State consequentialism

Mohist form of consequentialism

State consequentialism[1] is a modern minority theoretical interpretation of Mohist consequentialist ethics in Sinology, often intersecting with Chinese Legalism. Sinologist Fraser of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy interprets Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BC, as the "world's earliest form of consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of intrinsic goods taken as constitutive of human welfare".[2] An ancient Chinese State consequentialist might evaluate the moral worth of an action based on how it contributes to the basic goods of a more particular entity: a state,[1] with social order, basic material wealth, and population growth valued by both Mohists and "Legalists" like Shang Yang. The term has also been applied to the political philosophy of the Confucian philosopher Xunzi.[3]

Although some scholars have argued Mohist consequentialism as a type of state consequentialism, Mohism more generally holds that right and wrong are determined by what benefits all the people of the world. While some Mohists did serve in states, the Mohist ethical concern is generally to benefit all people, considered as an aggregate or a community, not just a particular political entity, such as the state.[4]

Since there was no literal pre-Han Legalism category, although some of the Han Feizi is critical of Mohism, as a major force of the Warring States period Mohism is nonetheless relevant as one theoretical framework for interpreting the work. Considering peace beneficial and war harmful, Mohist participation in warfare was generally defensive, serving as military engineers; Shang Yang and the Han Feizi both advocate offensive warfare in the interest of the state. As one of State Consequentialism's more recent advocates, professor Tao Jiang attempts to reconcile it with more generalist Mohist consequentialism with the idea of the state coming to encompass "all under Heaven", making the human world and state identical and bringing warfare to an end.

## Consequentialism

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> It is the business of the benevolent man to seek to promote what is beneficial to the world and to eliminate what is harmful, and to provide a model for the world. What benefits he will carry out; what does not benefit men he will leave alone (Chinese: 仁之事者, 必务求于天下之利, 除天下之害, 将以为法乎天下. 利人乎, 即为; 不利人乎, 即止).[5]

> — Mozi, Mozi (5th century BC) (Chapter 8: Against Music Part I)

Unlike utilitarianism, which views pleasure as a moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are... order, material wealth, and increase in population".[6] During Mozi's era, war and famines were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a harmonious society. The "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to basic needs like shelter and clothing, and the "order" of Mohist consequentialism refers to Mozi's stance against warfare and violence, which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability.[7]

Stanford Sinologist David Shepherd Nivison, in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more reproduction; more people, then more production and wealth... if people have plenty, they would be good, filial, kind, and so on unproblematically".[6] The Mohists believed that morality is based on "promoting the benefit of all under heaven and eliminating harm to all under heaven". In contrast to Bentham's views, state consequentialism is not utilitarian because it is not hedonistic or individualistic. The importance of outcomes that are good for the community outweigh the importance of individual pleasure and pain.[8]

## Shen Dao

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Eirik Harris of the Shenzi fragments has an essay including a State Consequentialist interpretation of Shen Dao, from the Warring States period. Harris takes Shen Dao's reasoning as based more simply in the consequences of actions for the state than a 'normative morality', as found in Confucian and later Daoist texts. One of Shen Dao's fragments say's that the ruler's position was established to benefit the state, rather than the state to benefit the ruler. The text suggests that whatever benefits the state 'ought' to be done, namely to make it stronger, stable and well ordered as to better ensure it's survival.

Shen Dao does seem to have some moral grounding, and does claim that an orderly state will benefit the people, assuming that a ruler might have such goals. But he never claims such goals as intrinsically valuable, or as the ruler's "fundamental aim", and never claims he should always take those actions which benefit state order or the people. The ruler simply 'ought' to follow Shen Dao's advice if he desires 'consequences' like a strong, orderly state and welfare, as might be assumed.[9]

Sinologist Hansen took Shen Dao as only beginning to emphasize a concept of the Dao or Way.[10] Shen Dao claims to espouse a Dao or "Way" of Heaven. But his fragments do not focus on the concept as later texts do. As a major concept, if it had been a focus for him, his archival commentators might have seen fit to include his discussion of the Way, at least to criticize it. The concept of an intrinsically moral Daoistic Dao or Way may not have been as developed in his time.[11]

## References

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1. ^ a b Ivanhoe, P.J.; Van Norden, Bryan William (2005). Readings in classical Chinese philosophy. Hackett Publishing. p. 60\. ISBN 978-0-87220-780-6. ""he advocated a form of state consequentialism, which sought to maximize three basic goods: the wealth, order, and population of the state"
2. ^ Fraser, Chris, "Mohism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Edward N. Zalta.
3. ^ Deen K. Chatterjee (6 October 2011). Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Springer. p. 1170\. ISBN 978-1-4020-9159-9. "in this sense, one can interpret Xunzi's political philosophy as a form of state utilitarianism or state consequentialism"
4. ^ Fraser, Chris (2016). The Philosophy of the Mozi: The First Consequentialists. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 17, 249.
5. ^ Di Mo; Xunzi; Di Mo Xunzi Fei Han; Professor Burton Watson (1967). Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu. Columbia University Press. p. 110\. ISBN 978-0-231-02515-7.
6. ^ a b Loewe, Michael; Shaughnessy, Edward L. (2011). The Cambridge History of Ancient China. Cambridge University Press. p. 761\. ISBN 978-0-521-47030-8.
7. ^ Van Norden, Bryan W. (2011). Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy. Hackett Publishing. p. 52\. ISBN 978-1-60384-468-0.
8. ^ Jay L. Garfield; William Edelglass (9 June 2011). The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 62\. ISBN 978-0-19-532899-8. "The goods that serve as criteria of morality are collective or public, in contrast, for instance, to individual happiness or well-being"
9. ^ Pines 2024, p. 94.
10. ^ Hansen 1992, p. 208,217,236; Hansen 2020.
11. ^ Harris 2016, p. 17.

## Sources

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* Hansen, Chad (1992). A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-535076-0.
* Hansen, Chad (2020). "Daoism". In Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 ed.). Retrieved 19 February 2024.
* Harris, Eirik Lang (2016). The Shenzi Fragments. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231542166.
* Pines, Yuri (2024). Dao Companion to China's fa Tradition. Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Springer. ISBN 9789048129270.