Internet censorship in Iran

Iran is known for having one of the world's most restrictive internet censorship systems.[1][2][3][4] The Iranian government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have blocked access to 70 percent of the internet,[5] including many popular websites and online services such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Telegram.[6][7] Internet traffic in the country is heavily restricted and monitored.[8] Internet Filtering Committee (Iran) headed by Prosecutor-General of Iran decides which websites must be censored and implements this vast censorship.

Instagram page taken over by Iranian government reading This page, in accordance with the judicial order, was out of reach by Faraja until secondary notice.

In response to the 2019 Iranian protests, the government implemented a near-total Internet shutdown, reducing traffic to just 5% of normal levels.[2][9][10] A 2022 poll ranked Iran as the country with the second highest level of Internet censorship after it repeatedly disrupted Internet access and blocked social media platforms to curb protests following the death of Mahsa Amini.[11] The government is now targeting Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) in an effort to completely block citizens' access to foreign media and online content.[12]

In November 2024, the Iranian regime was reportedly talking about removing internet restrictions, possibly with reduced speed and higher tariff costs.[13][14]

Persian language has been almost wiped out from the web because of the censorship.[15][16][17]

In December 2024, Iran unbanned the Google Play Store and WhatsApp after 2 and a half years.[18][19]

As of 2025 number of Iranian Starlink terminals had surpassed 100,000.[20]

## History

[edit]

### Pre 2000s

[edit]

Following the establishment of a theocratic government in 1979, religious authorities used a mix of bombastic propaganda and brutal censorship to consolidate their political power and demonize potential opponents.[21] Building upon a long tradition of resistance to Western influence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the newly empowered religious authorities sought to dominate the information sphere in all its forms (e.g., traditional print media, oral debate, and electronic media).[21]

Iran was the second country in the Middle East, after Israel, to embrace the Digital Age. In January 1993 Dr. Larijani, director of the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (IPM), sent Iran's first e-mail message (a greeting to administrators at the University of Vienna).[22] Initially, the leadership of the Islamic Republic viewed the internet as a tool which could (1) improve the efficiency of the state bureaucracy with the development of e-government programs; (2) provide an alternative means of scientific and technological advancement during the troubled economic period following the Iran-Iraq War;[22] (3) serve as a forum to disseminate revolutionary propaganda;[22] and (4) aid in further legitimizing the Islamic regime’s "authority in the face of internal strife over the definition of the revolutionary state."[22] Despite early excitement by 1997, the threat of an open and free internet would be identified by conservative groups within the Islamic government, resulting in early attempts at censorship and restriction.

### Early 2000s

[edit]

Iran underwent a significant increase in internet usage in the early 2000s.[23] Many users saw the internet as an easy way to circumvent Iran's strict press laws.[24][25] As international internet usage grew, its censorship increased, and many popular websites were blocked,[23][26] especially after 2005 under the administration of conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[27]

In 2005–2018,[6][28] Ayatollah Khamenei sent letters to the presidents of Iran, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran, and the IRGC, ordering them to form a national intranet called the National Information Network.[29][30][31][32] The National Information Network was unveiled during the 2019 Iranian protests.[33] The NIN works in a way similar to the Great Firewall of China, but with more strict monitoring.[6][34][35][32]

After YouTube was blocked in Iran,[36] Aparat, an Iranian online video-sharing platform, was founded. In 2020, due to the activity of an Aparat user, the CEO of Aparat was sentenced to 10 years in prison because of an interview with children about sex and pornography by Gelofen TV.[37][38] The business of selling virtual private networks (VPNs), SOCKS, and proxy servers in Iran is worth millions of dollars due to their large demand.[39] The twelfth Minister of Information and Communications Technology in Iran announced that the lucrative business of selling VPNs and proxies has generated substantial profits for its manufacturers and retailers, and there are efforts to stop these businesses.[citation needed]

In 2006 and 2010, the activist group Reporters Without Borders labeled Iran one of the 13 countries designated "Enemies of the Internet."[40] Reporters Without Borders sent a letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, to share its deep concern and ask for her intervention in the case of two netizens and free speech defenders, Vahid Asghari and Hossein Derakhshan.

### 2010s

[edit]

Following the 2009 election protests, Iran ratified the Computer Crimes Law (CCL) in 2010.[41] The CCL established legal regulations for internet censorship. Notable provisions of the CCL include the following: Article 10, which effectively prohibits internet users and companies from using encryption or protecting data in a manner that would "deny access of authorized individuals to data, computer, and telecommunication systems"; Article 14, which criminalizes "producing, sending, publishing, distributing, saving or financially engaging in obscene content"; Article 21, which requires ISPs to maintain records of internet traffic data and the personal information of their Internet users; and Article 48, which requires Internet Service Providers to record data from telephone conversations over the internet.[42]

In April 2011, Ali Agha-Mohammadi, a senior official, announced the government had plans to launch a halal internet that would conform to Islamic values and provide government-approved services. The $6 billion project had been initially proposed in 2006, and would result in the creation of the National Information Network (NIN) (Habake-ye Melli-ye Ettela'at).[43] The system would effectively completely disconnect the Iranian people from the outside world.[44] Such a network, similar to one used by North Korea, would prevent unwanted information from outside of Iran from entering the closed system.[45] The development of the closed system was hastened due to the Green Movement protests which began in June 2009 continuing into 2010,[46] as well as the discovery of the Stuxnet Virus in June 2010.[47]

In 2012, Iran's ministry of information and communication technology began testing a countrywide "national internet" network as a substitute for services run through the World Wide Web.[44] It also began working on software robots to analyze emails and chats and find more "effective ways of controlling user's online activities". One Iranian IT expert defended the program as aimed not "primarily" at curbing the global internet but at securing Iran's military, banking, and sensitive data from outside cyber-attacks such as Stuxnet.[44] In addition, by late January 2012, internet café owners were required to record the identities of their customers before providing services. According to the news website Tabnak, an Iranian policy statement states:

> Internet cafes are required to write down the forename, surname, name of the father, national identification number, postcode, and telephone number of each customer. Besides the personal information, they must maintain other information of the customer such as the date and the time of using the internet and the IP address, and the addresses of the websites visited. They should keep these informations for each individual for at least six months.[44]

In preparation for the March 2012 elections and the launch of a national internet,[44] the Iranian government instituted strict rules for cybercafés. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, instructed the Iranian authorities to set up the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, a body to oversee the internet. It consists of the president of Iran, the Minister of Intelligence, and IRGC chiefs. It defines policy and coordinates decisions regarding the internet. It is thought to be the strongest attempt at internet censorship by any country to date.[48] It requires all Iranians to register their websites with the Ministry of Art and Culture.[49]

Also in March 2012, Iran began implementing a national intranet. This effort was partially in response to Western actions such as the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran's main uranium enrichment facility, which fueled suspicions against foreign technologies.[50] The government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard's response has been to mandate the use of Iranian email systems, block popular web-mail services, inhibit encryption use by disabling VPNs and HTTPS, and ban externally developed security software.[6][51][52]

In May 2012, Iran criticized Google for dropping the name "Persian Gulf" from its maps, leaving the feature unlabeled. Six days after Khamenei's statement, Iran announced that Google and Gmail would be added to the list of banned sites, to be replaced by the national network. Iranian media reported that the new system would be ready by March 2013.[53] Gmail and Google were later unblocked. The Iranian alternative to Google was Parsijoo, which is disabled now. The network already hosted some government and academic sites.[54]

The isolation of the separate network was also touted as an improvement to network security in the wake of Stuxnet. A computer virus was also found in Iran's major Kharg Island oil export terminal in April. Communications and Technology Minister Reza Taqipour said, "Control over the internet should not be in the hands of one or two countries. Especially on major issues and during crises, one cannot trust this network at all."[53]

In September 2012, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called on Western leaders to censor the trailer for Innocence of Muslims, which was posted to YouTube. Khamenei alluded to bans on Nazi-related or anti-gay sites in some countries, asking, "How there is no room for freedom of expression in these cases, but insulting Islam and its sanctities is free?".[55]

Starting in mid-2014, the government of then-President Hassan Rouhani sought to ease internet restrictions in the country, with Ali Jannati, the culture minister, likening the restrictions to the ban on fax machines, video recorders, and videotapes after the 1979 revolution.[56]

In December 2016, Iranian Prosecutor Ahmad Ali Montazeri, who heads Iran's internet censorship committee, banned and closed 14,000 websites and social networking accounts in Iran.[57] He underlined that President Rouhani and Interior Minister Rahmani Fazli agreed with him and have addressed "serious warnings" on this issue.[57]

As of 2018, it is estimated that between 64% and 69% of Iranians are internet users.[58][59]

#### Blocking in 2017–18 protests

[edit]

See also: Telegram in Iran

During the 2017–18 Iranian protests, the Iranian government blocked internet access from mobile networks and various websites, including Instagram and Telegram, in an effort to stymie protests. At some points, the government completely blocked internet access in Kurdish parts of the country.[60][61] A January 2018 report by four special rapporteurs of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the blocking, stating, "Communication blackouts constitute a serious violation of fundamental rights".[61]

#### 2019 total Internet shutdown

[edit]

Main article: 2019 Internet blackout in Iran

During the nationwide 2019 fuel protests in Iran, the Iranian authorities deliberately shut down the internet, hiding the true scale of unlawful killings by security forces. As protests intensified, the Iranian authorities implemented a near-total internet blackout by ordering different internet service providers (ISPs) to shut down. IODA observed steady drops in signals, which started when cellular operators were ordered to disconnect around 2pm local time on 16 November. By 7pm, Iran had descended into digital darkness.

Iran’s domestic internet remained online, allowing activities such as government services and banking to continue, which minimized financial losses in the country’s economy. It was only around five days later, at approximately 10am on 21 November, that internet access began to be restored. It did not completely return until 27 November.

"The authorities deliberately blocked internet access inside Iran, hiding the true extent of the horrendous human rights violations that they were carrying out across the country" said Iranian expert Diana Eltahawy.[62]

### 2022

[edit]

Main article: Mahsa Amini protests § Communications blackouts

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (November 2022)

|

During Mahsa Amini protests, the government shutdown and slowed internet.[63] US government issued license D-2 sanctions relief for American internet companies to help Iranians. Earlier this year, the cyberspace protection act was run.[64] Restrictions were put in place for LTE networks such as Irancell, Hamrahe-Aval And Rightel completely blocking access to all website excluding those hosted in Iran.[65][66][67]

On 4 December, a news article was published in the media quoting Ahmad Vahidi, the Minister of Interior of the 13th government, citing a "complete filtering of cyberspace" and it was denied a few hours later. On 18 December, Mohsen Taeb, the former head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, said, "[t]here will come a day on the platforms where we will determine whose photo will be published and who will not." In the last 3 months, the Ministry of Communications of the Ebrahim Raisi government has made contradictory statements on this matter.

This time, the international community has decided to fight back, with many countries severing economic and diplomatic relations with Iran after these censorships.[citation needed]

"The country’s cyber governance has been compromised by such an action  It is possible that the international court will issue a verdict that will hit Iran’s cyber governance the most. Also, financial fines are probable for the infrastructure communication company." Said Sharareh Abdolhoseinzadeh, a PhD in Political Sociology.[68]

### 2023

[edit]

In January, the Ministry of ICT opened the radar.game software and a DNS for games.[69][70][71][72] The Minister of ICT created 403.online, a DNS and VPN for Iranians bypassing the HTTP 403 code.[73][74]

TLD generic names ending with .online are blocked.[75]

On 19 February, Iranians began blocking Cloudflare with a massive share of 70% Iranian traffic cut off from the Internet.[76][77][78][79] The median internet speed became worse as of May 2023 according to Speed test, as the government began limited fiber optically connected internet rollout.[80][81][82][83][84][85] The Iranian cyber police began purging social media and websites,[86] while the Minister of Science Research, Technology and ICT discussed cutting the internet for university entry exam tests.[87]

According to the Parliament research group head, VPN sales were highly profitable, estimated to be whopping 50,000 billion Toman (about US$1.01 billion) annually which is then taxed by Iranian government.[88][89][90][91][92][93][94] It was noted by the newspaper Ham-Mihan that while prices stayed the same, data bandwidth was now more expensive.[95] A seventh five-year plan increased internet tariffs, making the national information network far cheaper.[96]

The Minister of Cultural Heritage and Tourism had claimed that the internet would be restored once the upheaval is gone.[97] However, according to the newspaper Resalat, as of June 2023, a branch of Islamic Republic military are pro-denial of free internet access and are actively working towards it, even obstructing others efforts to achieve it.[98][99] In June 2023, a member of parliament claimed that the Cyberspace protection bill is now in full effect, while according to another, it is abandoned and irrelevant.[100][101]

The Minister of ICT denied reduced internet speed, claiming that Iran has three times its need.[102] On 27 June, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace began a workgroup in association with Ministry of ICT for slow internet to report by one month.[103] The Supreme leader asked judicial system power to begin a program combat "those who are annoying in cyber and real life".[104]

In August, a cyberspace services system bill commission member claimed the government had decided to lower internet access, make it unaffordable, and reduce speed.[105]

### 2024

[edit]

#### 2024 order

[edit]

In February 2024, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Supreme Council of CyberSpace to ban Internet censorship circumvention technology such as virtual private networks (VPNs).[106] In late May 2024, Cloudflare showed that regime had begun blocking IPv6.[107][108]

## Effects and Internet fragmentation

[edit]

### Effects

[edit]

The government's censorship techniques has led to internet in Iran being among the worst worldwide, according to a report by the Tehran Electronic Commerce Association (TECA). The report noted the effect of new filtering equipment within the domestic network, which causes functional disruptions and processor saturation.[109]

### Forking apps

[edit]

Iranian government had released another law in 2024 that allow censored apps to be accessible through government enabled client side forks.[110]

### Elite internet

[edit]

Minister of communications offered selling class "professional" based internet access to startups and corporations with less restrictions.[111][112][113][114][115] IRNA defended the internet closed access.[116]

The Iranian state spokesman compared the internet to arms control, while the Minister of Science Research and Technology promoted the mass censorship program as an "open internet for academics".[117][118][119] The Minister of ICT also promised journalists that they would be granted internet access.[120]

On 11 June 2023, the Minister of Tourism and Cultural Heritage demanded that foreign tourists should be allowed unfiltered internet access whilst visiting Iran, via 'tourist' SIM cards.[121] This plan was subsequently approved by the Iranian government in September 2023.[122]

On 15 June 2023, the Minister of Communications denied copying Chinese internet rules.[123]

### August 2023 easing for businesses and universities

[edit]

In August 2023, the number of anonymous internet users in Iran rose.[124]

The Minister of ICT claimed he was dissatisfied with the restrictions placed on speed, quality and the filtering of websites, proposing to whitelist some websites.[125][126] A member of the Islamic Council's supervisory committee, part of a working group tasked with identifying instances of criminal online content, responded by nothing fluctuations in website accessibility, mentioning that some sites were intermittently blocked or unfiltered based on the government's preferences. The Minister of Communications indicated a willingness to address these issues by considering selective removal of filters in certain contexts. Additionally, it was noted that various filtered websites remained accessible to specific groups such as students, university professors, and professionals in need of them for government-approved purposes.[127]

A member of the Islamic Council's supervisory committee in the working group to determine examples of criminal computer content stated that some websites at some times were blocked and unfiltered according to requirements and that the opinion of the Minister of Communications was that action would be taken to remove the filter in some places. In addition, many sites that are normally filtered are available for classes, university professors, businessmen and all those who need it professionally.

In December 2022, the government unveiled plans to implement a program initially targeting students at the Sharif University of Technology, known as Goshayesh ("Opening"). Under this initiative, the Iranian government would allocate internet access levels to individuals, based on their social class. This would grant varying degrees of access to selected internet domains.[128][129]

## Starlink

[edit]

In July 2023, The Minister of ICT claimed they sued Starlink that them with help from ITU Article 18 Radio Regulation board and WRC article 23 compelled Starlink to cut access in Iran.[130][131][132][133]

## Department of Security, Integration, Innovation

[edit]

The seventh development program ordered the government to incorporate a new department into Minister of ICT, called the Dept. Security, integration, innovation.[134]

The Iranian government began training 500,000 personnel for cyberspace and video content. They claim that the operation of their program will have a positive economic impact.[135]

## List of blocked websites

[edit]

Iran's SmartFilter blocks access to most pornography, gay and lesbian sites, political sites, news media, and software privacy tools. Iran has been accused of censoring more internet traffic than any other nation besides China.[40] As of 2006, Iran's SmartFilter is configured to allow local Persian-language sites, and block prominent English-language sites, such as the BBC and Facebook.[136] By 2008, Iran had blocked access to more than five million websites, whose content was deemed as immoral and anti-social.[137]

Below is an estimated list of well-known websites blocked by Iran:[138][139][136][6][140]

* File hosting:
* Videos: YouTube, Twitch, Dailymotion, Vimeo, Nico Video, Newgrounds
* Images: Flickr, Pinterest, DeviantArt, Shutterstock, Dreamstime, 9gag
* Software: ApkPure, Uptodown
* Torrent indexing: The Pirate Bay
* Social media: Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, Reddit, Threads, Instagram
* News: Deutsche Welle, BBC, NDTV, CNN
* Messaging: Telegram, Facebook Messenger, Signal, Discord
* Music: YouTube Music
* Entertainment: Netflix, Zhanqi
* Sexual content (porn): all pornography sites

It is speculated that 90% of Iranians remain on social media despite government restrictions.[140][23][6][141][142][143][40]

During the Mahsa Amini protests internet blackout, approximately 80% of all popular websites were promptly blocked, including Instagram, WhatsApp, Apple's App Store, Google's Play Store. This came in addition to total internet blackouts across the country for hours per day.[144]

## Methods

[edit]

The primary engine of Iran's censorship is the content-control software SmartFilter, developed by San Jose firm Secure Computing.[145] The American company alleges that Iran did not purchase the software legally.[146] Iran has since developed its own hardware and software to filter the internet.[147] All internet traffic is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure of the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI), which implements additional surveillance measures.[147]

Dozens of internet service providers (ISPs) operate in Iran.[147] All of them must implement content-control software for websites and e-mail, with strict penalties for failure to comply. As of 2008, at least twelve ISPs have been shut down for failing to install adequate filters. An ISP must be approved by both the TCI and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance before it can operate.[148] ISP must store all data sent or received by a user for at least three months, and must store data within Iran's borders.[149]

Iran uses the lawful intercept capabilities of telecommunications systems to monitor communications by political dissidents and other individuals. A monitoring center installed by Nokia Siemens Networks (now Nokia Networks) intercepts and archives internet communications for Iranian law enforcement officials.[150] Online social networks, especially Facebook, are also monitored. Citizens returning home from living abroad have been questioned and detained due to the contents of their personal Facebook web pages. After protests outside Iran following the 2009 elections, such social media monitoring increased.[151]

Iran throttles the speed of the internet to frustrate users and limit communication. Mass-scale throttling has been observed following the 2009 Iranian presidential election, the weeks leading to the 2013 election, and during times of international political upheaval.[152] In October 2006, the government ordered all ISPs to limit their download speeds to 128 kbit/s for residential clients and internet cafes; no reason was publicly announced. The purpose, as widely believed according to Reuters, was to constrain the consumption of Western mass media.[153] As of 2010, ISPs in Tehran may offer a higher speed of at least two Mbit/s businesses, while the residential speed limit remains.[154] Since then, speed restrictions have been relaxed.[citation needed]

Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a technology that analyzes the contents of transmissions, even if they have been encrypted. Iran may use it to detect connections to TLS-based VPNs and use TCP reset attacks to interfere with them.[155] In 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that Nokia may have sold DPI software to Iran for monitoring and altering the content of internet voice and e-mail communications.[156] Andrew Lighten, an employee of Nokia, claimed that it sold software to Iran for lawful interception, but that the company does not sell any products with deep packet inspection.[157]

In September 2020, Abolhassan Firoozabadi, director of the National Cyberspace Center of Iran, described China as a successful "model" in censoring the internet. He added that censorship applies where "the operating system does not comply with Iranian law" or "create[s] cultural, social, political and security problems" for the government.[158][159]

There is also state awareness that domestically produced content considered undesirable can pervade the internet, highlighted by the 2006 controversy over the appearance of a celebrity sex tape featuring a popular Iranian soap opera actress (or a convincing look-alike).[40] (See the Iranian sex tape scandal)

## Punishment of dissidents

[edit]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (September 2021)

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Lily Mazahery, a human rights and immigration lawyer who represents Iranian dissidents, reported that one of her clients was arrested after instant messaging with her. Ms. Mazahery said: "He told me he had received a call from the Ministry of Intelligence, and this guy when he went to the interrogation, they put in front of him printed copies of his chats with me. He said he was dumbfounded, and he was sent to prison."[150]

## Circumvention

[edit]

See also: Internet censorship circumvention

### Methods

[edit]

In 2003, Voice of America began to operate a proxy server for Iranian citizens, free of charge, along with internet privacy company Anonymizer and the International Broadcasting Bureau. Whenever the proxy is blocked, it uses a new IP address until that one is also blocked.[160] Some websites and keywords related to pornography are blocked in the American proxy, although the list of banned words is publicly available.[160][161] Non-pornographic websites may be inadvertently blocked; for example, the banning of ass blocks access to the website of the United States Embassy.[162]

### United States sanctions

[edit]

See also: United States sanctions against Iran

Following the 2009 Iranian presidential election, the US Senate ratified the Victims of Iranian Censorship Act (VOICE), which allocated US$50 million to fund measures "to counter Iranian government efforts to jam radio, satellite, and internet-based transmissions."[163]

In 2018, the Trump administration increased American economic sanctions against Iran. These sanctions were not intended to prevent Iranian civilians from accessing basic internet services, but multiple American technology companies subsequently blocked access to their services in Iran. Iranian users who work with the Iranian government or are involved in terrorism were also sanctioned; technology suppliers risk prosecution by the US government if selling web services to sanctioned users.[citation needed]

Identifying an internet user can be difficult, so some companies have entirely discontinued serving users in Iran.[164] Apple's App Store[165] and the messaging platform Slack[166] have been unavailable in Iran since 2018. In 2019, access to free services on GitHub, GitLab, Amazon Cloud, and several video game services were also suspended.[167][164][168] Such suspensions, however, may inadvertently strengthen censorship, although Amazon Cloud, another banned service, hosts most tools that help Iranians bypass the censorship filters. Internet developers have been forced to use less secure hosting tools, which leave websites vulnerable to cyberattacks and risk users' security.[169]

These suspensions continue despite a General License D-1, first issued by the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (ORAC) in 2014, which authorizes private companies to provide certain "personal communications" technologies to users in Iran.[170] When sanctions were re-imposed by the United States, the US Treasury Department highlighted that General License D-1 would help with "fostering internet freedom and supporting the Iranian people."[171]

## See also

[edit]

* 2017–2018 Iranian protests § Censorship
* Blogging in Iran
* Censorship in Iran
* Internet in Iran
* Mahsa Amini protests § Communications blackouts
* National Information Network of Iran
* Internet censorship in China

## References

[edit]

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## External links

[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Internet censorship in Iran.

* Blocked In Iran—Test if any website is blocked in Iran in real-time
* Internet Enemies Report 2012, Reporters Without Borders
* Iran and Internet Filtering (OpenNet Initiative—16 June 2009 report)
* "Fed contractor, cell phone maker sold spy system to Iran"—Washington Times article (13 April 2009)
* "Tightening the Net: Internet Freedom in Iran."—a series of reports documenting Internet censorship in Iran by ARTICLE19
* How to Bypass Internet Censorship, also known by the titles: Bypassing Internet Censorship or Circumvention Tools, a FLOSS Manual, 10 March 2011, 240 pp.

* v
* t
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Censorship

Media regulation|

* Books
* books banned
* Films
* banned films
* Internet
* circumvention
* Music
* Postal
* Press
* Radio
* Speech and expression
* Student media
* Televisions
* banned televisions
* Thought
* Video games
* banned video games

Methods|

* Bleeping
* Book burning
* Broadcast delay
* Cancel culture
* Censor bars
* Chilling effect
* Collateral censorship
* Concision
* Conspiracy of silence
* Content-control software
* Damnatio memoriae
* De-banking
* Deplatforming
* Euphemism
* Minced oath
* Expurgation
* Fogging
* Gag order
* Gatekeeping
* Hallin's spheres
* Heckling
* Heckler's veto
* Hush money
* Internet police
* Malinformation
* Media blackout
* Memory hole
* National intranet
* Newspaper theft
* Opinion corridor
* Overton window
* Pixelization
* Political correctness
* Prior restraint
* Propaganda
* Purge
* Redaction
* Revisionism
* Sanitization
* Self-censorship
* Shadow banning
* Social rejection
* Speech code
* Spiral of silence
* Strategic lawsuit
* Surveillance
* computer and network
* mass
* Taboo
* Whitewashing
* Word filtering

Contexts|

* AI
* Algorithmic
* Chinese censorship abroad
* Criminal
* Corporate
* Apple
* Facebook
* Google
* Hate speech
* Online
* Ideological
* Academic
* LGBT issues
* Media bias
* Moral police
* Moralistic fallacy
* Naturalistic fallacy
* Political censorship
* Banned parties
* Political prisoner
* Propaganda model
* Religious
* Blasphemy law
* Islamic
* Police
* Suppression of dissent
* Systemic bias
* Wikipedia

By location|

* Censorship by country
* Blasphemy law
* Freedom of speech
* Internet censorship
* In the Middle East
* In South Asia

* v
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Internet censorship and surveillance by country

Africa|

* Algeria
* Angola
* Botswana
* Burkina Faso
* Burundi
* Cameroon
* Central African Republic
* Chad
* Congo DR
* Congo RO
* Egypt
* Eritrea
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* Mozambique
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* Sierra Leone
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* Sudan
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* Tanzania
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* Zambia
* Zimbabwe

Americas|

* Argentina
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* Jamaica
* Mexico
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* Panama
* Paraguay
* Peru
* Suriname
* Trinidad and Tobago
* United States
* Puerto Rico
* Uruguay
* Venezuela

Asia|

* Afghanistan
* Bahrain
* Bangladesh
* Bhutan
* Cambodia
* China
* East Timor
* Hong Kong
* India
* Indonesia
* Iran
* Iraq
* Israel
* Japan
* Jordan
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* Kyrgyzstan
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* Saudi Arabia
* Singapore
* South Korea
* Sri Lanka
* Syria
* Taiwan
* Tajikistan
* Thailand
* Turkmenistan
* United Arab Emirates
* Uzbekistan
* Vietnam
* Yemen

Europe|

* Albania
* Armenia
* Austria
* Azerbaijan
* Belarus
* Belgium
* Bosnia and Herzegovina
* Bulgaria
* Croatia
* Cyprus
* Czech Republic
* Denmark
* Estonia
* Finland
* France
* Germany (YouTube video blocking)
* Georgia
* Greece
* Hungary
* Iceland
* Ireland
* Italy
* Kazakhstan
* Latvia
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* Moldova
* Montenegro
* Netherlands
* North Macedonia
* Poland
* Portugal
* Romania
* Russia
* Serbia
* Slovakia
* Slovenia
* Spain
* Sweden
* Switzerland
* Turkey
* Ukraine
* United Kingdom

Oceania|

* Australia
* Fiji
* New Zealand
* Papua New Guinea

* v
* t
* e

Internet censorship in Asia

Sovereign states|

* Afghanistan
* Armenia
* Azerbaijan
* Bahrain
* Bangladesh
* Bhutan
* Brunei
* Cambodia
* China
* Cyprus
* Egypt
* Georgia
* India
* Indonesia
* Iran
* Iraq
* Israel
* Japan
* Jordan
* Kazakhstan
* North Korea
* South Korea
* Kuwait
* Kyrgyzstan
* Laos
* Lebanon
* Malaysia
* Maldives
* Mongolia
* Myanmar
* Nepal
* Oman
* Pakistan
* Philippines
* Qatar
* Russia
* Saudi Arabia
* Singapore
* Sri Lanka
* Syria
* Tajikistan
* Thailand
* Timor-Leste (East Timor)
* Turkey
* Turkmenistan
* United Arab Emirates
* Uzbekistan
* Vietnam
* Yemen

States with
limited recognition|

* Abkhazia
* Northern Cyprus
* Palestine
* South Ossetia
* Taiwan

Dependencies and
other territories|

* British Indian Ocean Territory
* Christmas Island
* Cocos (Keeling) Islands
* Hong Kong
* Macau

* Category
* Asia portal

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