Categories
  Encyclosphere.org ENCYCLOREADER
  supported by EncyclosphereKSF

Semiconductor industry in China

From Wikipedia - Reading time: 15 min

For the major semiconductor manufacturing company in the Republic of China (Taiwan), see TSMC.

The Chinese semiconductor industry, including integrated circuit design and manufacturing, forms a major part of mainland China's information technology industry.

China's semiconductor industry consists of a wide variety of companies, from integrated device manufacturers to pure-play foundries, fabless semiconductor companies and OSAT companies. Integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) design and manufacture integrated circuits. Pure-play foundries only manufacture devices for other companies, without designing them, while fabless semiconductor companies only design devices. Examples of Chinese IDMs are YMTC and CXMT, examples of Chinese pure-play foundries are SMIC, Hua Hong Semiconductor and Wingtech, examples of Chinese fabless companies are Zhaoxin, HiSilicon, Loongson and UNISOC, and examples of Chinese OSAT companies are JCET, Huatian Technology and Tongfu Microelectronics.

Overview

[edit]

China is currently the world's largest semiconductor market in terms of consumption. In 2020, China represented 53.7% of worldwide chip sales, or $239.45 billion out of $446.1 billion. However, a large percentage are imported from multinational suppliers. In 2020, imports took up over 83% ($199.7 billion) of total chip sales. In response, the country launched a number of initiatives to reduce its reliance on foreign companies.[1]: 274  To reduce reliance on foreign semiconductor companies, CICF pools resources from state investors including the Ministry of Finance, China Tobacco, China Mobile, and China Development Bank.[1]: 274 

In 2022, the country announced a Made in China 2025 goal of 70% domestic production.[2][3]

China leads the world in terms of number of new fabs under construction, with 8 out of 19 worldwide in 2021. A total of 17 fabs were expected to start construction between 2021 and 2023. Total installed capacity of Chinese-owned chipmakers was also set to increase from 2.96 million wafers per month (wpm) in 2020 to 3.57 million wpm in 2021.[2]

History

[edit]

Soviet-style system of industry

[edit]

The semiconductor industry in China began between a period in 1956, along with the country's first transistor produced in a state lab. In 1965, China created their first integrated circuit. From 1956 to 1990, the industry followed a Soviet-style system of industrial organization.[4] China's State Council prioritized semiconductor technology in its "Outline for Science and Technology Development, 1956–1967," leading to the establishment of semiconductor-related degree programs in five major universities. The Huajing Group's Wuxi Factory No. 742, operational from 1960, played a crucial role in training industry experts and supporting subsequent industrial strategies.[5]

In the mid-1960s through the late 1960s, China began a semiconductor program.[6]: 101 

During the 1970s, China's semiconductor industry operated with research conducted in state labs and manufacturing in separate state-owned factories, hindering technology transfer. Most of the approximately 40 factories focused on producing basic diodes and transistors rather than integrated circuits (ICs). The Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1975 further disrupted industry progress. However by 1972, China was producing third-generation computers.[6]: 101 

Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms starting in 1978 initiated significant changes. By the early 1980s, under the sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), the State Council formed a "Computer and Large Scale IC Lead Group" to modernize the industry. Despite importing 24 secondhand semiconductor lines by 1985, only the Wuxi Factory No. 742 met production targets. Efforts then narrowed to focus on five key firms, but cumulative setbacks left the industry lagging behind global leaders.[5]

End of the 20th century

[edit]

In the 1990s, China adopted a strategy of concentrating resources on a few large firms to foster partnerships with foreign companies, aiming to accelerate technological advancement.[7][8] Initiatives included joint ventures with Nortel, Philips, NEC, and ITT starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) focused on developing Huajing (operator of Wuxi Factory No. 742) into a leading integrated device manufacturer (IDM),[9] supported by significant funding and a joint venture with Lucent Technologies.[8] However, delays in implementation resulted in outdated manufacturing technologies and slower market entry. The ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) introduced Project 909, aiming for a domestic firm, Huahong, to produce internationally competitive chips using Chinese intellectual property and engineers.[9][8] While Huahong successfully partnered with NEC to enter production promptly, reliance on Japanese expertise limited knowledge transfer. Economic downturns in the global DRAM market by 2002 led to significant financial losses for Huahong, prompting changes in its partnership and operational strategies.[8]

21st century

[edit]

In 2014, the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was established in an effort to reduce dependence on foreign semiconductor companies.[10]: 274  In addition to the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, many other China government guidance funds also frequently invest in companies in the semiconductor industry.[11]: 164–167 

Due to the rapid pace of Chinese semiconductor industry advances, on 7 October 2022, the U.S. government announced a major set of export restrictions toward China, with a focus on artificial Intelligence and semiconductor technologies, with the aim of disrupting the development of China's semiconductor industry.[12] In January 2023, these export controls were made multilateral with an agreement between the governments of the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands.[13] Between October 2022 and May 2023, China's government responded with a diverse set of measures, including filing a suit in the World Trade Organization.[14][15]

On 26 December 2023, China prohibited the use of CPUs made by US companies Intel and AMD for Chinese government PCs and servers.[16] The country instead approved 18 processors made by Chinese companies Loongson and Phytium. State-owned companies were also instructed to transition towards Chinese hardware by 2027.[16] The ban was part of China's strategy to rely more on its domestically designed options in response to US sanctions and export controls.

On 15th September 2024, China announced significant advancements in its domestic semiconductor industry, promoting two new deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography machines. One of the machines operates at a wavelength of 193nm with a resolution below 65nm and an overlay accuracy below 8nm. The second machine has a wavelength of 248nm, with 110nm resolution and 25nm overlay accuracy. [17]

Foreign companies

[edit]
Main article: List of semiconductor fabrication plants

Samsung, who is currently the world's largest producer of NAND flash memory, has two plants in Xi'an which accounts for 42.5% percent of its total production capacity, and 15.3% of worldwide NAND production capacity.[18][19] It was the company's largest overseas investment in chip production with an initial cost of $7 billion.[20]

Domestic companies

[edit]

Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs)

[edit]

Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp (YMTC)

[edit]
Main article: Yangtze Memory Technologies

Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp (YMTC) is a Chinese semiconductor integrated device manufacturer specializing in flash memory (NAND) chips. Founded in Wuhan, China in 2016, the company received backing from Tsinghua Unigroup. Prior to YMTC, China had no company capable of producing flash memory. Its consumer products are marketed under the brand Zhitai.

In 2020, YMTC was using a 20 nm process to make 64-layer 3D NAND flash.[21] In April 2020, the company unveiled its first 128 layers vertical NAND chip, then the most advanced layer count in mass production, based on XTacking architecture, which then entered production.[22]

In 2021, YMTC was producing around 80,000 wafers per month, with plans to expand its first plant to reach 100,000 wpm capacity by 2022;[23] this would have given the company around 6-8% of global market share.[3]

ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT)

[edit]
Main article: Changxin Memory Technologies

ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) is a Chinese semiconductor integrated device manufacturer headquartered in Hefei, Anhui specializing in the production of DRAM memory. As of 2020, ChangXin can manufacture LPDDR4 and DDR4 RAM on a 19 nm process with a capacity of 40,000 wafers per month.[24] The company plans to increase output to 120,000 wpm and launch 17 nm (LP)DDR5 by end of 2022, with a target total capacity of 300,000 wpm in the mid-long term.[25]

Hangzhou Silan Microelectronics

[edit]
Main article: Hangzhou Silan Microelectronics

Hangzhou Silan Microelectronics is a Chinese semiconductor company headquartered in Hangzhou. The company focuses on the design of integrated circuit (IC) chip and the manufacturing of semiconductor microelectronics-related products. It is one of the largest integrated device manufacturers (IDM) in China.[26]

Other companies

[edit]

Pure-play foundries

[edit]

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)

[edit]
Main article: Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) is a partially state-owned publicly listed Chinese pure-play semiconductor foundry company.[27][28] It is the largest contract chip maker in mainland China and 5th largest globally, with a market share of 5.3% in the second quarter of 2021.[2][29][30]

SMIC is headquartered in Shanghai[31] and incorporated in the Cayman Islands.[32] It has wafer fabrication sites throughout mainland China, offices in the United States, Italy, Japan, and Taiwan, and a representative office in Hong Kong.[33] It provides integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing services on 350 nm to 14 nm process technologies. State-owned civilian and military telecommunications equipment provider Datang Telecom Group as well as the China National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund are major shareholders of SMIC.[34][35][36][37]

Hua Hong Semiconductor

[edit]
Main article: Hua Hong Semiconductor

Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited is a publicly listed Chinese pure-play semiconductor foundry company based in Shanghai, established in 1996 as part of China's national efforts to boost its IC industry. Currently, Hua Hong's most advanced node is achieved by its subsidiary Shanghai Huali (HLMC), which in 2022 could manufacture a 28/22nm process; in 2022 advanced 14nm technology was being developed by the company.[38][39]

Hua Hong Semiconductor is currently mainland China's second largest chip-maker behind rival SMIC and the 6th largest globally, with a market share of 2.6% in the second quarter of 2021.[2][38]

Other companies

[edit]

Fabless companies

[edit]

HiSilicon

[edit]
Main article: HiSilicon

HiSilicon is a Chinese fabless semiconductor company based in Shenzhen, Guangdong and wholly owned by Huawei. HiSilicon purchases licenses for CPU designs from ARM Holdings, including the ARM Cortex-A9 MPCore, ARM Cortex-M3, ARM Cortex-A7 MPCore, ARM Cortex-A15 MPCore,[40][41] ARM Cortex-A53, ARM Cortex-A57 and also for their Mali graphics cores.[42][43] HiSilicon has also purchased licenses from Vivante Corporation for their GC4000 graphics core.[citation needed]

HiSilicon is reputed to be the largest domestic designer of integrated circuits in China.[44] In 2020, the U.S. instituted rules that require American firms providing certain equipment to HiSilicon or non-American firms who use American technologies that supply HiSilicon to have licenses[45] and Huawei announced it will stop producing its Kirin chipset from 15 September 2020, onwards.[46] HiSilicon was overtaken by Chinese rival UNISOC in terms of mobile processor market share as a consequence.[47] However, at the end of 2023 the Kirin 9000S processor, which was first used in the Huawei Mate 60, showed that HiSilicon was restarting its production of Kirin chipsets after a three-year hiatus, this time with entirely domestically produced chips.[48]

Hygon Information Technology

[edit]
Main article: Hygon Information Technology

Hygon Information Technology is a partially state-owned publicly listed Chinese fabless semiconductor company headquartered in Beijing. The company mainly handles central processing units (CPUs) based on Intel's x86 technology as well as domestic Deep Learning Processors.[49]

Loongson Technology

[edit]
Main article: Loongson Technology

Loongson Technology is a Chinese fabless company that develops a family of general-purpose, MIPS architecture-compatible microprocessors, mainly used in personal computers and supercomputers. The processors were favoured by the Chinese government in its “Made in China 2025” push, which was also directed against US semiconductor sanctions.[16]

UNISOC

[edit]
Main article: UNISOC

UNISOC is a Chinese fabless semiconductor company headquartered in Shanghai which produces chipsets for mobile phones. UNISOC develops its business in two major fields: consumer electronics, which includes smart phones, feature phones, smart audio systems, smart wear and other areas; Industrial electronics, on the other hand, covers such fields as LAN IoT, WAN IoT, or smart display.

In 2021, it was the fourth largest mobile processor manufacturer in the world, after Mediatek, Qualcomm and Apple, with 9% of global market share.[47]

Will Semiconductor (OmniVision Group)

[edit]
Main article: Will Semiconductor

Will Semiconductor is a publicly listed Chinese fabless semiconductor company headquartered in Shanghai. In May 2019, it acquired OmniVision Technologies.[50]

Zhaoxin

[edit]
Main article: Zhaoxin

Zhaoxin is a fabless semiconductor company, created in 2013 as a joint venture between VIA Technologies and the Shanghai Municipal Government.[51] The company manufactures x86-compatible desktop and laptop CPUs.[52] The term Zhào xīn means million core.[note 1] The processors are created mainly for the Chinese market: the venture is an attempt to reduce the Chinese dependence on foreign technology.[53][54]

Other companies

[edit]

Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT)

[edit]

JCET

[edit]
Main article: JCET (company)

JCET Group Co., Ltd. is a public company headquartered in Jiangyin on China's eastern coast.[55][56] It is the largest Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) company in mainland China and the third-largest globally.[57] JCET was formed in 1972, when Jiangyin converted a local factory to produce transistors. JCET went public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2003 and continued to grow over time. JCET provides a range of semiconductor packaging, assembly, manufacturing, and testing products and services.[citation needed]

Other companies

[edit]

Semiconductor equipment manufacturers

[edit]

Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment (AMEC)

[edit]
Main article: Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment

Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment is a partially state-owned publicly listed Chinese company that manufactures semiconductor chip production equipment. It is one of the largest semiconductor equipment manufacturer in China.[58]

NAURA Technology Group

[edit]
Main article: NAURA Technology Group

NAURA Technology Group is a partially state-owned publicly listed Chinese company that manufactures semiconductor chip production equipment. It is currently the largest semiconductor equipment manufacturer in China. [59]

Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE)

[edit]
Main article: Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment

Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE) is a semiconductor manufacturing equipment manufacturer based in Shanghai, supplying lithography (DUV immersion) equipment and other equipment used in the semiconductor manufacturing industry. Currently, its most advanced product is the SSA600, with a resolution of 90 nm. SMEE is developing the SSA800, with a resolution of 28 nm, which will be followed up by the SSA900, with a resolution of 22 nm.[60] In December 2022, the United States Department of Commerce added SMEE to the Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List.[61]

China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC)

[edit]
Main article: China Electronics Technology Group Corporation

China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is China's third largest electronics and IT company behind only Huawei and Lenovo. Its fields include communications equipment, computers, electronic equipment, IT infrastructure, networks, software development, research services, investment and asset management for civilian and military applications.[62][63]

The company also manufactures semiconductors and semiconductor equipment used in the semiconductor manufacturing industry, largely for military applications.[64]

Other companies

[edit]

Other developments

[edit]

Huawei

[edit]

Huawei is reportedly planning to build its own fabs, in cooperation with SMIC, in an attempt to promote vertical integration and reduce impacts of US sanctions such as the one it was subjected to during the China–United States trade war.[65] In 2023, Huawei released its Mate60 Pro smartphone, which had a 7nm chip application processor HiSilicon Kirin 9000S manufactured by SMIC using SMIC's N+2 process node.[66]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ In China 兆 can mean either short-scale million (1e6) or trillion (1e12). However, for IT-related topics 兆 always means mega/million in Mainland China.

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Zhang, Angela Huyue (2024). High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001. ISBN 9780197682258.
  2. ^ a b c d Paper, Technical (2022-05-09). "China Accelerates Foundry, Power Semi Efforts". Semiengineering.com. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  3. ^ a b "The Impending Chinese NAND Apocalypse – YMTC 128 Layer NAND Is The First Semiconductor Where China Is Technologically Competitive – SemiAnalysis". Semianalysis.com. 2021-10-01. Archived from the original on 2022-05-07. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  4. ^ VerWey 2019, p. 3.
  5. ^ a b VerWey 2019, p. 10.
  6. ^ a b Mullaney, Thomas S. (2024). The Chinese Computer: a Global History of the Information Age. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. ISBN 9780262047517.
  7. ^ Mays, Susan Kay (2013). Rapid Advance: High Technology in China in the Global Electronic Age (Thesis). Columbia University. p. 4. doi:10.7916/d8hq464q.
  8. ^ a b c d VerWey 2019, p. 11.
  9. ^ a b Fuller, Douglas (May 2016). "'IC Fabrication', Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and the Political Economy of China's Technological Development". academic.oup.com. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777205.003.0006. Retrieved 2024-07-07.
  10. ^ Zhang, Angela Huyue (2024). High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001. ISBN 9780197682258.
  11. ^ Lan, Xiaohuan (2024). How China Works: An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development. Translated by Topp, Gary. Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-981-97-0080-6. ISBN 978-981-97-0079-0.
  12. ^ Allen, Gregory (11 October 2022). "Choking off China's Access to the Future of AI". Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS.
  13. ^ Allen, Gregory (March 1, 2023). "Clues to the U.S.-Dutch-Japanese Semiconductor Export Controls Deal Are Hiding in Plain Sight". Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  14. ^ Allen, Gregory (May 3, 2023). "China's New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War". Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved May 7, 2023.
  15. ^ Allen, Gregory C. (2023-10-06). "In Chip Race, China Gives Huawei the Steering Wheel: Huawei's New Smartphone and the Future of Semiconductor Export Controls".
  16. ^ a b c Roshan Ashraf Shaikh (2024-03-25). "China blocks Intel and AMD CPUs for government offices and servers, plans to switch to domestic-made alternatives". Tom's Hardware. Retrieved 2024-04-02.
  17. ^ "China touts home-grown chip machines amid self-sufficiency drive". South China Morning Post. 2024-09-15. Retrieved 2024-09-16.
  18. ^ Che Pan in Beijing + FOLLOW (2021-12-29). "Samsung's Xian chip plants hit by Covid-19 lockdowns as tech giant moves to minimise impact | South China Morning Post". Scmp.com. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  19. ^ Byung-wook, Kim (29 December 2021). "Samsung Electronics cuts chip production in Xian due to lockdown". The Korea Herald. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  20. ^ Peter Clarke (2019-05-28). "Samsung to spend $7 billion on wafer fab in Xian, China". EETimes. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  21. ^ "China's YMTC is Poised to Lead in NAND Flash Technology". EE Times Asia. 3 November 2020.
  22. ^ "YMTC makes a memory chip that competes with Samsung. What's next?". TechNode. 23 April 2020.
  23. ^ "China's top maker of memory chips plans to double output in 2021 - Nikkei Asia". Asia.nikkei.com. 2021-01-12. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  24. ^ Mellor, Chris (2020-10-13). "Micron said to be mulling action against Chinese DRAM maker CXMT – report". Blocks & Files. Retrieved 2021-08-16.
  25. ^ "China's CXMT Aims to Tackle DDR5 Market Later This Year | Tom's Hardware". Tomshardware.com. 28 February 2022. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  26. ^ "The IDM model is receiving more attention in China's semiconductor industry. Industry pioneer Chen Xiangdong sees the potential for more IDM players to emerge". www.laoyaoba.com. Retrieved 2024-03-09.
  27. ^ "Co-chiefs of China's top chipmaker SMIC fighting over strategy". Financial Times. 9 May 2019. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2019-05-26. (published 05-09-2019)
  28. ^ "Either Huawei Doesn't Need U.S. Tech Or It Does. Which Is It?". Forbes. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2019-05-26. (published 05-24-2019)
  29. ^ "China's biggest chipmaker has applied for 'voluntary delisting' from the New York Stock Exchange amid the trade war and Trump's crackdown on Chinese tech (SMI)". Connecticut Post. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2019-05-26. (published 05-25-2019)
  30. ^ Beddor, Christopher (19 February 2019). "Breakingviews - Money can't buy China's chip industry much love". Reuters. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2019-05-26. (published 02-18-2019)
  31. ^ "SMIC". Nikkei Asian Review. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2019-05-26.
  32. ^ "SMIC". Nasdaq. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2019-05-26.
  33. ^ "SMIC - Contact Us". SMIC website. Archived from the original on 4 January 2012. Retrieved 6 January 2012.
  34. ^ "Annual Report 2019" (PDF). Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation. p. 70. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2020-09-06.
  35. ^ Sheng, Wei (May 18, 2020). "SMIC gets $2 billion from China's state-backed funds". TechNode. Archived from the original on July 6, 2020. Retrieved September 5, 2020.
  36. ^ Strumpf, Dan (2020-09-26). "U.S. Sets Export Controls on China's Top Chip Maker". The Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Archived from the original on 2020-11-12. Retrieved 2020-09-26.
  37. ^ Whalen, Jeanne (September 26, 2020). "U.S. restricts tech exports to China's biggest semiconductor manufacturer in escalation of trade tensions". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on November 12, 2020. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
  38. ^ a b Che Pan in Beijing + FOLLOW (2022-03-21). "China's No 2 chip maker seeks Shanghai listing to expand capacity, as Beijing continues to back self-sufficiency drive | South China Morning Post". Scmp.com. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  39. ^ Shanghai Huali Microelectronics Corporation. "SHANGHAI HUALI MICROELECTRONICS CORPORATION - International Semiconductor Executive Summits". Isesglobal.com. Archived from the original on 2022-09-25. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  40. ^ HiSilicon Licenses ARM Technology for use in Innovative 3G/4G Base Station, Networking Infrastructure and Mobile Computing Applications Archived 27 January 2013 at the Wayback Machine, 2 August 2011 on ARM.com
  41. ^ "HiSilicon Technologies Co., Ltd. 海思半导体有限公司". ARM Holdings. Archived from the original on 15 January 2013. Retrieved 26 April 2013.
  42. ^ ARM Launches Cortex-A50 Series, the World’s Most Energy-Efficient 64-bit Processors Archived 5 January 2013 at the Wayback Machine on ARM.com
  43. ^ Lai, Richard (9 January 2013). "Huawei's HiSilicon K3V3 chipset due 2H 2013, to be based on Cortex-A15". Engadget. Archived from the original on 15 May 2013. Retrieved 26 April 2013.
  44. ^ "Hisilicon grown into the largest local IC design companies". Windosi. September 2012. Archived from the original on 21 August 2014. Retrieved 26 April 2013.
  45. ^ Josh, Horwitz (21 May 2020). "U.S. strikes at a Huawei prize: chip juggernaut HiSilicon". Reuters. Archived from the original on 22 May 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2020.
  46. ^ "Huawei to stop making flagship chipsets as U.S. pressure bites, Chinese media say". Reuters. 8 August 2020. Retrieved 8 August 2020.
  47. ^ a b "China's Tsinghua Unigroup axes major memory chip projects - Nikkei Asia". Asia.nikkei.com. 2022-01-26. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  48. ^ Anton Shilov (2023-12-19). "Huawei's sanctions-evading Kirin 9000S processor tested: significantly behind its Kirin 9000 predecessor that used TSMC tech". Tom's Hardware. Retrieved 2024-04-02.
  49. ^ Noriyuki, Doi (13 August 2022). "China chipmaker Hygon makes strong debut on Shanghai startup market". Nikkei Asia. Retrieved 18 February 2024.
  50. ^ Wu, Zongyu (2023-11-02). "Analysis of Will's Acquisition of Omnivision". Highlights in Business, Economics and Management. 19: 416–423. doi:10.54097/hbem.v19i.11977. ISSN 2957-952X.
  51. ^ Chan, Leon (3 January 2018). "Via's Chinese Joint Venture Aims For Competitive Home-Grown X86 SOCs By 2019". Hexus.net. Retrieved 3 January 2018.
  52. ^ Tyson, Mark (2 January 2018). "VIA and Zhaoxin ZX- family of x86 processors roadmap shared". Hexus.net. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
  53. ^ Clark, Don (21 April 2016). "AMD to License Chip Technology to China Chip Venture". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 24 April 2018. The VIA/Shanghai Zhaoxin KX-5000 series of x86-compatible CPUs will never be sold outside of China to avoid an Intel lawsuit.","...will use the technology to develop chips for server systems to be sold only in China
  54. ^ Wu, Yimian (23 May 2018). "China Supports Local Semiconductor Firms By Adding Them To Government Procurement List". China Money Network. Retrieved 31 May 2018.
  55. ^ "Changjiang Electronics Offers $780 Million for Stats ChipPack". Bloomberg.com. November 6, 2014. Retrieved June 25, 2021.
  56. ^ Carew, Rick; Venkat, P.R. (November 6, 2014). "Jiangsu Changjiang Makes $780 Million Offer for STATS ChipPAC". WSJ. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
  57. ^ "Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology Co., Ltd.". The International Directory of Company Histories Series. Vol. 216. St. James Press. 2020. ISBN 978-1410382443.
  58. ^ Landers, Peter (9 November 2022). "Entrepreneur Caught in the Middle of U.S.-China Chip War". WSJ. Retrieved 24 February 2024.
  59. ^ Hope, Arran (3 February 2023). "China's top 10 semiconductor firms". The China Project. Retrieved 17 February 2024.
  60. ^ "ASML's Current Battleground Now In China On Several Fronts (NASDAQ:ASML)". Seeking Alpha. 16 February 2022. Retrieved 2022-05-13.
  61. ^ Alper, Alexandra (2022-12-15). "Biden blacklists China's YMTC, crackdowns on AI chip sector". Reuters. Retrieved 2022-12-15.
  62. ^ "Company Overview of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 6 March 2016. Retrieved 5 March 2016.
  63. ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (June 24, 2020). "Defense Department produces list of Chinese military-linked companies". Axios. Archived from the original on June 25, 2020. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
  64. ^ "Manufacturing Equipments_Products_CETC ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT GROUP CO., LTD._Electronic electrician".
  65. ^ Huawei foundry speculationtechtaiwan.com Archived 2022-01-29 at the Wayback Machine
  66. ^ Allen, Gregory (October 6, 2023). "In Chip Race, China Gives Huawei the Steering Wheel: Huawei's New Smartphone and the Future of Semiconductor Export Control". Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Sources

[edit]
Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 | Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiconductor_industry_in_China
23 views |
↧ Download as ZWI file
Encyclosphere.org EncycloReader is supported by the EncyclosphereKSF