Redistricting in Missouri

in Missouri

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Redistricting
State-by-state redistricting procedures
Majority-minority districts
Congressional district demographics
United States census, 2020

Redistricting is the process by which new congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn. Each of Missouri's eight United States Representatives and 197 state legislators are elected from political divisions called districts. United States Senators are not elected by districts, but by the states at large. District lines are redrawn every 10 years following completion of the United States census. The federal government stipulates that districts must have nearly equal populations and must not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity.^[1][2][3][4]

See the sections below for further information on the following topics:

1. Background: This section summarizes federal requirements for redistricting at both the congressional and state legislative levels. In addition, common state-level requirements are discussed. Recent court decisions affecting redistricting policy are also summarized.
2. State process: This section provides details about the redistricting process in Missouri, identifying the entities responsible for redistricting and delineating state-imposed requirements.
3. District maps: This section provides information about current congressional and state legislative district maps.
4. Issues: This section discusses issues that intersect with redistricting policy, including electoral competitiveness and the consideration of race and ethnicity in electoral policy.
5. Historical information: This section provides summaries of the redistricting processes that occurred in Missouri following the 2010 census.
6. State legislation and ballot measures: This section lists state legislation and state and local ballot measures relevant to redistricting policy.

Background[edit]

This section includes background information on federal requirements for congressional redistricting, state legislative redistricting, state-based requirements, redistricting methods used in the 50 states, gerrymandering, and recent court decisions.

Federal requirements for congressional redistricting[edit]

According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, the states and their legislatures have primary authority in determining the "times, places, and manner" of congressional elections. Congress may also pass laws regulating congressional elections.^[5][6]

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution stipulates that congressional representatives be apportioned to the states on the basis of population. There are 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives. Each state is allotted a portion of these seats based on the size of its population relative to the other states. Consequently, a state may gain seats in the House if its population grows or lose seats if its population decreases, relative to populations in other states. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that the populations of House districts must be equal "as nearly as practicable."^[8][9][10]

The equal population requirement for congressional districts is strict. According to All About Redistricting, "Any district with more or fewer people than the average (also known as the 'ideal' population), must be specifically justified by a consistent state policy. And even consistent policies that cause a 1 percent spread from largest to smallest district will likely be unconstitutional."^[10]

Federal requirements for state legislative redistricting[edit]

The United States Constitution is silent on the issue of state legislative redistricting. In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of rulings in an effort to clarify standards for state legislative redistricting. In Reynolds v. Sims, the court ruled that "the Equal Protection Clause [of the United States Constitution] demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." According to All About Redistricting, "it has become accepted that a [redistricting] plan will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts [within a state or jurisdiction] are more than 10 percent apart."^[10]

State-based requirements[edit]

In addition to the federal criteria noted above, individual states may impose additional requirements on redistricting. Common state-level redistricting criteria are listed below.

1. Contiguity refers to the principle that all areas within a district should be physically adjacent. A total of 49 states require that districts of at least one state legislative chamber be contiguous (Nevada has no such requirement, imposing no requirements on redistricting beyond those enforced at the federal level). A total of 23 states require that congressional districts meet contiguity requirements.^[10][11]
2. Compactness refers to the general principle that the constituents within a district should live as near to one another as practicable. A total of 37 states impose compactness requirements on state legislative districts; 18 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.^[10][11]
3. A community of interest is defined by FairVote as a "group of people in a geographical area, such as a specific region or neighborhood, who have common political, social or economic interests." A total of 24 states require that the maintenance of communities of interest be considered in the drawing of state legislative districts. A total of 13 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.^[10][11]
4. A total of 42 states require that state legislative district lines be drawn to account for political boundaries (e.g., the limits of counties, cities, and towns). A total of 19 states require that similar considerations be made in the drawing of congressional districts.^[10][11]

Methods[edit]

In general, a state's redistricting authority can be classified as one of the following:^[12]

1. Legislature-dominant: In a legislature-dominant state, the legislature retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. Maps enacted by the legislature may or may not be subject to gubernatorial veto. Advisory commissions may also be involved in the redistricting process, although the legislature is not bound to adopt an advisory commission's recommendations.
2. Commission: In a commission state, an extra-legislative commission retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. A non-politician commission is one whose members cannot hold elective office. A politician commission is one whose members can hold elective office.
3. Hybrid: In a hybrid state, the legislature shares redistricting authority with a commission.

Gerrymandering[edit]

In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a state Senate district map that, according to the Encyclopædia Britannica, "consolidated the Federalist Party vote in a few districts and thus gave disproportionate representation to Democratic-Republicans." The word gerrymander was coined by The Boston Gazette to describe the district.

See also: Gerrymandering

The term gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district lines to favor one political party, individual, or constituency over another. When used in a rhetorical manner by opponents of a particular district map, the term has a negative connotation but does not necessarily address the legality of a challenged map. The term can also be used in legal documents; in this context, the term describes redistricting practices that violate federal or state laws.^[1][13]

For additional background information about gerrymandering, click "[Show more]" below.

Recent court decisions[edit]

See also: Redistricting cases heard by the Supreme Court of the United States

The Supreme Court of the United States has, in recent years, issued several decisions dealing with redistricting policy, including rulings relating to the consideration of race in drawing district maps, the use of total population tallies in apportionment, and the constitutionality of independent redistricting commissions. The rulings in these cases, which originated in a variety of states, impact redistricting processes across the nation.

For additional background information about these cases, click "[Show more]" below.

Show more

Gill v. Whitford (2018)[edit]

See also: Gill v. Whitford

In Gill v. Whitford, decided on June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the plaintiffs—12 Wisconsin Democrats who alleged that Wisconsin's state legislative district plan had been subject to an unconstitutional gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments—had failed to demonstrate standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring a complaint. The court's opinion, penned by Chief Justice John Roberts, did not address the broader question of whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Roberts was joined in the majority opinion by Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Kagan penned a concurring opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Associate Justice Clarence Thomas penned an opinion that concurred in part with the majority opinion and in the judgment, joined by Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch.^[17]

Cooper v. Harris (2017)[edit]

See also: Cooper v. Harris

In Cooper v. Harris, decided on May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, finding that two of North Carolina's congressional districts, the boundaries of which had been set following the 2010 United States Census, had been subject to an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the court's majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor (Thomas also filed a separate concurring opinion). In the court's majority opinion, Kagan described the two-part analysis utilized by the high court when plaintiffs allege racial gerrymandering as follows: "First, the plaintiff must prove that 'race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.' ... Second, if racial considerations predominated over others, the design of the district must withstand strict scrutiny. The burden shifts to the State to prove that its race-based sorting of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly tailored' to that end." In regard to the first part of the aforementioned analysis, Kagan went on to note that "a plaintiff succeeds at this stage even if the evidence reveals that a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including political ones." Justice Samuel Alito delivered an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority opinion. This opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy.^[18][19][20]

Evenwel v. Abbott (2016)[edit]

See also: Evenwel v. Abbott

Evenwel v. Abbott was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts in Texas. The plaintiffs, Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger, argued that district populations ought to take into account only the number of registered or eligible voters residing within those districts as opposed to total population counts, which are generally used for redistricting purposes. Total population tallies include non-voting residents, such as immigrants residing in the country without legal permission, prisoners, and children. The plaintiffs alleged that this tabulation method dilutes the voting power of citizens residing in districts that are home to smaller concentrations of non-voting residents. The court ruled 8-0 on April 4, 2016, that a state or locality can use total population counts for redistricting purposes. The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.^{[21][22][23][24]}

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2016)[edit]

Justice Stephen Breyer penned the majority opinion in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

See also: Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts that were created by the commission in 2012. The plaintiffs, a group of Republican voters, alleged that "the commission diluted or inflated the votes of almost two million Arizona citizens when the commission intentionally and systematically overpopulated 16 Republican districts while under-populating 11 Democrat districts." This, the plaintiffs argued, constituted a partisan gerrymander. The plaintiffs claimed that the commission placed a disproportionately large number of non-minority voters in districts dominated by Republicans; meanwhile, the commission allegedly placed many minority voters in smaller districts that tended to vote Democratic. As a result, the plaintiffs argued, more voters overall were placed in districts favoring Republicans than in those favoring Democrats, thereby diluting the votes of citizens in the Republican-dominated districts. The defendants countered that the population deviations resulted from legally defensible efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act and obtain approval from the United States Department of Justice. At the time of redistricting, certain states were required to obtain preclearanceA jurisdiction subject to preclearance needed to get approval from the U.S. Department of Justice before changing election laws or district maps. from the U.S. Department of Justice before adopting redistricting plans or making other changes to their election laws—a requirement struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). On April 20, 2016, the court ruled unanimously that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a partisan gerrymander had taken place. Instead, the court found that the commission had acted in good faith to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The court's majority opinion was penned by Justice Stephen Breyer.^[25][26][27]

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015)[edit]

See also: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2015. At issue was the constitutionality of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which was established by state constitutional amendment in 2000. According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." The state legislature argued that the use of the word "legislature" in this context is literal; therefore, only a state legislature may draw congressional district lines. Meanwhile, the commission contended that the word "legislature" ought to be interpreted to mean "the legislative powers of the state," including voter initiatives and referenda. On June 29, 2015, the court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, finding that "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the state's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the governor's veto." The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito dissented.^{[28][29][30][31]}

State process[edit]

See also: State-by-state redistricting procedures

In Missouri, congressional district boundaries are drawn by the state legislature. These lines are subject to veto by the governor.^[32]

Two distinct politician commissions are ultimately responsible for state legislative redistricting, one for the Missouri State Senate and another for the Missouri House of Representatives. Membership on these commissions is determined as follows:^[32]

1. Senate redistricting commission: The state committee of each major political party nominates 10 members to the commission, for a total of 20 nominees. From this pool, the governor selects five members per party, for a total of 10 commissioners.
2. House redistricting commission: The congressional district committee of each major political party nominates two members per congressional district, for a total of 32 nominees. From this pool, the governor appoints one member per party per district, for a total of 16 commissioners.

How incarcerated persons are counted for redistricting[edit]

See also: How incarcerated persons are counted for redistricting

States differ on how they count incarcerated persons for the purposes of redistricting. In Missouri, incarcerated persons are counted in the correctional facilities they are housed in.

District maps[edit]

Congressional districts[edit]

See also: United States congressional delegations from Missouri

Click the above image to enlarge it.
Source: The National Atlas of the United States of America

Missouri comprises eight congressional districts. The map to the right depicts Missouri's congressional district lines as drawn following the 2010 United States Census. The table below lists Missouri's current House representatives.

State legislative maps[edit]

See also: Missouri State Senate and Missouri House of Representatives

Missouri comprises 34 state Senate districts and 163 state House districts. State senators are elected every four years in partisan elections. State representatives are elected every two years in partisan elections. To access the current state legislative district maps, click here.^[33]

Political impacts of redistricting[edit]

Competitiveness[edit]

There are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between partisan gerrymandering and electoral competitiveness. In 2012, Jennifer Clark, a political science professor at the University of Houston, said, "The redistricting process has important consequences for voters. In some states, incumbent legislators work together to protect their own seats, which produces less competition in the political system. Voters may feel as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to the incumbent legislator. Legislators who lack competition in their districts have less incentive to adhere to their constituents’ opinions."^[34]

In 2006, Emory University professor Alan Abramowitz and Ph.D. students Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote, "[Some] studies have concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on competition. ... [It] is often the case that partisan redistricting has the effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections more competitive."^[35]

In 2011, James Cottrill, a professor of political science at Santa Clara University, published a study of the effect of non-legislative approaches (e.g., independent commissions, politician commissions) to redistricting on the competitiveness of congressional elections. Cottrill found that "particular types of [non-legislative approaches] encourage the appearance in congressional elections of experienced and well-financed challengers." Cottrill cautioned, however, that non-legislative approaches "contribute neither to decreased vote percentages when incumbents win elections nor to a greater probability of their defeat."^[36]

In 2021, John Johnson, Research Fellow in the Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education at Marquette University, reviewed the relationship between partisan gerrymandering and political geography in Wisconsin, a state where Republicans have controlled both chambers of the state legislature since 2010 while voting for the Democratic nominee in every presidential election but one since 1988. After analyzing state election results since 2000, Johnson wrote, "In 2000, 42% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans lived in a neighborhood that the other party won. Twenty years later, 43% of Democrats lived in a place Trump won, but just 28% of Republicans lived in a Biden-voting neighborhood. Today, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to live in both places where they are the overwhelming majority and places where they form a noncompetitive minority."^[37]

Congress[edit]

See also: United States House of Representatives elections, 2016

In 2016, Ballotpedia analyzed the margins of victory in all 435 contests for the United States House of Representatives. Ballotpedia found that the average margin of victory was 36.6 percent. A total of 321 elections (73.8 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or more. Sixteen elections (3.7 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of less than 5 percent.

In Missouri, all eight elections for the United States House of Representatives were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or greater. The smallest margin of victory occurred in District 5, where Emanuel Cleaver (D) won by 20.7 percent. The greatest margin of victory occurred in District 1, where William Lacy Clay (D) won by 55.5 percent. See the table below for full details.

Electoral margins of victory in 2016 United States House of Representatives elections, Missouri
District	Winner	Margin of victory	Total votes cast	Top opponent
Missouri District 1	William Lacy Clay	55.5%	314,024	Steven Bailey
Missouri District 2	Ann Wagner	20.9%	413,296	Bill Otto
Missouri District 3	Blaine Luetkemeyer	39.9%	368,333	Kevin Miller
Missouri District 4	Vicky Hartzler	40%	332,234	Gordon Christensen
Missouri District 5	Emanuel Cleaver	20.7%	324,270	Jacob Turk
Missouri District 6	Sam Graves	39.6%	350,444	David Blackwell
Missouri District 7	Billy Long	40.1%	338,607	Genevieve Williams
Missouri District 8	Jason Smith	51.7%	308,871	Dave Cowell

State legislatures[edit]

See also: Margin of victory in state legislative elections

In 2014, Ballotpedia conducted a study of competitive districts in 44 state legislative chambers between 2010, the last year in which district maps drawn after the 2000 census applied, and 2012, the first year in which district maps drawn after the 2010 census applied. Ballotpedia found that there were 61 fewer competitive general election contests in 2012 than in 2010. Of the 44 chambers studied, 25 experienced a net loss in the number of competitive elections. A total of 17 experienced a net increase. In total, 16.2 percent of the 3,842 legislative contests studied saw competitive general elections in 2010. In 2012, 14.6 percent of the contests studied saw competitive general elections. An election was considered competitive if it was won by a margin of victory of 5 percent or less. An election was considered mildly competitive if it was won by a margin of victory between 5 and 10 percent. For more information regarding this report, including methodology, see this article.

In Missouri, there were 15 competitive races for the Missouri House of Representatives in 2012, compared to nine in 2010. There were five mildly competitive House races in 2012, compared to five in 2010. This amounted to a net gain of six competitive elections.

Partisan composition[edit]

The tables below summarize the current partisan composition of the Missouri House of Representatives and the Missouri State Senate.

House[edit]

Senate[edit]

Race and ethnicity[edit]

See also: Majority-minority districts

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates that electoral district lines cannot be drawn in such a manner as to "improperly dilute minorities' voting power."

States and other political subdivisions may create majority-minority districts in order to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A majority-minority district is a district in which minority groups compose a majority of the district's total population. As of 2015, Missouri was home to one congressional majority-minority district.^[2][3][4]

Proponents of majority-minority districts maintain that these districts are a necessary hindrance to the practice of cracking, which occurs when a constituency is divided between several districts in order to prevent it from achieving a majority in any one district. In addition, supporters argue that the drawing of majority-minority districts has resulted in an increased number of minority representatives in state legislatures and Congress.^[2][3][4]

Critics, meanwhile, contend that the establishment of majority-minority districts can result in packing, which occurs when a constituency or voting group is placed within a single district, thereby minimizing its influence in other districts. Because minority groups tend to vote Democratic, critics argue that majority-minority districts ultimately present an unfair advantage to Republicans by consolidating Democratic votes into a smaller number of districts.^[2][3][4]

Demographics[edit]

See also: Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 and Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 (as percentages)

The tables below provide demographic information for each of Missouri's congressional districts as of 2015. At that time, the population of the largest congressional district, Missouri's 3rd Congressional District, totaled 774,899, and the population of the smallest, Missouri's 1st Congressional District, totaled 736,055, which represented a difference of 5.28 percent.^[39]

Redistricting after the 2020 census[edit]

See also: Redistricting in Missouri after the 2020 census

Missouri was apportioned eight seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. This represented neither a gain nor a loss of seats as compared to apportionment after the 2010 census.^[40]

Enacted congressional district maps[edit]

Missouri is drawing congressional district maps following the 2020 census. New congressional district maps have not yet been enacted.

Enacted state legislative district maps[edit]

Missouri is drawing state legislative district maps following the 2020 census. New state legislative district maps have not yet been enacted.

Redistricting after the 2010 census[edit]

See also: Redistricting in Missouri after the 2010 census

Congressional redistricting, 2010[edit]

Following the 2010 United States Census, Missouri lost one congressional seat. At the time of redistricting, Republicans held majorities in both chambers of the Missouri General Assembly. Democratic Governor Jay Nixon vetoed the legislature's congressional redistricting plan, but on May 4, 2011, the legislature overrode the veto and the new map became law.^[32][41]

Pearson v. Koster[edit]

On September 23, 2011, opponents of the newly approved congressional district map filed suit in the Missouri 19th Judicial Circuit Court, alleging "partisan gerrymandering and deviations from state constitutional compactness requirements." On December 12, 2011, the court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Missouri Supreme Court, which ordered the trial court to reconsider the case. The Missouri Supreme Court "agreed with the trial court's decision to dismiss several counts (including partisan gerrymandering claims), but remanded for a determination of whether the congressional districts (particularly districts 3 and 5) were sufficiently compact under state constitutional law." On February 3, 2012, the trial court again rejected the plaintiff's compactness claims, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed that decision on May 25, 2012.^[42]

State legislative redistricting, 2010[edit]

The two politician commissions charged with state legislative redistricting failed to approve plans of their own. The Missouri Supreme Court appointed a six-member panel to draw the boundaries instead. This panel issued state Senate and House district maps on November 30, 2011.^[32]

The panel's original state Senate district map was ultimately struck down in court. It was also determined that the panel lacked the authority to draw a second map. A new politician commission was convened to make a second attempt. The new commission issued a final state Senate district map on March 12, 2012.^[32]

State legislation and ballot measures[edit]

Redistricting legislation[edit]

See state election laws

The following is a list of recent redistricting bills that have been introduced in or passed by the Missouri state legislature. To learn more about each of these bills, click the bill title. This information is provided by BillTrack50 and LegiScan.

Note: Due to the nature of the sorting process used to generate this list, some results may not be relevant to the topic. If no bills are displayed below, no legislation pertaining to this topic has been introduced in the legislature recently.

Redistricting ballot measures[edit]

See also: Redistricting measures on the ballot and List of Missouri ballot measures

Ballotpedia has tracked the following ballot measure(s) relating to redistricting in Missouri.

1. Missouri Amendment 1, Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and Redistricting Initiative (2018)
2. Missouri Amendment 3, Redistricting Process and Criteria, Lobbying, and Campaign Finance Amendment (2020)
3. Missouri Congressional Redistricting Commission, Amendment 5 (1982)
4. Missouri Congressional Redistricting Proposition, Issue 17 (1922)
5. Missouri Elected Members of Congress, Amendment 3 (August 1965)
6. Missouri General Assembly Reorganization and Legislative Updates Amendment, Issue 3 (February 1924)
7. Missouri Issue 7, State Legislative Redistricting, Salaries and Procedures (1938)
8. Missouri Reapportionment Commission Hearings, Amendment 12 (1982)
9. Missouri Redistricting of Senatorial and Representative Districts, Amendment 3 (August 1978)
10. Missouri Representative and Senatorial Districts, Amendment 3 (January 1966)
11. Missouri Senatorial Redistricting Proposition, Issue 19 (1922)
12. Missouri St. Louis Court Judges Amendment, Issue 12 (1920)

Recent news[edit]

The link below is to the most recent stories in a Google news search for the terms Redistricting Missouri. These results are automatically generated from Google. Ballotpedia does not curate or endorse these articles.

See also[edit]

• United States census, 2020
• Redistricting in Missouri after the 2010 census
• Redistricting
• State-by-state redistricting procedures
• Majority-minority districts
• State legislative and congressional redistricting after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory in state legislative elections before and after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory analysis for the 2014 congressional elections

External links[edit]

• All About Redistricting
• Dave's Redistricting
• FiveThirtyEight, "What Redistricting Looks Like In Every State"
• National Conference of State Legislatures, "Redistricting Process"
• FairVote, "Redistricting"

Footnotes[edit]

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