Chinese settlements in Tibet

Chinese colonies in Tibet

Tibetan independence groups have alleged that the influx of Han Chinese people to Tibet, sometimes sponsored by the Chinese government, is an attempt to sinicize the region. Some academics have described it as a form of Han settler colonialism.[1][2][3]

## Context

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One Tibetan administration formally declared its Independence in 1912 and was de facto independent until the People's Republic of China reasserted Chinese claims over the area in 1949. The Office of Tibet in Washington, D.C., made a statement that an alarming influx of Chinese migrants into Tibetan major cities is the cause of a deterioration of the region.[4] The Office of Tibet then explains that these Chinese immigrants are influencing the culture of Tibet.[4] This dates back to the so-called "major reform" of the regions' social, religious, political, and economic after the debated 1950 annexation of Tibet.[5] Other than civilian migrants, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) also has occupation in Tibet, affecting population demographics.[5] This influx of Chinese migrants goes back centuries, as the neighboring regions have had conflicts other than the current tensions.[6] Another modern assimilation attempt of Tibet from China was during the Cultural Revolution movement.[6] Another submovement of modern Tibetan immigration was through the Cadre Transfer Policy in the 1980's by the "Tibetan Party Committee".[7]

## Motives

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Largely, the accepted motive of the Chinese is to assimilate the Tibetan people to create a more homogenous country.[6][failed verification]

In 1991 the Dalai Lama declared:

> The new Chinese settlers have created an alternate society: a Chinese apartheid which, denying Tibetans equal social and economic status in our own land, threatens to finally overwhelm and absorb us.[8][9]

Another potential motive of Chinese settlements is to gain access to the once-protected Indian-Chinese border.[4]

Chinese migrants are incentivized with major personal economic benefits.[7] Publications report salary increases averaging at 71.8% of the migrant's previous salary.[7] Monthly allowances are also provided, the amount fluctuating according to the migrant's residence "hardship level".[7] Children of the Cadre Transfer Policy migrants are given priority job assignments.[7]

This policy itself created an influx of Han Chinese migrants as well, but this more focused approach was described as an attempt to promote economic development.[7]

Another claim of the motive of the Chinese government is that the religious and social systems of tibet are not aligned with those of the Chinese government, and, again, to create a more homogenous region, creating migration to promote assimilation of Tibetans.[5] The consequences of this religious homogenization, however, resulted in vandalization of Tibetan cultural institutes, like montestaries, nunneries, and temples.[5]

### Economic incentives

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After China enacted a policy to develop Tibet economically in the 1980s, the majority of migrants entering Tibet came from the neighboring Sichuan province, dwarfing the number of CCP cadres. They were mostly men who had left Sichuan due to overpopulation and poverty. Because of the Hukou residency system in China, migrants do not automatically obtain new legal residency. In addition, due to the perceived lower quality of education in Tibet, many of them intend to return to Sichuan to marry and have children after making money.[10]

## Migration statistics

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The Free Tibet Campaign in April 1996 made the unproven claim that 500,000 Chinese were to be moved into eastern Tibet to work in copper mines, a project that was to involve the building of several new mining towns.[11]

In 1999 Lobsang Sangay, a leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, alleged in the Harvard Asia Quarterly that 60-70% of the population in Lhasa now is Chinese and, outside of the traditional Tibetan "Barkhor" market, Tibetans own only 400-450 of the 3,500 to 4,000 shops.[12] Han Chinese also occupy most government-related employment with 95 percent of official Chinese immigrants employed in state owned enterprises.[citation needed]

Although reports are highly censored and misrepresented,[4][13] some statistics have been obtained. The Office of Tibet claims that misrepresentation currently is affected by a lack of residence permits held by migrants.[4] The Office of Tibet also claims that militant occupation consists of "at least a quarter million", focused in the city of Lhasa.[4] They claim that Tibetans in urban Eastern areas are outnumbered at least 2 to 1, however there are very few Chinese in rural areas.[4]

Military occupancy increases Chinese population of Tibet, however they also reduce the Tibetan population in the region, thus increasing the proportion of Chinese to native Tibetans.[5] Sources say that from 1952 to 1958, during the early stages of Chinese annexation of Tibet, the PLA killed over 10,000 Tibetans in Kanlho.[citation needed]

Some migrants are more accurately described as drifters because they feel alienated in their home provinces yet are not attached enough to stay in Tibet permanently. They are attracted to a less modern, slower-paced lifestyle but still have to work for a living, setting them apart from more affluent lifestyle migrants.[14]

### Impact on local communities

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The influx of migrant workers have caused resentment among Tibetans and longtime Han residents. Almost all small businesses, such as shops and restaurants, were started and run by Sichuanese. They also tend to have a larger guanxi network to government and business resources outside Tibet.[10]

## Neutrality

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Some publications claim that every Chinese immigration influx isn't with mal intent.[7][6] The Cadre Transfer Policy wasn't an assimilation attempt because the number of Chinese immigrants was minimal compared to other periods; instead it was an attempt to promote economic development of the newly annexed region.[7] Professionals were sent to the area in "low quantity but high quality".[7] There are also claims that earlier Chinese migration was a natural phenomenon caused by the natural passing of time causing the replacing of their "barbarian" culture.[6]

## See also

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* Sinicization of Tibet
* Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China

## References

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1. ^ McGranahan, Carole (2019-12-17). "Chinese Settler Colonialism: Empire and Life in the Tibetan Borderlands". In Gros, Stéphane (ed.). Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands. Amsterdam University Press. pp. 517–540. doi:10.2307/j.ctvt1sgw7.22. ISBN 978-90-485-4490-5. JSTOR j.ctvt1sgw7.22.
2. ^ Ramanujan, Shaurir (2022-12-09). "Reclaiming the Land of the Snows: Analyzing Chinese Settler Colonialism in Tibet". The Columbia Journal of Asia. 1 (2): 29–36. doi:10.52214/cja.v1i2.10012. ISSN 2832-8558.
3. ^ Wang, Ju-Han Zoe; Roche, Gerald (March 16, 2021). "Urbanizing Minority Minzu in the PRC: Insights from the Literature on Settler Colonialism". Modern China. 48 (3): 593–616. doi:10.1177/0097700421995135. ISSN 0097-7004. S2CID 233620981. Archived from the original on 15 June 2024. Retrieved 7 October 2023.
4. ^ a b c d e f g Tibet, Office of. "Invasion & After". Retrieved 2022-04-29.
5. ^ a b c d e Mittal, Devika. "The sinicization of Tibet". `{{cite journal}}`: Cite journal requires `|journal=` (help)
6. ^ a b c d e Smith, Warren (2019-07-31). Tibetan Nation: A History Of Tibetan Nationalism And Sino-tibetan Relations. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-61228-8.
7. ^ a b c d e f g h i Yasheng Huang (April 1995). "China's Cadre Transfer Policy toward Tibet in the 1980s". Modern China. 21 (2): 184–204. doi:10.1177/009770049502100202. hdl:2027.42/68381. ISSN 0097-7004. S2CID 220737848.
8. ^ "Profile: The Dalai Lama", BBC News, April 25, 2006.
9. ^ United States Congressional Serial Set, United States Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 110.
10. ^ a b "Tibet Through Chinese Eyes (Part Three)". www.theatlantic.com. Retrieved 2024-11-27.
11. ^ Facts about Tibet | Free Tibet
12. ^ "Harvard Asia Quarterly - China in Tibet: Forty Years of Liberation or Occupation?". August 24, 2007. Archived from the original on 24 August 2007.
13. ^ Crete-Nishihata, Masashi; Tsui, Lokman (2021-09-08). ""The truth of what's happening" How Tibetan exile media develop and maintain journalistic authority". Journalism. 24 (2): 295–312. doi:10.1177/14648849211044899. ISSN 1464-8849. S2CID 239413863.
14. ^ Zhang, Jinfu; Xiao, Honggen (2021-05-01). "Liquid identities: Han sojourners in Tibet". Annals of Tourism Research. 88: 103157. doi:10.1016/j.annals.2021.103157. ISSN 0160-7383.