Redistricting in Connecticut

in Connecticut

Fiscal Budgets Connecticut state budget and finances Tax policy in Connecticut Finance Financial regulation in Connecticut Pensions Public pensions in Connecticut Pension health in Connecticut Civil liberties Affirmative action in Connecticut Campaign finance requirements in Connecticut Campaign finance requirements for Connecticut ballot measures Nonprofit regulation in Connecticut Education Charter schools in Connecticut Higher education in Connecticut Public education in Connecticut School choice in Connecticut Elections Ballot access Ballot access requirements for political candidates in Connecticut Ballot access requirements for political parties in Connecticut Political parties in Connecticut Ballot access requirements for presidential candidates in Connecticut Redistricting in Connecticut Voting in Connecticut Energy and Environment Energy policy in Connecticut Fracking in Connecticut Oil and gas extraction on federal land in Connecticut Endangered species in Connecticut Environmental policy in Connecticut Healthcare Healthcare policy in Connecticut Medicaid spending in Connecticut Effect of the Affordable Care Act in Connecticut Immigration Immigration in Connecticut

Redistricting
State-by-state redistricting procedures
Majority-minority districts
Congressional district demographics
United States census, 2020

Redistricting is the process by which new congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn. Each of Connecticut's five United States Representatives and 187 state legislators are elected from political divisions called districts. United States Senators are not elected by districts, but by the states at large. District lines are redrawn every 10 years following completion of the United States census. The federal government stipulates that districts must have nearly equal populations and must not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity.^[1][2][3][4]

See the sections below for further information on the following topics:

1. Background: This section summarizes federal requirements for redistricting at both the congressional and state legislative levels. In addition, common state-level requirements are discussed. Recent court decisions affecting redistricting policy are also summarized.
2. State process: This section provides details about the redistricting process in Connecticut, identifying the entities responsible for redistricting and delineating state-imposed requirements.
3. District maps: This section provides information about current congressional and state legislative district maps.
4. Issues: This section discusses issues that intersect with redistricting policy, including electoral competitiveness and the consideration of race and ethnicity in electoral policy.
5. Historical information: This section provides summaries of the redistricting processes that occurred in Connecticut following the 2010 and 2000 censuses.
6. State legislation and ballot measures: This section lists state legislation and state and local ballot measures relevant to redistricting policy.

Background[edit]

This section includes background information on federal requirements for congressional redistricting, state legislative redistricting, state-based requirements, redistricting methods used in the 50 states, gerrymandering, and recent court decisions.

Federal requirements for congressional redistricting[edit]

According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, the states and their legislatures have primary authority in determining the "times, places, and manner" of congressional elections. Congress may also pass laws regulating congressional elections.^[5][6]

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution stipulates that congressional representatives be apportioned to the states on the basis of population. There are 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives. Each state is allotted a portion of these seats based on the size of its population relative to the other states. Consequently, a state may gain seats in the House if its population grows or lose seats if its population decreases, relative to populations in other states. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that the populations of House districts must be equal "as nearly as practicable."^[8][9][10]

The equal population requirement for congressional districts is strict. According to All About Redistricting, "Any district with more or fewer people than the average (also known as the 'ideal' population), must be specifically justified by a consistent state policy. And even consistent policies that cause a 1 percent spread from largest to smallest district will likely be unconstitutional."^[10]

Federal requirements for state legislative redistricting[edit]

The United States Constitution is silent on the issue of state legislative redistricting. In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of rulings in an effort to clarify standards for state legislative redistricting. In Reynolds v. Sims, the court ruled that "the Equal Protection Clause [of the United States Constitution] demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." According to All About Redistricting, "it has become accepted that a [redistricting] plan will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts [within a state or jurisdiction] are more than 10 percent apart."^[10]

State-based requirements[edit]

In addition to the federal criteria noted above, individual states may impose additional requirements on redistricting. Common state-level redistricting criteria are listed below.

1. Contiguity refers to the principle that all areas within a district should be physically adjacent. A total of 49 states require that districts of at least one state legislative chamber be contiguous (Nevada has no such requirement, imposing no requirements on redistricting beyond those enforced at the federal level). A total of 23 states require that congressional districts meet contiguity requirements.^[10][11]
2. Compactness refers to the general principle that the constituents within a district should live as near to one another as practicable. A total of 37 states impose compactness requirements on state legislative districts; 18 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.^[10][11]
3. A community of interest is defined by FairVote as a "group of people in a geographical area, such as a specific region or neighborhood, who have common political, social or economic interests." A total of 24 states require that the maintenance of communities of interest be considered in the drawing of state legislative districts. A total of 13 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.^[10][11]
4. A total of 42 states require that state legislative district lines be drawn to account for political boundaries (e.g., the limits of counties, cities, and towns). A total of 19 states require that similar considerations be made in the drawing of congressional districts.^[10][11]

Methods[edit]

In general, a state's redistricting authority can be classified as one of the following:^[12]

1. Legislature-dominant: In a legislature-dominant state, the legislature retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. Maps enacted by the legislature may or may not be subject to gubernatorial veto. Advisory commissions may also be involved in the redistricting process, although the legislature is not bound to adopt an advisory commission's recommendations.
2. Commission: In a commission state, an extra-legislative commission retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. A non-politician commission is one whose members cannot hold elective office. A politician commission is one whose members can hold elective office.
3. Hybrid: In a hybrid state, the legislature shares redistricting authority with a commission.

Gerrymandering[edit]

In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a state Senate district map that, according to the Encyclopædia Britannica, "consolidated the Federalist Party vote in a few districts and thus gave disproportionate representation to Democratic-Republicans." The word gerrymander was coined by The Boston Gazette to describe the district.

See also: Gerrymandering

The term gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district lines to favor one political party, individual, or constituency over another. When used in a rhetorical manner by opponents of a particular district map, the term has a negative connotation but does not necessarily address the legality of a challenged map. The term can also be used in legal documents; in this context, the term describes redistricting practices that violate federal or state laws.^[1][13]

For additional background information about gerrymandering, click "[Show more]" below.

Recent court decisions[edit]

See also: Redistricting cases heard by the Supreme Court of the United States

The Supreme Court of the United States has, in recent years, issued several decisions dealing with redistricting policy, including rulings relating to the consideration of race in drawing district maps, the use of total population tallies in apportionment, and the constitutionality of independent redistricting commissions. The rulings in these cases, which originated in a variety of states, impact redistricting processes across the nation.

For additional background information about these cases, click "[Show more]" below.

Show more

Gill v. Whitford (2018)[edit]

See also: Gill v. Whitford

In Gill v. Whitford, decided on June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the plaintiffs—12 Wisconsin Democrats who alleged that Wisconsin's state legislative district plan had been subject to an unconstitutional gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments—had failed to demonstrate standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring a complaint. The court's opinion, penned by Chief Justice John Roberts, did not address the broader question of whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Roberts was joined in the majority opinion by Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Kagan penned a concurring opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Associate Justice Clarence Thomas penned an opinion that concurred in part with the majority opinion and in the judgment, joined by Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch.^[17]

Cooper v. Harris (2017)[edit]

See also: Cooper v. Harris

In Cooper v. Harris, decided on May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, finding that two of North Carolina's congressional districts, the boundaries of which had been set following the 2010 United States Census, had been subject to an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the court's majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor (Thomas also filed a separate concurring opinion). In the court's majority opinion, Kagan described the two-part analysis utilized by the high court when plaintiffs allege racial gerrymandering as follows: "First, the plaintiff must prove that 'race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.' ... Second, if racial considerations predominated over others, the design of the district must withstand strict scrutiny. The burden shifts to the State to prove that its race-based sorting of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly tailored' to that end." In regard to the first part of the aforementioned analysis, Kagan went on to note that "a plaintiff succeeds at this stage even if the evidence reveals that a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including political ones." Justice Samuel Alito delivered an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority opinion. This opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy.^[18][19][20]

Evenwel v. Abbott (2016)[edit]

See also: Evenwel v. Abbott

Evenwel v. Abbott was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts in Texas. The plaintiffs, Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger, argued that district populations ought to take into account only the number of registered or eligible voters residing within those districts as opposed to total population counts, which are generally used for redistricting purposes. Total population tallies include non-voting residents, such as immigrants residing in the country without legal permission, prisoners, and children. The plaintiffs alleged that this tabulation method dilutes the voting power of citizens residing in districts that are home to smaller concentrations of non-voting residents. The court ruled 8-0 on April 4, 2016, that a state or locality can use total population counts for redistricting purposes. The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.^{[21][22][23][24]}

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2016)[edit]

Justice Stephen Breyer penned the majority opinion in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

See also: Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts that were created by the commission in 2012. The plaintiffs, a group of Republican voters, alleged that "the commission diluted or inflated the votes of almost two million Arizona citizens when the commission intentionally and systematically overpopulated 16 Republican districts while under-populating 11 Democrat districts." This, the plaintiffs argued, constituted a partisan gerrymander. The plaintiffs claimed that the commission placed a disproportionately large number of non-minority voters in districts dominated by Republicans; meanwhile, the commission allegedly placed many minority voters in smaller districts that tended to vote Democratic. As a result, the plaintiffs argued, more voters overall were placed in districts favoring Republicans than in those favoring Democrats, thereby diluting the votes of citizens in the Republican-dominated districts. The defendants countered that the population deviations resulted from legally defensible efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act and obtain approval from the United States Department of Justice. At the time of redistricting, certain states were required to obtain preclearanceA jurisdiction subject to preclearance needed to get approval from the U.S. Department of Justice before changing election laws or district maps. from the U.S. Department of Justice before adopting redistricting plans or making other changes to their election laws—a requirement struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). On April 20, 2016, the court ruled unanimously that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a partisan gerrymander had taken place. Instead, the court found that the commission had acted in good faith to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The court's majority opinion was penned by Justice Stephen Breyer.^[25][26][27]

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015)[edit]

See also: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2015. At issue was the constitutionality of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which was established by state constitutional amendment in 2000. According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." The state legislature argued that the use of the word "legislature" in this context is literal; therefore, only a state legislature may draw congressional district lines. Meanwhile, the commission contended that the word "legislature" ought to be interpreted to mean "the legislative powers of the state," including voter initiatives and referenda. On June 29, 2015, the court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, finding that "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the state's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the governor's veto." The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito dissented.^{[28][29][30][31]}

State process[edit]

See also: State-by-state redistricting procedures

In Connecticut, the state legislature is primarily responsible for drawing both congressional and state legislative district lines. Maps must be approved by a two-thirds vote in each chamber. If the state legislature is unable to approve new maps, a backup commission is convened to draw congressional and state legislative district boundaries. The commission consists of nine members. The four legislative leaders (i.e., the majority and minority leaders of each chamber of the legislature) appoint two members each. The ninth member is selected by the eight previously selected commissioners.^[32][33]

The Connecticut Constitution requires that all districts, whether congressional or state legislative, be contiguous. In addition, state House districts must "not divide towns except where necessary to comply with other legal requirements."^[34]

How incarcerated persons are counted for redistricting[edit]

See also: State-by-state redistricting procedures

States differ on how they count incarcerated persons for the purposes of redistricting. In Connecticut, inmates who were in-state residents prior to incarceration are counted in their last known residence's district population. Out-of-state residents and inmates with unknown previous residences are counted as generic state residents. Persons serving life sentences without the possibility of parole are counted as residents of their correctional facility. Federal inmates are counted using the same standard as state inmates.

District maps[edit]

Congressional districts[edit]

See also: United States congressional delegations from Connecticut

Click the above image to enlarge it.
Source: The National Atlas of the United States of America

Connecticut comprises five congressional districts. The map to the right depicts Connecticut's congressional district lines as drawn following the 2010 United States Census. The table below lists Connecticut's current House representatives.

State legislative maps[edit]

See also: Connecticut State Senate and Connecticut House of Representatives

Connecticut comprises 36 state Senate districts and 151 state House districts. State senators are elected every two years in partisan elections. State representatives are elected every two years in partisan elections. To access the current state legislative maps, click here.^[35]

Political impacts of redistricting[edit]

Competitiveness[edit]

There are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between partisan gerrymandering and electoral competitiveness. In 2012, Jennifer Clark, a political science professor at the University of Houston, said, "The redistricting process has important consequences for voters. In some states, incumbent legislators work together to protect their own seats, which produces less competition in the political system. Voters may feel as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to the incumbent legislator. Legislators who lack competition in their districts have less incentive to adhere to their constituents’ opinions."^[36]

In 2006, Emory University professor Alan Abramowitz and Ph.D. students Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote, "[Some] studies have concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on competition. ... [It] is often the case that partisan redistricting has the effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections more competitive."^[37]

In 2011, James Cottrill, a professor of political science at Santa Clara University, published a study of the effect of non-legislative approaches (e.g., independent commissions, politician commissions) to redistricting on the competitiveness of congressional elections. Cottrill found that "particular types of [non-legislative approaches] encourage the appearance in congressional elections of experienced and well-financed challengers." Cottrill cautioned, however, that non-legislative approaches "contribute neither to decreased vote percentages when incumbents win elections nor to a greater probability of their defeat."^[38]

In 2021, John Johnson, Research Fellow in the Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education at Marquette University, reviewed the relationship between partisan gerrymandering and political geography in Wisconsin, a state where Republicans have controlled both chambers of the state legislature since 2010 while voting for the Democratic nominee in every presidential election but one since 1988. After analyzing state election results since 2000, Johnson wrote, "In 2000, 42% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans lived in a neighborhood that the other party won. Twenty years later, 43% of Democrats lived in a place Trump won, but just 28% of Republicans lived in a Biden-voting neighborhood. Today, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to live in both places where they are the overwhelming majority and places where they form a noncompetitive minority."^[39]

Congress[edit]

See also: United States House of Representatives elections, 2016

In 2016, Ballotpedia analyzed the margins of victory in all 435 contests for the United States House of Representatives. Ballotpedia found that the average margin of victory was 36.6 percent. A total of 321 elections (73.8 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or more. Sixteen elections (3.7 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of less than 5 percent.

In Connecticut, three of five elections for the United States House of Representatives were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or greater. The smallest margin of victory occurred in District 5, where Elizabeth Esty (D) won by 16 percent. The greatest margin of victory occurred in District 3, where Rosa DeLauro (D) won by 38.1 percent. See the table below for full details.

Electoral margins of victory in 2016 United States House of Representatives elections, Connecticut
District	Winner	Margin of victory	Total votes cast	Top opponent
Connecticut District 1	John Larson	30.4%	312,925	Matthew Corey
Connecticut District 2	Joe Courtney	29.6%	330,257	Daria Novak
Connecticut District 3	Rosa DeLauro	38.1%	309,379	Angel Cadena
Connecticut District 4	Jim Himes	19.8%	313,540	John Shaban
Connecticut District 5	Elizabeth Esty	16%	309,082	Clay Cope

State legislatures[edit]

See also: Margin of victory in state legislative elections

In 2014, Ballotpedia conducted a study of competitive districts in 44 state legislative chambers between 2010, the last year in which district maps drawn after the 2000 census applied, and 2012, the first year in which district maps drawn after the 2010 census applied. Ballotpedia found that there were 61 fewer competitive general election contests in 2012 than in 2010. Of the 44 chambers studied, 25 experienced a net loss in the number of competitive elections. A total of 17 experienced a net increase. In total, 16.2 percent of the 3,842 legislative contests studied saw competitive general elections in 2010. In 2012, 14.6 percent of the contests studied saw competitive general elections. An election was considered competitive if it was won by a margin of victory of 5 percent or less. An election was considered mildly competitive if it was won by a margin of victory between 5 and 10 percent. For more information regarding this report, including methodology, see this article.

There were nine competitive elections for the Connecticut House of Representatives in 2012, compared to 20 in 2010. There were 12 mildly competitive state House races in 2012, compared to 13 in 2010. This amounted to a net loss of 12 competitive elections.

There were seven competitive elections for the Connecticut State Senate in 2012, compared to five in 2010. There were two mildly competitive state Senate races in 2012, compared to three in 2010. This amounted to a net gain of one competitive election.

Partisan composition[edit]

The tables below summarize the current partisan composition of the Connecticut House of Representatives and the Connecticut State Senate.

House[edit]

Senate[edit]

Race and ethnicity[edit]

See also: Majority-minority districts

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates that electoral district lines cannot be drawn in such a manner as to "improperly dilute minorities' voting power."

States and other political subdivisions may create majority-minority districts in order to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A majority-minority district is a district in which minority groups compose a majority of the district's total population. As of 2015, Connecticut was home to zero congressional majority-minority districts.^[2][3][4]

Proponents of majority-minority districts maintain that these districts are a necessary hindrance to the practice of cracking, which occurs when a constituency is divided between several districts in order to prevent it from achieving a majority in any one district. In addition, supporters argue that the drawing of majority-minority districts has resulted in an increased number of minority representatives in state legislatures and Congress.^[2][3][4]

Critics, meanwhile, contend that the establishment of majority-minority districts can result in packing, which occurs when a constituency or voting group is placed within a single district, thereby minimizing its influence in other districts. Because minority groups tend to vote Democratic, critics argue that majority-minority districts ultimately present an unfair advantage to Republicans by consolidating Democratic votes into a smaller number of districts.^[2][3][4]

Demographics[edit]

See also: Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 and Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 (as percentages)

The tables below provide demographic information for each of Connecticut's congressional districts as of 2015. At that time, the population of the largest congressional district, Connecticut's 4th Congressional District, totaled 736,742, and the population of the smallest, Connecticut's 2nd Congressional District, totaled 709,647, which represented a difference of 3.82 percent.^[41]

Redistricting after the 2020 census[edit]

See also: Redistricting in Connecticut after the 2020 census

Connecticut was apportioned five seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. This represented neither a gain nor a loss of seats as compared to apportionment after the 2010 census.^[42]

Enacted congressional district maps[edit]

Connecticut is drawing congressional district maps following the 2020 census. New congressional district maps have not yet been enacted.

Enacted state legislative district maps[edit]

Connecticut is drawing state legislative district maps following the 2020 census. New state legislative district maps have not yet been enacted.

Redistricting after the 2010 census[edit]

See also: Redistricting in Connecticut after the 2010 census

Congressional redistricting, 2010[edit]

Following the 2010 United States Census, Connecticut neither gained nor lost congressional seats. Although Democrats controlled both chambers of the state legislature, Republican opposition prevented the legislature from achieving the two-thirds vote necessary to approve a congressional redistricting plan. The redistricting backup commission was convened to draw the map.^[32][43]

The backup commission ultimately failed to reach an agreement and petitioned the Connecticut Supreme Court to appoint a special master to draw the lines. The court appointed Columbia University law professor Nathaniel Persily. Persily, at the direction of the court, made minimal changes, shifting 28,975 people between districts. Persily released his draft congressional district map on January 13, 2012. The state supreme court approved the plan on February 10, 2012. In November's election, Democrats retained all five of Connecticut's congressional seats.^[32][43]

State legislative redistricting, 2010[edit]

Although the state legislature failed to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary to approve a state legislative redistricting plan, the state's backup commission approved new maps on November 30, 2011.^[32]

Redistricting after the 2000 census[edit]

Following the 2000 United States Census, Connecticut lost one congressional seat. Because the state legislature could not approve a congressional redistricting plan, the state's backup commission drew the map. It was adopted on December 21, 2001.^[32][43]

The state legislature also failed to pass a state legislative district plan. The backup commission adopted new state Senate maps on November 26, 2001, and new state House maps on November 30, 2001. According to All About Redistricting, "it appears none of the plans were challenged in court."^[32]

Noteworthy events[edit]

2021[edit]

On May 26, 2021, Governor Ned Lamont (D) signed Senate Bill 753 into law, reclassifying how incarcerated people were to be counted for redistricting purposes.^[44][45] The bill required in-state inmates of state and federal prisons to be counted in the population of the person's last known residence, and out-of-state inmates to be counted as generic state residents. Under Senate Bill 753, incarcerated persons serving life sentences were counted as residents of the district where their facility was located.^[46] Proponents of the bill said the existing system artificially inflated the population count of rural communities where many prisons are located and depressed population counts of cities where many inmates come from, with criminal justice chair of the Connecticut NAACP Corrie Betts saying, “Prison gerrymandering is discriminatory, acting like a modern-day three-fifths clause,” and that “It reduces the representation and political power of Black and Latino communities in Connecticut cities like New Haven and Hartford. [They] see their votes count for less while largely white prison communities see their votes count for more.”^[47] Opponents argued that the change was not necessary, with Senator Robert Sampson (R) saying, "Essentially what this bill aims to do is ignore the fact that people actually do reside at an address, even if that happens to be a prison location."^[47] Connecticut was the 11th U.S. state to pass such a law, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Washington all have similar laws.^[46]

To read Senate Bill 753 click here.

2018[edit]

On June 28, 2018, the NAACP, in conjunction with five Connecticut voters, filed suit in federal district court, alleging that Connecticut's state legislative district plan violates the Amendment XIV, United States Constitution by counting prison inmates as residents of their incarceration facilities as opposed to their pre-incarceration residences for redistricting purposes. In their initial court filing, submitted to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the plaintiffs contended that this practice "impermissibly inflates the voting strength of predominantly white voters residing in certain Connecticut House and Senate districts, as compared to the voting strength of persons residing in all other House and Districts." The plaintiffs further alleged that "by counting prisoners in the districts where they are imprisoned instead of their pre-incarceration residences, prison gerrymandering dilutes the votes of residents in their home communities, who are disproportionately African-American and Latino, as compared to residents in other communities and districts."^[48]

At the time this suit was filed, four states counted prison inmates as residents of their pre-incarceration districts as opposed to their incarceration districts: California, Delaware, Maryland, and New York. The remaining states (including Connecticut) counted prison inmates as residents of the districts in which they were incarcerated.^[49]

State legislation and ballot measures[edit]

Redistricting legislation[edit]

See state election laws

The following is a list of recent redistricting bills that have been introduced in or passed by the Connecticut state legislature. To learn more about each of these bills, click the bill title. This information is provided by BillTrack50 and LegiScan.

Note: Due to the nature of the sorting process used to generate this list, some results may not be relevant to the topic. If no bills are displayed below, no legislation pertaining to this topic has been introduced in the legislature recently.

Redistricting ballot measures[edit]

See also: Redistricting measures on the ballot and List of Connecticut ballot measures

Ballotpedia has tracked the following ballot measure(s) relating to redistricting in Connecticut.

1. Connecticut Reapportionment Procedure, Question 4 (1976)
2. Connecticut Reapportionment Timetable, Question 4 (1980)
3. Connecticut Timetable for Reapportionment, Amendment 1 (1990)

Recent news[edit]

The link below is to the most recent stories in a Google news search for the terms Redistricting Connecticut. These results are automatically generated from Google. Ballotpedia does not curate or endorse these articles.

See also[edit]

• United States census, 2020
• Redistricting in Connecticut after the 2010 census
• Redistricting
• State-by-state redistricting procedures
• Majority-minority districts
• State legislative and congressional redistricting after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory in state legislative elections before and after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory analysis for the 2014 congressional elections

External links[edit]

• All About Redistricting
• Dave's Redistricting
• FiveThirtyEight, "What Redistricting Looks Like In Every State"
• National Conference of State Legislatures, "Redistricting Process"
• FairVote, "Redistricting"

Footnotes[edit]

v • e Election policy Election governance Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • Washington, D.C. • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Voting policy Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Electoral systems policy Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Primary elections policy Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Redistricting policy Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Recount laws Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Ballot access for political candidates Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Ballot access for presidential candidates Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming Ballot access for political parties Alabama • Alaska • Arizona • Arkansas • California • Colorado • Connecticut • Delaware • Florida • Georgia • Hawaii • Idaho • Illinois • Indiana • Iowa • Kansas • Kentucky • Louisiana • Maine • Maryland • Massachusetts • Michigan • Minnesota • Mississippi • Missouri • Montana • Nebraska • Nevada • New Hampshire • New Jersey • New Mexico • New York • North Carolina • North Dakota • Ohio • Oklahoma • Oregon • Pennsylvania • Rhode Island • South Carolina • South Dakota • Tennessee • Texas • Utah • Vermont • Virginia • Washington • West Virginia • Wisconsin • Wyoming

	v • e State of Connecticut Hartford (capital)
Elections	What's on my ballot? | Elections in 2021 | How to vote | How to run for office | Ballot measures
Government	Who represents me? | U.S. President | U.S. Congress | Federal courts | State executives | State legislature | State and local courts | Counties | Cities | School districts | Public policy