Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia

This article is about the conflict between Polish and Ukrainian partisans. For the Massacres of the Polish population, see Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.

Not to be confused with Polish-Ukrainian ethnic conflict.

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Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia

Part of World War 2 and Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
| Date| 1943-1944

|

Location|

Volhynia

Result|  See Summary
Belligerents

Polish self-defence in Volhynia
Home Army
Soviet Union (partisans)

* * *

Hungary
Schutzmannschaft Battalion 202|  Ukrainian Insurgent Army
OUN-M
Polissian Sich
Commanders and leaders
Władysław Kochański
Władysław Czermiński
Jan Rerutko
Henryk Cybulski
Jan Wojciech Kiwerski
Tadeusz Sztumberk-Rychter
Tadeusz Klimowski|  Dmytro Klyachkivsky
Ivan Lytvynchuk
Nikolai Svistun
Ivan Klimishin
Petro Olijnyk
Ivan Mitringa  †
Strength

1943:
1,500
1944
6,000-7,000

* * *

Polish Auxiliary Police
2,000-2,500[1]|  15,000
Casualties and losses
60,000 Civilians[2]|  2,000-3,000 Civilians[2]

The Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia was a series of confrontations that unfolded in Volhynia during World War II. Primarily marked by hostilities between the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Polish population which was supported by the Home Army and Soviet partisan units in the Region.

## Background[edit]

At the beginning of the Second World War, organizational structures of the Polish resistance were formed in the western Ukrainian lands. Its main goal was to restore the independent Polish state in its pre-war borders. However, on the eve of the Eastern Front , the activities of the Polish military underground were practically paralyzed as a result of the opposition of the NKVD bodies. The Galician network was the most numerous Polish military organization, the Union of Armed Struggle was suppressed and its main functionaries were arrested. The Polish organized underground was re-established after the German occupation of Western Ukraine, but its armed formations, as a real force, emerged only in the first half of 1943. The organization and activities of the Polish underground with their armed formations was one of the reasons for the creation of the UPA. For their part, the leadership of the OUN(b) did not want Polish underground organizations to implement their plans on their land, and after the war they would take over the region again. The UPA was to serve as a counterbalance to the AK - to prevent the Poles from dominating the forests of Volhynia and the Carpathian mountains.

In the report of the SD Chief of Police dated 9 October 1942, a few lines were devoted to the mood among the Polish minority in Volhynia and Polesia:

> "The position of the Poles is also still characterised by two peculiarities: on the one hand, by the strong subservience shown by many employees of German institutions, and on the other, by the concentration on the idea of creating a great Polish state after the end of the war. The complicity of the Polish rural population with the Soviet gangs can be observed time and time again".

After a raid on the Rivne region in early 1943, Sidor Kovpak confirmed the German assessment: "The mood of the Poles towards the Soviet power, the Red Army and the Red partisans is extraordinarily good. Many Poles have asked to join our detachment". Thus, for the Ukrainian nationalists, the Polish minority, appeared as a harmful "lackey of three evils": the Nazi administration in 1941–1942, the Polish nationalists in the underground in 1942, and the Soviets, represented by the Red partisans in 1942. In turn, the Ukrainian population appeared to the Poles as the same: "gloating accomplices of the communist authorities" in 1939–1941, "cruel servants of the Nazi rulers in 1941-1942", and "hidden supporters of the terrorist OUN". The latter, due to the weakening of other Ukrainian parties and the radicalization of the mood of the population, systematically increased its influence.[3] By the end of 1942, the hostility had reached such an intensity that the situation slowly began to slip away from the Germans' control. Heinrich Schöne, General Commissioner of Volhynia-Podolia, wrote about this in his review of the situation on 1 November 1942:

> "The tense relations between certain national groups, especially the Belarusians and Ukrainians on the one hand, and the Poles on the other, have become particularly tense. There is a certain system in this. Attempts from some hostile side to disturb the people"

On 17–23 February 1943, the III Conference of the OUN-B took place near Olesk, at which it was decided to start an open partisan war in Volhynia, although it is not clear when the exact time of its start was determined. The conference, importantly, took place after the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad, but before its defeat in the battle of Kharkov in March 1943. It may have seemed to the Banderites that Germany's defeat was very near. They were convinced that the final battle for independence would have to be fought with the USSR or Poland, or perhaps both enemies at the same time. The keynote address at the conference was delivered by Mihail Stepaniak, who warned that the USSR could win the war. He proposed to immediately start an uprising against the Germans and liberate Ukraine from occupation before the Red Army arrived, his actions were supported by the Provod, but were not implemented under pressure from Dmytro Klyachkivsky and Roman Shukhevych (Klyachkivsky's future successor as commander-in-chief of the UPA) who believed that the armed struggle should be directed not primarily against the Germans, but against the Red partisans and Poles.[4]

## The Polish self-defense[edit]

The first self-defence units were formed at the turn of 1942/43. They were organised spontaneously by local leaders of the Polish community. Initially, self-defence was limited to patrolling the area, posting guards, warning the local population of the appearance of unknown armed units. In the early spring of 1943, as the mass murders of Poles intensified, the number of observation posts and patrols was increased and outposts began to be supplied with firearms. The effectiveness of the self-defence units during this period was low; they were poorly armed and unable to defend themselves against the much more numerous units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

### Attempts to organize[edit]

After the first attempts at self-defence from below, this process was supported and brought under conspiratorial control by the Home Army, as ordered in April 1943 by Home Army Volhynia District Commander, Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński "Luboń":

> The spontaneously forming Volhynian self-defence in the threatened areas prevents or at least hinders further assaults by the resunts. I place on the commanders at all levels the duty to take the initiative in organising self-defence in their own hands, without deconstructing their organisational associations. On us, as the commanders, fell the duty and responsibility to defend Poles in Volhynia, since Polish blood has already been shed through no fault of ours. I forbid the use of methods used by Ukrainian resurgents. We will not burn Ukrainian homesteads or kill Ukrainian women and children in retaliation. Self-defence is to defend ourselves against the attackers or to attack the attackers, leaving the population and their possessions alone.

At the same time, "Lubon" forbade cooperation in self-defence with the Germans (including joining the German police) and Soviet partisans.[5]

Historical publicist Piotr Zychowicz argues that the structures of the Home Army (AK) failed to provide adequate assistance to the threatened Polish population in the Volhynia area. The possibility of redeploying some AK partisan units from Lubeszczyzna to the Volhynia area was not used. In his opinion, the AK did not take advantage of the possibility to supply village self-defences with weapons from the Home Army's warehouses, which were issued a few months later to the 27th Volhynian Division of the AK created as part of the Operation Tempest.[6]

The first major centre of Polish self-defence was organised at the beginning of May 1943 in Pańska Dolina in the Dubien district. It was not until 20 July (after the bloody Sunday of 11 July) that the "Instruction on the formation of self-defence bases and the organisation of partisan detachments" was issued by the Regional Government Delegation for Volhynia. The formation of larger self-defence bases, consisting of several villages (outposts) with larger Polish population concentrations, was begun. Such bases were to be defended by local troops, using shooting ditches, primitive wooden and earth bunkers and various types of entanglements.

Among the more important self-defence bases in Volhynia were:

* Dubno County, Pańska Dolina
* Horochów County, Zaturce
* Kostopol County, Stara Huta , Huta Stepańska
* Kowel County: Zasmyki, Dąbrowa
* Krzemieniec county: Dederkały, Rybcza, Kuty:
* Lubomelski county: Jagodzin-Rymacze
* Lutsk county: Przebraże, Antonówka Szepelska, Rożyszcze
* Sarny county: Antonówka
* Vladimir-Volynsky District: Bielin-Spaszczyzna, Andresovka
* Zdolbunovskiy district: Witoldovka, Ostróg on the Horyn.[2]

### Partisan units[edit]

After the occupation of Volhynia by the Germans in 1941, it was not possible to create larger partisan units. In August 1942, the AK Headquarters separated the Volhynia district from Area No. 3 (Lvov) and subordinated it directly to itself. In September 1942, Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński, pseud. "Luboń", was appointed District Commander. The District Delegate of the Government was Kazimierz Banach, pseud. "Jan Linowski" (author of the proclamation To the People of Volhynia), who arrived in Volhynia on 21 November 1942. After the failure of talks with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), during which two representatives of the Home Army, Zygmunt Rumel and Krzysztof Markiewicz, were murdered, it was decided on 20 July 1943 to create partisan units in Volhynia.

At that time, units were formed:

* "Luna" - under the command of Lieutenant Jan Rerutko ("Drzazga"), and from 10 November 1943 the unit was commanded by Lieutenant Zygmunt Kulczycki ("Olgierd"). The "Łuna" unit consisted of 107 partisans.
* "Jastrząb" - under the command of Lieutenant Władysław Czerminski ("Jastrząb") numbering about 150 partisans.
* "Bomba" - under the command of Capt Wladyslaw Kochanski ("Bomba", "Wujek"). The unit numbered about 500 partisans.
* "Strzemię" - under the command of Lt. Zenon Blachowski ("Strzemię"). The unit numbered about 100 partisans.
* "Gzyms" - under the command of Lt. Franciszek Pukacki ("Gzyms") numbering about 80 partisans.
* "Ryszard" - commanded by Lieutenant Ryszard Walczak ("Ryszard"). The unit numbered about 80 partisans.
* "Sokol" - commanded by Lt. Michal Fijalka ("Sokol"), numbering about 120 partisans
* "Kord" - commanded by Lieutenant Kazimierz Filipowicz ("Kord"). The unit numbered about 80 partisans.
* "Piotruś" - commanded by Lieutenant Wladyslaw Cieslinski ("Piotruś"), numbering about 80 partisans.

## Soviet Partisans[edit]

* Alexander Nevsky Unit
* Vasily Begma detachment - 1,070 men (including several hundred Poles from the Frunze Brigade[1])
* Anton Brinsky Unit
* Fyodorov unit - 2,200 men
* Demyan Korotchenko's detachment
* Sumy District's guerilla units - 2,000 men
* Yevhen Melnyk's unit
* Dmitry Medvedev's unit
* Mikhail Naumov's unit - 860 men
* Partisan detachment (Zhytomyr) - 3,000 men
* Partisan detachment "Poland Is Not Yet Lost"
* Polish-Ukrainian partisan detachment named after Felix Dzerzhinsky \- and including 120 Poles
* Vasily Chapayev partisan unit - with 29 Poles
* Pyotr Vershigora's unit - at the beginning of February 1944, this grouping together with the units of the Home Army's 27th Volhynian Infantry Division defeated the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) Sich unit.

## The Conflict in 1943[edit]

### First Stage[edit]

The first stage falls in the spring of 1943, when the UPA was just being created, but the insurgents had already undertaken their first anti-Polish actions. The reliable armed force on which the Poles could rely in this situation was, strangely enough, the warring parties: the Soviet partisans and the German administration. Some of them sought help from the Germans against the UPA and thus became enemies of the Soviet militias as well, while others benefited from the Soviet support: in 1943–1944, five thousand Poles passed through the Soviet partisan units in Volhynia and 500 in eastern Galicia.[7]

However, despite mutual distrust and bloody incidents, the assistance of the AK to the Reds in Western Ukraine and the Lublin region provided the partisans with an indispensable service. It was not only a question of joint operations, but also of the support of the Polish population under the influence of the AK - providing guides and intelligence information, in a number of cases - assistance with food, shelter for the wounded, warning of the threat from the Germans, the Banderites, and so on. At the same time, close allied relations led to a deep mutual agent penetration between AK units and Soviet partisans, which made it easier for the NKVD and NKGB to defeat Polish structures in Western Ukraine in 1944–1945.

#### Battles[edit]

* On the night of 18–19 March, the self-defence of the village of Lipniki drove away several attackers from the UPA, and one of them, a former policeman, was captured, handed over to the Germans and hanged in Berezne.[8]
* On the night of 2 to 3 May 1943, combined units of the Kremenets UPA kuren under the command of Ivan Klimyshyn-Kruk and the Melnikov kuren of Mykola Nedvedzsky-Khrena attacked Kuty. Polish self-defence defended themselves in stone buildings in the centre. Ukrainian partisans broke into houses along the defence line, killing the inhabitants, looting and burning the houses. At the same time there was intense shelling of the village centre. At around 3.30am the attackers retreated after a failed attack. At least fifty-three Poles were killed, UPA losses are unknown.[2]
* On 12 May 1943, the UPA attacked Stakhovka (a former colony in Vladimiretskyi district), where there was a self-defence base. The village was fortified with caches and other fortifications, the attack was repelled but this did not prevent heavy casualties. More than 40 Poles were killed in the attack.[9]
* On 13 June, a hundred from the Kruka kuren again attacked Stakhovka. The attack was supported by the fire of two machine guns. The village was engulfed in flames. Fortunately for the defenders, reinforcements arrived from Porada. The Poles eliminated the machine gun nests and forced the UPA to retreat. In the morning, the Germans arrived and shot five captured nationalist prisoners captured by the self-defence. However, during the skirmish, the colony was burned to the ground and twenty-two people were killed.[10]

### Second Stage[edit]

The second stage falls in the summer of 1943, when the Ukrainian terror against the Poles took on the widest scale, and the Polish underground responded with its own terror. The summer of 1943 saw the reduction of the territory controlled by the Home Army in Volhynia.

#### Battles[edit]

* On 5 July, at around 11 o'clock, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army launched its first attack on Przebraże, where the self-defence base was located. The village was shelled with mortar fire. The clashes continued until noon. Ten Polish civilians were killed, while on the Ukrainian side one UPA soldier died and 6 were wounded.[11]
* The UPA next attacked Przebraże on 31 August. The Ukrainian insurgents numbered about 6,000 people, including volunteer peasants from the surrounding villages, armed mostly with axes and scythes. Fortunately for the defenders, they were helped in time by an AK unit under the command of Henryk Cybulski "Wołyniak" and a group of Soviet partisans of Mykola Prokopyuk. Thanks to them, the Ukrainians were defeated.[11]
* On 22 June 1943 the UPA attacked Pańska Dolina for the first time, but the Poles managed to repel the attack.[12]
* On 5 August, the UPA made another attempt to capture Panska Dolina: it was surrounded by a UPA "Max" (Maksim Skorupski) kuren, supported by three 75 mm cannons. Fortunately for the defenders, after firing several times, the Ukrainian cannons fell silent: probably due to poor technical condition. Without artillery support, the UPA was unable to break through the Polish defences. After 4 hours of fighting, the UPA retreated at dawn, losing several men killed and wounded. On the Polish side, one member of the self-defence and several women and children were wounded.[13]
* On 12 July, the Polish self-defence attacked Trostyanets, defeating the UPA's underground school in the settlement. The village was partly burned down and its Ukrainian inhabitants were ordered to relocate elsewhere.[13]
* One of the most important Polish bases was Huta Stepanska, which co-operated with the self-defence village of Wyrka, located six kilometres north of it. Together they guarded the surrounding small Polish settlements, whose inhabitants had the option of fleeing to the main bases in a dangerous situation. The Poles also co-operated with the Soviet partisans, organising raids with them against the UPA. At the beginning of July 1943 the self-defence in Huta numbered 500 men, but had only 80 firearms, including six hand-held machine guns. The number of Wyrka defenders is unknown.
* To liquidate these two Polish self-defence bases, the commander of VO-1 "Zagrava" Ivan Litvinchuk allocated ten UPA and SKV units, from which two powerful fighting groups were created. The grouping also included the UPA's "first hundred" led by "Yarema". On 16 July, at about 23 hours, the Ukrainian units simultaneously went on the offensive. The first UPA fighting group destroyed alternately Perespy, Uzhany, Soshniki, Haly, Tur and other settlements. Polish houses were burnt and the captured inhabitants were killed. At 3.25 a.m. the Banderites attacked Wyrka from three sides. The Poles tried to defend themselves in the Latin church and the surrounding stone houses, but after two hours of fighting they were forced to retreat to Guta Stepanska. The rest of the surrounding Polish settlements were destroyed the next day. Meanwhile, the second UPA group destroyed Borok, Lyady and Kurorty and then launched a direct attack on Guta Stepanskaia. It is estimated that some 50-100 defenders and civilians were killed during the attack on 17 July.[14]
* Huta felt the strongest blow at 1 a.m. on 18 July. One of the assault groups managed to break into the village, set fire to several houses and killed about a hundred Poles. After a day-long battle, the Polish command decided to evacuate Huta. The Poles created a multi-kilometre column of wagons, which was covered by self-defence. Taking advantage of the fog, most of the inhabitants of Huta retreated in the direction of Antonovka. However, some people panicked, broke away from the main group and fell victim to the Banderovites. On 19 July in the morning the Ukrainians entered Guta Stepanskaya and burned all the houses (the stone ones were blown up). From the Ukrainian point of view, the operation ended successfully. The UPA estimates their own losses were 18 killed and 17 wounded, the Poles estimate that the UPA lost 500 men. but a strong centre of self-defence was eliminated and more than 500 Poles were killed (according to Ukrainian data). Several Germans from the patrol that had been on the UPA's trail were also killed in the battle.[15]
* On August 5, 1943, the village of Rybcza was attacked by UPA forces, aided by local Ukrainians, leading to a fierce battle. Despite initial success in reaching the village's edge, a determined self-defense unit repelled the attack after a four-and-a-half-hour struggle, resulting in three casualties and the destruction of 42 buildings.
* A strong self-defence was located in Rozhyshchy. There were about 130 people in it. The Poles, supported by the German-Hungarian garrison, managed to repel several UPA attacks on the town. On 29 August 1943, in retaliation, the Poles burned the Ukrainian villages of Swóż and Soltysy, killing several Ukrainian civilians.[16]
* There was a large unit of the Polish Schutzmanschaft in Gorokhov. It numbered 150 people. During the Volhynia massacre there were about 1,200 refugees in the town, mostly Polish refugees from neighbouring villages. In August 1943 the UPA attacked the town. After an hour and a half of fighting, the nationalists were forced to retreat.[17]

### Third Stage[edit]

The third stage of Polish-Ukrainian partisan fighting in Volyn fell in the autumn-winter of 1943. It is characterised by the intensification of Polish terror and the strengthening of the UPA, which continued to increase its zone of activity. In addition, Polish self-defence units conducted raids on neighbouring Ukrainian villages to replenish food supplies, with frequent killings of local residents, and several Ukrainian villages were partially or completely burned. In total, from September 1943 to March 1944, self-defence units carried out 39 anti-Ukrainian actions, during which more than 550 people, including children, women and elderly people, were killed.[18][19]

#### Battles[edit]

* On 6 September 1943, the biggest battle between Bulbovites and Polish partisans took place in the village of Wilia. The Polissian Sich encountered a Home Army unit under the command of Władysław Kochański and a detachment of Polish communist partisans named after. Felix Dzerzhinsky. The battle lasted for an entire day and resulted in the Polish partisans driving out the UNRA from the village killing it's commander Ivan Mitringa.[20]
* On 7 September 1943, the UPA decided to attack the Polish self-defence in the village of Zasmyki. Several UPA kurens of the VO-Turov group under the command of Oleksiy Shum were allocated for the operation. In the process of the attack, the Ukrainian units ran into the Germans, which led to the battle of Radovychi. Both Ukrainians and Germans suffered heavy losses. The UPA was forced to abandon the attack and retreat.[21]
* On 2 October 1943, two hundred Polish self-defence fighters from Przebraże together with Prokopiuk's Soviet partisans struck in the direction of the village of Omelno. They first shelled it with machine guns and mortars, causing numerous fires, and then went on the offensive. At least ten civilian Ukrainians were killed, and several cattle were taken from the village.[22]
* On the night of 15 October 1943, the UPA attacked Przebraże for the last time, but this attack was ineffective. On 25 November, the Polish self-defence launched a successful attack on the Ukrainian village of Zhuravichi to obtain flour, grain and cattle. The Poles held out in their garrison until the end of January 1944. Then the Red Army's offensive diametrically changed the situation in Volhynia. The long-time inhabitants of Przebraże, like the rescued fugitives, were not destined to enjoy relative peace for long. In 1945, they were forced to leave for Poland as part of the so-called population exchange.[13]
* On 16 November 1943, taking advantage of the absence in the village of the "Bomba" detachment, which had set out on an action against the Germans, UPA units of about 1,200 men attacked the self-defence centre in Huta Stara from the east. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day. The balance of power was altered by the return of the "Bomba" unit, which hit the Ukrainians in the vicinity of Moczulanka, and the attack on the UPA units by Soviet partisans under the command of Capt. Kotlarov. Smashed and dispersed, the UPA lost 54 killed and about 40 wounded.[23] On the Polish side, some people were killed.
* On 22 November 1943, the UPA attacked the village of Kupichev. It was inhabited by Czechs and openly supported the Polish side by sending a militia unit to support the AK garrison stationed in the village. The Banderites had a "tank" (a tractor clad in armour and equipped with a small calibre gun). Fortunately for the defenders, the "tank" broke down during the attack, and the appearance of the "Jastrząb" unit finally forced the Ukrainians to retreat.[24]
* In response to the murder of several civilians on December 18, 1943, Polish communists from the unit named after. T. Kosciuszko, with the support of Soviet partisans, attacked Lakhvichi. The local OUN militants retreated from the village due to the numerical superiority of the enemy. The settlement was half burned. 25 civilians were killed, 15 wounded and 10 kidnapped.[25]
* On the night of 26–27 December, UPA Kuren under the command of Mykola Svistun of Zdolbuniv attacked the village of Vitoldievka. Although local self-defence units repulsed the assault, the banderites killed dozens of Poles.[26][27]

## 1944[edit]

### Establishment of the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division[edit]

At the beginning of January 1944, after the Red Army had crossed the pre-war Polish border, the Home Army command ordered the mobilisation of partisan units in Volhynia and decided to launch Operation Tempest. On 28 January 1944, the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division was formed.[28]

### Battles[edit]

* From the 8th - 20 February the "Osnowo" Grouping fought the UPA in victorious battles in the villages of Puzów, Worczyn, Zablocie and Stęzarzyce.[29]
* On February 20, a UPA unit tried to sneak into the village of Rybcza, pretending to be a Soviet partisan unit. However, thanks to the attitude of Jan Niewiński, who, despite his advisors, did not let the alleged Soviet partisans into the village, Rybcza survived. . The UPA marched towards Wiśniowiec, where they committed crimes against the defenseless Polish population.[2]
* On the 12th of March, two Companies from the 27th Infantry Division drove out a UPA Unit in Korytnica.[29]
* On the 18th of March, The 27th Infantry Division under the command of Michał Fijałka fought a victorious battle with the UPA in Zapol.[29]
* On the 20th of March, The 27th Infantry Division under the command of Zbigniew Twardy and Walery Krokay, after a battle with the UPA captured the Railway station in Turzysk.[29]

In addition to operations against the Germans, the division carried out 16 major combat actions against UPA units, partially removing the threat to the Polish civilian population in the west of Volhynia.[28]

## Summary[edit]

The maximum number of self-defence outposts was about 128 (July 1943) against 3,400 villages in Volhynia where Poles lived. A maximum of 1,500 people served in all partisan units until January 1944, with at least 15,000 UPA members against them. The self-defence and partisan units were formed too late and were too small to prevent the crimes. According to Siemaszko's findings, at least 262 Poles and at least 311 members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were killed in the battles between the self-defence and the UPA. Losses among civilians amounted to: 60,000 victims of the Polish population and 2–3,000 victims of the Ukrainian population killed in an act of Polish retaliation. On the basis of these data, we cannot speak of the events in Volhynia in 1943-1944 as a Polish-Ukrainian war, but as a Volhynian Genocide.[2]

## Citations[edit]

1. ^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2006). Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960 (in Polish). Warsaw: RYTM. p. 200\. ISBN 83-7399-163-8.
2. ^ a b c d e f Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945 (in Polish).
3. ^ "Между Гитлером и Сталиным" (in Ukrainian). 2021.
4. ^ Постанови Третьої Конференції Організації Українських націоналістів-держав-ників (in Ukrainian). p. 83.
5. ^ Ludobójstwo... (in Polish). p. 1251.
6. ^ Zychowicz, Piotr (2019). Wołyń zdradzony, czyli jak dowództwo AK porzuciło Polaków na pastwę UPA (in Polish).
7. ^ "Украинско-польский конфликт 1943-1944 гг". 2021.
8. ^ Grzegorz, Motyka (2013). Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła. Konflikt Polsko-Ukraiński 1943-1947 (in Polish). pp. 68–69.
9. ^ Grzegorz, Motyka (2013). Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła. Konflikt Polsko-Ukraiński 1943-1947 (in Polish). p. 74.
10. ^ Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945 (in Polish). p. 804.
11. ^ a b Grzegorz, Motyka (2013). Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła. Konflikt Polsko-Ukraiński 1943-1947 (in Polish). pp. 99–100.
12. ^ Piotrowski, Tadeusz (2000-01-01). Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World War II. McFarland. p. 215\. ISBN 978-0-7864-0773-6.
13. ^ a b c Grzegorz, Motyka (2013). Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła. Konflikt Polsko-Ukraiński 1943-1947 (in Polish). p. 100.
14. ^ Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945 (in Polish). p. 292.
15. ^ Poliszczuk, Wiktor. "Dowody zbrodni OUN i UPA. Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński jako odmiana faszyzmu. Tom drugi: Działalność ukraińskich struktur nacjonalistycznych w latach 1920-1999 Wiktor Poliszczuk" (in Polish). p. 460.
16. ^ Romanowski, Wincenty (1993). ZWZ-AK na Wołyniu 1939-1944 (in Polish). p. 182.
17. ^ Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945 (in Polish). p. 191.
18. ^ ОУН-УПА і українське питання в роки Другої світової війни: в світлі польських документів (in Ukrainian). 2000.
19. ^ Кривава Волинь (in Ukrainian). Kiev. 2008. p. 248.`{{cite book}}`: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
20. ^ Grzegorz, Motyka (2013). Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła. Konflikt Polsko-Ukraiński 1943-1947 (in Polish). p. 190.
21. ^ Grzegorz, Motyka (2013). Od Rzezi Wołyńskiej do Akcji Wisła. Konflikt Polsko-Ukraiński 1943-1947 (in Polish). p. 101.
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