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Chinese Communist Party

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Communist Party of China
中国共产党
Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng
AbbreviationCPC (official)
CCP (common)
"The Party" (colloquial)
General SecretaryXi Jinping
Standing Committee
Founders
Founded
HeadquartersZhongnanhai, Xicheng District, Beijing
Newspaper
Youth wing
Armed wing
Media wings
Research officeCentral Policy Research Office
Membership (2022)Increase 96,710,000[2]
Ideology
International affiliation
Colours  Red
Slogan"Serve the People"[note 2]
Anthem"The Internationale" (unofficial)
National People's Congress (13th)
2,090 / 2,980
NPC Standing Committee
118 / 175
Party flag
File:Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg
Communist Party of China
File:Communist Party of China (Chinese characters).svg
"Communist Party of China" in Simplified (top) and Traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
Chinese name
Simplified Chinese中国共产党
Traditional Chinese中國共產黨
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng
Literal meaningChinese Communist Party
Tibetan name
Tibetanཀྲུང་གོ་གུང་ཁྲན་ཏང
Zhuang name
ZhuangCunghgoz Gungcanjdangj
Mongolian name
Mongolian CyrillicДундад улсын (Хятадын) Эв хамт (Kоммунист) Нам
Mongolian scriptᠳᠤᠮᠳᠠᠳᠤ ᠤᠯᠤᠰ ᠤᠨ
(ᠬᠢᠲᠠᠳ ᠤᠨ)
ᠡᠪ ᠬᠠᠮᠲᠤ
(ᠺᠣᠮᠮᠤᠶᠢᠨᠢᠰᠲ)
ᠨᠠᠮ
Uyghur name
Uyghurجۇڭگو كوممۇنىستىك پارتىيىسى
Manchu name
Manchu scriptᡩᡠᠯᡳᠮᠪᠠᡳ ᡤᡠᡵᡠᠨ ‍‍ᡳ
(ᠵᡠᠨᡤᠣ ‍‍ᡳ)
ᡤᡠᠩᡮᠠᠨ
ᡥᠣᡴᡳ
RomanizationDulimbai gurun-i (Jungg'o-i) Gungcan Hoki

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also known as the Communist Party of China (CPC),[3] is the sole ruling party of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), exercising authoritarian control since its founding of the PRC in 1949.[4] Established in 1921 by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao with Soviet support, the CCP rose to power by defeating the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War.[5] Led by Xi Jinping, the paramount leader since 2012, the party controls the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and operates a United Front with eight smaller parties, guided by socialism with Chinese characteristics.[6] With over 96 million members as of 2022, it ranks as the world’s second-largest political party.[7]

The CCP’s domestic policies have drawn widespread criticism for human rights violations, particularly its persecution of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in 1999. Millions of practitioners have faced detention, torture, forced labor, and organ harvesting, with survivors reporting systematic abuses in custody.[8][9] The party’s broader controls include mass surveillance, censorship, and forced assimilation of minorities, limiting freedoms of religion, speech, and association.[10] Globally, the CCP has extended its influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and ties with socialist and non-communist parties, while its democratic centralism structure concentrates power in the Politburo Standing Committee.[6] Economic reforms since the 1980s, initiated by Deng Xiaoping, have driven China’s rise as a global economic power within a socialist framework.[11]

Since the 2020s, the CCP’s activities have raised alarms in the United States over its infiltration into government, academia, and media through espionage and United Front operations, with documented cases of CCP-linked individuals shaping policy and academic narratives.[12][13] Concurrently, fears of a CCP-led invasion of Taiwan, claimed by Beijing as its territory, have grown, prompting Taiwan to enhance its military readiness through exercises like the Han Kuang drills.[14][15] These issues, coupled with the CCP’s global propaganda efforts, have strained relations with Western nations, particularly over sovereignty, security, and human rights concerns.[16]

History[edit | edit source]

Founding and early development[edit | edit source]

The Chinese Communist Party was formally founded in July 1921 with support from the Soviet-led Comintern, following years of growing Marxist influence among Chinese intellectuals during the May Fourth Movement.[17][18] Founders such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were influenced by the Bolshevik revolution and early Leninist theory, which they believed could offer a revolutionary path for China’s political crisis.

The CCP’s First Congress was held secretly in Shanghai and later on a boat in Jiaxing, after police disrupted the meeting. With only a few dozen members—including Mao Zedong—it adopted a resolution to align with the Comintern and to pursue Marxist revolution in China.[19] Early party activity included participation in Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang (KMT), though internal divisions soon emerged. After Sun's death, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek turned against the communists, resulting in widespread purges and the start of civil war.

Rise to power[edit | edit source]

Following years of armed struggle and the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP defeated the KMT and declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Mao Zedong, as party chairman, led a new single-party regime that immediately began consolidating power through land reforms, social campaigns, and purges of political opposition.[20]

With Soviet backing, the CCP adopted a one-party constitutional structure in 1954. Although Mao publicly endorsed a multi-party system in 1956, real power remained exclusively with the CCP. The Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 marked the suppression of intellectual and political dissent, resulting in the persecution of over half a million people.[21]

The Great Leap Forward (1958–1962), an economic and social campaign aimed at rapid industrialization, led to a massive famine resulting in the deaths of an estimated 15 to 45 million people.[22][23] This remains one of the deadliest man-made disasters in recorded history.

Reforms and modern era[edit | edit source]

After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as leader, initiating economic reforms in 1978 that embraced market principles within a socialist framework, spurring China’s economic growth.[24] The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre exposed tensions over political liberalization, but Deng’s policies persisted under Jiang Zemin, who introduced the Three Represents to include private entrepreneurs in the party.[25] Hu Jintao, leader from 2002, emphasized collective leadership and social harmony.[26] Since 2012, Xi Jinping has centralized power, launched an anti-corruption campaign, and embedded Xi Jinping Thought in the party’s constitution.[27] The CCP’s policies in Xinjiang, including the detention of over 1 million Uyghurs, have drawn genocide accusations from some governments, though others support them as anti-terrorism measures.[28][29] The CCP marked its 100th anniversary in 2021, reinforcing its global influence.[30]

Sino-Soviet split and Cultural Revolution[edit | edit source]

In the 1960s, the Chinese Communist Party broke sharply with the Soviet Union over ideological and strategic differences. Mao Zedong criticized Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization and perceived abandonment of revolutionary struggle, calling the USSR "revisionist."[31][32] This schism, known as the Sino-Soviet split, fractured the unity of the international communist movement and influenced global Cold War alignments.[33]

In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, declaring that class enemies persisted even under socialism and needed to be eliminated through continued revolution.[34] He called for mass mobilization, particularly of students organized into Red Guards, to attack perceived "bourgeois" elements and eliminate the "Four Olds"—old customs, culture, habits, and ideas.[35]

The movement led to political chaos and widespread persecution. Senior leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Dehuai were purged, imprisoned, or exiled.[36] The period saw arbitrary arrests, public humiliations, forced confessions, and extrajudicial killings. Death toll estimates vary but range from hundreds of thousands to over a million.[37] The Gang of Four, led by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, gained influence during this period until Mao’s death in 1976, after which they were arrested and charged with crimes committed during the revolution.[38]

Formal ideology[edit | edit source]

The CCP’s official ideology has evolved with successive leadership generations. Initially grounded in Marxism–Leninism, it was localized into Mao Zedong Thought, which adapted revolutionary theory to China’s historical and social context.[39]

In the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping Theory introduced market reforms under “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” asserting that policies should be judged by practical outcomes rather than ideological labels.[40] Jiang Zemin's Three Represents expanded party membership to include private entrepreneurs.[41] Hu Jintao advanced the Scientific Outlook on Development, promoting sustainability, welfare, and a “harmonious society.”[42]

Since 2017, Xi Jinping Thought has been enshrined in the party constitution, continuing the emphasis on adapting Marxism to Chinese conditions and asserting ideological leadership in all sectors of society.[43]

Economics[edit | edit source]

The CCP rejects the idea that central planning defines socialism, arguing instead that both planning and markets are tools for economic management. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that market mechanisms could exist under socialism, a view later reinforced by Jiang Zemin, who coined the term “socialist market economy.”[44][40] In 1992, the Party committed to allowing market forces to guide resource allocation, a policy reaffirmed in 2013 when the CCP declared markets should play a “decisive” role.[45] However, the CCP has simultaneously maintained the dominance of the public sector and continued support for state-owned enterprises.

The Party views global capitalism and socialism as two opposing systems, maintaining that historical materialism ensures socialism will ultimately prevail.[46] Despite benefiting from globalization, the CCP argues it is not inherently capitalist and can be adapted to support socialist modernization.[47] This belief underpins the CCP’s confidence in China's development path, particularly in contrast to Western financial crises.[48]

Analysis and criticism[edit | edit source]

Observers outside China often argue that the CCP has largely abandoned orthodox Marxism in practice, despite its continued official endorsement.[49] Some critics point to Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” as a shift toward ideological flexibility, though defenders assert it modernized socialism rather than rejecting it.[50] The concept of a "primary stage of socialism" has been interpreted either as a pragmatic rationale or as ideological cynicism.

David Shambaugh has noted a reversal under Deng, where decision-making began to shape ideology, rather than vice versa, in contrast to Soviet rigidity.[51] Kerry Brown has argued the CCP lacks a consistent ideology and operates pragmatically, though Party leaders have insisted that ideological struggle remains central to national cohesion and governance.[52]

Governance[edit | edit source]

Collective leadership[edit | edit source]

Collective leadership, the idea that decisions will be taken through consensus, is the ideal in the CCP.[53] The concept has its origins back to Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party.[54] At the level of the central party leadership this means that, for instance, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee are of equal standing (each member having only one vote).[53] A member of the Politburo Standing Committee often represents a sector; during Mao's reign, he controlled the People's Liberation Army, Kang Sheng, the security apparatus, and Zhou Enlai, the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[53] This counts as informal power.[53] Despite this, in a paradoxical relation, members of a body are ranked hierarchically (despite the fact that members are in theory equal to one another).[53] Informally, the collective leadership is headed by a "leadership core"; that is, the paramount leader, the person who holds the offices of CCP general secretary, CMC chairman and PRC president.[55] Before Jiang Zemin's tenure as paramount leader, the party core and collective leadership were indistinguishable.[56] In practice, the core was not responsible to the collective leadership.[56] However, by the time of Jiang, the party had begun propagating a responsibility system, referring to it in official pronouncements as the "core of the collective leadership".[56]

Democratic centralism[edit | edit source]

"[Democratic centralism] is centralized on the basis of democracy and democratic under centralized guidance. This is the only system that can give full expression to democracy with full powers vested in the people's congresses at all levels and, at the same time, guarantee centralized administration with the governments at each level ..."

— Mao Zedong, from his speech entitled "Our General Programme"[57]

The CCP's organizational principle is democratic centralism, a principle that entails open discussion of policy on the condition of unity among party members in upholding the agreed-upon decision.[58][59] It is based on two principles: democracy (synonymous in official discourse with "socialist democracy" and "inner-party democracy") and centralism.[57] This has been the guiding organizational principle of the party since the 5th National Congress, held in 1927.[57] In the words of the party constitution, "The Party is an integral body organized under its program and constitution and on the basis of democratic centralism".[57] Mao once quipped that democratic centralism was "at once democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and centralization united in a definite form." Mao claimed that the superiority of democratic centralism lay in its internal contradictions, between democracy and centralism, and freedom and discipline.[57] Currently, the CCP is claiming that "democracy is the lifeline of the Party, the lifeline of socialism".[57] But for democracy to be implemented, and functioning properly, there needs to be centralization.[57] The goal of democratic centralism was not to obliterate capitalism or its policies but instead it is the movement towards regulating capitalism while involving socialism and democracy.[60] Democracy in any form, the CCP claims, needs centralism, since without centralism there will be no order.[57]

Shuanggui[edit | edit source]

Shuanggui is an intra-party disciplinary process conducted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). This formally independent internal control institution conducts shuanggui on members accused of "disciplinary violations", a charge which generally refers to political corruption. The process, which literally translates to "double regulation", aims to extract confessions from members accused of violating party rules. According to the Dui Hua Foundation, tactics such as cigarette burns, beatings and simulated drowning are among those used to extract confessions. Other reported techniques include the use of induced hallucinations, with one subject of this method reporting that "In the end I was so exhausted, I agreed to all the accusations against me even though they were false."[61]

United Front[edit | edit source]

The CCP employs a political strategy that it terms "united front work" that involves groups and key individuals that are influenced or controlled by the CCP and used to advance its interests.[62][63] United Front work is managed primarily but not exclusively by the United Front Work Department (UFWD).[64] The United Front has historically been a popular front that has included eight legally-permitted political parties alongside other people's organizations which have nominal representation in the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).[65] However, the CPPCC is a body without real power.[66] While consultation does take place, it is supervised and directed by the CCP.[66] Under Xi Jinping, the United Front and its targets of influence have expanded in size and scope.[67][68]

Human rights violations[edit | edit source]

Since April 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has intensified its long-standing oppressive measures in Xinjiang, targeting more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of religious minority groups. This systematic campaign aims to eradicate their ethnic and cultural identity, suppress religious beliefs, and exert control over population growth. Reports of torture, rape, forced drug consumption, sexual assault, and other egregious abuses within internment camps have surfaced from individuals who managed to escape. Beyond the camps, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) subjects minorities to pervasive surveillance, mass collection of biometric data, state-sponsored forced labor, and mandatory stays by CCP officials in Uyghur households to hinder religious practices. Forced relocation to camps and factories, accompanied by demands to renounce ethnic identity and religious beliefs, is commonplace. Children are separated from their families and placed in state-run indoctrination centers, while women and girls face forced marriages, forced abortions, sterilization, and involuntary birth control measures. Leaked government documents affirm the coercive nature of these policies and the CCP’s targeted repression against these vulnerable populations.[69]

Organization[edit | edit source]

Central organization[edit | edit source]

The National Congress is the party's highest body, and, since the 9th National Congress in 1969, has been convened every five years (prior to the 9th Congress they were convened on an irregular basis). According to the party's constitution, a congress may not be postponed except "under extraordinary circumstances."[70] The party constitution gives the National Congress six responsibilities:[71]

  1. electing the Central Committee;
  2. electing the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI);
  3. examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee;
  4. examining the report of the outgoing CCDI;
  5. discussing and enacting party policies; and,
  6. revising the party's constitution.

In practice, the delegates rarely discuss issues at length at the National Congresses. Most substantive discussion takes place before the congress, in the preparation period, among a group of top party leaders.[71] In between National Congresses, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution.[72] The CCDI is responsible for supervising party's internal anti-corruption and ethics system.[73] In between congresses the CCDI is under the authority of the Central Committee.[73]

File:Front cover of Constitution of the Communist Party of China.jpg
Front cover of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party

The Central Committee, as the party's highest decision-making institution between national congresses, elects several bodies to carry out its work.[74] The first plenary session of a newly elected central committee elects the general secretary of the Central Committee, the party's leader; the Central Military Commission (CMC); the Politburo; the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC); and since 2013, the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). The first plenum also endorses the composition of the Secretariat and the leadership of the CCDI.[74] According to the party constitution, the general secretary must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and is responsible for convening meetings of the PSC and the Politburo, while also presiding over the work of the Secretariat.[75] The Politburo "exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session".[76] The PSC is the party's highest decision-making institution when the Politburo, the Central Committee and the National Congress are not in session.[77] It convenes at least once a week.[78] It was established at the 8th National Congress, in 1958, to take over the policy-making role formerly assumed by the Secretariat.[79] The Secretariat is the top implementation body of the Central Committee, and can make decisions within the policy framework established by the Politburo; it is also responsible for supervising the work of organizations that report directly into the Central Committee, for example departments, commissions, publications, and so on.[80] The CMC is the highest decision-making institution on military affairs within the party, and controls the operations of the People's Liberation Army.[81] The general secretary has, since Jiang Zemin, also served as Chairman of the CMC.[81] Unlike the collective leadership ideal of other party organs, the CMC chairman acts as commander-in-chief with full authority to appoint or dismiss top military officers at will.[81] The CNSC "co-ordinates security strategies across various departments, including intelligence, the military, foreign affairs and the police in order to cope with growing challenges to stability at home and abroad."[82] The general secretary serves as the Chairman of the CNSC.[83]

A first plenum of the Central Committee also elects heads of departments, bureaus, central leading groups and other institutions to pursue its work during a term (a "term" being the period elapsing between national congresses, usually five years).[70] The General Office is the party's "nerve centre", in charge of day-to-day administrative work, including communications, protocol, and setting agendas for meetings.[84] The CCP currently has four main central departments: the Organization Department, responsible for overseeing provincial appointments and vetting cadres for future appointments,[85] the Publicity Department (formerly "Propaganda Department"), which oversees the media and formulates the party line to the media,[86][87] the International Department, functioning as the party's "foreign affairs ministry" with other parties,[88] and the United Front Work Department, which oversees work with the country's non-communist parties, mass organizations, and influence groups outside of the country.[86] The CC also has direct control over the Central Policy Research Office, which is responsible for researching issues of significant interest to the party leadership,[89] the Central Party School, which provides political training and ideological indoctrination in communist thought for high-ranking and rising cadres,[90] the Party History Research Centre, which sets priorities for scholarly research in state-run universities and the Central Party School,[91] and the Compilation and Translation Bureau, which studies and translates the classical works of Marxism.[92] The party's newspaper, the People's Daily, is under the direct control of the Central Committee[93] and is published with the objectives "to tell good stories about China and the (Party)" and to promote its party leader.[94] The theoretical magazines Seeking Truth from Facts and Study Times are published by the Central Party School.[90] The various offices of the "Central Leading Groups", such as the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, the Taiwan Affairs Office, and the Central Finance Office, also report to the central committee during a plenary session.[95] Additionally, CCP has sole control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) through its Central Military Commission.[96]

Lower-level organizations[edit | edit source]

After seizing political power, the CCP extended the dual party-state command system to all government institutions, social organizations, and economic entities.[97] The State Council and the Supreme Court each has a party core group (党组), established since November 1949. Party committees permeate in every state administrative organ as well as the People's Consultation Conferences and mass organizations at all levels.[98] Party committees exist inside of companies, both private and state-owned.[99] Modelled after the Soviet Nomenklatura system, the party committee's organization department at each level has the power to recruit, train, monitor, appoint, and relocate these officials.[100]

Party committees exist at the level of provinces, cities, counties, and neighbourhoods.[101][102] These committees play a key role in directing local policy by selecting local leaders and assigning critical tasks.[6][103] The Party secretary at each level is more senior than that of the leader of the government, with the CCP standing committee being the main source of power.[103] Party committee members in each level are selected by the leadership in the level above, with provincial leaders selected by the central Organizational Department, and not removable by the local party secretary.[103]

In theory, however, party committees are elected by party congresses at their own level.[101] Local party congresses are supposed to be held every fifth year, but under extraordinary circumstances they may be held earlier or postponed. However that decision must be approved by the next higher level of the local party committee.[101] The number of delegates and the procedures for their election are decided by the local party committee, but must also have the approval of the next higher party committee.[101]

A local party congress has many of the same duties as the National Congress, and it is responsible for examining the report of the local Party Committee at the corresponding level; examining the report of the local Commission for Discipline Inspection at the corresponding level; discussing and adopting resolutions on major issues in the given area; and electing the local Party Committee and the local Commission for Discipline Inspection at the corresponding level.[101] Party committees of "a province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the central government, city divided into districts, or autonomous prefecture [are] elected for a term of five years", and include full and alternate members.[101] The party committees "of a county (banner), autonomous county, city not divided into districts, or municipal district [are] elected for a term of five years", but full and alternate members "must have a Party standing of three years or more."[101] If a local Party Congress is held before or after the given date, the term of the members of the Party Committee shall be correspondingly shortened or lengthened.[101]

Vacancies in a Party Committee shall be filled by an alternate members according to the order of precedence, which is decided by the number of votes an alternate member got during his or hers election.[101] A Party Committee must convene for at least two plenary meetings a year.[101] During its tenure, a Party Committee shall "carry out the directives of the next higher Party organizations and the resolutions of the Party congresses at the corresponding levels."[101] The local Standing Committee (analogous to the Central Politburo) is elected at the first plenum of the corresponding Party Committee after the local party congress.[101] A Standing Committee is responsible to the Party Committee at the corresponding level and the Party Committee at the next higher level.[101] A Standing Committee exercises the duties and responsibilities of the corresponding Party Committee when it is not in session.[101]

Funding[edit | edit source]

The funding of all CCP organizations mainly comes from state fiscal revenue. Data for the proportion of total CCP organizations’ expenditures in total China fiscal revenue is unavailable. However, occasionally small local governments in China release such data. For example, on 10 October 2016, the local government of Mengmao Township, Ruili City, Yunnan Province released a concise fiscal revenue and expenditure report for the year 2014. According to this report, the fiscal Revenue amounted to RMB 29,498,933.58, and CCP organization' expenditures amounted to RMB 1,660,115.50, that is, 5.63% of fiscal revenue is used by the CCP for its own operation. This value is similar to the social security and employment expenditure of the whole town—RMB 1,683,064.90.[104]

Members[edit | edit source]

"It is my will to join the Communist Party of China, uphold the Party's program, observe the provisions of the Party constitution, fulfill a Party member's duties, carry out the Party's decisions, strictly observe Party discipline, guard Party secrets, be loyal to the Party, work hard, fight for communism throughout my life, be ready at all times to sacrifice my all for the Party and the people, and never betray the Party."

Chinese Communist Party Admission Oath[105]

The CCP reached 96.71 million members at the end of 2021.[106] It is the second largest political party in the world after India's Bharatiya Janata Party.[107]

To join the CCP, an applicant must go through an approval process. In 2014, only 2 million applications were accepted out of some 22 million applicants.[108] Admitted members then spend a year as a probationary member.[105]

In contrast to the past, when emphasis was placed on the applicants' ideological criteria, the current CCP stresses technical and educational qualifications.[105] To become a probationary member, the applicant must take an admission oath before the party flag.[105] The relevant CCP organization is responsible for observing and educating probationary members.[105] Probationary members have duties similar to those of full members, with the exception that they may not vote in party elections nor stand for election.[105] Many join the CCP through the Communist Youth League.[105] Under Jiang Zemin, private entrepreneurs were allowed to become party members.[105] According to the CCP constitution, a member, in short, must follow orders, be disciplined, uphold unity, serve the Party and the people, and promote the socialist way of life.[101] Members enjoy the privilege of attending Party meetings, reading relevant Party documents, receiving Party education, participating in Party discussions through the Party's newspapers and journals, making suggestions and proposal, making "well-grounded criticism of any Party organization or member at Party meetings" (even of the central party leadership), voting and standing for election, and of opposing and criticizing Party resolutions ("provided that they resolutely carry out the resolution or policy while it is in force"); and they have the ability "to put forward any request, appeal, or complaint to higher Party organizations, even up to the Central Committee, and ask the organizations concerned for a responsible reply."[101] No party organization, including the CCP central leadership, can deprive a member of these rights.[101]

File:党员徽章图样.jpg
Badge given to party members

As of 30 June 2016, individuals who identify as farmers, herdsmen and fishermen make up 26 million members; members identifying as workers totalled 7.2 million.[108][109] Another group, the "Managing, professional and technical staff in enterprises and public institutions", made up 12.5 million, 9 million identified as working in administrative staff and 7.4 million described themselves as party cadres.[109]

As of 2021, CCP membership had become more educated, younger, and less blue-collar than previously.[106]

28.43 million women are CCP members (less than a third of the party).[106] Women in China have low participation rates as political leaders. Women's disadvantage is most evident in their severe under representation in the more powerful political positions.[110] At the top level of decision making, no woman has ever been among the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party's Politburo. Just 3 of 27 government ministers are women, and importantly, since 1997, China has fallen to 53rd place from 16th in the world in terms of female representation at its parliament, the National People's Congress, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union.[111] Party leaders such as Zhao Ziyang have vigorously opposed the participation of women in the political process.[112] Within the party women face a glass ceiling.[113]

Communist Youth League[edit | edit source]

The Communist Youth League (CYL) is the CCP's youth wing, and the largest mass organization for youth in China.[114] According to the CCP's constitution the CYL is a "mass organization of advanced young people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China; it functions as a party school where a large number of young people learn about socialism with Chinese characteristics and about communism through practice; it is the Party's assistant and reserve force."[101] To join, an applicant has to be between the ages of 14 and 28.[114] It controls and supervises Young Pioneers, a youth organization for children below the age of 14.[114] The organizational structure of CYL is an exact copy of the CCP's; the highest body is the National Congress, followed by the Central Committee [zh], Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.[115] However, the Central Committee (and all central organs) of the CYL work under the guidance of the CCP central leadership.[101] Therefore, in a peculiar situation, CYL bodies are both responsible to higher bodies within CYL and the CCP, a distinct organization.[101] As of the 17th National Congress (held in 2013), CYL had 89 million members.[116]

Symbols[edit | edit source]

Flag of the Chinese Communist Party from 1942 to 1996 (top) and from 1996 onwards (bottom)

At the beginning of its history, the CCP did not have a single official standard for the flag, but instead allowed individual party committees to copy the flag of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[117] The Central Politburo decreed the establishment of a sole official flag on 28 April 1942: "The flag of the CPC has the length-to-width proportion of 3:2 with a hammer and sickle in the upper-left corner, and with no five-pointed star. The Political Bureau authorizes the General Office to custom-make a number of standard flags and distribute them to all major organs".[117]

According to People's Daily, "The standard party flag is 120 centimeters (cm) in length and 80 cm in width. In the center of the upper-left corner (a quarter of the length and width to the border) is a yellow hammer-and-sickle 30 cm in diameter. The flag sleeve (pole hem) is in white and 6.5 cm in width. The dimension of the pole hem is not included in the measure of the flag. The red color symbolizes revolution; the hammer-and-sickle are tools of workers and peasants, meaning that the Communist Party of China represents the interests of the masses and the people; the yellow color signifies brightness."[117] In total the flag has five dimensions, the sizes are "no. 1: 388 cm in length and 192 cm in width; no. 2: 240 cm in length and 160 cm in width; no. 3: 192 cm in length and 128 cm in width; no. 4: 144 cm in length and 96 cm in width; no. 5: 96 cm in length and 64 cm in width."[117]

On 21 September 1966, the CCP General Office issued the "Regulations on the Production and Use of the CPC Flag and Emblem", which stated that the emblem and flag were the official symbols and signs of the party.[117] Article 53 of the CCP constitution states that "the Party emblem and flag are the symbol and sign of the Communist Party of China."[101]

Party-to-party relations[edit | edit source]

The International Liaison Department of the CCP is responsible for dialogue with global political parties.[118]

Communist parties[edit | edit source]

The CCP continues to have relations with non-ruling communist and workers' parties and attends international communist conferences, most notably the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.[119] While the CCP retains contact with major parties such as the Communist Party of Portugal,[120] the Communist Party of France,[121] the Communist Party of the Russian Federation,[122] the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia,[123] the Communist Party of Brazil,[124] the Communist Party of Greece,[125] the Communist Party of Nepal[126] and the Communist Party of Spain,[127] the party also retains relations with minor communist and workers' parties, such as the Communist Party of Australia,[128] the Workers Party of Bangladesh, the Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist–Leninist) (Barua), the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, the Workers' Party of Belgium, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Dominican Workers' Party, the Nepal Workers Peasants Party, and the Party for the Transformation of Honduras, for instance.[129] In recent years, noting the self-reform of the European social democratic movement in the 1980s and 1990s, the CCP "has noted the increased marginalization of West European communist parties."[130]

Ruling parties of socialist states[edit | edit source]

The CCP has retained close relations with the ruling parties of socialist states still espousing communism: Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.[131] It spends a fair amount of time analysing the situation in the remaining socialist states, trying to reach conclusions as to why these states survived when so many did not, following the collapse of the Eastern European socialist states in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.[132] In general, the analyses of the remaining socialist states and their chances of survival have been positive, and the CCP believes that the socialist movement will be revitalized sometime in the future.[132]

The ruling party which the CCP is most interested in is the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).[133] In general the CPV is considered a model example of socialist development in the post-Soviet era.[133] Chinese analysts on Vietnam believe that the introduction of the Doi Moi reform policy at the 6th CPV National Congress is the key reason for Vietnam's current success.[133]

While the CCP is probably the organization with most access to North Korea, writing about North Korea is tightly circumscribed.[132] The few reports accessible to the general public are those about North Korean economic reforms.[132] While Chinese analysts of North Korea tend to speak positively of North Korea in public, in official discussions circa 2008 they show much disdain for North Korea's economic system, the cult of personality which pervades society, the Kim family, the idea of hereditary succession in a socialist state, the security state, the use of scarce resources on the Korean People's Army and the general impoverishment of the North Korean people.[134] Circa 2008, there are those analysts who compare the current situation of North Korea with that of China during the Cultural Revolution.[135][needs update] Over the years, the CCP has tried to persuade the Workers' Party of Korea (or WPK, North Korea's ruling party) to introduce economic reforms by showing them key economic infrastructure in China.[135] For instance, in 2006 the CCP invited then-WPK general secretary Kim Jong-il to Guangdong to showcase the success economic reforms had brought China.[135] In general, the CCP considers the WPK and North Korea to be negative examples of a ruling communist party and socialist state.[135]

There is a considerable degree of interest in Cuba within the CCP.[133] Fidel Castro, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), is greatly admired, and books have been written focusing on the successes of the Cuban Revolution.[133] Communication between the CCP and the PCC has increased since the 1990s.[136] At the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, which discussed the possibility of the CCP learning from other ruling parties, praise was heaped on the PCC.[136] When Wu Guanzheng, a Central Politburo member, met with Fidel Castro in 2007, he gave him a personal letter written by Hu Jintao: "Facts have shown that China and Cuba are trustworthy good friends, good comrades, and good brothers who treat each other with sincerity. The two countries' friendship has withstood the test of a changeable international situation, and the friendship has been further strengthened and consolidated."[137]

Non-communist parties[edit | edit source]

Since the decline and fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the CCP has begun establishing party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.[88] These relations are sought so that the CCP can learn from them.[138] For instance, the CCP has been eager to understand how the People's Action Party of Singapore (PAP) maintains its total domination over Singaporean politics through its "low-key presence, but total control."[139] According to the CCP's own analysis of Singapore, the PAP's dominance can be explained by its "well-developed social network, which controls constituencies effectively by extending its tentacles deeply into society through branches of government and party-controlled groups."[139] While the CCP accepts that Singapore is a liberal democracy, they view it as a guided democracy led by the PAP.[139] Other differences are, according to the CCP, "that it is not a political party based on the working class—instead it is a political party of the elite. ... It is also a political party of the parliamentary system, not a revolutionary party."[140] Other parties which the CCP studies and maintains strong party-to-party relations with are the United Malays National Organization, which has ruled Malaysia (1957–2018, 2020–present), and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which dominated Japanese politics since 1955.[141]

Since Jiang Zemin's time, the CCP has made friendly overtures to its erstwhile foe, the Kuomintang. The CCP emphasizes strong party-to-party relations with the KMT so as to strengthen the probability of the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.[142] However, several studies have been written on the KMT's loss of power in 2000 after having ruled Taiwan since 1949 (the KMT officially ruled mainland China from 1928 to 1949).[142] In general, one-party states or dominant-party states are of special interest to the party and party-to-party relations are formed so that the CCP can study them.[142] The longevity of the Syrian Regional Branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is attributed to the personalization of power in the al-Assad family, the strong presidential system, the inheritance of power, which passed from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar al-Assad, and the role given to the Syrian military in politics.[143]

File:Cena de Estado que en honor del Excmo. Sr. Xi Jinping, Presidente de la República Popular China, y de su esposa, Sra. Peng Liyuan (8959188037).jpg
Xi Jinping (second from left) with Enrique Peña Nieto (second from right), the former President of Mexico and a leading member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party

Circa 2008, the CCP has been especially interested in Latin America,[143] as shown by the increasing number of delegates sent to and received from these countries.[143] Of special fascination for the CCP is the 71-year-long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico.[143] While the CCP attributed the PRI's long reign in power to the strong presidential system, tapping into the machismo culture of the country, its nationalist posture, its close identification with the rural populace and the implementation of nationalization alongside the marketization of the economy,[143] the CCP concluded that the PRI failed because of the lack of inner-party democracy, its pursuit of social democracy, its rigid party structures that could not be reformed, its political corruption, the pressure of globalization, and American interference in Mexican politics.[143] While the CCP was slow to recognize the pink tide in Latin America, it has strengthened party-to-party relations with several socialist and anti-American political parties over the years.[144] The CCP has occasionally expressed some irritation over Hugo Chávez's anti-capitalist and anti-American rhetoric.[144] Despite this, the CCP reached an agreement in 2013 with the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), which was founded by Chávez, for the CCP to educate PSUV cadres in political and social fields.[145] By 2008, the CCP claimed to have established relations with 99 political parties in 29 Latin American countries.[144]

Social democratic movements in Europe have been of great interest to the CCP since the early 1980s.[144] With the exception of a short period in which the CCP forged party-to-party relations with far-right parties during the 1970s in an effort to halt "Soviet expansionism", the CCP's relations with European social democratic parties were its first serious efforts to establish cordial party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.[144] The CCP credits the European social democrats with creating a "capitalism with a human face".[144] Before the 1980s, the CCP had a highly negative and dismissive view of social democracy, a view dating back to the Second International and the Marxist–Leninist view on the social democratic movement.[144] By the 1980s, that view had changed and the CCP concluded that it could actually learn something from the social democratic movement.[144] CCP delegates were sent all over Europe to observe.[146] By the 1980s, most European social democratic parties were facing electoral decline and in a period of self-reform.[146] The CCP followed this with great interest, laying most weight on reform efforts within the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany.[146] The CCP concluded that both parties were re-elected because they modernized, replacing traditional state socialist tenets with new ones supporting privatization, shedding the belief in big government, conceiving a new view of the welfare state, changing their negative views of the market and moving from their traditional support base of trade unions to entrepreneurs, the young and students.[147]

Electoral history[edit | edit source]

National People's Congress elections[edit | edit source]

Election General Secretary Seats +/– Position
1982–1983 Hu Yaobang
1,861 / 2,978
Steady 1st
1987–1988 Zhao Ziyang
1,986 / 2,979
Increase 125 Steady 1st
1993–1994 Jiang Zemin
2,037 / 2,979
Increase 51 Steady 1st
1997–1998
2,130 / 2,979
Increase 93 Steady 1st
2002–2003 Hu Jintao
2,178 / 2,985
Increase 48 Steady 1st
2007–2008
2,099 / 2,987
Decrease 79 Steady 1st
2012–2013 Xi Jinping
2,157 / 2,987
Increase 58 Steady 1st
2017–2018
2,119 / 2,980
Decrease 38 Steady 1st

See also[edit | edit source]

Notes[edit | edit source]

  1. ^ During the Chinese Civil War, party officials were only able to confirm from available documents that the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in July 1921, but not the specific date of the meeting. In June 1941, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declared 1 July the party's "anniversary day". Although the exact date of the 1st National Congress was later determined by party officials to be 23 July 1921, the date of the anniversary has not been changed.[1]
  2. ^ Chinese: 为人民服务; pinyin: Wèi Rénmín Fúwù

References[edit | edit source]

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