Chinese settlements in Tibet

Chinese colonies in Tibet

Tibetan independence groups have alleged that the influx of Han Chinese people to Tibet, sometimes sponsored by the Chinese government, is an attempt to sinicize the region. Some academics have described it as a form of Han settler colonialism.[1][2][3] Many Chinese migrants are not permanent residents in Tibet. The intent and impact of these policies and migrations are disputed.

## Context

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Tibet came under the control of the Qing dynasty in the 18th century.[4] It gained de facto independence after China's 1911 Revolution. The People's Republic of China (PRC) annexed Tibet between 1950 and 1951. After the 14th Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, the PRC established the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965.[5]

The influx of Chinese migrants goes back centuries, as the neighboring regions have had conflicts even before the current tensions.[6] In the 1980s the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party initiated the Cadre Transfer Policy that sent party personnel into Tibet.[7]

## Motives

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In 1991 the Dalai Lama declared:

> The new Chinese settlers have created an alternate society: a Chinese apartheid which, denying Tibetans equal social and economic status in our own land, threatens to finally overwhelm and absorb us.[8][9]

Another potential motive of Chinese settlements is to gain access to the once-protected Indian-Chinese border.[10]

Chinese migrants are incentivized with major personal economic benefits.[7] Publications report salary increases averaging at 71.8% of the migrant's previous salary.[7] Monthly allowances are also provided, the amount fluctuating according to the migrant's residence "hardship level".[7] Children of the Cadre Transfer Policy migrants are given priority job assignments.[7] This policy itself created an influx of Han Chinese migrants as well, but this more focused approach was described as an attempt to promote economic development.[7]

After China enacted policies to develop Tibet economically in the 1980s, the majority of migrants entering Tibet came from the neighboring Sichuan province, dwarfing the number of Chinese Communist Party cadres. This new wave consists mostly of men who had left Sichuan due to overpopulation and poverty. Because of the Hukou residency system in China, they do not automatically obtain new legal residency where they live and work. Due to the perceived lower quality of education in Tibet, many of them intend to return to Sichuan to marry and have children after saving enough money.[11]

### Alternative interpretations

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Some publications claim that every Chinese immigration influx is not with mal intent.[7][6] According to Yasheng Huang, the Cadre Transfer Policy was not an assimilation attempt because the number of Chinese immigrants was minimal compared to other periods; instead it was an attempt to promote economic development of the newly annexed region.[7] Professionals were sent to the area in "low quantity but high quality".[7]

## Migration statistics

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In 1999 Lobsang Sangay, a leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, alleged in the Harvard Asia Quarterly that 60-70% of the population in Lhasa now is Chinese and, outside of the traditional Tibetan "Barkhor" market, Tibetans own only 400-450 of the 3,500 to 4,000 shops.[12] Han Chinese also occupy most government-related employment with 95 percent of official Chinese immigrants employed in state owned enterprises.[citation needed]

The Office of Tibet claims that the data is distorted by a lack of residence permits held by the migrant population.[10][13] It also claims that militant occupation consists of "at least a quarter million", focused in the city of Lhasa, and that Tibetans in urban eastern areas are outnumbered at least 2 to 1, although there are very few Chinese in rural areas.[10]

The 2020 census of China showed that the Han population increased to 12 percent in the Tibet Autonomous Region, concentrated around Lhasa and the border with India, but fell in neighboring regions such as Gansu and Qinghai which also have a high proportion of Tibetans.[14] Reporting of Han population in Tibet usually occurs in the summer months when the region experiences a swell of Han tourists.[14]

Some migrants are more accurately described as drifters because they feel alienated in their home provinces but are not attached enough to stay in Tibet permanently. They are attracted to a less modern, slower-paced lifestyle but still need to work for a living, setting them apart from more affluent lifestyle migrants.[15]

### Impact on local communities

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The influx of migrant workers have caused resentment among Tibetans and longtime Han residents. Almost all small businesses, such as shops and restaurants, were opened and run by Sichuanese. They also tend to have a larger guanxi network to government and business resources outside Tibet.[11]

## See also

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* Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China
* Han chauvinism
* Sinicization of Tibet

## References

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1. ^ McGranahan, Carole (2019-12-17). "Chinese Settler Colonialism: Empire and Life in the Tibetan Borderlands". In Gros, Stéphane (ed.). Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amsterdam University Press. pp. 517–540\. doi:10.2307/j.ctvt1sgw7.22. ISBN 978-90-485-4490-5. JSTOR j.ctvt1sgw7.22.
2. ^ Ramanujan, Shaurir (2022-12-09). "Reclaiming the Land of the Snows: Analyzing Chinese Settler Colonialism in Tibet". The Columbia Journal of Asia. 1 (2): 29–36\. doi:10.52214/cja.v1i2.10012. ISSN 2832-8558.
3. ^ Wang, Ju-Han Zoe; Roche, Gerald (March 16, 2021). "Urbanizing Minority Minzu in the PRC: Insights from the Literature on Settler Colonialism". Modern China. 48 (3): 593–616\. doi:10.1177/0097700421995135. ISSN 0097-7004. S2CID 233620981. Archived from the original on 15 June 2024. Retrieved 7 October 2023.
4. ^ Herman, John (June 2014). "Collaboration and Resistance on the Southwest Frontier: Early Eighteenth-Century Qing Expansion on Two Fronts". Late Imperial China. 35 (1): 77–112\. doi:10.1353/late.2014.0001. ISSN 1086-3257.
5. ^ "The story of Dalai Lama' escape from Tibet". Salute. 2020-11-28. Archived from the original on 2021-01-13. Retrieved 2022-01-20.
6. ^ a b Smith, Warren (2019-07-31). Tibetan Nation: A History Of Tibetan Nationalism And Sino-tibetan Relations. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-61228-8.
7. ^ a b c d e f g h i Huang, Yasheng (April 1995). "China's Cadre Transfer Policy toward Tibet in the 1980s". Modern China. 21 (2): 184–204\. doi:10.1177/009770049502100202. hdl:2027.42/68381. ISSN 0097-7004. S2CID 220737848.
8. ^ "Profile: The Dalai Lama", BBC News, April 25, 2006.
9. ^ United States Congressional Serial Set, United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 110.
10. ^ a b c Tibet, Office of. "Invasion & After". Retrieved 2022-04-29.
11. ^ a b Hessler, Peter (February 1999). "Tibet Through Chinese Eyes (Part Three)". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2024-11-27.
12. ^ "Harvard Asia Quarterly - China in Tibet: Forty Years of Liberation or Occupation?". August 24, 2007. Archived from the original on 24 August 2007.
13. ^ Crete-Nishihata, Masashi; Tsui, Lokman (2021-09-08). ""The truth of what's happening" How Tibetan exile media develop and maintain journalistic authority". Journalism. 24 (2): 295–312\. doi:10.1177/14648849211044899. ISSN 1464-8849. S2CID 239413863.
14. ^ a b Fischer, Andrew M. (2021-07-16). "Chinese population shares in Tibet revisited : Early insights from the 2020 census of China and some cautionary notes on current population politics". International Institute of Social Studies | Erasmus University Rotterdam. Retrieved 2025-02-10.
15. ^ Zhang, Jinfu; Xiao, Honggen (2021-05-01). "Liquid identities: Han sojourners in Tibet". Annals of Tourism Research. 88: 103157. doi:10.1016/j.annals.2021.103157. hdl:10397/90545. ISSN 0160-7383.