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8 (9): 16–20. ISSN 2382-6444. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351451. Retrieved 17 April 2021.
7. ↑ "Kaaba" (in en). https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kaaba-shrine-Mecca-Saudi-Arabia.
8. ↑ Om, Hari (15 March 2016). "Understanding the Jamiat's truth" (in en). The Pioneer. https://www.dailypioneer.com/2016/columnists/understanding-the-jamiats-truth.html.
9. ↑ Dhulipala, p. 4.
10. ↑ Usmani, p. 21.
11. ↑ Dhulipala, p. 360-361.
12. ↑ Dhulipala, p. 373.
13. ↑ Usmani, p. 15.
14. ↑ "MQM to observe 'black day' over Khursheed Shah's 'Muhajir' comment" (in en). Dawn (Karachi). 25 October 2014. https://www.dawn.com/news/1140322/mqm-to-observe-black-day-over-khursheed-shahs-muhajir-comment.
15. ↑ Madani, Hussain Ahmad (2005). Composite Nationalism and Islam. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors. ISBN 8173045925.
16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Metcalf, p. 116.
17. ↑ Metcalf, p. 117.
18. ↑ Dhulipala, p. 107-108.
19. ↑ Dhulipala, p. 362.

## Bibliography

* Dhulipala, Venkat (2015), Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 9781107280380
* Metcalf, Barbara (2009), Husain Ahmad Madani : The Jihad for Islam and India's Freedom, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, ISBN 978-1851685790
* Usmani, Shabbir Ahmad (1946) (in ur), ہمارا پاکستان: خطبہا صدارت پنجاب جمیعتول علامہ کانفرنس, Lahore: Majlis-e-Istaqbaliya Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam Conference, https://www.rekhta.org/ebook-detail/khutba-e-sadarat-hamara-pakistan-shabbir-ahmad-usmani-ebooks, retrieved 17 April 2021

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