Taiwanese nationalism

Political and cultural ideology

This article is about the nationalist movement which asserts that the Taiwanese people are a nation and Taiwan is a country. For Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, see Chinese nationalism § In Taiwan.

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National flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Flag of the Taiwan independence movement

Taiwanese nationalism (Chinese: 臺灣民族主義 or 台灣民族主義; pinyin: Táiwān mínzú zhǔyì; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Tâi-oân Bîn-cho̍k Chú-gī) is a nationalist movement asserting that Taiwanese are a nation and Taiwan is a sovereign country. Due to the political status of Taiwan and Han origin of most Taiwanese today, it is strongly linked to the Taiwan independence movement in promoting de-Sinicization to seek a national identity separate from China.

Taiwanese nationalists strongly oppose Chinese unification and "One China"; demanding formal independence for the island of Taiwan, or supporting status quo but interpreting that Taiwan is a sovereign country called the "Republic of China" and equating the People's Republic of China with "China" similar to popular world's understanding. The option of formal independence is now not widely supported in the Taiwanese public due to Chinese military pressure, most Taiwanese today still support status quo. One obvious point is that Taiwanese nationalists call the People's Republic of China as "China", while Taiwanese advocates of Chinese nationalism refer to it as "Mainland China". From the retreat to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in 1949 until democratization started in 1991, Taiwan's local culture and identity were suppressed while Chinese nationalism was favored by the Kuomintang (KMT)-led Republic of China, reflecting KMT's strong will in national assimilation and reconquering the Mainland from the Communist-led People's Republic of China. Since democratization started, Taiwanese nationalism has become popular and an important aspect governing Taiwan's socio-politics. It involves the education of history, geography, and culture from a Taiwan-centric perspective, promoting native languages of the island of Taiwan such as Hakka, indigenous languages, and Taiwanese Hokkien, as well as reforms in other aspects.

Today the values ​​of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law are considered an indispensable part of Taiwan's culture, in contrast to the communist totalitarian regime in China. Taiwanese today believe that Taiwan and China are two separate countries in reality although one of the island's two main political groups accepting One China according to Taiwan's constitution to avoid the tension with China. Despite the fact that most Taiwanese are of Han descent, most Taiwanese today do not consider themselves "Chinese" but "Taiwanese" or have a dual identity. And Taiwanese today oppose joining China. Taiwanese nationalism was described as 'anti-imperialist' in that it opposed Japanese imperialism (or Japanese nationalism) before 1945. Now as China does not recognize the island as a country and seeks to isolate and annex Taiwan, it is used to oppose Chinese imperialism (or Chinese nationalism).[1] Most Taiwanese political groups supporting Taiwanese nationalism strongly adhere to democracy, except a minority like the NSA and ISF.

## History and development

[edit]

Politics of Taiwan

Government

* Constitution of the Republic of China
* Additional Articles of the Constitution

* * *

* Law
* Taxation

Presidency

* President of the Republic of China

Lai Ching-te (DPP)

* Vice President of the Republic of China

Hsiao Bi-khim (DPP)

* * *

* Office of the President
* National Security Council

Executive

Executive Yuan

* Premier

Cho Jung-tai (DPP)

* Vice Premier

Cheng Li-chun (DPP)

Legislature

Legislative Yuan

11th Legislative Yuan

* President of the Legislative Yuan

Han Kuo-yu (KMT)

* Vice President of the Legislative Yuan

Johnny Chiang (KMT)

Judiciary

Judicial Yuan

* President of the Judicial Yuan and Chief Justice

Hsu Tzong-li

* Vice President of the Judicial Yuan

Tsai Jeong-duen

* * *

* Supreme Court
* High Courts
* District Courts

Other branches

Examination Yuan

* President of the Examination Yuan

Huang Jong-tsun

* Vice President of the Examination Yuan

Chou Hung-hsien

* * *

Control Yuan

* President of the Control Yuan

Chen Chu

* Vice President of the Control Yuan

Lee Hung-chun

* * *

Local government

Mayors and Magistrates

Elections

Central Election Commission

* * *

* Presidential elections
* Legislative elections
* Local elections
* Referendums

Political parties

Represented in the Legislative Yuan

Kuomintang
Democratic Progressive Party
Taiwan People's Party

* * *

Others
New Power Party
Taiwan Statebuilding Party
People First Party
Taiwan Solidarity Union
New Party
Non-Partisan Solidarity Union

Green Party Taiwan

Mass media

Television

Newspapers
United Daily News
Liberty Times
China Times
Taipei Times

* * *

Propaganda
Censorship
Film censorship

White Terror

Foreign relations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

* Foreign Minister

Lin Chia-lung

* * *

Cross-Strait relations
Special state-to-state relations
One Country on Each Side
1992 Consensus
Taiwan consensus
Chinese Taipei

* * *

Australia–Taiwan relations
Canada–Taiwan relations
France–Taiwan relations
Russia–Taiwan relations
Taiwan–United Kingdom relations
Taiwan–United States relations

Taiwan and the World Health Organization

Related topics

Political status of Taiwan

Republic of China (1912–1949)
Chinese Civil War
One-China policy
China and the United Nations
Chinese unification
Taiwan independence movement
Taiwanese nationalism
Tangwai movement

Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

Taiwan portal

* Other countries

* v
* t
* e

Part of a series on the

Taiwan independence
movement

Basis

* Anti-imperialism
* De-Sinicization
* Self-determination
* Formosa
* Historical point of view of Taiwan [zh]
* Progressivism
* State normalization [zh]
* Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign
* Taiwan subjectivity [zh]
* Formosan
* Taiwanese nationalism
* Left-wing
* Taiwanization

Branch

* Taiwan independence
* Left-wing
* Republic of China independence
* Independent Taiwan [zh]

Theory

* 1996 consensus [zh]
* Four-Stage Theory
* Four Wants and One Without
* One Country on Each Side
* Republic of China is Taiwan [zh]
* Republic of China on Taiwan
* Second Republic of the Republic of China [zh]
* Special state-to-state relations [zh]
* Taiwan consensus
* Taiwan Value
* Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan
* Two Chinas
* Two Sides, Two Constitutions [zh]

Document

* A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation [zh]
* The Programme of New Generation [zh]
* Resolution on Taiwan's Future
* Taiwan Independence Clause [zh]
* Treaty of San Francisco

History

* Kingdom of Middag
* Kingdom of Tungning
* Republic of Formosa

Incident

* 2008 Taiwanese United Nations membership referendum
* Additional Articles of the Constitution
* Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement
* Article 100 of the Criminal Code [zh]
* Attempted Assassination of Chiang Ching-kuo [zh]
* The Case of Scheming for Taiwan Independence [zh]
* The Case of Taiwan Independence Association [zh]
* The Case of Su Tong-ch'i [zh]
* Chen Wen-chen Incident [zh]
* February 28 Incident
* Fully election and recall of legislators [zh]
* Formosa Incident
* Guanziling Conference [zh]
* The Murder of the Lin Family [zh]
* Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament
* Presidential elections in Taiwan
* 1996
* Qiandao Lake Incident
* The self-immolation of Cheng Nan-jung
* Sunflower Student Movement
* Taiwan Passport Sticker
* Taiyuan Incident
* Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
* Tiananmen Square protests of 1989
* White Terror
* Wild Lily student movement
* Zhongli incident

Policy

* Abrogation of Guidelines for National Unification
* Abolition of National Unification Council
* No haste, Be patient [zh]
* Referendum Act
* Streamlining of Taiwan Province [zh]

Extant parties

Pan-Green

* Democratic Progressive Party
* Green Party Taiwan
* Social Democratic Party
* Taiwan Statebuilding Party
* Taiwan Solidarity Union

* * *

Other

* International Socialist Forward
* New Power Party

Historical parties

Republic of China rule

* Taiwan Action Party Alliance
* Taiwan Constitution Association
* Taiwan Defense Alliance
* Taiwan Independence Party
* Taiwan Nationalist Party
* Taiwan Renewal Party
* Taiwan Revolutionary Party
* Tangwai movement

* * *

Japanese rule

* Taiwanese Communist Party
* Taiwanese People's Party

Alliances

* Pan-Green Coalition
* Formosa Alliance

Organization

* Formosan League for Reemancipation
* Liberty Times
* One Side One Country Alliance [zh]
* Provisional Government [zh]
* Taiwanese Cultural Association
* World United Formosans for Independence

People

* Chai
* Chang
* Chen (Chih-hsiung)
* Chen (Lung-chu) [zh]
* Chen (Nan-tien) [zh]
* Chen (Shui-bian)
* Cheng
* Chiang (Ping-hsing) [zh]
* Chiang (Wei-shui)
* Hsiao
* Huang
* Kin
* Ko [zh]
* Koh
* Koo
* Lai
* Lee (Chen-Yuan)
* Lee (Teng-hui)
* Lee (Ying-yuan)
* Liao (Joshua) [zh]
* Liao (Shih-hau) [zh]
* Liao (Wen-i)
* Lin (Freddy)
* Lin (Fei-fan)
* Lo [zh]
* Lu
* Ng
* Peng
* Su (Beng)
* Su (Tong-ch'i) [zh]
* Tsai
* Tsay

Movement

* 228 Hand-in-Hand rally
* Taiwan Consciousness Debate [zh]

Related topics

* Benshengren
* Chinese imperialism
* Modern History of Taiwanese in 400 Years
* Mutual Defense Treaty
* New Tide faction
* Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity
* Political status of Taiwan
* Proposed flags of Taiwan
* Taiwan independence activists
* Taiwan Relations Act
* Taiwan the Formosa
* Taiwanese indigenous peoples

Taiwan portal

* v
* t
* e

Tangwai (non-KMT) politicians in Taipei, early 1951. The 1971 meeting of WUFI leaders Peng Ming-min and George Chang in New York City. WUFI was one of Taiwanese political groups in exile opposing KMT's dictatorship and supporting Taiwanese independence

No one can confirm when the concept of localism of Han people here has started. Some say when the first wave of Han people emigrated from China (Ming dynasty) from Fujian to Taiwan island in the early 17th century, they must have wanted to maintain some independence from the control of the ruling class in their original hometown. Others say that only when the Kingdom of Tungning, with its capital at Tainan, was built by the Zheng family on part of the island as a temporary base to overthrow the Qing dynasty and restore the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) in 1661, did this concept appear. But surely Austronesian Taiwanese aborigines began living here long before the first Sino-Tibetan persons settled on the island and they even formed the Kingdom of Middag. The Qing dynasty beat the Kingdom of Tungning in 1683 and became the first Chinese government ruling Taiwan in 1684 although it was ruled by ethnic Manchus but not ethnic Han Chinese, main people of China. However, the Chinese themselves were not interested in the island before.[2][3][4] The annexation of Taiwan was primarily for security reasons. The Qing did little to administer the aborigines and rarely tried to subjugate or impose cultural change upon them during most of its rule. During the reigns of the Kangxi (r. 1661–1722), Yongzheng (r. 1722–1735), and Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) emperors, the Qing court deliberately restricted the expansion of territory and government administration in Taiwan.[citation needed]

The Qing dynasty never controlled all of the island. It forbade mainlanders from moving to Taiwan for the majority of its rule and sent most of the Fujianese living in Taiwan back to the mainland after conquering it. Nevertheless, Han Taiwanese people became a majority in Taiwan under the Qing rule, passing the population of the Native Taiwanese. In 1887, the Manchus elevated Taiwan's status to a province, marking a turning point in Taiwan's administrative history. After the Chinese Qing Dynasty was defeated and forced to cede Taiwan to Japan in 1895, the Taiwanese localists who were loyal to the Qing opposed the future Japanese rule and declared independence before the Japanese arrived on the island, but their young nation was quickly crushed by Tokyo in the same year.[citation needed]

Western theories of nationalism were introduced to Taiwan during the Japanese rule. Most Chinese contemporary scholars of mainland China believe the roots of the localist movement began during the Japanese rule (1895 to 1945), when political groups organized to lobby the Imperial Japanese government for greater Taiwanese autonomy and home rule, or even independence such as the Taiwanese Communist Party. In fact, Japanese rule and cultural influence have greatly contributed to making Taiwanese people's identities highly separate from those of the mainland. Nevertheless, Taiwanese identity was still far different from Japanese identity during that period and many supporters of independence for Taiwan view the history of Taiwan since the 17th century as a continuous struggle for independence and use it as an inspiration for the current political movement.[5] According to this view, the people indigenous to Taiwan and those who had taken up residence there have been repeatedly occupied by groups including the Dutch (1624-1668), the Spanish (1626-1642), the Tungning (1661-1683), the Qing (1683-1895), the Japanese (1895-1945) and finally the Kuomintang's dictatorial regime (1945-1991). From a pro-independence supporter's point of view, the movement for Taiwan independence began under Qing rule in the 1680s which led to a well known saying those days, "Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion".[citation needed]

From 1928 to 1942, the Chinese Communist Party maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.[6] Mao Zedong was an early supporter of Taiwanese independence, telling Edgar Snow in the 1930s that his Chinese Communist Party would lend "our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence." He changed this position only after the Kuomintang's government started claiming Taiwan with the Cairo Declaration.[7] After Japan lost World War II, the KMT's dictatorial government took over Taiwan; nevertheless the KMT's harsh conduct and the corrupt KMT administration quickly led to Taiwanese discontent during the immediate postwar period. The Taiwan home-rule groups were decimated in the wake of the February 28 Incident of 1947, an event of repression against the locals that caused division between Taiwanese and mainlanders and promoted Taiwanese nationalism. After the Republic of China (ROC) was overthrown by the Chinese Communist Party on the Mainland and forced to flee to Taiwan Area, there were opinions in the ROC supporting Two Chinas legal status or even formal Taiwanese independence, especially after Taiwan (ROC) was expelled from the United Nations in 1971. Nevertheless; the KMT considered the ROC to be the only representative of China, viewed Taiwan primarily as a base to retake mainland China from the Communists, and maintained a dictatorial regime on the island. They suppressed all opinions supporting the division of China or Taiwan independence, as well as the island's democratic movement. Supporters of Taiwan independence could only operate openly abroad.[citation needed]

In January 1951, Tangwai (independent) Taiwanese-born politician Wu San-lien won in Taipei City's first mayoral election (65.5%). However, the KMT still dominated Taiwan's political and social life, while independent politicians did not have much power and political groups outside the KMT and its satellite parties were not allowed to exist due to martial law. The Kuomintang ruling a Chinese nationalist dictatorship did nothing to promote a unique Taiwanese identity but even oppressed it except an ironic fact that the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan made this place have its own sovereign country in reality for the first time in history, because 99% territory of the Republic of China after the Kuomintang lost the mainland has been the island of Taiwan. Often newly immigrated Chinese or "mainlanders" as they were called, working in administrative positions, lived in neighborhoods where they were segregated from the Taiwanese. Others, especially poorer refugees, were shunned by the Hoklo Taiwanese and lived among aborigines instead. The mainlanders often learned Hokkien. However, since Mandarin was enforced as the official language of the Republic of China and Taiwanese was not allowed to be spoken in schools, the mainlanders who learned Taiwanese found their new language skills to diminish. As Taiwanese, or any language other than Mandarin, was forbidden in the military posts, many mainlanders whose family lived in martial villages only spoke Mandarin and perhaps their home language (e.g. Cantonese, Shanghainese, etc.). The promotion of Chinese nationalism within Taiwan and the fact that the ruling group on Taiwan were considered outsiders by some were the reasons cited for both the Taiwan independence movement and localism.[citation needed]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the KMT began a period of education reform, including a lift on Hokkien restrictions in schools and the restoration of previously suppressed private schooling. However, these private schools were staffed by regime loyalists and reliant upon government funding for support, meaning that they often provided the same program of political and cultural indoctrination as public schools. Furthermore, while speaking Hokkien in schools or military bases was no longer illegal, few opportunities were available for its use, as Mandarin continued to be the state-approved lingua franca.[8]

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a shift in power away from the KMT to people native to Taiwan. This, combined with cultural liberalization and the increasing remoteness of the possibility of retaking mainland China, led to a cultural and political movement which emphasized a Taiwan-centered view of history and culture rather than one which was China-centered or even, as before 1946, Japan-centered. Localism was strongly supported by President Lee Teng-hui.[citation needed]

The Bentuhua movement was sparked in the mid-1970s with the growing expression of ethnic discontent due to unequal distribution of political and cultural power between mainlanders and Taiwanese people. Beginning in the 1960s, Taiwan was enveloped by the problems of rapid industrial development, rural abandonment, labor disputes and the uneven distribution of access to wealth and social power. These changes, combined with the loss of several key allies, forced the KMT regime to institute limited reforms. The reforms permitted under Chiang Ching-kuo allowed indigenization to increase as leading dissidents generated a response to the government's failures. Rubenstein (2007) credits Chiang for beginning Taiwanization as Premier. His ideology itself was influenced by local Taiwanese identity despite his Mainland origin and being a KMT member.[9] The dissident groups, united under the Tangwai, or “outside the party” banner, called for the government to accept the reality that it was only the government of Taiwan and not China. The key demands of the Tangwai involved instituting democracy and seeking international recognition as a sovereign state. Taiwanese demanded full civil rights as guaranteed under the ROC constitution and equal political rights as those experienced by the Mainlander elite.[citation needed]

The Taiwanese cultural elite fully promoted the development of Xiang tu literature and cultural activities, including rediscovering Taiwanese nativist literature written under Japanese colonial rule. The Tangwai movement revived symbols of Taiwanese resistance to Japanese rule in the effort to mobilize ethnic Taiwanese. The opposition to the KMT's China-centered cultural policies resulted in dissidents crafting new national-historical narratives that placed the island of Taiwan itself at the center of the island's history. The Taiwanese emerged as a frequently colonized and often oppressed people. The concept of bentuhua was finally expressed in the cultural domain in the premise of Taiwan as a place with a unique society, culture and history. This principle has been largely adopted for understanding Taiwan's cultural representation and expressed in a variety of cultural activities, including music, film and the literary and performing arts. In 1986, members of the Tangwai movement formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in the same year members of the party ran for an election to the legislative councils but as independent candidates due to martial law banning the DPP, this was the first time in history that supporters of Taiwanese nationalism were able to be openly politically active in the Republic of China.[citation needed]

The pressures of indigenization and the growing acceptance of a unique Taiwanese cultural identity have met opposition from more conservative elements of Taiwan society. Critics argue that the new perspective creates a “false” identity rooted in ethnic nationalism as opposed to an “authentic” Chinese identity, which is primordial and inherent. Many mainlanders living on Taiwan complain that their own culture is marginalized by bentuhua, and initially expressed fear of facing growing alienation. In the past decade these complaints have subsided somewhat as Taiwan increasingly views itself as a pluralistic society that embraces many cultures and recognizes the rights of all citizens.[citation needed]

In the mid-to-late 1990s, gestures toward localism were increasingly adopted by pan-blue figures who, while supporting the Chinese nationalism of Chiang Kai-shek, saw it as appropriate, or at least advisable, to display more appreciation for cultures of Taiwan. Pan-blue politicians such as James Soong, the former head of the Government Information Office who once oversaw the limitation of Taiwanese dialects, began speaking in Hoklo on semi-formal occasions.[citation needed]

With the end of martial law in 1987 and especially the introduction of democracy in 1991 after the Wild Lily student movement, an effort began to re-assert Taiwanese political and cultural identity separate from Chinese people while trying to get rid of many Chinese influences imposed by the Kuomintang before. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwanese being the ROC president. With the beginning of the democratization of Taiwan in 1991, the Republic of China de facto accepted the jurisdiction it had. In 1992, the Republic of China promulgated the Cross-Strait Act, the main purpose of the act is to protect the security and welfare of the people of Taiwan.[10] In 1996, Taiwan completed became a democratic country when it had its first direct leadership election, a significant event for Taiwan's political and social identity. In 1999, despite being a member of the KMT party, the Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui actually supported Taiwan independence and proposed that the relationship between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China was a special relationship between the two sovereign Chinese countries. In 2000, for the first time in the history of the Republic of China, a Taiwanese nationalist political group (DPP) took power. In 2002, the president Chen Shui-bian, as he was a member of the DPP, even went further than Lee by proposing that Taiwan (Republic of China) and China (People's Republic of China) were two separate countries, this view is now widely accepted in Taiwanese society. In 2016, for the first time of ROC history, Taiwanese nationalists (DPP) held both power and a majority in parliament.[11][12]

For the ROC rule in Taiwan now, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and 1951 Treaty of San Francisco are often cited by radical[citation needed] Taiwanese nationalists as the main bases for Taiwan independence in international law,[13][14][15] The premise of citing these two treaties is that: a) Japan gained sovereignty over Taiwan in 1895, b) Japan de jure lost sovereignty over Taiwan in 1952, and c) Japan never indicated the "successor state" on Taiwan thereafter. Therefore, according to certain activists, this means that Taiwan is only controlled by the Republic of China on behalf of the WWII Allies, and does not constitute a part of the ROC's sovereign territory. Moderate Taiwanese nationalists (including the DPP) accept the view that Taiwan de facto became part of the Republic of China with the 1945 Japanese Instrument of Surrender, but since 1949 the Republic of China has been Taiwan.[citation needed]

## Taiwanization

[edit]

Efforts have been made by Taiwan (Republic of China) beginning in 1991 to distance itself from China (People's Republic of China) led by the Communists, and rollback earlier sinicisation efforts of the KMT's dictatorial government by taking actions such as removing Chinese influence from items within Taiwan control. This sometimes led to incongruities such as Sun Yat-sen being treated as both a "foreign" (Chinese) historical figure and as the "Father of the Country" (Republic of China). The common socio-political experience in Taiwan gradually developed into a sense of Taiwanese cultural identity and a feeling of Taiwanese cultural awareness, which has been widely debated domestically.[16][17][18] While the local nationalists may view such efforts as emphasising the importance of Taiwan's national culture and identity as a necessity, this made the perspective of those in Taiwan who support the Chinese nationalism uncomfortable. Taiwanese nationalists also reject or do not actively pursue ROC's current claim over territories outside the island of Taiwan, such as dropping its claim that it is the sole representative of China, but doing that easily creates an excuse for China to invade Taiwan. In 2001, proponents of Taiwanization began characterizing de-Sinicization 2001 as a part of the movement to emphasize a local Taiwan-based identity in opposition to the political leadership that had historically identified with China and Chinese culture.[19]

### Origin

[edit]

Wild Lily Movement in Taipei, 18/3/1990.

At the end of World War II on 2 September 1945, Chinese Kuomintang forces took over Taiwan and soon began an effort to sinicise the population. Taiwanese urban elites were wiped out in the February 28 Incident. Mandarin Chinese became the only language allowed in media and school to the exclusion of other languages of Taiwan, as well as Japanese. Public institutions and corporations were given names that included the words "China" or "Chinese". School history and geography lessons focused on China with little attention paid to Taiwan. Street names in Taipei were changed from their original names to Chinese names that reflected the geography of China and Kuomintang ideals.[20][21]

### Education and language campaign

[edit]

In 2000, then-ROC president Lee Teng-hui began making statements such as "Taiwan culture is not a branch of Chinese culture" and "Taiwan's Minnan dialect is not a branch of Fujian's Min-nan, dialect but rather a 'Taiwan dialect'[22] Taiwan radio and TV increased their Taiwanese Hokkien programming.[22] These efforts were perceived in China as initial efforts towards breaking the ties between Taiwan culture and Chinese culture by downplaying the long-term Chinese cultural and historic identification in that region.[22]

De-Sinicization accelerated under the Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008), with the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party in control of the Executive Yuan. Chen's Minister of Education, Tu Cheng-sheng, directed the rewriting of high school history textbooks to abolish the "remnants of greater Chinese consciousness" (大中國意識的沈痾). This textbook's de-Sinicization included the separation of Taiwanese history and Chinese history into separate volumes, a ban on the term mainland China, and the portrayal of Chinese immigration to Taiwan during the Qing dynasty as "colonization".[citation needed]

In 2002, Tu's department chose to invent its own romanization system for Mandarin Chinese, Tongyong Pinyin, designed by a Taiwanese scholar rather than adopting the internationally well-known Hanyu Pinyin system developed by the People's Republic of China and used in other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. In 2003, the government abolished the longstanding policy of using Mandarin as the sole language of government, which in practice promoted the second-largest language on the island, Taiwanese Hokkien, to fulfill many of the functions of a national language.[citation needed]

In April 2003, the National Languages Committee, which was part of Taiwan's Ministry of Education, released a legislation proposal entitled "Language Equality Law."[23] The proposed legislation sought to designate fourteen languages as the national languages of Taiwan.[23] In mainland China, this was seen as an effort to diminish the use of standard Mandarin and its cultural influences in favor of revising the cultural and psychological foundations on the island of Taiwan by using other languages.[23] The draft was not adopted.[23]

The textbook issue was raised in November 2004, when a group of lawmakers, legislative candidates and supporters of the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) urged the Ministry of Education to publish Taiwan-centric history and geography textbooks for school children as part of the localist campaign.[24] Although the resulting draft outline of history course for regular senior middle schools was criticized by a variety of groups,[25] President Chen Shui-bian responded that "to seek the truth of Taiwan's history" is not equal to desinicization nor an act of independence and indicated that he would not interfere with the history editing and compilation efforts.[26][27]

In 2006, the National Languages Committee (Taiwanese Ministry of Education) proposed its Romanization System (Tâi-ôan Lô-má-jī pheng-im, Tâi-Lô) for Taiwanese language. This alphabet reconciles two orthographies, TLPA and POJ.[28]

The proposals to revise Taiwan's history textbooks were condemned in February 2007 by the People's Republic of China's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council as being part of the desinicization campaign.[29] In July 2007, the Taiwan Ministry of Education released a study that found 5,000 textbook terms, some relating to Chinese culture, as being "unsuitable".[30] The Kuomintang saw this as part of a textbook censorship desinicization campaign.[31]

In 2019, three indigenous languages on the island of Taiwan, Hakka, indigenous languages, and Taiwanese Hokkien, ​​met the criteria to become national languages ​​under a law of the island nation.[32]

### Name change campaign

[edit]

Republic of China (Taiwan) passport. Taiwan Post Co. post office in Taichung.

In academia, de-Sinicization in the late 1980s and 1990s resulted in the replacement of the word "China" in the names of institutions to "Taiwan", creating the "Taiwan Legal Association", "Taiwan Political Science Association", "Taiwan Sociological Association", and "Taiwan History Association". As part of this movement, some Taiwanese historians downplayed the abuses of Japan's colonial administration, referring to it as "rule" rather than "occupation"; and the Taiwan History Association claimed that Taiwan's history at the time was a part of Japanese, rather than Chinese, history.[citation needed]

Between 2002 and 2007, the ROC government under Chen Shui-bian took steps to revise the terms "China", "Republic of China", "Taipei", and others that impart an association with the Chinese culture.[33][34][35][36] On 22 July 2020, the Legislative Yuan passed two resolutions put forth by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that ask the executive branch of government to highlight "Taiwan" on passports and China Airlines' (CAL) aircraft. The resolutions require the Executive Yuan to work out measures to emphasize the word for "Taiwan" written in Chinese (臺灣) and in English on the passport cover.[37][38]

In 2002, the "Name Rectification Campaign" made significant advances in replacing the terms "China", "Republic of China", or "Taipei" with the term "Taiwan" on official documents, in the names of Taiwan-registered organizations, companies, and public enterprises on the island, and in the names of businesses stationed abroad.[33] In 2003, the ROC Foreign Ministry issued a new passport with the word "Taiwan" printed in English on its cover.[39] Moreover, in January 2005, Taiwan adopted a Westernized writing format for government documents, denied that it was an attempt at desinicization, and promoted the actions as "a concerted effort at globalizing Taiwan's ossified bureaucracies and upgrading the nation's competitive edge."[40]

From 2005, Chen's Executive Yuan also initiated the Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign, which sought to remove the words "China" or "Chinese" from public and private organizations. This included the renaming of state bodies such as the "Overseas Chinese Affairs Council" (which became the "Overseas Community Affairs Council"), persuading private organizations like China Airlines to change their name, and also the purging of references to mainland China in nearly 100 administrative laws.[citation needed]

Campaigning in this area continued in March 2006, where the Democratic Progressive Party sought to change the Republic of China year designation used in Taiwan to the Gregorian calendar.[41] Instead of the year 2006 being referred to as the "95th year of the ROC"—with the 1912 founding of the Republic of China being referred to as "the first year of the ROC"—the year 2006 would be identified as 2006 in official usage such as on banknotes, IDs, national health insurance cards, driver's licenses, diplomas and wedding certificates.[41] This was viewed as the government trying another angle for desinicization by removing any trace of China from Taiwan.[41]

In February 2007, the term "China" was replaced by the term "Taiwan" on Taiwan postage stamps to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the February 28 Incident that began on 28 February 1947 that was violently suppressed by the Kuomintang (KMT).[42] In that same month, the name of the official postal service of Taiwan was changed from the Chunghwa Post Co. to The Taiwan Post Co.[43] The company's name was changed back on 1 August 2008, and the names on the postal stamps were reversed in late 2008, soon after the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-Jeou won back presidency and ended 8 years of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule.[citation needed]

In March 2007, the name plate of the ROC Embassy in Panama was revised both to include the word "Taiwan" in parentheses between the words "the Republic of China" and "Embassy" in both of its Chinese and Spanish titles, and to omit the ROC national emblem.[44]

Supporters[specify] of the name-change movement argue that the Republic of China no longer exists, as it did not include Taiwan when it was founded in 1912 and mainland China is now controlled by the Chinese Communist Party as the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding the legal status of Taiwan as a result of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and Treaty of San Francisco after World War II, means that the Republic of China was merely a military occupier of Taiwan. As Japan relinquished its sovereignty over Taiwan without passing it to a specific country, it is argued that Taiwan ought to be deemed a land belonging to no country, whose international status has yet to be defined.[citation needed]

### Constitutional and political campaign

[edit]

From the perspective of the ROC constitution, which the mainstream political parties such as the KMT and DPP currently respect and recognize, changing the ROC's governing status or completely clarifying Taiwan's political status would at best require amending the ROC constitution. Passing an amendment requires approval from three-quarters of a quorum of members of the Legislative Yuan. This quorum requires at least three-quarters of all members of the Legislature. After passing the legislature, the amendments need ratification from at least fifty percent of all eligible voters of the ROC, irrespective of voter turnout. Nevertheless, despite ROC territorial claim according to its constitution, Taiwan established informal diplomatic relations with Mongolia in 2002 and the map of the "Republic of China" no longer includes mainland China from 2004.[citation needed]

In October 2003, President Chen Shui-bian announced that Taiwan would seek a new constitution suitable for the Taiwan people that would turn Taiwan into a "normal country."[45] In explaining what a normal country was in the context of desinicization and the 1992 One-China policy, Chen Shui-bian stated,

> Taiwan is an independent sovereign country, but a lot of people do not think of Taiwan as a country and do not dare to call Taiwan an independent sovereign nation, which is quite abnormal. ... Taiwan must not fall into the trap of being regarded as part of China, or become a special region of China like Hong Kong.[45][additional citation(s) needed]

In response, the Pan-Blue Coalition led by the Kuomintang within Taiwan sought to portray President Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party as radicals intent on implementing revolutionary desinicization that would disenfranchise various ethnic groups within Taiwan who have an affinity for China and the Chinese culture.[46]

On 27 February 2006, the Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian abolished the Guidelines for National Unification and National Unification Council, which were formed to serve the future unification of China. Chen said that his decision did not change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, but instead returned sovereignty to the people of Taiwan.[47]

In February 2007, the Democratic Progressive Party adopted a resolution to identify those responsible for the 1947 February 28 Incident massacre of Taiwanese people in order to charge them with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The effort also sought to remove the "remnants of dictatorship" traced to that sixty-year-old incident.[48] This was seen in mainland China as being in line with a series of desinicization actions by both the Taiwan government and the DPP to rid both Chiang and China from the Taiwan public scene.[48] Some applauded this as a courageous act of seeking justice. Others criticized the request, seeing it as "rubbing salt into wounds" by playing up the historical issues for political gain.[48]

On 2 May 2024, the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan banned Taiwanese citizens from working at Confucius Institutes, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the All-China Youth Federation, and the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots of China due to national security concerns.[49]

### Other campaign

[edit]

After the democratization, the elected KMT government supported many of the bills that had been promoted by Austronesian indigenous groups. The tenth amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of China also stipulates that the government would protect and preserve indigenous culture and languages and also encourage them to participate in politics. On 31 October 2001, the Indigenous Peoples Employment Rights Protection Act was promulgated in Taiwan to create Indigenous Areas. In order to implement the provisions of the act, the Council of Indigenous Peoples designated 30 mountain indigenous townships and districts and 25 townships and cities as indigenous areas.[50] Now in Taiwan there are 16 nationally recognized aboriginal groups[51] and 3 locally recognized aboriginal groups.[citation needed]

Textbooks published by Taiwan's Ministry of Education stopped describing Nanjing as the capital in 2002.[52]

In March 2007, it was noted that the destruction of the Western Line railway base found below the floor of the Taipei Main Station and built in 1893 by Qing Empire-appointed Governor of Taiwan Province Liu Mingchuan was part of the government's call for desinicization through removal of the Chinese site.[53]

In July 2007, President Chen Shui-bian announced that he would allow mainland Chinese diplomas or students into Taiwan during the rest of his presidential term.[54]

In recent years, the concept of Taiwanese multiculturalism has been proposed as a relatively apolitical alternative view, which has allowed for the inclusion of mainlanders (Chinese) and other minority groups into the continuing re-definition of Taiwanese culture as collectively held systems of meaning and customary patterns of thought and behavior shared by the people of Taiwan.[55][56]

On 2 September 2024, Taiwan's president Lai Ching-te stated that China’s motivation for annexing Taiwan is not about territorial integrity but rather about altering the “rules-based world order” to achieve hegemony in the international arena or the Western Pacific, suggesting that if it were, China should focus on reclaiming land ceded to the Russian Empire with the 1858 Treaty of Aigun in the Qing dynasty. Lai pointed out that if China only wanted to take Taiwan, there would be no need to expand its military presence in the East and South China Seas or to conduct joint military exercises with Russia.[57]

### Impact

[edit]

Further information: Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity

One phenomenon that has resulted from the localist movement is the advent of Taike subculture, in which young people consciously adopt the wardrobe, language and cuisine to emphasize the uniqueness of popular, grassroots Taiwanese culture, which in previous times had often been seen as provincial and backwards by the mainstream.[citation needed]

In April 2002, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) noted both active efforts on the part of Taiwan to push ahead its localist policy and intensify United States-Taiwan military cooperation. In response, the CCP publicly reminded its military to be prepared to achieve its goal of "Chinese reunification" (intended to mean making Taiwan a part of the People's Republic of China) through military means. In addition, the CCP sought assistance from the United States (US) to address the matter with Taiwan. As part of making the upcoming U.S. visit by then vice-president Hu Jintao go smoothly, the United States cautioned the Chen Shui-bian administration not to "go too far" in cross-Strait relations.[58]

In April 2005, the CCP general secretary Hu Jintao and the former ROC Vice President and then chairman of the Kuomintang party (KMT) Lien Chan shook hands. Billed as a historic moment, this was the first handshake by the top leaders of the KMT and the CCP in 60 years.[59] In remarking on the handshake, chairman Lien noted that it was a turning point where the KMT and the CCP would work together to bring about peaceful cross-strait relations and specifically distanced the KMT from Taiwan independence and desinicization efforts.[60]

## Support and opposition

[edit]

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|

KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited Mainland China in 2005 to oppose the Taiwan independence movement.

Significant outcries surfaced both within Taiwan and abroad opposing the concept of Taiwan localization in the early years after President Chiang Ching-kuo's death, denouncing it as the "independent Taiwan movement" (Chinese: 台獨運動). Vocal opponents are primarily the 1949-generation Mainlanders, or older generations of Mainlanders living in Taiwan that had spent their formative years and adulthood on the pre-1949 mainland Republic of China, and native Taiwanese who identify with a pan-Han Chinese cultural identity. They included people ranging from academics like Chien Mu, reputed to be the last prominent Chinese intellectual opposing the conventional wisdom take on the May Fourth Movement, politicians like Lien Chan, from a family with a long history of active pan-Chinese patriotism despite being native Taiwanese, to gang mobsters like Chang An-lo, a leader of the notorious United Bamboo Gang.[citation needed]

The opposing voices were subsequently confined to the fringe in the mid-2000s Taiwan itself. Issues persist, particularly supporters of the KMT-led Pan-Blue Coalition, which advocates Chinese nationalism and retaining a strong link to mainland China, dispute over such issues as what histories to teach. Nonetheless, both of the two major political forces in Taiwan reached a consensus, and the movement has overwhelming support among the population. This is in part due to the 1949-generation Mainlanders have gradually passed on from the scene, and politicians supporting and opposing the Taiwanese independence movement both realize a majority of Taiwan's current residents, either because they are born in Taiwan to Mainlander parents with no collective memories of their ancestral homes, or they are native Taiwanese, thus feeling no historical connotations with the entire pre-1949 Republic of China on mainland China, support the movement as such.[citation needed]

In Mainland China, the People's Republic of China (PRC) government has on the surface adopted a neutral policy on localism and its highest-level leaders publicly proclaim it does not consider the localist movement to be either a violation of its One China Policy or equivalent to the independence movement. Nonetheless, the state-owned media and academics employed by organizations such as universities' Institutes of Taiwan Studies or the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) periodically release study results, academic journal articles, or editorials strongly criticizing the movement as "the cultural arm of Taiwanese independence movement" (Chinese: 文化台獨) with the government's tacit approval, showing the PRC government's opposition towards localism.[citation needed]

Nowadays, another source of significant opposition to the localist movement remains in the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the Western world, who identify more with the historic pre-1949 mainland Republic of China or pre-localist movement ROC on Taiwan that oriented itself as the rump legitimate government of China. A great many are themselves refugees and dissidents who fled mainland China, either directly or through Hong Kong (China) or Taiwan, during the founding of the People's Republic of China and the subsequent periods of destructive policies (such as the Land Reform, the Anti-Rightist Movement, Great Leap Forward, or the Cultural Revolution), Hong Kong anti-Communist immigrants who fled Hong Kong in light of the British Handover to the PRC on 1 July 1997, or Mainlanders living in Taiwan who moved to the West in response to the localist movement. Conversely, the current population of Taiwan regard these overseas Chinese as foreigners akin to Singaporean Chinese, as opposed to the pre-localist era when they were labeled as fellow Chinese compatriots. The PRC has capitalized on this window of opportunity in making overtures to the traditionally anti-Communist overseas Chinese communities, including gestures in supporting traditional Chinese culture and dropping explicitly Communist tones in overseas communications. This results in a decline of active political opposition to the PRC from overseas Chinese when compared with the times before the localist movement in Taiwan.[citation needed]

In Hong Kong, Taiwanese localist movements have pushed localization or pro-Chinese Communist tilts among the traditionally pro-Republic of China individuals and organizations. A prominent example is Chu Hai College, whose academic degree programs were recognized officially by the Hong Kong SAR government in May 2004, and registered as an "Approved Post-secondary College" with the Hong Kong SAR government since July of the same year. It has since been renamed the Chu Hai College of Higher Education (珠海學院) and no longer registered with the Republic of China's Ministry of Education. New students from 2004 have been awarded degrees in the right of Hong Kong rather than Taiwan.[citation needed]

## Role in domestic politics

[edit]

Main article: Tangwai movement

> Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China.

—Lai Ching-te, Taiwan's vice president, 15 August 2023[61]

Even though it is a broad consensus currently regarding the overall ideology of localism, there are still deep disputes over practical policies between the three main political groups of Taiwan independence, Chinese unification, and supporters of Chinese culture. Pro-independence supporters argue that Taiwan is and should be enhancing an identity which is separate from the Chinese one, and in more extreme cases advocates the removal of Chinese "imprints". Meanwhile, some would argue that Taiwan should create a distinctive identity that either includes certain Chinese aspect or exists within a broader Chinese one. Those who support Chinese unification call for a policy of enhancing the Chinese identity. Groups that support Chinese unification and Chinese nationalism have emphasized the distinction between localism and what some perceive as desinicization and argued that they do not oppose the promotion of a Taiwanese identity, but rather oppose the use of that identity to separate itself from a broader Chinese one. On the other hand, a few apolitical groups have claimed that most of the political factions merely use these points to win support for elections[citation needed]. Like Taiwanese nationalist political groups like the DDP, most political groups supporting Chinese nationalism in Taiwan like the KMT also want to exploit Taiwanese identity and culture to win popular support while promoting democratic values ​​and opposing joining the People's Republic of China.[62][63] Taiwanese people support the status quo or formal independence for Taiwan rather than being unified and annexed by the People's Republic of China.[64][65][66]

## See also

[edit]

* China portal
* Taiwan portal

* Hong Kong nationalism
* Taiwanese people
* History of Taiwan
* February 28 incident
* Qiandao Lake incident
* Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
* Huadu (Taiwan)
* Liberal ethnic nationalism
* Pan-Green Coalition
* Tangwai movement
* Formosa Alliance
* Taiwan independence movement
* Taiwanese literature movement
* Sinocentrism
* Sinicization
* De-Sinicization
* Warriors of the Rainbow: Seediq Bale

## References

[edit]

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2\. Tzeng, Shih-jung, 2009. From Honto Jin to Bensheng Ren- the Origin and Development of the Taiwanese National Consciousness, University Press of America. ISBN 0-7618-4471-6

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* Tibet
* Slavicisation
* Slovakisation
* Sovietisation
* Swahilisation
* Swedification
* Talibanisation
* Taiwanisation
* Tamilisation
* Thaification
* Turkification
* placenames
* Turkmenisation
* Ukrainisation
* Uzbekisation
* Vietnamisation
* Westernisation
* Wolofisation
* Zairianisation

| Assimilation by religions|

* Christianisation
* Judaisation
* Islamisation

|

Assimilation by writings|

* Cyrillisation
* Romanisation of the writings
* Soviet Union

Opposite trends|

* De-arabisation
* De-communisation
* De-stalinisation
* De-nazification
* De-russification
* Korenizatsiia
* Latinisation
* Ukraine
* De-sinicisation
* Vergangenheitsbewältigung

Related concepts|

* Cultural globalisation
* Cultural imperialism
* Dominant culture
* Forced assimilation
* Forced religious conversion
* Globalisation
* Identity politics
* Internal colonialism
* Jewish assimilation
* Language shift
* Melting pot
* Monoculturalism

* v
* t
* e

Ethnic nationalism

Nationalisms
in|

| Africa|

| North Africa|

* Arab
* Berber
* Coptic
* Egyptian
* Pharaonism
* Kabyle
* Sahrawi

|

East Africa|

* Acholi
* Amhara
* Hutu
* Somali
* Tigrayan

Nigeria|

* Igbo
* Ogoni

Southern Africa|

* Afrikaner

Americas|

| North America|

* Chicano
* Greenlandic
* Indigenous Canadian
* Lakota
* Native American
* Québécois

|

Caribbean|

* Haitian
* Puerto Rican

South America|

* Argentine
* Criollo
* Mapuche
* Peruvian

Asia|

| Middle East|

* Arab
* Assyrian
* Iranian
* Iraqi
* Jewish
* Diaspora
* Zionism
* Jordanian
* Kurdish
* Lebanese
* Palestinian
* Syrian
* Turkish
* in Cyprus
* Zaza

|

Eastern Asia|

* Cantonese
* Chinese
* Han
* chauvinist
* Hongkonger
* Japanese
* Korean
* Manchu
* Okinawan
* Ryukyu
* Taiwanese
* Tibetan

Southern Asia|

* Assamese
* Bengali
* in Bangladesh
* Bodo
* Dravidian
* Hazara
* Meitei
* Naga
* Punjabi
* Sindhi
* Sinhalese
* Tamil
* in Sri Lanka
* Tripuri

South-eastern Asia|

* Filipino
* Khmer
* Malay
* Mon
* Shan
* Thai
* Vietnamese

Northern & Middle Asia|

* Baloch
* Mongolian
* South Mongolia
* Pan-Turkism
* Pashtun
* Siberian
* Uyghur

South Caucasus|

* Armenian
* Azerbaijani
* Georgian
* Laz

Europe|

| Southeastern Europe|

* Albanian
* in Albania
* in Kosovo
* in North Macedonia
* Aromanian
* Bosniak
* Croatian
* Greek
* in Cyprus
* Macedonian
* Moldovan
* Montenegrin
* Romani (Gypsy)
* Romanian
* Serbian

|

Central Europe|

* Austrian
* Bavarian
* Czech
* Frisian
* German
* in Austria
* Völkisch
* Hungarian
* Polish
* Silesian
* Slovak
* Slovenian

Eastern Europe|

* Belarusian
* Russian
* Ukrainian
* Yiddish

North Caucasus|

* Balkar and Karachay
* Circassian
* Ingush
* Lezgin
* Ossetian

Volga Region|

* Chuvash
* Tatar

Western Europe|

* Arpitan
* Breton
* Flemish
* French
* Irish
* Occitan
* Walloon

United Kingdom|

* British
* Cornish
* English
* Scottish
* Ulster
* Welsh

Southern Europe|

* Basque
* Corsican

Italy|

* Italian
* Lombard
* Padanian
* Sardinian
* Sicilian
* Venetian

Spain|

* Spanish
* Andalusian
* Aragonese
* Asturian
* Basque
* Canarian
* Castilian
* Catalan
* Galician
* Navarrese
* Valencian

Northern Europe|

* Estonian
* Faroese
* Finnish
* Icelandic
* Lithuanian
* Norwegian

Oceania|

* Australian
* Hawaiian
* Indigenous Australian
* Māori

Pan-nationalism|

* African
* Arab
* Asian
* Bangladeshi
* Celtic
* Chinese
* Congolese
* European
* Finnic
* Germanic
* Hispanic
* Iberian
* Indian
* Iranian
* Iraqi
* Korean
* Latin
* Libyan
* Mongolian
* Native American
* Nigerian
* Nordic
* Oceanian
* Pakistani
* Russian
* Scandinavian
* Slavic
* South Slavic
* Tunisian
* Turanian
* Turkic
* Ugandan

Movements|

* Alsace independence movement
* Assam separatist movements
* Assyrian independence movement
* Catalan independence movement
* Champa independence movement
* East Turkestan independence movement
* Faroese independence movement
* Flemish Movement
* Free Aceh Movement
* Free Papua Movement
* Future of Åland
* Galician independence movement (Spain)
* Greenlandic independence
* Guangdong Independence Movement
* Hawaiian sovereignty movement
* Inner Mongolian independence movement
* Kashubian Association
* Māori protest movement
* Mapuche separatist movement
* Muslim Independence Movement (Philippines)
* National Liberation Front of Corsica
* Patani United Liberation Organisation
* Ryukyu independence movement
* Scottish independence
* Siberian regionalism
* Silesian Autonomy Movement
* Székely autonomy movement
* Taiwan independence movement
* Tibetan independence movement
* Vojvodina Autonomist Movement
* Wallmapuwen
* Walloon Movement
* Welsh independence

Projects|

* Arakan
* Assyria
* Azawad
* Balawaristan
* Balochistan
* Bangsamoro
* Basque Country (greater region)
* Catalan Countries
* Chameria
* Champa
* Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
* Circassia
* Crimea
* Hatay State
* Hazarajat
* Danzig
* Donetsk
* East Turkestan
* Herzeg-Bosnia
* Hutu Power
* Ilirida
* Karakalpakstan
* Karelia
* Katarism
* Ketuanan Melayu
* Kurdistan
* Lezgistan
* Luhansk
* Manchukuo
* Marathi Abhimaangeet
* Northern Epirus
* Occitania
* Ossetia
* Pashtunistan
* Republika Srpska
* Santa Cruz
* Sápmi
* Saraikistan
* Silesia
* Sindhudesh
* Székely Land
* Tamil Eelam
* Tibet

Other|

* Local (China)
* Racial
* American Indigenous
* Black
* German
* Indigenous
* White

* Note: Forms of nationalism based primarily on ethnic groups are listed above. This does not imply that all nationalists with a given ethnicity subscribe to that form of ethnic nationalism.

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