Hamas has pursued its objectives primarily through violence, including suicide bombings, rocket attacks, mass shootings, and hostage-taking deliberately targeting civilians. Its 1988 charter framed the conflict as a religious obligation to eradicate Israel, incorporated antisemitic conspiracy theories, and endorsed jihad as a duty, positions the organization has not renounced despite later rhetorical revisions. Armed operations are carried out by its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which conducts attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets.[36][37]
From 2017 until his death in July 2024, Hamas was led internationally by political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh, who operated primarily from Qatar. Following the targeted killings of multiple senior leaders in 2024, the organization has functioned without a single dominant leader, with authority exercised through its political bureau and consultative bodies. Hamas has ruled the Gaza Strip since 2007 and is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, and numerous other countries.[37][38][35]
"Hamas" functions as an Arabic acronym for حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah), translating to "Islamic Resistance Movement".[37] The term aligns with the Arabic word ḥamās (حماس), meaning "zeal," "enthusiasm," "strength," or "bravery," chosen to evoke positive connotations of determination and courage.[39] In biblical Hebrew, the similar-sounding ḥāmās (חָמָס) denotes "violence," "injustice," or "oppression," as in Genesis 6:11 where the earth is described as filled with ḥāmās prior to the Flood—an etymological coincidence frequently cited as ironic in light of the group's violent history.[40][41][42] The selection prioritized the uplifting Arabic interpretation over any potential Hebrew association.[40]
Hamas was founded in December 1987 during the First Intifada as an offshoot of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had maintained charitable, educational, and social activities in the region since the 1950s.[37][43] Under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the group emerged from growing Palestinian discontent with Israeli occupation, blending Islamist principles with armed resistance and positioning itself as an alternative to secular nationalist organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[37] Assertions that Israel directly established or funded Hamas to undermine Palestinian unity lack evidence; although Israeli officials in the 1970s and 1980s permitted Islamist social organizations as a potential counterbalance to PLO influence, this involved registration of charities rather than creation or militarization of the group.[44]
Over the years, Hamas has signaled openness to a long-term truce (hudna) with Israel conditioned on withdrawal to 1967 borders and other demands, while steadfastly refusing to recognize Israel's legitimacy or renounce armed operations.[37] As of December 2025, with a ceasefire in place since October, Hamas operates under a five-man leadership council based primarily in Qatar, following Israeli targeted killings of prior leaders, and continues to reject disarmament absent guarantees of Palestinian statehood.[45][46]
The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades have utilized tactics such as suicide bombings during the Second Intifada and rocket barrages since 2001, frequently framing them as defensive responses, with arsenals expanding from short-range Qassams to systems reaching major Israeli cities.[47] International monitors, including Human Rights Watch, have classified indiscriminate rocket fire toward civilian populations as violations of international humanitarian law.[47]
Hamas secured a legislative majority in the 2006 Palestinian elections, prompting international sanctions tied to demands for non-violence and recognition of Israel, followed by a brief unity government that collapsed into the Battle of Gaza (2007), where Hamas forcibly ousted Fatah and assumed sole control of the Strip.[37] Subsequent blockade by Israel and Egypt was justified on security grounds after the loss of Fatah oversight, amid debates over whether prior Israeli policies inadvertently bolstered Hamas.[48][49]
On October 7, 2023, Hamas coordinated a large-scale assault on southern Israel, resulting in approximately 1,200 deaths—predominantly civilians—and the abduction of 251 hostages through deliberate attacks on communities and a music festival, involving widespread atrocities condemned internationally as terrorism and crimes against humanity.[37][50] The ensuing conflict caused over 70,000 Palestinian deaths according to Gaza authorities by late 2025, with extensive destruction and humanitarian challenges.[51] A ceasefire implemented in October 2025 facilitated hostage releases and remains recoveries, with nearly all returned by December amid ongoing tensions and mediation for further phases.[52]
Map of key Hamas leadership nodes (2010; note: structure has evolved significantly since, with external leadership primarily in Qatar as of 2025).
Hamas operates a multifaceted structure combining political, social, military, and security functions, historically divided into branches including a charitable social welfare wing (dawah) providing education, healthcare, and aid; the military wing known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades responsible for armed operations; an internal security apparatus; and media activities.[37][53] While formally presented as separate, these components are interconnected for operational and political purposes, with communication challenges arising from Israeli surveillance and intelligence operations.[37]
Weapons found in a mosque during Operation Cast Lead, according to the IDF
The organization is governed by a Shura (consultative) Council, drawing on Islamic principles of shura for decision-making, which elects a Political Bureau (Politburo) to handle high-level strategy.[37] As of December 2025, following the deaths of previous leaders Ismail Haniyeh (killed July 2024) and Yahya Sinwar (killed October 2024), Hamas is led by a five-member collective leadership council based primarily in Qatar, comprising Khaled Meshaal, Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Muhammad Ismail Darwish (chair of the Shura Council), and a fifth member (possibly Mousa Abu Marzouk or Nizar Awadallah).[37][54][55] This interim arrangement, established after Sinwar's death, emphasizes collective decision-making to mitigate risks from targeted assassinations, with elections postponed amid ongoing conflict.[56]
In Gaza, military operations are directed by surviving commanders of the Qassam Brigades, such as Izz al-Din al-Haddad (reported as a key figure in 2025), with the group adapting to decentralized guerrilla tactics following heavy losses.[57] The external political leadership, historically split between Gaza and exile bases, is now predominantly abroad, with Qatar serving as the primary hub despite periodic pressures and relocation reports to Turkey.[37]
Hamas derives revenue from a combination of internal taxation in Gaza, external state support, international investments, and other illicit or semi-licit activities.[37] Pre-October 2023 estimates placed its annual budget between $300 million and over $1 billion, with significant portions from taxes on goods entering Gaza (including through tunnels and crossings), direct aid from allied states, and a global investment portfolio valued at hundreds of millions to $1 billion in companies across countries like Turkey, Sudan, Algeria, Qatar, and the UAE.[37][58]
A major source has historically been Iran, providing an estimated $100 million annually or more for military support, often channeled through networks including Hezbollah or direct transfers, though fluctuations occurred due to geopolitical tensions (e.g., reduced during Hamas criticism of Iran's Syria role).[37][59] Qatar hosted Hamas's political leadership and provided hundreds of millions in aid since 2012—often with Israeli approval for humanitarian purposes like salaries and infrastructure—but documents seized in Gaza and Israeli assessments indicate portions reached military uses, contributing to pre-October 7 buildup.[60][61] Post-October 7 sanctions and pressures led to reduced overt flows, with Qatar facing criticism and reportedly limiting support by late 2025.[62]
Turkey has provided political shelter and facilitated financial networks, including Iran-backed money exchanges moving hundreds of millions to Hamas as of late 2025, despite NATO membership.[63] Other sources include charities (some shut down internationally, like the Holy Land Foundation), cryptocurrency fundraising (millions seized by U.S. authorities in 2025 disruptions), smuggling, extortion, and control over Gaza's waqf endowments and real estate.[37][64] The post-October 7 war and sanctions severely strained finances, limiting salaries and operations, though Hamas adapted through decentralized methods.[65]
Hamas operates an extensive social welfare network known as the dawah, modeled on the Muslim Brotherhood's charitable system, providing education, healthcare, food aid, orphanages, and community programs to Palestinians primarily in Gaza.[37] These services fill gaps left by the Palestinian Authority and international aid shortfalls, contributing significantly to the group's popularity despite its militant activities.[37] By the early 2000s, Hamas-affiliated institutions managed roughly 40% of social services in Gaza and the West Bank, supporting tens of thousands with financial stipends, medical care, and educational facilities.[66]
Critics, including U.S. and Israeli officials, argue that the dawah serves dual purposes: genuine humanitarian aid intertwined with political recruitment, ideological indoctrination, and support for families of militants, allowing flexible fund allocation between welfare and military operations.[37][67] Payments to families of killed or imprisoned operatives, including suicide bombers, have been documented, with stipends and grants distinguishing between levels of involvement.[68]
After seizing Gaza in 2007, Hamas expanded these programs using taxation revenue and external funding, but operations in the West Bank were curtailed by Palestinian Authority and Israeli restrictions.[37] The 2013 Egyptian coup disrupted smuggling routes and Brotherhood-linked support, straining finances, while post-October 2023 conflict and blockade intensified reliance on limited aid channels.[69] As of 2025, amid ongoing war recovery, Hamas continues dawah activities in Gaza but at reduced scale due to destruction of infrastructure and funding constraints.[37]
The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades serves as Hamas's military wing, responsible for armed operations including rocket attacks, tunnel warfare, anti-tank missiles, and ground incursions.[37] Pre-war estimates placed its strength at 25,000–40,000 fighters organized into geographic brigades with battalions and smaller units, though the group suffered heavy losses during the 2023–2025 Gaza war.[37][70] As of December 2025, Israeli assessments indicate Hamas retains around 20,000 fighters—many new recruits of lower quality—and hundreds of rockets, including some long-range systems, allowing continued sporadic attacks despite degraded capabilities.[71]
The Brigades developed indigenous rocket production starting with short-range Qassam rockets in the early 2000s, evolving to longer-range systems capable of reaching major Israeli cities, supplemented by Iranian-supplied weapons.[37] Rocket fire peaked during escalations, with thousands launched in conflicts up to 2023, though arsenal depletion and Israeli countermeasures significantly reduced capabilities by 2025.[71] International observers condemn indiscriminate rocket attacks on civilian areas as violations of international law.[72]
Leadership has been decimated by Israeli targeted operations: Mohammed Deif (commander until killed July 2024), Marwan Issa (deputy, killed March 2024), Yahya Sinwar (Gaza leader, killed October 2024), and others.[73][74] As of late 2025, Izz al-Din al-Haddad (known as the "Ghost") leads the Brigades in Gaza, overseeing remaining forces with a focus on survival and potential reconstitution.[75]
The Brigades operate with some autonomy from Hamas's political leadership, though ultimately aligned, using small cells integrated into larger units for resilience against assassinations and incursions.[37] Official guidelines claim operations target military objectives and prohibit civilian attacks or excessive force, but actions—including the October 7, 2023 assault involving deliberate civilian killings—have drawn widespread condemnation as terrorism and crimes against humanity.[76]
Human Rights Watch - Rocket Launches from Civilian Areas
Designation: Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported after Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 that Hamas fired rockets from densely populated Gaza areas, endangering civilians.[77] Specific incidents included a rocket launched near the Shawa and Housari Building, housing media offices, and another from a yard near the Deira Hotel.[78] HRW noted this violated international law by placing military targets in civilian zones.[77]
Israel - Military Use of Civilian Infrastructure
Designation: Israel accuses Hamas of using civilian areas for military purposes, citing 12,000 rockets and mortars fired from Gaza between 2000 and 2008, with 3,000 in 2008 alone.[79] A 2009 government report to the UN documented rocket launch sites near schools and mosques, supported by video evidence.[80] The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center reported Hamas used nearly 100 mosques to store weapons and launch rockets, based on Palestinian testimony.[81]
United Nations - Militant Activity in Civilian Zones
Designation: The 2009 UN Goldstone Report found credible evidence that Hamas militants blended with civilians during the Gaza conflict, though it found no intent to use civilians as shields.[82] A specific case in January 2009 involved an Israeli mortar strike near a UN school, killing dozens, after Hamas fired a rocket from an adjacent yard.[83]
Israel - 2006 Jabalya Incident
Designation: In November 2006, Israel accused Hamas of organizing civilians to protect a target in Jabalya refugee camp, suspending a planned airstrike after hundreds, mostly women and children, gathered at the site.[84] Human Rights Watch initially condemned the action as unlawful but later clarified it was an administrative demolition, not a military operation.[85]
Designation: Hamas has acknowledged training teenagers in weapons handling at summer camps, with evidence from 2001 showing kindergarten children in uniforms and mock rifles at ceremonies.[86]: 124–134 After three teens died in a 2002 attack on Netzarim, Hamas banned child attacks and urged restraint.[87] A 2012 report documented at least 160 child deaths during tunnel construction for attacks on Israel.[88]
In the early intifada period, children in Gaza and the West Bank were instilled by Hamas with Islamic and military values. Evidence from 2001 shows that kindergarten children attended ceremonies where they wore emblematic uniforms and bore mock rifles. Some were dressed up as suicide bombers, whose readiness to die for the cause was held up as a model to be imitated. The preschoolers would swear an oath 'to pursue jihad, resistance and intifada.' At summer camps, alongside qur'anic studies and familiarization with computers, courses were given that included military training.[86]: 124–34
Although Hamas admits to sponsoring summer schools to train teenagers in handling weapons they condemn attacks by children. Following the deaths of three teenagers during a 2002 attack on Netzarim in central Gaza, Hamas banned attacks by children and "called on the teachers and religious leaders to spread the message of restraint among young boys".[89][90] Hamas's use of child labor to build tunnels with which to attack Israel has also been criticized, with at least 160 children killed in the tunnels as of 2012.[91]
The "Israel/Netanyahu created or funded Hamas" claim
This persistent myth alleges that Israel or Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly created or intentionally funded Hamas to divide Palestinians and block a two-state solution.[92][37] In fact, Hamas emerged independently in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, with ideology rooted in Islamist opposition to secular nationalism and Zionism that long predated modern Israel.[37] Early Israeli tolerance of Brotherhood social activities in the 1970s and 1980s sought to counter PLO dominance through non-violent religious alternatives, but did not extend to creating or arming a militant organization.[92] From around 2012, Israel permitted monitored Qatari financial transfers to Gaza—primarily cash deliveries—for civil servant salaries, humanitarian aid, and infrastructure to prevent economic collapse and maintain periods of calm, though this policy faced substantial criticism for indirectly strengthening Hamas by allowing resource diversion to military purposes.[60][93]
Muslim Brotherhood ties to Nazi Germany
This is factual and well-documented, not a myth. The Muslim Brotherhood maintained documented ties with Nazi Germany during World War II, including propaganda efforts and alliances involving Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who collaborated with Adolf Hitler and the Schutzstaffel (SS) against British forces and Jewish immigration while promoting antisemitic broadcasts.[94][95] These collaborations influenced early Islamist antisemitic ideology, with Brotherhood founder al-Banna expressing admiration for Hitler.[94] In the United States, the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR) was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trial due to evidence connecting its founders and activities to Hamas support networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, though CAIR asserts its independence as a civil rights advocacy group.[96][97]
Hamas's 2006 election victory and Bush's role
Hamas's victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, promoted in part by U.S. democracy initiatives under President George W. Bush, triggered international sanctions after the group refused to renounce violence or recognize Israel, exacerbating divisions and leading to no further national elections since. Bush believed free elections would marginalize extremists and strengthen moderates like Fatah. Warnings from Israelis, some U.S. officials, and Palestinians concerned that Hamas might win were ignored or downplayed.[98][37]
Al-Aqsa TV is a television channel founded by Hamas.[99] The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9, 2006,[100][101] less than three weeks before the Palestinian legislative elections. It has shown television programs, including some children's television, which deliver anti-semitic messages.[102] Hamas has stated that the television station is "an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement," and that Hamas does not hold anti-semitic views.[103] The programming includes ideologically tinged children's shows, news talk, and religiously inspired entertainment.[104] According to the Anti-Defamation League, the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis.[101] Al-Aqsa TV is headed by Fathi Ahmad Hammad, chairman of al-Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions—a Hamas-run company that also produces Hamas's radio station, Voice of al-Aqsa, and its biweekly newspaper, The Message.[105]
Al-Fateh ("the conqueror") is the Hamas children's magazine, published biweekly in London, and also posted in an online website. It began publication in September 2002, and its 108th issue was released in mid-September 2007. The magazine features stories, poems, riddles, and puzzles, and states it is for "the young builders of the future".[106]
According to the Anti-Defamation League, al-Fateh promotes violence and anti-semitism, with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers, and that it "regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained, injured or killed by Israeli police, images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs."[107]
Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries. The United States classified Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997 (not 1995 as previously stated),[108] followed by Canada in November 2002,[109] and the United Kingdom in November 2021, when it proscribed the entire organization, not just its military wing.[110] The European Union designated Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as a terrorist entity in 2001 and extended this to the entire organization in 2003.[86]: 50–51 </ref> Hamas challenged the EU designation, but the European Court of Justice upheld it in July 2017, ruling that media and internet reports were sufficient to maintain the listing after initial competent authority decisions.[111] Japan and New Zealand have designated only the military wing as a terrorist organization,[112] while Jordan banned Hamas outright in 1999.[86]
Hamas is not classified as a terrorist organization by Iran,[113] Russia,[114] Norway,[d][115] Switzerland,[e][116] Turkey, China,[117] Egypt, Syria, and Brazil.[118] Many of these states view Hamas’s armed struggle as legitimate resistance rather than terrorism.[119]
Some analysts note that while Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by Israel, the U.S., and the EU, its status has shifted in the Arab and Muslim world, where it is no longer treated as a pariah and its representatives are received in various capitals.[120] While several governments and academics classify Hamas as a terrorist group, others see it as a multifaceted organization, with terrorism as only one aspect alongside its political and social roles.[121]
Designation of Hamas: Pink = Terrorist; Light green = Not terrorist / voted no to UN condemnation; Yellow = Only military wing as terrorist
Brazil: Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Brazil.[125]
Brunei: voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.[122][123]
Canada: Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Government of Canada currently lists Hamas as a terrorist entity, thus establishing it as a terrorist group, since 2002.[126][127]
China: As of 2006, China does not designate Hamas to be a terrorist organization and acknowledges Hamas to be the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip that represents the Palestinian people. In June 2006, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "We believe that the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected."[128][129]
Ecuador: designated Hamas as a terrorist organization on 16 September 2025.[130]
Egypt: In June 2015, Egypt's appeals court overturned a prior ruling that listed Hamas as a terrorist organization.[131] In February 2015, Cairo's Urgent Matters Court designated Hamas as a terrorist organization, as part of a crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood movement following the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état. The court accused Hamas of carrying terrorist attacks in Egypt through tunnels linking the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip.[132] In March 2014, the same court outlawed Hamas' activities in Egypt, ordered the closure of its offices and to arrest any Hamas member found in the country.[133][134]
Gambia: voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.[122][123]
Guinea: voted against a resolution at the United Nations that would condemn Hamas as a terrorist organization.[122][123]
Jordan: Hamas was banned in 1999, reportedly in part at the request of the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.[137]In 2019, Jordanian sources are said to have revealed "that the Kingdom refused a request from the General Secretariat of the Arab League in late March to ban Hamas and list it as a terrorist organization."[138]
Norway: Norway does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization.[140] In 2006, Norway distanced itself from the European Union, "claiming that it was causing problems for its role as a 'neutral facilitator.'"[115]: 199
Paraguay: The military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is listed as a terrorist organization.
Qatar: The Qatari government has a designated terrorist list. As of 2014, the list contained no names, according to The Daily Telegraph.[143]In September 2020, Qatar brokered an Israel-Hamas ceasefire that reportedly included plans for a Qatar-operated power station in Gaza, $34 million in humanitarian aid, 20,000 COVID-19 test kits, and initiatives to reduce unemployment.[144]
Russia: Russia does not designate Hamas a terrorist organisation, and held direct talks with Hamas in 2006, after Hamas won the Palestine elections, stating that it did so to press Hamas to reject violence and recognise Israel.[145]
Saudi Arabia: Banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 2014 and branded it a terrorist organization. While Hamas is not specifically listed, a non-official Saudi source stated that the decision also encompasses its branches in other countries, including Hamas.[146]As of January 2020, ties between Saudi Arabia and Hamas remain strained despite attempts at a rapprochement. Wesam Afifa, director general of Al-Aqsa TV is quoted as saying that "Saudi Arabia did not sever ties with Hamas, and even when Riyadh made public its list of terrorists in 2017, Hamas was not added to the list."[147]
Switzerland: Switzerland does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. In accordance with Swiss neutrality, its policy of contact with the main actors of a conflict is characterized by impartial inclusiveness, discretion and pragmatism. Switzerland has direct contacts with all major stakeholders in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including Hamas.[148]
Syria: Syria does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. Syria is among other countries that consider Hamas' armed struggle to be legitimate.[119]: 203, n.27
Turkey: The Turkish government met with Hamas leaders in February 2006, after the organization's victory in the Palestinian elections. In 2010, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described Hamas as "resistance fighters who are struggling to defend their land".[149][150]
United Kingdom: Hamas in its entirety is proscribed as a terrorist group and banned under the Terrorism Act."The government now assess that the approach of distinguishing between the various parts of Hamas is artificial. Hamas is a complex but single terrorist organisation."[32]
Below is a summary of significant legal actions involving Hamas, based on court filings, judgments, and official reports as of December 23, 2025.
United States - Holy Land Foundation Case
In 2001, the U.S. Treasury designated the Holy Land Foundation a supporter of Hamas, freezing its assets.[159] A 2008 federal trial convicted five leaders on 108 counts, including material support for terrorism; convictions upheld on appeal in 2011.[160][161]
United States - Ungar Family Lawsuit
A 2004 federal judgment held Hamas liable for the 1996 murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar, awarding $116 million.[162] The Palestinian Authority settled in 2011.[163]
United States - October 7 Victims vs. Iran, Syria, and Binance (2024)
Filed January 2024 by American families, this suit accuses Iran and Syria of arming/funding Hamas and Binance of facilitating transactions.[164][165] Ongoing as of December 2025.
United States - October 7 Victims vs. AMP and NSJP (2024)
Filed May 2024 by nine survivors and families in Virginia federal court, alleging AMP and NSJP serve as Hamas propagandists and collaborators.[166][167] Active as of December 2025.
United States - October 7 Victims vs. Iran, Syria, and North Korea (2024, expanded 2025)
Initial July 2024 suit by over 100 victims accused the states of support to Hamas.[168] Expanded September 2025 to include Hamas and other groups (e.g., PIJ, PFLP), seeking billions.[169] Ongoing.
United States - October 7 Victims vs. Bashar Masri (2025)
Filed April 2025 against Palestinian-American businessman Bashar Masri, alleging his Gaza properties concealed Hamas tunnels and infrastructure used in October 7 attacks.[170][171] Ongoing.
United States - October 7 Victims vs. Binance (2025)
Filed November 2025 by families of 300 U.S. victims, accusing Binance of facilitating over $1 billion in transactions for Hamas and allies.[172] Ongoing.
Germany - IHH e.V. Ban (2010)
Germany banned the Frankfurt-based IHH e.V. in 2010 for allegedly supporting Hamas-affiliated projects in Gaza.[173] Ban remains in effect.
^"Hamas considers Palestine the main front of jihad and viewed the uprising as an Islamic way of fighting the Occupation. The organisation's leaders argued that Islam gave the Palestinian people the power to confront Israel and described the Intifada as the return of the masses to Islam. Since its inception, Hamas has tried to reconcile nationalism and Islam. [...] Hamas claims to speak as a nationalist movement but with an Islamic-nationalist rather than a secular nationalist agenda."[10]
^"Hamas is primarily a religious movement whose nationalist worldview is shaped by its religious ideology."[11]
^Arabic: حماس, romanized: Ḥamās, IPA: [ħaˈmaːs]; an acronym of حركة المقاومة الإسلامية Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, lit. “Islamic Resistance Movement”
^In 2006, Norway distanced itself from the EU’s proscription regime to maintain its role as a neutral facilitator in peace talks.
^Switzerland has avoided designating Hamas, citing its neutrality policy, as confirmed in a 2016 parliamentary statement.
May, David (October 14, 2024). "South Africa Is Not Pro-Palestinian, It's Pro-Hamas". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Retrieved April 28, 2025. President Cyril Ramaphosa described October 7, 2023, as “the start of an onslaught against the Palestinian people” rather than a murderous and antisemitic attack on Jews. Ramaphosa also invoked past grievances to justify Hamas atrocities. The week after the October 7 massacre, he cast the event as a consequence of the “occupation of Palestine,” as if killing women and children and raping girls at a music festival is the inevitable outcome of disputes over land.
Boiskin, Asher (April 17, 2025). "Scrutiny Over South Africa's Hamas Links". Jewish Policy Center. Retrieved April 28, 2025. The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy also recently released a bombshell report identifying South Africa’s alarming ties with Hamas, Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. The report highlighted South Africa’s involvement “in the global web of anti-democratic terror financing.”
^Cook, Alethia H. (2011). Copeland, Thomas E. (ed.). The Subtle Impact of Iran on the Flotilla Incident. Drawing a Line in the Sea: The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Lexington Books. pp. 35–44 [36].
^Freedman, Robert O. (2013). Peters, Joel; Newman, David (ed.). Russia. The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Routledge. pp. 325–33 [331].{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
^ abHaspeslagh, Sophie (2016). The EU and Hamas: A Case Study. The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Routledge. p. 199.
^"Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook 2005"(PDF). 2005. "In accordance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, it [Japan] has frozen the assets of a total of 472 terrorists and terrorist organizations, including ..., as well as those of Hamas ..."
^"Norway to Revise Terrorist Organizations List After the Elections". The Nordic Page. May 15, 2013. Archived from the original on August 12, 2014. Retrieved October 29, 2020. Israel, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Japan classify Hamas as a terrorist organization, while Norway, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Arab nations do not.
Clemesha, Arlene (2013). "Brazil: Newcomer to the Region". The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World: evolving relations with Russia, China, India, and Brazil. The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World. German Marshall Fund of the United States. pp. 27–35. JSTORresrep18967.7.
Gerner, Deborah J. (2007). "Mobilizing Women for Nationalist Agendas". In Moghadam, Valentine M. (ed.). From Patriarchy to Empowerment: Women's Participation, Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Syracuse University Press. pp. 17–39. ISBN978-0815631118.
Gunning, Jeroen (2007). "Hamas: Harakat al-Muqamama al-Islamiyya". In Marianne Heiberg; Brendan O'Leary (eds.). Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 134–. ISBN978-0812239744.
Hueston, Harry Raymond; Pierpaoli, Paul G.; Zahar, Sherifa (2014). "Hamas". In Roberts, Priscilla (ed.). Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Essential Reference Guide. ABC-CLIO. pp. 67–71. ISBN978-1610690683.
Robinson, Glenn E. (2004). "Hamas as a Social Movement". In Wiktorowicz, Quintan (ed.). Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press. pp. 112–39. ISBN978-0253216212.
Van Engeland, Alincée (2015). "Hamas". In Ross, Jeffrey Ian (ed.). Religion and Violence: An Encyclopedia of Faith and Conflict from Antiquity to the Present. Routledge. pp. 319–23. ISBN978-1317461098.
Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (June 1, 2006). "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada". Social Forces. Oxford University Press. 84 (4): 1969–86. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN0037-7732. S2CID146180585.
Byman, Daniel (September–October 2010). "How to Handle Hamas: The Perils of Ignoring Gaza's Leadership". Foreign Affairs. 89 (5): 45–62. JSTOR20788644.