Iran–Houthi relations

Cache of weapons, which according to US assessments originated in Iran and was bound for the Houthis, intercepted by the coastal patrol ship USS Sirocco (PC 6) on March 28, 2016, in the Arabian Sea.

Iran has been a key supporter of the Houthi movement in Yemen, providing military, financial, and logistical support, despite both Iran and the Houthis denying the scale of assistance for years. The relationship dates back to the 1990s, when Houthi leaders received religious training in Iran. By 2009, Iran began offering more direct support, and this escalated after the collapse of the Yemeni government in 2011. Following the Houthis' takeover of Sana'a in 2014, Iranian support became more overt, with the supply of advanced weapons, military training, and intelligence. This support helped the Houthis bolster their military capabilities, including the use of sophisticated missiles and drones, which have played a significant role in their ongoing conflict with Saudi-led forces and with Israel, and with the disruption of the global maritime trade route through the Bab al-Mandab strait.

The strategic benefits for Iran in backing the Houthis are significant, particularly in terms of countering Saudi influence and furthering its regional interests. Iran has used the Houthis to destabilise the region and exert pressure on Saudi Arabia, including through attacks on Saudi military targets and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. This proxy warfare allows Iran to challenge Saudi Arabia without direct involvement. In return, the Houthis align themselves with Iran's ideological goals, promoting resistance against Western influence and supporting Iranian interests in the broader Middle East.

## Background

[edit]

There is circumstantial evidence pointing to an informal relationship between Iran and the Houthis during the 1990s,[1] as members of the al-Houthi family, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and his sons, Hussein al-Houthi and Abdul Malik al-Houthi received religious training in the Iranian Islamic seminary in al-Qom.[1][2] Prior to 2010, Iranian media denied Iranian assistance to the Houthis and rarely referred to the military and political crisis in Yemen, though from late November 2009 it gradually increased its reports of Saudi attacks against Yemeni Shi'ites, and at times portraying it as being against the entire Shia world.[3] This is interpreted by the RAND institute as an attempt to garner public support for future Iranian assistance to the Houthis.[3] According to some experts, Iran "has unquestionably lent the Houthis some support, most likely through its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, since at least the mid-2000s",[4] others assert that official Iranian influence on the Houthis began in 2009, with the final phase of the Houthi insurgency against the Yemeni government,[5][6] when according to the Yemeni chief of counterterrorism, Iran was training and arming Houthi militants.[7] Until the Arab Spring and the fall of the Yemeni government "the Yemeni state was weak but functional" and it was too difficult for Iran to infiltrate, but after 2011 the state nearly collapsed and the barriers preventing Iran's entry, which were maintained by the recognised Yemeni government, were eliminated.[8] Newly opened smuggling routes between Iran and Yemen greatly limited the costs and risks involved in Iran's provision of materiel support to the Houthis.[8]

Between 2011, when the revolt against the government began,[9] and 2014, when the government was overthrown,[9] Iranian support of the Houthis was fairly limited.[8] In September 2014 the Houthis gained control over Sana'a, after which they began making several overtures to Iran, by releasing Iranian prisoners, both from Hezbollah and the IRGC,[10] and by announcing direct flights from Iran to the airport in Sana'a,[11] each act being an expression of Houthi aspirations for stronger ties and additional support from Iran.[6] Most experts agree that Iran provided the Houthis with weapons that same year.[9] By waging a civil war with Iranian assistance and pushing all the way to southern Yemen, the Houthis demonstrated their potential value to Iran.[12] The Houthis view themselves as part of the "axis of resistance" led by Iran and their ideology is echoed in their slogans calling for the deaths of America and Israel, the cursing of the Jews and victory of Islam.[13]

Iranian backing of the Houthis has been reported by diplomatic correspondents of major news outlets, and has been the reported perspective of Yemeni governmental leaders militarily and politically opposing Houthi efforts (e.g., as of 2017, the UN-recognized, deposed Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who referred to the "Houthi rebels... as 'Iranian militias'").[14][15] The Houthis in turn accused the Saleh government of being backed by Saudi Arabia and of using Al-Qaeda to repress them.[16] Under the next President Hadi, Gulf Arab states accused Iran of backing the Houthis financially and militarily, though Iran denied this, and they were themselves backers of President Hadi.[17] Despite confirming statements by Iranian and Yemeni officials in regards to Iranian support in the form of trainers, weaponry, and money, the Houthis denied reception of substantial financial or arm support from Iran.[18][19]

## Houthi promotion of Iranian interests in the region

[edit]

Some of Iran's regional interests and geopolitical objectives are served through its fostering of conflict and instability in Yemen, specifically along the border with Saudi Arabia, a long time adversary of Iran.[8] Deployment of the Houthis along the border allows the crossing of terrorists into Saudi Arabia, and forces the Saudi Arabian military to focus on Yemen as opposed to Iran.[8] By subsidising proxy warfare in the region Iran achieves its objective of threatening Saudi Arabia at a relatively low cost and minimal risk, but at a great expense for the Saudi military.[8] Essentially, from that perspective, Iran is backing the Houthis to fight against a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf States whose aim is to maintain control of Yemen.[15] Beginning in April 2015, the Houthis engaged in frequent assaults on Saudi Arabia, including ambushing of military convoys, overrunning small border forts, seizure and demolition of large Saudi facilities and partial occupation of depopulated towns, as well as multiple missile attacks involving short, medium and long range ballistic[20] missiles.[21] Additionally, Houthi controlled areas serve as a platform for an Iranian intelligence outpost and a covert weapons distribution network which would promote Iranian objectives in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.[22]

In return for the support they receive from Iran, the Houthis, as part of the "axis of resistance" seek to prevent western influence on the Middle East and to intimidate the regional countries which ally themselves with the US.[9] Iran expert Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar from Foreign Affairs states that the Houthis assist Iran by posing a regional threat to Saudi Arabia and allowing Iran to evade the sanctions on its oil trade by protecting the Iranian vessels in the Red Sea.[23]

## Iranian support for the Houthis

[edit]

Iran is the only country who recognises the Houthi government in Sana'a,[9] and according to the Council of Foreign Affairs (CFR) "Iran is the Houthis' primary benefactor", providing them with weapons, training and military intelligence.[9] This relationship has been a significant factor in enhancing the group's military capabilities.[9] Through this alliance, the Houthis have gained access to advanced weaponry, including sophisticated missiles and drones, which would have otherwise been impossible for them to manufacture independently.[9] Iranian support has played a crucial role in strengthening the Houthis' ability to assert military dominance within Yemen.[9] However, analysts suggest that the strategic impact of this support extends beyond the Yemeni conflict, influencing regional dynamics and altering the balance of power in the broader Middle East.[9] According to Gulf analyst of the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies "The role of Iran has been decisive in providing the Houthis with smuggled weapons and expertise to project power into the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait".[24]

### Iranian military support

[edit]

Beginning in 2009, Iran has increasingly involved itself in the support the Houthis, and through Iranian assistance the Houthis have gained military strength through the acquirement of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and UAVs.[13][25] in a similar fashion to other Iranian sponsored militias in the Middle East,[13] such as Hezbollah and Hamas.[26]

In 2013, an Iranian vessel was seized and discovered to be carrying Katyusha rockets, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, RPG-7s, Iranian-made night vision goggles and artillery systems that track land and navy targets 40 km away. That was en route to the Houthis.[27]

In early 2013, photographs released by the Yemeni government show the United States Navy and Yemen's security forces seizing a class of "either modern Chinese- or Iranian-made" shoulder-fired, heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles "in their standard packaging", missiles "not publicly known to have been out of state control", raising concerns of Iran's arming of the rebels.[28]

On the edition of 8 April 2015 of PBS Newshour, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the US knew Iran was providing military support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, adding that Washington "is not going to stand by while the region is destabilised".[29]

In April 2016, the U.S. Navy intercepted a large Iranian arms shipment, seizing thousands of AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and 0.50-caliber machine guns, a shipment described as likely headed to Yemen by the Pentagon.[30][31]

In a report quoted by Al-Arabiya it was stated that in 2016 Iran provided 90 million dollars in aid to the Houthis in addition to weapons and ammunition delivered by the 34th and 44th ranks of the Iranian navy.[32] It was also reported that 1100 Houthi militants were trained in IRGC training facilities, and 250 "were being trained in the Quds force garrison in the Iranian city of Hamedan" and that three top commanders from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Col. Ridaa Bassini, Com. Ali al-Rajabi and Maj. Gen. Mohammad Niazi, were sent to Yemen to work with the Houthis.[32]

As of 2017 the Iranian Ministry of Defense had sent an ammunition manufacturing team, headed by Bahram Rahnama, to Yemen in order to assist the Houthis in their weapon production.[32] According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, Hezbollah also aids the Houthis at the behest of the Iranian regime, and its representatives, together with those of the IRGC, serve as advisors to the Houthi military committee, the Jihad council.[9]

In March 2017, Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran's Quds Force, met with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to look for ways to what was described as "empowering" the Houthis. Soleimani was quoted as saying, "At this meeting, they agreed to increase the amount of help, through training, arms and financial support." Despite the Iranian government, and Houthis both officially denying Iranian support for the group. Brigadier General Ahmad Asiri, the spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition told Reuters that evidence of Iranian support was manifested in the Houthi use of Kornet anti-tank guided missiles which had never been in use with the Yemeni military or with the Houthis and that the arrival of Kornet missiles had only come at a later time.[33] In the same month the IRGC had altered the routes used in transporting equipment to the Houthis by spreading out shipments to smaller vessels in Kuwaiti territorial waters in order to avoid naval patrols in the Gulf of Oman due to sanctions imposed, shipments reportedly included parts of missiles, launchers, and drugs.[34]

In May 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on Iran's IRGC, which was also listed as a designated terrorist organization by the US over its role in providing support for the Houthis, including help with manufacturing ballistic missiles used in attacks targeting cities and oil fields in Saudi Arabia.[35]

In August 2018, despite previous Iranian denial of military support for the Houthis, IRGC commander Nasser Shabani was quoted by the Iranian Fars News Agency as saying, "We (IRGC) told Yemenis [Houthi rebels] to strike two Saudi oil tankers, and they did it", on 7 August 2018. In response to Shabani's account, the IRGC released a statement saying that the quote was a "Western lie" and that Shabani was a retired commander, despite no actual reports of his retirement after 37 years in the IRGC, and media linked to the Iranian government confirming he was still enlisted with the IRGC.[36] Furthermore, while the Houthis and the Iranian government have previously denied any military affiliation,[37] Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei openly announced his "spiritual" support of the movement in a personal meeting with the Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam in Tehran, in the midst of ongoing conflicts in Aden in 2019.[38][39]

In January 2024, the US intercepted and captured an Iranian vessel carrying drone parts, missile warheads and anti-tank missiles to the Houthis, According to CFR military aid of this type usually reaches the Houthis through the Iranian IRGC.[9]

In July 2024, the United States targeted new sanctions focusing on IRGC ties with the group. Ansar Allah dismissed the sanctions as pathetic and powerless.[40]

Also in 2024, commanders from IRGC and Hezbollah were reported to be actively involved on the ground in Yemen, overseeing and directing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, according to a report by Reuters.[41] Iran further facilitates Houthi attacks in the Red Sea by providing them with the means to gather intelligence on maritime trading vessels along the international shipping lanes.[42] Owing to Iranian assistance, the Houthis are capable of maintaining "an up-to-date-maritime intelligence picture" with Iranian radar ships such as MV Saviz and MV Behshad together with smaller Iranian vessels conducting visual observations while avoiding detection.[42]

### Iranian support in Red Sea attacks

[edit]

Between November 2023 and December 2024, the Houthis conducted over 100 attacks on commercial and military vessels in the red sea, effectively making the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint into an anti-access/area-denial zone.[43] At first, the Houthis threatened to target any ship traveling to or departing from Israel, though these threats were eventually to include ships remotely linked to Israel and finally ships related to the US and UK.[13] In fact, the subsequent assaults, consisting of more than 130 missile and drone attacks on international commercial and naval vessels, were indiscriminate,[44][13] and many of the attacked ships had no relation to Israel, US or the UK at all;[42] assaulted ships included some from China and Russia[42] as well as others which were bound for Iran.[45]

According to CFR, the Houthis field-test Iranian weaponry on Saudi Arabia and in the Red Sea while providing Iran with plausible deniability, as they "claim responsibility for attacks likely ordered or perpetrated by Iran".[9] Iranian backed Houthi attacks on targets in the Red Sea have had a ruinous effect on international shipping,[9] as they have forced ships into alternative trade routes around the African Cape of Good Hope.[46] As a direct result of the rerouting, disrupted supply chains have been extended by at least two weeks,[46] cargo volumes traversing the strait have dropped by two thirds and the cost to global economy in 2024 has been estimated at 200 billion dollars.[46] According to CFR, "Tehran has voiced its unequivocal support for the operations and reportedly assists the Houthis in targeting vessels".[9]

## See also

[edit]

* Iran–Yemen relations
* Red Sea crisis
* Houthi takeover in Yemen
* Houthi–Saudi Arabian conflict
* Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war

## References

[edit]

1. ^ a b Juneau, Thomas (May 2016). "Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment". International Affairs. 92 (3): 655. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12599.
2. ^ Salmoni, Barak A.; Loidolt, Bryce; Wells, Madeleine (2010). Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon. RAND Corporation. p. 98\. ISBN 978-0-8330-4933-9. JSTOR 10.7249/mg962dia.
3. ^ a b Johnston, Trevor; Lane, Matthew; Casey, Abigail; Williams, Heather J.; Rhoades, Ashley L.; Sladden, James; Vest, Nathan; Reimer, Jordan R.; Haberman, Ryan (2020-07-13). Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement (Report). RAND Corporation. P. 63
4. ^ Salisbury, Peter (2016-05-25). "Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State". `{{cite journal}}`: Cite journal requires `|journal=` (help)
5. ^ "Iran's Support of the Houthis: What to Know". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2025-01-12.
6. ^ a b Johnston, Trevor; Lane, Matthew; Casey, Abigail; Williams, Heather J.; Rhoades, Ashley L.; Sladden, James; Vest, Nathan; Reimer, Jordan R.; Haberman, Ryan (2020-07-13). Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement (Report). RAND Corporation.
7. ^ "Yemen says Iran funding rebels". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2025-01-13.
8. ^ a b c d e f Johnston, Trevor; Lane, Matthew; Casey, Abigail; Williams, Heather J.; Rhoades, Ashley L.; Sladden, James; Vest, Nathan; Reimer, Jordan R.; Haberman, Ryan (2020-07-13). Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement (Report). RAND Corporation. P. 64
9. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o "Iran's Support of the Houthis: What to Know". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2025-01-16.
10. ^ "Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)(S/2023/130) [EN/AR] – Yemen". ReliefWeb. 2023-02-25. Retrieved 2025-01-13.
11. ^ "First Iran flight lands in Shiite-held Yemen capital". Al Arabiya English. 2015-03-01. Retrieved 2025-01-13.
12. ^ Johnston, Trevor; Lane, Matthew; Casey, Abigail; Williams, Heather J.; Rhoades, Ashley L.; Sladden, James; Vest, Nathan; Reimer, Jordan R.; Haberman, Ryan (2020-07-13). Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement (Report). RAND Corporation. P. 62.
13. ^ a b c d e Naar, Ismaeel; Livni, Ephrat; Gupta, Gaya (2024-12-31). "Who Are the Houthis, and Why Are the U.S. and Israel Attacking Them?". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2025-01-06.
14. ^ Wintour, Patrick (4 December 2017). "Yemen Houthi rebels kill former president Ali Abdullah Saleh". The Guardian (TheGuardian.com). Archived from the original on 13 September 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2023.
15. ^ a b Lockie, Alex (October 13, 2016). "Why the US Confronted Iranian-Backed Militants in Yemen, and the Risks that Lie Ahead". Business Insider BusinessInsider.com. Archived from the original on 22 October 2016. Retrieved 9 November 2016.
16. ^ "Al-Qaeda Fighting for Yemeni Government Against Houthi Shia Rebels..." 29 December 2009. Archived from the original on 13 May 2020. Retrieved 1 February 2010.
17. ^ "BBC". BBC News. 30 January 2018. Archived from the original on 28 July 2018.
18. ^ "Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen's Houthis". Reuters. 15 December 2014. Archived from the original on 2 February 2015. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
19. ^ "Iranian ship unloads 185 tons of weapons for Houthis at Saleef port". Al Arabiya News. 20 March 2015. Archived from the original on 24 March 2015.
20. ^ "Yemen rebel missile shot down 200km from Saudi capital". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2025-01-16.
21. ^ "Border Fight Could Shift Saudi Arabia's Yemen War Calculus". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 2025-01-16.
22. ^ Terrill, W. Andrew (2014-01-01). "Iranian Involvement in Yemen". Orbis. 58 (3): 431. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2014.05.008. ISSN 0030-4387.
23. ^ Tabaar, Mohammad Ayatollahi (2024-01-29). "Iran's New Best Friends: The Houthis Have Become Key Partners in Tehran's Quest for Regional Dominance". www.foreignaffairs.com. Retrieved 2025-01-20.
24. ^ "The Red Sea Front – The Yemen Review, November and December 2023". Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies. p. 31. Retrieved 2025-01-20.
25. ^ Resolution 2140 (2014), UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council (2018-01-26). "Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council". `{{cite journal}}`: Cite journal requires `|journal=` (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
26. ^ "Iran's Islamist Proxies in the Middle East". Wilson Center. 2025-01-14. Retrieved 2025-01-06.
27. ^ "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)". Counter Extremism Project. Archived from the original on 13 August 2019. Retrieved 12 August 2019.
28. ^ Chivers, C. J.; Worth, Robert F. (8 February 2013). "Seizure of Antiaircraft Missiles in Yemen Raises Fears That Iran Is Arming Rebels There". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 4 February 2017. Retrieved 9 November 2023.
29. ^ "Kerry Says U.S. Knew of Iran's Military Aid to Houthi Rebels". The New York Times. 10 April 2015. Archived from the original on 18 December 2016. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
30. ^ Reuters Staff (4 April 2016). "U.S. Navy Says it Seized Weapons from Iran Likely Bound for Houthis in Yemen". Reuters.com. Archived from the original on 9 November 2023. Retrieved 9 November 2023.
31. ^ Tomlinson, Lucas & The Associated Press (April 4, 2016). "US Seizes Thousands of Iranian Weapons, Including Grenade Launchers, in Arabian Sea". FoxNews.com. Archived from the original on 19 October 2016. Retrieved 15 October 2016.
32. ^ a b c "Who are the Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers leading Houthis in Yemen?". Al Arabiya English. 2018-01-01. Retrieved 2025-01-22.
33. ^ Saul, Jonathan; Hafezi, Parisa; Georgy, Michael (21 March 2017). "Exclusive: Iran Steps up Support for Houthis in Yemen's War – Sources". U.S. News & World Report. Archived from the original on 22 March 2017. Retrieved 12 August 2019.
34. ^ "Exclusive: Iran Revolutionary Guards find new route to arm Yemen..." Reuters. 2 August 2017. Archived from the original on 12 August 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2019 - via www.reuters.com.
35. ^ "US hits Iran IRGC with sanctions over support of Yemen's Houthis". aljazeera.com. Archived from the original on 7 August 2019. Retrieved 12 August 2019.
36. ^ "IRGC Claims General Who Spilled The Beans Is A 'Retired' Officer". RFE/RL. 8 August 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2019. Retrieved 12 August 2019.
37. ^ "Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen's Houthis". Reuters. 15 December 2014. Archived from the original on 2 February 2015. Retrieved 19 February 2015.
38. ^ "خامنه‌ای خطاب به رهبران حوثی: در برابر عربستان و امارات بایستید". Euronews. 14 August 2019. Archived from the original on 15 August 2019. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
39. ^ "Iran's Khamenei backs Yemen's Houthi movement, calls for dialogue". Reuters. 13 August 2019. Archived from the original on 21 September 2019. Retrieved 21 September 2019.
40. ^ O'Connor, Tom (18 July 2024). "Iran's Houthi allies laugh off Biden's "pathetic" move". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 19 July 2024. Retrieved 19 July 2024.
41. ^ Nakhoul, Samia; Hafezi, Parisa (20 January 2024). "Exclusive: Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks in Yemen, sources say". Reuters. Archived from the original on 20 January 2024. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
42. ^ a b c d "Iran's shadow hand in Houthi Red Sea attacks". Lowy Institute. Retrieved 2025-01-22.
43. ^ "Houthi Shipping Attacks: Patterns and Expectations for 2025". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 2025-01-22.
44. ^ U. S. Naval Institute Staff (2024-08-06). "Report to Congress on Conflict in Yemen, Red Sea Attacks". USNI News. Retrieved 2025-01-06.
45. ^ "Salvage complete of tanker at center of oil spill scare after being hit by Houthi rebels in Red Sea". AP News. 2025-01-10. Retrieved 2025-01-19.
46. ^ a b c Sadek, Hatem (2025-01-21). "Houthi: Iran's Last Card". Dailynewsegypt. Retrieved 2025-01-22.