First Amendment standing cases

From Conservapedia - Reading time: 1 min

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Though the requirements of standing are somewhat "relaxed in the First-Amendment context," standing is relaxed "only as relating to the various court-imposed prudential requirements of standing." Seals v. McBee, 898 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2018). Even in the First-Amendment context, plaintiffs "still must show that they satisfy the core Article III requirements of injury, causation, and redressability." Id. Here, two theories of standing are relevant: individual and associational standing.

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Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 384 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Tex. 2019).

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Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that the requirements of standing are relaxed in the First Amendment context. That is true, but only as relating to the various court-imposed prudential requirements of standing. See Sec. of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1984). They still must show that they satisfy the core Article III requirements of injury, causation, and redressability. See id.; Miss. State Dem. Party v. Barbour, 529 F.3d 538, 545-48 (5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a First Amendment claim for lack of standing because there was no threat of future injury).

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Seals v. McBee, 898 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2018).