A war crime is an act that violated the laws of war that applied in the jurisdiction and time of occurrence. The definition varies with time and place, and from a strict legal rather than historical perspective. That being said, there is abundant precedent for the trial and conviction of defendants in an ad hoc tribunal that enforced issues ex post facto, because the offense had not been considered prewar, but, such as genocide, met a consensus of qualifying as egregious conduct, perhaps under the doctrine of hostis humani generis or of just war theory.
Just war theory created a basis for formalizing the conduct of war, but there were earlier efforts.
limitations on the conduct of armed conflict date back at least to the Chinese warrior Sun Tzu (sixth century b.c.e.), the ancient Greeks were among the first to regard such prohibitions as law. The notion of war crimes per se appeared more fully in the Hindu Code of Manu (circa 200 b.c.e.), and eventually made its way into Roman and European law. [1]
The first recognized trial of an individual war crime, in the West, appears to have been in Austria in 1474.[2]
Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (1433-1477), known to his enemies as Charles the Terrible, had placed Landvogt Peter von Hagenbach at the helm of the government of the fortified city of Breisach, on the Upper Rhine. The governor, overzealously following his master’s instructions, introduced a regime of arbitrariness, brutality and terror in order to reduce the population of Breisach to total submission. Murder, rape, illegal taxation and the wanton confiscation of private property became generalized practices... the Archduke of Austria, under whose authority von Hagenbach was captured, had ordered the trial of the bloody governor.
This may have been the first true international tribunal, as it was made not “… an ordinary tribunal, an ‘’ad hoc’’ court was set up, consisting of 28 judges of the allied coalition of States and towns.” In his defense, Hagenbach used the doctrine of compliance with superior orders, a defense rejected at the Nuremberge and Tokyo trials. He defended murder, rape, and
orders to his non-German mercenaries to kill the men in the houses where they were quartered so that the women and children would be completely at their mercy. The defence essentially played the card of compliance with superior orders, considering that “Sir Peter von Hagenbach does not recognise any other judge and master but the Duke of Burgundy”, whose orders he could not dispute. “Is it not known that soldiers owe absolute obedience to their superiors ?” This basic consideration was underlined by the fact that the Duke himself had personally confirmed and ratified ex post factum “all that had been done in his name”. Von Hagenbach requested an adjournment to ask for confirmation from the Duke, but the tribunal refused, because this request was considered contrary to the laws of God and because the defendant’s crimes had already been established beyond doubt. Therefore, the tribunal found the accused guilty, and, deprived of his rank of knight and related privileges (because he had committed crimes which he had the duty to prevent), von Hagenbach was executed following the Marshal’s order : “Let justice be done”. [3]
In the present international environment, the most important definitions are in the Geneva Conventions. There are complex issues when dealing with national decisions, such as the doctrine of command responsibility stated in the in re Yamashita decision. International law has generally not stayed abreast of non-state actors accused of terrorism or genocide, democide, or "ethnic cleansing".
Not all those individuals accused of war crimes have come to trial. Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels and Heinrich Himmler all committed suicide before any legal process, and were not tried in absentia as was Martin Bormann. Ratner summarizes this problem as
the creation of a body of law criminalizing certain violations of the laws of war does not mean that war criminals will actually be prosecuted. This remains a matter for States and, increasingly, the United Nations and other international organizations. The Geneva Conventions require all parties to search for and either extradite or try all persons suspected of having committed grave breaches. And international law gives all States the legal right to prosecute war criminals under the theory of universal jurisdiction. While States have at times prosecuted war criminals (e.g., the U.S. trial of the My Lai offenders), the more pervasive pattern, despite the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, is either mere administrative punishment or impunity. [1]
War criminal v. war crime
Individual responsibility for crimes, within formal law, is largely a 20th century development in international law, although it was recognized in the 1864 U.S. Lieber Code. [4] The term "war criminal" was, especially in the period of late World War II and the trials between 1945 and 1948, a term of art for those for whom there was abundant evidence, often in sworn testimony, but were never formally prosecuted due to their death or, as in the case of Josef Mengele, escape. It is also common usage in works of military history, and cannot simply be erased from the literature. For example, Robert Jay Lifton referred to Mengele, in the authoritative book ‘’The Nazi Doctors’’, saying "Certainly no Nazi war criminal has evoked so much fantasy and fiction." [5] This usage is deprecated in current international law, where there is a presumption of innocence. Nevertheless, especially in the context of World War Two and its aftermath, the term certainly was used; the single actual trial under International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), under four-power control, was titled the "International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals." Note that "alleged" or similar qualifiers were not used. Subsequently, the four major powers conducted trials under their national authorities, such as U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunals. Not all legal codes have a presumption of innocence. |
One of the first, if not the first, modern set of the laws of war was the U.S. Lieber Code of April 1863.[6] Confederate Major Henry Wirz was the only war criminal executed under the provisions of the Code. [7]
Unlike the Geneva Convention, the Lieber Code prescribed specific punishment for violations, including death It allowed starvation of unarmed belligerents (Article 17), but generally stated ethical principles for the treatment of civilians, later to be prescribed in the Fourth Geneva Convention for civilians and the Third Geneva Convention for prisoners of war. As opposed to subsequent international treaties, over a number of years, it took the radical step of assigning individual responsibility for crimes.
There are speculations that, under the Lieber Code, that Abraham Lincoln may have committed war crimes, and the historical literature, in these speculations, uses the term “war criminal”. Again, this is a term of art of historical writing rather than a formal adjudication. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, Burris Carnahan evaluates Lincoln’s actions in the context of the laws of war extant in 1861 rather than through a modern lens. He concludes that Lincoln’s actions generally fell within the boundaries of what was considered at the time lawful conduct measured by the somewhat malleable standard of “military necessity.” [8] It also is a case of presentism, a common problem in historical judgments of morality.
Throughout, he shows a president walking a tightrope between employing legal principles to mitigate the impact of warfare on civilians and simultaneously avoiding concessions that would give the Confederacy “belligerent” or sovereign nation status.
The first international humanitarian law treaty, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, was signed on August 22, 1864, slightly after the Lieber Code, and was narrower in scope. This did not use a concept of individual responsibility. [4]
Two major groups of conventions were enacted at The Hague, in 1899 and 1907:
Most have been superseded by other conventions, but were important background to later treaties. The Hague Conventions do not deal with individual guilt.
While the Hague Conventions had not firmly defined individual responsibility, the postwar treaty said:
Even though the Neverlands was the birthplace. of the Hague Conventions,it “ refused to extradite the Kaiser and he was never tried. Although a few Germans of lesser rank were eventually tried under Article 228 by German courts in Leipzig, the process was crippled by controversy among Allied observers and widespread, vehement German opposition. A good portion of this controversy sprang from the radically new idea of individual criminal responsibility for acts of war.”[4] Nevertheless, the term “war criminal” was not used. Hague was intended to be used by member states.
Neither the Hague Conventions, nor the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War addressed the punishment of individuals. There was a weak provision, however, in the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, a predecessor to the First Geneva Convention of 1947. [9] “But these Conventions were to be referred to later in the Nuremberg Judgement.” [3]
While the 1928 Treaty providing for the renunciation of the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, better known as the ‘’’Kellogg-Briand Pact’’’, was initially adopted by Germany, the United States of America, France, Great Britain, India, Japan, Poland, and Czechslovakia. It went into force on July 24, 1929, at which time 32 more countries' instruments of definitive adherence brought them into the treaty; a number of other countries later ratified it. In practice, it did nothing to deter World War II, or preliminary conflicts such as the Second Sino-Japanese War. It did, however, provide the basis for the new concept of “crimes against peace”, or “waging aggressive war”, which were part of the indictments in the IMT.
Post-WWII tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo did rule ex post facto in matters such as crimes against peace, although there was some legal background such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Hague Conventions; see Article 19 in the Charter below
The IMT operated under a charter, Article 14 of which stated that its mission included (emphasis added) “settle the final designation of major war criminals to be tried by the Tribunal”, [10]
Also in the Charter were articles indicating that it might not follow strict international law. This needs to be in the context that much international law for such offenses was not codified until 1949, with the Geneva Conventions.
Evem though the Tribunals used loose definitions, the United Nations General Assembly recognized them with Resolution 95(1) “Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.”[4]
Crimes it tried had, as defendants, individuals and organizations. Note that “war crime” is a subset of the list, but that the title of the court include “war criminal”; the grammar is not consistent.
The IMT tried both individuals and organizations. Membership in an organization judged a criminal enterprise, such as the SS and subordinate organizations such as the SD and Gestapo, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, etc., automatically made the member a criminal.
The Tribunal rejected defenses based on superior orders. With one significant exception, it rejected tu quoque. The exception was in the prosecution of Karl Doenitz as head of the German submarine force. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz submitted a statement that German submarines had not done anything that U.S. submarines had not.
Twelve trials ("cases") were held under U.S. authority following the IMT, focused at the next levels of authority below the Major War Criminals. These individuals were program managers for mass killing in the fields, slave labor, medical experiments, the manufacture of chemicals for gas chambers, etc.
In re Yamashita was an appeal, to the Supreme Court of the United States, as to the legitimacy of the U.S. Army tribunal that tried Tomoyuki Yamashita, a general in the Imperial Japanese Army, for war crimes. The Court only reviewed the issue of the legality of the tribunal, not the controversial argument of command responsibility, in which Yamashita was tried for atrocities of subordinates, although he had taken positive steps to stop them. In Collins v. McDonald, the Court said, "It is not necessary that the charge in court martial proceedings should be framed with the technical precision of a common-law indictment." [11]
But we conclude that the allegations of the charge, tested by any reasonable standard, adequately allege a violation of the law of war, and that the commission had authority to try and decide the issue which it raised. [12]
Bodies such as the International Criminal Court can and do indict suspects. With no enforcement arm, however, it can be difficult to bring them to trial. A leader of an internal insurgency may be accused of war crimes, but also might be part of a reconciliation process. Such problems were simply not issues in the bipolar environments of Nuremberg and Tokyo.
The international dynamics involved with a suspect are complex, as with Bosco Ntaganda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a UN peace operations force is active. In 2000, the UN Office of Legal Affairs said "There would also be significant legal obstacles to MONUC participating in the operation envisaged in the Directive if were to play a prominent role in that operation, whether as a commander of, or senior officer in, one or more of the FARDC units involved, or as a staff officer involved in the planning or execution of the operation or otherwise."[13]
The International Criminal Court has "jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These crimes are defined in detail in the Rome Statute. In addition, a supplementary text of the “Elements of Crimes” provides a breakdown of the elements of each crime. " Its jurisdiction applies to both the direct perpetrators "as well as others who may be liable for the crimes, for example by aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission of a crime. The latter group also includes military commanders or other superiors whose responsibility is defined in the Statute." [14]
The U.S., along with a number of countries, is not a member of the International Criminal Court. They have been concerned that it could be a venue of [[lawfare[15]]], and also the idea offends domestic constituencies concerned with national sovereignty.
U.S. law defines war crimes principally in terms of the Geneva Conventions, although it has not ratified the 1977 extensions. The basic statute does not address the requirements of trial and conviction. [16] "war crime” means any conduct—