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    Separation issues (unemployment insurance)

    From Ballotpedia - Reading time: 16 min
    Unemployment insurance
    What are unemployment insurance overpayments?

    Unemployment insurance overpayments refer to benefits paid to individuals that they were not entitled to receive. Overpayment causes include misreported benefit year earnings; inadequate work search activity; separation issues; ability and availability to work issues; base period wage issues; employment service (ES) registration issues; severance, vacation, Social Security, and employer pension pay issues; and dependent allowance issues. Read about unemployment insurance here.


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    Separation issues, in the context of unemployment insurance, refers to inadequate or inaccurate reporting of a claimant's reason for leaving his or her last job. Overpayments occur when claimants are initially determined to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits but later information reveals a disqualifying employment separation. The definition of disqualifying separation varies by state. Generally, the term refers to situations where a worker is fired with cause or quits without cause.[1]

    Separation issues were one of the nine primary causes of unemployment insurance overpayments the U.S. Department of Labor identified in its 2022 Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) report.

    Background[edit]

    Separation issues were the second most common cause of unemployment insurance overpayments in 2022. Errors related to separation issues accounted for about 27.5% of all the overpayments examined in the BAM report. Intentional misreporting of separation circumstances was also the cause of 24.7% of all fraudulent overpayments.[1]

    2022 unemployment benefits overpayments by cause
    Cause Overpayment rate Fraud rate Agency responsible rate
    Benefit Year Earnings 27.78% 47.80% 9.30%
    Separation Issues 27.49% 24.67% 42.48%
    Other Eligibility 10.95% 17.91% 13.62%
    Work Search 10.35% 0.77% 1.01%
    Able+Available 8.43% 6.69% 5.56%
    Base Period Wage Iss. 3.11% 0.37% 3.48%
    ES Registration 1.50% 0.00% 2.01%
    Sev./Vac./SSI/Pension 1.28% 0.95% 1.36%
    Dependent Allow 0.10% 0.10% 0.17%
    Other Issues 9.02% 0.74% 21.02%

    Overpayment recovery by state[edit]

    See also: Unemployment insurance fraud recovery

    States typically use similar unemployment insurance overpayment recovery methods in cases of both fraudulent and non-fraudulent payments. States primarily use the following overpayment recovery methods:[2]

    • Benefits offset - States can deduct overpayment amounts (or a set percentage of overpayments) from future benefits payable to recipients.
    • The Treasury Offset Program - A program that allows states to recover overpayments due to fraud and misreported work or earnings from the recipient's federal tax refund.
    • State tax offset - States can garnish overpayment amounts from recipients' state tax refunds.
    • Direct repayments from overpayment recipients.
    • Interception of lottery winnings.
    • Denial or suspension of professional licenses for individuals who have not returned overpayments to the state.
    • Civil court action to compel repayment in non-fraudulent cases.
    • Criminal court action to compel repayment in fraudulent cases.

    Recovery of fraudulent claims[edit]

    The U.S. Department of Labor compiles information on each states' unemployment insurance overpayment recovery options in cases of fraud.[2] The following list includes highlights from the department's 2023 data:

    • 40 states have laws providing for the recovery of overpayments due to fraud through state tax offset.
    • 47 states allow for 100% benefit offset to recover overpayments due to fraud.[3]
    • 32 states charge interest on overpayments due to fraud.

    The table below outlines each states' overpayment recovery options in cases of fraud:

    Recovery of fraudulent claims
    State Recovery of overpayments through offset Monetary assessments Max prison time imposed when fraud committed by
    Reduction in weekly benefit amount (WBA) Number of years benefit offset limited State tax refunds Interest charged Fines or penalties on claimant Fines or penalties on employer Claimant Employer
    AL 100% 6 years from date overpayment is final Yes 2% per month 4 x WBA to maximum benefit amount; 15% of overpayment $50 - $500 1 to 20 years under Classes B & C felony charges 1 year
    AK 100% No Yes No 50% of each fraud overpayment Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes 5 years Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes
    AZ 100% No Yes[4] 10% per year 15% of overpayment $2,500 Depends on individual’s record 6 months
    AR 100% No Yes 10% per year 50% of overpayment (15% if repaid within 30 days) $20-$200 60 days 60 days
    CA 100% 6 years from mailing Yes 7% until summary judgment filed; 10% until paid in full 30% of overpayment $20,000 1 year minimum 1 year minimum
    CO 100% No Yes No $25 – $1,000 fine; 65% of overpayment penalty $25-$1,000[5] 6 months 6 months
    CT 100% 8 years Yes 1% per month 50% 1st offense; 100% subsequent offense Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes 1 year minimum 1 year minimum
    DE 100% 5 years from end of benefit year Yes 18% per year $23 – $57.50 fine; 15% of overpayment $20-$200 60 days 60 days
    DC 100% No Yes[4] No Up to $100 fine; 15% of overpayment $1,000 60 days 6 months
    FL 100% Commenced within 7 years from date established No No, unless and until a civil judgment is entered 15% of overpayment $5,000 5 years 5 years
    GA 100% 7 years from release date of notice of determination and overpayment Yes 1% per month 15% of overpayment Up to $1,000 for basic fraud; at least $1,000 for multiple counts 12 months per count Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes
    HI 100% 2 years from mailing or final appeal decision; after, if individual agrees (percentage up to individual) No No Up to $10,000 fine; 15% of overpayment Up to $10,000 5 years 1 years
    ID 100% 8 years from final determination date Yes[4] Yes 25% 1st instance; 50% 2nd instance; 100% 3rd instance and subsequent $20-$200 and 10 x WBA Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes
    IL 100% No Yes[4] No, unless suit filed and judgment entered; then 9% per year 15% of overpayment Up to $500 180 days 180 days
    IN 100% No Yes 0.5% per month 25% 1st instance; 50% 2nd instance; 100% 3rd instance and subsequent; 15% of overpayment penalty See note[6] 6-36 months or 2-8 years 6-36 months or 2-8 years
    IA[7] N/A N/A Yes No 15% of overpayment 50% of tax owed 10 years N/A
    KS 100% No Yes 1.5% per month 25% of overpayment $20-$200 60 days 60 days
    KY 100% 10 years from end of applicable BY Yes 1.5% per month Up to $10,000 fine; 15% of overpayment $500-$10,000 1-5 years 1-5 years
    LA 100% No Yes No Penalty is greater of $20 or 25% of overpayment balance $50-$1,000 10 years 30-90 days
    ME 100% No Yes 1% per month 50% 1st incident, 75% 2nd incident, 100% other incidents Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes
    MD 100% No Yes 1.5% per month Up to $1,000 fine; 15% of overpayment Up to $1,000 90 days 90 days
    MA 100% No Yes 1% per month until total interest = 50% of overpayment $1,000-$10,000 fine; 15% of overpayment $2,500-$10,000 6 months to 5 years 1 year
    MI 100% 3 years from overpayment Yes Yes 100% 1st instance; 150% 2nd instance overpayment amount 100% - 1st instance; 150% - 2nd instance 1 year 1 year
    MN[8] N/A N/A Yes[4] 1% per month 40% of overpayment Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes 20 years 20 years
    MS 100% 5 years from last week overpaid Yes 1% per month $100 - $500 fine; 20% of overpayment $100-$1,000 30 days for each fraudulent week 6 months
    MO 100% No; may write off as uncollectible after 5 years of no activity Yes No 25% - 100% of overpayment 25% - 100% of fraudulent amount 6 months for each violation 6 months for each violation
    MT 100% 5 years; 10 years if lien filed Yes Yes 50% of overpayment $50-$500 Depends on recommendation of district attorney or employer 30 days for each false statement
    NE 100% 3 years from end of applicable BY Yes No Up to $500 fine; 15% of overpayment Up to $500 90 days for each count 90 days
    NV 100% 10 years from date overpayment established No Civil judgments only (6% per year) 15% of overpayment[9] $2,000 10 years 10 years
    NH 1%-10% 10 years from date overpayment decision is final No 1% per month Up to $4,000 fine; 20% of overpayment Up to $100,000 15 years 15 years
    NJ 100% No Yes[4] 5% for CY 2009 25% of total overpayment $100 to $1,000 per offense Decided by court 90 days
    NM 100% No Yes No Up to $100; 25% of overpayment Up to $10,000 30 days 30 days
    NY 100% No Yes[4] 9% per year (civil action only) $500; the greater of $100 or 15% of overpayment $500 1 year 1 year
    NC 100% No Yes No Up to $200 fine; 15% of overpayment1 Up to $200 2 years 2 years
    ND 100% No Yes[4] 18% per year $1,500 fine; 15% of overpayment $1,000 10 years 30 days
    OH 100% 6 years from date overpayment is final Yes 14% per year Up to $1,000; 25% of overpayment Up to $1,000 6 months 6 months
    OK 100% No Yes 1% per month Up to $500 fine each week after conviction; 25% of overpayment $50-$500 6 months 90 days
    OR 100% No Yes[4] 1% per month 15 - 30% of overpayment $100-$500 Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes 90 days
    PA 100% 10 years from date applied for benefits No Computed annually based on IRS rate $500 - $1,500; 15% of overpayment $100 - $1,500 per offense 30 days per week illegally claimed 30 days per offense
    RI 100% No Yes 1.5% per month Greater of $1,000 or double value of fraud; 15% of overpayment Greater of $1,000 or double value of fraud 1 year 1 year
    SC 100% No Yes No $50 - $250 fine; 25% of overpayment $20-$100 30 days for each offense or week claimed 30 days
    SD 100% No No 12% per year Up to $2,000 fine (higher fine if amount obtained > $200); 50% - 1st instance; 100% - any subsequent instance overpayment amount $1,000 1 or 2 years 1 or 2 years
    TN 100% No No 1.5% per month 30% - 1st instance; 50% - any subsequent instance overpayment amount Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes 1 year minimum 1 year minimum
    TX 100% No No 1% per month Up to $4,000 fine; 15% of overpayment $4,000 Depends on whether prosecuted as misdemeanor or felony Penalty assessed under misdemeanor or felony statutes
    UT 100% No Yes[4] No, unless it goes to judgment Up to $10,000 fine; 100% of overpayment Up to $20,000 15 years 15 years
    VT 100% 5 years from determination date Yes[4] No Up to $5,000 fine[10]; 15% of overpayment Up to $50 30 days 30 days
    VA 100% No Yes[4] No Up to $2,500; 15% of overpayment Up to $1,000 1 year 1 year
    WA 100% No No 1% per month $20 - $250; 15% - 1st instance, 25% - 2nd instance, 50% - any subsequent instance overpayment amount $20-$250 90 days 90 days
    WV 100% 10 years from last week overpaid No Yes $100 - $1,000 fine; 20% of overpayment $20-$200 30 days 30 days
    WI 100% No Yes[4] No Up to $25,000 fine; 40% – 100% of overpayment depending on facts of fraud Up to $25,000 Up to 10 years Up to 10 years
    WY 100% No Yes No 20% of overpayment and additional 5% of unpaid balance every 6 months thereafter until paid $750 5 years 5 years

    Recovery of non-fraudulent overpayments[edit]

    The U.S. Department of Labor compiles information on each states' unemployment insurance overpayment recovery options in non-fraudulent cases, including accidental misreporting.[2] The following list features highlights from the department's 2023 data:

    • 41 states have laws providing for the recovery of non-fraud overpayments through state tax offset.
    • 33 states allow for up to 100% benefit offset to recover non-fraud overpayments, depending on circumstances.
    • 39 states can pursue civil action to recover non-fraud overpayments.
    • 14 states charge interest on non-fraud overpayments.

    The table below outlines each states' overpayment recovery options in cases of non-fraudulent payments:

    Recovery of non-fraudulent overpayments
    State Offset against future benefits Number of years benefit offset limited Offset with state tax refunds Civil action permitted Interest assessed
    AL 100% No Yes Yes No
    AK 100% No Yes No No
    AZ 50%-100% No Yes[4] No 10% per year from month after overpayment established
    AR 100% 4 years from date of final determination Yes Yes 10% annually once final overpayment has force and effect of judgment of Circuit Court
    CA 25% 6 years from date overpayment notice mailed Yes No[11] No
    CO 25% No Yes Yes No
    CT 50%; if WBA <$100 then 25% No; may write off as uncollectible after 8 years Yes Yes No
    DE 50% 5 years from end of BY Yes Yes No
    DC 100% No Yes[4] Yes No
    FL 100% Commenced within 7 years from date overpayment is established No Yes No, unless and until a civil judgment is entered
    GA 50% 7 years from release date of the notice of determination and overpayment Yes Yes No
    HI 100% 2 years from date of mailing notice of redetermination or final appeal decision; after, may offset % agreed to by individual No Yes No
    ID 100% No Yes Yes Yes
    IL 25% 5 years from date overpayment decision issued Yes Yes No
    IN 100%; if agency error, then 50% No Yes Yes No
    IA 100% 10 years from date of last activity Yes No No
    KS 100% No Yes Yes 1.5% per month if 2 years old
    KY 25% 5 years from last day of BY Yes Yes No
    LA 100% No Yes Yes No
    ME 10% of 1st $100 WBA; 50% of rest No Yes No 1% per month starting 1 year after decision is set up in system
    MD 100% No Yes Yes No
    MA 100%; 50% if nonfault and individual requests No Yes Yes[12] No
    MI Up to 20% 3 years from date of payment Yes Yes Yes, starting 1 year after determination is final
    MN 50% 6 years from date overpayment is determined Yes[4] Yes No
    MS 100% 5 years from last day of week overpaid Yes Yes 1% per month on principal balance after 1st full month overpayment established
    MO 100% No; may write off as uncollectible after 5 years of no activity Yes Yes No
    MT 50%; higher if individual permits 5 years; must file lien against individual’s real and personal property to extend to 10 years Yes No Yes
    NE Any amount per week and any amount up to MBA 3 years from end of BYE in which overpaid weeks were paid Yes Yes No
    NV 50% 5 years from date overpayment established No No No
    NH 1%-10% 10 years from date overpayment decision is final No Yes 1% per month on principal balance from 1st day of month after decision if not paid within 60 days
    NJ 100% or 50% No Yes[4] Yes 2% annually 6 months after debt established if no formal payment agreement
    NM 100%; 50% or 75% if request approved No Yes Yes No
    NY 50% No Yes No No
    NC 50% No Yes Yes[12] No
    ND Minimum 50% No Yes[4] Yes 18% starting 180 days after establishment of overpayment or 180 days from date of final appeal determination
    OH 100% 3 years from date decision is final Yes No No
    OK 100% No; except for administrative error, 1 year from expiration of BY current at time overpayment established Yes; administrative error Yes; administrative error 1% per month starting date overpayment determined
    OR 100% 5 years from week decision became final for nonfault or nonfraud overpayments; no time limit for fault overpayments "Yes (if fault overpayment)" Yes If fault, 1% per month from 1st day of month following 60 days after final decision
    PA 33⅓% (nonfault); 100% (fault) 4 (nonfault), 7 (fault) years from date of application for benefits No Yes Computed annually based on the IRS rate
    RI 100% No Yes Yes No
    SC 100% No Yes No No
    SD 100% No No Yes 12% per year upon establishment of fault overpayment or 6 months after establishment of nonfault overpayment
    TN 100% After the expiration of 6 years from overpayment determination No Yes No
    TX 100% No limit for overpayment absorptions on subsequent BYs No Yes 1% per month from 30 days after served (when becomes judgment)
    UT 50% (nonfault) or 100% (fault) If nonfault, 3 years from date decision is final; if fault, 8 years from effective date of judgment lien Yes (fault only) Yes (fault only) No, unless it goes to judgment
    VT 100% 5 years from determination date Yes[4] Yes No
    VA 100%; 50% if administrative error[13] No Yes Yes No
    WA 50% (up to 100% depending on claimant request) No No Yes 1% per month (simple interest) after ≥ 2 minimum monthly payments are delinquent
    WV 100% 5 years from last day of week overpaid Yes No No
    WI 100% No Yes[4] Yes No
    WY 100% First 5 years from effective date of claim resulting in overpayment Yes Yes No

    Reform proposals related to unemployment insurance compensation[edit]

    This section presents the main approaches to addressing challenges related to unemployment insurance fraud and unemployment insurance overpayments.

    If you know of any reform proposals that are missing, email us.

    Incentivize job search efforts and job acceptance[edit]

    In his 2019 article "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring," economist Ofer Setty proposed that job search efforts and job acceptance among unemployment insurance benefits recipients could be incentivized through monitoring procedures, decreasing a worker's UI benefits the longer they are unemployed, and increasing the taxes unemployed individuals pay once they return to work.[14]

    “ In optimal UI, a risk-neutral planner insures a risk-averse worker against unemployment by setting transfers during unemployment and a wage tax or a subsidy during employment. During unemployment, the worker searches for a job by exerting effort, the level of which is private information. Since the planner cannot observe the job-search effort, the constant benefits that are implied by the first-best allocation would undermine the worker's incentives to search for a job. Therefore, to solve the incentive-insurance trade-off, benefits should continuously decrease during unemployment, and the wage tax upon reemployment should continuously increase.


    I include monitoring in this framework as follows. The planner chooses the quality (precision) of the monitoring technology for the unemployed worker. The cost of monitoring increases with the monitoring's precision, which is correlated with the worker's job-search effort. The planner uses the monitoring signal to improve the efficiency of the contract by conditioning future payments and the wage tax not only on the employment outcome but also on the signal's outcome. These future payments create endogenous sanctions and rewards that, together with the monitoring signal, create effective job-search incentives. By exerting job-search effort, the worker increases the probability of a good signal and, consequently, of higher payments.[14][15]

    		”

    In their 2015 article "Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring," economists David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang proposed that incentives to report new employment and disincentives to collect unemployment benefits while employed could reduce fraudulent claims. The authors proposed a constant period between verification checks for employment, tax incentives for individuals who promptly reported new employment between verification checks, and unemployment insurance benefits that decreased with the length of unemployment.[16]

    “ The most prevalent incentive problem in the U.S. unemployment insurance system is that individuals collect unemployment benefits while being gainfully employed. We examine a model of optimal unemployment insurance where a worker can conceal his employment status and the Unemployment Insurance authority has a technology to verify his employment status. We find that the optimal interval between consecutive monitoring periods is a constant, independent of history. The optimal employment tax is nonmonotonic, increasing between verifications and decreasing immediately after a verification. The optimal unemployment benefits decline with unemployment duration with sharp declines after each verification.[16][15] ”

    Require employers to report work refusals[edit]

    See also: Refusal of work

    The Foundation for Government Accountability (FGA) published a 2020 paper titled "Reporting Employee Work Rejections," proposing that states require employers to report unemployed workers who refuse job offers.[17]

    “ Individuals aren’t returning to work after being laid off, and are refusing new jobs as well. Instead, they continue to draw taxpayer-funded unemployment insurance benefits. Continuing to collect unemployment after refusing to work is fraud. ...


    States should set up simple, easy-to-use processes where employers can report employees who have refused an offer of suitable work.[17][15]

    		”

    Increase verification and reporting[edit]

    The FGA published an article in 2021 titled "Top 10 Examples of Outrageous Unemployment Fraud in 2020—And How to Fix It." The article proposed that state agencies tasked with administering unemployment insurance programs could reduce unemployment insurance fraud by performing increased unemployment insurance verification checks against existing records and reporting their findings to state legislatures.[18]

    “ One typical practice for state unemployment agencies is to cross-reference their claims against the state’s quarterly tax and wage reports, provided by employers. However, rather than simply once per quarter, states should be performing these checks every week, since unemployment claims themselves happen every week.


    Further, a cross-reference is only as good as the database it utilizes. Therefore, weekly checks should be made against three important databases: prison records, the National Directory of New Hires, and the NASWA Integrity Data Hub. These are pre-existing databases to which states should already have access.

    State legislatures should also require their workforce agencies to report back, at least once per year, about their implementation of and findings from these crosschecks, including overpayments detected and money saved.[18][15]

    		”

    In his 1997 article "Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring," U.S. Department of Labor economist Burman Skrable proposed that additional use and publication of unemployment insurance fraud recovery and identification techniques could deter fraudulent claims.[19]

    “ Massive efforts to restructure the UI system's incentives are unlikely. Narrowly defined process improvements, at least to improve benefit payment administration, have had, overall, slight effects on payment accuracy. The most productive avenue remaining might thus be more, and more intelligent, detection and recovery efforts. Students of UI integrity have concluded that much evasive behavior is systematic, and thus liable to detection and deterrence by computerized profiling. They have urged this for increasing employer compliance with tax reporting laws and for screening claimants to focus scrutiny on those persons statistically more likely than average to violate various UI eligibility provisions (Blakemore et al. 1996; Burgess 1992; Burgess and Kingston 1987, p. 256). Such work could build on the profiling systems developed to identify laid-off individuals who are prone to need extensive reemployment assistance and implemented in the past two years. Benefits profiling could use the extensive BQC records. Employer profiling would require each state to mount one-time, if not continuing, random audit programs of employers as was done in Illinois. The targeted selections of workers would help SESAs focus enforcement efforts, information, and job search assistance on workers most likely to need them. Targeted employer audits would increase yield. Both should also provide more effective deterrence if the activity and results are publicized (Kingston, Burgess, and St. Louis 1986, p. 334; Blakemore et al. 1996, p. 22).[19][15] ”

    Require recovery of overpayments[edit]

    See also: Unemployment insurance fraud recovery

    The 2021 FGA paper "Top 10 Examples of Outrageous Unemployment Fraud in 2020—And How to Fix It" also proposed that state legislatures could require state workforce agencies to recover unemployment insurance overpayments and report any cases where recovery was not attempted or impossible.[18]

    “ State lawmakers should also require state workforce agencies to recover all fraud and non-fraud overpayments. Further, state workforce agencies should be required to report and explain to state legislators and the public any cases where they fail or refuse to recover any overpayments, even for allowable reasons such as agency error. Fraud and overpayment recovery should not be optional, since the unemployment tax increases on small businesses that are caused by a leaky unemployment program are also nonoptional.[18][15] ”


    See also[edit]

    External links[edit]

    Footnotes[edit]

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 U.S. Department of Labor, "Benefit Accuracy Measurement State Data Summary Improper Payment Information Act Performance Year 2022," accessed August 7, 2023
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 U.S. Department of Labor, "Chapter 6: Overpayments," accessed May 16, 2023
    3. ↑ New Hampshire can use 1-10% of benefits to offset overpayments. Minnesota prohibits all benefits payments until overpayments due to fraud are returned, so offsetting is not possible. In Iowa, benefits offsets are only possible if a lien is filed against a person's property or rights to property.
    4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 Provision found in non-UI law.
    5. ↑ Individual receives 1.5 x benefits due for weeks delayed, thus increasing employer’s experience rate.
    6. ↑ 4 The employer is assigned the rate for the year in which the violation occurred and the following 3 years. If employer is already paying the highest rate at the time of the violation, or the increase in the contribution rate described in this table is less than 2%, the employer will pay an additional 2% of the employer’s taxable wages for the year in which the violation occurred and the following 3 years.
    7. ↑ Recovery of benefits fraudulently obtained requires a lien be filed against the individual’s property and rights to property, whether real or personal.
    8. ↑ Benefit offset not possible since individuals committing fraud are ineligible for benefits until they fully repay the amount owed.
    9. ↑ May impose additional penalties: 5% if overpayment >$25 to $1,000; 10% if overpayment >$1,000 to $2,500; 35% if overpayment >$2,500.
    10. ↑ If not prosecuted, assessed 1 penalty week for each week of fraud; however if fraud committed within the past 3 calendar years, and fraud committed again, assessed 2 penalty weeks for each week of fraud. Limited to no more than 26 penalty weeks in any BY.
    11. ↑ Summary judgment proceedings may be initiated if the claim was based solely on income received as an elected official.
    12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Do not pursue civil action based on policy.
    13. ↑ If overpayment due to administrative error an individual is allowed to repay solely by voluntary repayment agreement, and the agency will not resort to any other methods of collection unless the individual breaches the agreement.
    14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Journal of the Econometric Society, "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring," May 8, 2019
    15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, "Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring," February 2014
    17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Foundation for Government Accountability, "Reporting Employee Work Rejections," accessed July 9, 2021
    18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Foundation for Government Accountability, "Top 10 Examples of Outrageous Unemployment Fraud in 2020—And How to Fix It," accessed July 9, 2021
    19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, "Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the Unemployment Insurance System: Extent, Measurement, and Correction," January 1, 1997
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