Identity politics

Political strategy and rhetorical framework centered on group identity

Identity politics refers to political organization, advocacy, and theoretical analysis structured around shared characteristics such as race, ethnicity, religion, sex, gender, nationality, or other markers of collective identity. In academic usage, the term describes political claims grounded in the lived experiences of particular social groups and often connected to perceived patterns of injustice or exclusion.[1][2] Although the phrase gained prominence in the late twentieth century, political mobilization based on shared identity predates the term and has appeared in nationalist movements, religious reform movements, class-based organizing, and civil rights campaigns throughout modern history.[1][3]

The term identity politics has developed multiple meanings in public discourse. In scholarly contexts it refers to political activity rooted in shared group experience and collective claims for recognition or equality.[1][2] In contemporary political rhetoric, however, the phrase is frequently used as a critical or pejorative label to describe perceived factionalism, grievance-based mobilization, or prioritization of subgroup interests over broader civic identity.[4][5] Because the term is applied in divergent ways across academic theory, media commentary, and partisan debate, its meaning often depends on context and perspective.[3]

## Contents

* 1 Historical antecedents
* 2 Critiques
* 2.1 Liberal universalist critique
* 2.2 Marxist and class-first critique
* 2.3 Conservative critique
* 2.4 Civic republican and democratic stability critique
* 3 Identity politics in public discourse
* 4 Comparative historical developments
* 5 Identity politics and polarization research
* 6 Comparative historical developments
* 7 Synthesis and continuing debates
* 8 See also
* 9 References

## Historical antecedents[edit | edit source]

Political organization structured around shared identity categories long predates the emergence of the modern term. Nineteenth-century nationalist movements in Europe and the Americas mobilized populations around language, ethnicity, and territorial belonging, linking political sovereignty to collective cultural identity.[6] Religious reform movements likewise framed political and social demands in terms of confessional identity, while labor movements organized workers around shared class position and economic interests.[7]

In the United States, abolitionism, Reconstruction-era civil rights advocacy, women's suffrage campaigns, and later civil rights and feminist movements frequently articulated claims grounded in shared social experience and exclusion from political participation.[8][9] Scholars of social movements have noted that collective identity formation often plays a central role in mobilization, providing shared narratives, symbols, and interpretive frameworks that link personal experience to political action.[10]

The explicit phrase "identity politics" is widely associated with the 1977 statement of the Combahee River Collective, a Black feminist organization that described political analysis rooted in the interlocking experiences of race, sex, class, and sexuality.[11] During the 1980s and 1990s, the term entered broader academic and political usage, particularly within feminist theory, critical race theory, and scholarship on intersectionality, which examined how overlapping systems of social stratification shape political experience and claims-making.[12][1]

Although identity-based mobilization has been associated with movements seeking expanded rights and representation, scholars have also observed that collective identity can be mobilized in exclusionary or nationalist forms, depending on institutional context and political leadership.[3][6] Comparative historical research indicates that identity-centered political narratives may function differently within pluralist democratic systems than within authoritarian or revolutionary regimes, where identity categories can become institutionalized as state ideology.[7]

## Critiques[edit | edit source]

Scholarly criticism of identity politics has emerged from multiple intellectual traditions, including liberal universalism, Marxist and class-centered theory, conservative political thought, and civic republican analysis. These critiques differ in assumptions about justice and political order, but they often converge on questions of social cohesion, distributive justice, democratic legitimacy, and the long-term stability of pluralist institutions.[4][5][13][3]

Critics also differ over what they mean by identity politics, distinguishing between descriptive claims for equal citizenship and rights enforcement, and broader cultural or institutional programs framed around group identity. Because the term is used in multiple ways, many disputes concern scope and definition as much as they concern normative evaluation.[1][2][10]

### Liberal universalist critique[edit | edit source]

Liberal universalist critics argue that democratic citizenship depends on shared civic principles that can be affirmed across lines of race, religion, and culture, and that political strategies built primarily around subgroup identity can weaken coalition-building by narrowing the language of political appeal.[5][4] Mark Lilla argues that identity-centered mobilization, when treated as a comprehensive political strategy, can leave majorities and cross-pressured voters outside the imagined constituency of reform movements, reducing electoral reach and incentives for broad-based institutional change.[5] Francis Fukuyama similarly contends that modern democracies require an integrating sense of national identity to sustain trust and legitimacy, and that political conflict increasingly organized around dignity, recognition, and cultural status can intensify polarization when it becomes detached from shared civic commitments.[4]

Other liberal critics emphasize institutional incentives and the long-term consequences of politics framed as intergroup conflict. Yascha Mounk argues that identity-based frameworks can produce rigid moral sorting and weaken norms of pluralism when political disagreement is interpreted primarily through group membership rather than shared constitutional principles.[14] Amy Chua approaches the issue through the lens of group psychology and tribal affiliation, arguing that group loyalty often functions independently of ideology and that democratic stability depends on reducing zero-sum tribal competition within national politics.[15]

Counterarguments within liberal and egalitarian theory emphasize that equal citizenship is not achieved solely through formal universalism if institutions systematically exclude or disadvantage particular groups. Iris Marion Young argues that a politics attentive to group difference can be necessary for justice when social structures impose differentiated constraints and vulnerabilities that are not captured by abstract sameness.[16] Related scholarship in social movement studies also holds that collective identity formation can be a normal and sometimes necessary component of democratic mobilization, particularly in contexts of longstanding exclusion.[10][8]

### Marxist and class-first critique[edit | edit source]

Marxist and class-first critics contend that identity politics can displace analysis centered on political economy, class relations, and the distribution of material resources. Nancy Fraser argues that modern progressive politics has often shifted from redistribution toward recognition, and that recognition-focused politics can be compatible with persistent or worsening economic inequality if structural reforms to labor, welfare, and market power are not pursued.[13] In this line of critique, the concern is not that identity claims are illegitimate, but that a politics oriented toward cultural status can leave the economic foundations of inequality largely intact.[13]

Other class-first critics argue that institutional emphasis on diversity and representation can function as a substitute for policies that reduce inequality across society. Walter Benn Michaels argues that modern diversity frameworks can coexist with widening economic disparity, and that moral and cultural validation may be offered in place of redistribution or structural economic reform.[17] Adolph Reed Jr. and Michaels jointly argue that a politics primarily organized around protected categories and representational diversity can align with existing legal and managerial frameworks while limiting the development of broader working-class political coalitions.[18]

Counterarguments from intersectional scholarship hold that class-centered approaches risk understating how race, sex, and other status hierarchies shape labor markets, state enforcement, and exposure to violence. Crenshaw's intersectionality framework argues that discrimination and vulnerability may operate through intersecting mechanisms that cannot be captured adequately by class analysis alone.[12] Some scholars therefore treat the tension between redistribution and recognition as a practical and strategic question, not a binary choice, contending that durable reform agendas often require both economic and anti-discrimination components.[16][1]

### Conservative critique[edit | edit source]

Conservative critics often argue that institutionalizing identity categories within law, education, corporate governance, and public policy can undermine principles of formal equality by shifting political legitimacy from individual rights to group-based claims for recognition or redress.[4][5] From this perspective, politics framed in terms of identity categories may encourage competitive grievance claims and intensify social conflict by recasting policy disagreements as moral conflict between groups rather than disputes over interests and institutional design.[4] Conservative critiques also commonly focus on the administrative and cultural consequences of identity-based frameworks, including the expansion of compliance regimes, speech disputes, and the perception that institutions treat citizens differently based on protected categories.[19]

Counterarguments emphasize that anti-discrimination law and civil rights enforcement are identity-relevant by necessity, because unequal treatment is often targeted at specific groups. Social movement research and democratic theory therefore frequently distinguish between identity as a basis for equal protection claims and identity as a comprehensive theory of politics.[8][16] Empirical research on affective polarization also suggests that perceptions of group-based favoritism or exclusion can influence trust in institutions, indicating that both real policy design and perceived fairness shape political conflict, regardless of ideological framing.[19]

### Civic republican and democratic stability critique[edit | edit source]

Drawing on classical republican concerns about faction, some theorists argue that democratic stability depends on cross-cutting affiliations and shared civic identity, and that politics organized primarily around subgroup identity can increase zero-sum competition for state power.[16] This critique is often linked to longstanding arguments in constitutional thought about the dangers of factionalism, in which political communities divide into camps motivated by passion or perceived group interest rather than by deliberation oriented toward the common good.[20] Comparative historical analysis also cautions that identity-centered narratives can become institutionalized as state ideology under certain authoritarian or revolutionary regimes, with identity categories used to justify repression, exclusion, or social control, even when the ideological vocabulary differs across cases.[7][6]

Counterarguments emphasize that pluralist democracies often manage identity conflict through constitutional rights, federalism, and negotiated institutional arrangements, and that the presence of identity-based advocacy does not by itself determine whether a system becomes unstable or authoritarian. Scholars therefore caution against direct equivalence between democratic identity-based mobilization and authoritarian identity-based state ideology, emphasizing institutional context and constraints on state power.[3][6]

## Identity politics in public discourse[edit | edit source]

Over time, the phrase identity politics has moved beyond academic theory and into everyday political language. In public debate, it is often used not as a neutral description of group-based political organizing, but as a shorthand for factionalism, grievance politics, or perceived fragmentation of civic life.[4][5] The term is frequently invoked in electoral campaigns, legislative disputes, media commentary, and cultural debates, where it may function less as an analytical category and more as a rhetorical label.[14][15]

Scholars of political communication have noted that political labels can shape public perception by framing disputes in moral or identity-based terms rather than policy-based terms.[19] When disputes are framed as conflicts between identity groups, political disagreement may be interpreted as evidence of hostility toward the group itself rather than as disagreement over institutional design or policy outcomes.[19] Research on affective polarization suggests that partisan identity increasingly overlaps with social identity markers, intensifying distrust and negative sentiment toward perceived out-groups.[19]

Some commentators argue that the pejorative use of identity politics can itself contribute to polarization by dismissing policy concerns as illegitimate simply because they are articulated through the language of group experience.[16] Others contend that the term has become a catch-all phrase used to criticize any political movement perceived as emphasizing difference over shared citizenship.[3] Because the phrase is applied across ideological contexts, it has been used both to critique progressive social movements and to describe nationalist or cultural appeals on the political right.[4][15]

> "Identity has become a lens through which politics is increasingly understood, but when political actors treat identity as the primary organizing principle of public life, it can reshape democratic competition into a struggle over recognition and status." — Francis Fukuyama[4]

Public discourse surrounding political violence provides a contemporary illustration of how identity framing operates. The assassination of Charlie Kirk in 2025, which occurred during a public speaking event at a university venue, was widely described by officials and media outlets as a politically motivated killing.[21][22] In the immediate aftermath, public discussion focused not only on the facts of the case and legal proceedings, but also on how the event reflected broader political divisions and rhetorical escalation.[22]

Media reporting and commentary frequently categorized the victim and alleged perpetrator through ideological and identity-based descriptors, illustrating how acts of violence can become embedded in larger narratives about political alignment and group conflict.[21] Scholars of political communication observe that early narrative framing often shapes long-term public understanding, particularly when events are interpreted through preexisting partisan or cultural lenses.[19] In such contexts, identity categories may influence how motive is perceived, how blame is assigned, and how broader social conclusions are drawn from a single event.[19]

> "When political identity becomes central to social identity, disagreement can be perceived as a threat to one's group, rather than a contest over policy." — Shanto Iyengar et al.[19]

Commentators across ideological traditions have argued that sustained use of identity-based framing, whether to mobilize supporters or to criticize opponents, may contribute to escalating cycles of mistrust.[14][15] Others maintain that the language of identity remains necessary to describe real patterns of discrimination, exclusion, or unequal treatment, and that removing such language would obscure substantive social grievances.[16][12] The tension between these positions reflects a broader debate about whether identity-based discourse primarily clarifies political conflict or intensifies it.[3]

Because the term identity politics is often used rhetorically rather than analytically, its meaning in public debate can vary widely depending on speaker and context. Some employ it to critique redistributive or recognition-based policies; others use it to describe nationalist appeals or cultural traditionalism. As a result, the phrase frequently functions as a contested symbol within larger struggles over civic identity, national cohesion, and the proper boundaries of political disagreement.[4][15]

## Comparative historical developments[edit | edit source]

Comparative history shows that political movements organized around collective identity have taken markedly different forms depending on institutional structure, leadership, and constitutional constraints. In pluralist democracies, identity-based advocacy has often operated within legal frameworks to expand civil rights, voting access, and representation.[8][6] In authoritarian or revolutionary regimes, however, identity categories have at times been formalized into state doctrine, linking political legitimacy to a prescribed class, ethnic, or national identity.[7]

In the twentieth century, several revolutionary governments institutionalized identity classifications as part of political restructuring. Under Mao Zedong in the People's Republic of China, class identity became a central organizing principle of governance. Citizens were categorized according to perceived class background, and those labeled "landlords," "rich peasants," or "counterrevolutionaries" were subjected to dispossession, public denunciation, imprisonment, and execution.[23][24] Historians estimate that tens of millions of people died during the Great Leap Forward due to famine linked to state agricultural policies, and that widespread persecution occurred during the Cultural Revolution.[23][24]

> "The Great Leap Forward was the greatest catastrophe in the history of the People's Republic of China, leading to the deaths of tens of millions of people as a result of radical collectivization and coercive state policies." — Frank Dikötter[23]

In these contexts, identity was not merely a tool of mobilization but a legal and administrative category embedded in party rule and state power. Political loyalty and social classification could determine access to education, employment, and even survival.[24] Comparative scholars emphasize that such outcomes were linked to concentrated authority and absence of institutional safeguards, rather than to identity language alone.[7]

Revolutionary nationalism in other contexts likewise tied state legitimacy to a dominant ideological or cultural identity. In Cuba, the post-1959 revolutionary government consolidated authority around anti-imperialist and socialist identity, restructuring property relations and political institutions under a single-party system.[7] In North Korea, the doctrine of Juche linked national identity to centralized political authority, producing a political structure in which dissent was criminalized and loyalty to state ideology was paramount.[25]

> "Totalizing ideologies that fuse identity with state authority leave little space for pluralism, dissent, or institutional correction." — Eric Hobsbawm[7]

Scholars caution against drawing direct equivalence between democratic identity-based advocacy and authoritarian identity-based state ideology. Constitutional democracies typically maintain institutional mechanisms that limit executive authority, protect minority rights, and provide avenues for electoral accountability.[6][16] Where such safeguards remain intact, identity-based movements may seek recognition or policy reform without monopolizing state power.[8]

Nevertheless, comparative historical cases are frequently cited in contemporary debate as cautionary examples of how identity categories, when institutionalized without legal restraint, can become instruments of exclusion or coercion. The historical record documents that political systems which defined citizenship or loyalty primarily through rigid identity classifications often experienced severe repression, mass imprisonment, or large-scale loss of life.[23][7]

These historical experiences inform modern discussions about the relationship between identity, citizenship, and constitutional order. Scholars across ideological traditions emphasize that the consequences of identity-centered political organization depend not solely on rhetoric, but on institutional design, rule of law, and the distribution of state power.[4][3] The distinction between identity as a basis for equal protection within pluralist systems and identity as an exclusive state doctrine remains central to contemporary political analysis.[16]

## Identity politics and polarization research[edit | edit source]

In recent decades, researchers have examined whether increasing alignment between partisan affiliation and social identity markers has intensified political division. Studies of affective polarization indicate that members of opposing parties increasingly view each other with distrust or hostility, even when policy differences are limited.[19] This phenomenon is often attributed to social sorting, in which party identity overlaps with religion, geography, education level, race, and cultural affiliation.[19]

> "Partisan identity has become a powerful social identity, shaping not only political preferences but also social relationships and perceptions of moral difference." — Shanto Iyengar et al.[19]

Some scholars argue that identity-based political framing contributes to this dynamic by encouraging voters to interpret disagreement as evidence of moral opposition rather than policy divergence.[14][4] Others contend that polarization is driven primarily by media ecosystems, institutional incentives, and geographic realignment, with identity language functioning as a reflection rather than a root cause.[19]

The empirical record therefore presents a complex picture. Identity categories may serve as organizing tools for political participation and recognition, while simultaneously interacting with institutional and media structures in ways that heighten emotional division. The long-term consequences of this interaction remain the subject of ongoing research and debate.[3][14]

## Comparative historical developments[edit | edit source]

Comparative historical research demonstrates that political movements organized around collective identity have produced diverse outcomes depending on institutional context and political leadership. In pluralist democracies with strong constitutional constraints, identity-based advocacy has often operated within legal and electoral frameworks to expand representation or reform public policy.[8][6] In other contexts, identity-centered narratives have been incorporated into state ideology, linking political authority to a dominant class, ethnic, or national identity.[7]

Revolutionary regimes in the twentieth century frequently mobilized populations through appeals to class, national, or cultural identity. In some cases, identity categories were institutionalized within party structures and state policy, shaping access to resources, education, and political participation.[7] Comparative scholarship cautions, however, that identity-based mobilization in democratic advocacy movements is not analytically equivalent to identity institutionalized as exclusive state doctrine, and that outcomes depend heavily on constitutional design, rule of law, and civil society constraints.[6][3]

These comparative cases are frequently cited in contemporary debate as cautionary or instructive examples, particularly in discussions about the long-term stability of democratic institutions. Scholars emphasize that identity-centered political narratives can either coexist with pluralism or undermine it, depending on whether institutions maintain protections for dissent, minority rights, and equal application of law.[16][4]

## Synthesis and continuing debates[edit | edit source]

The historical and contemporary record indicates that identity-based political mobilization is neither confined to a single country nor reducible to a single ideological tradition. Across centuries, political movements have organized around religion, ethnicity, language, class, nationality, and race. In constitutional democracies, identity-based advocacy has often functioned as a mechanism for expanding legal recognition and civil rights within established institutional frameworks.[8][16] In authoritarian or revolutionary systems, identity categories have at times been formalized into instruments of state control, shaping access to property, political participation, and even personal safety.[23][7]

These divergent outcomes underscore the importance of institutional context. Scholars across political theory and comparative history emphasize that constitutional design, separation of powers, protection of dissent, and equal application of law significantly influence whether identity-based political claims coexist with pluralism or contribute to coercive governance.[6][4] The historical record demonstrates that when identity classifications become exclusive criteria for citizenship or loyalty, political repression and large-scale human suffering have followed in multiple contexts.[23][7]

> "National identity and group identity can provide solidarity and purpose, but they can also become sources of division when detached from shared civic principles." — Francis Fukuyama[4]

At the same time, democratic theory has long recognized that political equality requires attention to real patterns of exclusion. Advocates of identity-based frameworks argue that equal protection under law cannot be fully realized if historical disadvantage, discrimination, or structural inequality remain unaddressed.[12][16] From this perspective, collective identity may function as a vehicle for political participation and legal reform rather than as a departure from democratic norms.[1]

Ongoing research in political science suggests that the interaction between identity, partisanship, and media ecosystems has intensified emotional polarization in several democracies.[19] Whether identity-based framing acts as a primary driver of polarization or as a reflection of broader institutional and technological changes remains a subject of scholarly debate.[14][3] The empirical evidence indicates that identity categories can strengthen social cohesion within groups while simultaneously heightening distrust between groups, particularly when political competition is framed as existential or zero-sum.[19]

The study of identity politics therefore remains an ongoing inquiry rather than a settled doctrine. Historical experience demonstrates that collective identity can serve as a basis for solidarity, reform, and representation, but also that identity classifications, when institutionalized without constitutional restraint, have coincided with repression and large-scale loss of life in multiple twentieth-century regimes.[23][7] Contemporary debates continue to center on how democratic societies can address inequality, preserve civic equality, and maintain institutional stability without reducing citizenship to rigid or competing identity categories.[4][16]

> "The challenge for modern democracies is to reconcile the demand for recognition with the need for common purpose." — Kwame Anthony Appiah[3]

As political systems evolve and social identities intersect with technology, media, and demographic change, the concept of identity politics continues to shape public debate. Its interpretation varies across contexts, but its enduring relevance reflects a broader question at the center of democratic governance: how to balance recognition of difference with the maintenance of shared civic order.

## See also[edit | edit source]

* Affective polarization
* Civic nationalism
* Exclusionary nationalism
* Intersectionality
* Political particularism
* Political polarization in the United States
* Rise in political violence 2015–2025
* Party identity politics

## References[edit | edit source]

1. ^ a b c d e f g Bernstein, Mary (2005). "Identity Politics". Annual Review of Sociology. 31: 47–74. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100054.
2. ^ a b c Neofotistos, Vasiliki (2013). "Identity Politics". Oxford Bibliographies. Oxford University Press.
3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2018). The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity. W. W. Norton & Company.
4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Fukuyama, Francis (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
5. ^ a b c d e f Lilla, Mark (2017). The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. Harper.
6. ^ a b c d e f g h i Anderson, Benedict (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso.
7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Hobsbawm, Eric (1996). The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991. Vintage.
8. ^ a b c d e f g McAdam, Doug (1982). Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. University of Chicago Press.
9. ^ Evans, Sara M. (1979). Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left. Vintage.
10. ^ a b c Polletta, Francesca (2001). "Collective Identity and Social Movements". Annual Review of Sociology. 27: 283–305. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.283.
11. ^ Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta (2017). How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River Collective. Haymarket Books.
12. ^ a b c d Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1991). "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color". Stanford Law Review. 43: 1241–1299.
13. ^ a b c Fraser, Nancy (1995). "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a "Post-Socialist" Age". New Left Review. 212: 68–93.
14. ^ a b c d e f Mounk, Yascha (2023). The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time. Penguin Press.
15. ^ a b c d e Chua, Amy (2018). Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations. Penguin Press.
16. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Young, Iris Marion (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press.
17. ^ Michaels, Walter Benn (2006). The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality. Metropolitan Books.
18. ^ Reed, Adolph L. Jr.; Michaels, Walter Benn (2022). No Politics but Class Politics. Columbia University Press.
19. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Iyengar, Shanto; Lelkes, Yphtach; Levendusky, Matthew; Malhotra, Neil; Westwood, Sean (2019). "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States". Annual Review of Political Science. 22: 129–146. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034.
20. ^ Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James; Jay, John (2001). Carey, George W.; McClellan, James (eds.). The Federalist: The Gideon Edition. Liberty Fund.
21. ^ a b "Conservative activist Charlie Kirk shot and killed at Utah event". Reuters. 11 September 2025.
22. ^ a b "Political leaders condemn killing of Charlie Kirk as political violence debate intensifies". PBS News. 12 September 2025.
23. ^ a b c d e f g Dikötter, Frank (2010). Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962. Walker & Company.
24. ^ a b c Dikötter, Frank (2016). The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962–1976. Bloomsbury Press.
25. ^ Myers, B. R. (2015). The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters. Melville House.