Malaysia–Singapore relations

Bilateral relations

Malaysian–Singaporean relations

Malaysia |
Singapore
Diplomatic mission
High Commission of Malaysia, Singapore| High Commission of Singapore, Kuala Lumpur
Envoy
Malaysian High Commissioner to Singapore Azfar Mohamad Mustafar| Singapore High Commissioner to Malaysia Vanu Gopala Menon

Malaysia–Singapore relations refers to the bilateral relations between Malaysia and the Republic of Singapore, after the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Singapore has a high commission in Kuala Lumpur and a consulate general in Johor Bahru,[1][2] while Malaysia has a high commission in Singapore.[3] Both countries are full members of the Commonwealth of Nations and ASEAN.[4][5][6]

## Diplomatic relations

[edit]

High Commission of Singapore in Kuala Lumpur

Both countries are full members of the Commonwealth of Nations and ASEAN.

### Bilateral relations

[edit]

Singapore and Malaysia enjoy close bilateral relations, and there is an annual Singapore-Malaysia Leaders' Retreat for bilateral talks between the two countries.

Leaders of the two countries

## Socio-economic relations

[edit]

> Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said in 1981: Singapore's success story in the economic and social fields cannot but be a model for Malaysians rather than an object of envy. What we do within our own country is, therefore, contributory and complementary towards each other's progress.[7]

As of 2015, Singapore is Malaysia's biggest trading partner, with imports and exports totalling approximately US$28 billion.[8] Conversely, Singapore's biggest trading partner is China, followed by Hong Kong and Malaysia respectively.[9] Former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has suggested that both nations can promote regulations and e-commerce, and encourage electronic payments.[10]

Specifically, Malaysia's southernmost state of Johor has enjoyed close bilateral relations with Singapore.[11][12] Both territories neighbour each other and share natural resources such as water.[13] In addition, Johor and Singapore, together with Indonesia's Riau Islands, form the SIJORI Growth Triangle. Singapore is consistently one of the top sources of foreign direct investments into Iskandar Malaysia, an economic corridor spanning much of southern Johor.[14] Meanwhile, almost 300,000 Malaysians from Johor transit across the two border crossings between Johor and Singapore - the Causeway and the Second Link \- on a daily basis, either for work or education opportunities.[15][16]

In 2018, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean during his visit to Sabah said that they were keen to assist the latter in technical and vocational education in efforts to build up skills for state youths to meet the needs of the state's industries with an invitation to Singapore were also delivered to Sabah Chief Minister Shafie Apdal and other state officials to further discuss about working together on technical skills development for the state youths.[17] Further in 2019, Sarawak opened its trade and tourism office in Singapore to boost investment with several other trade deals were also signed between the two.[18][19] During a visit by Singapore's senior Minister of State for Trade and Industry Chee Hong Tat to Sabah State Administrative Centre in August, he said Sabah has been an important partner for Singapore over the years and hopes to elevate the relations into further levels with the setting up of a Sabah trade office in Singapore.[20] During the meeting, Chee adding that Singapore are keen to investing in developing tourism hospitality facilities as well on cruise tourism.[20] Sabah Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry Junz Wong also said that Sabah was in the process to form a strategic alliance with Singapore to facilitate and create platforms for the business community of the two and discovering potential trade in agriculture-based manufactured food products.[21]

### Tourism

[edit]

Singaporeans account for a majority of tourist arrivals into Malaysia, at nearly 13 million as of 2016[update].[22] Malaysia was also Singapore's third largest market in terms of inbound visitors, contributing 8.5% of the total tourists in the city-state in 2012; tourists from Kuala Lumpur, Sarawak, Penang, Sabah and Perak formed the bulk of Malaysian tourist arrivals into Singapore in that year.[23]

According to a study conducted by the Singapore Tourism Board, Malaysians tend to view Singapore as an extension of their lifestyle rather than a holiday destination, due to the close geographical proximity, cultural similarities and family ties between the two countries.[23] Aside from leisure, 41% of Malaysian tourists in Singapore cited meetings, incentives, conferencing and exhibitions (MICE) as their purpose of visit.

## Cultural relations

[edit]

Malaysia and Singapore share significant historical and cultural affinities, as both countries have multiracial populations consisting of Malays, Chinese and Indians, and had experienced British colonial rule.[24][25] These are in addition to cross-border family ties due to migration between the two countries.[23][26] In recent years, more arts and cultural activities have been jointly organised by artists from both sides of the Causeway, including the Titian Budaya showcase in Kuala Lumpur in 2015 and the Causeway Exchange during the George Town Festival that year.[27][28]

In particular, Singapore is culturally linked with its former fellow Straits Settlements, Penang and Malacca \- both of which are now among the 13 Malaysian states. Aside from being governed directly by the British as crown colonies until the mid-20th century, the three territories are renowned for their cosmopolitan populaces, which include the Peranakans.[29] There has been a recent resurgence of Peranakan culture, fuelled by conservation efforts at historic sites and the mass media.[29][30] One of the key regional events aimed at promoting Peranakan culture is the International Baba Nyonya Convention, which was last held in Penang's capital city of George Town in 2017.[31]

## Security relations

[edit]

Main article: Five Power Defence Arrangements

Singapore and Malaysia are part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FDPA), along with New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, in which the five nations are to consult one another in the event of an armed attack on either Malaysia or Singapore. An Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for both Malaysia and Singapore was set up at RMAF Butterworth in the Malaysian state of Penang in 1971.[32]

Both countries, along with Indonesia, help each other respond to threats by Jemaah Islamiah (JI).

On 19 February 2025, just hours before his scheduled execution, a Singapore court granted a stay of execution to Pannir Selvam Pranthaman after he was previous arrested for carrying 52 grams of heroin. He was set to be hanged, and to be the fourth person executed in Singapore that year. The Appeals Court halted the execution due to an ongoing constitutional challenge related to drug laws. Malaysian lawmakers urged their government to intervene, but officials did not respond.[33]

## Transport links

[edit]

The two countries are connected by the Johor–Singapore Causeway and the Tuas Second Link. The Second Link is a bridge connecting Singapore and Johor, Malaysia. In Singapore, it is officially known as the Tuas Second Link. The bridge was built to reduce traffic congestion at the Johor–Singapore Causeway which have been operated since 2 January 1998. The twin-deck bridge supports a dual-three lane carriageway linking Kampong Ladang at Tanjung Kupang in Johor to Jalan Ahmad Ibrahim at Tuas in Singapore. The span over water is 1,920 metres (6,300 ft). On the Malaysian side, the bridge is connected to the Second Link Expressway (Malay: Lebuhraya Laluan Kedua Malaysia-Singapura), also known as Linkedua Expressway, which links from Senai North Interchange Exit 253 at North-South Expressway, Senai Airport and Taman Perling, Johor Bahru via its extension known as Johor Bahru Parkway. In Singapore, the bridge connects to the Ayer Rajah Expressway.

On 7 April 2014, during a joint press conference with Lee Hsien Loong, after the annual Malaysia-Singapore Leaders' Retreat in Putrajaya, Najib proposed a Friendship Bridge between the two countries to strengthen and enhance the relationship between both countries.[34]

The Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link, a high-speed rail line between Malaysia and Singapore, under development, is scheduled to open in 2024.[35][36][37] This long-delayed project required the resolution of a dispute between the two countries over transportation links and Singaporean investment in Iskandar Malaysia in 2010. Malaysian and Singaporean counterparts thereby agreed to modify the Points of Agreement signed in 1990. Specifically, the two sides agreed to move the KTM railway station from Tanjung Pagar to Woodlands and created a joint venture to be called M-S Pte Ltd to develop six parcels of Singapore land, develop a rapid transit link between Tanjung Puteri in Johor Baru and Woodlands in Singapore, and allow Temasek Holdings and Khazanah to set up a joint venture for the purpose of developing a town in Iskandar Malaysia.[38] The deadline to form the aforementioned joint venture company lapsed on 30 June 2018, thus both nations have to decide to mutually extend the deadline or open an international tender for the rail operator.[39]

Singapore and Malaysia also agreed to build the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore High Speed Rail in 2013. The project was expected to be completed by 2026, and would connect Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru to Singapore.[40] Under the administration of the new Malaysian government, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad however announced that Malaysia have postponed the HSR project while Singapore spent S$250 million (US$184 million) on the project and another S$40 million is expected to be spent from August 2018 till the end of 2018.[41][42] On 18 July 2018, former Malaysian Prime Minister and opposition member of parliament (MP) Najib Razak questioned the government on the economic impact of cancelling the project.[43] On 1 January 2021, the project's cancellation was announced by the Prime Ministers of both countries as no agreement was reached after the final deadline extension of 31 December 2020 lapsed.[44]

There are also numerous air and sea links between the two countries.

## Other bilateral projects

[edit]

There have been schemes to raise the water levels in Johor's Linggiu Reservoir to meet the needs of both countries. There is an ongoing joint hydrometric modelling study of the Johor River.[45] This has been prompted by the parching of the Reservoir, with its water level dropping to a historic low of 20 per cent after a long spell of rainless days in October 2016. The study aims to help find out why water levels in the Reservoir fell recently, and can also analyse what happens when it rains in Johor, and how this translates into inflows to Linggiu and outflows to the Johor River. The dip in supply was previously pegged to persistent dry weather, as well as large discharges of water to prevent salinity levels downstream from getting too high.[46]

## Disputes and diplomatic incidents

[edit]

Since the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation in 1965, several other differences developed between Singapore and Malaysia, including a dispute over water prices (under the 1961 and 1962 water agreements) and ownership of Pedra Branca, an island off the coast of Johor.

### Water conflicts

[edit]

Main article: Water conflicts between Malaysia and Singapore

Under the 1962 Water Agreement, Singapore refines up to 250 million gallons of water per day from the Johor River and sells the majority of it back to Malaysia. This right expires in 2061. There has been numerous disputes between the two nations over the fairness of the deal, with Malaysia arguing Singapore is an affluent nation profiting from Malaysia's water resources due to the deal, and Singapore arguing that its treatment of water and subsequent resale of said treated water to Malaysia is done at a generous price, as Singapore makes no economic profit off the resale due to the costs involved in refining the water.[47] Malaysia has threatened to cut off the water supply prematurely to pressure Singapore politically, a move that has sparked tensions between the two states.

### Territorial dispute

[edit]

Main article: Pedra Branca dispute

On 23 May 2008, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favour of Singapore on the question of ownership over Pedra Branca with 12 to 4 votes whereas the UN court ruled almost unanimously in favour of Malaysia regarding its legal ownership of Middle Rocks. In its Judgment, the ICJ expressly noted that Singapore had plans for reclamation at Pedra Branca.[48] Both the microsized features are valued for their respective strategic positions at the junction of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea where 40% of global trade passes through on annual basis.[49]

In February 2017, Malaysia filed an application for the revision of the ICJ's judgement. In its filing, Malaysia cited three documents recently declassified by the United Kingdom to support the application. Singapore has set up its legal team to respond to Malaysia's application. The team includes Attorney-General Lucien Wong, Professor S. Jayakumar, Professor Tommy Koh, and former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong.[50] Responding to the application, Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, said: "I am confident of the eventual outcome, because (we have) strong lawyers (and) a strong case".[50]

On 30 June 2017, Malaysia filed a second application, requesting interpretation over the judgement delivered by the ICJ in 2008 over the sovereignty of Pedra Branca. According to Malaysia, this was "separate and autonomous" from the earlier application filed in February 2017, seeking revision of the ICJ judgement.[51] In response, Singapore said that "Malaysia's request for the ICJ to interpret the judgement is puzzling. Singapore will therefore oppose Malaysia's application for interpretation, which we consider to be both unnecessary and without merit. Singapore is committed to resolving these issues in accordance with international law".[51]

To implement the ICJ's judgement in 2008, Malaysia and Singapore have attempted to implement the 2008 judgement through co-operative processes. Both countries established the Malaysia-Singapore Joint Technical Committee (MSJTC) to implement the ICJ's judgement, which was inter alia, tasked with addressing the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between the territorial waters of both countries. According to Malaysia, the MSJTC reached an impasse in November 2013. Malaysia asserted that one of the reasons was both parties being unable to agree over the meaning of the 2008 judgement as it concerns South Ledge and the waters surrounding Pedra Branca.[52]

Malaysia's latest legal bid, according to international experts, could be an attempt by the Barisan Nasional government to stir up nationalist fervour against a convenient, smaller neighbour, Singapore, ahead of a key general election.[53] In the aftermath of the general election under the new government of Pakatan Harapan, Malaysia has dropped its appeal on the Pedra Branca case while announcing plans to convert the Middle Rocks that are under its sovereignty into an island.[54][55]

### Maritime and aviation dispute

[edit]

#### Maritime dispute over port limits

[edit]

On 25 October 2018, the Malaysian Attorney General's Chamber announced changes to the port limits for the Johor Bahru Port.[56] This was followed by the Marine Department of Malaysia issuing a Notice to Mariners on 22 November 2018 detailing an extension of the port limits that brought it closer to the Tuas area in Singapore which indeed was previously under Malaysian maritime claims. Tensions have erupted before in the past as Singapore launched a move to reclaim land in the Johore Straits (off Tuas, Singapore and Tanjung Piai, Malaysia) which was in an area of overlapping claims between the 2 respective nations.

In response, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) issued a circular on 30 November instructing ship masters and owners of vessels to disregard Malaysia's Notice to Mariners.[57] On 4 December 2018, Singapore's Ministry of Transport (MOT) announced that it had lodged a "strong protest" with the Malaysian government over the extension of the Johor Bahru port limits "in a manner which encroaches into Singapore's territorial waters off Tuas".[58] Meanwhile, both nations had started blaming each other for intruding into their own claimed territorial waters. The MOT statement also indicated that vessels from the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Marine Department of Malaysia had repeatedly intruded into Singapore's territorial waters off Tuas over the past two weeks, saying that the extension of the Johor Bahru port limits were "a serious violation of Singapore's sovereignty and international law" and "unconducive to good bilateral relations, cause confusion for the international shipping community, and lead to increased navigational and safety risks for all parties."[58]

On 6 December 2018, Singapore's Transport Minister Khaw Boon Wan described Malaysia extension of port limits as a "blatant provocation", and indicated that fourteen intrusions into Singapore's territorial waters had occurred. He also announced that the Republic had extended its port limits off Tuas in response to Malaysia's actions.[59]

#### Aviation dispute

[edit]

On 4 December 2018, Malaysian Transport Minister Loke Siew Fook announced Malaysia's intention to "reclaim" airspace over southern Johor that was previously accorded under an agreement in 1974 to Singapore to provide air traffic control services as Malaysia now had adequate technological, financial, and aviation expertise to control its own airspace. It is sketched begin in phases between 2019 and 2023. He also said that Malaysia would send a protest note to Singapore over the latter's plan to implement an instrument landing system (ILS) at Seletar Airport. Malaysia claimed that the implementation of the ILS would violate Malaysia's sovereignty, independent rights over its own airspace, and also cause restrictions on building heights and port activities that would stunt the development of the Pasir Gudang industrial area.[60] Singapore's Transport Minister Khaw Boon Wan countered Loke's claim by saying that the ILS would not cause any additional restricts or impact, and that cross-border airspace arrangements did not amount to a violation of sovereignty, pointing to other similar arrangements where Malaysia managed airspace over Brunei and Indonesia although both the latters have given full consent to Malaysia in managing civil air traffic in their designated airspaces as both the nations lack the needed expertise in this matter.[61][62]

On 25 December 2018, the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia published a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that it would establish an area of permanently restricted airspace over Pasir Gudang from 2 January 2019. Singapore protested the new permanent restricted area on 1 January 2019, saying that the restricted area was in a "controlled and congested airspace" and would affect aircraft travelling through the area.[63]

#### Negotiations

[edit]

On 8 January 2019, following a meeting, the foreign ministers of both countries, Singapore's Vivian Balakrishnan and Malaysia's Saifuddin Abdullah, announced that the implementation of the ILS by Seletar Airport and the permanent restricted airspace by Malaysia would be suspended, and that a working group would be set up to study and discuss the issues relating to the maritime dispute, pending further discussions and negotiations.[64]

On 9 January 2019, Johor Chief Minister Osman Sapian made a visit to one of the Malaysian vessels, MV Pedoman, that were still anchored within the disputed waters and posted photos of the visit on Facebook.[65] This prompted Singapore to suspend the Joint Ministerial Committee for Iskandar Malaysia (JMCIM) talks scheduled for 14 January.[66]

On 14 March 2019, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to mutually suspend the implementation of their overlapping port limits, which effectively represented a reversion to the status quo prior to Malaysia's initial announcement of alteration to the Johor Port limits. Other measures announced included: the suspension of commercial activities in the area; an agreement to not anchor government vessels; and Singapore and Malaysia vessels will operate in the area "in accordance with international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)".[67]

## See also

[edit]

* Malaysia–Singapore border
* Pedra Branca dispute
* People's Action Party–United Malays National Organisation relations, the governing parties of Singapore and Malaysia
* Singaporeans in Malaysia
* Malaysians in Singapore

Portals:

* Malaysia
* Singapore
* Politics

## References

[edit]

Library resources about
Malaysia–Singapore relations

* * *

* Resources in your library
* Resources in other libraries

1. ^ "High Commission of the Republic of Singapore, Kuala Lumpur". Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. Retrieved 18 April 2017.
2. ^ "Consulate-General of the Republic of Singapore, Johor Bahru". Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. Retrieved 18 April 2017.
3. ^ "Official Website of High Commission of Malaysia, Singapore". Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. Retrieved 18 April 2017.
4. ^ Lau Teik Soon (1969). "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Crisis of Adjustment, 1965-68". Journal of Southeast Asian History, Cambridge University Press on Behalf of Department of History, National University of Singapore. 10 (1): 155–176\. JSTOR 20067736.
5. ^ Shaun Narine (2002). Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 73–. ISBN 978-1-58826-129-8.
6. ^ Mely Caballero Anthony (2005). Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 59–. ISBN 978-981-230-260-1.
7. ^ "Do your best to boost relations". The Straits Times. 18 December 1981.
8. ^ "Malaysia | Trade At a glance | Most Recent Value | WITS | Data". wits.worldbank.org. Retrieved 16 April 2017.
9. ^ "Singapore | Trade At a glance | Most Recent Value | WITS | Data". wits.worldbank.org. Retrieved 16 April 2017.
10. ^ Seow Bei Yi (17 January 2018). "Causeway jams, high-speed rail bidding process among issues discussed". The Straits Times. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
11. ^ Amir Yusof (19 July 2018). "Exclusive: Johor crown prince claims 'sovereignty' over water in the state, prefers 'no federal interference' on the issue". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
12. ^ Sulaiman Daud (27 August 2017). "Views of Johor Sultan matter in the construction of Rapid Transit System". Mothership.sg. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
13. ^ Royston Sim (25 June 2018). "Singapore, Malaysia must comply fully with 1962 water agreement provisions, says MFA in response to Mahathir comments". The Straits Times. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
14. ^ Zunaira Saieed (1 April 2017). "Iskandar Malaysia continues to attract capital 11 years on". The Star. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
15. ^ "Toiling across Causeway, Iskandar Puteri's urban Malays hungry for change". Today. 7 May 2018. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
16. ^ Khor Yu Leng (6 November 2017). "Commentary: Johor-Singapore tolls and the impact on commuters on both sides of the Causeway". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
17. ^ Muguntan Vanar (8 September 2018). "Singapore keen to help Sabah enhance its vocational skills training". The Star. Retrieved 22 August 2019.
18. ^ "Sarawak opens trade and tourism office in Singapore to boost investment". New Straits Times. 16 August 2019. Retrieved 22 August 2019.
19. ^ Grace Ho (17 August 2019). "Singapore, Sarawak ink 8 deals at inaugural trade forum". The Straits Times. Retrieved 22 August 2019.
20. ^ a b Olivia Miwil (27 August 2019). "Singapore, Sabah to boost cooperation". New Straits Times. Retrieved 29 August 2019.
21. ^ "Sabah and Singapore to establish strategic alliance, says minister". Bernama. The Malay Mail. 28 August 2019. Retrieved 29 August 2019.
22. ^ Sean Lim (7 June 2017). "Malaysia's new tourism tax unlikely to deter visitors from Singapore". The Straits Times. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
23. ^ a b c "STB Market Insights: Malaysia" (PDF). Singapore Tourism Board. April 2014.
24. ^ Sonthi, Uma Devi. Parliamentary democracy in Singapore 1965-1980 (PDF) (Thesis).
25. ^ Jamie Koh, Stephanie Ho (2009). Culture and Customs of Singapore and Malaysia. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780313351167.
26. ^ Lee, Hsien Loong (9 August 2015). "Flourishing ties rooted in shared history". The Straits Times. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
27. ^ Lim Yan Liang (20 November 2015). "'Cultural bridge' showcase event of arts from S'pore and Malaysia launched by PM Lee in KL". The Straits Times. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
28. ^ "A look at the Indian Muslim community in inner city". The Star. 27 July 2015. Retrieved 29 July 2015.
29. ^ a b Stuart Heaver (10 May 2014). "High society". Retrieved 29 July 2018.
30. ^ Deepika Shetty (24 April 2008). "Singapore pays tribute to Peranakan culture with new museum". Retrieved 29 July 2018.
31. ^ Cavina Lim; R. Sekaran (29 November 2017). "Baba Nyonya convention aims to uphold precious heritage". The Star. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
32. ^ "The Five Power Defence Arrangement comes into force". National Library Board, Singapore. 1 November 1971. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
33. ^ "Alleged Malaysian drugs trafficker gets last-minute stay of execution in Singapore". AP News. 19 February 2025. Retrieved 1 March 2025.
34. ^ Sim Bak Heng (19 April 2014). "Johor won't budge on Friendship Bridge". AsiaOne. Retrieved 13 December 2018.
35. ^ "M'sia, S'pore joint implementation team meets". Bernama. The Star. 29 August 2010. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
36. ^ Lianne Chia (31 July 2017). "Singapore-JB Rapid Transit System to begin passenger service by 2024". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
37. ^ Royston Sim; Adrian Lim (1 August 2017). "Johor Baru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link's first step: Terms for joint venture firm". The Straits Times. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
38. ^ "Malaysia and Singapore end deadlock on key issues". The Star. 25 May 2010. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
39. ^ Kevin Kwang (9 July 2018). "Deadline to form joint venture company to operate JB-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link missed: Khaw". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 12 July 2018.
40. ^ "Kuala Lumpur – Singapore high speed rail tender to be called this year". Railway Gazette. 5 July 2017. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
41. ^ Kevin Kwang (9 July 2018). "Singapore has spent more than S$250m on High-Speed Rail; no reply from Malaysia yet: Khaw". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 12 July 2018.
42. ^ Sumisha Naidu (10 July 2018). "Singapore 'knows what we want to do' about High-Speed Rail: Mahathir". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 12 July 2018.
43. ^ Sumisha Naidu; Melissa Goh (18 July 2018). "Former Malaysian PM Najib questions economic impact of cancelling high-speed rail project". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 18 July 2018.
44. ^ Amir Yusof (1 January 2021). "KL-Singapore HSR project terminated after agreement lapses, both countries to proceed with 'necessary actions't". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 1 January 2021.
45. ^ Royston Sim (17 January 2018). "Singapore, KL ink milestone pact to build rapid transit link". The Straits Times. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
46. ^ "Finding ways to increase water supply from Johor River". The Straits Times. 17 January 2018. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
47. ^ Kelly Ng (25 June 2018). "Mahathir revives water dispute with Singapore, calls 1962 deal 'ridiculous'". Today. Retrieved 28 July 2018.
48. ^ hermesauto (5 July 2021). "Development works at Pedra Branca, including land reclamation, to begin later this year: MND". The Straits Times. Retrieved 12 July 2021.
49. ^ "Court awards islet to Singapore". BBC News. 23 May 2008. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
50. ^ a b "Singapore confident of retaining Pedra Branca". Bernama. New Straits Times. 1 April 2017. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
51. ^ a b "Malaysia files new application to ICJ on Pedra Branca ruling; Singapore says it's 'without merit'". Channel NewsAsia. 1 July 2017. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
52. ^ Hidir Reduan (4 July 2017). "M'sia files fresh legal bid over Pulau Batu Puteh / Pedra Branca ownership". New Straits Times. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
53. ^ Bhavan Jaipragas (11 February 2017). "Why Malaysia is fighting Singapore over a rock". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
54. ^ "Malaysia drops Pulau Batu Puteh dispute with Singapore, withdraws ICJ challenge". Agence France-Presse. New Straits Times. 1 June 2018. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
55. ^ Bhavan Jaipragas (30 May 2018). "Mahathir plans Malaysian island on Middle Rocks near Singapore". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 4 August 2018. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
56. ^ Binte Baharudin, Rina Maslina (22 November 2018). "Alteration of Port Limits for Johore Bahru Port" (PDF). Jabatan Laut, Malaysia. Retrieved 14 March 2019.
57. ^ "Port Marine Circular No. 8 of 2018". Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore. 30 November 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
58. ^ a b "Singapore lodges 'strong protest' over extension of Johor Bahru port limits". Channel NewsAsia. 4 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
59. ^ Kenneth Cheng (6 December 2018). "Singapore extends port limits off Tuas amid maritime boundary standoff with M'sia". Today. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
60. ^ "Malaysia wants to reclaim airspace delegated to Singapore". FlightGlobal. 4 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
61. ^ Amir Yusof (12 December 2018). "Malaysia 'seems to be using technical excuse' to change airspace arrangements: Singapore's Khaw Boon Wan". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
62. ^ Adrian Lim; Shannon Teoh (5 December 2018). "Managing airspace not tied to sovereignty, says Khaw Boon Wan". The Straits Times. Retrieved 22 March 2019.
63. ^ "Singapore raises concerns with Malaysia over establishment of permanent restricted area over Pasir Gudang". Channel NewsAsia. 1 January 2019. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
64. ^ Amir Yusof (8 January 2019). "Malaysia, Singapore agree to suspend permanent restricted area over Pasir Gudang, ILS for Seletar Airport". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 11 January 2019.
65. ^ "Singapore, Malaysia maritime dispute: 2 Malaysia vessels still in Singapore waters". Channel NewsAsia. 10 January 2019. Retrieved 22 March 2019.
66. ^ "Singapore postpones joint ministerial committee talks on Iskandar after Johor chief minister's intrusion into its territorial waters". Channel NewsAsia. 12 January 2019. Retrieved 22 March 2019.
67. ^ Amir Yusof (14 March 2019). "Singapore-Malaysia maritime dispute: Both sides agree to suspend overlapping port limits". Channel NewsAsia. Retrieved 14 March 2019.

* v
* t
* e

Foreign relations of Malaysia

Bilateral relations

| Africa|

* Algeria
* Egypt
* Ethiopia
* Gambia
* Ghana
* Kenya
* Libya
* Malawi
* Mauritius
* Morocco
* Namibia
* Nigeria
* Senegal
* Seychelles
* South Africa
* Sudan
* Tanzania
* Tunisia
* Uganda

|

Americas|

* Argentina
* Brazil
* Canada
* Chile
* Colombia
* Cuba
* Ecuador
* Jamaica
* Mexico
* Peru
* United States
* Uruguay
* Venezuela

Asia|

* Azerbaijan
* Bahrain
* Bangladesh
* Brunei
* Cambodia
* China
* Hong Kong
* East Timor
* Georgia
* India
* Indonesia
* Iran
* Israel
* Japan
* Jordan
* Kazakhstan
* Kuwait
* Kyrgyzstan
* Laos
* Lebanon
* Maldives
* Mongolia
* Myanmar
* Nepal
* North Korea
* Oman
* Pakistan
* Palestine
* Philippines
* Qatar
* Saudi Arabia
* Singapore
* South Korea
* Sri Lanka
* Syria
* Taiwan
* Tajikistan
* Thailand
* Turkey
* Turkmenistan
* United Arab Emirates
* Uzbekistan
* Vietnam
* Yemen

Europe|

* Austria
* Belarus
* Belgium
* Bosnia and Herzegovina
* Croatia
* Czech Republic
* Denmark
* Finland
* France
* Germany
* Greece
* Holy See
* Hungary
* Italy
* Kosovo
* Lithuania
* Netherlands
* Norway
* Poland
* Romania
* Russia
* Spain
* Sweden
* Switzerland
* Ukraine
* United Kingdom

Oceania|

* Australia
* Fiji
* New Zealand
* Solomon Islands

Former|

* South Vietnam
* Soviet Union

Multilateral relations

* Malaysia and the Commonwealth of Nations
* European Union
* United Nations

Diplomacy

| Treaties|

| Former|

* Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA)

|

Current|

* Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
* Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC)

Territorial disputes|

* South China Sea
* Spratly Islands

Related topics|

* Diplomatic missions of Malaysia / in Malaysia
* Ministry of Foreign Affairs
* Made in Malaysia
* brands
* Malaysia My Second Home

* v
* t
* e

Foreign relations of Singapore

Africa|

* Kenya
* South Africa

Americas|

* Brazil
* Canada
* Mexico
* Trinidad and Tobago
* United States

Asia|

* Armenia
* Bangladesh
* Brunei
* Cambodia
* China (Hong Kong)
* India
* Indonesia
* Israel
* Japan
* Kazakhstan
* Malaysia
* Mongolia
* Myanmar
* North Korea
* Pakistan
* Philippines
* Saudi Arabia
* South Korea
* Taiwan
* Thailand
* Turkey
* Vietnam

Europe|

* France
* Germany
* Kosovo
* Netherlands
* Russia
* United Kingdom

Oceania|

* Australia
* New Zealand

International organisations|

* Commonwealth of Nations
* United Nations (UN relations)
* APEC
* ASEAN
* Asian Development Bank
* WTO
* G-77
* Non-Aligned Movement
* Interpol
* PCA
* ICA
* ICRM
* WCO
* IAEA

Treaties|

* Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership
* ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement
* Five Power Defence Arrangements
* Malaysia–Singapore Points of Agreement of 1990
* Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks
* Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
* Straits Settlement and Johore Territorial Waters Agreement of 1927
* Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
* United Nations Charter

Related topics|

* Diplomatic missions of / in Singapore

*[v]: View this template
*[t]: Discuss this template
*[e]: Edit this template