Andreas Papandreou

Greek economist and politician (1919–1996)

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Andreas Papandreou

Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου

Papandreou in 1968

Prime Minister of Greece
In office
13 October 1993 – 22 January 1996
President|

* Konstantinos Karamanlis
* Kostis Stephanopoulos

Preceded by| Konstantinos Mitsotakis
Succeeded by| Costas Simitis
In office
21 October 1981 – 2 July 1989
President|

* Konstantinos Karamanlis
* Christos Sartzetakis

Preceded by| Giorgos Rallis
Succeeded by| Tzannis Tzannetakis
Leader of the Opposition
In office
11 April 1990 – 13 October 1993
Preceded by| National Union government
Succeeded by| Miltiadis Evert
In office
2 July 1989 – 23 November 1989
Preceded by| Konstantinos Mitsotakis
Succeeded by| National Union government
In office
28 November 1977 – 21 October 1981
Preceded by| Giorgos Mavros
Succeeded by| Giorgos Rallis
President of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
In office
3 September 1974 – 23 June 1996
Preceded by| Position established
Succeeded by| Costas Simitis
Member of the Hellenic Parliament
In office
17 November 1974 – 23 June 1996
In office
16 February 1964 – 21 April 1967
Personal details
Born|

Andreas Papandreou

(1919-02-05)5 February 1919
Chios, Greece
Died| 23 June 1996(1996-06-23) (aged 77)
Athens, Greece
Political party| Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Spouses|

Christina Rasia

(m. 1941; div. 1951)​

Margaret Chant-Papandreou

(m. 1951; div. 1989)​

Dimitra Liani

(m. 1989)​

Children| George
Sofia
Nikos
Andrikos
Emilia
Parents|

* Georgios Papandreou (father)
* Sofia Mineico (mother)

Alma mater| University of Athens
Harvard University
Signature|
Website| Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation
Military service
Branch/service| United States Navy

Andreas Georgiou Papandreou (Greek: Ανδρέας Γεωργίου Παπανδρέου, pronounced [anˈðreas papanˈðreu]; 5 February 1919 – 23 June 1996) was a Greek academic and economist who founded the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and served three terms as prime minister of Greece.

Papandreou was born in 1919, the son of Georgios Papandreou. In 1938, in his early 20s, Papandreou left Greece for United States to escape the Metaxas' dictatorship (1936–1941) and became a prominent academic. Papandreou returned to Greece in 1959 after years of resisting his father's entreaties. His father, who was now Prime Minister of Greece, wanted him to return so that he could prepare him as his successor.[1] However, Papandreou's rapid ascension, together with his uncompromising radical rhetoric only amplified Greece's post-civil war political instability, which created the conditions for a group of colonels to stage a coup d'etat and rule Greece for seven years.[2]

Papandreou was exiled during the Greek Junta, with many, even his father, blaming him for the fall of democracy.[i][3] While in exile, Papandreou developed and spread an anti-American, conspiratorial[ii] narrative of past events, in which he was a victim of larger forces.[4] On his return in 1974, Papandreou created PASOK, the first organised Greek socialist party. Papandreou's populist rhetoric resonated with the Greek people who sought a break from the failed politics of the past, along with the mounting pressure from the 1970s energy crisis.[5] PASOK won the elections in 1981 and Papandreou began to implement a transformative social agenda, expanding access to education and healthcare, reinforcing workers' rights, and passing a new family law that elevated the position of women in society and the economy. He also secured official recognition of the communist resistance groups in the Greek Resistance making it easier for communist refugees from the Greek Civil War to return.[6] His governance, however, was tarnished by numerous corruption scandals, a soft stance on terrorism, damage to democratic institutions,[7] a public divorce and subsequent marriage to an air stewardesses half his age, controversial foreign policy decisions, and a constitutional crisis which he had instigated. Under Papandreou, the Greek economy diverged from the European average as a result of large-scale patronage, misuse of European Union funds, and excessive foreign borrowing, which resulted in Greece earning the reputation of Europe's "black sheep".[8][9]

Papandreou died in 1996 at the age of 77. He had transformed Greece's post-junta liberal democracy into a "populist democracy" that continues to resonate with many Greeks.[iii][10][11][12] His son, George Papandreou became the leader of PASOK in February 2004 and, in part invoking his father's memory, was elected prime minister in 2009.

## Personal life and family

[edit]

Papandreou was born on 5 February 1919 on the Greek island of Chios,[13] the son of Zofia (Sofia) Mineyko (1883–1981) and Greek liberal politician and future prime minister George Papandreou. His maternal grandfather was Polish-Lithuanian-born public figure Zygmunt Mineyko, and his maternal grandmother was Greek. Before university, he attended Athens College, a private school in Greece. He attended the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens from 1937 until 1938 when, during the dictatorship led by Ioannis Metaxas, he was arrested for purported Trotskyism.[14] Following representation in court by his father, Papandreou gained an exit visa through family connections, and once he arrived in New York, he asked for political asylum based on the imprisonment by the Metaxas regime.[15]

Papandreou was married to Christina Rasia from 1941 to 1951. In 1948, he entered into a relationship with Margaret Chant a journalism student at University of Minnesota where he was a professor.[16] After both Chant and Papandreou obtained a divorce from their spouses, they were married in 1951. They had three sons and a daughter. Papandreou also had, with Swedish actress and TV presenter Ragna Nyblom [sv], a daughter out of wedlock, Emilia Nyblom, who was born in 1969 in Sweden.[17][18] Papandreou divorced his second wife Margaret Chant-Papandreou in 1989, and married Dimitra Liani who was 37 years his junior.[19]

Papandreou died on 23 June 1996. The government declared four days of national mourning,[20] and at his funeral procession produced crowds of "hundreds of thousands".[21] His will shocked the public because he left everything to his 41-year-old third wife and left nothing to his family by the second wife, whom he married for 38 years, and their four children, or the illegitimate Swedish daughter.[18]

### Theodore Katsanevas

[edit]

Until their divorce in 2000, Papandreou's daughter, Sofia, was married to the academic and politician Theodore Katsanevas.[22][23] In Papandreou's will, he accused Katsanevas of being a "disgrace to the family" (Greek: όνειδος της οικογένειας)[23][24][25] and claimed that "his aim was to politically inherit the history of struggle of Georgios Papandreou and Andreas Papandreou".[24][26][27][28]

## Academic career

[edit]

In 1943, Papandreou received a PhD degree in economics from Harvard University under the thesis advisor William L. Crum.[29] Immediately after earning his doctorate, Papandreou joined America's war effort and volunteered to serve in the US Navy; after his basic training in the Great Lakes Naval Training in Illinois, he spent 15 weeks to qualify as a hospital corpsman at the Bethesda Naval Hospital.[30] Papandreou's skills in maths were recognized by an American admiral who placed him in a statistical control unit planning the Okinawa invasion.[30] He returned to Harvard in 1946 and served as a student advisor until 1947, when he received an assistant professorship at the University of Minnesota.[31] Papandreou became a visiting professor at Northwestern University for 1950–1951,[32] and in 1956, he accepted a tenured teaching position at the University of California, Berkeley (where he became chair of the Department of Economics later on).[33] While in exile, Papandreou worked at Stockholm University for a year and then at York University in Toronto until 1974,[34] where he worked alongside long-term academic advisor Christos Paraskevopoulos.[citation needed]

## Political career

[edit]

### Greek politics before Andreas Papandreou

[edit]

Further information: National Schism, Axis occupation of Greece, Cold War, Greek Civil War, and Greek economic miracle

Greece was recovering from the Axis occupation in World War II and immediate 1944–49 civil war (between the Communist-led uprising against the establishment led by the King). The latter dominated the political dialogue in the following decades; the underlying question was how the power basis would shift from the Right (victors of the civil war) to the Center. Political stability in Greece was balanced with the support of three factions: the king along with the military forces, the Americans, and the political establishment.[35] The political institutions of the restored Kingdom of Greece were fragile due to military (often pro-royal) interventions preventing democratically elected parliaments from executing their campaign promises; the root of these disputes was the constitutional crisis by the disagreement between Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine I on the entry of Greece in World War I with the Allies,[36] and resulted in the National Schism with the expulsion of the king and the creation of the short-lived Second Hellenic Republic (1924–1935). Overall, militarized politics was always a danger since Greece had eight military coups since World War I.[37] The Greek economy was small, but rapidly growing due to American aid from the Marshall Plan (in total approximately 3.75 billion US dollars, half of which were military supplies;[38] for comparison Greece's GDP was 4.34 billion US dollars in 1960[39]) as Americans feared that the poor economic conditions would make Greece susceptible to Communist rhetoric.[40] Moreover, Americans recognized the strategic significance of Greece's location in the Eastern Mediterranean by constructing four military bases in Greece[41] and had close ties with the Greek military.[42] Greece entered NATO in 1952,[43][44] and became associate member of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1962.[45] The politicians often acted between the king and the Americans.[46]

### Pre-Junta era (1959–1967)

[edit]

Further information: Iouliana and Cyprus dispute

Andreas Papandreou started his career as an academic economist and achieved considerable fame in his field. While he was chair of the department at Berkeley, he was pressured by his father to return to Greece to groom him as his successor.[1] He initially resisted his father's requests. However, he eventually returned to Greece in 1959, where he headed an economic development research program by invitation of Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis.[47] In 1960, he began leading the Athens Economic Research Center, and advising the Bank of Greece. He received funding from the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation to promote projects aligned to liberal internationalism.[48] Initially, American officials hoped that Andreas Papandreou would be a stabilizing force in Greek politics.[48] However, he developed an ideology heavily influenced by the progressive liberalism from his years in the US.[49] He considered securing support from the non-communist left-leaning voters the only way to assist his father in becoming Prime Minister. Andreas Papandreou called for social and economic modernization through a mass-based political party.[50] However, he steadily moved away from progressive liberalism and adopted a fierce populist rhetoric, where the king, the armed forces, and the Americans are described as having "vested interests" not in the best interests of the Greek people.[51]

The 1963 Greek legislative election brought George Papandreou, head of the Center Union, to prime minister. Andreas Papandreou became chief economic advisor, renounced his American citizenship, and was elected to the Greek Parliament in the 1964 Greek legislative election.[52] He immediately became the assistant Prime Minister and leader of the party's left wing.[53] Andreas Papandreou's rapid ascension, orchestrated by his father, created displeasure among members of the Center Union party.[54][55] In 1965, Constantine Mitsotakis,[iv] a Center Union member, raised nepotism concerns in a newspaper interview, "leadership... is neither bestowed nor is it inherited".[56] The discontent of the members of the Center Union increased as Andreas Papandreou's influence grew to the point that his father started to ignore his own Cabinet on critical political decisions.[57]

Both Papandreous advocated for the liberalization of Greek society, which was rapidly urbanizing, resulting in large salary increases for police, judges, and teachers. However, seeds of resentment towards the Papandreous grew among the military as they were excluded from salary increases.[58] Moreover, the Papandreous made a faint attempt to gain military control, which alarmed many officers without weakening them.[59][53] The latter created friction with the king, who wanted to remain in command of the army and not the elected government. Papandreou's government also released all the political prisoners as a first step towards healing wounds from the civil war.[55]

In foreign policy, Andreas Papandreou criticized the presence of American military and intelligence in Greece by describing Greece as a colony of the United States and publicly taking a neutral stand in Cold War. Andreas Papandreou's rhetoric intensified after his father's visit as Prime Minister to Washington with President Johnson in July 1964 to discuss the Cyprus dispute. This criticism became politically turbulent with his interview on October 4th,[v] resulting in his sudden but temporary resignation.[60] Andreas Papandreou's public attacks against the king and the Americans greatly disturbed the political balance.[61] The conservatives feared that Andreas Papandreou was a secret Communist, leading them to another civil war.[62][63] The US embassy officials, sensitive to these public attacks during the Cold War, and his father repeatedly requested Andreas Papandreou tone down his emotive rhetoric.[2][64][65] Despite promises that he would do so, Andreas continued actively campaigning, further deepening divisions and prolonging the political instability in the pre-1967 coup period.[2] A few weeks before the coup, his father apologized to the US ambassador Phillips Talbot for his son's behavior, explaining that his son "would like nothing better than to be arrested" as he would "relish the role of martyr", adding that if he were not his son, then he would have been expelled from Center Union.[66] Andreas Papandreou increasingly became the target of ultra-rightists who feared that, following any new elections, which the nearly 80-year-old Georgios Papandreou would likely win, his son would be the actual focus of power in the party.[35][67]

In 1965, while the Aspida scandal within the Hellenic Army was being investigated, alleged by the political opposition and accusing Andreas Papandreou, Georgios Papandreou decided to remove the defense minister and assume the post himself to protect his son from investigations. The King, Constantine II of Greece, refused to endorse this move since this would create a conflict of interest, which forced George Papandreou's resignation;[vi] the events following this became known as the Iouliana in 1965.[68] For the next twenty-two months, there was no elected government, and hundreds of demonstrations took place, with many being injured and killed in clashes with the police.[69] The King tried to lure members of the Center Union party to his side and form a government. He temporarily succeeded in bringing 45 members to his side including Mitsotakis,[iv] who later were called 'apostates' by the side supporting Papandreous.[69][70] To end the political deadlock, his father attempted a more moderate approach with the King, but Andreas Papandreou publicly rejected his father's effort and attacked the whole establishment. This attracted the support of 41 members of the Center Union in an effort designed to gain the party's leadership and prevent any compromise.[71] As the politicians were unable to sort out their differences, rumors of a military coup intensified and before the next election took place, anti-Communist Colonels led the Greek military junta of 1967–1974.[72][67][73]

### Junta and exile (1967–1974)

[edit]

Further information: Greek junta and Turkish invasion of Cyprus

Andreas Papandreou in 1968.

When the Regime of the Colonels led by Georgios Papadopoulos seized power in April 1967, Andreas Papandreou was captured and charged with treason. His political colleagues, including his father, blamed him as the person primarily responsible for the fall of Greek democracy.[i][3] Gust Avrakotos, a Greek-American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer assigned to Athens, told the Colonels that the U.S. Government wished for Andreas Papandreou to be allowed to leave the country with his family. Unofficially, however, Avrakotos warned them that he'll be back if you don't execute him.[74] Under heavy pressure from American officials and academics, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, a friend of Andreas Papandreou since their Harvard days, the military regime released Andreas Papandreou on Christmas Day 1967 on condition that he leave the country.[75] He then moved to Sweden with his wife, four children, and mother, where he accepted a post for one year at Stockholm University.[34] Afterward, he moved to University of Toronto, where he stayed until 1974.[34]

Andreas Papandreou in an anti-dictatorial rally, Netherlands, 1968

In exile, Andreas Papandreou was a political pariah and was excluded from the political forces seeking to restore democracy in Greece.[vii] In the beginning, he actively campaigned, relying on his American network for a US intervention to bring down the junta, but then changed his mind and favored military resistance.[76] Papandreou publicly accused the CIA of being responsible for the 1967 coup[ii] and became increasingly critical of the US administration, often stating that Greece was a US "colony" and a Cold War "garrison state".[77][78][79] In 1968, Andreas Papandreou formed an anti-dictatorship organization, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), which sought to 'violently overthrow' the military regime.[80][81] Reacting to the creation of PAK, his father added: "Political leaders do not head up conspiratorial organizations" and urged his son to work within the Central Union party.[76] George Papandreou, who was under house arrest since the coup and already at an advanced age, died in 1968; Andreas Papandreou was not allowed by the junta regime to attend his father's funeral.[79] In the early 1970s, during the latter phase of the dictatorship in Greece, Andreas Papandreou opposed the process of political normalization attempted by Georgios Papadopoulos and his appointed Prime Minister, Spyros Markezinis. Overall, Papandreou's rhetoric found little response in Greece and whose activities contributed little to the downfall of the junta, which in effect collapsed because of the poor handling of the events leading to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974.[82][83]

### Return to Greece, Restoration of democracy (1974–1981)

[edit]

Further information: Metapolitefsi, PASOK, and European Union

> We are announcing today the inauguration of a new political movement, a movement which we believe represents the desires of and needs of the average Greek: the farmer, the worker, the craftsman, the salaried worker, and our courageous and enlightened youth. The movement belongs to them, and we will call on every exploited Greek to strengthen our ranks, to form cadres and participate in the molding of the movement in order to promote our national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation, and democracy in all phases of public life.

—Papandreou announcing the creation of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement on 3 September 1974.[84]

The logo of PASOK in the elections of 1981.

Papandreou returned to Greece after the fall of the junta in 1974, during metapolitefsi. The dominant and leading political figure in Greece was Karamanlis with his new political party New Democracy, while Papandreou continued to have the stigma of past events. On 6 August 1974, Papandreou dissolved PAK in Winterthur, Switzerland, without announcing it publicly.[85] He was offered the leadership of his father's old party, which had evolved into Centre Union – New Forces. However, he turned it down by rejecting his father's ideological heritage as a Venizelist liberal, declaring himself a democratic socialist. Instead, he formed a new 'radical' party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) on 3 September 1974.[82] Most of his former PAK companions, as well as members of other leftist groups such as the Democratic Defense joined the new party. The founding charter of PASOK advocated social liberation, a radical re-orientation of the country's foreign policy, Greek withdrawal from NATO, the closure of the US military bases, and rejection of the option of membership of the EEC, which was dismissed as a capitalist club.[86] In 1974 elections, PASOK received 13.5% of the vote.[87]

A new Constitution, adopted by Parliament and promulgated on 11 June 1975, established a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state. In the new constitution, the majority of powers resided upon the prime minister, with the president having sufficient powers to guard the constitution. Papandreou boycotted the promulgation of the constitution and publicly described it as "totalitarian", advocating instead for a "socialist" constitution without explaining what he meant.[88] Papandreou's attacks sharpened upon the initiation of talks for the entry of Greece into the EEC, accusing the politicians and the democratic institutions of Greece of "national betrayal".[89]

Papandreou was able to salvage his political career by doubling down on his polarizing pre-junta-developed ideology by combining it with nationalist elements,[viii] which was assisted by three major events. First, the US interactions with the junta after the coup and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus reinforced in the imagination of the Greek populace the conspiratorial involvement of the US in the Colonels' junta,[ii][90][91] and thus, Papandreou depicted himself and his father as victims of larger forces. Second, the oil crisis in 1973 and 1979 deeply affected the Greek economy, and the inability of Karamanlis' governments after the democratic restoration to address the rising economic problems further increased the frustration of the Greek population.[5][92] Third, Karamanlis, the dominant political figure in bringing democracy back to Greece, became President of Greece in 1980, leaving a power vacuum in the upcoming elections of 1981.[93] Papandreou promised a wide range (some unrealistic) changes,[ix] encapsulated in the PASOK's slogan "Change" (Greek: Αλλαγή), which resonated with the Greek people who sought a break from the failed politics of the past. In 1977 elections, PASOK received 25.3% of the vote, doubling in size from 1974, and Papandreou became the leader of the opposition.[87]

The radical and uncompromising positions (mostly anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-EEC) of Papandreou, along with his rising popularity, renewed fears of another military coup in the Right and Greece's allies. After the 1977 elections, Karamanlis toured the European capitals, urging for Greece's quicker entry into EEC as this may reduce the temptation for military intervention if Papandreou implements his promises once in power.[94][95] Foreign leaders agreed with Karamanlis on a plan for Greece's entry to EEC. Papandreou started to soften his tone without abandoning his initial positions. Specifically, he called for a referendum regarding the entry to EEC after 1977 as he was trying to win over the crucial share of the vote from the centrist Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK) after its disintegration from its performance in the elections of 1977, and the entry to EEC was becoming positively popular among the Greeks.[96][97][92] Papandreou frequently stated in his campaigns prior 1981 elections regarding the entry to EEC:

> PASOK believes that the crucial matter of our accession to the EEC cannot be decided without a referendum.[98]

However, placing the entry to EEC in a referendum was impossible since only the President can do this according to the Greek constitution of 1975[99] and Karamanlis, as President, would not have permitted this.[100] Legislation to ratify the entry to EEC was passed in the Greek Parliament on 28 June 1979, with PASOK and the Communist Party leaving the chamber.[98] Greece entered the EEC as its tenth member in January 1981, and in the eyes of allies, Karamanlis, as President, would act as a restraining factor on radical departures in foreign and domestic affairs.[101][92] In the elections of October 1981, Papandreou won by a landslide with 48.1% of the vote.[87]

### Leading the "Change" (1981–1985)

[edit]

> Our basic target is a self-sufficient economic and social development, using all the productive forces in combination with a fairer distribution of the national income and wealth... We seek the gradual reform of the structures of the economy so that the basic economic choices are made by the society as a whole. The strategic sectors of the economy must come under substantial social control without overlooking the positive role of private initiative. The crisis in the capitalist system on a world scale, with ever-increasing unemployment and inflation, intensified international competition, the increase in the degree of concentration and the monopolistic structure of many branches, have made the traditional means of economic policy ineffective.

—Papandreou, in his first appearance in the Greek Parliament as the prime minister on 22 November 1981.[102]

PASOK's 1981 landslide victory over the conservative New Democracy party made Papandreou Greece's first socialist prime minister. It was a milestone because PASOK was the first non-communist political party with a mass-based organization, introducing unprecedented political and social participation in Greek society.[103] PASOK's supporters were thrilled by the election victory and the proclamation of a brand new kind of government, while many conservatives feared the uncertain future if Papandreou's radical positions materialize.[104] However, these feelings dissipated by the end of the first administration because Papandreou made considerable U-turns and followed a more conventional approach, either by choice or by dysfunctional government incapable of undertaking the transformation it had promised (see Government style).[105] In his first administration, Papandreou enacted essential pieces of social legislation that were overdue since many laws had roots in the pre-junta era and were not in line with the new Greek constitution of 1975 and with the Greek society that was becoming more liberal. The implementation of Papandreou's social policies, however, exacerbated the rising structural problems of the Greek economy from the oil crisis of the 1970s and the integration of Greece into the EEC.[citation needed]

#### Economy and EEC

[edit]

Andreas Papandreou in Athens European Council – 1983. (1st row L-R) Bettino Craxi, Wilfried Martens, Gaston Thorn, Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, Andreas Papandreou, and Helmut Kohl.

Papandreou abandoned his campaign promise of placing Greece's entry to the EEC in a referendum and instead submitted a memorandum to the EEC with a list of demands in March 1982.[106] The memorandum effectively pleaded for special treatment and financial support based on Greece's "peculiarities".[106] EEC delayed its response until after the date at which Greece could opt out of her entry into the EEC and then rejected the Greek memorandum in March 1983.[106] However, the EEC promised support via the newly created "Integrated Mediterranean Programs", and Papandreou declared victory. Greece started to become more dependent on the EEC funding, and by 1989, the EEC's support had reached 4.5% of Greece's GDP.[107] In March 1985, Papandreou stated that Greece would remain in EEC for the foreseeable future because "the cost of leaving would be much higher than the cost of staying"; there was little reaction from PASOK members.[107]

In domestic affairs, Papandreou's government carried out a series of wealth redistribution policies upon coming into office that immediately increased the availability of entitlement aid to the unemployed and lower wage earners. Public spending on pensions nearly doubled from 5.8% in 1980 to 10.7% in 1985,[108] manufacturing workers acquired a salary increase of 10%,[109] and the minimum wage increased by 32% overnight in 1982.[110] The share of gross national product devoted to social welfare, social insurance, and health was significantly increased.[111] The government made credit more accessible, provided a variety of handouts to various groups, and introduced a wage indexation system protecting (particularly low) wage earners' salaries from the erosion of high inflation, which was around 20% in the early 80s.[107][112] Changes were made to labor laws, which, until 1984, made it difficult for employers to make workers redundant. A number of other reforms were carried out in areas such as the protection of union and protest rights. A national system against unemployment was set up that granted benefits to young people and elderly unemployed persons. In addition, Law 1545/85 extended unemployment benefit duration for certain groups of people while relaxing entitlement to unemployment benefit.[113] From 1982 to 1985, public consumption and public investment grew on average by 7% and 10%, respectively.[114]

Greek debt over GDP (%) in 1974–2000 period. The colored regions approximately highlight the prime minister's reigns; for 1989–1990, there was no stable government due to Papandreou's change in electoral law. In 1981, Papandreou changed the course of the economy by making it more dependent on foreign borrowing. The dataset is from the International Monetary Fund website [1].

The pro-worker policies and Papandreou's failure to address the rising structural issues (limited growth and high inflation) in the Greek economy at a time when the capital was moving out of Europe in the early 80s placed additional pressure on the companies in Greece;[115] Papandreou's anti-capital rhetoric was not helping to secure foreign investments. Companies in Greece already had competitiveness issues and diminished profits due to the oil crisis in the 70s, and they were now exposed to European competition. Several multi-national companies left Greece, such as Esso, Ethyl, Pirelli, and Goodyear.[116] Shipyards and associated industries employing thousands of workers shuttered.[117] Companies not already bankrupted encouraged early retirement, further burdening the Greek state, which had to assist the insurance funds.[117] In 1983, PASOK nationalized companies over a wide range of industries ranging from textiles, consumer goods, metallurgy, and mining by establishing a restructuring business agency, "Industrial Reconstruction Organisation".[116] The companies under this organization continued to operate at a loss without increasing productivity,[109] effectively turning nationalization of the economy into patronage.[118] The undersecretary for industry, Vasso Papandreou (no relation), commented on the inability of the government to improve the nationalized non-competitive industries (problematics), "it would be more cost-effective to shut the problematics and simply keep on paying workers their wages."[119] Among these companies were the munitions company Pyrkal, Heracles General Cement company, and the textile corporation Peiraiki-Patraiki.[116] Greek agriculture also encountered considerable obstacles in the EEC market. As a result, the former trade surplus in agricultural products turned into a deficit from 1986 onwards.[120] Part of the problem was that Papandreou artificially increased the salaries, resulting in farmers importing agricultural products while theirs remained in fields uncollected due to the absence of cheap labor; this issue was partially resolved with cheap labor from the Balkans after the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1989. By the end of his first term, Papandreou recognized the lack of productivity and increased trade deficits, admitting that "we consume more than we produce."[109]

The size of this nationalization endeavor brought the Bank of Greece, which effectively converted the private debt of these companies into public debt and effectively burdening the average taxpayer, to the brink of collapse.[116] Moreover, it increased public spending substantially during Papandreou's first term in office, from 40.6% in 1980 to 55.5% in 1985.[121] The deindustrialization and the global recession led to the Greek economy shrinking by −1.55% in 1981, −1.13% in 1982, and −1.08% in 1983.[39] Recovery started once EEC support arrived in Greece. Still, growth was anemic due to his government's inability to effectively utilize this financial support to improve the economy, mainly due to corruption and clientelism (see more on Papandreou's populism and patronage).[122] The lack of economic growth and investments, as well as high inflation, increased unemployment from 2.8% in 1980 to approximately 8% by the end of Papandreou's first administration;[123] an economic condition known as stagflation. Papandreou did not introduce progressive tax reform to increase the state's revenues to address the increasing budget deficits due to his policies, and instead, he used foreign loans.[124] As the foreign debt increased, so did the external debt interest payments from 2.5% of GDP in 1980 to 5.4% of GDP in 1986, more than defense and education combined in his second administration.[124]

#### Foreign policy, NATO, Turkey

[edit]

Further information: NATO

After swearing-in as prime minister, Papandreou took the Ministry of Defense as well (a typical move in times of war; however, Greece was not at war) because there were fears of another coup as it happened in 1967.[125][126] This move also made various leaders in the NATO alliance, particularly Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, uncomfortable in dealing with Papandreou.[127] In December 1981, at the NATO Defence Planning Committee, Papandreou demanded, in an acrimonious discussion, NATO guarantees against Turkey, a NATO ally, stating that the true threat for Greece is from the east instead from the north. The NATO meeting concluded without publishing a press release for the first time.[128] While this displeased Greece's allies, Papandreou reinforced his image as a patriot in the eyes of concerned Greek voters and the Greek military wary about their neighbor.[129] He maintained the military spending at high levels, at 6.7% of GDP in 1982,[130] pleasing the Greek military at the expense of the economy. In 1985, he bought 40 American F-16 and 40 French Mirage 2000 aircraft[131] at the cost of US$2 billion, committing Greece's defense to long-term dependence on French and American technology.[132] The purchase size was unusual given the status of the Greek economy, and it was described in the press as the "purchase of the century" (Greek: η αγορά του αιώνα).[133][134] Despite efforts to pacify the military, Papandreou had discipline difficulties in controlling the military. There were two incidents (31 May 1982 and 28 February 1983) that were called "routine readiness exercises" by the PASOK government, however, in both cases, followed by forced officer resignations.[135][136] According to Constantine Danopoulos and Neovi Karakatsanis, these incidents were probably failed attempted coups; similar incidents occurred during the Karamanlis governance.[135][136]

Despite Papandreou's promise to remove United States troops and military bases from Greece immediately once in power, Greece remained firmly committed to the NATO alliance. This kind of political U-turn required a careful balance between public opinion, inflated by Papandreou's rhetoric for more than a decade, and negotiating parties since removing the US bases would only strengthen the importance of Turkey in the NATO alliance. When Papandreou publicly stated, "For us, the idea of having foreign bases on our soil is unacceptable since we do not believe in the competition between the two superpowers and Europe's division," his government was quietly renegotiating the stay of the US bases, behind closed doors with US ambassadors Monteagle Stearns and Robert V. Keeley who were experienced with the Greek issues.[137] In the final agreement signed in 1983, all four bases that existed since 1952 continued on Greek soil for five more years with some additional military assistance but failed to get any guarantees against Turkish aggression.[137] Papandreou called the agreement "a Greek triumph" and a "treaty [...] that could have never been signed by the Americans if they faced a [Greek] government on its knees that would tell them 'we are with you, we want the bases, etc.'"[138] Specifically, Papandreou touted that there was a provision for the removal of the US bases upon the end of the five-year term in 1988, that for the first time Greece could restrict the use of foreign bases according to its interests, and the United States pledged to provide military assistance based on the 7/10 ratio between Greece and Turkey.[139][140] All these statements were inaccurate, but the treaty agreement documents were kept away from the public for nearly two months to sideline the opposition.[140] Afterward, it was revealed that the agreement was nearly identical to his predecessor beyond minor symbolic concessions.[140]

#### Education

[edit]

Further information: Education in Greece

After the fall of the junta, education needed long-overdue reforms. In 1976, the Minister of Education Georgios Rallis implemented Georgios Papandreou's 1964 education reforms, which the junta had reversed. Specifically, the changes included the extension of compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, abolished the use of katharevousa (an archaic version of Greek) as the official language of educational institutions, replacing it with the demotic Greek used in everyday speech, the separation of junior (Gymnasium) and senior high schools (Lyceum), and the introduction of vocational education.[141]

In 1981, Papandreou continued the educational reforms. The Greek language was further simplified with the adoption of the single accent system monotoniko [el].[142] Exams required for entry to senior high school were abolished to improve access to working-class students. Ancient Greek literature was taught in modern translation rather than the original. Social and political studies students were not required to know classical languages to enter university. School uniforms were abolished in public schools. Students were exposed to democratic political processes through forming student committees, new social science and history subjects, and establishing the annual celebration of the Athens Polytechnic uprising.[141] Vocational guidance and training was also strengthened.[citation needed]

Papandreou's primary principle behind the educational reforms was to increase access to education. The number of students entering the universities doubled between 1981 and 1986, but without an analogous increase in the budget; from 1982 to 1987, spending on education rose from 7.6% to 8.4% of total government spending.[143] The university administration, based on the German prototype,[142] was also democratized, with its governance done by (senior and junior) academic staff and student representative committees.[141] However, the quality of education deteriorated due to poor research facilities, a shortage of qualified teaching staff, inefficient administration, and ministerial funds being spent on free textbooks rather than on libraries, which remained very inadequate.[144][145] Moreover, PASOK's reforms of 1982 gave students a sense of entitlement to a degree by fighting to gain their demands with mass protests and occupations at the expense of critical thinking.[145]

Papandreou abolished the function of school inspectors (forced to retire), and the powers of headmasters and headmistresses were diminished, with teachers' committees taking more responsibilities. However, these reforms also abolished merit-based promotion in public schools, which was seen as a relic of the conservative establishment, and teachers were automatically promoted based on seniority, irrespective of performance.[146] PASOK used the positions of school principals and temporary teachers as part of their patronage,[147] a practice continued by future governments. Papandreou's reforms resulted in public schools lagging in academic excellence performance from private schools, which selected qualified teachers and assigned them according to their skills.[147] Since the reforms of Papandreou, Greek families increasingly rely on private tutoring, e.g., frontistirio, and travel abroad to attend foreign universities; Greek spending on education is higher almost every other country in Europe in 1999,[148] even though the Greek constitution (Article 16) guarantees a free education.[149]

#### Social reconciliation

[edit]

After the restoration of democracy in 1974, healing the wounds caused by the civil war was pressing since the junta had only exacerbated them. Towards this direction, Karamanlis legitimized the Communist Party[150] and opened the borders to exiled Greeks who had fled the junta and civil war to return home, including Melina Merkouri, Mikis Theodorakis, and Cornelius Castoriadis.[151] Approximately 25,000 returned after passing security screening from 1974 to 1981.[152] However, Karamanlis' governments maintained the post-civil war state's anticommunist stance, i.e., it was challenging to get a civil service job as a communist. Minister of Interior Konstantinos Stefanopoulos explained the conservative viewpoint as "Greeks would never forgive those who had taken up arms against the Nation."[153]

Papandreou made progress in this direction, but unlike Karamanlis, he was pressured to do more since he relied on left-leaning voting blocks (see details in Papandreou's populism). In December 1982, Papandreou dropped the security screening requirement, allowing the return of another potential 22,000 returnees; the most notable was Markos Vafiadis at age 77,[152] but excluded any Slav-Macedonian war veterans (comprising half the group) that participated in the resistance.[6][154]

Papandreou introduced a law in 1985 for civil servants dismissed for political reasons to restore their pension.[152] All formal Civil War commemorations were abolished, including ceremonies commemorating Dekemvriana.[155] The first law recognizing the Greek Resistance was passed in 1949, which excluded left-leaning partisan groups that fought against the Greek State in the Greek Civil War. On 20 September 1982, Papandreou's government passed a law that abolished this exception, allowing EAM/ELAS members the war veteran status and pension rights.[152] Papandreou touted this as "the gravestone of the spirit of national division," however, New Democracy deputies, who many of their senior members were participants in the civil war, denounced it as a "shameless attempt to whitewash the communist crimes during and after the war."[152]

#### Healthcare reforms

[edit]

Further information: Healthcare in Greece

The statistics reflecting the health status of Greece in the period 1974–1981 were approximately between the advanced societies of northern Europe and the developing South of Europe.[156] However, there were rising issues that both PASOK and New Democracy recognized, such as the shortage of doctors in rural areas,[157] and wanted to introduce healthcare reform to strengthen the public health sector based on universal access and shifting the emphasis from intervention to prevention.[158] In the 1970's, the New Democracy governments commissioned studies and formulated plans influenced by the pediatrician Dr. Spyros Doxiadis [el],[158] who was a proponent of establishing a decentralized network of rural health centers and family doctors to tackle health care inequalities in rural areas. However, these plans did not materialize due to political opposition in and out of New Democracy as well as from the medical profession.[159]

Once in power, Papandreou relied on Paraskevas Avgerinos for the establishment of a national healthcare system (ESY), which was modeled on Britain's National Health Service (NHS). The law was passed in September 1983 and was hailed as a landmark legislation, for it was the first time that an organized healthcare system was formally articulated within the framework of Greek Law. From 1982 to 1987, spending on healthcare (as a proportion of total government spending) rose during that same period from 5.7% to 6.2%.[143] New hospitals and medical centers were constructed throughout Greece, increasing available beds by 50%, expanding healthcare coverage, and making modern medical procedures available in rural areas for the first time.[158][160] However, Papandreou's reforms were not compressive due to budgetary constraints and shortage of specialized doctors, as well as obstruction from professional unions, who refused to give up their private health insurance plans.[158][161] The medical profession strongly opposed the reforms requiring doctors to relinquish private practice and work under state control. University and military doctors were temporarily exempt, pending a presidential decree never issued. They also resisted efforts to decentralize healthcare by assigning doctors to rural areas. Following prolonged protests and strikes, Health Minister Avgerinos resigned in January 1984.[162]

Papandreou then turned to Georgios Gennimatas, a more practical politician familiar with the healthcare reforms. Gennimatas found a compromising position to pacify the medical profession, resulting in partially implementing the 1983 reforms.[163] However, the inclusion of doctors, irrespective of ideology, under a single organization with limited supervision from the government resulted in doctors having considerable political leverage.[164] Soon, it was revealed that doctors were breaking the 1983 healthcare law with impunity by continuing to receive informal payments (fakelaki) from patients, undertaking private practice, and being able to choose their working hours.[164] Gennimatas resigned in 1987, under pressure from the medical profession, who requested improved benefits.[165]

Ultimately, Papandreou's vision of a socialist healthcare system was never fully realized because doctors convinced the public of their essential role and stopped the implementation of the reforms.[166] The partial implementation of the reforms created new problems and made it more challenging for future governments to reform Greek healthcare.[167] Wealthy Greeks, including Papandreou himself in 1988, continued to seek treatment abroad.[142]

#### Elevation of women and their inclusion in the economy

[edit]

Further information: Feminism in Greece

The 1975 constitution of Greece guaranteed equality under the law and between men and women (Article 4),[168] and equal pay (Article 22).[169] However, many laws were enacted in the pre-junta era and were not in line with the new constitution. Moreover, Greek law was expected to converge to European standards according to the Treaty of Rome.[170] In 1974, several organizations for women advocating change were established. The wife of Papandreou, Margaret Chant, played a leading role in the women's movement in Greece.[171][172]

In 1981, part of Papandreou's new "Social Contract" was a set of liberalizing laws that redefined the relations between men and women and emphasized the individual as the central unit in society instead of the family.[173] These reforms also reduced the Church's and state's power over private life.[174] The PASOK government legalized civil marriage,[x] abolished the dowries (although parental assistance at marriage continued to exist in different forms), decriminalized adultery, and divorce by mutual consent was established.[173][175] The result was that women continued to increase their participation in education and the economy. In 1986, Papandreou's government passed a law to decriminalize abortion, which was prohibited in all circumstances but practiced on a large scale before then.[176]

PASOK introduced additional policies to ease the participation of women in the workforce. In 1982, Greece ratified the International Labour Organization Convention on Maternal Job Protection, resulting in 14 weeks of job-protected maternity leave with a maternity leave payment of 66% of the salary by 1984. That same year, 3 months of unpaid job-protected parental leave for each parent was introduced, available until the child was aged 2.5 years. Other policy changes included the establishment of parental leave for both parents and childcare centers, maternity allowances, community health centers, and encouraging women to join agricultural cooperatives as full members, an option that previously had not been open to women.[177] All women with unmarried children under 21 were given the right to retire at 55.[178] Despite legislative changes, women largely remained outside the political arena, with all political parties, including PASOK, having less than 5% of women deputies among their ranks.[179]

Papandreou's reforms also led to a steep decline in the total fertility rate from 2.2 in 1980, which was just above the 2.1 threshold for stabilizing the size of the population, to 1.4 by 1989, which would lead to shrinking the Greek population. The demographics of Greece has not recovered from this sharp decline in the fertility rate,[180] placing pressure on the Greek society and economy due to population decline. In 1988, deaths exceeded births, though immigration offset the effect on the population until 2010; between 2008 and 2018, Greece lost 385,000, or 3.5% of its population.[181] A 2016 demographics analysis estimates that Greece might lose up to a quarter of its population by 2050.[182]

#### Constitutional crisis of 1985 and elections

[edit]

Presidents of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Karamanlis (left) and Christos Sartzetakis (right).

Further information: 1985 Greek constitutional crisis

On March 6, 1985, Greece faced a major political shift when New Democracy announced its support for Konstantinos Karamanlis' second presidential term. That same day, the Communist Party (KKE) nominated its candidate. Though Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou had previously assured Karamanlis in person of his support and the press anticipated such an announcement,[183][184] instead, Papandreou endorsed Supreme Court judge Christos Sartzetakis. Sartzetakis, known for his investigation into the assassination of Grigoris Lambrakis portrayed in the 1969 movie Z, was favored by the left. Many inside and outside PASOK, including Sartzetakis, were caught off guard by the sudden nomination.[183][184] While initially framed as a last-minute decision, it later emerged that Papandreou had planned this move since Sartzetakis had known for some time, and two other judges had reportedly declined Papandreou's offer.[185] Simultaneously, Papandreou proposed constitutional reforms to diminish the president's powers, including calling elections or referendums, appointing governments, or dissolving parliament. He argued that Karamanlis, who had heavily influenced the 1974 constitution, should not oversee its reform.[88] Critics contended that these presidential powers were unused and that stripping them away would concentrate power dangerously in the hands of the prime minister. The counterargument from PASOK was the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of kings of Greece to intervene in the political life since the creation of the modern Greek state.[186] Irrespective of the arguments, the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful ("autocratic") position in the Greek state,[187] due to lack of any constitutional restraints.[citation needed]

Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, Antonios Livanis [el].[188] Karamanlis resigned from the Presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the termination of his term, and was replaced by a PASOK's deputy, Ioannis Alevras, as acting president.[88] This course of action divided constitutional scholars on whether the acting President could vote for president; in the end, the parliament took the decision, with New Democracy deputies leaving the chamber.[189]

The first two rounds failed to elect Sartzetakis for president, which was done under high political tension, with a deputy of New Democracy momentarily grabbing the ballot box. Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating constitutional protocol, which required a secret ballot, by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots, but Mitsotakis was dismissed.[190] Mitsotakis and Papandreou ended up having an oral confrontation, with Mitsotakis showing how Papandreou had no respect for the parliament, and Papandreou firing back that Mitsotakis was the last person to speak about respect, invoking memories from Iouliana.[iv][190] In the third round, Sartzetakis was voted president with a decisive vote from Alevras since Papandreou had two more defected deputies, who Papandreou accused of taking bribes from Mitsotakis' party.[191] Papandreou also formally submitted the proposals for constitutional amendments by adding to the previous one the removal of a secret ballot for president.[192]

Mitsotakis considered the vote illegal and claimed that if they won the elections, Sartzetakis would not be president, further deepening the constitutional crisis. Both parties continued their polarized confrontations with the elections of June 1985. Just before the elections, Karamanlis broke his silence, urging Greeks to be cautious with their vote (without explicitly advising who to vote for), commenting that PASOK had brought "confusion and uncertainty". However, the state media (TV and radio) did not broadcast his statement.[193] Papandreou was re-elected in the 1985 Greek legislative election with 45.82% of the vote.[194] Papandreou's gamble worked to his benefit because he gained more from far-left voting blocks than the voters lost from the center.[195][185] After the election results, Mitsotakis accepted Sartzetakis as president and the head of the state.[196] Papandreou's constitutional proposals took effect in 1986.[197]

### Stabilization effort and disillusionment (1985–1989)

[edit]

Papandreou began his second administration with a comfortable majority in the parliament and increased powers based on the 1986 Greek Constitution. However, his premiership was soon surrounded by numerous financial and corruption scandals while the Greek economy rapidly deteriorated. Moreover, choices made in the early 1980s on anti-terrorism legislation and controversial foreign policy decisions led to a significant rise in terrorist incidents in Greece. Papandreou's extramarital affair and eventual divorce from his wife became a frequent topic of yellow newspapers and tabloids.[198][199] The retired Karamanlis publicly described the situation at the end of Papandreou's second administration as: "A boundless lunatic asylum",[200] while others refer to the events surrounding 1989 as "dirty 89".[201]

#### Failed stabilization of the economy

[edit]

Further information: Euro convergence criteria

Greek inflation (%) in 1974–2000 period. The colored regions approximately highlight the prime minister's reigns; for 1989–1990, there was no stable government due to Papandreou's change in electoral law. In 1987, Papandreou abandoned the austerity measures (the dotted line estimates inflation if he had not) and delayed the convergence of the Greek economy with EEC criteria by more than four years. The 1980–2000 dataset is from the International Monetary Fund website [2], the 1974–1979 dataset is from AMECO Database [3].

In 1985, Papandreou's government applied to the EEC for a $1.75 billion loan to deal with the widening foreign trade deficit (8.7% of GDP).[202] However, the EEC imposed the implementation of a package of economic stabilization measures as a precondition for the loan.[203] The stabilization package, implemented by Costas Simitis as minister of Finance, included a 15% devaluation of the Greek currency (drachma), posed limits on government borrowing, and monetary policy became more strict, wages ceased to follow inflation, some tax exemptions were eliminated, effectively the incomes dropped to pre-1980 levels.[202] As a result of the stabilization program introduced in 1985, public consumption fell by an average of 2.2% and public investment decreased by 18.2% on average in 1986 and 1987.[114]

Papandreou touted the loan as a life savior for the economy of Greece because if they had not, then the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would have imposed much more strict and severe austerity measures.[204] Moreover, Greece signed the Single European Act in February 1986, which required the member states to deregulate and reduce state intervention in economic life for the formation of a single EEC market by 1992.[203] Simitis' policies had the intended outcome, with the inflation reduced from 23% in 1986 to 13.5% in 1988,[205] and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement fell from approximately 18% of GDP in 1985 to 13% of GDP in 1987. However, Papandreou was shaken by a widespread backlash, with long-running strikes and demonstrations by farmers and major unions in early 1987.[206] With the elections approaching, Papandreou forced Simitis to resign from his ministerial position in November 1987, and the reforms were abandoned towards a relaxation of monetary and fiscal policies, effectively violating the loan agreement.[207][208] The lifting of the austerity measures by 1988 led to a relaxation of income policy.[xi] Overall, Greece started to fall last in terms of convergence with EEC goals, economic competitiveness, dependence on EEC and state subsidies, investment, inflation, and growth.[203]

#### Terrorism in Greece

[edit]

Further information: Terrorism in Greece, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, TWA Flight 847, EgyptAir Flight 648, and City of Poros ship attack

After the restoration of democracy in 1974, Greece was going through a stabilization phase, but terrorist attacks started to rise. Many youths, inspired by the Athens Polytechnic uprising, were sympathetic to left-wing organizations advocating violence against authority.[209] The slowing down of the economy and the high inflation caused by the oil crisis in the 1970s fueled the rise of these incidents. In response, Karamanlis passed the 1978 anti-terrorist law (Law 774/1978), which was based on the recently enacted Italian and German anti-terrorist bills.[210] Papandreou decried the law on the basis that it suppresses civil liberties and the Greek constitution, and he further claimed that no such law is required simply because Greece does not have the social and political conditions for people to cause such violence.[210] In 1983, Papandreou abolished Karamanlis' law (without proposing an alternative) based on the argument that this law "does not concern the terrorists, but it creates the ideological and political conditions to terrorize the Greek populace."[210]

The pilot with one of the hijackers holding a gun, who took TWA Flight 847 passenger plane from the unguarded Athens airport in June 1985.

Papandreou's abolishing anti-terrorism law combined with his opening to 'radical' Arab regimes (see details in foreign policy) effectively let terrorists operate in Greece in the 1980s with impunity.[211] This created friction between Reagan and Papandreou's administrations. In June 1985, international attention was drawn to the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from the Athens airport.[212] After this incident and Papandreou's inaction on terrorism, the US produced a travel advisory against Greece, resulting in an 80% drop in US visitors and loss of considerable tourism income.[213] In November of 1985, another hijack from Athens resulted in 61 dead.[214] The reputation of Greece as a tourist destination deteriorated further by the frequency of incidents; in 1986 alone, there were twenty bombings in Athens.[213] Infighting between Arab groups led to a series of anti-Gaddafi dissidents being found murdered and Syrian agents killing Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members on Greek soil.[215] On 11 July 1988, nine tourists were killed, and eighty others were wounded in an attack on the Greek ferry boat at the City of Poros.[213][216] PASOK's response to these events was to deny them by claiming that it was an American conspiracy (as in the case of the Poros incident), or that terrorists are freedom fighters.[217] A notable example of the latter was Ozama Al Zomar's release from prison and his extradition to Libya instead of Italy, where he was suspected by Italian police of the Great Synagogue of Rome attack. Papandreou's Justice Minister, Vassilis Rotis, explained this course of action by justifying that the attack "falls within his struggle to regain the independence of his homeland and consequently suggests action for freedom."[218]

The symbol of November 17 terrorist organization, which operated largely undisturbed under Papandreou's reign.

The primary terrorist organization in Greece was Revolutionary Organization 17 November. Operating from December 1975 until its dismantling in 2002, it assassinated 23 people, mainly Western diplomats with military or intelligence roles and prominent businessmen.[219] Soon after taking power, Papandreou closed down the police unit investigating the organization.[220] In the first two years of Papandreou's rule, the 17 November organization was inactive. Presumably, Papandreou's anti-EU, anti-NATO rhetoric aligned with 17 November goals.[221] However, after the new agreement for the US bases to stay on Greek soil, they turned against Papandreou.[221] In 1985, in an attack responding to the death of a 15-year-old boy by police, the organization claimed that Papandreou's PASOK is "now working for the Right, which explains why it has yet to be overthrown."[222] 17 November also turned against industrialists based on the belief that they were getting large bonuses from Papandreou's governments, state money meant for investments and instead used for increasing their wealth.[223] Notable deaths were the President of the Halyvourgiki Hellenic Steel Industry, Dimitrios Angelopoulos, in 1986, and two years later the Director of Larco, Alexandros Athanassiadis.[224] The 17 November organization power reached a turning point in the Koskotas scandal when a parliamentary member was assassinated.[225][226]

For much of the 1980s, Greek police remained underfunded and demoralized by Papandreou's anti-authoritarian rhetoric, resulting in few terrorist convictions.[227][228] At the same time, Papandreou used the junta's surveillance infrastructure exclusively to keep track of his political enemies, labeled as terrorists, including well-respected politicians such as Karamanlis, from political opposition Mitsotakis and Evangelos Averoff, senior ministers in PASOK governments who may be potential successors such as Simitis and Gennimatas, newspaper publishers, police chiefs, and even PASOK's governmental spokesman.[229]

The change of course from Papandreou's policy on terrorism came from Mitsotakis' government in the early 1990s by reinstating Karamanlis' anti-terrorism legislation (Law 1916/1990)[230] and any terrorists found, and the PLO representatives were expelled.[231] In 1993, upon the return of PASOK to power, it repealed Law 1916/1990.[232] Later, Simitis passed new anti-terrorist legislation in 2001 (Law 2928/01), and he brought to justice the 17 November organization before the 2004 Olympic Games.[233]

#### Reapprochment with Turkey

[edit]

Further information: 1987 Aegean crisis

Davos World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 1988 – Handshake between Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal.

Greece and Turkey nearly entered into war over a series of miscommunications in late March 1987; Turkey learned that Greece was about to initiate exploration for the drilling oil in the Aegean Sea near Thasos, a Greek island on the north Aegean. In response, the Turkish survey ship Piri Reis (and later the RV MTA Sismik 1) was sent to the area with an escort of Turkish warships. Papandreou threatened to sink any Turkish ship found in Greek waters.[234] Turkey's reaction was exaggerated by hard-liners since Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal was undergoing open heart surgery in Houston, Texas. As the situation escalated, the US (particularly Robert V. Keeley, US ambassador in Athens) and NATO intervened to defuse the crisis.[234] Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for the Turkish aggressiveness.[235] He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri, and he sent the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria, for consultations with President Zhivkov.[235] The crisis ended with Greece not pursuing oil drills in the north Aegean Sea and Turkey withdrawing its naval vessels.[236]

In January 1988, Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart, Turgut Özal, met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve the relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations" and "a breakthrough" by Özal. Part of the meeting was a 'no war agreement' and establishing a 'hotline' between the two governments, and joint committees were established to work towards closer political and economic relations.[237] Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace,[238] while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community.[239] However, only a week after the Davos meeting, Papandreou was under pressure from Mitsotakis' criticism that Papandreou focused only on bilateral disputes in Davos and effectively "shelved" the Cyprus dispute. Papandreou was forced to denounce the Davos process and famously apologized in Latin ("mea culpa") from the podium of the Greek parliament.[240][241] Despite some progress achieved on culture exchange and accident prevention over international waters, however, by the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace with 42 mock dogfights,[240] making it clear that much of the 'spirit of Davos' was quickly vanishing.[242]

#### Heart Surgery, Liani, and crowd size

[edit]

In August 1988, Papandreou (at age 70) underwent major heart surgery in London, but he refused to yield the reins of power. The operation and recovery lasted three months, leaving the Greek state and party without a leader.[243] The opposition described the situation as "government by fax".[244]

However, in London, it was revealed that next to him was not his wife but Dimitra Liani, an Olympic Airways steward aged 33, who had met in 1986, and she was a constant companion in the last months before the surgery.[245] Soon after the revelation, Papandreou divorced his wife Margaret Chant one month before the elections of June 1989 and married Liani soon after. Liani became an influential 'gatekeeper' for Papandreou's favor and was involved in appointments in the Prime Minister's Office.[243] The sudden elevation of Liani in the Prime Minister's Office had negative effects on the operation of the government and caused discontent among members of PASOK;[246] his sons had key positions in the party.[247]

The return from London after the heart surgery (22 October) sparked another series of controversies. No family member was there to greet Papandreou, including his eldest son (George Papandreou), who was the Minister of Education and a key member of PASOK.[248] Three days later, there was a sudden strike from the Greek Radio and Television Corporation (ERT) employees, alleging that PASOK gave prepared texts to ERT's employees to read as live reports at the scene of Papandreou's arrival. Moreover, the government spokesman publicly stated that the strike was illegal and accused the ERT's union of not describing Papandreou's arrival (crowd size and enthusiasm) in the same way as Karamanlis's return after the junta's fall.[248]

#### Koskotas scandal

[edit]

Further information: Koskotas scandal

During the Papandreou's second term, press reports on PASOK's corruption multiplied.[249][250] While initial scandals—such as the Yugoslav corn scandal, telephone tapping, and public utilities scandals—caused concern, they were overshadowed by revelations involving George Koskotas, the owner of the Bank of Crete. In the mid-1980s, Koskotas rapidly acquired several media outlets, including two prominent conservative newspapers (Kathimerini and Vradyni), and the popular football team, Olympiacos F.C., raising suspicions due to the unclear sources of his wealth. Investigations revealed that he had embezzled large sums from the bank and used them to build a media empire that supported PASOK, with assistance from the PASOK government.[251][252] Despite being under surveillance, Koskotas fled Greece in November 1988[253] and was arrested later on 24 November 1988 in Massachusetts on unrelated fraud charges.[254] His escape and the emerging details about state involvement forced Papandreou to reshuffle his cabinet and agree to a parliamentary inquiry. The inquiry uncovered further wrongdoing, including efforts by PASOK officials to block audits[255] and the illegal profiteering from arms sales during the Iran–Iraq War and to apartheid South Africa.[250][256][255] Additionally, it was revealed that Greece overpaid for military aircraft, with the excess funneled as commissions to PASOK members.[257][134]

In March 1989, Time magazine published allegations from Koskotas, claiming that Papandreou and PASOK leaders had directed over $200 million[xii] in state deposits to the Bank of Crete, which were then siphoned off.[258] Koskotas also claimed to have delivered $600,000 to Papandreou hidden in a Pampers box.[259][260] Papandreou denied the allegations, accused the U.S. of attempting to undermine him,[261] and filed a lawsuit against Time, but the scandal drew global attention. Six ministers, including prominent figures like Costas Simitis,[243] resigned in protest. Amid growing political unrest, Papandreou narrowly survived two no-confidence votes in Parliament,[262] although he expelled dissenting PASOK members, including Antonis Tritsis, a founding member of PASOK.[263] To shield himself from prosecution, Papandreou passed legislation via emergency procedures altering judicial procedures, which was widely condemned by the legal community.[264]

Political polarization reached a climax five weeks before the scheduled elections of November 1989, when the Greek parliament was about to start deliberations on whether Papandreou and three of his ministers would be indicted. On this day (26 September 1989) and hours before deliberations began, Pavlos Bakoyannis, a prominent conservative member of parliament and the architect of collaboration between the left and right wings for Papandreou's indictment, was shot by 17 November terrorist group outside his office in Athens.[225][226] Both major political parties (New Democracy and PASOK) accused each other of the assassination.[265] A few days later, Papandreou stormed out of Parliament, shouting, "I accuse my accusers", just before the parliamentary vote on his indictment.[225]

Koskotas was extradited to Greece in 1991 for the trial, and Papandreou's trial began in Athens on 11 March 1991.[266] However, as a former prime minister, he exercised his constitutional right not to attend the trial and proclaimed that the trial was a witch-hunt. In January 1992, the Parliament-appointed tribunal of 13 judges of Supreme Special Court, having heard over 100 witnesses and investigated 50,000 pages of documents over ten months, acquitted Papandreou of the charge of instigating the loss of funds of state companies with a 7–6 vote and a bribery charge of receiving the proceeds of a crime with a vote 10–3.[267][266][268] During the trial, the deputy of the Prime Minister, Agamemnon Koutsogeorgas, who was also accused and a close friend of Papandreou, had a stroke on witness stant, on live television, and died a few days afterward. Dimitris Tsovolas, former Minister of Finance, was sentenced to two-and-a-half jail years.[269] Koskotas was tried and sentenced to a 25-year prison term. When Karamanlis was asked about the verdict, he commented, "In democracies, prime ministers do not go to prison. They return home." by both reaffirming the court's decision while at the same time admitting the existence of both positive and negative implications for the country.[270] The trial was characterized as the "trial of trials" and the most critical judicial decision in modern Greek history since the Trial of the Six in 1922.[271]

#### Junta's surveillance state under Papandreou

[edit]

In 1989, it was revealed that the National Information Service (EYR), through the state telecommunications organization OTE, had been bugging over 46,000 phones of allies and enemies in politics, press, business, and law and Papandreou used the information obtained for PASOK's purposes.[206][249][272] While the wiretapping infrastructure was established in previous decades and used by the junta and lesser degree conservative governments to track suspects that may pose a threat at national level on anti-communist grounds, Papandreou utilized these tools and expanded the potential targets by changing the definition of "national security threat" to be any Greek citizen raising criticism against him.[273] A former head of EYR appointed by PASOK claimed that none of these activities would have been possible without the approval of the prime minister, involving Papandreou in another scandal.[250][274]

Junta's extensive anti-communist filing on private citizens, promised by Papandreou to destroy in the pre-1981 campaigns, was revealed in 1989 during the Catharsis era that Papandreou not only did not destroy the files as proclaimed in 1985 but also extended and updated on anyone perceived by Papandreou as a potential enemy.[275] This list included political opponents inside and outside PASOK and many prominent conservatives and communists.[276] Leaks to pro-PASOK yellow newspapers against Papandreou's opponents originated from these files.[276] Moreover, many on the left were uncomfortable by Papandreou's threat of using the files to entice their vote by invoking the danger of these files falling into the hands of conservatives.[277] The majority of these files were destroyed in 1989 by the collaborative government of conservatives and communists to prevent future governments from exploiting the files for political gains, as Papandreou did.[277]

#### Abuse of power

[edit]

Four Greek politicians (L-R: Leonidas Kyrkos, Charilaos Florakis, Mitsotakis, Konstantinos Stephanopoulos) discuss a time after the Papandreou indictment for the Koskotas scandal. Papandreou called them as the "gang of four".

Beyond the financial scandals, the public was getting worried about the government's assertions of arbitrary power. Papandreou used the national broadcasting organization as a public relations agency.[248][278] The newspapers that were unfriendly to PASOK were openly threatened by his ministers.[206] Six months before the 1989 elections, public appointments were bestowed on about 90,000 people to gain additional votes.[200]

The abuse of power continued when Papandreou changed the electoral law shortly before the June 1989 general elections, a move designed to prevent the absolute majority of a rival political party.[279][280][134] Papandreou's action prolonged the instability because no stable government existed to address the mounting economic problems for nearly a year and three national elections. Papandreou ordered his ministers not to cooperate in the handover of power, and official documents and state treaties went missing.[281]

### Catharsis (1989–1990)

[edit]

Charilaos Florakis took the decisive step to collaborate with conservatives, closing the chapter of the Greek Civil War, to indict Andreas Papandreou for the PASOK scandals.

In the June 1989 elections, PASOK's electoral percentage fell to 38%, owing much to the Koskotas scandal.[282] However, Mitsotakis' party got 43%, but it was insufficient to form a government; Papandreou's last-minute change of the electoral vote law required a party to win 50% of the vote to govern alone. Papandreou hoped that while PASOK might come second in electoral votes, it could form a government with the support of the other leftist parties, but he was rejected.[283] Instead, conservative New Democracy collaborated with the (radical left) Synaspismos, led by Charilaos Florakis, to form a government; while on the opposite ideological sides (as well in the Greek Civil War), both sought a "catharsis", i.e., investigation and trial of PASOK's corruption was completed.[266][200][284] This collaboration was led by first under Tzannis Tzannetakis (2 July-12 October) and then Ioannis Grivas (12 October-23 November).[285] The participation of Synaspismos party in the government marked the end of the militarized politics of the past since there was no reaction from the military. The decision carried additional responsibility because if no charges were brought against Papandreou under the current collaboration between New Democracy and Synaspismos, no future government could do so based on the Greek constitution.[286][287] The collaboration was soon dissolved after the indictment of Papandreou for the Koskotas scandal (29 September 1989),[288] and the Greek people went to the polls again. In the elections of November 1989, New Democracy got 46% of the vote but could still not produce a government. All the parties in Parliament (New Democracy, PASOK, and Synaspismos) entered a National Union government[200] under Xenophon Zolotas (a retired banker at the age of 85) as a way out of the deadlock and to restore public trust in political institutions. Zolotas resigned in April 1990 due to the inability to reverse the continuous deterioration of the Greek economy from Papandreou's handling of the economy in previous years.[266] In the elections of April 1990, Mitsotakis received sufficient (by one seat above the threshold) support to form a government, and Papandreou became the opposition leader.[266]

### Papandreou in opposition (1990–1993)

[edit]

Recovering from the Koskotas scandals and electoral defeat, Papandreou had a relatively quiet opposition strategy (departing from the radical rhetoric in the 1970s and early 1980s[289]), effectively letting Mitsotakis implement difficult, unpopular economic and foreign policy choices.[citation needed]

Mitsotakis' government, after taking office, introduced a series of austerity measures (following the footsteps of Simitis in 1985-7), including freezing public-sector salaries and pensions, cutting government spending, and raising taxes on various goods, including fuel oil.[285] It also repealed the wage price index, which kept people's incomes high while fuelling inflation, and it was PASOK's popular law among wage earners since 1982 when it was first introduced.[290] This repeal caused wages and salaries to fall by 13% from 1990 to 1993, resulting in continuous strikes by the affected workers.[291] Certain areas, such as banking, were deregulated to attract capital.[291] Mitsotakis' government sold or liquidated 44 companies controlled by the "Industrial Reconstruction Organisation", which was created by PASOK and was designed to assist failed firms in recovery.[292] The Greek economy started to recover due to Mitsotakis' economic policies toward meeting the Euro convergence criteria, but this was not enough to balance the rising frustration of the Greek voters with the impact of austerity on their lives.[293]

Constantine Mitsotakis initiated efforts designed to improve relations with the US, which Papandreou's anti-American rhetoric had damaged.[294][295] In July 1990, a defense cooperation agreement was signed regarding the operation of American bases in Greece for the next eight years.[294][296] Greece's airspace and naval support during the Gulf War further improved the relations between Greece and US. Mitsotakis also visited Washington, making him the first Greek prime minister to do so since 1964 by Papandreou's father.[297] The fall of Mitsotakis's government followed after Antonis Samaras left the New Democracy party (June 1993) in protest for Mitsotakis removing Samaras from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (April 1992) for his handling of the Macedonia naming dispute with the neighboring country; Mitsotakis had one seat above the threshold according to Papandreou's electoral law.[289]

Papandreou campaigned to bring back the euphoria of the early 1980s.[293] Moreover, PASOK's campaign program had dropped the past socialist ideals and instead presented itself as a "responsible" political party.[298] The Greek people voted in October 1993 the return of Papandreou to power.[293] Following the electoral results, Mitsotakis resigned[iv] from the leadership of New Democracy and was replaced by Miltiadis Evert.[299][300]

### Return to power (1993–1996)

[edit]

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou on official visit with United States President William J. Clinton, Washington, April 1994. Dimitra Liani is in the background on the right.

Papandreou's return to power was less vigorous, as he could only work a few hours a day due to his fragile health, and for much of 1995, he remained bedridden.[301][302][303] Lianni, now officially part of the government as Chief of Staff, was the person, along with her staff, that Papandreou depended upon, alienating many of his senior ministers.[301][304][305] At the same time, Papandreou's position in PASOK was crumbling, and two factions were emerging: the "reformers" faction with a pro-Europe vision led by Costas Simitis, Vasso Papandreou (no relation) and Theodoros Pangalos, and the "loyalists" faction advocating a populist path led by Akis Tsochatzopoulos, Kostas Laliotis [el],[xiv] and Gerasimos Arsenis.[306] All of them were long-time (some even founding) members of PASOK. However, Papandreou was said to favor one of the loyalists without specifying which, but rank and file tended to favor the pro-Europe reformers, reflecting Papandreou's losing grip on his party.[306]

Like Mitsotakis, Papandreou had to bring the Greek economy to converge to Euro convergence criteria,[285] but little time remained to achieve them. He abandoned his campaign promises and continued the austerity policies of Mitsotakis with minor alterations, expanding the deregulation and liberalization of the economy.[301] There was less public reaction to these policies because Papandreou found a compromising position between capital and unions,[285][307] and the pace of deregulation was slower than his predecessor.[306]

In foreign policy, Papandreou followed a hawkish strategy. In February 1994, Papandreou ordered an economic embargo on landlocked North Macedonia due to the ongoing naming dispute regarding the name of the then Republic of Macedonia.[308] In April 1994, Papandreou visited the United States to meet with President Clinton, who had recently recognized the new republic, but the visit did not result in any immediate breakthroughs.[309] Papandreou hoped the embargo would have been a bargaining chip, but it backfired since North Macedonia gained considerable sympathy worldwide, damaging Greece's reputation.[310][311] In September 1995, an interim accord was signed between the two countries to address the matter and the name issue temporarily and ending the 18 months embargo.[303] Papandreou also announced the "Common Defence Dogma" with the Republic of Cyprus (October 1993) and the intention of expanding the territorial waters to 12 miles (November 1994), which further disturbed Turkey[xiii] and increased the chances for another crisis, as it happened at Imia in January 1996, right after the transition of power from Papandreou to Simitis.[312]

Papandreou was hospitalized with advanced heart disease and renal failure on 21 November 1995 at Onassio Cardiac Surgery Centre and refused to retire from office.[304] Papandreou's refusal to resign paralyzed the government; Costas Simitis resigned in protest, and Papandreou's eldest son joined the call for his father to resign "for the good of the country."[313] Eventually, Papandreou resigned on 16 January 1996,[314] and Costas Simitis was chosen as the new party leader on 18 January.[301] Papandreou died on 23 June 1996.[citation needed]

## Papandreou's populism and patronage

[edit]

Further information: § Social reconciliation

Both dominant political parties in Metapolitefsi, New Democracy and PASOK, advocated for an inclusive society, but PASOK held an edge due to Papandreou's populist rhetoric.[315] Papandreou presented a grand historical narrative of Greece through the prism of binary characterizations, good vs. evil, Left (socialists) vs. Right (conservatives), privileged vs. underprivileged, etc., that aimed to exacerbate polarization among Greeks.[316][317] In particular, he and his close associates instrumentalized the painful and divided past by regularly invoking the memories of the civil war ("right the wrongs of the past") and "revenge of the losers [of the Civil War]" (Greek: "η ρεβάνς των ηττημένων") to maintain the support of the left-leaning faithful by demonstrating to them that PASOK remained true to its campaign promises and left-wing roots.[152][318] Papandreou claimed that the 'underprivileged' would exercise power through him,[316] even if this would damage democratic institutions,[7] e.g., judicial independence;[264] he characteristically proclaimed on a television party rally: "There are no institutions – only the people rule this country."[319] Papandreou's populism was followed by vilifying his opponents, Mitsotakis was described as a "traitor" and a "nightmare",[320][321] and blaming the conservatives for civil war and the junta, "Greek people never forget what the Right has done."[322] Unable to close the gap since both parties had similar policies,[7] Mitsotakis adopted Papandreou's populist rhetoric, further enhancing the political polarization in the 1980s and early 1990s. The political polarization reached a point that The Economist magazine in 1985 described Greece as a "country divided", tearing itself apart and opening the wounds of civil war.[323] Papandreou's populism was also used to describe international relations[citation needed] (see foreign policy).

The class struggle that Papandreou campaigned on had little basis in reality,[7] it was instead part of old-fashioned patronage politics. Papandreou transformed the localized voter-patron relation, where the patrons were local aristocratic families, into a centralized national machine where the state controlled by PASOK became the source of patronage. He rewarded its loyal supporters with civil service jobs to an unprecedented degree.[124][324] Papandreou's generosity depended on PASOK's performance in the polls. One day before the 1989 elections and as the scandals were closing in, Papandreou's populism reached new heights when, on a balcony, surrounded by a crowd that gathered to watch him, he gave a public command to the Minister of Finance Dimitris Tsovolas to "give it all [to them]" (Greek: Τσοβόλα δώσ'τα όλα) and "Tsovolas, empty the coffers [of the state]," and the crowd chanted these back.[325][204] Later on, Papandreou claimed that he was merely joking, but this event became an infamous moment of the era.[citation needed]

The mass-scale patronage from PASOK was made feasible by abolishing early on the merit-based evaluations in selecting civil servants in the public domain, such as utility companies and the National Bank of Greece (see also education). After a decade without merit-based evaluations and intensified PASOK's clientelism, these organizations were near paralysis or collapse.[326] In 1994, merit-based evaluations were re-introduced by PASOK, known as Supreme Council for Personnel Selection (ASEP).[327] Despite initial criticism of this behavior, Mitsotakis' and future governments adopted Papandreou's newly established voter-patron relation.[citation needed]

## Government style

[edit]

Papandreou had lifelong experience in political campaigning, which few could match in the metapolitefsi era (1974–1990), and had commanding leadership in setting the narrative of Greece in the greater context. However, he had little ministerial experience,[xv][328] and spent little time preparing on how to govern before the 1981 election victory.[246] The lack of experience was exacerbated by two more choices. First, Papandreou chose ministers with no previous ministerial experience but who were also ideologically similar, thus eliminating differences of opinion out of fear of leading to intra-party factionalism, as happened in Iouliana.[328][126] Second, PASOK passed Law 1232/82 in 1982, which purged senior civil servants from all ministries (eliminating institutional memory) based on the allegation that they were hostile to the new regime, and they were replaced by party loyalists who had little knowledge of how the government worked.[329] Lack of experience in Papandreou's governments led to early failures with costly economic and social consequences.[330]

Papandreou had unchallenged authority in PASOK to the point of being "authoritarian".[331][332][333] He acted as the 'final arbiter,' and he was "ruthless" if he felt threatened.[334] He did not hesitate to silence his intra-party critics with expulsion from PASOK,[334] followed by a character assassination from the pro-PASOK press and even state media.[278] His grip on the government and his party started to weaken after the Koskotas scandal.[250][335]

Papandreou experimented with various government structures (both in size and form) and restarted the government frequently as he holds the record for the most ministerial reshuffles (13 times in 1981–1989, with over 100 people changing various ministerial positions).[336] Papandreou found the day-to-day government management less interesting (especially after 1983) and instead focused on the grant narratives of Greece's democratization process.[337] Limited access to Papandreou (especially in later years), lack of guidance, and fluid organizational structure left his ministers spending valuable time decoding what their 'Leader' wanted. Ministers who have worked with Papandreou have recorded their frustration at Ministerial Councils where Papandreou would not disagree with anyone.[188] These choices reflected his aversion to institutional development, and he instead opted for personality (reactive) politics to be the cohesive force that kept PASOK together. The result was that Papandreou's governments were dysfunctional and lacked coordination, with ministers having little or no time until the next reshuffle to implement campaign promises.[338] The fluid government style of Papandreou, both in structure and in personnel, also made his governments vulnerable to corruption, as the Koskotas scandal proved.[339]

## Economic policies

[edit]

Further information: Greek economy, § Economy and EEC, § Failed stabilization of the economy, and § Elevation of women and their inclusion in the economy

Once in power, Papandreou did not oppose the integration of Greece into the European Union despite his fierce rhetoric against it in the 1970s. Papandreou began to implement a political agenda to restructure the Greek economy and improve living standards by increasing access of lower-income and rural populations to state services such as education and healthcare. Many infrastructure projects were completed in rural areas at the expense of large urban centers. He pursued expansionary fiscal policies, characterized by increases in public spending, and total public expenditure rose from 44.2% to 51.3% of GDP between 1984 and 1988.[340] These increases were carried out to boost social welfare, healthcare, education, and pensions. Workers' rights were reinforced. Women with new rights and protections were integrated into the economy, particularly in the emerging tourism industry.[341] At the same time, he started to nationalize a wide range of companies in key sectors such as banking, industry, and transport, believing this would stabilize the economy and protect national interests.[citation needed]

Papandreou implemented a mixture of protectionist measures and extensive state-guaranteed lending.[116] Still, many policies exacerbated the structural problems of the Greek economy that had been rising from the oil crisis of the 1970s, the European competition, and the global recession of the early 1980s. Specifically, his policies further reduced the competitiveness of companies operating in Greece, which either left or minimized investments to survive.[342] The growing public sector, through the nationalization endeavor, mass-scale clientelism, corruption, and social policies, resulted in substantial fiscal deficits. Papandreou did not establish progressive taxation to increase the state's revenues and did not reduce the military expenses, which were above 5.5% of GDP throughout the 1980s.[343] Instead, he burdened the Greek people with foreign loans that substantially increased the government debt that became a central challenge for subsequent governments. The lack of competitiveness allowed the penetration of European goods into the Greek market, further widening the trade deficit. By the end of Papandreou's term, the Greek economy was on the verge of bankruptcy since the foreign exchange reserves were at their lowest point.[344] Papandreou, to avoid the economic collapse, accepted another loan from EEC in 1985 and was forced to implement austerity to improve the state of the Greek economy.[202][203] While the economy started to improve after two years of austerity, Papandreou retreated to his populistic tactics once PASOK's popularity waned.[206] By abandoning the austerity measures, Papandreou wasted two years of improvements and effectively delayed the convergence of the Greek economy to Euro convergence criteria by more than four years.[citation needed]

Greek National Income per decade for 1900–2000. Under Papandreou's 1981–1989 tenure, the national income increased approximately at the same rate as in the turbulent decade of 1941–1950. Source: The Bank of Greece and National Statistical Service, various open source bulletins and reports.[345]

After eight years of Papandreou's rule, the Greek economy was in dire condition, with a reputation nationally and in European circles as that of a 'black sheep.'[8][9] Specifically, the economy was burdened by debt that had nearly tripled in size (from 26.7% of GDP in 1981 to 73.3% of GDP in 1990),[346] high inflation rates (ranging between 13% and 23% from 1981 to 1989), rising unemployment (2.7% in 1980 and reached 8% in 1988),[347] chronic primary budget deficits, and large government expenditures some intended to keep failed companies afloat.[290] The gross national income increased in the decade 1981–1990 at approximately the same rate as the decade 1941–1950, where foreign occupation and a civil war took place.[345] The poor economic performance of Greece and the misuse of EEC funds was the subject of a report produced by the EEC Monetary Committee in March 1992.[291] While political opponents criticized Papandreou's economic policies early on, in the end, criticism came from his allies as well.[348][349] Theodore Stathis [el], who worked in the governments of Andreas Papandreou and his father, commented on Papandreou's economic policy outcome,

> He [Andreas Papandreou] wanted to build a state with better salaries and services. But in the end, the money just went into the bureaucracy and not to the people. In fact, we built up such a large state that we had to keep borrowing just to pay its expenses. This was a terrible mistake.[348]

The austerity measures needed in the Greek economy were implemented in the early 1990s by Mitsotakis, which Papandreou continued with minor variations after his return in 1993.[301] After Papandreou's death, Simitis put the economy in order, and by 2001, Greece joined the Euro.[350]

## Foreign policy

[edit]

Further information: Foreign relations of Greece and § Reapprochment with Turkey

Papandreou conducted, as PASOK affiliates touted, an "independent" and "multidimensional" foreign policy; however, even his more vigorous supporters admitted later that these characterizations meant "everything or nothing" due to the frequent inconsistencies and U-turns.[351]

Papandreou's foreign policy had two facets: international relations and domestic consumption. On the latter, he often utilized foreign policy by exaggerating the (real or not) national dangers to distract the Greeks from a domestic crisis.[xvi][352] Moreover, his rhetoric was that of a Third World populism infused with nationalism aimed against the imperialist forces represented by the United States and the European Union. His statement best represents his nationalism: "Greece belongs to the Greeks." According to historian John Iatrides, Papandreou's nationalistic and confrontational diplomacy had a "therapeutic effect upon the national psyche, as the general [Greek] public came to believe that [Greece's] sovereignty had been restored" since the Greeks largely perceived that their country is pushed around by European Great Powers and now the Americans.[351] On the former, foreign politicians recognized his 'pragmatic' approach despite the frustration rising from his radical rhetoric and confrontational tactics. On the most consequential aspects, Papandreou's actions, often contrary to his rhetoric, followed Karamanlis' policy of "Greece belongs to the West" by keeping Greece firmly committed to the NATO alliance and EEC.[viii] The balance between these two facets has made Greece's foreign policy appear "schizophrenic" to an outsider observer.[351][353] Such an example is provided by John Iatrides: "while publicly attacking Washington for its interventionist policies, the PASOK government would privately complain that American officials were not sensitive to Greek fears of Turkish intentions concerning Cyprus and the Aegean."[351]

Papandreou's frequent statements antagonizing the Western allies made foreign leaders question his intentions and made Greece more isolated and vulnerable, and they were not helping solve the Cyprus question.[354][355] A notable example was in September 1983, when Papandreou vetoed a formal European Community statement condemning the Soviet government for shooting down the Korean airliner KAL Flight 007, asserting that it was a plane spying for the benefit of the United States, and he added that "if such a plane came into Greece, we would have downed it."[354] Papandreou's siding with the Soviet position effectively eliminated any possibility of visiting the White House under at the time the Reagan administration to advance Greek national interests in the foreseeable future.[356]

Papandreou continued Karamanlis's opening to Arab countries as part of diversifying diplomatic partners to secure trade deals and investments from petro-dollars countries. He improved relations with 'radical' Arab nations, such as Muammar Gaddafi's Libya,[357] Hafez al-Assad's Syria, and letting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members stay in Greece,[358] antagonizing the United States. Moreover, Papandreou supported the causes of various national liberation movements worldwide and agreed for Greece to host representative offices of many such organizations.[358] He also supported the Palestinian liberation cause and advocated the two-state solution while at the same time condemned Israeli policies in the occupied territories. However, inviting 'radical' Arab groups in Greece further fueled the rising terrorism incidents in Greece.[211]

Regarding Turkey, Papandreou often emphasized the threat to Greece is coming from the east instead of from the north[359] and tried to remind other European members frequently of Turkey's violations of international law and human rights.[360] Moreover, he repeatedly blocked EEC credits for Turkey and its candidacy application for EEC membership in 1987.[360] At the same time, Papandreou made an effort to improve relations with Turkey in Davos.[citation needed]

He was co-creator in 1982 of, and subsequently an active participant in, a movement promoted by the Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Initiative of the Six, which included, besides the Greek PM, Mexico's president Miguel de la Madrid, Argentina's president Raúl Alfonsín, Sweden's prime minister Olof Palme, Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere and India's prime minister Indira Gandhi.[361] The movement's stated objective was the "promotion of peace and progress for all mankind." Papandreou pledged that Greece would be a nuclear-free country by removing the existing nuclear weapons and initiating diplomatic efforts to turn the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone, but then proceeded to modernize nuclear storage sites in Greece.[353] After various initiatives, mostly directed at pressuring the United States and the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing and reduce the level of nuclear arms, it eventually disbanded.[citation needed]

## Cultural and political image

[edit]

Papandreou was highly charismatic, an excellent orator, and skillful in manipulating impressions and achieving his political goals.[362] Despite his aristocratic and academic background, Papandreou could converse with Greeks of any social status. At the same time, it was also challenging to interpret his intentions. He used a form of doublespeak, absent in the Greek political language at the time, where the meanings of terms could change depending on the situation.[363]

Among both his supporters and his opponents, Papandreou was referred to simply by his first name, "Andreas", which was a novelty in the Greek political world but necessary for Papandreou to keep some distance from his family name,[362] which had been involved in turbulent politics of the past that brought the 1967 dictatorship and eventually the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.[364][2]

In the 1970s, Papandreou wore his business suits with turtleneck sweaters instead of the traditional white shirt and tie.[365][362] His first appearance in the Greek Parliament with a black turtleneck instead of a shirt and tie caused an uproar in the conservative press, who considered it disrespectful of Parliament; however, the whole issue only added to his popularity. By breaking the dress code, Papandreou communicated that he was a 'rebel' fighting against the 'establishment,' composed chiefly of conservatives who dominated the political scene in the previous decades.[365] This symbolism, however, did not last, once in power, Papandreou started to wear exclusively a suit with a shirt and tie.[365]

## Legacy

[edit]

Papandreou's grave in the First Cemetery of Athens. On his grave is written "Greece belongs to the Greeks."

Papandreou was a realist on core political issues but a leftist ideologue on peripheral matters. In foreign policy, he continued Karamanlis' policy to remain in the European Union and NATO, both of which he vehemently opposed for many years. Complementing this political realism, Papandreou's ability to publicly reject American positions gave Greeks a sense of national independence and psychological self-worth.[366] However, in the end, his frequent radical and combative rhetoric frustrated existing allies and did not bring new allies (Arab states[211] or countries from the eastern bloc), leaving Greece more diplomatically isolated and unable to advance a solution on the Cyprus problem.[354][355]

Papandreou shifted political power in domestic issues from the conservatives, who dominated Greek politics for decades, to a more populist and centre-left locus. His inclusionist policies, expanding access to healthcare, education and strengthening women's rights, ended the sociopolitical and economic exclusion of social classes. This shift in the Greek political landscape helped Greek society to become more pluralistic and converge to the Western European countries' social norms. His early achievements, however, were tarnished by controversial decisions leading to a Constitutional crisis[187] and many corruption scandals. Moreover, the revelation that Papandreou did not hesitate to redirect the junta's surveillance infrastructure against any Greek citizen who opposed him,[367] his soft stance on terrorism,[368] damaging the legitimacy of democratic institutions,[7] and his public family drama dominated public discourse. Papandreou's populism under the guise of inclusionist social policies became part of PASOK's patronage, greatly expanded by misuse of EEC funds and an unprecedented rate of foreign borrowing that brought the Greek economy twice (1985 and 1989) to the verge of bankruptcy. His mishandling of the Greek economy's reconstruction became a central problem for future governments. Overall, Papandreou had little impact on improving the Greek state and its institutions, and his governance became a negative reference point.[369]

Papandreou's populism remained popular[iii] in a significant fraction (approximately 40%) of Greek society,[12] despite the deterioration of the economy and the various corruption scandals. Papandreou's son, George Papandreou, was elected leader of PASOK in February 2004 and prime minister during the October 2009 parliamentary elections and the slogan chanted in political rallies was: "Andreas, you are still alive! You're leading us!" (Greek: Ανδρέα ζείς! Εσύ μας οδηγείς!).[citation needed]

## Decorations and awards

[edit]

* Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella the Catholic (1983)
* Star of People's Friendship (1985)[370]
* Order of the Polar Star (1999)

## Bibliography

[edit]

Books

* Papandreou, Andreas (1943). The Location and Scope of the Entrepreneurial Function. Boston: Harvard University.
* 

--; Wheeler, John T. (1954). Competition and its regulation. Summit St. Kent: Prentice-Hall.
* 

--; Sauerlender, Owen H. (1957). A test of a stochastic theory of choice. University of California publications in economics. Oakland: University of California Press.
* 

-- (1958). Economics as a Science. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
* 

-- (1962). A Strategy for Greek Economic Development. Center of Economic Research.
* 

-- (1962). Fundamentals of model construction in macro-economics. Center of Economic Research.
* 

-- (1966). The Political Element in Economic Development. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
* 

-- (1966). Δημοκρατία και εθνική αναγέννηση [Democracy and National Rebirth] (in Greek). Athens: Fexis.
* 

-- (1970). Man's freedom. New York: Columbia University Press.
* 

-- (1971). Democracy at Gunpoint. New York: Deutsch.
* 

-- (1972). Paternalistic Capitalism. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
* 

-- (1973). Economic Development - Rhetoric and Reality. Vancouver: The University of British Columbia.
* 

--; Zohar, Uri (1974). Project Selection for National Plans. New York: Praeger Publishers.
* 

-- (1974). The Impact Approach to Project Selection. Toronto: York University.
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-- (1975). Ιμπεριαλισμός και οικονομική ανάπτυξη [Imperialism and Economic Development] (in Greek). Athens: Livanis.
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-- (1976). Η Ελλάδα στους Έλληνες [Greece to the Greeks] (in Greek). Athens: Karanasis.
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* Papandreou, Andreas (1950). "Economics and the social sciences". The Economic Journal. 60 (240): 715–723\. doi:10.2307/2226710. JSTOR 2226710.
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-- (1953). "An experimental test of an axiom in the theory of choice". Econometrica. 21 (3): 477.

## Notes

[edit]

1. ^ a b

Andreas Papandreou admits that his father, on the night of the Colonels' coup, blamed Andreas for the coup, and Andreas himself wondered whether he had crossed the line with his radical campaign.[364][2]

2. ^ a b c

There is a long-standing debate on whether the Johnson administration gave the green light for the 1967 coup in Greece.[78] Andreas Papandreou and his academic colleagues frequently accused the US administration of being responsible for the coup, and since then, Andreas Papandreou and other Greek elites sold this to the masses as part of nurturing anti-American sentiment, making it a widespread belief among Greeks.[371][372] Others are more skeptical due to the lack of "smoking gun" evidence. Louis Klarevas, based on the declassified documents of the US government and extensive literature review, concluded that there was no official action for the coup, however, additional evidence is required to determine any unofficial activities.[78]

3. ^ a b

In a poll conducted by Kathimerini in 2007, 48% of those polled called Papandreou the "most important Greek prime minister".[373] In the same poll, the first term of Papandreou's government was voted as the best government Greece ever had after Metapolitefsi.[374]

4. ^ a b c d

While Andreas Papandreou and Constantine Mitsotakis started from the same political party, and both competed for the leadership of the Center Union,[375] Andreas had vilified Mitsotakis for Iouliana of 1965 (siding with the king and in the view of Andreas betraying his father) as a "traitor" and a "nightmare" effectively stigmatizing the life-long career of Mitsotakis in Greek politics.[320][321] In 1984, Mitsotakis became the New Democracy party leader because he was the only active politician (Karamanlis was President at the time) who could rival Andreas Papandreou.[320] From 1984 until 1990, the political conflict between Papandreou and Mitsotakis was both personal and polarized.[375] After winning the elections of 1990, Mitsotakis lacked the political capital and sufficient majority to implement his policies despite his long-term ministerial experience, resulting in Mitsotakis's tenure being short.[285]

5. ^

Andreas Papandreou's interview in Le Monte effectively stated his disagreement in public with the Acheson Plan by criticizing the American's efforts in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem while at the same time siding with Makarios, who was wanted an independent Cyprus and effectively opposed a union with Greece, known as "Enosis" (Greek: Ένωσις). The Acheson Plan required a territorial concession (e.g., Kastellorizo) as a compromise for a union with Cyprus without a military conflict with Turkey, and in retrospect, it was the best Greece could get in the 1960s.[376] The Americans were losing patience with the Papandreous' delays and maneuvering (beforehand, the first version of the Aechelon plan was leaked to Makarios when visiting Athens[377]). The Le Monte interview was when American officials lost trust in both Papandreous.[378] Andreas Papandreou's influence on his father by circumventing the Greek Cabinet unanimously agreement on Achelon's Plan effectively wasted this chance for a peaceful union, and a lack of a solution on Cyprus intensified the political instability in Greece that led to the 1967 Greek junta and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.[379][380]

6. ^

According to the Greek constitution of 1952,[381] article 31 states that the king hires and fires ministers (Greek: Ο βασιλεύς διορίζει και παύει τους υπουργούς αυτού). This created confusion as the prime minister was chosen by popular election, with the king forced to work with, but at any moment, the king could dissolve the government and parliament and call new elections. Two prime ministers in the 1950s had raised the question as to who governs the state, the king or the prime minister,[382] echoing the disagreements between Venizelos and Constantine I during the National Schism.

7. ^

American officials and friends like Carl Kaysen, while willing to aid efforts to secure his release from the junta's imprisonment, had written him off as a demagogue and untrustworthy. Similarly, the British Labour Party and Foreign Office also ignored the exiled Papandreou because he was unreliable and expressed anti-Western views.[383] Karamanlis declined Papandreou's requests for a meeting by commenting that Andreas Papandreou could not be ignored nor be trusted.[76] US Ambassador Phillips Talbot stated that his political colleagues are virtually unanimous in their hostility toward Andreas Papandreou. He concluded that "Andreas would probably have been wiser to return to the university for the indefinite future."[384]

8. ^ a b

Unable to challenge Karamanlis's foreign policy directly, Papandreou channeled Greece's nationalist sentiments and widespread post-junta feelings of humiliation and betrayal into fiery rhetoric targeting NATO and the EEC.[385] Papandreou's campaign slogan, "Greece belongs to the Greeks", sharply contrasted with Karamanlis's assertion that "Greece belongs to the West." According to political scientist Takis Pappas, Papandreou saw radical polarization and political extremism as the only way to secure his path to power, believing that inflaming divisions within Greek politics would rally support for his cause.[386]

9. ^

Beyond the anti-NATO and anti-EEC rhetoric, Papandreou's campaign promises include higher wages for workers, more jobs, improvements in transportation, reform of Greece's antiquated education system, cheaper housing, higher prices for farm goods, and an end to corruption and inefficiency in the state bureaucracy.[387][388] He also promised to decentralize the government and give more control to local authorities.[389] Also, the smog covering Athens would disappear once PASOK was in power, though the smog got worse in the 1980s.[390][173]

10. ^

Civil marriage was a novelty in Greek culture, and it was strongly opposed by the Church of Greece,[391] which was the only institution in Greece that legally performed marriages before this. Couples seeking a civil marriage had to get married outside Greece, generally in Italy.

11. ^

Earnings rose higher than inflation in 1988, compensating workers for their loss of purchasing power.[392] At the same time, the consumption rate per capita had progressively increased since 1981 but remained well below the EEC average, and savings per capita reached the lowest rate since 1971.[393] The money supply rose by 23% while the drachma appreciated in real terms. This expansionary policy encouraged growth in the short term, with a rise in domestic demand and a rise in real GDP by 4.3%. In addition, private investment rose by 12% and public investment by 1.6%. Due to revenue shortfalls and high public spending, however, the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement reached 16% of GDP. In addition, total public sector debt went above 100% of GDP by the end of 1988.[394]

12. ^

The total amount of money was substantial, approximately 1⁄280 of the Greek economy, based on Greece's GDP in 1986 of US$56 billion.[39]

13. ^

In response to Papandreou's declaration that Greece intended to expand to 12 miles, in June 1995, the Turkish Parliament voted for a "casus belli" license, meaning the Turkish government could take any necessary action (including military) if Greece exercised its right (according to Law of the Sea) to expand.[395]

14. ^

Laliotis was often called the Papandreou's "fifth child" due to his privileged access to Papandreou.[396]

15. ^

Papandreou's ministerial experience was 18 months when his father was prime minister, from February 1964 to July 1965.[328] For comparison, Constantine Mitsotakis and Costas Simitis had approximately seven years of ministerial experience each before becoming prime ministers.[397] Karamanlis had three years of experience as a minister of public works, but more experienced ministers surrounded him once as a prime minister.[398]

16. ^

In the summer of 1982, Papandreou responded to bank employees' general strike "to take into consideration the crucial international crisis facing the nation."[352] Later on, PASOK's poor performance in the municipal elections of 1982 prompted Papandreou to make appearances near Greece's borders as if the country was about to be under attack and appealed to Greek citizens living in the cities to "understand that the main issue that the country is facing is at this moment is defending national integrity."[352]

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[edit]

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357. ^ & Greek Reporter Aug. 2011.
358. ^ a b New York Times Dec. 1981a.
359. ^ Karamouzi & Chourchoulis 2018, pp. 6–7.
360. ^ a b Close 2014, p. 268.
361. ^ Clogg 1993, p. 188.
362. ^ a b c Chilcote et al. 2015, p. 160.
363. ^ Liakos & Doumanis 2023, p. 312.
364. ^ a b Papandreou 1971, pp. 24, 312.
365. ^ a b c Macha-Bizoumi 2020, pp. 22–24.
366. ^ Miller 2009, p. 210.
367. ^ Samatas 1993, pp. 42–45.
368. ^ Kassimeris 1993, pp. 295–300.
369. ^ Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, pp. 113–115.
370. ^ National Video-audio Archive Mar. 1985.
371. ^ Michas 2002, p. 94.
372. ^ Larrabee 1981, p. 160.
373. ^ Kathimerini Dec. 2007a.
374. ^ Kathimerini Dec. 2007b.
375. ^ a b Clogg 2013, p. 190.
376. ^ Hatzivassiliou 2006, p. 183.
377. ^ Miller 2009, p. 104.
378. ^ Miller 2009, p. 119.
379. ^ Draenos 2012, pp. 105–113, 140.
380. ^ Brinkley 1992, pp. 217–218.
381. ^ Greek Constitution 1952, p. 6.
382. ^ Dervitsiotis 2019, p. 240.
383. ^ Miller 2009, p. 140.
384. ^ Draenos 2014, p. 32.
385. ^ Nafpliotis 2018, p. 516.
386. ^ Pappas 2009, pp. 77–87.
387. ^ Clogg 1982, pp. 95–96.
388. ^ Clogg 2013, pp. 177–178.
389. ^ Larrabee 1981, pp. 159.
390. ^ Clogg 2013, p. 178.
391. ^ Curtis 1995, p. 85.
392. ^ Jouganatos 1992, p. 141.
393. ^ Jouganatos 1992, p. 163.
394. ^ US Dept. of Commerce 1990, p. 5.
395. ^ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 174.
396. ^ Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 87.
397. ^ Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 117.
398. ^ Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 59.

## References

[edit]

Constitutions of Greece

* "Greek Constitution of 1952". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 1/1952 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
* "Greek Constitution of 1975". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 111/1975 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
* "Greek Constitution of 1986". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 23/1986 (in Greek). National Printing Office.

Books

* Alexiadou, Despina (2016). Ideologues, partisans, and loyalists: Ministers and policymaking in parliamentary cabinets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780191072345.
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* Bellou, Fotini; Couloumbis, Theodore A.; Kariotis, Theodore C., eds. (2003). Greece in the twentieth century. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780203045893.
* Bottomley, Gillian (1992). From Another Place Migration and the Politics of Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521410144.
* Brinkley, Douglas (1992). Dean Acheson, The Cold War Years, 1953-71. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300060751.
* Carabott, Philip; Sfikas, Thanassis D., eds. (2004). The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences. Surrey: Ashgate. ISBN 9780754641322.
* Charalambis, Dimitris; Maratou-Alipranti, Laura; Hadjiyanni, Andromachi (2004). Recent Social Trends in Greece 1960-2000. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP. ISBN 9780773569324.
* Chilcote, Ronald H.; Hadjiyannis, Stylianos; Lopez, Fred A. III; et al. (2015). Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy, Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece. New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781317841043.
* Clogg, Richard (1987). Parties and elections in Greece: the search for legitimacy. North Carolina: Duke University Press. ISBN 0822307944.
* 

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* 

 (2013). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107656444.
* Close, David H. (2014). Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781317880011.
* Crampton, Richard J. (2014). The Balkans since the second World War. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781317891178.
* Crile, George (2003). Charlie Wilson's War. New York: Grove Press. ISBN 0802141242.
* Dervitsiotis, Alkis (2019). Η έννοια της Κυβέρνησης (in Greek). Athens: P.N. Sakkoulas SA. ISBN 9789604208005.
* Draenos, Stan (2012). Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick. New York: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1780760803.
* Cavallaro, Maria E.; Kornetis, Kostis, eds. (2019). Rethinking Democratisation in Spain, Greece and Portugal. Cham: Palgrave Mcmillan. ISBN 9783030111083.
* Curtis, Glenn E. (1995). Greece, A Country Study. Maryland: Library of Congress. ISBN 1490436235.
* Duke, Simon (1989). United States military forces and installations in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198291329.
* Featherstone, Kevin; Katsoudas, Dimitrios K., eds. (1987). Political change in Greece: Before and after the colonels. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781000992144.
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; Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2015). Prime Ministers in Greece, The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198717171.
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; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198825104.
* Gallant, Thomas W. (2016). Modern Greece: From the war of independence to the present. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781350014510.
* Garrard, James; Newell, John, eds. (2006). Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719065514.
* Gunther, Richard; Diamandouros, Nikiforos; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri, eds. (2006). Democracy and the state in the new southern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780191513961.
* Heraclides, Alexis (2010). The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780230283398.
* Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis [in Greek] (2006). Greece and the Cold War Front Line State, 1952-1967. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781134154883.
* Jones, Michael J., ed. (2011). Creative Accounting, Fraud and International Accounting Scandals. West Sussex: Wiley. ISBN 9781119978626.
* Jouganatos, George A. (1992). The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991, An Historical, Empirical, and Econometric Analysis. Westport & London: Greenwood Press. ISBN 9780313283444.
* Kaplan, Robert D. (1994). Balkan Ghosts, A Journey Through History. London: Vintage Books. ISBN 0679749810.
* Karakatsanis, Neovi M.; Swarts, Jonathan (2018). American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels' Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781137523181.
* Karamouzi, Eirini (2014). Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1979. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781137331335.
* Katsoulas, Spyros (2021). The United States and Greek-Turkish Relations, The Guardian's Dilemma. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781000514339.
* Kriesi, Hanspeter; Pappas, Takis S., eds. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the great recession. Colchester: ECPR Press. ISBN 9781785521386.
* Kofas, Jon V. (2003). Under the Eagle's Claw Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S. - Greek Relations. New York: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780313072239.
* 

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* Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. [in Greek] (2009). Modern Greece A History Since 1821. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781444314830.
* Lagos, Katerina; Othon, Anastasakis, eds. (2021). The Greek Military Dictatorship Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967-1974. New York & London: Berghahn Books. ISBN 9781800731752.
* Liakos, Antonis [in Greek]; Doumanis, Nicholas (2023). The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 20th and Early 21st Centuries: Global Perspectives. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-1474410847.
* Magone, José (2003). The Politics of Southern Europe Integration Into the European Union. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780313051678.
* Maravall, José María (1997). Regimes, Politics, and Markets: Democratization and Economic Change in Southern and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198280835.
* Miller, James (2009). The United States and the Making of Modern Greece. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-1469622163.
* Mouzelis, Nicos P. (1978). Modern Greece: facets of underdevelopment. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. ISBN 978-0333226155.
* Nikolentzos, Athanasios (2008). The influence of the medical profession on the National Health Service of Greece, 1983–2001 (PDF) (PhD thesis). London: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. doi:10.17037/PUBS.00682367.
* Pappas, Takis S. (2009). Το χαρισματικό κόμμα: ΠΑΣΟΚ, Παπανδρέου, Εξουσία (in Greek). Athens: Patakis. ISBN 9789601632568.
* 

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* Pirounakis, Nicholas (1997). The Greek Economy Past, Present and Future. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0333654224.
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* Stearns, Monteagle (2021). The enigma of Andreas Papandreou. Sterling: Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1640123298.
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* Trantidis, Aris (2016). Clientelism and economic policy: Greece and the crisis. London & New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781138101401.
* Tsakonas, Panagiotes (2015). The incomplete breakthrough in Greek-Turkish relations: Grasping Greece's socialization strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. ISBN 9780230278073.
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* Borgeas, Andreas (2016). "The Evolution of Greece's Security Legislation and Policy". Journal of International and Comparative Law. 3 (2): 161–208.
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* Draenos, Stan (2014). "Andreas Papandreou's Exile Politics: The First Phase (1968-1970)". The Historical Review/La Revue Historique. 11: 35–66\. doi:10.12681/hr.332.
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* Fytili, Magdalini; Avgeridis, Manos; Kouki, Eleni (2023). "Heroes or Outcasts? The Long Saga of the State's Recognition of the Greek Resistance (1944–2006)". Contemporary European History. 33 (4): 1365–1383\. doi:10.1017/S0960777323000395.
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* Kuniholm, Bruce R. (1986). "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: US Policy Options toward Greece and Turkey". SAIS Review. 6 (1): 137–157\. doi:10.1353/sais.1986.0044. JSTOR 45349337.
* Larrabee, F. Stephen (1981). "Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks". Foreign Policy. 45 (45): 158–174\. doi:10.2307/1148318. JSTOR 1148318.
* Lefeber, Louis (1989). "The Socialist Experience in Greece". International Journal of Political Economy. 19 (4): 32–55\. doi:10.1080/08911916.1989.11643783. JSTOR 40470531.
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* Macha-Bizoumi, Nadia (2020). "The Attire of Politicians in Modern Greece: A Language of Communication" (PDF). Mediterranean and European Linguistic Anthropology. 2 (4): 17–34\. doi:10.47298/jomela.v2-i4-a2 (inactive 1 July 2025).`{{cite journal}}`: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)
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* Pappas, Takis S. (2014). "Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian, Greece and Post-Communist Hungary". Government and Opposition. 49 (1): 1–23\. doi:10.1017/gov.2013.21.
* Rizopoulos, Nicholas X. (1993). "Pride, Prejudice, and Myopia: Greek Foreign Policy in a Time Warp". World Policy Journal. 10 (3): 17–28\. JSTOR 40209315.
* Samatas, Minas (1993). "The Populist Phase of an Underdeveloped Surveillance Society: Political Surveillance in Post-Dictatorial Greece". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 19 (1): 31–70.
* Siani-Davies, Peter; Katsikas, Stefanos (2009). "National reconciliation after civil war: The case of Greece". Journal of Peace Research. 46 (4): 559–575\. doi:10.1177/0022343309334611. JSTOR 25654436.
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Newspapers and magazines

* Steven V. Roberts (24 January 1977). "Greece Is Facing an Uphill Fight For Admission to Common Market". The New York Times.
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* "Greece grants diplomatic status to P.L.O. Office". The New York Times. 17 December 1981. p. 6.
* "Greece obstructs NATO communique". The New York Times. 10 December 1981.
* "Greece seeks weapons and an arms industry". The New York Times. 3 March 1982.
* Gage, Nicholas (21 March 1982). "The paradoxical Papandreou". The New York Times Magazine.
* "Θεαματική εξαγγελία της αγορά του αιώνα" (in Greek). Kathimerini. 6 March 1985.
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* Jonathan C. Randal (13 March 1985). "Greek Opposition Leader Gladdened by Papandreou's Shift". Washington Post.
* "Greek banker arrested at Boston airport". Washington Post. 24 November 1988.
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## Additional reading

[edit]

* Boggs, Carl (1995). The socialist tradition: from crisis to decline. New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780415906708.
* Jacobs, Francis (1989). Western European political parties: a comprehensive guide. London: Addison-Wesley Longman Limited. ISBN 978-0582001138.
* Kassimeris, George (2019). "Greek Everyman: Andreas Papandreou at 100". The Political Quarterly. 90 (2): 304–309\. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12685. hdl:2436/622589.
* Kutlay, Mustafa (2018). The Political Economies of Turkey and Greece: Crisis and Change. London: Springer International Publishing. ISBN 978-3319927886.
* Pantazopoulos, Andreas (2001). For the people and the nation - the moment of Andreas Papandreou [Για το λαό και για το έθνος - η στιγμή του Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου 1965–1989] (in Greek). Athens: Ekdoseis Polis. ISBN 978-9608132320.
* Troitiño, David R.; de la Guardia, Ricardo M.; Sánchez, Guillermo A. P., eds. (2022). The European Union and its political leaders. Cham: Springer International Publishing. ISBN 9783030966621.
* Veremis, Thanos (2017). Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου: Μεγάλες Προσδοκίες [Andreas Papandreou: Great expectations]. Athens: Pataki. ISBN 9789601672069.
* Williams, Allan M.; Gallagher, Tom, eds. (1989). Southern European Socialism Parties, Elections, and the Challenge of Government. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719025006.

## External links

[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Andreas Papandreou.

Wikiquote has quotations related to Andreas Papandreou.

* "Collection of articles about Andreas Papandreou from Kathimerini" (in Greek).
* "ERT archives; Andreas Papandreou' interview after the 1977 elections" (in Greek).
* T. Pappas (August 2020). "The rise of modern populism". TED.
* "Videos of Andreas Papandreou". British Pathé.

Party political offices

New office |  President of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
1974–1996  | Succeeded by

Costas Simitis

Political offices
Preceded by

Georgios Mavros

|  Leader of the Opposition
1977–1981  | Succeeded by

Georgios Rallis

Preceded by

Georgios Rallis

|  Prime Minister of Greece
1981–1989  | Succeeded by

Tzannis Tzannetakis

Preceded by

Evangelos Averoff

|  Minister for National Defence
1981–1986  | Succeeded by

Ioannis Charalambopoulos

Preceded by

Konstantinos Mitsotakis

|  Leader of the Opposition
1989  | Succeeded by

National Union government

Preceded by

National Union government

|  Leader of the Opposition
1990–1993  | Succeeded by

Miltiadis Evert

Preceded by

Konstantinos Mitsotakis

|  Prime Minister of Greece
1993–1996  | Succeeded by

Costas Simitis

* v
* t
* e

Andreas Papandreou

* Prime Minister of Greece (1981–1989; 1993–1996)
* President of PASOK (1974–1996)

Leadership|

| Parties|

* Centre Union
* PASOK

|

Elections|

* 1974
* 1977
* 1981
* 1985
* June 1989
* Nov. 1989
* 1990
* 1993

Family|

* Zygmunt Mineyko (grandfather)
* Georgios Papandreou (father)
* George Papandreou (son)
* Nikos Papandreou (son)
* Margaret Chant-Papandreou (second wife)
* Dimitra Liani (third wife)

Politics|

* Democratic socialism
* Left-wing nationalism
* Populism
* Statism
* Nationalization
* Syndicalism
* Local governments
* Decentralization
* Egalitarianism
* Welfare state
* Gender equality

Events|

* 4th of August Regime
* World War II
* Centre Union
* Relentless Struggle
* ASPIDA case
* Iouliana of 1965
* Greek military junta
* Turkish invasion of Cyprus
* Metapolitefsi
* Declaration of 3 September
* 1985 Greek constitutional crisis
* 1987 Aegean crisis
* Koskotas scandal
* Interim accord with F.Y.R.O.M.

Establishments|

* Panhellenic Liberation Movement
* Monotonic orthography
* Civil marriage
* Ministry of Health
* Ministry for the Aegean
* Hellenic Police
* KYSEA
* National Guard
* Greek Resistance recognition (EAM)
* Greek genocide recognition
* ASEP
* ERT3

Partners|

* Anastasios Peponis
* Karolos Papoulias
* Melina Mercouri
* Vasso Papandreou
* Antonis Tritsis
* Giannos Kranidiotis
* Georgios Gennimatas
* Costas Simitis

Works|

* I Dimokratia sto apospasma

Remembrance|

* Andreas Papandreou airbase
* Peristeri Indoor Hall Andreas Papandreou

* v
* t
* e

Heads of government of Greece

First Hellenic Republic
(1822–1832)|

* Mavrokordatos
* P. Mavromichalis
* Kountouriotis
* And. Zaimis
* I. Kapodistrias
* A. Kapodistrias

Kingdom of Greece (Wittelsbach)
(1833–1862)|

* Sp. Trikoupis
* Mavrokordatos
* Kolettis
* von Armansperg
* von Rudhart
* King Otto
* Mavrokordatos
* King Otto
* A. Metaxas
* Kanaris
* Mavrokordatos
* Kolettis
* Tzavelas
* Kountouriotis
* Kanaris
* Kriezis
* Mavrokordatos
* D. Voulgaris
* Miaoulis
* Kolokotronis

Kingdom of Greece (interregnum)
(1862–1863)|

* D. Voulgaris
* Moraitinis
* Z. Valvis
* Kyriakos
* Roufos

Kingdom of Greece (Glücksburg)
(1863–1924)|

* D. Voulgaris
* Kanaris
* Z. Valvis
* Kanaris
* Koumoundouros
* Deligeorgis
* Roufos
* D. Voulgaris
* Koumoundouros
* Deligeorgis
* Roufos
* D. Voulgaris
* Koumoundouros
* Moraitinis
* D. Voulgaris
* Thr. Zaimis
* Deligeorgis
* Koumoundouros
* Thr. Zaimis
* D. Voulgaris
* Deligeorgis
* D. Voulgaris
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Koumoundouros
* Deligeorgis
* Koumoundouros
* Deligeorgis
* Koumoundouros
* Kanaris
* Koumoundouros
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Koumoundouros
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Koumoundouros
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Diligiannis
* D. Valvis
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Diligiannis
* Konstantopoulos
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Sotiropoulos
* Ch. Trikoupis
* Deligiannis
* Diligiannis
* D. Rallis
* Al. Zaimis
* G. Theotokis
* Al. Zaimis
* Diligiannis
* G. Theotokis
* D. Rallis
* G. Theotokis
* Diligiannis
* D. Rallis
* G. Theotokis
* D. Rallis
* K. Mavromichalis
* Dragoumis
* El. Venizelos
* Gounaris
* El. Venizelos
* Al. Zaimis
* Skouloudis
* Al. Zaimis
* Kalogeropoulos
* El. Venizelos2
* Lambros
* Al. Zaimis
* El. Venizelos
* D. Rallis
* Kalogeropoulos
* Gounaris
* Stratos
* Protopapadakis
* Triantafyllakos
* Charalambis
* Krokidas
* Gonatas
* El. Venizelos
* Kafantaris

Second Hellenic Republic
(1924–1935)|

* Papanastasiou
* Sofoulis
* Michalakopoulos
* Pangalos1
* Eftaxias1
* Kondylis3
* Al. Zaimis
* El. Venizelos
* Papanastasiou
* El. Venizelos
* P. Tsaldaris
* El. Venizelos
* Othonaios3
* P. Tsaldaris

Kingdom of Greece (Glücksburg)
(1935–1973)|

* Kondylis1
* Demertzis
* I. Metaxas1
* Koryzis
* Tsouderos2
* Tsolakoglou4
* Logothetopoulos4
* I. Rallis4
* Bakirtzis2
* S. Venizelos2
* Svolos2
* G. Papandreou (Sr.)
* Plastiras
* P. Voulgaris
* Archbishop Damaskinos
* Kanellopoulos
* Sofoulis
* Poulitsas3
* K. Tsaldaris
* Maximos
* K. Tsaldaris
* Sofoulis
* Vafeiadis2
* Partsalidis2
* Diomidis
* I. Theotokis3
* S. Venizelos
* Plastiras
* S. Venizelos
* Plastiras
* Kiousopoulos3
* Papagos
* K. Karamanlis (Sr.)
* Georgakopoulos3
* K. Karamanlis (Sr.)
* Dovas3
* K. Karamanlis (Sr.)
* Pipinelis
* Sty. Mavromichalis3
* G. Papandreou (Sr.)
* Paraskevopoulos3
* G. Papandreou (Sr.)
* Novas
* Tsirimokos
* Stefanopoulos
* Paraskevopoulos3
* Kanellopoulos3

Military Junta
(1967–1974)|

* Kollias1
* Papadopoulos1
* Markezinis1
* Androutsopoulos1

Third Hellenic Republic
(since 1974)|

* K. Karamanlis (Sr.)
* G. Rallis
* A. Papandreou
* Tzannetakis
* Grivas3
* Zolotas
* Ko. Mitsotakis
* A. Papandreou
* Simitis
* K. Karamanlis (Jr.)
* G. Papandreou (Jr.)
* Papademos3
* Pikrammenos3
* Samaras
* Tsipras
* Thanou3
* Tsipras
* Ky. Mitsotakis
* Sarmas3
* Ky. Mitsotakis

1Head of military/dictatorial government. 2Head of rival government not controlling Athens. 3Head of emergency or caretaker government. 4Head of collaborationist government during the Axis occupation (1941-44).

* v
* t
* e

Presidents of the European Council

President-in-Office
(1975–2009)|

* Cosgrave
* Moro
* Thorn
* Den Uyl
* Callaghan
* Tindemans
* Jørgensen
* Schmidt
* Giscard d'Estaing
* Lynch
* Cossiga
* Haughey
* Werner
* Van Agt
* Thatcher
* Martens
* Jørgensen
* Schlüter
* Kohl
* Papandreou
* Mitterrand
* FitzGerald
* Craxi
* Santer
* Lubbers
* Martens
* González
* Mitterrand
* Andreotti
* Lubbers
* Cavaco
* Major
* Nyrup Rasmussen
* Dehaene
* Chirac
* González
* Dini
* Prodi
* Bruton
* Kok
* Juncker
* Blair
* Klima
* Schröder
* Lipponen
* Guterres
* Chirac
* Persson
* Verhofstadt
* Aznar
* Fogh Rasmussen
* Simitis
* Berlusconi
* Ahern
* Balkenende
* Juncker
* Blair
* Schüssel
* Vanhanen
* Merkel
* Sócrates
* Janša
* Sarkozy
* Topolánek
* Fischer
* Reinfeldt

Permanent President
(since 2009)|

* Van Rompuy
* Tusk
* Michel
* Costa

* v
* t
* e

Leaders of the opposition of the Third Hellenic Republic

* Georgios Mavros
* Andreas Papandreou
* Georgios Rallis
* Evangelos Averoff
* Konstantinos Mitsotakis
* Andreas Papandreou
* Konstantinos Mitsotakis
* Miltiadis Evert
* Kostas Karamanlis
* George Papandreou
* Kostas Karamanlis
* Antonis Samaras
* Alexis Tsipras
* Antonis Samaras
* Vangelis Meimarakis
* Giannis Plakiotakis
* Kyriakos Mitsotakis
* Alexis Tsipras
* Stefanos Kasselakis (de facto)
Sokratis Famellos (de jure)
* Nikos Androulakis

* v
* t
* e

Leaders of PASOK

* Andreas Papandreou (1974–1996)
* Costas Simitis (1996–2004)
* George Papandreou (2004–2012)
* Evangelos Venizelos (2012–2015)
* Fofi Gennimata (2015–2021)
* Nikos Androulakis (2021–present)

* v
* t
* e

Social democracy in Greece

Organizations|

* Society of sociologists

Political Parties|

* Agricultural and Labour Party
* Democratic Socialist Party of Greece
* PASOK
* Socialist Initiative
* Socialist March
* Party of Democratic Socialism (Greece)
* Democratic Left
* Movement of Democratic Socialists
* Social League
* Syriza
* Movement for Change

People|

* Fotis Kouvelis
* Alexandros Papanastasiou
* Andreas Papandreou
* George Papandreou
* Georgios Papandreou
* Anastasios Peponis
* Alexandros Svolos

* v
* t
* e

Socialism in Greece

Ideas|

* Modern Greek Enlightenment
* Pacifism
* Social democracy
* Democratic socialism
* Agrarian socialism
* Land reform
* Nationalization
* Welfare state
* Marxism–Leninism
* Social justice
* Anti-imperialism
* Republicanism
* Left-wing nationalism

Organizations|

* Socialist Workers' Federation
* National Liberation Front
* Greek People's Liberation Army
* Greek People's Liberation Navy
* United Panhellenic Organization of Youth
* Democratic Army of Greece
* Panhellenic Liberation Movement

Political parties|

* Socialist Party of Greece
* Communist Party of Greece
* Agricultural and Labour Party
* Agrarian Party of Greece
* Democratic Alignment
* United Democratic Left
* PASOK
* Fighting Socialist Party of Greece
* Greek Left
* Democratic Social Movement
* Coalition of Left Movements and Ecology
* Communist Organization of Greece
* Coalition of the Radical Left

People|

* Manolis Anagnostakis
* Marinos Antypas
* Evripidis Bakirtzis
* Avraam Benaroya
* Maria Damanaki
* Platon Drakoulis
* Charilaos Florakis
* Manolis Glezos
* Dimitris Glinos
* Ilias Iliou
* Stavros Kallergis
* Pandelis Pouliopoulos
* Yiannis Ritsos
* Andreas Papandreou
* Ioannis Passalidis
* Stefanos Sarafis
* Georgios Skliros
* Alexandros Svolos
* Alexis Tsipras
* Ilias Tsirimokos
* Markos Vafeiadis
* Kostas Varnalis
* Aris Velouchiotis
* Nikos Zachariadis

Historical events|

* Kileler uprising
* Greek resistance
* Political Committee of National Liberation (National Council)
* Dekemvriana
* Greek Civil War
* Athens Polytechnic uprising

Policies|

* Demotic Greek
* Gender equality

Authority control databases

International|

* ISNI
* VIAF
* FAST
* WorldCat

National|

* Germany
* United States
* France
* BnF data
* Australia
* Czech Republic
* Portugal
* Netherlands
* Norway
* Chile
* Greece
* Sweden
* Poland
* Israel
* Catalonia
* Belgium

Academics|

* CiNii

People|

* Trove
* Deutsche Biographie
* DDB

Other|

* IdRef
* SNAC
* Yale LUX

*[m.]: married
*[div.]: divorced
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*[e]: Edit this template