Thought of Thomas Aquinas

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This article contains a selection of thoughts of Thomas Aquinas on various topics. It is not intended as a complete account of Aquinas's thought. Within Aquinas' thought is included the philosophical school of Thomism.

Social justice

Aquinas defines distributive justice as follows:^[1]

[I]n distributive justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another.

Aquinas asserts that Christians have a duty to distribute with provision to the poorest of society.^[2]

"Social justice" is a term that arose in the 19th century in the writings of Luigi Taparelli, SJ, ^[3] and it was his term for the reality Thomas Aquinas called "legal justice" or "general justice." Legal or social justice is the contribution from the individual to the common good. So for Aquinas, distributive justice goes in the direction from the common good to the individual, and is a proportional distribution of common goods, to individuals based on their contribution to the community. Legal or general justice, or what came to be called social justice, goes in the other direction, from the individuals to the common good.^[4]

It is helpful to understand as well other related types of justice: if social justice is from the individual to the community, and distributive justice is from the community to the individual, there is also commutative justice (between two individuals, as in buying and selling, or stealing and returning) as well as retributive justice (rectifications that occur to restore justice, once justice has been violated).^[5]

Death penalty

In Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 3, Chapter 146, which was written by Aquinas prior to writing the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas was a vocal supporter of the death penalty. He stated:^[6]

[M]en who are in authority over others do no wrong when they reward the good and punish the evil.

[...] for the preservation of concord among men it is necessary that punishments be inflicted on the wicked. Therefore, to punish the wicked is not in itself evil.

Moreover, the common good is better than the particular good of one person. So, the particular good should be removed in order to preserve the common good. But the life of certain pestiferous men is an impediment to the common good which is the concord of human society. Therefore, certain men must be removed by death from the society of men.

Furthermore, just as a physician looks to health as the end in his work, and health consists in the orderly concord of humors, so, too, the ruler of a state intends peace in his work, and peace consists in "the ordered concord of citizens." Now, the physician quite properly and beneficially cuts off a diseased organ if the corruption of the body is threatened because of it. Therefore, the ruler of a state executes pestiferous men justly and sinlessly in order that the peace of the state may not be disrupted.

Heretics

Aquinas advocated the death penalty for obstinate heretics, writing:

With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but "after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome commenting on Galatians 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame." (ST II:II 11:3 corpus)

According to Michael Novak, Aquinas' view in this matter is one of the more difficult parts of dealing with Thomism.^[7]

Usury

The Second Lateran Council called the practice of loaning money "detestable and shameful... insatiable rapacity of money lenders, forbidden both by divine and human laws throughout the Old and New Testament, we condemn, and separate from the ecclesiastical consolation".^[8] The Fifth Lateran Council defined usury as "when, from its use, a thing which produces nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and profit without any work, any expense or any risk".^[9]

Our views concerning capitalism, unfair labor practice, living wage, price gouging, monopolies, fair trade practices, and predatory pricing, inter alia, are remnants of the inculcation of Aquinas' interpretation of natural moral law.^[10]

Forced baptism of children of Jews and heretics

The position taken by Aquinas is that if children were being reared in error, the Church had no authority to intervene. From Summa Theologica II-II Q. 10 Art. 12:

Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parent's will. The custom of the Church has been given very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of Catholic Doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than that of an Augustine or a Jerome or any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of Jews against the will of their parents. There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to faith. For children baptized before coming into the use of reason, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith. The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within the mother's womb and later on after birth, and before it has the use of free will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, like a spiritual womb. So long as a man does not have the use of reason, he is no different from an irrational animal. Hence, it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parent's custody, or anything done against its parent's wish.

The question was again addressed by Aquinas in Summa Theologica III Q. 68 Art. 10:

It is written in the Decretals (Dist. xiv), quoting the Council of Toledo: In regard to the Jews the holy synod commands that henceforth none of them be forced to believe; for such are not to be saved against their will, but willingly, that their righteousness may be without flaw. Children of non-believers either have the use of reason or they have not. If they have, then they already begin to control their own actions, in things that are of Divine or natural law. And therefore, of their own accord, and against the will of their parents, they can receive Baptism, just as they can contract in marriage. Consequently such can be lawfully advised and persuaded to be baptized. If, however, they have not yet the use of free-will, according to the natural law they are under the care of their parents as long as they cannot look after themselves. For which reason we say that even the children of the ancients were saved through the faith of their parents.

The issue was discussed in a papal bull by Pope Benedict XIV (1747) where both schools were addressed. The pope noted that the position of Aquinas had been more widely held among theologians and canon lawyers, than that of John Duns Scotus.^[11]

God

Augustine of Hippo's reflexion on divine essentiality or essentialist theology would influence Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure. By this method, the essence of God is defined by what God is, and also by describing what God is not (negative theology). St. Thomas took the text of Exodus beyond the explanation of essential theology. He bridged the gap of understanding between the being of essence and the being of existence. In Summa Theologica, the way is prepared with the proofs for the existence of God. All that remained was to recognize the God of Exodus as having the nature of "Him Who is the supreme act of being". God is simple, there is no composition in God. In this regard, Aquinas relied on Boethius who in turn followed the path of Platonism, something Aquinas usually avoided. The conclusion was that the meaning of "I Am Who Am" is not an enigma to be answered, but the statement of the essence of God. This is the discovery of Aquinas: the essence of God is not described by negative analogy, but the "essence of God is to exist". This is the basis of "existential theology" and leads to what Gilson calls the first and only existential philosophy. In Latin, this is called "Haec Sublimis Veritas", "the sublime truth". The revealed essence of God is to exist, or in the words of Aquinas, I am the pure Act of Being. This has been described as the key to understanding Thomism. Thomism has been described (as a philosophical movement), as either the emptiest, or the fullest of philosophies.^[12]

See also

• Actus essendi
• Actus purus
• Determinatio
• Thomistic sacramental theology

Notes

Further reading

• Plucknett, K, A Concise History of the Common Law, Little, Brown, 1956
• Copleston, Frederick, S.J., A History of Philosophy, vol. II: Augustine to Scotus, Paulist Press, New Jersey, 1950 (pp. 302–434)
• Nahm, Milton, Selections from Early Greek Philosophy, Appleton-Century Crofts, New York, 1964 (pp. 1–36)
• Nichols, Adrian, O.P., Discovering Aquinas, An Introduction to His Life, Work and Influence, Wm. B. Eardmans Publ. 2002
• Pieper, Joseph, The Silence of St. Thomas, Pantheon, 1957 (pp. 80–91)
• Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1972
• Shahan, Robert W. and Kovach, Francis J., Bonaventure and Aquinas, Enduring Philosophers, University of Oklahoma Press, 1976 (pp. 118–132)

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