As told by the Primary Chronicle, the first interactions between the Hungarians and Kievan Rus' occurred towards the end of the 9th century during the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, at Askold's Grave in Kyiv. During the Hungarian migration from the Ural Mountains to the Pannonian Basin, the Hungarians crossed the Dnieper river near Kyiv, the capital of Kievan Rus'.[3] There, they stayed at the site of Askold's grave, eventually passing peacefully through the city.[4] During the Middle Ages, the location of Askold's Grave became known in Ukrainian as Uhors'ke urochyshche (Ukrainian: Угорське урочище, lit. 'Hungarian tract'), in memory of the Hungarian passage through the area, and retains that name today.
In 895, the Hungarians entered the Pannonian Basin through the Verecke Pass in the Carpathian Mountains (today in Ukraine), where they went on to establish the Kingdom of Hungary.[5] In 1996, the Hungarian government received permission from Ukraine to install a monument commemorating the 1100th anniversary of the passing of the Hungarians through the Verecke Pass and the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin. Completed in 2008 by Hungarian sculptor Péter Matl, the structure sits on the border of Lviv and Zakarpattia oblasts near the village of Klymets.[6]
In 1939, in the aftermath of the breakup of the Second Czechoslovak Republic, the formerly autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine declared independence on 15 March. The same day, the Kingdom of Hungary occupied and annexed the territory. Over the course of a few days, the 40,000 strong Hungarian army overpowered the limited forces of the newly proclaimed unrecognized state, which had only 2,000 troops.[9] By the 18th, Hungarian forces took full control of the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.[10]
In the chaos that followed, an estimated 27,000 Ukrainian civilians were killed.[10] Approximately 75,000 Ukrainians from the area sought asylum in the Soviet Union, of whom 60,000 ultimately died in Soviet Gulags.[10]
In September 2017, then-president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko signed the 2017 Ukrainian Education Law, which had previously been adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. The new law made Ukrainian the required language of study for all state schools in Ukraine past the fifth grade, reversing a 2012 law signed by ousted former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych that allowed regions with an ethnic minority making up more than ten percent of the population to use minority languages in education.[12] Although mainly intended to discourage the use of Russian in public education, the policy meant that schools in Hungarian majority areas of Zakarpattia, including many funded directly by the Hungarian government, would be forced to stop teaching in the Hungarian language.[13]
The change in rules served as the catalyst for the rapid deterioration of relations between Hungary and Ukraine. Immediately after the adoption of the law, Hungarian Minister of Foreign AffairsPéter Szijjártó announced that Hungary would block all further integration of Ukraine into NATO and the European Union and offered to "guarantee that all this will be painful for Ukraine in future."[14] This marked a significant shift in Hungarian foreign policy towards Ukraine, as it had previously supported stronger Ukrainian integration into NATO and the European Union and advocated for visa-free travel between Ukraine and the European Union, largely in order to make travel to Hungary easier for the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.[15]
Following through on its promises, in October 2017, Hungary vetoed and effectively blocked the convening of a NATO-Ukraine commission meeting.[16] In response, Ukrainian officials announced concessions to some Hungarian demands, most notably extending the transition period until the implementation of the language law to 2023.[17]
Ukrainian officials faced immediate backlash from the Hungarian government after the announcement. Hungarian Minister of Foreign AffairsPéter Szijjártó restated that Hungary would block any further Ukrainian integration into NATO or the European Union until Hungarian concerns were addressed, and called the placement of the base in a mostly ethnic Hungarian area "disgusting."[19]
The plans for the base were ultimately abandoned; however, in May 2020, officials again announced plans for the restoration of the same military base and the permanent stationing of Ukrainian troops there, this time from the 80th Air Assault Brigade.[20]
In September 2018, an undercover video that showed diplomats in the Hungarian consulate in Berehove granting Hungarian citizenship and distributing Hungarian passports to Ukrainian citizens sparked new tensions between the two nations. The video, published by Ukrinform, captured recipients of new passports reciting an oath of allegiance to Hungary and singing the Hungarian national anthem.[21] Because voluntarily obtaining a foreign citizenship while failing to renounce Ukrainian citizenship is illegal according to Ukrainian nationality law, Hungarian diplomats instructed new citizens to hide their possession of Hungarian passports from Ukrainian authorities.[22]
In the run-up to the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election, Hungarian officials attempted on numerous occasions to influence the results in favor of candidates backed by the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, a political party active in Zakarpattia Oblast. Specifically, the Hungarian government worked to sway voters in favor of party leader Vasyl Brenzovych and two other candidates contesting seats in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament. The party received direct payments in the form of Hungarian grant money, and the Hungarian Development Bank spent 800,000 Hungarian forints (about 2,400 Euros at the time) paying for billboards supporting the organization in violation of Ukrainian law.
Throughout July 2019, a number of top Hungarian figures visited Zakarpattia in order to hold rallies and lobby voters for the party's candidates, including Minister of Foreign AffairsPéter Szijjártó. Around the same time, party leader and parliamentary candidate Vasyl Brenzovych visited Budapest to attend a meeting with Prime Minister of HungaryViktor Orbán. Despite the extensive efforts, none of the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine's candidates were ultimately elected.[24]
On 27 September 2021, the Hungarian government signed a 15-year natural gas contract with Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy conglomorate.[25] The deal will provide 4.5 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to Hungary annually through the newly constructed TurkStream pipeline; under the contract, 3.5 billion cubic meters will be transported through Serbia and 1 billion cubic meters will go through Austria, making up about half of Hungary's natural gas consumption.[26][27] By bypassing Ukraine entirely, the new route strips Ukraine of millions of dollars in profits from transit fees on Russian natural gas shipments to central and western Europe, on which it is economically reliant.[28]
The agreement sparked new tensions between Hungary and Ukraine. Shortly after the contract was signed, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement deriding the deal as politically motivated and economically unreasonable, meant solely to please the Kremlin, and intended to harm the national interests of Ukraine and Hungary–Ukraine relations.[29][30] The statement also accused Hungary of violating the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between Ukraine and Hungary of 6 December 1991, suspended the Joint Ukrainian-Hungarian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, and called for a European Commission investigation into the deal's compliance with European energy law.[30]
In response, Hungarian Minister of Foreign AffairsPéter Szijjártó summoned the Ukrainian ambassador to Hungary, calling Ukraine's actions a "violation of our sovereignty" and accusing Ukraine of trying to halt the deal and prevent "a secure gas supply for Hungary".[31] In turn, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Hungary's ambassador to Ukraine in a tit for tat move, reiterated its position that the agreement undermines Ukraine's national security and the energy security of Europe, and said that it would take "decisive measures" to protect its interests.[32]
In December 2021, the Hungarian government reversed course, signing an agreement to transport up to 2.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas through Ukraine annually on top of the Gazprom deal.[33] Alongside a larger deal with Slovakia, the new contract will increase Ukraine's guaranteed natural gas exports by nearly 30%.[33] On 28 December, after the deal's signing, the foreign ministers of both nations declared their "mutual intention to improve bilateral relations" between Hungary and Ukraine.[33]
Days after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Hungarian president János Áder and prime minister Viktor Orbán condemned the invasion, and declared their support for Ukraine in the conflict. Áder added that the conflict was "not provoked by Kyiv", and said that Hungary "hold[s] the leaders of the Russian Federation responsible for the bloodshed", while Orbán noted that military support "out of the question, though we will, of course, provide humanitarian aid".[34][35]
However, in the leadup to the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election, Orbán avoided directly criticizing Russian president Vladimir Putin, and expressed opposition to potential blockades of Russian oil and gas, on which Hungary relies.[36] During his victory speech on 3 April, Orbán said that Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was one of the "opponents" that he had overcome in order to win the parliamentary elections.[37] On 6 April, Hungary signaled its intent to agree to pay for Russian gas in rubles, breaking ranks with the rest of the European Union.[38]
In early May, Hungary said that it would veto a proposed European Union sanctions package against the Russian energy sector.[39] Explaining his country's opposition to the sanctions, Hungarian Minister of Foreign AffairsPéter Szijjártó said that "Hungary’s energy supply cannot be endangered because no one can expect us to allow the price of the war [in Ukraine] to be paid by Hungarians".[40]
On 1 May, Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, accused Hungary of having advance knowledge of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, saying that Vladimir Putin had warned the Hungarian government ahead of time, and that Hungary had plans to annex parts of Zakarpattia Oblast in Western Ukraine, which lies on the border with Hungary. Hungarian officials condemned Danilov's accusation as false, and expressed outrage over his claims.[41]
Hungary has accepted many[vague] refugees from Ukraine, some of them travelled on to other EU countries.[42]
In June 2023, considerable tensions arose between the two nations from a transfer of eleven Ukrainian POWs from the Russian Federation to Hungary without the involvement of Ukrainian officials. Later three of this group were sent back to Ukraine. The prisoners reportedly from the Zakarpattia Oblast of Hungarian ethnicity were moved under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church at the request of Budapest. The Hungarian foreign ministry denied that it had knowledge of such a transfer, but Ukrainian government sources claimed otherwise, as the men had no access to open source information during the process. Later on 15 July, Hungarian President Katalin Novák accepted an invitation by Kyiv for a visit on 23 August for the Crimean Platform with a prior stop in the Zakarpattia Oblast.[43][44]
The Council of the European Union voted to begin accession negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023.[45] These talks was preceded by a significant revision by the Ukrainian government in December 2023 to legislation on national minorities in Ukraine, which addressed recommendations from the Council of Europe's Venice Commission regarding the legislation.[46] Previously, the Hungarian government (specifically Balázs Orbán, political advisor to the Hungarian Prime Minister) had indicated that, without improvement to Ukrainian legislation on national minority rights, Hungary would not support Ukraine's desire for EU accession.[47] After the revision to the Ukrainian national minorities legislation, Hungarian Foreign MinisterPéter Szijjártó noted that it represented an improvement but suggested that national minority legislation was not yet entirely satisfactory to Hungary.[48] The revised Ukrainian national minority legislation includes, according to a summary of legislation by Rubryka, the right of "[r]epresentatives of national minorities" to "receive basic and specialized secondary education in their respective languages" and the right of private universities "to choose a language of teaching" provided that it is an official language of the European Union.[46] Importantly, the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies notes in an analysis that the Hungarian government did not seem to place national minorities legislation concerns at the center of its discourse on opposing "Ukraine’s integration with the EU", instead "[focusing] on accusing the Ukrainian leadership of ‘widespread and systemic corruption’ and emphasising Ukraine’s problems with the rule of law and democracy".[49]
Due to their significant minority populations within each other's borders, Hungary and Ukraine each maintain an extensive network of diplomatic missions across both nations. Hungary has an embassy in Kyiv, a consulate-general in Uzhhorod, and a consulate in Berehove,[50] while Ukraine maintains an embassy in Budapest[50] and a consulate-general in Nyíregyháza.[51]
Hungary and Ukraine share a 136.7 km (84.9 mi) border, roughly following the Tisza river across the Zakarpattia Lowland. The border has a single point of entry by passenger rail, between Chop and Záhony, and one point of entry that only serves freight rail, between Solovka and Eperjeske.[52]
Because of the Hungarian minority there, the vast majority of Hungary and Ukraine's city links involve towns and villages in Zakarpattia Oblast; specifically, many twinned Ukrainian towns are on or near the border with Hungary and have Hungarian-majority populations. Conversely, multiple agreements between the two nation's municipalities involve towns and villages in Hungary's Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County, which is home to a significant part of the Ukrainian minority in Hungary.
^"Verecke Pass". KMTT.info. Hungarian Tourism Council of Zakarpattia. Retrieved 26 February 2021.
^Baják László: A fejedelmek kora. A korai magyar történet időrendi vázlata. II. rész. 900-1000 ("The Era of the Princes. The chronological sketch of the early Hungarian history. II. part. 900-1000"); ÓMT, Budapest, (2000). p. 25
^Baják László: A fejedelmek kora. A korai magyar történet időrendi vázlata. II. rész. 900-1000 ("The Era of the Princes. The chronological sketch of the early Hungarian history. II. part. 900-1000"); ÓMT, Budapest, (2000). p. 32
^Skavron, Bohdan (25 July 2015). "Розстріляна держава" (in Ukrainian). Galician Correspondent. Archived from the original on 25 July 2015. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Külkapcsolatok". papa.hu (in Hungarian). Pápa. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Города-побратимы". alushta-adm.ru (in Russian). Alushta. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Testvérvárosok". rackeve.hu (in Hungarian). Ráckeve. Archived from the original on 19 June 2020. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Міста-побратими". omr.gov.ua (in Ukrainian). Odesa. Archived from the original on 1 April 2019. Retrieved 23 February 2021.
^"History of Luhansk". Official site of Luhansk City Council. 15 October 2012. Archived from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Testvérvárosaink". tamasi.hu (in Hungarian). Tamási. Archived from the original on 10 April 2021. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Testvérvárosok". tatabanya.hu (in Hungarian). Tatabánya. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Testvérvárosaink". teglas.hu (in Hungarian). Téglás. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
^"Testvértelepülések". torokszentmiklos.hu (in Hungarian). Törökszentmiklós. Retrieved 25 February 2021.