Criticism of democracy

Short description: Critiques of democratic political systems

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Democracy as a concept and as a practical form of government has been the subject of critique throughout history. Some critics consider that democratic regimes often fail to be true to the highest principles expected of them, while others reject the values promoted by constitutional democracy in whole or part.[1]

Opposition to democracy goes as far back as Plato, who argued for a 'government of the best qualified'. More recently, James Madison extensively studied historic attempts at and arguments on democracy in his preparation for the Constitutional Convention, and Winston Churchill remarked that, "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."[2]

Critics argue that modern democracies may fail to be sufficiently democratic and instead function in practice as oligarchies, insofar as governments are more responsive to the preferences of economic elites than to those of ordinary citizens. Numerous empirical studies across various western democracies including the United States, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Norway and Germany have consistently found that elected representatives tend to respond more to the preferences of very affluent citizens for policy outcomes than those of the average voter.[3][4][5][6]

Some critics of democracy have highlighted the concept's inconsistencies, paradoxes, and limits: drawing contrasts with other forms of government, such as epistocracy or lottocracy. Others have characterized most modern democracies as democratic polyarchies[7] and democratic aristocracies.[8] Yet others have identified fascist moments in modern democracies. They have termed the societies produced by modern democracies as neo-feudal[9] and have contrasted democracy with fascism, anarcho-capitalism, theocracy, and absolute monarchy.

## Contents

* 1 Historical criticism
* 1.1 Classical philosophy
* 1.2 Post-classical era criticism
* 1.3 Early modern criticism
* 1.4 Romantic era criticism
* 2 Political and philosophical criticism
* 2.1 Competence of the electorate
* 2.2 Majoritarianism
* 2.3 Elitism
* 2.4 Socialist and communist perspectives
* 3 Practical criticism
* 3.1 Lobbying and moneyed influence
* 3.2 Vulnerability to opponents
* 3.3 Inefficiency and instability
* 3.4 Low voter turnout
* 3.5 Politicians picking voters
* 4 Theocratic criticism
* 5 Responses to criticism
* 5.1 Defenses of democracy
* 5.2 Empirical evidence
* 6 See also
* 7 References
* 7.1 Cited works
* 8 Further reading

## Historical criticism

### Classical philosophy

Plato is considered one of the most important opponents of democratic rule in Ancient Greece.

Our understanding of classical theories of democracy depend heavily on the work of critics. For example, Robert Dahl has written, "Although the practices of modern democracy bear only a weak resemblance to the political institutions of classical Greece ... Greek democratic ideas have been more influential ... [and] what we know of their ideas comes less from the writings and speeches of democratic advocates, of which only fragments survive, than from their critics."[10] Amongst those critics, Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides are notable.

Aristotle was a mild critic of democracy. The essence of his critique was that he "disliked the power that he thought the expansion of democracy necessarily gave to the poor."[10] Plato was also skeptical of the broad scope of democracy: he advocated for "government by the best qualified."[10] Early liberal democracy paid attention to these critiques.[11] For example, James Madison "trained rigorously in ... ancient learning" as a young man, and the ideas of ancient authors explain a "facet of Madison's recorded attitude on the nature of man."[12] The influence of ancient critiques of democracy can be seen in the way Madison spent the months before the Constitutional Convention "studying many centuries of political philosophy and histories of past attempts at republican forms of government."[13]

According to Dahl, Aristotle and Plato would agree with most advocates of modern democracy that an aim of the society is "to produce good citizens", and that "Virtue, justice, and happiness are companions ... [in] developing citizens who seek the common good."[10]

Thucydides, the famous Greek historian of the Peloponnesian War, witnessed the fall of Athenian democracy and applied scientific history in his critique of the democratic government.[14] At the heart of his critique was an assertion that democracy failed "in the search for truth" and that leaders and citizens attempted "to impose their own speech-dependent meanings on reality."[14] Thucydides blamed "public orators" and demagogues for a failure of epistemic knowledge, allowing most Athenians to "believe silly things about their past and the institutions of their opponents."[14]

### Post-classical era criticism

Italian philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas favored "a mixed government combining elements of democracy, aristocracy and kingship ... [which] is reminiscent of Aristotle's preference for mixed government over either democracy or oligarchy."[15] Scholars also consider "the substantial medieval literature in support of the Inquisitions" to be opposed to modern ideas of democracy.[16]

Democracy existed in a few "city-states of medieval Italy ... [which] were ultimately submerged in imperial or oligarchic rule."[10] The idea of "representation was not invented by democrats but developed instead as a medieval institution of monarchical and aristocratic government," and had its beginnings in "assemblies summoned by the monarch, or sometimes the nobles themselves, to deal with important matters of state."[10] The "state of military technology and organization" in medieval Europe was "highly unfavorable in its effects" on democracy.[10]

Medieval Jewish political philosophy, being influenced by Plato, Muslim thought and Halakhic concepts, was "monarchist, and inherently anti-democratic."[17]

Traditional Asian societies were regarded as anti-democratic, but Amartya Sen has pointed out that "It is not hard, of course, to find authoritarian writings within the Asian traditions. But neither is it hard to find them in Western classics: One has only to reflect on the writings of Plato or Aquinas to see that devotion to discipline is not a special Asian taste."[16]

Since the post-classical period, Islam has been an important pillar of society for much of the world, and some critics have defended this tradition from "the secular assumptions of the Enlightenment" and an "uncritical universalism" that "erodes historical continuity and the sense of community that sustains traditional societies."[18] In many societies today, people of faith challenge the idea of "secularism as the only 'rational' way to deal with the challenges of life."[18]

### Early modern criticism

Thomas Hobbes, one of the first philosophers of the Enlightenment, published Leviathan in 1651 in defense of "absolute sovereignty" and in support of the royalist side in the English Civil War.[19] Hobbes was a critic of democracy because "the sovereign in a democracy (i.e. the people) can only exercise its power when it is actually assembled together ... Only in a monarchy is the capacity to govern always exercised."[20] Hobbes also considered that democracy would undermine the social contract because it leads to instability, conflict, glory-seeking, and mistrust.[20] Later Enlightenment thinkers, such as Madison, who shared Hobbesian concerns about "the strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses" of human nature, would use some of these critiques to improve modern democracy.[21][12]

### Romantic era criticism

Romantic critics of democracy include Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, James Fitzjames Stephen, Henry Maine, and William Lecky. In his study, Benjamin Evans Lippincott wrote that "they opposed democracy fundamentally for the same reason as Plato—that democracy led to disorder." However, their historical contribution was to critique democracy under capitalism in modern industrial society. They believed that democracy produced anarchy in society, not simply anarchy within the individual as Plato believed.[22]

Lippincott argued that this group held three fundamental doctrines: "the common man's inferiority, the title of the few to rule, and authority." They found sources for these principles in Puritanism, middle-class ideas of power, and the classical education that they had received in their youth. The three doctrines were "most perfectly represented in Plato's Republic," while classical history seemed to provide examples of "the common man's inferiority" as in the cases of Athens and Rome, "which showed the populace turning to disorder." The three doctrines had been developed during the Reformation and the Enlightenment by writers like John Calvin, Edmund Burke and David Hume.[23]

## Political and philosophical criticism

### Competence of the electorate

Plato's view was that the ability of common men to vote was one of democracy's key failings. This aspect of democracy means that the vote of an expert has equal value to the vote of 'an incompetent'.[24] Jason Brennan believes that low information voters are a significant problem in America, and that this is the main objection to democracies in general because the system does not incentivize being or becoming better informed.[25] He cites a study in which it was found that less than 30% of Americans could name two or more of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights.[25] He believes an informed voter should have extensive knowledge of the candidate's current and previous political beliefs/tendencies. He concludes that an epistocracy, which would only give a vote to those with an elite political understanding, would be better than a broad democracy.[25]

Charles Maurras, a supporter of the Vichy regime and principal philosopher of the right-wing Action Française movement, believed in biological inequality and natural hierarchies. He argued that the individual is naturally subordinate to collectivities such as the family, society, and the state, and so those are doomed to fail if they are founded on the "myth of equality" or "abstract liberty". Maurras criticized democracy as being a "government by numbers" in which quantity matters more than quality, and the worst is favored over the best. Maurras denounced the principles of liberalism as described in The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as based upon the false assumptions of liberty and equality. He claimed that the parliamentary system subordinates the national interest, or common good, to private interests of a parliament's representatives where only short-sighted interests of individuals prevail. Other studies have found that attempts, such as those proposed by Maurras, to replace democratic meritocracy with authoritarian meritocracy face challenges since power can override merit.[26]

In his criticism of Western liberal democracy, academic Zhang Weiwei argues that liberal democracy is insufficiently meritocratic and fails to choose trustworthy leaders.[27]: 211

### Majoritarianism

Plato, James Madison and other democratic theorists criticize the majority rule due to situations in which a majority could become tyrannical, also called the tyranny of the majority.[28][29] Richard Ellis and Michael Nelson have argued that much constitutional thought, from Madison to Lincoln and beyond, has focused on "the problem of majority tyranny". They conclude, "The principles of republican government embedded in the Constitution represent an effort by the framers to ensure that the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness would not be trampled by majorities."[30] Thomas Jefferson warned that "an elective despotism is not the government we fought for."[31] A constitution[32] limits what a simple majority can accomplish since changes to a constitution frequently require a supermajority.[33]

Another safeguard against the tyranny of majority are principles of liberalism through rights of the individual, liberty, consent of the governed, political equality, right to private property, political egalitarianism and equality before the law and other civil and political rights and human rights.[34][35] Cases where the majority opinion conflicts with some interpretations of liberal principles, for example on immigration, have been described as a democratic dilemma.[36]

The Chinese Communist Party's political concept of whole-process people's democracy criticizes liberal democracy for relying excessively on procedural formalities or rule of law without, in the party's view, genuinely reflecting the interests of the people.[37]: 60–64 According to Wang Zhongyuan of Fudan University, this critique arises as part of a post-1990s trend in which various countries have sought to redefine "democracy" in ways that differ from Western multi-party democratic systems.[37]: 61 Under the framing of whole-process people's democracy, the most important criteria for democracy is whether it can "solve the people's real problems," while a system in which "the people are awakened only for voting" is deemed not truly democratic.[37]: 60–64 The concept can thus be used as a way of criticizing liberal democracy and to deflect criticism of the Chinese system.[37]: 64

### Elitism

"The consciousness of power always produces vanity, an undue belief in personal greatness. The desire to dominate, for good or for evil, is universal. These are elementary facts. In the leader, the consciousness of his personal worth, and of the need which the mass feels for guidance, combine to induce in his mind a recognition of his own superiority (real or supposed), and awake, in addition, that spirit of command which exists in the germ in every man born of woman....He who has acquired power will almost always endeavor to consolidate it and to extend it, to multiply the ramparts which defend his position, and to withdraw himself from the control of the masses."

— Robert Michels, Political Parties, 1911[38]

Bernard Manin [fr; fr] draws on James Harrington, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to suggest that the dominant form of government—representative rather than direct democracy—is effectively aristocratic.[8] He says that modern representative governments exercise political power through aristocratic elections which, in turn, countermands the "rule of the people". Montesquieu argued that elections favor the "best" citizens who, as Manin notes, tend to be wealthy and upper-class. For Rousseau, elections favor incumbent government officials or those citizens with the strongest personalities, which results in a form of hereditary aristocracy. Manin further evinces the aristocratic nature of representative governments by contrasting them with the ancient style of selection by lot. He notes that Montesquieu considered lotteries to prevent jealousy and distribute offices equally (among citizens from different ranks), while Rousseau believed that lotteries chose indifferently, preventing self-interest and partiality from tainting the citizen's choice (and thereby preventing hereditary aristocracy).

Manin looks at the gap between the American and French revolutionaries' claim of "equality of all citizens" in the 18th century and their decision to use elections that often favored elites instead of lotteries in their democratic systems.[8] He explains this by noting that they valued some forms of equality more than others. What mattered most to them was that government rested on the consent of the governed, even if that meant an aristocratic democracy. They cared less about giving every citizen an equal chance to hold office. Elections gave citizens two kinds of consent: acceptance of both the process and the outcome, even when elites were chosen. Lotteries, on the other hand, only gave consent to the process, not to the individuals selected. Seen this way, their preference for elections over lotteries makes sense if they prioritized consent over equal opportunity.

The 20th-century Italian thinkers Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (independently) argued that democracy was illusory, and served only to mask the reality of elite rule. They suggested that elite oligarchy is the unbendable law of human nature, due largely to the apathy and division of the masses (as opposed to the drive, initiative and unity of the elites), and that democratic institutions would do no more than shift the exercise of power from oppression to manipulation.[39]

In 1911, German-Italian political scientist Robert Michels formulated the iron law of oligarchy.[40] He argued that oligarchy is unavoidable in any organization due to the practical demands of organizing. In democracy, he noted, organization inevitably produces the dominance of leaders over followers and delegates over those they represent.[40] Michels concluded that democracy's aim to end elite rule is impossible, since democracy ultimately serves to legitimize the rule of a particular elite, making oligarchy inevitable.[40]

A 2014 study led by Princeton professor Martin Gilens of 1,779 U.S. government decisions concluded that "elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence."[41]

### Socialist and communist perspectives

French revolutionary syndicalist Hubert Lagardelle claimed that French revolutionary syndicalism came to being as the result of "the reaction of the proletariat against idiotic democracy," which he claimed was "the popular form of bourgeois dominance". Lagardelle opposed democracy for its universalism, and believed in the necessity of class separation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, as democracy did not recognize the social differences between them.

Chinese communist policymakers argue that policy under democratic systems is largely restricted to ad hoc interventions and that this renders social development vulnerable to market forces.[42]: 144 Chinese planners argue that such ad hoc interventions are incapable of coping with fundamental challenges such as environmental degradation, dysfunction in capital markets, and demographic change.[42]: 145

## Practical criticism

### Lobbying and moneyed influence

Political representatives may be persuaded to vote against the interests of their constituency interests by special interest groups with significant funding for lobbying.[43] Some aspects of lobbying have been criticized for contributing to a democratic deficit.[44]

Democracies are not immune to corruption.[45] Whilst countries with high levels of democracy tend to have low levels of different forms of corruption, it is also clear that countries with moderate levels of democracy can have high levels of corruption. Similarly, countries with no democracy may have very little corruption.[46] Various features of democratic systems can reduce corruption, but only the combination of sophisticated democratic institutions, such as open and free elections coupled with judicial and legislative constraints, might effectively reduce corruption.[citation needed]

### Vulnerability to opponents

Boaventura de Sousa Santos has argued that "democracy is being so emptied of content that it can be instrumentally defended by those who use it in order to destroy it," and that individuals calling for increased democratization and protection from fascism are labeled as leftists.[47]

Various reasons can be found for eliminating or suppressing political opponents. Methods such as false flags, counterterrorism-laws,[48] planting or creating compromising material, or perpetuation of public fear can be used to suppress dissent. After a failed coup d'état in Turkey, over 110,000 people were removed from office and nearly 40,000 were imprisoned (despite its status as a democratic nation) during the 2016 purges.[49][50] Fake parties, phantom political rivals, and "scarecrow" opponents may be used to undermine the opposition.[51]

The electoral process in democracies can be corrupted through the giving and receiving of bribes, the threat or use of violence, treatment, or impersonation.[52]

Social bots and other forms of online propaganda, as well as algorithmically-driven search engine results, may be used to alter voters' perception of candidates and sway their opinions.[53][54] In 2016 Andrés Sepúlveda disclosed that he manipulated public opinion to rig elections in Latin America. According to his account, using a budget of $600,000, he led a team of hackers that stole campaign strategies, manipulated social media to create false waves of enthusiasm and derision, and installed spyware in opposition offices to help Enrique Peña Nieto, a right-of-center candidate, win the election.[55][56] Televised debates[57] and, according to George Bishop, inaccurate opinion polls[58] can in some cases shift election outcomes.

Dan Slater and Lucan Ahmad Way have contended that misinformation—such as fake news—has become common in elections around the world.[59] They criticized the FBI for announcing that the agency would examine potentially incriminating evidence against Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server just 11 days before the US election.[59]

### Inefficiency and instability

Majoritarian democracy has been criticized [by whom?] for not providing sufficient political stability. As governments of different political parties are frequently alternated, there tend to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries.{{Citation needed|date=February 2024} t rigid approaches to democracy may undermine the ability for a developing country to achieve long-term stability and democracy.[60][needs update]

Democracy tends to improve conflict resolution.[61] However, spatially concentrated costs and diffuse benefits together with regulatory transaction costs can result in ineffective conflict resolution such as NIMBYism.[62]

The Coase theorem states that non-zero transaction costs will generally lead to inefficient conflict resolution. Daron Acemoglu argues that the Coase theorem extends to politics, where the "rules of the game" in politics need to be enforced to achieve low transaction costs. Groups with political power can prefer inefficient policies and inefficient institutions and oppose further democratization.[63] Anthony Downs has argued that political markets work in much the same way as the economic market and that the democratic process could be responsible for creating equilibrium in the system.[64] However, he also acknowledged that imperfect knowledge in politicians and voters prevented the full realization of that equilibrium.[64]

Income inequality and limited socioeconomic mobility can lead to social unrest and revolutions.[65] The extension of the democratic franchise can be seen as a commitment by the political elite in favor of economic redistribution and political redistribution to prevent social unrest, explaining the Kuznets curve.[66] There is no consensus as to the situations in which democracy actually does reduce economic inequality.[67]

The democratic process can provide short-term incentives for elected politicians, and this may lead to the prioritization of actions or policies with short-term benefits,[68] while longer-term risks such as debt crisis, pensions crisis, climate risk or financial crisis are ignored.[69] Some election systems have been shown to reward financial prudence[70] and debt brakes.[71] Different voting systems lead to different levels of short-termism in politics.[72]

James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner have argued that the nontransparent nature of most tax systems causes a fiscal illusion which results in greater government spending than democratically expected.[73]

### Low voter turnout

Voter turnout being lower than desired in some democracies has been attributed to several causes, including: reduced trust in democratic processes; lack of compulsory voting; political efficacy; wasted votes;[74] political gridlock; and high barriers to entry for new political movements.[75] Lower voter turnout for young adults contributes to gerontocracy.[76]

### Politicians picking voters

Gerrymandering in first-past-the-post voting has been criticized in some cases as politicians picking voters instead of voters picking politicians.[77] Politicized naturalization can reshape the electorate of the country.[78]

## Theocratic criticism

Main articles: Social:Theocracy and Salafism

In a theocracy, the supreme ruling authority is a deity, rather than the people.[79] Theodemocracy combines authority by both deity and the people.[80]

The practice of orthodox Islam in the form of Salafism can clash with a democratic system. The core precept of Islam, that of "tawheed" (the "oneness of God"), can be interpreted by fundamentalist Salafis to mean, among other things, that democracy as a political system is incompatible with the purported notion that laws not handed down by God should not be recognized.[81]

Carl Schmitt contended that political representation in a liberal democracy was formulaic, and that the mystical nature and personalist ideal of the Catholic sovereign was essential.[82]: 516

Some political leaders in Singapore and China, such as Lee Kuan Yew, have said that Confucianism provides a more "coherent ideological basis for a well-ordered Asian society than Western notions of individual liberty."[83] Chinese Confucian Jiang Qing, who advocates for the political Confucianism of the Gyongyang School, contends that parliamentary democracy is constrained by legal formalism, vulgar populism, and moral relativism.[84]: 258

## Responses to criticism

### Defenses of democracy

In his book Against Elections: The Case for Democracy, David Van Reybrouck argues that allocating power through sortition, such as in citizens' assemblies, can resolve many of the shortcomings of representative democracy. "Democracy is not government by the best in our society, because such a thing is called an aristocracy, elected or not ... Democracy, by contrast, flourishes precisely by allowing a diversity of voices to be heard. It's all about having an equal say, an equal right to determine what political action is taken."[85]

To safeguard democracy from inappropriate use of the power to declare a state of emergency, it is sometimes proposed that such declarations should include sunset provisions together with a process of extension review.[86] Sunset provisions are also thought to increase the long-term electoral accountability of some other types of law or regulation.[87]

Those concerned by the way public opinion can be swayed by funded campaigns often argue for limitations on the ability of money to play a role in democracy.[88][89]

### Empirical evidence

Contemporary empirical evidence on the success of democracy is equivocal. On one hand, democracy is sometimes credited for bringing peace, individual freedoms and economic prosperity.[90] On the other hand, certain studies, such as The Economist Democracy Index indicate that democracies are in decline globally.[91]

## See also

* Böckenförde dilemma
* Collective problem solving
* Democracy in China
* Democracy: The God That Failed—2001 book by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
* Group decision-making
* General will § Criticisms
* Liberal democracy § Objections and criticism
* Illiberal democracy
* Neo-feudalism
* Political warfare
* The Myth of the Rational Voter
* The Rise of the Meritocracy

## References

1. ↑ Ober, Josiah (2005). "Democratic Athens as an Experimental System: History and the Project of Political Theory" (in en). Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics Paper No. 110512 (Rochester, NY). doi:10.2139/ssrn.1426841. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1426841.
2. ↑ Winston Churchill (11 November 1947). "Parliament Bill". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). 444. House of Commons. col. 206. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill#column_206. Retrieved 2025-09-03.
3. ↑ Persson, Mikael (2024-07-02). "Who got what they wanted? Investigating the role of institutional agenda setting, costly policies, and status quo bias as explanations to income based unequal responsiveness". Journal of European Public Policy 31 (7): 1879–1901. doi:10.1080/13501763.2023.2177323. ISSN 1350-1763. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2177323.
4. ↑ Sevenans, Julie; Marié, Awenig; Breunig, Christian; Walgrave, Stefaan; Soontjens, Karolin; Vliegenthart, Rens (2025). "Are poor people poorly heard?" (in en). European Journal of Political Research 64 (3): 1326–1350. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12750. ISSN 1475-6765. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1475-6765.12750.
5. ↑ Lupu, Noam; Warner, Zach (2022). "Why are the affluent better represented around the world?" (in en). European Journal of Political Research 61 (1): 67–85. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12440. ISSN 1475-6765. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1475-6765.12440.
6. ↑ "Oligarchy in the open: What happens now as the U.S. is forced to confront its plutocracy problem?" (in en). 2025-02-13. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policycast/oligarchy-open-what-happens-now-us-forced-confront-its-plutocracy.
7. ↑ Dahl, Robert A. (1972). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 1–16. ISBN 978-0-300-01565-2.
8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Manin, Bernard (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 2, 67–93, 132–160. ISBN 978-0-521-45891-7. https://archive.org/details/principlesrepres00mani.
9. ↑ Thom Hartmann, "Time to Remove the Bananas...and Return Our Republic to Democracy," CommonDreams.org, 6 November 2002
10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 Dahl, Robert A. (1991). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-04938-1.
11. ↑ Arnhart, Larry (2015-06-01). "Leo Strauss and Anglo-American Democracy: A Conservative Critique, by Grant N. Havers". American Political Thought 4 (3): 513–516. doi:10.1086/682033. ISSN 2161-1580. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/682033.
12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Ketcham, Ralph L. (1958). "James Madison and the Nature of Man". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (1): 62–76. doi:10.2307/2707952. ISSN 0022-5037.
13. ↑ "The Life of James Madison". http://www.montpelier.org/learn/the-life-of-james-madison.
14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Ober, Josiah (1993-01-01). "Thucydides' Criticism of Democratic Knowledge". Nomodeiktes. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264838793.
15. ↑ Kilcullen, John; Robinson, Jonathan (2019), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Medieval Political Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/medieval-political/, retrieved 2022-02-19
16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Sen, Amartya Kumar (1999). "Democracy as a Universal Value". Journal of Democracy 10 (3): 3–17. doi:10.1353/jod.1999.0055. ISSN 1086-3214. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16979.
17. ↑ Melamed, Avraham (1993). "The Attitude Towards Democracy in Medieval Jewish Philosophy". Jewish Political Studies Review 5 (1/2): 33–56. ISSN 0792-335X.
18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Majid, Anouar (1995). "Can the Postcolonial Critic Speak? Orientalism and the Rushdie Affair". Cultural Critique (32): 5–42. doi:10.2307/1354529. ISSN 0882-4371.
19. ↑ Duncan, Stewart (2021), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Thomas Hobbes (Fall 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/hobbes/, retrieved 2022-02-20
20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Apperley, Alan (1999). "Hobbes on Democracy" (in en). Politics 19 (3): 165–171. doi:10.1111/1467-9256.00101. ISSN 1467-9256. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9256.00101.
21. ↑ Coleman, Frank (2017-06-12) (in en). Hobbes and America. University of Toronto Press. doi:10.3138/9781442652989. ISBN 978-1-4426-5298-9. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781442652989/html.
22. ↑ Lippincott, Benjamin Evans (1938). Victorian Critics of Democracy. The University of Minnesota Press. p. 5. http://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.505455.
23. ↑ Lippincott, Benjamin Evans (1938). Victorian Critics of Democracy. The University of Minnesota Press. p. 257.
24. ↑ "Plato | Criticism of democracy". January 23, 2021. https://thegallerist.art/plato-criticism-of-democracy/.
25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Brennan 2016.
26. ↑ He, Baogang; Warren, Mark E. (2020). "Can meritocracy replace democracy? A conceptual framework". Philosophy & Social Criticism 46 (9): 1093–1112. doi:10.1177/0191453720948388.
27. ↑ Bachulska, Alicja; Leonard, Mark; Oertel, Janka (2 July 2024) (EPUB). The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People. Berlin, Germany: European Council on Foreign Relations. ISBN 978-1-916682-42-9. https://ecfr.eu/publication/idea-of-china/. Retrieved 22 July 2024.
28. ↑ Michels, Robert. Political Parties – A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, Jarrold & Sons. London, 1916.
29. ↑ "The Federalist Papers: No. 10". Avalon Project. December 29, 1998. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp.
30. ↑ Richard J. Ellis and Michael Nelson, Debating the presidency (2009) p. 211
31. ↑ David Tucker, Enlightened republicanism: a study of Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia (2008) p. 109
32. ↑ Lowell, A. Lawrence. "Democracy and the Constitution," Essays on Government, Houghton Mifflin & Co. New York, 1890.
33. ↑ James Madison, Federalist No. 10
34. ↑ "liberalism In general, the belief that it is the aim of politics to preserve individual rights and to maximize freedom of choice." Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, Third edition 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-920516-5.
35. ↑ Young, Shaun (2002). Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. p. 36. ISBN 978-0-7618-2240-0. https://archive.org/details/beyondrawlsanaly0000youn.
36. ↑ Kapelner, Zsolt (2024). "Anti-immigrant backlash: the Democratic Dilemma for immigration policy". Comparative Migration Studies 12 (1). doi:10.1186/s40878-024-00370-7. ISSN 2214-594X. Bibcode: 2024CmpMS..12...12K.
37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 37.2 37.3 Wang, Zhongyuan (2022). "Democracy with Chinese Adjectives: Whole-Process Democracy and China's Political Development". CPC Futures The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press. doi:10.56159/eai.52060. ISBN 978-981-18-5206-0. OCLC 1354535847.
38. ↑ Michels, Robert (1962). Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: The Free Press. p. 206.
39. ↑ Femia 2001.
40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 40.2 James L. Hyland. Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations. Manchester, England, UK; New York, New York, USA: Manchester University Press ND, 1995. Pp. 247.
41. ↑ "Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens," M. Gilens and B. I. Page (2014), Perspectives on politics 12, 564–581, [1]
42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Heilmann, Sebastian (2018). Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy-Making Facilitated China's Rise. The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv2n7q6b. ISBN 978-962-996-827-4.
43. ↑ Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois (31 May 2024). "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention". The Economic Journal 134 (662): 2290–2320. doi:10.1093/ej/ueae020. ISSN 0013-0133.
44. ↑ Karr, Karolina (2007). Democracy and lobbying in the European Union.. Campus Verlag. p. 10. ISBN 978-3-593-38412-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=ZhOQHhYU-YYC&pg=PA10.
45. ↑ "How Corruption Weakens Democracy". https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi_2018_global_analysis.
46. ↑ McMann, Kelly M.; Seim, Brigitte; Teorell, Jan; Lindberg, Staffan (July 2019). "Why Low Levels of Democracy Promote Corruption and High Levels Diminish It". Political Research Quarterly 73 (4): 1. doi:10.1177/1065912919862054.
47. ↑ De Sousa Santos, Boaventura (21 March 2023). "Silence of the Intellectuals". Journal of World-Systems Research 29 (1): 219–226. doi:10.5195/JWSR.2023.1177.
48. ↑ (in en) Chronicles. Rockford Institute. 2003. https://books.google.com/books?id=5VYIAQAAMAAJ. Retrieved 22 January 2017.
49. ↑ "Turkey's crackdown on dissent has gone too far". Financial Times. October 4, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/269f0b22-8a27-11e6-8aa5-f79f5696c731.
50. ↑ Norton, Ben (2016-11-02). "Turkey's ruthless, slow-motion coup: 110,000 purged as Western ally cracks down on dissent, journalism". Salon. https://www.salon.com/2016/11/02/turkeys-ruthless-slow-motion-coup-110000-purged-as-western-ally-cracks-down-on-dissent-journalism/.
51. ↑ Wilson, Andrew (2005). Virtual politics: faking democracy in the post-Soviet world (1st ed.). New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Pr.. ISBN 978-0-300-09545-6.
52. ↑ Ward, Norman (February 1949). "Electoral Corruption and Controverted Elections". The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 15 (1): 74–86. doi:10.2307/137956.
53. ↑ Copley, Caroline (24 November 2016). "Merkel fears social bots may manipulate German election". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-merkel-socialbots-idUSKBN13J1V0.
54. ↑ Gaycken, Sandro (18 October 2016). "The new power of manipulation" (in en). Deutsche Welle. http://www.dw.com/en/the-new-power-of-manipulation/a-36074925.
55. ↑ Robertson, Jordan; Riley, Michael; Willis, Andrew (March 31, 2016). "How to Hack an Election". Bloomberg.com (Bloomberg). https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-to-hack-an-election/.
56. ↑ Staufenberg, Jess (2 April 2016). "Man claims he rigged elections in most Latin American countries over 8 years". The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/political-cyberhacker-andres-sepulveda-reveals-how-he-digitally-rigged-elections-across-latin-a6965161.html.
57. ↑ Davis, Colin J.; Bowers, Jeffrey S.; Memon, Amina (30 March 2011). "Social Influence in Televised Election Debates: A Potential Distortion of Democracy". PLOS ONE 6 (3). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018154. ISSN 1932-6203. PMID 21479191. Bibcode: 2011PLoSO...618154D.
58. ↑ Bishop, George (November 30, 2015). "Polls Can Create an Illusion of Public Opinion". The Opinion Pages - The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/11/30/does-polling-undermine-democracy/polls-can-create-an-illusion-of-public-opinion.
59. ↑ 59.0 59.1 Slater, Dan; Way, Lucan Ahmad (January 12, 2017). "Was the 2016 U.S. election democratic? Here are 7 serious shortfalls.". Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/12/was-the-2016-u-s-election-democratic-we-see-7-serious-shortfalls/.
60. ↑ Wafawarova, Reason (16 October 2008). "Opinion: Head to head: African democracy". BBC News. https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7671283.stm.
61. ↑ Dixon, William J. (1993). "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict". Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 42–68. doi:10.1177/0022002793037001002.
62. ↑ Foster, David; Warren, Joseph (2022). "The NIMBY problem". Journal of Theoretical Politics 34: 145–172. doi:10.1177/09516298211044852.
63. ↑ Acemoglu, Daron (2003). "Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, And Politics". Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4): 620–652. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.003.
64. ↑ 64.0 64.1 Downs, Anthony (April 1957). "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy". Journal of Political Economy 65 (2): 135–150. doi:10.1086/257897.
65. ↑ Parvin, Manoucher (1973). "Economic Determinants of Political Unrest: An Econometric Approach" (in en). Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (2): 271–296. doi:10.1177/002200277301700205. ISSN 0022-0027. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200277301700205.
66. ↑ Acemoglu, D.; Robinson, J. A. (2000). "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective" (in en). The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (4): 1167–1199. doi:10.1162/003355300555042. ISSN 0033-5533. https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-lookup/doi/10.1162/003355300555042.
67. ↑ Timmons, Jeffrey F. (2010). "Does Democracy Reduce Economic Inequality?" (in en). British Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 741–757. doi:10.1017/S0007123410000165. ISSN 0007-1234. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0007123410000165/type/journal_article.
68. ↑ Ogami, Masakazu (2 May 2024). "The Conditionality of Political Short-Termism: A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies". Politics and Governance 12. doi:10.17645/pag.7764. ISSN 2183-2463.
69. ↑ Lipscy, Phillip Y. (2018). "Democracy and Financial Crisis". International Organization 72 (4): 937–968. doi:10.1017/S0020818318000279. ISSN 0020-8183.
70. ↑ Buchs, Aurélia; Soguel, Nils (2022-04-01). "Fiscal performance and the re-election of finance ministers–evidence from the Swiss cantons" (in en). Public Choice 191 (1): 31–49. doi:10.1007/s11127-021-00949-z. ISSN 1573-7101.
71. ↑ Mosler, Martin; Schaltegger, Christoph (27 June 2024). "The Swiss Debt Brake Is Democratic, Strict, Transparent, and Binding. A Model to Follow?". The Economists' Voice 21 (1): 213–218. doi:10.1515/ev-2024-0021. ISSN 1553-3832.
72. ↑ Ferrín, Mónica; Hernández, Enrique (May 2021). "Preferences for consensus and majoritarian democracy: long- and short-term influences" (in en). European Political Science Review 13 (2): 209–225. doi:10.1017/S1755773921000047. ISSN 1755-7739. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/preferences-for-consensus-and-majoritarian-democracy-long-and-shortterm-influences/865BE64CC6B0369D96145514186B84FA.
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80. ↑ Times and Seasons, 5:510.
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### Cited works

* Brennan, Jason (2016). Against Democracy: New Preface. Princeton University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctvc77mcz. ISBN 978-1-4008-8839-9. OCLC 942707357.
* Reybrouck, David Van (2016). Against Elections: The Case for Democracy. London: The Bodley Head. p. 133. ISBN 978-1-84792-422-3.
* Femia, Joseph V. (2001). Against the masses: varieties of anti-democratic thought since the French Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-828063-7. OCLC 46641885.

## Further reading

This further reading section may contain inappropriate or excessive suggestions that may not follow Wikipedia's guidelines. Please ensure that only a reasonable number of balanced, topical, reliable, and notable further reading suggestions are given; removing less relevant or redundant publications with the same point of view where appropriate. Consider utilising appropriate texts as inline sources or creating a separate bibliography article. (March 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

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* Benoist, Alain de (2011). The Problem of Democracy. London: Arktos. ISBN 978-1-907166-16-7. OCLC 713181908. [importance?]
* Lukacs, John (8 March 2005). Democracy and Populism. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-10773-9.
* Mann, Michael (2004). The Dark Side of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-53854-1.
* Graham, Gordon (2002). The Case Against the Democratic State. Thorverton: Imprint Academic. ISBN 978-0-907845-38-6. OCLC ocm50581619. [importance?]
* Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (2001). Democracy - the God That Failed. New Brunswick, [NJ]: Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-0-7658-0868-4.
* Schmitt, Carl (22 June 1988). The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-69126-0.
* Briggs, Asa (1975-04-15). "Robert Lowe and the Fear of Democracy in late 19th century British politics". Victorian People. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-07488-7. https://archive.org/details/victorianpeoplea000327mbp/page/n9/mode/2up.
* Newcastle, Lord Percy of. The Heresy of Democracy, Henry Regnery Co, 1955.[importance?]
* Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von. Liberty or Equality, The Caxton Printers, 1952.[importance?]
* Mencken, H. L. (1926). Notes on democracy. New York: Knopf. OCLC 182664.
* Mackinder, Sir Halford J. Democratic Ideals and Reality, Henry Holt & Company. New York, 1919.
* Godkin, Edwin L. Problems of Modern Democracy, Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1896.[importance?]
* Maine, Sir Henry Sumner. Popular Government, John Murray. London, 1886.

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