Islamic extremism, Islamist extremism or radical Islam refers a set of extremist beliefs, behaviors and ideology within Islam. These terms remain contentious, encompassing a spectrum of definitions, ranging from academic interpretations to the notion that all ideologies other than Islam have failed and are inferior.[1] Furthermore, these terms may extend to encompass other sects of Islam that do not share such extremist views.
Political definitions of Islamic extremism, such as that employed by the government of the United Kingdom, characterize it as any form of Islam that opposes "democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs."[2] In 2019, the United States Institute of Peace issued a report on extremism in fragile states, advocating the establishment of a shared understanding, operational framework for prevention, and international cooperation.[3]
It is crucial to distinguish Islamic extremism from Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism. Islamic fundamentalism refers to a movement among Muslims advocating a return to the fundamental principles of an Islamic state in Muslim-majority countries. Meanwhile, Islamism constitutes a form of political Islam. However, both Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism can also be classified as subsets of Islamic extremism. Acts of violence committed by Islamic terrorists and jihadists are often associated with these extremist beliefs.
The academic definition of radical Islam consists of two parts:
The first being: Islamic thought that states that all ideologies other than Islam, whether associated with the West (capitalism or democracy) or the East (communism or socialism) have failed and have demonstrated their bankruptcy.[1]
The second being: Islamic thought that states that (semi)secular regimes are wrong because of their negligence of Islam.[4]
United Kingdom High Courts definition
The UK High Courts have ruled in two cases on Islamic extremism, and provided definition.
Aside from those, two major definitions have been offered for Islamic extremism, sometimes using overlapping but also distinct aspects of extreme interpretations and pursuits of Islamic ideology:
The use of violent tactics such as bombing and assassinations for achieving perceived Islamic goals (see Jihadism; or Zeyno Baran, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute, prefers the term Islamist extremism)[5]
An extremely conservative view of Islam,[6] which does not necessarily entail violence[7] (see also Islamic fundamentalism [Baran again prefers the term Islamism]).[5]
UK High Court rulings
There are two UK High Court cases that explicitly address the issue of Islamic extremism.[8]
May 2016: An Appeal from the Crown Court and Central Criminal Court: several individuals' cases considered together.[9]
October 2016: In which the Judge concluded that Imam Shakeel Begg is an Islamic Extremist, and does not uphold Begg's claim that the BBC had libelled him by saying so.[10]
May 2016 appeal case
The judge refers to several grounds: section 20 of the 2006 Act; the definition of "terrorism" in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the decision of the Supreme Court in R v Gul.[9]
October 2016 Shakeel Begg case
Begg, a prominent Muslim public figure and Imam at Lewisham Islamic Centre since 1998 lost his 2016 court case of Libel against the BBC. This case is noteworthy because the judge lists a 10-point definition of Islamic extremism that he used to determine the case:
118. In my view, the following constitute "extremist" Islamic positions (or indicia thereof).
First, a 'Manichean' view of the world. A total, eternal 'Manichean' worldview is a central tenet of violent Islamic extremism. It divides the world strictly into 'Us' versus 'Them': those who are blessed or saved (i.e. the "right kind" of Muslim) on the one hand and those who are to be damned for eternity (i.e. the "wrong kind" of Muslim and everyone else) on the other. For violent Islamic extremists, the "wrong kind" of Muslim includes moderate Sunni Muslims, all Shia Muslims, and many others who are "mete for the sword" and can be killed, and anyone who associates or collaborates" with them...
Second, the reduction of jihad (striving in God's cause) to qital (armed combat) ('the Lesser Jihad')...
Third, the ignoring or flouting of the conditions for the declaration of armed jihad (qital), i.e. the established Islamic doctrinal conditions for the declaration of armed combat (qital) set out above...
Fourth, the ignoring or flouting of the strict regulations governing the conduct of armed jihad, i.e. the stipulations in the Qur'an and the Sunna for the ethics of conducting qital set out above. Thus, the use of excessive violence, attacks on civilians, indiscriminate 'suicide' violence and the torture or the murder of prisoners would constitute violation of these regulations of jihad...
Fifth, advocating armed fighting in defence of Islam (qital) as a universal individual religious obligation (fard al 'ayn)...
Sixth, any interpretation of Shari'a (i.e. religious law laid down by the Qur'an and the Sunna) that required breaking the 'law of the land'...
Seventh, the classification of all non-Muslims as unbelievers (kuffar)...
Eighth, the extreme Salafist Islamism doctrine that the precepts of the Muslim faith negate and supersede all other natural ties, such as those of family, kinship and nation...
Ninth, the citing with approval the fatwa (legal opinions) of Islamic scholars who espouse extremist view...
Tenth, any teaching which, expressly or implicitly, encourages Muslims to engage in, or support, terrorism or violence in the name of Allah.[10][11]
Key influences of radical Islam
Early Islam
According to the academic definition of radical Islam, the second condition for something to be called radical Islam, is that it is antigovernmental. Consequently, a government is a condition for radical Islam. However, even though the peace of Westphalia was established in 1648 and thus introduced the nation state, the writings of the formative centuries of Islamic history are influential to the contemporary writings that were coined radical after the concept of the nation state was established in the Muslim world as well. Key influences of radical Islam that stem from early Islam include:
Kharijites
Islamic extremism dates back to the early history of Islam with the emergence of the Kharijites in the 7th century CE.[12] The original schism between Kharijites, Sunnīs, and Shīʿas among Muslims was disputed over the political and religious succession to the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.[12] From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[12] Shīʿas believe ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs consider Abu Bakr to hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during the First Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[12] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be either infidels (kuffār) or false Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed them worthy of death for their perceived apostasy (ridda).[12][13][14]
The Islamic tradition traces the origin of the Kharijities to the battle between ʿAlī and Mu'awiya at Siffin in 657 CE. When ʿAlī was faced with a military stalemate and agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration, some of his party withdrew their support from him. "Judgement belongs to God alone" (لاَ حُكْمَ إلَا لِلّهِ) became the slogan of these secessionists.[12] They also called themselves al-Shurat ("the Vendors"), to reflect their willingness to sell their lives in martyrdom.[15]
These original Kharijites opposed both ʿAlī and Mu'awiya, and appointed their own leaders. They were decisively defeated by ʿAlī, who was in turn assassinated by a Kharijite. Kharijites engaged in guerilla warfare against the Umayyads, but only became a movement to be reckoned with during the Second Fitna (the second Islamic Civil War) when they at one point controlled more territory than any of their rivals. The Kharijites were, in fact, one of the major threats to Ibn al-Zubayr's bid for the caliphate; during this time they controlled Yamama and most of southern Arabia, and captured the oasis town of al-Ta'if.[15]
The Azariqa, considered to be the extreme faction of the Kharijites, controlled parts of western Iran under the Umayyads until they were finally put down in 699 CE. The more moderate Ibadi Kharijites were longer-lived, continuing to wield political power in North and East Africa and in eastern Arabia during the 'Abbasid period. Because of their readiness to declare any opponent as apostate, the extreme Kharijites tended to fragment into small groups. One of the few points that the various Kharijite splinter groups held in common was their view of the caliphate, which differed from other Muslim theories on two points.
First, they were principled egalitarians, holding that any pious Muslim ("even an Ethiopian slave") can become Caliph and that family or tribal affiliation is inconsequential. The only requirements for leadership are piety and acceptance by the community.
Second, they agreed that it is the duty of the believers to depose any leader who falls into error. This second principle had profound implications for Kharijite theology. Applying these ideas to the early history of the caliphate, Kharijites only accept Abu Bakr and 'Umar as legitimate caliphs. Of 'Uthman's caliphate they recognize only the first six years as legitimate, and they reject 'Ali altogether.
By the time that Ibn al-Muqaffa' wrote his political treatise early in the 'Abbasid period, the Kharijites were no longer a significant political threat, at least in the Islamic heartlands. The memory of the menace they had posed to Muslim unity and of the moral challenge generated by their pious idealism still weighed heavily on Muslim political and religious thought, however. Even if the Kharijites could no longer threaten, their ghosts still had to be answered.[15] The Ibadis are the only Kharijite group to survive into modern times.
The Salafiyya movement is a conservative,[16]Islahi (reform)[17] movement within Sunnī Islam that emerged in the second half of the 19th century and advocate a return to the traditions of the "devout ancestors" (Salaf al-Salih). It has been described as the "fastest-growing Islamic movement"; with each scholar expressing diverse views across social, theological, and political spectrum. Salafis follow a doctrine that can be summed up as taking "a fundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers—al-salaf al-salih, the 'pious forefathers'....They reject religious innovation, or bidʻah, and support the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law)."[18] The Salafi movement is often divided into three categories: the largest group are the purists (or quietists), who avoid politics; the second largest group are the militant activists, who get involved in politics; the third and last group are the jihadists, who constitute a minority.[18] Most of the violent Islamist groups come from the Salafi-Jihadist movement and their subgroups.[19] In recent years, Jihadi-Salafist doctrines have often been associated with the armed insurgencies of Islamic extremist movements and terrorist organizations targeting innocent civilians, both Muslims and Non-Muslims, such as al-Qaeda, ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh, Boko Haram, etc.[20][21][18][19] The second largest group are the Salafi activists who have a long tradition of political activism, such as those that operate in organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab world's major Islamist movement. In the aftermath of widescale repressions after the Arab spring, accompanied by their political failures, the activist-Salafi movements have undergone a decline. The most numerous are the quietists, who believe in disengagement from politics and accept allegiance to Muslim governments, no matter how tyrannical, to avoid fitna (chaos).[18]
Wahhabism has been described as a conservative, strict, and fundamentalist branch of Sunnī Islam,[30] with puritan views,[30] believing in a literal interpretation of the Quran.[22] The terms "Wahhabism" and "Salafism" are sometimes evoked interchangeably, although the designation "Wahhabi" is specifically applied to the followers of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and his reformist doctrines.[22] The label "Wahhabi" was not claimed by his followers, who usually refer themselves as al-Muwaḥḥidūn ("affirmers of the singularity of God"), but is rather employed by Western scholars as well as his critics.[22][23][27] Starting in the mid-1970s and 1980s, the international propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism within Sunnī Islam[30] favored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia[25][31][32] and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf has achieved what the French political scientist Gilles Kepel defined as a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."[33]
22 months after the September 11 attacks, when the FBI considered al-Qaeda as "the number one terrorist threat to the United States", journalist Stephen Schwartz and U.S. Senator Jon Kyl have explicitly stated during a hearing that occurred in June 2003 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the U.S. Senate that "Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world".[34] As part of the global "War on Terror", Wahhabism has been accused by the European Parliament, various Western security analysts, and think tanks like the RAND Corporation, as being "a source of global terrorism".[34][35] Furthermore, Wahhabism has been accused of causing disunity in the Muslim community (Ummah) and criticized for its followers' destruction of many Islamic, cultural, and historical sites associated with the early history of Islam and the first generation of Muslims (Muhammad's family and his companions) in Saudi Arabia.[36][37][38][39]
The contemporary period begins after 1924. With the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (1908–1922), the Ottoman Caliphate was also abolished. This event heavily influenced Islamic thinking in general, but also what would later be coined radical Islamic thought.[40] Key thinkers that wrote about Islam in the 20th century, and especially about jihad, include:
Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement of radical Islam.[43][44][53] Unlike the other Islamic thinkers that have been mentioned above, Qutb was not an apologist.[53] He was a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a highly influential Islamist ideologue,[43][53] and the first to articulate these anathemizing principles in his magnum opus Fī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān (In the shade of the Qurʾān) and his 1966 manifesto Maʿālim fīl-ṭarīq (Milestones), which lead to his execution by the Egyptian government.[53][54] Other Salafi movements in the Middle East and North Africa and across the Muslim world adopted many of his Islamist principles.[43][53]
According to Qutb, the Muslim community (Ummah) has been extinct for several centuries and reverted to jahiliyah (the pre-Islamic age of ignorance) because those who call themselves Muslims have failed to follow the sharia law.[43][53] In order to restore Islam, bring back its days of glory, and free the Muslims from the clasps of ignorance, Qutb proposed the shunning of modern society, establishing a vanguard modeled after the early Muslims, preaching, and bracing oneself for poverty or even death as preparation for jihad against what he perceived as jahili government/society, and overthrow them.[43][53]Qutbism, the radical Islamist ideology derived from the ideas of Qutb,[43] was denounced by many prominent Muslim scholars as well as other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, like Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
Sunnī Islamist and militant terrorist organization which aims to "restore Islam" and establish "true Islamic states", implement Sharia law, and rid the Muslim world of any Non-Muslim influences by following the doctrine and teachings of the Egyptian Islamist ideologue and propagandist Sayyid Qutb.[58] The title translates to "Organization of the Base of Jihad".
Over 250 killed in the 2012 Sana'a bombing and 2013 Sana'a attack.[61]
AQAP is considered the most active[62] of al-Qaeda's branches, or "franchises", that emerged due to weakening central leadership.[63] The U.S. Government believes AQAP to be the most dangerous al-Qaeda branch due to its emphasis on attacking the "far enemy" and its reputation for plotting attacks on overseas targets.[61][64]
Claims 6 killed in assassinations. Naval frigate hijacking attempted in 2014.
AQIS is a Sunnī Islamist and militant terrorist organization which aims to overthrow the Governments of Pakistan, India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh in order to establish an Islamic state.
Since 1988, numerous rocket attacks and suicide bombers targeting Israel and Israelis.
Founded as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Its 1988 founding charter, steeped in Sunnī Islamist rhetoric, calls for jihad to take all of historical Palestine, resulting in the destruction of the State of Israel.
Since 1982, numerous rocket attacks and suicide bombers targeting Israel and Israelis.
ShīʿaIslamist and militant group with Jihadist paramilitary wing. Hezbollah was largely formed with the aid of the Ayatollah Khomeini's followers in the early 1980s in order to spread the Islamic revolution outside of Iran.[74][75]
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi † (founder 1999 - 2006) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi † (2010 - 2019) Abu Ibrahimi al-Hashimi al-Qurashi † (2019 - 2022)[76] Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2022)[77]Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi (2022-2023) Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2023-present)
40,000–200,000 at its height across all 'provinces'[78][79]
30,000+ killed, including the genocides of Shīʿa Muslims, Christians, Yazidis, other ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, and many others around the world by ISIL or groups associated or inspired by ISIL. Since 2015 includes Boko Haram, rebranded as "Islamic State's West Africa Province" (ISWAP).[67][80]
Over 250 killed in bombings throughout Indonesia since 2002
With a name meaning "Islamic Congregation" (frequently abbreviated JI),[83] is a Southeast Asian Sunnī Islamist and militant terrorist organization dedicated to the establishment of a Daulah Islamiyah (regional Islamic caliphate) in Southeast Asia.[84]
TTP is an umbrella organization of various Sunnī Islamist and militant groups protecting foreign Islamic terrorists hiding in the mountains of Pakistan . Not to be confused with the Afghani Taliban.
Jaish-e-Mohammed
Kashmir, India
Masood Azhar
Aim is to annex Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan . Operates primarily in Jammu and Kashmir.
Lashkar-e Tayyiba
a.k.a. LeT
Kashmir, India
Hafiz Saeed
Aim is to annex Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and, ultimately, install Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Operational throughout India , especially in the northern region of Jammu and Kashmir since at least 1993.[86]
Allied Democratic Forces
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
National Thowheeth Jama'ath
Sri Lanka
269 (excluding 9 bombers)
Convert Sri Lanka into an Islamic caliphate
Foreign political support
According to the British historian Mark Curtis, in his book Secret Affairs, Britain has been accused of consistently supporting radical Islam to combat secular nationalism. Because the secular nationalists threatened to seize the resources of their countries and use it for internal development, which was not accepted by England.[87] The United States, like Britain before it, has been accused of historically supporting radical Islam in the face of secular nationalism, seen as a major threat to Western colonial dominance. Chomsky and coauthors accuse Israel of destroying Egypt and Syria in 1967, two bastions of secular Arab nationalism opposed to Saudi Arabia, which they view as the leader of radical Islam.[88]
↑Hasan, Noorhaidi (2010). "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign: Transnational Islam and the Salafi madrasa in post-9/11 Indonesia". South East Asia Research (Taylor & Francis on behalf of the SOAS University of London) 18 (4): 675–705. doi:10.5367/sear.2010.0015. ISSN2043-6874.
↑ 34.034.1"Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States". Washington, D.C.: United States Government Publishing Office. 26 June 2003. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg91326/html/CHRG-108shrg91326.htm. "Nearly 22 months have passed since the atrocity of September 11th. Since then, many questions have been asked about the role in that day's terrible events and in other challenges we face in the war against terror of Saudi Arabia and its official sect, a separatist, exclusionary and violent form of Islam known as Wahhabism. It is widely recognized that all of the 19 suicide pilots were Wahhabi followers. In addition, 15 of the 19 were Saudi subjects. Journalists and experts, as well as spokespeople of the world, have said that Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world, from Morocco to Indonesia, via Israel, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya. In addition, Saudi media sources have identified Wahhabi agents from Saudi Arabia as being responsible for terrorist attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. The Washington Post has confirmed Wahhabi involvement in attacks against U.S. forces in Fallujah. To examine the role of Wahhabism and terrorism is not to label all Muslims as extremists. Indeed, I want to make this point very, very clear. It is the exact opposite. Analyzing Wahhabism means identifying the extreme element that, although enjoying immense political and financial resources, thanks to support by a sector of the Saudi state, seeks to globally hijack Islam [...] The problem we are looking at today is the State-sponsored doctrine and funding of an extremist ideology that provides the recruiting grounds, support infrastructure and monetary life blood of today's international terrorists. The extremist ideology is Wahhabism, a major force behind terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, a group that, according to the FBI, and I am quoting, is the "number one terrorist threat to the U.S. today"."
↑Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl (2004). "The Middle East: Cradle of the Muslim World". The Muslim World After 9/11. Rand Corporation. p. 103, note 60. ISBN0-8330-3712-9.
↑Finn, Helena Kane (8 October 2002). "Cultural Terrorism and Wahhabi Islam". http://www.cfr.org/world/cultural-terrorism-wahhabi-islam/p5234. "It is the undisputed case that the Taliban justification for this travesty [the destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamiyan] can be traced to the Wahhabi indoctrination program prevalent in the Afghan refugee camps and Saudi-funded Islamic schools (madrasas) in Pakistan that produced the Taliban. ...In Saudi Arabia itself, the destruction has focused on the architectural heritage of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, where Wahhabi religious foundations, with state support, have systematically demolished centuries-old mosques and mausolea, as well as hundreds of traditional Hijazi mansions and palaces."
↑Cook, David (2015). Understanding Jihad. University of California Press. pp. 93. ISBN9780520287327.
↑Gibril Haddad, "Quietism and End-Time Reclusion in the Qurʾān and Hadith: Al-Nābulusī and His Book Takmīl Al-Nuʿūt within the ʿuzla Genre", Islamic Sciences 15, no. 2 (2017): pp. 108-109)