Financial risk management is the practice of protecting economic value in a firm by managing exposure to financial risk - principally credit risk and market risk, with more specific variants as listed aside - as well as some aspects of operational risk. As for risk management more generally, financial risk management requires identifying the sources of risk, measuring these, and crafting plans to mitigate them.[1][2] See Finance § Risk management for an overview.
The discipline can be qualitative and quantitative; as a specialization of risk management, however, financial risk management focuses more on when and how to hedge,[5] often using financial instruments to manage costly exposures to risk.[6]
In the banking sector worldwide, the Basel Accords are generally adopted by internationally active banks for tracking, reporting and exposing operational, credit and market risks.[7][8]
Insurers manage their own risks with a focus on solvency and the ability to pay claims.[11] Life Insurers are concerned more with longevity and interest rate risk, while short-Term Insurers emphasize catastrophe-risk and claims volatility.
In investment management[12] risk is managed through diversification and related optimization; while further specific techniques are then applied to the portfolio or to individual stocks as appropriate.
In all cases, the last "line of defence" against risk is capital, "as it ensures that a firm can continue as a going concern even if substantial and unexpected losses are incurred".[13]
Given these, there is therefore a fundamental debate relating to "Risk Management" and shareholder value.[5][15][16] The discussion essentially weighs the value of risk management in a market versus the cost of bankruptcy in that market: per the Modigliani and Miller framework, hedging is irrelevant since diversified shareholders are assumed to not care about firm-specific risks, whereas, on the other hand hedging is seen to create value in that it reduces the probability of financial distress.
When applied to financial risk management, this implies that firm managers should not hedge risks that investors can hedge for themselves at the same cost.[5] This notion is captured in the so-called "hedging irrelevance proposition":[17] "In a perfect market, the firm cannot create value by hedging a risk when the price of bearing that risk within the firm is the same as the price of bearing it outside of the firm."
In practice, however, financial markets are not likely to be perfect markets.[18][19][20][21] This suggests that firm managers likely have many opportunities to create value for shareholders using financial risk management, wherein they are able to determine which risks are cheaper for the firm to manage than for shareholders. Here, market risks that result in unique risks for the firm are commonly the best candidates for financial risk management.[22]
Application
As outlined, businesses are exposed, in the main, to market, credit and operational risk. A broad distinction[13] exists though, between financial institutions and non-financial firms - and correspondingly, the application of risk management will differ. Respectively:[13]
For Banks and Fund Managers, "credit and market risks are taken intentionally with the objective of earning returns, while operational risks are a byproduct to be controlled".
For non-financial firms, the priorities are reversed, as "the focus is on the risks associated with the business" - ie the production and marketing of the services and products in which expertise is held - and their impact on revenue, costs and cash flow, "while market and credit risks are usually of secondary importance as they are a byproduct of the main business agenda".
(See related discussion re valuing financial services firms as compared to other firms.)
In all cases, as above, risk capital is the last "line of defence".
Banks and other wholesale institutions face various financial risks in conducting their business, and how well these risks are managed and understood is a key driver[23]
behind profitability, as well as of the quantum of capital they are required to hold.[24]
Financial risk management in banking has thus grown markedly in importance since the 2008 financial crisis.[25]
(This has given rise[25] to dedicated degrees and professional certifications.)
The broad distinction between Investment Banks, on the one hand, and Commercial and Retail Banks on the other, carries through to the management of risk at these institutions.
Investment Banks profit from trading - proprietary and flow - and earn fees from structuring and deal making; the latter includes listing securities so as to raise funding in the capital markets (and supporting these thereafter), as well as directly providing debt-funding for large corporate "projects".
The major focus for risk managers here is therefore on market- and (corporate) credit risk.
Commercial and Retail Banks, as deposit taking institutions, profit from the spread between deposit and loan rates.
The focus of risk management is then on loan defaults from individuals or businesses (SMEs), and on having enough liquid assets to meet withdrawal demands; market risk concerns, mainly, the impact of interest rate changes on net interest margins.
All banks will focus also on operational risk, impacting here (at least) through regulatory capital;
(large) banks are also exposed to Macroeconomicsystematic risk - risks related to the aggregate economy the bank is operating in[26]
(see Too big to fail).
Central to both commercial and investment banking is the function of maturity transformation, [27] where institutions fund long-term assets using short-term liabilities. Commercial banks typify this by issuing demand deposits (which can be withdrawn at any time) to fund long-dated assets like mortgages, while investment banks often finance longer-term
trading inventory or structured products through short-term repurchase agreements (repos). While this "borrowing short and lending long" strategy is profitable — normally capturing the spread between lower short-term rates and higher long-term rates — it creates an inherent mismatch on the balance sheet. This structural mismatch generates the primary risks that banks must manage - outlined in the preceding paragraph - but here especially: liquidity risk (the inability to meet short-term obligations without selling assets) and interest rate risk (changes in the yield curve affecting asset and liability values differently), making Asset and liability management (ALM) a critical discipline.
The Basel Accords mandate the predominant risk management framework. Under "Pillar I" regulators define the minimum regulatory capital requirements for quantifiable risks — principally credit risk, market risk, and operational risk as outlined — using either standardised or approved internal‑model approaches. Under "Pillar II", banks must conduct an internal capital adequacy assessment (ICAAP) to capture all material risks, holding sufficient "economic capital" for those.[28] Some jurisdictions (or banks) complement these with additional buffers, stress testing, and supervisory review.
Investment banking
The 5% Value at Risk of a hypothetical profit-and-loss probability density function
Correspondingly, and broadly, the analytics[30][29] are based as follows:
For (i) on the "Greeks", the sensitivity of the price of a derivative to a change in its underlying factors; as well as on the various other measures of sensitivity, such as DV01 for the sensitivity of a bond or swap to interest rates, and CS01 or JTD for exposure to credit spread.
For (ii) on value at risk, or "VaR", an estimate of how much the investment or area in question might lose as market and credit conditions deteriorate, with a given probability over a set time period, and with the bank then holding "economic"- or "risk capital" correspondingly; common parameters are 99% and 95% worst-case losses - i.e. 1% and 5% - and one day and two week (10 day) horizons.[31]
These calculations are mathematically sophisticated, and within the domain of quantitative finance.
The regulatory capital quantum is calculated via specified formulae: risk weighting the exposures per highly standardized asset-categorizations, applying the aside frameworks, and the resultant capital — at least 12.9%[32] of these Risk-weighted assets (RWA) — must then be held in specific "tiers" and is measured correspondingly via the various capital ratios.
In certain cases, banks are allowed to use their own estimated risk parameters here; these "internal ratings-based models" typically result in less required capital, but at the same time are subject to strict minimum conditions and disclosure requirements.
As mentioned, additional to the capital covering RWA, the aggregate balance sheet will require capital for leverage and liquidity; this is monitored via[33] the LR, LCR, and NSFR ratios.
Regulatory changes, are also twofold.
The first change, entails an increased emphasis[41] on bank stress tests.[42]
These tests, essentially a simulation of the balance sheet for a given scenario, are typically linked to the macroeconomics, and provide an indicator of how sensitive the bank is to changes in economic conditions, whether it is sufficiently capitalized, and of its ability to respond to market events.
The second set of changes, sometimes called "Basel IV", entails the modification of several regulatory capital standards (CRR III is the EU implementation). In particular FRTB addresses market risk, and SA-CCR addresses counterparty risk;
other modifications are also being phased in.
To operationalize the above, Investment banks, particularly, employ dedicated "Risk Groups", i.e. Middle Office teams monitoring the firm's risk-exposure to, and the profitability and structure of, its various business units, products, asset classes, desks, and / or geographies.[43]
By increasing order of aggregation and time-horizon:
Financial institutions will set[44][29][45]limit values for each of the Greeks, or other sensitivities, that their traders must not exceed, and traders will then hedge, offset, or reduce periodically if not daily; see the techniques listed below. These limits are set given a range[46] of plausible changes in prices and rates, coupled with the board-specified risk appetite[47] re overnight-losses.[48]
Desks, or areas, will similarly be limited as to their VaR quantum (total or incremental, and under various calculation regimes), corresponding to their allocated[49] economic capital; a loss which exceeds the VaR threshold is termed a "VaR breach".
RWA - the key Pillar I result - is correspondingly monitored from desk level[44] and upward. Market-risk RWA will be monitored more frequently, with credit-risk RWA less so. While VaR is a risk-taking constraint (front office) RWA is a capital supply constraint (management + regulators); it does provide the denominator for the below ratios and feeds into other planning.
Periodically,[55]
these all are estimated under a given stress scenario — regulatory and,[56]
often, internal —
and risk capital,[23]together with these limits if indicated,[23][57] is correspondingly revisited (or optimized[58]).
The approaches taken center either on a hypothetical or historical scenario,[41][30]
and may apply increasingly sophisticated mathematics[59][30] to the analysis.
More generally, these tests provide estimates for scenarios beyond the VaR thresholds, thus “preparing for anything that might happen, rather than worrying about precise likelihoods".[60]
A reverse stress test, in fact, starts from the point at which "the institution can be considered as failing or likely to fail... and then explores scenarios and circumstances that might cause this to occur".[61]
Economic Capital (EC) reflects the totalrisk capital that the bank requires to cover "all" its risks as a going concern assessed on a realistic basis, including survival in a worst-case scenario.[62] The modelling - at least once annually - must be such that [62] any material risks are adequately and conservatively quantified; banks typically deploy detailed (long run) simulations and coupled stress testing. The balance-sheet composition is naturally revisited as part of the assessment. Although essentially an internal measure, EC will be (re)viewed by the Regulator under Pillar II and, as above, is governed by ICAAP, the framework for the bank's "internal capital adequacy assessment process".[28]
A key practice,[63] incorporating and assimilating much of the above, is to assess the Risk-adjusted return on capital, RAROC, of each area (or product). Here,[64]"economic profit" is divided by allocated-capital; and this result is then compared[64][24] to the target-return for the area — usually, at least the equity holders' expected returns on the bank stock[64] — and identified under-performance can then be addressed. (See similar below re. DuPont analysis.)
The numerator, risk-adjusted return, is realized trading-return less a term and risk appropriate funding cost as charged by Treasury to the business-unit under the bank's funds transfer pricing (FTP) framework;[65]
direct costs are (sometimes) also subtracted.[63]
The denominator is the area's allocated capital, as above, increasing as a function of position risk;[66][67][63] several allocation techniques exist.[49]
RAROC is calculated both ex post as discussed, used for performance evaluation (and related bonus calculations),
and ex ante - i.e. expected return less expected loss - to decide whether a particular business unit should be expanded or contracted.[68]
Other teams, overlapping the above Groups, are then also involved in risk management.
Corporate Treasury is responsible for monitoring overall funding and capital structure; it shares responsibility for monitoring liquidity risk, and for maintaining the FTP framework.
Middle Office maintains the following functions also:
Product Control is primarily responsible for ensuring traders mark their books to fair value — a key protection against rogue traders — and for "explaining" the daily P&L; with the "unexplained" component, of particular interest to risk managers.
Credit Risk monitors the bank's debt-clients on an ongoing basis, re both exposure and performance; while (large) exposures are initially approved by an "investment committee".
In the Front Office — since counterparty and funding-risks span assets, products, and desks — specialized XVA-desks are tasked with centrally monitoring and managing overall CVA and XVA exposure and capital, typically with oversight from the appropriate Group.[35]
"Stress Testing" is similarly centralized.[42]
Commercial and retail banks[70][71][72][73]
are, by nature, more conservative than Investment banks, earning steady income from lending and deposits; their focus is more on the "banking book" than the "trading book".
The biggest concern here - as mentioned - is the credit risk due to loan defaults from individuals or businesses. Liquidity risk, in this context not having enough liquid assets to meet withdrawal demands, is also a major focus; while interest rate risk concerns the impact of interest rate changes on net interest margins (the spread between deposit and loan rates).
For these banks, regulatory oversight is often tighter due to their direct impact on the financial system. Thus they are also highly regulated under Basel III and national banking laws, and will also be subject to regular stress testing by central banks; and all regulations above then apply (with local exceptions; e.g. an LCR "threshold" in the US[74]). Additional to these, however, they must maintain high capital and liquidity ratios to protect depositors; see CAMELS rating system.
Given their business model and risk appetite,[72] as outlined, various differences result vs risk management at investment banks.
Banks here maintain specific (and often additional) capital buffers to cover potential loan losses; reflected also in the fact that retail and commercial loans usually attract higher RWA results[75] than for assets typical in investment banking. See, e.g., the ALLL and NPL ratios.
At the same time, credit exposure for these banks is to significantly more clients than at investment banks. For retail banks, "consumer credit risk" is often diversified across a vast number of borrowers, and these employ statistical models for (ongoing "behavioral") credit scoring and probability of default. Commercial banks deal with mid-sized corporate loans and bonds, and apply accounting- and financial analysis to determine creditworthiness; the approach differs re investment banking in that the broad client base allows for (necessitates) automation, with close monitoring on an exception basis. AI / ML is increasingly employed at all stages.[76][77][78]
Concentration risk, relatedly, differs in its management: the concern is sector concentration as opposed to "name concentration". Here, in calculating VaR for a credit portfolio,[79] banks will incorporate a joint default probability for the various sectors and / or industries.
Banks' Economic Capital models, here, are focused more on credit- and operational risk. ICAAP applies; although allows for modelling which may be simpler, and with less stringent review by regulators.
Contribution analytics: Profit and Loss for units sold at current fixed costs.The same, for varying (scenario-based) Revenue levels, at current Fixed and Total costs
It is common for large corporations to have dedicated risk management teams — typically within FP&A or corporate treasury — reporting to the CRO; often these overlap the internal audit function (see Three lines of defence).
For small firms, it is impractical to have a formal risk management function, but these typically apply the above practices, at least the first set, informally, as part of the financial management function; see discussion under Financial analyst.
Actuaries use Extreme Value Theory[38] to model rare events such as "100-year floods". Pictured is Kaskaskia, Illinois, entirely submerged during the Great Flood of 1993.
Insurance companies make profit[111][112] through underwriting — selecting which risks to insure, charging a risk-appropriate premium, and then paying claims as they occur — and by investing the premiums they collect from insured parties.
They will, in turn, manage their own risks[11][113][114][112]
with a focus on solvency and the ability to pay claims:
Life Insurers[115]
are concerned more with longevity risk and interest rate risk;
Short-Term Insurers (Property, Health, Casualty)[111]
emphasize catastrophe- and claims volatility risks.
Fundamental here, therefore, are risk selection and pricing discipline, which as outlined, prevent insurers from taking on unprofitable business.
For expected claims — i.e. those covered, on average, by the pricing model’s assumptions re claim frequency and severity — reserves are set aside (actuarial, with statutory reserves as a floor). These will cover both known claims, reported but unpaid, as well as those which are incurred but not reported (IBNR).
To further mitigate large-scale risks — i.e. to reduce exposure to catastrophic losses — insurers transfer portions of their risk to Reinsurers. Here, analogous to VaR for banks, insurers use simulations to estimate potential losses at various thresholds, while stress tests assess how extreme events might impact capital and reserves under various [116] scenarios.
(Dynamic financial analysis (DFA) and the Wilkie model are used generally in scenario analytics, and may underpin the VaR engine.)
In parallel with all these, as above, premiums collected are invested to generate returns which will supplement underwriting profits, and the fund is then risk-managed as follows:[117] ALM must ensure that investments align with the timing and amount of expected claim payouts; while returns ("float") are defended using the techniques[118] discussed in the next section.
As for banks, all models are regularly reviewed,[119] comparing,[120]
i.a., "Actual versus Expected".
Specific treatments will, as outlined, differ by insurer-profile:
Life Insurers[115] deal with long-term risks tied to mortality, longevity, and interest rates. Policies (e.g., whole life, annuities) can span decades, making them sensitive to long-term economic and demographic shifts. Reserves are large and complex due to the long duration of liabilities, with capital models emphasizing longevity risk, interest rate risk, and lapse risk. Stress tests, correspondingly, focus on long-term scenarios (e.g. sustained low interest rates, or a pandemic related spike in mortality). Reinsurance is often used for excess death claims. ALM here is critical, and investments will be in long-term, stable assets (bonds as well as equities) to match these long-duration liabilities.
Short-Term Insurers[111]face more volatility relative to Life companies, while claims are typically resolved within a year or two (although tail events - e.g. asbestos litigation - can linger). Thus, reserves are shorter-term but must account for high uncertainty in claim frequency and severity; IBNR may be significant, especially after large events. Capital requirements focus on underwriting risk (e.g., mispricing policies) and catastrophe risk (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes). Stress tests therefore emphasize short-term catastrophic scenarios, and specialized catastrophe models are often used. Reinsurance is widely utilized to cap exposure to catastrophes; as are quota-share or excess-of-loss treaties re single events. Rapid claims settlement reduces reserving duration compared to life insurance, and portfolios lean toward liquid, shorter-term assets (e.g., cash, short-term bonds).
In a typical insurance company, Risk Management and the Actuarial Function are separate but closely related departments, each with distinct responsibilities. In smaller companies, the lines might blur, with actuaries taking on some risk management tasks, or vice versa. Regardless, the Head Actuary (or Chief Actuary or Appointed Actuary) has specific responsibilities, typically requiring formal "sign-off": Reserve Adequacy and Solvency and Capital Assessment, as well as Reinsurance Arrangements. The relevant calculations are usually performed with specialized software — provided e.g. by WTW and Milliman — and often using R or SAS.
Modern portfolio theory suggests a diversified portfolio of shares and other asset classes (such as debt in corporate bonds, treasury bonds, or money market funds) will realise more predictable returns. Illustrated is a typical diversified fund, where asset allocation is between asset classes; within each, managers may further select specific securities.Efficient Frontier. The hyperbola is sometimes referred to as the "Markowitz bullet", and its upward sloped portion is the efficient frontier if no risk-free asset is available. With a risk-free asset, the straight capital allocation line is the efficient frontier.Here maximizing return and minimizing risk such that the portfolio is Pareto efficient (Pareto-optimal points in red)
A key issue, however, is that the (assumed) relationships are (implicitly) forward looking.
As observed in the late-2000s recession, historic relationships can break down, resulting in losses to market participants believing that diversification would provide sufficient protection (in that market, including funds that had been explicitly set up to avoid being affected in this way[123]).
A related issue is that diversification has costs: as correlations are not constant it may be necessary to regularlyrebalance the portfolio, incurring transaction costs, negatively impacting investment performance;[124]
and as the fund manager diversifies, so this problem compounds (and a large fund may also exert market impact).
See Modern portfolio theory § Criticisms.
The above mean-variance optimization is implemented[125]
(more or less) directly[126] by asset allocation funds.
At the same time - in part given the issues outlined - alternative methods for portfolio construction have been developed,[127][128]including new approaches to defining risk, and to the optimization itself.[127]
Notably, managers will employ factor models[129] — generically APT — using time series regression[130] to design portfolios[118] with the desired exposure to macroeconomic, market and / or fundamental risk factors;[131] respectively: macro-, factor-, and style portfolios.
The optimization, under both the mean-variance and
[132][133]
factor model approaches, may be with respect to (tail)risk parity, focusing on allocation of risk, rather than allocation of capital, and employ, e.g. the Black–Litterman model which modifies the above "Markowitz optimization", to incorporate the "views" of the portfolio manager.[134]
An important requirement, regardless of approach, is that the Manager must ensure[121][138] that the portfolio's risk level matches the investor's objectives and comfort zone, i.e. must ensure risk tolerance alignment. Correspondingly, the fund's (advertised) investment strategy will, almost necessarily, define its own risk tolerance and appetite, and hence selection and application of optimization-criteria and risk management techniques. Here, for both individuals and Funds, generally, longer time horizons allow for greater tolerance of short-term volatility, while shorter horizons require more conservative strategies. A further generalization: portfolios constructed using mathematical-approaches are more exposed to market risk and the stock market cycle; while those constructed by stock picking are exposed, more, to firm and sector specific risks.
Guided by the analytics, and / or the above considerations, fund managers (and traders) will implement specific risk hedging techniques and strategies.[121][12]
As appropriate, these are applied to the portfolio as a whole ("top-down") or to individual holdings ("bottom-up"):
To protect the overall portfolio, fund managers[140]may sell the stock market index future or buy puts on the stock market index option;[141][142] the respective sensitivities, portfolio beta and option delta, determine the number of hedge-contracts required.[140] For both, the logic is that the (diversified) portfolio is likely highly correlated with the stock index it is part of: thus if the portfolio-value declines, the index will have declined likewise with the derivative holder profiting correspondingly.[140] Fund managers may (instead) engage in "portfolio insurance", a dynamic hedging process that involves selling index futures during periods of decline and using the proceeds to offset portfolio losses.
For derivative portfolios, and positions, the Greeks are a vital risk management tool: as above, these measure sensitivity to a small change in a given underlying price, rate, or parameter, and the portfolio is then rebalanced accordingly[140] by including additional derivatives with offsetting characteristics, or by purchasing or selling specified units of the underlying security.
Further, and more generally, various safety-criteria may also inform overall portfolio composition, both at initial construction and, in this context, as a risk overlay.
The Kelly criterion[151]will suggest - i.e. limit - the size of a position that an investor should hold in her portfolio.
Roy's safety-first criterion[152]minimizes the probability of the portfolio's return falling below a minimum desired threshold.
Chance-constrained portfolio selection similarly seeks to ensure that the probability of final wealth falling below a given "safety level" is acceptable.
In preference to the approaches above, Managers of Discretionary Funds, will, as mentioned, rely largely [135][136]on insight when managing portfolio risk. Here, they will closely monitor company-level risks, industry dynamics, and macro-factors, and will then reduce exposure, or hedge, based on any perceived risks.
In parallel, these Managers apply (practice derived) position-level stop loss rules, as well as portfolio-level construction limits re max position size, sector exposure, country or currency exposure, and benchmark-relative tracking error.
As a supplement, Managers (at larger institutions) may use various of the above quantitative tools to monitor risk exposures and potential losses.
Regardless of approach, all Managers - especially those with long horizons - must ensure a positive real growth rate, i.e. that their portfolio-returns at least match inflation (and regardless of market returns). Since this phenomenon impacts all securities,[157] inflation risk will typically be managed[158][159] at the portfolio level. Here the manager will programmatically[160] (or heuristically) increase exposure[161] to inflation-sensitive stocks (e.g. consumer staples) and / or invest in tangible assets and commodities, as well as inflation swaps and inflation-linked bonds (ILBs). The latter inflation derivatives can, in fact, provide a direct inflation hedge: to fully offset inflation,
[162]
the proportion of the portfolio in ILBs, for example, will correspond to its inflation beta[163][164][161]
(sensitivity of portfolio return to increases in inflation, measured using regression).
See Inflation hedge § Portfolio construction.
Newer and broader, and often qualitative[165] risks, are similarly managed industry-wide.
These include ESG risks (financially material risks related to the broader environmental, social, and governance contexts in which the firm operates),[166]cybersecurity risks (a material drop in share prices caused, e.g., by a significant ransomware incident)[167]
and geopolitical risks.[165]
These risks are often less tangible and less immediately visible than traditional financial risks,[166][168]
and quantifying these can be challenging.[165]
Managers may then employ techniques such as scenario analysis, and, sometimes, approaches from game theory.
Based on this, in the case of geopolitical risks they will then diversify geographically and / or increase exposure (possibly factor-wise) to macro-sensitive assets such as gold, oil, and Bitcoin. (See Global macro.)
ESG and cybersecurity risks are dealt with by diversification, and (for bottom-up portfolios) proactive screening,[166] with direct management engagement[167] as necessary.
The rise of alternative investments (e.g., cryptocurrencies, private equity) introduces unique risks that must also be addressed.[169][170]
Beyond market volatility, investment management requires rigorous control of liquidity, operational, and leverage risks[171][172] (the concerns mirroring those discussed above re banking).
Liquidity risk management ensures that a fund can meet redemption requests or rebalance portfolios without incurring excessive transaction costs, typically by maintaining cash buffers or limiting holdings in illiquid assets; this is closely tied to leverage concerns, where borrowed capital magnifies losses (as outlined above) and introduces the risk of margin calls or forced liquidation.
Operational and counterparty risks—the potential for failure in internal systems, trade execution, or default by a trading partner—are mitigated through robust reconciliation processes, segregation of duties, and collateral agreements.
These concerns differ significantly by fund structure.
Hedge funds often employ high leverage and hold illiquid assets to boost returns, managing the associated risks through "lock-up" periods that restrict withdrawals; in contrast, mutual funds and ETFs typically face regulatory limits on leverage and must provide daily liquidity, necessitating stricter risk controls to prevent asset-liability mismatches.
Unlike institutional managers, discretionary managers and retail brokers [138] manage liquidity by holding cash and blue-chip assets for immediate access, while
avoiding or (strictly) limiting leverage, while operational and counterparty risks are largely outsourced to clearing houses and protected by, e.g., SIPC insurance, prioritizing regulatory safety over complex hedging strategies.
Pension funds are specifically concerned re any asset–liability mismatch, and will employ interest rate immunization or cashflow matching, respectively attempting to offset changes in liabilities with corresponding changes in asset value (an increase in rates results in a decreased instrument value), or by matching cash outflows - i.e., financial obligations - with cash inflows and asset growth over a given time horizon.
While portfolio risks are managed day-to-day by the fund manager, the Chief Risk Officer - often[173] Chief Investment Officer - is responsible for overall risk.[174][175][176]
The Risk Function ("Group" at an IB, as above) thus monitors aggregate firm-level risks (exposure across funds, as well as, e.g., reputational risk) ensuring alignment with the firm's risk appetite and regulatory obligations; it will, relatedly, be involved in scenario generation - economic and geopolitical - and stress testing.
This team also provides independent challenge and escalation if a fund breaches its Risk Budget [177] (e.g. VaR, stress losses and sector concentration).
The CRO typically signs off on stress testing, liquidity risk reviews, and model validation.
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