Naval History Of The War

"Naval History Of The War. - The tornado of war which broke upon the world in 191 4 found the British navy at its post and ready for action. A review of all the seaworthy vessels of the fleet had taken the place of the customary annual manoeuvres, and by July 23 the ships had already begun to disperse. By the 26th the whole outlook had grown dark. The German Emperor was hastening back to Berlin, and Admiralty orders were sent by the First Sea Lord (Adml. Prince Louis of Battenberg') to Adml. Sir George Callaghan to remain with his First Fleet at Portland, and to the ships of the Second Fleet to be ready near their crews at their home ports. Squadrons abroad were warned of the political tension, and on the 27th the commander-in-chief Mediterranean was told to concentrate at Malta. On the 28th Austria issued her declaration of war, and orders went out at S P.M. for the First Fleet to leave for its war base at Scapa Flow. It sailed at 7 A.M. on the 29th.

The British fleet at the time consisted of the Home Fleet and the squadrons on the various stations abroad (Mediterranean, East Indies, China, Australia, Cape, N. America and West Indies and S.E. coast of America), but the bulk of it was to be found in the Home Fleet. This fleet was divided into three categories in three successive stages of efficiency. The First Fleet (to be designated the Grand Fleet) comprised all the newest ships fully manned, and in permanent commission. The Second Fleet consisted of older but still efficient battleships and cruisers with nucleus crews amounting to two-fifths of their complement aboard. Last of all came the Third Fleet, a rather motley collection of obsolescent but serviceable ships in the basins of our naval ports with only a small " care and maintenance " party aboard. The constitution of these fleets is summarized in Table A, and it will be seen that practically the whole of the " dreadnought " strength of the fleet was concentrated in Home Waters.

Tables A and B shown in terms of units were the two forces 1 Later created Marquess of Milford Haven (d. 1921). This last service to Great Britain by one who had always been a fine naval officer was never forgotten, although he retired soon after rather than allow his German origin to compromise his position.

Table A. Disposition of British Fleet, Aug. 1914. *Three battleships to Grand Fleet as " Minebumpers ' on 7/8/17.6th B.S. ceased to exist 8/8/17, and 7th was merged with 8th, leaving Channel Fleet composed of 5th and 8th B.S.

Table B. Disposition of German Fleet. ranged against one another across the North Sea. In terms of gun-power the British fleet was decidedly superior; 13 of the British dreadnoughts were armed with 13.5 guns and the others with 12 in., while the Germans had 12-in. guns in only nine of their ships and II in. in the remainder.

On July 29, the day that the British Home (or First) Fleet left for the north, the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) pressed the Cabinet for the initiation of the Precautionary Period, and the warning telegram went out to all squadrons abroad. By Aug. 1 the tension had increased. Germany had issued her ultimatum to Russia and had declared Kriegsgefahr. In Hamburg British ships were being detained. Immediately this news arrived the Admiralty issued orders at 2:15 P.M. to act on the instructions for mobilization, but the reserves were not yet called out. Late that night the news came in that Germany had declared war on Russia, and at 1:25 A.M. on Aug. 2 the Admiralty issued the order to mobilize. By 4 A.M. on Aug. 3 the whole fleet stood mobilized and ready for action.

The German mobilization had taken a somewhat different course. Arrangements had been made for the fleet' to visit various ports in Norway, but on July 15, when the cruise commenced, the German Admiral Staff was already beginning to doubt the wisdom of its continuance. By July 23 the Kaiser had adopted the view that the fleet should be recalled, but the Chancellor was 10th to do anything to aggravate the current tension and proposed to wait and see what England did. But no sooner had Adml. von Ingenohl anchored in Sogniefiord on July 25 and opened his mails than he became deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation. He went straight to the Kaiser and persuaded him to let the fleet sail for its home ports. It got under way on the 26th, and at 7 P.M. on July 27 had assembled off Stavanger. On the 30th the German ambassador at St. James's sent word that Sir Edward Grey had told him that the British fleet had sailed for the north of Scotland. Strained relations were notified to all commanders-in-chief that day, and on the 3 ist at 5 P.M. the telegram for Kriegsgefahr (Precautionary Period) went out. Everything was now hastening downhill. War was declared with Russia on Aug. 1. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons came round from Kiel to the North Sea the same day and at 8 P.M. that evening the order to mobilize went out.

One important step had not been taken. The German Admiral Staff had asked for orders to be issued for armed merchantmen to proceed to the trade routes, but the Chancellor had demurred and only one proceeded to sea. Before any more could sail the British Grand Fleet was at its post and actually put to sea on the morning of Aug. 4 to circumvent movements of this sort.

Its old commander, Adml. Sir George Callaghan, was no longer with it. It was thought that a younger commander was required to face the heavy responsibilities of war. By 8:30 A.M. Sir George Callaghan had struck his flag, and the fleet put to sea on Aug. 4 under its new commander, Sir John Jellicoe. That night at II P.M. the eventful order went out to all ships and squadrons " Commence hostilities at once against Germany." The Grand Fleet, for so it was to be designated, was already at sea engaged in a sweep to the south-east. These sweeps were an essential feature of the British war plans, which were primarily based on the concentration of the main fleet in the north to guard the northern exit of the North Sea. The closure of the southern exit was to be effected by flotillas supported by older squadrons and by the use of mines.

By its mere concentration at the outlets of the North Sea the British fleet performed all its principal tasks. It covered the trade routes, cut off Germany from the ocean, protected the coast line against invasion and secured the transport of the army. Further afield the focal and terminal areas of trade were guarded by cruiser squadrons. The protection of the coast was entrusted to patrol flotillas, under the Admiral of Patrols (8th Flotilla in Forth, 9th Flotilla in Tyne, 7th Flotilla in Humber, 6th Flotilla at Dover). This strategy was simple and effective. It offered ample opportunities for offensive tactics, survived the whole war, and was justified by the course of events.

The plans embodying it were only prepared in the latter part of 1913, and differed materially from those of the previous decade, which had favoured large landing operations on the German coast. The whole coastline of Great Britain stood behind the British plans, stretching like a colossal breakwater across Germany's path to the sea, and reproducing the geo graphical conditions of the Dutch wars.

This breakwater was 500 m. long. From the Shetlands to Norway (Sumburgh Head to Udsire) was 190 m., a distance well within the compass of a strong fleet. Dover Straits was only 21 m. wide, and though the concentration of the main fleet at Scapa 500 m. away left it exposed to attack, any British force south of 56° (i.e. the latitude of the Forth) threatened the flank of a force attacking the Channel, and Germany never actually took the risk of such a venture with any of her big ships.

So long as the enemy refrained from an attack in force, the dispatch of British troops across the Channel was almost as easy as sending them to Ireland or across the Thames. The length of the principal route from Southampton to Havre was only 100 m., and the average time of transport only 13 hours. No transport was, therefore, ever more than seven hours from port. The route was over loo m. west of Dover Straits, and in these circumstances the whole transport system could be quickly and rapidly controlled.

But Dover remained the weak point of the war plans, and all the more so as the actual organization of the southern area was defective. In the north there was one command. In the south there were five, namely, the Channel Fleet, the Dover Patrol, Cruiser Force C, the Harwich flotillas and Commodore (S). There can be little doubt that a determined attack in this area at the beginning of the war would have severely shaken the whole fabric of British strategy, but the enemy never attempted it. British troops poured in a continuous procession across the Channel. With the exception of the " Goeben " and " Breslau " in the Mediterranean there was nothing to threaten the safety of the Channel to the westward, and on Aug. 10 this anxiety was removed by the news that the " Goeben," after a strange chapter of accidents, had entered the Dardanelles the evening before. (See Goeben And Breslau.) Germany's strategy was defensive. This was forced on her by her inferior strength and unfavourable position. It was based on the idea that the British fleet would enter the Bight, where it was hoped to wear it down by ruthless minelaying and submarine warfare. Then when the British fleet had been reduced to reasonable proportions and when an equilibrium of strength (the greatly desired Krditeausgleich) had been attained, a decisive battle would he dared. First a policy of waiting, of sorties and attrition, then a decisive action. This was the substance of the German operation orders for the North Sea.

In pursuance of these aims, at 8:30 P.M. on Aug. 4, an hour after orders to prepare for war with England went out, the " KOnigin Luise " of the Hamburg American Line was despatched to lay mines off the Thames. She fulfilled her task but never returned. While Jellicoe was carrying out his sweep in the north Comm. Tyrwhitt with the " Amethyst " and " Amphion " and the Harwich flotillas carried out a similar operation in the south. About 10 A.M. on the 5th the " KOnigin Luise " was sighted on her way back, and the " Lance " and " Landrail " followed hot on her trail. She could go only 21 knots, and was quickly overhauled and sunk about 50 m. east (true) from Lowestoft. But she had laid her mines off Aldeburgh, and the " Amphion " returning ran on one of them and went down in a few minutes with a loss of 150 men. This threat to the North Sea routes emphasized the necessity of minesweeping, and started the enormous expansion of that important service which became one of the principal features of the war (see Minelaying).

Meanwhile the Germans had seen nothing of the British fleet, and on Aug. 6 to German submarines, escorted for 100 m. by the " Hamburg " and " Stettin," went off into the North Sea to look for it, with orders to remain on the line between Stavanger and Scapa Flow till 6 P.M. on the loth. Their first cruise was not particularly successful. A torpedo was fired at the " Monarch " and missed, U15 was rammed by the " Birmingham" (58° 26' N. 1°58'. E.), and Uri never returned. But the operation had an important bearing, for though reassuring enough from one point of view it gave the British commanderin-chief a sense of insecurity, and he asked permission to take the fleet to the west of the Orkneys as soon as the Expeditionary Force was across. That night (at io P.M. on the 6th) he received orders to take his whole force north-west of the Orkneys. The menace of the submarine was already working when the transports were assembling to take British troops over to France.

On Aug. 5 the British Government had decided to send the Expeditionary Force across the Channel, and Aug. 9 was finally fixed as the first day of passage. The question of transporting a British Expeditionary Force across the sea had been a subject of study for some years. Southampton to Havre was the principal route for troops, Newhaven to Boulogne for stores, and transports were already assembling at Southampton. It had been part of the war plans that, in the event of troops being sent to France, the Grand Fleet was to come down to a position south of the Forth (latitude 56° N.). But it was now to westward of the Orkneys, and remained north of Cromarty (58° N.) till Aug. 15, sometimes west of the Orkneys and sometimes east. The task of immediate protection fell therefore to the Channel Fleet. By Aug. 9 its 18 ships had assembled off Portland and were covering the lines of passage in the Channel. In the Narrows between Holland and Harwich, Tyrwhitt had a watching patrol of 12 to 18 destroyers on a 30-m. front. The " Bacchante," " Cressy," " Hogue," and " Aboukir " of Cruiser Force C were behind him in the Downs or off Dungeness keeping touch with the Channel Fleet. In the Straits were five destroyers of the Dover Patrol (increased to 12 at night) assisted by three light cruisers, and supported by io submarines of Comm. Keyes' force posted between the Goodwins and Ruytingen (near Calais). French submarines were on watch between Gris Nez and the Varne, and far to the westward cruising from Ushant to Land's End was Rear-Adml. Rouyer's force of 14 old French cruisers in touch with Wemyss' squadron of four " Talbots." This was a respectable force, and was in position by the 9th when the troops began to cross,-and for a fortnight remained on the alert. A steady stream of transports passed across the Channel, sailing as soon as they were ready and waiting only for the tide. Their numbers rose to 44 on the 14th, and remained well over 30 per day up to Aug. 18. On Aug. 12 the Admiralty suggested to the commander-in-chief that the fleet should return to the eastward of the Orkneys, and it came back just when the flow of troops was at its height, and sweeping down to the latitude of the Forth (56° N.) on the 16th joined hands with the southern forces, and for a few hours made a complete ring round the German Bight. But nothing was seen of the enemy and the Grand Fleet returned to Scapa. It arrived there on the 8th, and the enemy for the first time ventured out a little way. Two light German cruisers, the " Stralsund " and " Strassburg," pushed into the Narrows that day. There they were sighted at 6:30 A.M. by the " Fearless," which gave chase and opened fire on the " Strassburg " (thought to be the " Rostock "). Tyrwhitt came hurrying to the scene followed by Cruiser Force C, and the enemy quickly decamped.

By the 10th four British divisions had crossed, but the news from France was bad and another division was hurried over. By Aug. 23 the movement was complete. Out of 240 transports employed not one had been lost by accident or enemy attack.

A hundred thousand men were in France, and British divisions were already fighting against heavy odds at Mons.

In order to secure the position in the south and on the east coast, a squadron (Cruiser Force K) of two battle-cruisers, the " New Zealand " and " Invincible," under Rear-Adml. Sir Archibald Moore, was now stationed in the Humber and remained there for a time. Hardly had the passage been accomplished and the Watching Patrol been withdrawn for a short time than news came of a severe check in France, and the Admiralty was faced with the possibility of having to abandon the French Channel ports. So far did matters go that Boulogne was closed down on Aug. 24 and the army base was shifted to St. Naza.ire. This would have meant a serious dislocation of British naval strategy, but before it reached a critical stage the German advance had been checked.

The retention of Ostend and the Belgian coast was now engaging naval attention. Marines were being hurried over there, and for nearly two days (from Aug. 26-28) the Channel Fleet and Cruiser Force C were carrying them and their stores across, and were lying off Ostend to support their landing. The operation was entirely abortive. No sooner had they been landed than they were reembarked. The landing offered an excellent opening for the German High Sea Fleet to attack, but for a time at least its attention was riveted to the Bight.

Commodore Keyes' submarines had been watching the German patrols round Heligoland for some time, and on the strength of their observations he had suggested a plan for cutting them off. The original orders provided only for a concerted operation by six of Comm. Keyes' submarines, and Tyrwhitt's flotillas supported by the five " Bacchantes " of Cruiser Force C and the " Invincible " and " New Zealand." But at the last moment Beatty and his battle-cruiser squadron were fortunately allowed to join in, and there followed on Aug. 28 Beatty and Tyrwhitt's dramatic swoop into the Bight (see Heligoland Bight). The German patrols were driven in, the big ships failed to support them, and three light cruisers, the " Mainz," " Ariadne " and " Coln " were sunk.

The action had an important ulterior effect. It confirmed: the Kaiser, probably influenced at the time by the situation. in E. Prussia and the Baltic, in his determination to follow a strictly defensive naval policy, though Tirpitz fought strenuously for an increased offensive.

German strategy now settled down to the two-fold form of submarine activity against ships-of-war and minelaying, varied by occasional raids against the English coast. The activity of the German submarines (or " U-boats ") soon began to be felt. On Sept. 5 U2r entered the Forth and sank the " Path-. finder," a light cruiser patrolling outside, the first ship to fall a victim to an enemy submarine. Scapa's defenceless state became a source of acute anxiety to .the British commander-in-chief, and the Grand Fleet itself was not immune from false alarms, which in the circumstances had to be taken seriously enough. On Sept. r the " Falmouth " thought she saw a submarine, and. there ensued a feverish commotion in the Flow, which culminated in the battle-fleets weighing in thick weather and putting to sea at night. It anchored in Loch Ewe and was there on Sept. 7 when it was recalled to the North Sea to screen the passage of the 7th Division. Again Beatty's squadron and Tyrwhitt's flotillas swept the Bight from east to .west on Sept. r0 with the. battle-fleet behind them, but this time it was bare.

A week later (Sept. r7) an important conference assembled in the " Iron Duke's " cabin at Loch Ewe. The First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) was there with the chief of the war staff (Rear-Adml. Doveton Sturdee) and the Director of the Intelligence Division. Weighty matters were discussed, and the remains of the old war plans emerged in the form of .a proposal to attack Heligoland and to enter the Baltic. It was decided that the former project offered no advantage, for when it was taken it could not be held, and that no operation on a large scale could be attempted in the Baltic without endangering British supremacy in the North Sea.

When the First Lord returned he found the German threat to the Belgian and French Channel ports beginning to develop, and orders went out on Sept. 19 for the Marine Brigade to be landed at Dunkirk as the nucleus of a larger force. The task of screening their passage fell on the southern forces. This was one of the functions specially allotted to them in the war plans, and it came as a severe shock to the Admiralty to find Cruiser Force C, one of its component squadrons, suddenly swept off the board. On Sept. 22, while patrolling at io knots off the Dutch coast, the " Cressy," " Hogue " and " Aboukir " were torpedoed between 6:25 and 7:30 A.M. by U9, and disappeared beneath the waves with a loss of 60 officers and some. 1,400. men. This.

exploit produced a profound impression on both sides of the North Sea. It was the first striking success of the German submarine. For the moment something had to be found to cover the proposed operations on the Belgian coast, and it was decided to lay mines in the Narrows. The idea was no new one. It had been part of the British war plans in 1913, but the plans had outrun the performance, for the mines available at the outbreak of war required new pistols and new mooring-ropes, and could not be laid in the positions indicated on account of the tide. This had been pointed out in May 1914, and the work was now taken seriously in hand. A large area was notified on Oct. 2, and three lines of mines were laid between the Downs and Holland, but unfortunately the design of the mines was defective and their real utility small.

The commander-in-chief had hardly been informed of this new policy when on Oct. 2 he was ordered to take special measures to ensure the safety of the Canadian convoy, which was on its way across. For eight days a special watch was established, with the whole fleet stretching right across the waters between Fair I. and Norway. The convoy consisted of 31 ships, escorted by Adml. Wemyss and Cruiser Force G right across the Atlantic. The battle-cruiser " Princess Royal " went out into the Atlantic to meet it, and she and the old battleship " Majestic " brought it safely in to Plymouth on Oct. 14. The battle-fleet had retired, but the 10th Cruiser Squadron was still patrolling the next day at io A.M. on a line between Peterhead and the Naze 10 m. apart, when the " Hawke," which had stopped to get her mails from the " Endymion," and was going on again at 12 or 13 knots, was struck by a torpedo from U9. There was only time to lower two seaboats, and Soo lives were lost as she sank.

The losses were not all on the British side. The British submarine E9 (Lt.-Comm. Max Horton), lying off Heligoland, had sunk the small cruiser " Hela " on Sept. 12, and now one of the German minelaying enterprises came to a sudden and disastrous end. Four German destroyers of the 7th Torpedo Half Flotilla (5115, 5116, S117, Sr19) left the Ems in the morning of Oct. 17 to lay mines off the North Foreland, but the " Undaunted " with some of the British 3rd Flotilla (" Lennox," " Lance," " Legion," and " Loyal ") was waiting for them in the Narrows, and after a chase and sharp fight the last German boat sank off the Texel at 4:30 P.M. The success came very happily, for the guns were again busy on the Belgian coast. Dover had now became a separate command under Rear-Adml. the Hon. Horace Hood. A great German attack was gathering against Nieuport, and Joffre had asked on Oct. 16 for naval guns to act against the German right. Hood's light craft hurried across, followed by the monitors, and for nearly a week they maintained a heavy fire over the sand dunes against the German flank.

While the " Lennox " and " Lance " were sending their last shots into the German boats the British destroyers in the north were again engaged in a feverish hunt over the Flow. In the afternoon of Oct. 16 a German submarine was reported close to Switha Sound on the west side of the main entrance. Again the fleet had to raise steam and get to sea that night. There can be little doubt that these alarms were false, but they serve as a reminder that the British preparations for war were far from complete. The menace of the submarine had been recognized in 1912, and arrangements could have been devised for rapidly defending harbours by means of mines and booms. But the British mines were defective, and no suitable booms had been designed. The commander-in-chief proceeded to sea, and in view of the defenceless state of Scapa decided to take the fleet to Lough Swilly. Its arrival there on Oct. 22 meant a serious dislocation of the war plans, which were beginning to give way both in the north and south through the pressure of the German submarine. The proper reply, booms and a supply of efficient mines, had not been foreseen and was not forthcoming.

Oct. 1914 saw the sudden dispatch of the R.N. Division to Antwerp, and the landing of forces at Dunkirk and on the Belgian coast. The defence of Antwerp was a military and not a naval problem, but the extension of the transport routes to the Belgian coast and the landing of the 7th Division at Zeebrugge on Oct. 7 represented a considerable expansion of the original war plans, and brought a heavy strain on the Dover Patrol. The old battleship " Venerable " joined Rear-Adml. Hood's force, and lent the Belgian army the support of her guns in the German attack on Nieuport, which culminated on Nov. 2, when they fell back from the Yser as the waters rose.

On Oct. 27, when the Nieuport sluices were being opened, a bad piece of news arrived. The move to Lough Swilly had proved singularly unfortunate. Two days before the battlefleet left Scapa, the " Berlin," a large Norddeutscher Lloyd of 17,000 tons, had left on a minelaying cruise, and laid mines on Oct. 23 some 26 m. north-west of Lough Swilly in the north of Ireland. On the 27th the " Audacious " going out to battle practice struck one of them, though she remained afloat for some hours. The White Star liner " Olympic," outward bound full of passengers, came up and tried to tow her, but found her unmanageable. At 9 P.M. she was still 15 m. from Lough Swilly when she settled, sank and blew up. With the Grand Fleet 300 m. from the North Sea, the whole groundwork of the British war plans was giving way, and the commander-in-chief left to confer with the Admiralty. It was a new board he met. Prince Louis of Battenberg (Marquess of Milford Haven) had resigned, and Lord Fisher had stepped into his place.

It was decided that the 3rd Battle Squadron of King Edward's should leave the Grand Fleet and reinforce the Channel Fleet, thus securing the situation in the south. Nowhere did naval activity on the part of the enemy seem so likely as off the Belgian coast, where a small number of old British ships were fighting, 1,000 m. from the Grand Fleet at Lough Swilly, and barely 300 m. from the Bight. To secure the approach to Dover and the Belgian coast it was decided to lay mines in the North Sea, which was declared a military area on Nov. 2. The notification was hardly issued when news came in on Nov. 3 of a German raid on the east coast. This was made by the battle-cruisers " Seydlitz " " Moltke," " Von der Tann " " Blucher," the armoured cruiser " Yorck," and three light cruisers, with the object of covering the light cruiser " Kolberg " in laying a minefield some 15 m. from Yarmouth. Commodore (T), whose flotillas were patrolling in the Narrows, sent them off in chase. The Admiralty thought the raid was a prelude to something bigger, and ordered the Grand Fleet to proceed to Scapa and Beatty to put to sea, but by 4 P.M. the Germans were well on their way home and the orders to the Grand Fleet and Beatty were cancelled. The Germans did not get home scot-free. The " Yorck" struck a mine off the Jade and sank.

The commotion had barely died down when early in the morning of Nov. 4 a telegram arrived from the British consulgeneral at Valparaiso with news of Coronel (see Coronel). Cradock's squadron had been wiped off the board, and the whole system of trade defence began to tremble under the menace of von Spee's approach. This marks a milestone in the war. Steps were instantly taken to retrieve the situation; but to understand it we must leave home waters for a time.

Cruiser Warfare, 1914. - Outside home waters the principal task of the British navy was the protection of trade, and cruiser squadrons were stationed for this purpose at the focal points of maritime traffic, a system which may be termed the " Squadron " or " Patrol " system as compared with the " Convoy " system adopted later against the submarine. The number of German cruisers abroad was comparatively small. The largest squadron was von Spee's, consisting of the armoured cruisers " Scharnhorst " and " Gneisenau " (each 8 8.2-in., 8 5.9-in., 20 l i knots), and the light cruisers " Emden," " Nurnberg " and " Leipzig," which threatened China, Australia and the East Indies, and gave rise to reactions which were felt over the whole world. In the East Indies was the " Konigsberg," a German light cruiser with io 4r-in. guns, able to steam 22 or 23 knots, and in the Atlantic the " Dresden " and " Karlsruhe," armed with 12 4.1-in., and with a full seagoing speed of 25 to 26 knots. This completes the tale of German cruisers abroad.

As soon as war broke out the introduction of a Government Insurance Scheme had a great steadying influence on British trade, but over all the four seas the Admiralty was confronted with the problem of reconciling the squadron system, which was intended to hunt down enemy cruisers, with insistent demands for convoy which could not be denied. These demands arose all over the world, for a great imperial concentration was bringing the legions of the Dominions home at the very time when an attack on the German oversea possessions was sending them farther afield. In the east the convoys from India absorbed the whole of the East Indies Squadron; in the west the Canadian convoy in Oct. 1914 took away Rear-Adml. Wemyss and all his four cruisers (Force G) from the mouth of the English Channel. The expeditions to New Guinea and Samoa monopolized the whole Australian Squadron for a time. The Cape, Cameroon, and British East Africa all made similar demands on the squadrons, and the system was constantly threatening to break down.

When war broke out the " Karlsruhe " had just relieved the " Dresden," and both were still in the West Indies. In New York, too, were several fast German merchant cruisers, but the " Kronprinz Wilhelm " was the only one which actually put to sea. On Aug. 6 the " Suffolk " (Cradock's flagship) came suddenly on the " Karlsruhe " arming the " Kronprinz Wilhelm," some 120 m. N.E. of Watling I. (off Cuba), but after a long chase and an action in the moonlight with the " Bristol " the " Karlsruhe " got away. Then came news of her and the " Dresden " to the southward, and on Aug. 22 Cradock, who had transferred his flag to the " Good Hope," went off after them and began his fateful journey to the south. The " Karlsruhe " remained in the West Indies and South Atlantic. The " Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse," which had succeeded in slipping out of the North Sea on Aug. 5, was trying to get in touch with her, but on Aug. 26 was caught by the British cruiser " Highflyer" (Capt. Henry T. Buller), coaling at Rio del Ore, a desolate anchorage on the Sahara coast, and after a short action was sunk. The " Karlsruhe " (Capt. Kohler) continued to disturb British trade for some months, and had sunk 15 ships up to Nov. 4, when she suddenly blew up in the West Indies, leaving the survivors to get home to Kiel in the " Rio Negro." The depredations of the " Karlsruhe " and " Dresden " led to Rear-Adml. Sir Christopher Cradock being appointed in command on the south-east coast of America on Sept. 3. He was given the three armoured cruisers " Good Hope," " Monmouth," and " Berwick," the light cruisers " Glasgow " and Bristol," and the armed merchantmen " Otranto," " Carmania " and " Macedonia." Then ensued a hunt down the coast for the " Dresden." The "Carmania " (Capt. Noel Grant) went off to Trinidada, a tiny islet 600 m. out in the South Atlantic, and, though she did not find the " Dresden," she came upon an armed merchantman, the " Cap Trafalgar," coaling there on Sept. 14. An action ensued, the " Cap Trafalgar " was sunk and the " Carmania " limped back to Gibraltar to repair damages. Meanwhile the " Dresden " (Capt. Liidecke) had been joined by the German s.s. " Baden " with 13,000 tons of English coal, and had coaled at the Rocas Is. and Trinidada. Then with the " Baden " and " Santa Isabel " she sped southward to a little harbour, Orange Bay, hidden among the glaciers of Hoste I. in the vicinity of Cape Horn. There she lay from Sept. 5-16 before she ventured into the Pacific. In the Atlantic she had sunk only two ships, and allowed five to go on. Cradock was still on the south-east coast. The menace of von Spee had begun to loom in the west, and the British armoured cruiser " Defence " (Troubridge's late flagship) had been ordered to join him from the Mediterranean, but was detained there with defects.

Von Spee had been last located at Ponape in the Carolines on Aug. 9, and on Sept. 15 a message arrived from the Admiralty definitely informing Cradock, then at Santa Caterina (Brazil), that there was strong probability of the German squadron proceeding to Magellan, and that the " Defence " and " Canopus " were being sent to him. He was to concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet von Spee, then search Magellan Straits, break up German trade and destroy the German cruisers. The fact that his force could only muster 2 9.2-in. against von Spee's 16 8.2-in. was apparently lost sight of. Hardly had the telegram been sent than another followed on Sept. 16 to say that von Spee had appeared off Samoa on Sept. 14, that the situation had changed, Cradock need no longer concentrate his cruisers, and German trade on the W. coast was to be attacked at once. This second telegram was the beginning of a chapter of misfortunes, and its motives remain obscure. The situation had indeed changed, but in a sense precisely opposite to that intended. Concentration and reenforcement were more necessary than ever, but someone had apparently become obsessed with the idea that von Spee was making for North America (apparently on the sole ground of his very commonplace ruse of steering N.W. when he left Samoa), and the Admiralty abandoned their original opinion that he was making for Magellan. The order for the " Defence " to proceed to the S.E. coast was cancelled, though Cradock was not even informed of this, and remained under the impression that she was on her way out to reinforce him. For another reason Sept. 15 is a red-letter day in the story of cruiser warfare, for on it the news arrived of the German cruiser " Emden's " incursion into the Bay of Bengal, which immediately reacted on the China and Australian squadrons.

Von Spec's memorable journey can only be described here in the briefest terms of place and time. When war broke out he was at Ponape, the German capital of the western Carolinas. Thence he went to Pagan in the Mariana Is., where he was met by the " Emden " and a dozen supply ships, the latter leaving for her great venture in the East Indies on Aug. 14. Thence the squadron proceeded eastward to Enivetok, another atoll in the Marshall Is.; then on to Majuro in the same group, arriving on Aug. 26. There von Spec had heard (probably by wireless via Honolulu and Nauru) of Japan's entry into the war, and abandoned all thought of return. His next port of call was Christmas I., a small islet right in the middle of the Pacific, where he arrived on Sept. 7. On his way he had heard of the capture of Samoa, and after coaling at Christmas I., proceeded on Sept. 9 straight to Samoa, where he arrived at 3 A.M. on Sept. 14, hoping to surprise a British naval force there, but found the harbour empty. A landing was out of the question, and he withdrew. The report of his visit went out by wireless to Suva in Fiji, and thence by cable to New Zealand and London. The squadrons directly and immediately affected by the news, besides Cradock's, were the China and Australian, for in China it left Adml. Jerram free to hunt the " Emden " down, and in Australia it relieved Ad ml. Patey's mind as to the expedition to New Guinea and the homeward-bound Australian convoy.

A short survey of events on these two stations will now be given. In China Rear-Adml. Jerram's effective force consisted of the old battleship " Triumph," the armoured cruisers " Minotaur " (4 9.2-in., 10 7.5-in.) and "Hampshire" (4 7.5-in., 6 6-in.), and the light cruiser " Yarmouth " (8 6-in.). Japan's entry into the war on Aug. 23 secured the China seas, and RearAdml. Jerram took his force south, to bar any attempt on the part of von Spee to break back into the East Indies. The Admiralty ordered him on Aug. 23 to proceed in search of the " Scharnhorst " and " Gneisenau," and keep in touch with Rear-Adml. Patey in Australia, but there was no news of von Spec, and accordingly on his arrival at Singapore on Aug. 30 the British admiral sent his cruisers to search the Dutch East Indies, where 22 German merchant ships had taken refuge. This search lasted till Sept. 13, but already demands for convoys were beginning to dislocate his plans. On Sept. 8 the Admiralty ordered him to send the " Minotaur " and " Hampshire " to meet the Australian convoy, due to leave Fremantle for Europe on Oct. 3. The commander-in-chief decided to send the " Minotaur " in the meantime with two Japanese ships, the " Ibuki " (4 12-in., 8 8-in.) and " Chikama" (8 6-in.), to Rabaul in New Britain, to cover Australia, when suddenly the situation was changed on Sept. 15 by the news of von Spee's appearance at Samoa, and more imperatively by the simultaneous appearance of the.". Emden " in. the Bay of Bengal. Till the Emden " was finally run down by ,the ", Sydney " at Cocos I. on Nov. 9 the China Squadron was almost wholly engaged in her pursuit in the East Indies. The station boundaries had entirely broken down under the stress of war.

In Australia the same influences had been at work. At the outbreak of war Rear-Adml. Patey had decided to take up a position at Port Moresby in the Gulf of Papua, covering Australian waters and not too far from the enemy's two principal harbours, Rabaul (or Simpsonhafen) in New Britain and Friedrich Wilhelmshaven in New Guinea. Like the commanderin-chief on the China station he thought rightly that it was useless to search in the spaces of the Pacific for an unlocated enemy, but in his case demands for convoy began even sooner to dislocate his plans. New Zealand's expedition to Samoa was ready on Aug. 18 and the Admiralty approved of its starting, telling Patey on Aug. 13 to give it naval support. But he was at sea at the time with poor wireless connexion, and only received news of the expedition on Aug. 16. No sooner had he arranged to meet it with the battle-cruiser " Australia " and the cruiser " Melbourne " 450 m. south of Fiji on Aug. 24, than the Australia Navy Board complicated matters by asking that their New Guinea expedition should be taken first. Finally it was decided to take it second, and that the " Sydney " in the meantime should take the New Guinea force as far as the Barrier Reef and then wait for the " Australia " and " Melbourne " to return from Samoa. The " Australia " arrived at Samoa on Aug. 29, the force was landed, the British flag hoisted and she left the next day to join the New Guinea force. But now the demands of the European convoy came cranking in and upset Patey's plans. On Sept. 3 the Admiralty ordered the " Melbourne " and " Sydney " to be detached for it, and on Sept. 10 asked for the " Australia " as well. She was then engaged with Patey in the New Guinea operations. Rabaul was occupied on Sept. 13 but German forces still remained active, and Patey, not liking to leave, suggested that the China squadron should help in a search for von Spee. Then on Sept. 15 came the important news of von Spee's appearance at Samoa, clearing up the situation. The " Australia " and " Montcalm " were left to cover the New Guinea operations while the " Sydney " joined the " Minotaur " and " Ibuki " to escort the Australian troops to Europe and to cause the " Emden's " destruction.

While these events were happening in Australia and the East Indies, Cradock had gone on to the southward, and by Sept. 28 his ships were in the Magellan Straits, searching the gorges of Tierra del Fuego. On Oct. 3 the " Glasgow " and " Monmouth " went on to the W. coast in accordance with the Admiralty telegram of Sept. 16, but the " Good Hope " remained in the Falklands area, waiting for the " Canopus." Von Spee had been reported off Tahiti in the Society Is. on Sept. 22, and on Oct. 5 was again located by an intercepted wireless to the " Dresden," which stated that he was on the way to Easter Island. No shadow of doubt could remain that he was on his way across, and the Admiralty sent word to Cradock to be prepared to meet him, adding that the " Canopus " should accompany the " Glasgow " and " Monmouth " and " Otranto " in their search. It was not a practicable idea. The " Canopus " could go only 12 knots, and the conception of a cruiser squadron relying for its safety on a slow old battleship was both tactically and strategically unsound.

Cradock received the message on Oct. 7 1914, and on the 8th sent a message to say he was concentrating at the Falklands, and suggesting the formation of a strong second squadron on the E. coast to intercept the German squadron if it should succeed in evading him. The telegram reached the Admiralty on the 11th, and steps were immediately taken to carry out the Admiral's proposal by the dispatch of the " Defence " and " Kent " to reinforce Adml. Stoddart on the E. coast. The First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) was also in favour of postponing Cradock's cruise to the W. coast, but the reply actually sent to him merely took the form of a concurrence in the " concentration " of his vessels " for combined operations." The concentration at the Falklands never materialized. The " Good Hope " left for the W. coast (via Cape Horn) on Oct. 22, leaving the " Canopus " to follow with her colliers (via Magellan). Cradock's intentions will never be precisely known. He probably felt it incumbent on him to support the " Glasgow " and " Monmouth." There was a vagueness at both ends of the wire. Cradock spoke of concentrating at the Falklands when half his squadron had already been sent to the W. coast. The Admiralty expressed their concurrence in his concentration there for combined operations (whatever that might mean). But their readiness to reinforce Stoddart at Cradock's suggestion indicates that they would have been equally ready to reinforce Cradock himself if he had pressed for it. But neither in his telegrams nor in his letter of Oct. 12 did he suggest, much less definitely state, that his squadron was too weak to face the foe. There was one vessel which could have saved the situation, namely the " Australia," if Cradock had been told to wait for her, but she had been retained off Fiji to guard against von Spee's possible return, and was left there straining on her leash.

Von Spee was now at Mas-a-fuera (Oct. 18-26), a small island 450 m. from the coast of Chile, and the two squadrons were approaching one another, for Cradock had joined the " Glasgow," " Monmouth " and " Otranto " at Vallenar in the Chonos Archipelago on Oct. 27. The two forces met off Coronel towards evening on Nov. i. The battle had been von Spee's for over a month. Cradock's flag, still flying gloriously, went down into the Pacific. The " Monmouth " sank with the " Good Hope." The " Glasgow " and " Otranto " got away. The " Canopus " was 300 m. off, toiling northward at 12 knots (see Coronel).

The news arrived in England in the morning of Nov. 4, and fell on the country like a thunderclap. Lord Fisher was now First Sea Lord and every effort was made to redeem the situation. The battle-cruisers " Invincible " and " Inflexible " were taken from the Grand Fleet, and sailed on Nov. ii, with Vice-Adml. Sir Doveton Sturdee, late chief of the war staff, in command. Rear-Adml. Stoddart waited for him at Abrolhos Rocks with the " Carnarvon," " Cornwall," " Defence," and " Kent." The West Indies Squadron went off to watch the Panama Canal. Von Spee meanwhile had visited Valparaiso, and, unaware of the thunderbolt launched at him, was on his way southward. The " Canopus " had returned to the Falklands and was organizing the defences there.

Adml. Sturdee coaled at Abrolhos Rocks, and rushed on with his ships (" Inflexible," " Invincible," " Carnarvon," " Cornwall," " Kent," " Glasgow," " Bristol," and " Orama ") to the south, arriving at Port Stanley, Falklands, in the forenoon of Dec. 7. Meanwhile the " Australia " had been unleashed, and was speeding across the Pacific, and a Japanese squadron had moved down to Fiji to take her place. Von Spee had passed the Horn in bad weather at midnight on Dec. i. The next day his squadron met a three-masted Scottish barque, the " Drummuir," with 2,800 tons of coal on board, and put back into Picton I., near Beagle Channel, to transfer her coal. On Dec. 6 the work was finished. The " Drummuir " was sunk, and with her sank von Spee's hopes of getting home. He had decided at Picton I. to make a raid on the Falklands. On Dec. 8 1914 at dawn the islands were in sight, and the " Gneisenau " and " Nurnberg " were sent in towards Port Stanley. In the battle which followed (see Falkland Islands Battle) the " Scharnhorst," " Gneisenau," " Leipzig " and " Nurnberg " were sunk, and von Spee and his two sons perished. The battle stands out as one of the great beacons of the war at sea, for it marked the collapse of German naval power beyond the seas.

The " Emden's " career in the East Indies had already come to an end, with a tale of 15 ships. She had ranged the Bay of Bengal from Sept. 7-25, bombarded Madras on Sept. 22, worked in the approaches to Colombo till Oct. 21, coaling in the Maldives and at Diego Garcia, and raided Penang on Oct. 28. The " Hampshire " and " Chikuma," " Empress of Asia " and " Yarmouth," had searched for her in vain, though the latter on Oct. 9 had sunk her two supply ships at Pulo Tapak on the west coast of Sumatra. At dawn on Nov. 9 she appeared off the cable station at Cocos Keeling I., and the operator flashed the news to Singapore. The big Australian and New Zealand convoy of 38 transports homeward bound, which left Albany on Nov. 1, escorted by the " Minotaur," " Melbourne," " Sydney," and " Ibuki," was approaching Cocos. It was only 55 m. off when the news reached it, and the " Sydney " went off to Cocos I. at full speed. An action ensued between the " Sydney " (Capt.

J. C. Glossop, 8 6-in.) and the " Emden " (Capt. von Muller, 10 4.1-in.). By 11:30 the latter was driven ashore, blazing.

With the destruction of von Spee's squadron there remained only, as regards German naval forces at sea, the " Dresden " hiding in the creeks of Tierra del Fuego, and the " Konigsberg" shut up in the Rufiji river (German East Africa), both of them powerless for harm. The ocean passages were again secure for Great Britain and her Allies. Samoa and New Guinea had fallen, and a Japanese guard stood at the gates of Tsingtau. In Cameroon, Duala, Buea, and Victoria had been occupied. The naval operations under the conduct of Capt. C. M. Fuller had contributed largely to this success, and the " Cumberland " now joined the stream of British cruisers homeward bound.

The year 1915 saw a heavy blow dealt at the German battle-cruisers in the North Sea. An impression prevailed in Germany at this time that the British fleet was preparing to block the Jade and it was decided to send RearAdml. Flipper's battle-cruisers as far as the Dogger Bank to reconnoitre on Jan. 24, but the Admiralty had intelligence of this and dispatched Beatty with his battle-cruisers on the 23rd to join hands with Tyrwhitt. They met Hipper's forces on the morning of Jan. 24 and the battle of the Dogger Bank ensued in which the Germans lost the " Blucher " and were driven back to port (see 30.848). The battle reacted at once on German naval strategy. Von Pohl, chief of the staff, replaced von Ingenohl in command of the High Sea Fleet with instructions to use extreme caution. The successes of von Weddingen had inclined the German naval staff more and more to submarine warfare which opened with the declaration of a war zone round the British Isles on Feb. 4. Their tendency in this direction was strengthened by the final collapse of their cruiser warfare abroad. News of the " Dresden's " destruction arrived in March 1915. For two months after the battle of the Falklands she had lain hidden in the innermost recesses of the Magellan Straits with half a dozen British cruisers looking for her, and it was not till Feb. that she ventured to creep back into the Pacific in order to meet a German collier south of Juan Fernandez. The " Kent," searching the Barbara Channel (Magellan Straits) with the " Glasgow" at the time, got the news and hastened after her. On March 7 1915 she reached the rendezvous but the " Dresden's " speed enabled her to get away. It was not for long, however. The " Glasgow " had made out the words " Juan Fernandez " in a message the " Dresden " had sent and there, on March 14, the " Kent," " Glasgow " and " Orama " found her and brought her career to an end.

From the lonely islets of the Pacific we must return to Europe for a time. There the centre of interest had shifted from the Grand Fleet to the Dardanelles. After the Dogger Bank action the German fleet became more wary in its excursions and the work of the Grand Fleet was confined to periodical cruises enlivened only by an occasional attack by a submarine. The battle of the Falklands had released a number of older battleships and cruisers but in the North Sea the war was settling down into a state of equilibrium. The Germans rarely came out of the Bight and we could rarely go into it. On sea and land a deadlock had arisen, giving rise to the belief that a better outlet for energy could be found in the Mid East. In this way the idea of the Dardanelles came cranking across the original plans of naval strategy, challenging even the Grand Fleet in its insistency, swallowing at a gulp the Channel Fleet and wrecking Lord Fisher's plans for a Baltic campaign.

The general conception was sound for it was a matter of first-rate importance to gain free access to Russia and the scheme offered strategic political and economic advantages of the first magnitude, but it was begun in a haphazard way and its direction was marred by an inability to distinguish clearly between a naval bombardment and a combined naval and military operation and by a failure to appreciate that two operations unless conducted simultaneously must prejudice one another. The history of the naval side of the subject can only be briefly sketched. Petrograd had asked on Jan. 2 for a diversion to relieve the pressure of the Turks in the Caucasus. The idea of the Dardanelles was broached. Vice-Adml. Sackville Carden, the senior officer in the Mediterranean, gave his opinion on Jan. i i that a progressive attack on the defences, step by step, was practicable. The First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) waxed enthusiastic over it and pictured the forts falling in succession before the " Queen Elizabeth's" guns. There can be little doubt that had plans and preparations for a combined operation been made on a sufficient scale, a great success might have been gained; but the refusal of Lord Kitchener to supply the troops led to the proposal to force the Straits with ships alone. This was an entirely different operation and the war staff failed to put its difficulties in a clear enough light. It was and is a truism of naval warfare that ships are handicapped in engaging forts. A ship cannot be concealed; a fort, and much more a modern movable battery, can. Aerial reconnaissance and the increased range of naval guns were supposed to have altered these conditions, but aerial spotting in conjunction with naval artillery was still in its infancy, and the limitations of naval bombardment were insufficiently appreciated.

The First Lord had a wofully extravagant estimate of the capacity of the " Queen Elizabeth's " guns, and thought of her creeping relentlessly forward, destroying each fort in turn with five or six 15-in. shells. Lord Fisher was absorbed in his project for a campaign in the Baltic, and it was allowed that the proposition was worth a trial.

The result was an endeavour to perform a task of first-class magnitude with second-class material and with insufficient preparation. Had a force for the purpose been segregated and thoroughly trained on the lines afterwards followed for the much smaller project of Zeebrugge, the chances of success would have been much greater. It would have required a nucleus of the best artillerists, the best minesweeping officers and the best minesweeping vessels in the fleet and at least two score of first-class airmen to evolve and apply a sound scheme of air-spotting. Given these necessary adjuncts and approximately six weeks of intensive specialized training to groin the whole into a solid arch, the Dardanelles could probably have been forced. But here the strategical weakness of the conception would have revealed itself. The forcing of the Straits in itself could do little unless it precipitated a revolution. In default of a revolution the fleet would have been left in the air in the Sea of Marmora, for its ships could hardly pass and repass through a channel a mile wide whose shores were in hostile hands. But the principal objection lay in the fact that any premature bombardment must inevitably wreck or at least imperil the prospects of a combined operation and anticipate surprise where surprise was the essence of success.

But by Feb. 1915 the idea of merging the two operations had crept in. A military force was to be available " to reap the fruits " and was being assembled in Egypt. The opinion found favour that if the navy failed, the army should help - a fatal conception which ignored the real relativity of the two operations. Meanwhile Lord Fisher's attitude of lukewarm acquiescence had changed to one of definite disapproval, but his position was weakened by his adherence to a scheme for landing in the Baltic, much more difficult and dangerous. The War Council definitely approved of the project on Jan. 28, bringing Lord Fisher to the verge of resignation.

The force collected for the purpose consisted of the " Queen Elizabeth " (Capt. George Hope) and " Inflexible " (Capt.

R. Phillimore) with a heterogeneous collection of old battleships drawn from the Channel Fleet or which had come home from abroad after von Spee's defeat. In command was ViceAdml. Sackville Carden who had been admiral superintendent at Malta Dockyard when the war broke out, with Comm. Roger Keyes as his chief-of-staff. Operations against the outer fort were begun at 8 A.M. Feb. 19 by the " Inflexible " (8 12-in.), " Agamemnon " (Capt. H. Fyler 4 12-in., 10 9.2-in.), " Cornwallis," " Vengeance " (both 4 12-in., 12 6-in.), " Triumph " (Capt. Maurice Fitzmaurice 4 10-in., Io 7.6-in.), "Bouvet" (2 12-in., 2 108-in.), "Suffren" (4 12-in., 10 6.4) and " Gaulois " (4 12-in., 10 5.5-in,), The forts were apparently silenced, but when the ships closed in at 2:45 P.M. reopened fire, and were still firing on the Asiatic side when failing light put a stop to the operations. On Feb. 25 the operations were resumed with better results. The " Queen Elizabeth " (8 15-in.) assisted by the " Agamemnon " put both guns of Cape Helles out of action and the " Vengeance " (Capt. Bertram Smith) and " Cornwallis " (Capt. Alex. Davidson), running in, engaged it at close range. The Kumkale forts on the Asiatic side were silenced by the " Irresistible " (Capt. Douglas Dent), " Gaulois," " Suffren " and " Charlemagne," and by 5:15 P.M. all the outer forts were effectually reduced. The minesweepers proceeded in and swept a channel four miles up. The entrance was now clear and the " Albion" (Capt. Algernon Heneage), " Majestic" (Capt. H. F. Talbot) and " Vengeance " entered on Feb. 26 and engaged Fort Dardanus (E) on the right-hand side halfway up to the Narrows. But the outer forts were merely the outworks of the defences. The real obstacle loomed ahead at the Narrows, where a channel only a mile wide was commanded by a score of batteries, mounting at least 9 14-in. guns and three times as many Io -in, and 9-in.

March 3 to March 17 was occupied with attempts to sweep the channel by night and reduce the forts by day. On March 3 the " Irresistible," " Albion," " Prince George " (Capt. Alex. Campbell) (all 4 52-in., 12 6-in.) and " Triumph " resumed the attack on Fort E and the sweeping operations continued. It was here, however, that the principal shortcomings arose. The minesweeping force had neither the training nor the vessels required for their colossal task. On March 5 the " Queen Elizabeth " opened indirect fire on the Kilid Bahr forts, shelling them overland from the western side of Gallipoli and apparently putting Hamidieh ii. out of action. Indirect fire was continued the next day on Hamidieh i. and ii. at 21,000 yd. while the " Vengeance," " Albion," " Majestic," " Prince George " and " Suffren " inside the Straits engaged Forts E and F halfway up the Narrows. The weakness in aircraft and trained observers began to show itself when three officers were injured and two seaplanes disabled in two days. On the 7th the " Gaulois," " Charlemagne," " Bouvet " and " Suffren " engaged Fort E (Dardanus) while the " Agamemnon " and " Lord Nelson " (Capt. J. D. McChatock) went up and engaged Medjidieh and Hamidieh i. in the Kilid Bahr group on the north side of the Narrows at 14,000 yd., apparently silencing both. Meanwhile the progress of the minesweepers was poor. The trawlers unable to go more than four knots against the current were an easy target for the guns. On March io the minesweepers went up at night supported by the " Amethyst " (Comm. G. J. Todd) and " Canopus " (Capt. H. S. Grant). Two trawlers were hit by 6-in. shell and one sunk by a mine. At home the First Lord was growing impatient and on March II sent a telegram to Vice-Adml. Carden urging a decision and suggesting that the forts at the Narrows could be overwhelmed by the fire of the fleet. It was clear that in his case the idea of a gradual reduction of the defences had given place to that of a shock attack. Everything now hinged on clearing the minefields. The trawlers could not face the fire but on the night of the 13th seven of them and five picket boats manned by volunteers made a determined effort, as far as their lack of training would permit, to sweep the channel, supported by the " Amethyst " and " Cornwallis." They steamed up in line ahead on the European side, and at 3:50 A.M. were shooting their sweeps when six powerful searchlights shone out on them. The " Amethyst " opened fire on the searchlights and came under a heavy fire. A 6-in. shell carried away her wheel shafting, and after receiving nine hits she was forced to retire with 22 killed and 38 wounded. The trawlers were driven back under a tornado of fire. This effectually demonstrated the difficulty of sweeping under fire by night and it was decided to attempt it by day under cover of a bombardment. Vice-Adml. Carden's health had broken down and the final attack took place on March 18 under Vice-Adml. John de Robeck. He had with him the " Queen Elizabeth," " Inflexible," "Agamemnon." "Lord Nelson " and 14 older battleships.

It was a clear sunny day when the force mustered for the final attempt. At 10:45 the " Queen Elizabeth," " Inflexible," " Agamemnon " and " Lord Nelson " engaged the Kilid Bahr and Chanak batteries while the " Triumph " and " Prince George " engaged the forts halfway up at Soghandere (F), Dardanus (E) and Kephez. After a bombardment of about an hour and a half the French battleships " Bouvet," " Charlemagne," " Gaulois " and "Suffren " advanced as far as Kephez and engaged the Narrows forts at about 9,000 yards. The forts ceased firing for a time. The " Vengeance," " Irresistible," " Albion," " Ocean," " Swiftsure " (Capt. C. M. Lefroy) and " Majestic," after relieving the six old battleships previously engaged, renewed the attack at 2:36 P.M. while minesweepers continued their operations. Up to this point the day had been going fairly well though the " Inflexible " had been badly hit at 1:15 P.M., her fo'c'sle set on fire and her control station put out of action. Then came the denouement within one short hour. As the " Bouvet " was retiring, she was struck by a mine or shell and in two minutes turned turtle and sank with most of her crew. At 4 P.M. the " Inflexible " struck a mine and was forced to retire. At 4:15 the " Irresistible " struck another; the " Ocean " went to help her and struck another at 6:05 P.m. and both went down, though their crews were saved. All this happened in Arenkoi Bay four or five miles from the entrance on the Asiatic side, where mines had cith;r been laid by a Turkish minelayer on March 8 or may have drifted down from the minesweepers. The " Suffren " and " Gaulois " were also injured so severely as to require docking. Three ships had been sunk and three disabled, putting one-third of the force out of action before the minefield had been swept. De Robeck had attempted too much. To force a channel defended by a strong minefield and heavy batteries remained to the end of the war a tactical proposition of the first magnitude which was too much for the Germans in the Gulf of Finland and was beyond the compass of the force at De Robeck's disposal. The minesweeping force was an extemporized force of trawlers which attempted to perform a task of exceptional difficulty with no special experience, no special vessels, no special appliances and no special training for the work. The minesweepers and minesweeping talent required for the task had been retained at home. Success at the Dardanelles was sacrificed to the integrity of the Grand Fleet. Lord Fisher would not agree to a renewal of the attempt andthere is no reason to believe that a further attempt with Armaments tapprom .. 8 2, Defences the same force would have been any more successful. The war staff had not risen to the height of the First Lord's conception and the First Lord had no conception of the technical difficulties involved. This was the end of the purely naval enterprise and should have been the end of the whole project. But Lord Kitchener, who had hung back at the critical moment, now pressed forward when it was too late. Both at the Admiralty and the War Office the lack of a competent staff was painfully evident. On March 23, after a conference with Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, Sir John de Robeck abandoned the attempt.

A month elapsed before the army could make their attack, and Gen. Liman von Sanders converted the peninsula into a fortress.

It was now the task of the navy to prepare to support the landing. This did not take place till April 25. The naval force acting in support numbered 18 battleships, 12 cruisers, 29 destroyers and 8 submarines, and there gradually collected at Port Mudros in Lemnos a great armada of transports, supply ships, munition ships and auxiliary craft. The whole shore was carefully surveyed. Six beaches were chosen for the landing on the 12-m. strip of coast stretching northwards from Sedd-elBahr (on the north side of the entrance to the Straits) to Gaba Tepe. S beach was in Morto Bay inside the Straits a mile or so east of Sedd-el-Bahr. Then following the coast from Sedd-elBahr to the west and north came V beach just under the old castle at Sedd-el-Bahr and between it and the high lighthouse of Cape Helles; a mile or so further on came W beach between Cape Helles and Cape Tekeh; then X beach just north of Cape Tekeh, and Y beach close to it, and then at last Io m. to the north came Z beach near Gaba Tepe, christened in its baptism of fire with the new and splendid name of Anzac. It is only possible to give the names of the ships which supported the landings. The landings at the nose of the peninsula, that is at S, V, W, X and Y, were under Rear-Adml. Rosslyn Wemyss with seven battleships, the " Lord Nelson," " Swiftsure," " Implacable," " Cornwallis," " Vengeance," " Albion " and " Prince George," and four cruisers, the " Euryalus " (Capt.

R. Burmester, 29 2, 12 6-in.), "Talbot" (Capt. F. Wray, r1 6-in.), " Minerva " (Capt. P. Warleigh, 11 6-in.) and " Dublin" (Capt. J. D. Kelley, 8 6-in.). The landing at Anzac was under Rear-Adml. Ceci]. Thursby with five battleships, the " Queen " (flag., Capt. H. A. Adam), " Prince of Wales " (Capt. R. Bax), " London " (Capt. J. Armstrong), " Triumph," " Majestic," and one old cruiser the " Bacchante " (Capt. Hon. Algernon Boyle, 29 2, 12 6-in.). All six left Port Mudros on the af ternoon of the 24th, and the ships and transports went their respective ways.

At Gaba Tepe by a fortunate accident the landing was made at Sari Bahr a mile and a half farther north. Four thousand troops were ashore in an hour; the Australians rushed the Turks up the hills and out of them. At Y beach the troops were heavily attacked and had to be reembarked. At X beach the captain of the " Implacable" (Capt. Norman Lockyer, R.N.) dropped anchor close in, veered till the ship was almost aground, then let go with all her guns just over the beach, raising such smoke and dust and din that the troops landed there with scarcely any casualties. W was a beach about 300 yd. long, bristling with wire to the water's edge, flanked by steep cliffs honeycombed with guns. The " Euryalus " supported the landing here, but her 6-in. guns were too light to make any impression on the entanglements and the Lancashire Fusiliers had a terrible time. V beach, about Soo yd. long, just under the old castle of Sedd--el-Bahr, was another fortress, and there things were even more desperate. The old collier " River Clyde " had been prepared for the landing and it had been arranged to run her ashore and push a bridge of lighters out from her side on to the beach. But the lighters broke adrift though Comm. Unwin with his gallant companions made heroic efforts to get them into place. At S beach in Morto Bay the landing was made in trawlers covered by a heavy fire from the " Cornwallis " and " Lord Nelson " and the 2nd South Wales Borderers got ashore with a very few casualties. Such was the famous landing at Helles, but another danger was looming on the horizon.

Otto Hersing, one of the most skilful German commanders, was on his way out in U21. Already on May 13th the " Goliath " (Capt. T. L. Shelford), anchored in Morto Bay just inside Seddel-Bahr, had been attacked by a Turkish destroyer, the " Muavenet-i-Millet," which came down on her in the mist, and hit by three torpedoes she had sunk in a few minutes with a loss of over Soo men. Lord Fisher now insisted on the recall of the " Queen Elizabeth," and in the ill-advised decision of the War Council on May 24 to persist in the campaign he saw his great alternative scheme doomed. Faced with the progressive frustration of his plans, he left the Admiralty and Adml. Sir Henry Jackson took his place as First Sea Lord. On May 25 Otto Hersing made his presence felt. The " Vengeance " was fired at and missed. The " Triumph " was hit and capsized in twelve minutes and on the 27th the " Majestic " suffered the same fate. The movements of ships were now severely restricted but the fleet successfully maintained the army's passage by sea and remained its " father and mother " right up to the amazing night of Jan. 8 1916 when swiftly and silently it gathered into its arms the men of those tremendous legions and bore them home. But the passage of the Dardanelles, impenetrable to big ships, had been made by submarines - though not without severe loss. All together nine British and three French submarines passed the Straits, of which four British and the three French never returned. From July 1915 to the end of the year there were usually two British submarines working in the Sea of Marmora which seriously interfered with Turkish transports and supply.

The end of the year saw the end of the great crusade, leaving behind a trail of glory and bitter disappointment, for there can be little doubt that it had in it the elements of a splendid success had it been properly handled from the beginning. But there was no real staff at the Admiralty or War Office to grip the fundamental aspects of the problem, the Grand Fleet and the army in France were urgent in their insistency, and Lord Fisher unfortunately clung persistently to his Baltic plan, which was a far more extravagant conception than that of the Dardanelles. It was based on the idea of a big landing on the German coast near Rugen, and on the far-fetched assumption that the Russian general staff could be persuaded to cooperate in the scheme. The War Office would not listen to it. From a naval point of view it must be regarded as impracticable. It might have been possible with a specially trained and constituted force to force the Great Belt. But what was to be done then? The same question confronted the British at the Dardanelles. The Great Belt stretches for 80 m. and is only to to 15 m. wide; farther on come the narrow Fehmarn and Cadet channels with the impregnable fortress of Kiel only 30 m. on their flank, and any attempt to maintain a passage through these waters must sooner or later have developed into an investment or blockade of Kiel, where there would only be German granite to bite instead of Gallipoli sand. And yet it must be confessed that the assistance given the Russians in the Baltic was not very great. There, as in the Dardanelles, British assistance was limited to submarines, which did magnificent work after their kind but could do no more. It is certain that at the beginning of the war any rumour of an attack in the Baltic sent a quiver of trepidation through the German Admiralty. The Sound was not passable to big ships, and Germany at the beginning of the war had agreed with Denmark to the closure of the Great Belt by Danish minefields at the northern and German at the southern end. The defence of the Baltic had been entrusted to the older German ships, but in the East Baltic the Germans did not have it all their own way, and the Russians from first to last showed themselves no mean antagonists.

In the summer of 1915 after the capture of Libau, German naval forces were engaged supporting the army as it closed round Warsaw. At attempt was first made on June 28 to land troops at Windau (Courland) under an escort of old battleships, four cruisers and torpedo craft, but the opening bombardment was ineffectual, and while the troops were landing, a swarm of Russian destroyers appeared, and drove off the supporting ships and transports, bringing the operation to an abrupt close. On July 2 the Russian armoured cruisers " Admiral Makaroff " and " Bayan " (both 2 8-in., 8 6-in.), and the cruisers " Bogatyr " and " Oleg " (both 12 6-in.), all old ships, met the light cruiser " Augsburg " (12 4.1-in.) and minelayer " Albatross " off the coast of Courland and drove the latter ashore at Ostergarn on the E. coast of Gothland (Sweden). The German armoured cruisers " Roon " (4 8.2, 10 6-in.) and the " Lubeck " (to 4.1-in.) proceeded to reinforce them but were chased off by the " Rurik " (4 to-in., 8 8-in.), and when the old armoured cruiser "Prinz Adalbert" (4 8.2-in., ro 6-in.) was hurrying to the spot, she was torpedoed and seriously damaged by E9 (Comm. Max Horton) in the Gulf of Danzig. In Aug. 1915 a strenuous attempt was made by the German Baltic squadron to force the Gulf of Riga, whose possession would have enabled them to take the Russian army in rear, and the 1st and 4th Squadrons were assembled in the Baltic for the purpose, but the Russian minefields offered a serious obstacle and British submarines were again active. On Aug. 19, Er (Comm. Laurence) torpedoed and seriously injured the German battle-cruiser " Moltke," and she had to return to Kiel at 15 knots. Next day the order came to abandon the operations; all the High Sea Fleet ships were sent back, and there ensued a long period of minor activity in the East Baltic, though British submarines still remained there and did much to disturb the important German iron-ore trade with Sweden during the latter months of 1915.

Meanwhile the Grand Fleet had been carrying out occasional sweeps into the North Sea. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron with the " Nottingham " and " Birmingham " left the Forth on June 18 1915 for a sweep of this sort towards the Skagerack, and crossed the path of a line of four German submarines stationed off the Forth. Five torpedoes were fired at them, but all missed except one on the 10th from U38, which hit the " Roxburgh " and sent her into dock for a time. Some three weeks later came the last echo of the cruiser warfare, when news arrived from the East Indies of the destruction of the " Konigsberg " in the Rufiji river on July 1 r 1915.

After sinking the " Pegasus " off Zanzibar on Sept. 20 1914, she had hidden herself on the E. coast of Africa in the swampy delta of the Rufiji river opposite Mafia I. and the light cruisers " Chatham," " Weymouth " and " Dartmouth " had been sent from the Mediterranean to look for her. The papers of a captured German ship, the " Praesident," gave the first clue to her position, showing that coal had been sent 6 m. up the Rufiji for her use. The " Chatham " (Capt. S. R. Drury-Lowe) arrived off the Rufiji on Oct. 30 and learnt from the natives that a ship was lying up the Suninga branch of the river. The river was blockaded and a blockship sunk in the mouth of the creek. A supply ship, the s.s. " Rubens " (formerly British), had been sent to her from Germany and had made the long journey round Africa in safety, but exact intelligence had been received of her, and the cruiser " Hyacinth " (Rear-Adml. King-Hall) met her off Mansa Bay (near Tanga) and set her on fire. The monitors " Severn," " Humber " and " Mersey " (under Capt. E. J. Fullerton) were sent out later with an aeroplane, and their final attack was made on July 11 1915. Fire was opened by the " Mersey " at 9,500 yd., and hitting was established with the aeroplane's help after the eighth salvo. An explosion was followed by a dense cloud of smoke, and the last German cruiser was left a blazing wreck in the swamp of an African jungle. The ship sunk by the " Hyacinth " in German E. Africa was not the only one which ventured into the North Sea. The " Meteor " slipped over to the Scottish coast in Aug. 1915 and on the night of Aug. 7-8 laid a large minefield of 380 mines off the Moray Firth, sinking the patrol vessel " Ramsey " and taking the survivors of her crew prisoners. Intelligence came of her movements, and the " Harwich " destroyers went off at full speed to intercept her, but her captain sunk her and escaped in a Swedish vessel.

In Germany the submarine warfare controversy had reached an acute stage. After the sinking of the " Arabic " on Aug.

19 1916 by U24, orders were issued that no passenger steamers were to be sunk without warning and rescue. The chief of the admiral staff resigned, to be succeeded by Adml. von Holtzendorff. Tirpitz sat at his " lonely table " at Great Headquarters, discontented and furious, and all submarine activities in the Channel and to the westward ceased for a time.

The pressure of the blockade was beginning to be felt (see Blockade). It was the British navy's part to intercept all shipping entering the North Sea, in itself an immense task lost to sight in the greater immensity of the war. In the north this work was performed by the 10th Cruiser Squadron, but the New Year of 1916 saw the " Moewe " (Lt.-Comm. Count. Nikolas zu Dohna-Schlodien), one of the most notable German raiders, slip through its weather-beaten lines and get safely out to sea, after laying a large minefield on the west side of the Orkneys, where the " King Edward VII." was lost Jan. 5 1916.

The year 1916 saw an important change in German naval policy. Adml. von Pohl had been seriously. injured in an accident, and his place was taken on Jan. 18 by Adml. Scheer, a strong advocate of an offensive strategy at sea. He received his appointment as commander-in-chief on Jan. 18, and after a conference with the chief of the naval staff, Adml. von Holtzendorff, it was decided to adopt bolder measures.

One of the first fruits of the new policy was the dispatch of the German 2nd, 6th, and 9th Torpedo Flotillas to the Dogger Bank on Feb. 10 1916, where they attacked the 10th Sloop Flotilla belonging to the Humber Patrol and sank the `` Arabis." Meanwhile the safe passage of the "Moewe " had induced another raider, the " Greif " (4 5.91n. and two torpedo tubes); to try and get to sea. The commander-in-chief Grand Fleet had received intelligence of some project of the sort, and his patrols were posted between the Shetland Is. and Norway to intercept her. The " Greif " (with a crew of 306) was sighted by the " Andes " of the 10th Cruiser Squadron on Feb. 29 some 90 m. N.E. of the Shetlands, and the "Alcantara " (Capt. Thos. Wardle) joining in the chase got within 6,000 yd. of her at 9 :15 A.M. and ordered her to stop. She was then flying the Norwegian flag and gave the name of the Norwegian s.s. " Rena " from Rio to Trongjhem, but when the " Alcantara " lowered a boat to board, the German ensign fluttered out at the main and she opened fire. A hot action ensued, in which the " Greif " was sunk but the " Alcantara " was hit by a torpedo and went down as well. That same night the " Moewe " managed to slip through the dislocated patrol line and reach home. Directionals had been received that night at 2:53 A.M. of an enemy vessel off Ekersund, but unfortunately, on the assumption that she was coming westward, the patrols had been redisposed to the westward and missed her. Her cruise in midAtlantic in the regions of trade winds and flying fish had been a great and successful adventure. She had captured 15 ships of 57,835 tons, of which 14 were sunk. Her most important capture was the " Appano " (Jan. 15, 135 m. east of Madeira), an Elder Dempster liner of 7,781 tons, with the governors of Sierra Leone and Nigeria and a cargo worth £2,000,000 on board. She was sent in to Newport News, where she arrived on Feb. 15, but the German Government's claim was disallowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in March 1917, on the grounds that she arrived without convoy and was sent in with the intention of being laid up indefinitely.

A weightier matter than the return of the " Moewe " was now engaging the attention of Great Headquarters. Scheer when he took over the command had fully expected to see the inauguration of unrestricted submarine warfare in March 1916. Von Tirpitz and von Holtzendorff had appeared at a council of war on March 4 1916 and pressed for a decision, but the Chancellor had again carried the day. Von Tirpitz, unable to bear the constant frustration of his schemes, resigned, and Adml. von Capelle took his place.

The German air raids on England had instigated a counterattack and on March 24 1916 the Harwich flotillas sailed with the " Cleopatra," " Undaunted," " Penelope " and " Conquest " in support of an aerial operation carried out by the " Vindex " and five aeroplanes against the Zeppelin sheds at Tondern.

The German outpost forces, which had just been reorganized by Scheer, were caught napping, and two outpost trawlers were sunk, but fog and snow interfered with the aerial attack, which was driven off, and only two planes got back. The only naval result was the ramming of Gr94 by the " Cleopatra " (Tyrwhitt's flagship, Capt. F. P. Loder Symonds) on the way back and the loss of the British destroyer " Medusa " by collision with the " Laverack." A month later, signs of Scheer's activity were clearly apparent in the resumption of coastal raids. A sortie had already been made into the Hoofden (the narrows between England and Holland) on March 5, but on April 24 a more ambitious operation was attempted. This time the objective was Lowestoft. The whole High Sea Fleet was to take part in conjunction with submarines stationed off the Forth and eight of the newer airships. The actual bombardment was to be carried out by the five battle-cruisers of the 1st Scouting Group, attended by the light cruisers of the and Scouting Group and the 6th and 9th Flotillas. The force put to sea on the 24th, but on its way past Nordeney encountered a nasty setback by the " Seydlitz " striking a mine laid by the " Princess Margaret " in Nov. 1915 and having to put back. Intelligence of these movements had been received, and by ro P.M. the Grand Fleet had put to sea and was on its way south. During the night the German airships taking part bombed Norwich, Lincoln, Harwich and Ipswich. The German battle-cruisers were seen shortly after 4 A.M. on April 25 by the Harwich forces, consisting of the " Conquest," " Cleopatra," and 16 destroyers, who engaged the " Rostock " and " Elbing," but were driven off by the German battle-cruisers, the " Conquest " being hit by five r2-in. shells and suffering heavy casualties. At 5 A.M. the Germans were off the coast and bombarded Lowestoft and Yarmouth for half an hour. Beatty's battle-cruiser fleet struck down at them towards Terschelling and were off it at 12:30 P.M., but the enemy had passed him and gone home.

The raid had little naval significance, but in order to strengthen the position of the Harwich force in the south, which had been weak ever since the Channel Fleet had been swept off to the Mediterranean, it was decided to station the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Thames (" Hibernia," " Commonwealth," " Zeelandia," " Dominion," " Africa," " Britannia," " Hindustan," all 4 12-in., 9 42-in., 10 6-in.) and it sailed for Sheerness on April 29.

The day that saw the bombardment of Lowestoft saw a barrage being laid by the Dover Patrol off the Belgian coast to cope with the German submarines there, which was completed by May 7 Submarine Warfare). On May 5 1916 Adml. Jellicoe launched another attack against Tondern sheds. The 1st L.C.S. and 16 destroyers escorted the seaplane carriers " Vindex " and " Engadine " to Horn's Reef. Three submarines were posted there, and the " Abdiel " laid a line of mines (one of which was to catch the " Ostfriesland " on the night of Jutland), while the battle-cruiser fleet waited ready in support with the battle-fleet behind it. Only one seaplane would rise off the water, but the Galatea " and " Phaeton " damaged a Zeppelin, L7, forcing her to descend near Ear, one of the submarines on watch, which completed her destruction and rescued seven survivors.

The attack on the " Sussex " on March 24 1916, with the 80 casualties caused by it, had led to a strong American protest, and as Scheer was on his way across to the Lowestoft raid on April 24 he received a message that submarine warfare was to be carried on in accordance with Prize law (that is, by warning and examination). He at once recalled all the submarines of the High Sea Fleet, and announced that the submarine campaign against commerce had ceased so far as his submarines were concerned. This set free a number of submarines for work in conjunction with the fleet, and Scheer set to work to devise a plan to entice the British fleet out. This was ready by the middle of May. Twenty-two submarines were to be stationed off the British ports, two off Scapa, one off Cromarty, seven off the Forth, one off the Tyne, two off the Humber and one south of the Dogger Bank. The High Sea Fleet was then to appear off the coast of England or Norway in the hope that the Grand Fleet would rush out and be torpedoed by the submarines. Such was the plan of the Jutland operations. The submarines were off their ports by May 23; and U75, after laying mines off the Orkneys on May 29 which were to sink the " Hampshire," proceeded home, the only submarine to achieve any measure of success.

The weather was too bad for air reconnaissance, which was essential for approaching the English coast, so it was decided to try the less risky advance to the Norwegian coast. But the British Admiralty was on the alert, and the Grand Fleet had put to sea on May 30 before the German ships had cleared the Jade. There followed the battle of Jutland (see Jutland, Battle oF). The British lost three battle-cruisers, three cruisers and eight destroyers. The Germans one older battleship, one battle-cruiser, four cruisers and five destroyers. Scheer, threatened with envelopment and destruction, succeeded in making good his escape, and the High Sea Fleet, driven back to harbour, became the buttress of the submarine campaign. It remained intact, a fleet " in being " barring the road to the Baltic and access to Russia with all the consequences which that involved, guarding the Bight and insuring safe entry and exit to its submarines, circumventing British attempts to mine them in and forcing the British Government to keep a mass of craft still locked up in the Grand Fleet when they were wanted for convoy and the tremendous struggle against the submarine.

A single success was achieved by the submarines engaged in the Jutland operation. On June 5, H.M.S. " Hampshire " on her way to Archangel struck one of the mines laid by U75 and went down off the Orkneys, bringing Lord Kitchener's great career to an untimely end. He had arrived at Scapa that day with the weather growing steadily worse, and by the afternoon a gale was blowing from the north-east. Lord Kitchener insisted on sailing, and to give the " Hampshire " a lee it was decided to send her up the west side of the Orkneys instead of the east and she sailed at 5:30 P.M. But the wind had backed to N.N.W., and the destroyers, unable to make head against the gale, had to put back. The " Hampshire " was alone when about 7:50 P.M. she struck one of the mines laid by U75, one and a half miles from shore, between the B rough of Birsay and Marwick Head, and sank in 15 min., losing all but 12 men.

The disposition of submarines adopted for the Jutland operations had met with no success, but in August Scheer devised another and more successful plan, which led to the loss of the " Nottingham " and " Falmouth." This time, the submarines, instead of being stationed off the ports where patrols were constantly on watch, were disposed in lines in the North Sea on the expected track of the British fleet. One line of six submarines was posted off Blyth, another off the Yorkshire coast, and two lines of Flanders submarines off Terschelling. The High Sea Fleet put to sea in the evening of Aug. 18 1916, leaving the and Squadron this time to guard the Bight, and shaped course from Heligoland in the direction of Hartlepool, intending to bombard Sunderland, at sunset the next day, if the British fleet were not encountered.

The battle-cruisers of the 1st Scouting Group were reinforced by the new battleship " Bayern," and by the " Grosser Kurfiirst " and " Markgraf," in place of the " Derfflinger " and " Seydlitz," which were still under repair; and to permit of rapid concentration they were stationed only 20 m. ahead of the battle-fleet, with eight Zeppelins, to assist in air reconnaissance. They did not get across unscathed. E23 was waiting for them halfway, and sent two torpedoes into the " Westfalen," forcing her to put back, but Scheer held steadily on. Admiral Jellicoe had ample intelligence of the German movements, and had put to sea at 5 P.M. on Aug. 18. After meeting Beatty's force he was on his way down the East Coast with the battle-cruisers, 30 m. ahead, when the and L.C.S. ran into the first line of German submarines in the latitude of the Farne Is. at 5.55 A.M. on Aug. 19, and though going 20 knots the " Nottingham " was struck by two torpedoes from U52. Admiral Jellicoe immediately turned round and made to the northward for a time. The " Nottingham " struggling home was hit by a third torpedo at 7 A.M. and sunk. Meanwhile the Harwich forces had sighted the enemy at 6:30 A.M. and proceeded northeast to get in touch with him. But the German forces were too strong for Tyrwhitt's flotillas to attack, and Scheer held steadily across, receiving a succession of reports from his Zeppelins, submarines and the German intercept station at Neuminster, which enabled him to locate exactly the position of the British forces. By Io:30 A.M. Adml. Jellicoe had ample information of Scheer's movements and decided to make for a position off Newcastle to cover the coast. At noon he was some 95 m. east of the Farne Is. steering S.S.E. down the coast, with Beatty's battle-cruisers ahead of him, and the German fleet about 90 m. east of Whitby steering to the westward on a converging course. By 12:30 P.M. Beatty's squadrons were level with Newcastle and only 42 m. from the German fleet, when Scheer turned to the southward, made a push against the Harwich forces and turned home at 2:35 P.M. Adml. Jellicoe, thinking it unwise to follow on account of the danger of submarines, ordered Beatty to turn back at 4 P.M. and directed Comm. Tyrwhitt to proceed to a position off Terschelling to deliver a night attack. At 3:20 P.M. the commander-in-chief received the report of a submarine and ordered Beatty to turn back at once. At 4:52 P.M. while returning, the " Falmouth " of the 3rd L.C.S. was hit by two torpedoes from U66, though going 23 knots at the time. She managed to reach Flamborough Head, where she sank, and U66, though heavily depth-charged by the destroyer " Pelican," got safely away. The Harwich flotillas kept in touch with the enemy fleet till 7:30 P.M., but unsupported by the Grand Fleet dared not press home an attack, and as conditions were unfavourable for a night attack abandoned the pursuit. This was one of the most successful of Scheer's operations, and he intended to repeat it, but in Oct. orders were received to resume the submarine warfare against commerce (under conditions of visit and search), and U boats were no longer available for fleet purposes.

The resumption of the submarine campaign called for a clear passage down Channel, and the 3rd and 9th Torpedo-boat Flotillas were dispatched to Zeebrugge under Comm. Michelsen, the Commodore of Torpedo Flotillas, to raid the Dover Straits barrage. A line of mines and nets had been laid off Zeebrugge in April 1916, and a similar line had been begun across the Straits from South Goodwin towards Snouw Bank and Dunkirk. This was the first serious attempt to attack patrols off Dover, and merits special attention. The barrage in course of construction at Dover consisted of a line of nets fitted with mines, divided into sections marked by light buoys and patrolled by a force of 23 drifters, supported by an armed yacht, an armed trawler, and an old destroyer, the " Flirt." Information of the arrival of the flotillas in Flanders had been received, and the viceadmiral at Dover, expecting an attack either on the Downs or Belgian coast, distributed his destroyer forces to meet it, four in the Downs, eight at Dunkirk and six tribals at Dover. The night of October 26-27 was dark and favourable to the enemy. The Germans attacked in two divisions of five and six boats each. One attacked the centre of the patrol about 10 P.M. and sank three drifters. The " Flirt " had .seen them about 9:30 P.M. but took them for the British destroyers from Dunkirk. Hearing the gunfire she thought a submarine was being chased, hurried to the spot, found a blazing drifter, and sent a whaler to save the crew when a heavy fire was opened on her and she sank at once, about I I P.M. The yacht " Ombra " heard the firing, guessed the cause and gave the alarm, but before the patrols could be withdrawn another division of drifters ran into the enemy and two more were sunk. The destroyers at Dover and Dunkirk were now ordered out, and those in the Downs got under way.

The second section of attackers had proceeded westward, stopped the empty transport " Queen " off Gris Nez and set her on fire. The news of this incident came in at 12:30 A.M. The six destroyers at Dover (" Viking," " Amazon," " Nubian," " Cossack," " Tartar," and " Mohawk ") had put to sea at II:15 P.M., but leaving by different entrances got separated. The " Nubian " sighted destroyers at 12 :40 A.M., took them for the Downs division, challenged them and received in reply a heavy fire and a torpedo which blew off her bows and left her blazing. A few minutes later the enemy met the " Amazon " and sent a shell into her boilers. At 12:50 A.M. he met the " Viking " and two destroyers, was challenged, and after giving the usual reply of a broadside disappeared in the night. The Downs division had got to sea at 12:30 A.M. and the Dunkirk division by II:30 P.M., but neither saw the enemy though the latter heard the gunfire of the " Viking's" action. The Germans got back to Zeebrugge safely, after sinking seven drifters and two destroyers. This was the first of a series of attacks on Dover intended to assist the passage of submarines.

In the north the " Moewe " had got safely to sea again in the winter nights Nov. 23-25, and was followed by another raider, the " Wolfe " (Capt. Karl Nerger), on Nov. 30.

Submarines were again at work, and on Nov. 5 U30 and U20 (which had sunk the " Lusitania ") ran ashore off Bovsbjerg (Denmark) in a fog, and Scheer sent a half flotilla of destroyers supported by the " Moltke " and the 3rd Squadron to get them off. J1. (Comm. Lawrence) got there too, and torpedoed the battleships " Grosser Kurfiirst " and " Kronprinz," driving them both back into harbour. The Kaiser remonstrated with Scheer for risking two valuable battleships in this work, but Scheer maintained that sooner or later German naval strategy must resolve itself into a guerre de course, leaving only one task for the fleet to perform - to get submarines safely out and safely home again.

Unrestricted warfare (that is, sinking at sight without warning) was now being urged by the general staffs of both navy and army in Germany, but at a council of war held on Oct. 16 it was decided to postpone it till a last effort had been made to negotiate for peace. On Dec. 12, after the capture of Bucharest, a note went out to the Allied Powers inviting them to enter into negotiations to avoid further bloodshed. It was the first symptom of Germany's defeat, but it was based on the conception of her indestructible strength and was rejected by the Allies. The peril of the submarine was growing more and more acute, and on Nov. 29 1916 Adml. Sir John Jellicoe was summoned to the Admiralty to take the post of First Sea Lord, and his command passed to Adml. Sir David Beatty.

The new year of 1917 saw the controversy which had so long raged in Germany decided in favour of the submarine. In her growing need she was forced to have recourse to unrestricted warfare, and on Jan. 9 an Imperial Order went out to commence it on Feb. 1. The war at sea had now to adjust itself to the new conditions; but though the High Sea Fleet had only to ensure a safe entry and exit to its submarines, it continued indirectly to exercise a potent influence on the campaign, for as a " fleet in being " it compelled the Grand Fleet to remain concentrated and ready for action, and prevented its units and flotillas being dispersed to escort convoys and hunt the submarine.

The activity of the destroyer flotillas did not diminish. In the Hoofden, a short sharp destroyer action took place in the early morning of Jan. 23, when a Harwich force of three light cruisers and some 14 destroyers met the German 6th Flotilla of eight destroyers on its way from Zeebrugge to the Bight. It was a cold dark night and a general melee at short range ensued, which developed into two encounters. In the first, V69, the flotilla leader's boat, was badly hit and driven into Ymuiden, and Sp had to put back. In the second, which took place off Schouwen Bank, a British destroyer, the "Simoon," was hit in the bow by a torpedo and sunk. Feb. I saw the beginning of the momentous campaign followed by the rupture of diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States. The operations of the German fleet were now directed towards supporting their submarines, and with this in view a succession of raids was made on Dover Straits.

The first took place on the night of Feb. 25 and accomplished nothing. The barrage patrol at the time consisted of five Lclass boats, patrolling on courses S.W. and N.E. about 2 m.

apart. The German destroyers appeared, and after opening fire on the " Laverock " retired. March 17 1917 saw a more successful attempt. This time the barrage patrol consisted of four destroyers, the " Laertes," " Laforey," " Llewellyn " and " Paragon," patrolling on separate beats running S.W. and N.E. about 2 in. apart. Off Deal were lying the " Canterbury," " Faulknor " and four destroyers; the " Broke " and five destroyers were in Dover. At I I :50 P.iu. the " Paragon," on patrol at about the centre of the barrage on a N.E. course, sighted three or four destroyers, challenged them, received a heavy broadside and a torpedo, broke in two and sank. The "Laforey," 2 m. off, under the impression that the " Paragon " had struck a mine, was on her way with the " Llewellyn " to pick up survivors when the latter was hit by a torpedo, which was attributed at the time to a submarine. The destroyers at Dover went out but saw nothing, though the Germans were seen at 2:35 A.M. off Broadstairs, where they sunk a merchant ship and disappeared. The " Moewe " had slipped out to the north again, and while these events were happening in the Straits got back to Kiel after capturing 27 ships, one of which she had succeeded in sending in to Swinemunde. But another raider on the way out had not been so fortunate. At 4 P.M. on March 17 the a.c. " Achilles " (Capt. F. M. Leake) and the a.m.s. " Dundee " (Comm. S. M. Day, R.N.R.) had intercepted the " Leopard " disguised as the Norwegian s.s. " Reina Norge," 200 m. N.E. of the Faroes, and after a short action had sent her to the bottom.

April 20 saw another raid at Dover, but this time the raiders did not escape so easily. The system of patrols had been changed since the last attack. Instead of patrols of single destroyers, two patrols were maintained, one called the Western Barrage Patrol of two flotilla leaders patrolling on the N. and W. side of the Straits as far as the S. Goodwin Light vessel. The other, called the E. Barrage Patrol, consisted of a division of destroyers, patrolling on a line S.W. from a buoy approximately halfway between Dover and Calais. Reserves were available at Dover and Deal as before, and on the night in question the W. Barrage Patrol consisted of the " Broke " (Comm.

E. R. G. Evans) and the " Swift " (Comm. A. Peck). The German force, consisting of the 2nd Flotilla, which comprised their best and fastest boats, was in two sections. One went off to the S. and appeared off the French coast. The other of about six boats hugged the northern shore and fired at the English coast off Dover in an aimless sort of way. The night was dark, and at 12 :45 A.M. they were on their way home about 3 m. E. of the S. Goodwin on an easterly course when they were sighted on the port bow about 600 yd. off by the " Swift " and " Broke," steering an opposite course. This time there was no challenging. The " Swift " fired a torpedo, put her helm hard-a-starboard and attempted to ram, but passed through the enemy's line and went off in pursuit of the leader. The " Broke " fired a torpedo, turned hard to port and crashed into G42, the third boat in line. A hand-to-hand fight ensued in the darkness with German boarders, who were driven back by the fo'c'sle gun's crew led by Midshipman Donald Gyles. The " Broke's " engines were disabled by a shell, but she shook herself clear and completed the destruction of another destroyer, G85, already disabled by one or both of the torpedoes previously fired. The reserve division which had put to sea from Dover, only arrived in time to help to pick up the German survivors. This ended the raid of April 20, which made the " Broke " and Comm. Evans famous, and with the exception of two ineffectual sorties on April 25 and May 2, when the Germans shelled Dunkirk and Ramsgate, stopped such ventures for nearly a year.

On April 6 the United States entered the war, and ViceAdml. W. S. Sims was dispatched to determine the best methods of cooperating with the Allies. This was a black month for merchant shipping. At sea the war developed into a protracted struggle with the submarine, which became by degrees the dominant aspect of the war (see Submarine Warfare), while the battle-fleets were active as breakwaters behind which the submarine and its antagonists fought out the issues of the war at sea. The reply to the submarine took three forms, the reorgan ization of the naval staff, the institution of a convoy system (see Convoy), and the development of antidotes in the form of mine barrages and technical devices such as hydrophones and depth charges. In these spheres the United States navy was able to render valuable assistance: convoys required for destroyers, which the Grand Fleet could not supply. The U.S. destroyers, the first six of which under Comm. J. K. Taussig arrived at Queenstown on May 4, eased the situation and proved a welcome and necessary reinforcement.

In the Mediterranean the war had become more and more a war of flotillas. There the Straits of Otranto took the place of the Straits of Dover and a force of some so vessels, chiefly drifters, patrolled it to prevent the passage of German and Austrian submarines from their base at Cattaro. These little ships were attacked by a force of Austrian cruisers and destroyers on May 15, and as they stoutly refused to surrender, 14 were sunk, the skipper of the " Gowan Lea " receiving a V.C. for his gallant efforts to engage an overwhelmingly superior force. In the " Floandi " the wireless operator, Harris, was hit, but continued to send out messages till he fell dead at his post. The light cruisers " Dartmouth " and " Bristol " heard the call, and on their approach the enemy fled back to Cattaro; though the " Dartmouth " (Capt. A. P. Addison) was hit by a torpedo but got safely back.

At Dover Adml. Sir Reginald Bacon had endeavoured to extend the war against the submarine to the land and to attack it in its base by bombarding the locks at Zeebrugge and Ostend. These bombardments were carried out in summer by the monitors" Lord Clive," " General Wolfe," " Prince Rupert," " Prince Eugene " (all 2 12-in.), " Marshal Soult," " Erebus " and " Terror " (all 2 15-in.). The two latter joined the force in 1917 and took part with the " Marshal Soult " in an important bombardment off Zeebrugge on May 12 1917, carried out at a range of. 8,000 yards. Though these bombardments did not actually prevent the Germans using the ports, they damaged the dockyards and made it more difficult for them to do so, besides adding largely to British experience of bombardment work. During a shelling of Ostend on June 5 six German destroyers sallied out but were engaged by the Harwich Flotilla and driven back to port with the loss of S20. It was only now that the British authorities woke up to the extent to which the enemy continued to ply his trade along the coast between Rotterdam and German ports. The Harwich Flotilla began to harass it and succeeded in sinking some 24 ships during the year, capturing four on July 16 and driving two others ashore. The traffic between Sweden and Germany could no longer be checked, for with the collapse of Russia the Baltic had passed completely under German control. On July 9 the British battle-fleet received a severe blow in the loss of one of its dreadnoughts, the " Vanguard " (Capt. Jas. D. Dick), by an internal explosion, in the same terribly sudden way as the " Bulwark " and " Natal." She was lying at anchor in Scapa when at II :20 P.M. a great sheet of flame leapt up from her forward, and when the smoke cleared away she was gone. Seven Allied ships-of-war suffered this fate during the war - the " Bulwark " at Sheerness Nov. 26 1914, " Benedetto Brin " Sept. 27 1915, " Natal " at Invergordon Dec. 30 1915, " Leonardo da Vinci " Aug. 2 1916, " Tsukuba " Jan. 14 1917, and " Kawachi " July 12 1918.

Meanwhile a big project for mining Heligoland Bight had been given to the Plans Division as its first task, and preparations for it were steadily progressing, though its execution was delayed till Oct. by lack of mines. The enemy's outpost forces and minesweepers were not left immune from attack, and on Sept. 1, the 4th L.C.S. and 15th Flotilla made a raid on the Channel by Horn's Reef, driving four German minesweepers ashore off Ringkiobing. These minesweepers, working sometimes 150 and later 180 m. from Heligoland, formed an excellent target for attack, but as they always had heavy ships waiting in support and British heavy craft could not risk mined waters, British light-cruiser raids could not be carried out.

No big operation had taken place in the Baltic since 1915, and a German incursion into the Gulf of Finland, in Nov. 1916, had resulted only in the loss of seven destroyers by mines and the abandonment of the enterprise. But in Sept. 1917 the capture of Riga by the German army (Sept. 3) opened the way for a combined operation, which was to prove the death-blow of Russia, then in the throes of revolution. The German navy's task was to transport an infantry division to the island of Osel and effect a landing there, with the object of capturing the island and its batteries, and opening the Straits of Irbin so as to give direct access by sea to the Gulf of Riga. Transport was prepared for 23,000 men and 5,000 horses, and it was decided to land at Tagga Bay on the northward side of the island. The naval force detached for the purpose under Vice-Adml. Ehrhardt Schmidt consisted of the battle-cruiser " Moltke " (flag.), the 3rd and 4th Squadrons comprising ten of the latest battleships, and the 2nd Scouting Group, which with the Baltic light cruisers mustered eight light cruisers in all. A strong force of destroyers went with them, including the 2nd, 8th, and 9th Flotillas and the 7th, 13th and 12th Half Flotillas, numbering altogether 47 boats under Comm. Heinecke.

Nineteen transports were requisitioned for the purpose, with a tonnage of 153,664 tons. Preparations for the enterprise were begun on Sept. 12; on Oct. 9 the troops embarked and on Oct. 11 the fleet put to sea from Libau. Osel is an island of moderate size about 30 m. across at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, with the Straits of Irbin running between it and the mainland. On the night of Oct. i 1 the fleet was approaching Tagga Bay, with the minesweepers steaming slowly in front. But time was precious and rather than risk losing the chance of surprise at daylight Adml. Schmidt ordered the minesweepers out of the way and went straight in with his fleet. He reached Tagga Bay safely, and though the battleships " Bayern " and " Grosser Kurfiirst " struck mines in taking up their positions for bombarding the batteries in the Sound of Soelo between Dago and Osel, they were able to perform their task. The advanced troops got safely ashore in motor-launches and three small steamers at 5:30 A.M., and the transports entered the Bay at 6:30 A.M.

The German fleet's next task was to penetrate into Moon Sound. The 2nd Flotilla and 12th and 1 3 th Half Flotillas had pushed through Soelo Sound, and covered by the fire of the " Kaiser " and " Emden " had driven their enemy back with a loss of only one boat sunk by a mine, and three damaged. But the tables were turned by the appearance of the Russian battleship " Slava " which put up an obstinate fight and drove them back in turn, a good instance of the power of heavy guns working behind a minefield. The Russian small craft were still sheltered by their battleships in Moon Sound, which now had to be approached by the S. of Osel through Irbin Straits. This channel was commanded by the batteries at Zorel on the S. point of Osel, but these were bombarded and silenced on Oct. 14 by four battleships and blown up by the Russians. A chart of the minefields had been captured ashore, and with its help the Straits of Irbin were swept. By the morning of Oct. 16 the fleet was inside the Straits before Arensburg, and facing the southern entrance to Moon Sound that evening. The Russian battleships " Slava " and " Grozdani " engaged the Germans and an action ensued, in which the " Slava " was sunk and the Russians driven off to the northward. By Oct. 17 the German force was in complete occupation of Osel, and Arensburg was being organized as a base for the fleet. Dago I. was now captured, and Vice-Adml. Schmidt proposed to push on through a big minefield in the N. of Moon Sound into the Gulf of Finland.

The operation was analogous in some degree to that of the Dardanelles and British raids on the Bight, namely the attack of a large intact minefield protected by heavy guns or supported by a fleet in being. British submarines were beginning to show themselves, and the " Kiinig Albert," the " König " and " Kronprinz," had all been attacked. The detachment of so large a force had naturally given rise to some anxiety on the part of the German commander-in-chief in the North Sea, which had not been diminished by the mining of the " Bayern " and " Grosser Kurfiirst." It was decided to recall the 3rd and 4th Squadrons and the 1st Squadron was sent to relieve them, but on Oct. 29, when the " Markgraf " struck a mine in Irbin Straits, an order was. dispatched to bring the operations to an end, and the naval part of the campaign came to an abrupt conclusion. This campaign offered a welcome opportunity of giving the fleet some active employment, for symptoms of the spirit which was to end in Germany's collapse were already beginning to appear. Sporadic outbreaks of mutiny had occurred in the 3rd Squadron as early as May 1917, and in Aug. the men in the " Prinz Regent Luitpold " refused to put to sea and were isolated with their ship in Schillig Roads. A mutiny broke out in the " Kaiserin " on the ostensible grounds of insufficient food and the " Kaiserin," " Kaiser," and " K6nig Albert " were sent to Brunsbiittel for recreation and leave. The crew of the " Westfalen " were reported to have killed their captain, and a light cruiser was said to have made for Norway and been turned back by a torpedo-boat flotilla. Certain it is that the spirit and courage of the German fleet were beginning to flag, though it was still far from collapse, as British convoys had good cause to know before the year was out. The convoy system, as one of the most effectual replies to the German policy of submarine warfare, was a natural target of attack, and on Oct. 17 the Scandinavian convoy received a severe blow. This convoy sailed regularly from Lerwick to the Norwegian coast and back, and on this occasion was on its way to Lerwick, consisting of 12 ships (two British, one Danish, five Norwegian, three Swedish), under the escort of only two destroyers, the " Strongbow " (Lt.-Comm. Ed. Brooke) and " Mary Rose" (Lt.-Comm. Chas.

L. Fox). It was about halfway across, going about eight knots, at dawn about 6 A.M. on Oct. 17, when two cruisers were seen two points before the port beam coming up at about 25 knots. These were the " Brummer " and " Bremse," two fast German light cruisers completed in 1916 and armed with four 5.9-in. The " Strongbow " challenged thrice, and the enemy opened fire at 6:15 A.M., overwhelming her with the first salvo. A shell entered the engine-room, cutting the main steam-pipe and brought the ship to a stop; the bridge was wrecked, the captain badly wounded. The " Mary Rose " was also sunk after a short fight. Neither of them had time to make a wireless German Operations Oct. 1917 Tagga Bay & Arensburg signal, and the light-cruiser squadrons cruising to southward of the route knew nothing of the action, a clear instance of the necessity of an escort being within range of a convoy and not out of sight. The enemy went off at 8:20 A.M. after sinking nine of the merchant ships. The armed trawler " Elise " stood gallantly by the " Strongbow," and saved most of the survivors. The losses of the " Mary Rose " and " Strongbow " were 86 and 46, and as the armed trawlers " Elise " and " P. Fannon " had no wireless, it was not till 7 P.M., when they arrived at Lerwick, that any report of the action was received. This led to a general revision of the arrangements for convoy in the North Sea, but was also closely related to the general strategy of the war. There was a distinct disinclination both at the Admiralty and at sea to use the Grand Fleet to cover the convoys. But this was clearly their business. War is an endeavour to bring such pressure to bear on an enemy as to force him to submit to your will. In 1917 a grinding pressure was being brought to bear on Germany by the blockade. The enemy replied with a vigorous and effective attack on British maritime trade, not with surface craft, for these were held in check by the Grand Fleet, but with submarines. The British replied with convoy, and the German riposte was sudden and swift cruiser raids. The British answer to this was not to abolish convoys but to escort them in such strength as to force the Germans to bring their whole fleet out to attack, as actually happened in April 1918. This was the normal way of bringing about a battle at sea, but the use of wireless directionals had induced what may be called a policy of immediacy, in which the main fleet had to be held ready for immediate excursion and attack, and was jealous of any other use of its craft. But the opportunity of a great and decisive battle had been lost. The German operations in the Baltic in the autumn of 1917 clearly showed that they were not prepared to risk another fleet action in the North Sea, and in these circumstances the escort of convoys became one of the most important functions of the British fleet.

November was marked by light-cruiser raids both in the Cattegat and Bight. The Cattegat, a sort of "No Man's Sea" at the beginning of the war, had become more and more a sphere of German activity. The German-Swedish convention assuring free passage through the Sound had been denounced; minefields and guardships guarded the southern end of the Sound; ships proceeding to hostile ports were refused passage, and decoy ships cruised in the Cattegat to take the offensive against British submarines. One of these was the " Kronprinz Wilhelm " under command of Capt. Lauterbach, which was cruising off Kullen Light on Nov. 2 at 7 A.M. when several British destroyers swept down on her and opened a devastating fire. Her stern was blown off by the explosion of the after magazine, and in a few minutes she was burning fiercely fore and aft. This incident, small enough in itself, had a considerable effect in checking German activity in the Cattegat, and seems to have led them once again to confine their cruises to the Baltic and the Bight. In the Bight the British minelaying, which started in earnest in the last quarter of 1917, called for an immense expansion in the organization of German outpost and minesweeping forces, and necessitated constant trips by groups of minesweepers and barrier breakers (ships specially constructed with bows filled with concrete) along the swept channels. As the area of the minefields grew, the channels grew longer and longer, and the minesweepers became more and more exposed to attack, and had to be supported by light cruisers and battleships. These were the circumstances leading to an engagement on Nov. 17 1917 which affords an interesting illustration of the important part played by German battleships and battle-cruisers in keeping the Bight open for submarines.

Three German minesweeping half flotillas were making a test trip that morning, escorted by the 14th Half T.B. Flotilla and covered by the light cruisers of the 2nd and 4th Scouting Groups, supported by the " Kaiser " and " Kaiserin " lying off Heligoland. The group was on the point of starting when they were attacked at 7 A.M. by a force consisting of the " Courageous" (R.A. T. D. W. Napier) and " Glorious " (now forming the 1st two battle-cruisers, the " Renown " and " Repulse," several light cruisers including the r st and 6th L.C.S. with the " Caledon " and " Calypso," and a number of destroyers. The two former ships had been built by Lord Fisher for use in the Baltic, and were of special design, 786 ft. long over all, 224 ft. draught, 30 knots seagoing speed, with four 15-in. guns and a 3-in. belt. The horizon was misty and an action developed with the German light cruisers at about 12,000 yd. running to the south-east. The fight began to approach the minesweepers, which had made off at full speed to the S.E., while the " Nurnberg," " Pilau " and the German destroyers tried to screen them with a smoke cloud. At 8:50 A.M. a destroyer attack was made by the British on the 2nd Scouting Group without success and a counter-attack was made by the enemy in which the " Konigsberg " and " Frankfurt " fired torpedoes without hitting. The former was hit by a heavy shell, which went through all three funnels, and landing in a coal-bunker started a fire. At 9:30 the " Kaiserin " and " Kaiser " came in sight, and Rear-Adml. von Reuter tried to draw the British down to them. The "Kaiserin " got within range and scored a hit, but on the arrival of the battleships the British withdrew before the " Moltke " and " Hindenburg," which were coming up, could reach the scene. Several hits were scored on both sides, and on the German side 21 were killed and io severely wounded, but only one outpost vessel was lost. On the British side the " Calypso " was hit and her captain (Capt. H. L. Edwards) killed. The cooperation of the German battleships in supporting their minesweepers, and the difficulty of joining battle on the edge of a minefield, were the principal features.

British attack on the German minesweepers was answered by another German thrust at the Scandinavian convoys made by the German 2nd Flotilla on Dec. 12. The 3rd Half Flotilla proceeded to the Tyne, and after going up the coast and attacking two or three steamers returned about 6 A.M. The 4th Half Flotilla under Lt.-Comm. Hans Holbe proceeded to the northward, and at 7 A.M. on Dec. 12 was in sight of Udsire on the Norwegian coast. Proceeding to the northward he sighted at 1 r :30 P.M. a British convoy of six steamers escorted by two destroyers and four trawlers, approaching Norway on an easterly course and about 35 m. from the coast. The destroyers were the " Pellew " and " Partridge," who left the convoy and engaged the German destroyers at about 5,000 yards. The four armed trawlers with the convoy were sunk. The " Partridge " received a shot in her main steam-pipe, which brought her to a stop. She fired her torpedoes, but one stuck in the tube and another which hit Vioo did not explode. The " Pellew," pursued by three destroyers, managed to escape in a squall of rain. All was over in three-quarters of an hour, and the flotilla returned to Kiel with four officers, 48 men and 23 of the merchant crews as prisoners. Two armoured cruisers, the " Shannon " and " Minotaur," were at sea as a covering force, and receiving a signal from the " Partridge " for assistance steamed at full speed to the spot. But again it was too late. The 3rd L.C.S. was also at sea and actually 85 m. to the S.E., but it also failed to intercept the enemy - another illustration of the weakness of covering forces being out of sight of the forces they are intended to cover. The fact is that Grand Fleet cruiser forces were disinclined to be merely escorts. They preferred to be " covering " forces some way off, and the enemy eluded them. The raid led to the provision of stronger covering forces and to considerable changes in the Scandinavian convoy system, which had almost broken down under these successive blows.

The Dutch convoy in the S. suffered a little later an equally severe blow of a different kind. It was one of the principal duties of the Harwich Flotilla to escort the Dutch convoys, and on Dec. 23 at 3 A.M. four of its destroyers were steaming to the southward at 15 knots a few miles N. of the Maas Light buoy when they stumbled into a German minefield in that vicinity. The " Torrent," " Surprise," and " Valkyrie " all struck mines in rapid succession and sank before they could reach the shore.

The year was now drawing to a close, but before it closed Adml. Sir John Jellicoe had left the Admiralty, and his place as First Sea Lord was taken by Adml. Sir Rosslyn Wemyss. Adml. Jellicoe's departure was associated with that of ViceAdml. Sir Reginald Bacon's from Dover about the same time. The Belgian coast had acted as a fatal magnet to the Dover Command. All through the summer of 1917 Dover had been absorbed in preparations for what was known there as the Great Landing, a project for landing a division on the flank of the German army in conjunction with a general advance. Enormous pontoons of a special design, each to be pushed by two monitors, had been devised by Adml. Bacon, who had devoted an immensity of labour and attention to the scheme. But events had taken a different turn. The army did not want divisions landed in Belgium. The Admiralty wanted Dover Straits closed to submarines, and when difficulties arose as to the execution of their plans, it was considered necessary to send the Director of Plans, Rear-Adml. Sir Roger Keyes, to Dover to close the Straits. This he did, and very effectually. The war at sea was gradually expressing itself more and more in terms of submarine warfare. Nothing else mattered. The Dover pontoons were ingenious, but they did not close the Straits. History was merely repeating itself. Sir Sidney Smith in earlier days had made the same mistake. He spent much of his time preparing plans and devising pontoons for a landing on the Flemish coast, till Lord Keith complained to the Admiralty that one-third of his force was employed in this way to the detriment of trade in the Channel, which was suffering from privateers.

Operations in 1918. - All this time the Black Sea had been the scene of a sporadic warfare between the Russian and TurcoGerman forces. Russia had a considerable force in these waters. She possessed at the outbreak of war two good pre-dreadnoughts, the " Ievstafi " and " Ivan Zlatoust " (1906, 4 12-in., 4 8-in., 12 6-in.), to pit against the " Goeben," and three dreadnoughts, the " Ekaterina II.," " Imperatriza Maria " and " Alexander II." (all in 12-in., 20 5-in.), which were on the stocks at Nikolaieff. Her inability to face the " Goeben " with pre-dreadnoughts, and her military commitments, prevented her cooperating on a large scale against Turkey during the Gallipoli campaign, but by the end of 1915, after the completion of the three dreadnoughts, the control of the Black Sea passed into her hands and ensured her communication with the Caucasus. The collapse of Russia in 1917 and the mutiny of the Black Sea fleet led the " Goeben " to look to the westward, and on Jan. 20 she and the " Breslau " made a sortie from the Dardanelles directed against any Allied craft that might be cruising in its vicinity. The British force in the area consisted of the British Aegean Squadron under Rear-Adml. Hayes Sadler, a somewhat heterogeneous collection comprising the " Lord Nelson " (flag.) and " Agamemnon," 6 old light cruisers, 12 monitors, 7 sloops and 27 old destroyers. The only ships which could have opposed the "Goeben " (8 I I-in.) were the " Lord Nelson " and " Agamemnon " (each 4 12-in., 4 9.2-in.); the former was at Salonika, where the rearadmiral had gone to confer with the British general and French admiral, and the latter (Capt. P. W. Dumas) was lying at Mudros in the island of Lemnos. The ships in the immediate vicinity were the destroyers " Tigress " (Lt. J. B. Newill) and " Lizard " (Lt. N. A. Ohlenschlager) of the 5th Flotilla, patrolling off the Straits, and the monitors " Raglan " (Comm. Visct. Broome) and. M28 (Lt.-Comm. Donald Macgregor) anchored in Kusu Bay at the N.E. corner of Imbros some 15 m. from the Straits. The " Goeben " (Vice-Adml. von Rebeur Paschwik) and " Breslau," or to give them their Turkish names, the " Sultan Selim " and " Medilli," sallied out about 5 A.M. unobserved by the lookout station on Navro I. and steered for Imbros, shadowed by the " Tigress " and " Lizard." The " Raglan " sighted them at 5:35 and gave the alarm by wireless. She was engaged by the " Breslau " and set on fire, and after a few shots from the " Goeben " sank. The " Breslau " then opened fire on M28, which burst into flames and blew up with her captain at 6:27 A.M. The Goeben " and " Breslau " went off to the southward, but about 3 m. off the S.E. point of Imbros the " Breslau " entered a minefield, and was sunk by mines at 7:07 A.M., 40 survivors being picked up by the " Tigress." The Goeben " seems to have struck a mine about the same time, and after continuing south for some miles headed for the Dardanelles, followed by aircraft, and beached herself on the shoal off Magara. The " Raglan's " signal set the whole squadron in motion, and even the old cruiser " Europa " started to raise steam. The " Agamemnon " put to sea, and was on her way towards the Straits cleared for action when news arrived that the " Goeben " was returning to the Dardanelles. Almost simultaneously came a signal from the " Lord Nelson " ordering her to rendezvous off Cape Paliuri on the coast of Macedonia.

A series of air attacks were made on the stranded " Goeben," and in the course of the ensuing week more than 15 tons of bombs were dropped round her with several hits, but the 112 -1b. bombs failed to inflict any vital damage. An heroic attempt was made to torpedo her by E14 (Lt.-Comm. Geoffrey White), but the defences of the Straits were too strong, and the Er4 was sunk and her captain killed. The separation of the " Lord Nelson " and " Agamemnon " had been criticised, but even if we suppose that one had been on patrol outside the Straits and the other at Lemnos, the " Goeben " was more than a match for one and the sortie was made too quickly for the other to arrive in time. The " Goeben " was still too formidable an antagonist for a single ship of the " Lord Nelson " class, and in these circumstances the minefield provided the best solution of the problem, though in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean the episode does not reflect very great credit on the strategy of the Allied arms.

In the North Sea the increased activity in the Dover barrage led inevitably to another German raid. The barrage of deep mines which had been laid across the Straits was now patrolled at night by a strong force of drifters, and illuminated by brilliant flares and searchlights in trawlers and destroyers, in order to discover enemy submarines and force them to dive. The Germans sallied out against it on Feb. 15. The disposition that night was as follows: In the Downs - " Attentive " and three destroyers; West Barrage Patrol off S. Goodwins - " Swift " and " Marksman "; East Barrage Patrol (south and east side of Straits) - " Termagant," " Zubian," " Melpomene " and " Amazon." On the line Folkestone to Gris Nez there were stationed 58 drifters, supported by Monitor 26 off the N.E. Varne buoy and the old destroyer " Syren." All the conditions were favourable for a German raid; a moon three days old set at II P.M., and the east-going stream to assist the raiders home began to run at midnight. The light of the barrage could be seen a long way off. The flares and searchlights had a dazzling effect and the whole area was full of glare, varying in intensity as flares burnt up and died down and searchlights flickered and hovered. In such surroundings the flash of gunfire might be overlooked or might easily be mistaken for an attack on a submarine. If enemy destroyers were seen the general alarm for a surface craft raid was to be given; this was a green firework of any description, and on this signal all drifters had to evacuate the minefield and close the nearest land. The German 2nd Flotilla (B 9 8, Vioo, Gioi, G102, G103, G104, B97, B109, 110, III, I12) had again been chosen for attack and came straight from the Bight. At 11:30 P.M. on Feb. 15 it was off Sandettie Bank close to the Straits, where it split into two halves, one going towards Folkestone, the other towards Gris Nez. The northern force was sighted by the trawler " Sabreur " about 12 :40 A.M. off Folkestone. She took them for British destroyers hunting a submarine, and made no sign. The minesweeper " Newbury " was burning a searchlight close by, and as the destroyers passed they opened a heavy fire and left her a blazing wreck. They then made off to the S.E. down the drifter line, sank two drifters, damaged a minesweeper and motor-launch, and disappeared to the N.E. about 1:15 P.M. It would appear impossible for all this to happen without an alarm, but no alarm went up. The motor-launch thought she had got mixed up in an attack by British destroyers on a submarine. No news was received at Dover, and the Western Barrage Patrol saw only a few faint flashes about i A.M. Meanwhile the German southern detachment had reached the southern end of the barrage about 12:55 A.M. There they opened fire on the trawler " James Pond," a searchlight vessel, and set her on fire; then proceeding slowly to the N.W. along the drifter line they sank the drifters " Cloverbank," " Cosmos " and " Jennie Murray." One of these seems to have sent up a green light, which led to a general retirement towards Dover, but two more drifters, the " Christina Craig " and " Silver Queen," were met and sunk by the enemy as he retired to the east. Meanwhile the monitor M26 and the destroyer " Syren " remained serenely at their posts under the impression that the firing was associated with an air raid. M26 saw a green light to the southward about I A.M., and without repeating the signal ran down there at full speed (92 knots), and must have passed fairly close to the enemy, but finding everything quiet returned to the N.E. Varne about 2:10 A.M. By this time the firing had been heard at Dover and the rear-admiral asked for its reason at 1:28, but it was not till 2:52 that he heard that M26 saw a green light.

One more glimpse was caught of the enemy. About 2:20 the " Termagant," with the Eastern Barrage Patrol, was in about the middle of the Straits on a S.W. course, when the " Amazon " (2 4-in.), the last ship in the line, caught sight of three destroyers stealing past about 400 yd. off. She thought they were on their way to Dunkirk, and though they failed to reply to her challenge reported them as British. The senior officer (Comm. M. R. Bernard) was not satisfied, and asked if they had replied to the challenge, but by the time the question and answer got along the line the enemy were out of sight. By 2:30 evidence of a raid was taking shape. Reports of burning drifters and survivors were coming in, but it was not till 3:18 that the " Termagant's " report of passing three destroyers came in and banished all doubts. The losses inflicted by the enemy were seven drifters and one trawler sunk and three drifters and one minesweeper damaged. Had the alarm gone and been repeated immediately the enemy was seen the losses would have been less and the enemy might have suffered more.

They were not so fortunate, however, a month or so later. On March 21 the destroyers " Botha " (Comm. Roger Rede, 2 4.7-in., 2 4-in.) and " Morris " (Lt.-Comm. P. R. Percival, 3 4-in.) were lying in Dunkirk, with three French destroyers close by, when a burst of firing was heard off shore at 3:30 A.M. The British slipped, and passing through the Zuidcoote Pass, a narrow channel between the Dunkirk and Ostend roads, came upon the German destroyers retiring. The exploit of the " Broke " was repeated. The " Botha " rammed a German at full speed and cut it in half. Another was disabled by the fire of the two boats. A torpedo then hit the " Botha " in a coal-bunker and brought her to a full stop, while the enemy disappeared towards Ostend with the " Morris " in chase. She returned after seeing them enter Ostend Mole, sank the disabled boat burning close by, and took the " Botha" in tow. This was the last of the long series of Dover raids.

The war had become more and more a war of straits and passages, but it was not till 1918 that minelaying was carried into the Cattegat. It had been in the early part of the war a sort of " No Man's Sea," but Germany began gradually to reach out into it, and in 1917 her ships were regularly cruising there. The sweep on Nov. 2 1917 had revived all her old fears, but no minefields had yet been laid there. In Feb. 1918 a deep minefield was laid off the Skaw, and another on April 15 some io m. N.E. of Laeso. This was laid by the " Princess Margaret " and " Angora," supported by vessels of the 6th L.C.S. and 13th Flotilla, and escorted by the " Valentine " and " Vimiera," which sank 10 German trawlers off Anholt. The discovery of the mines seems to have caused serious apprehension in German naval circles, but the operation was not repeated.

At Dover a plan was maturing to supplement the closure of the Straits by the blocking of Zeebrugge and Ostend. This would seal up not only the Flanders submarines but the destroyers there as well, which formed a constant threat to the barrage and its patrols. The enterprise was a daring one, but the plans were carefully made and skilfully performed on the night of April 22-23. The " Vindictive " (Capt. Alfred F. Carpenter) went alongside the Mole to draw the fire from the three blocking ships, and though only two of the latter achieved their object, the whole attack remains a great and inspiring example of careful planning and heroic execution. At Ostend the attempt miscarried, and a second attempt made by the " Vindictive " on May 9 also failed (see Zeebrugge).

As the " Vindictive " was returning from her Zeebrugge venture the German fleet was putting out to sea. This was its last excursion and was directed against the Scandinavian convoys. The fleet left at 6 A.M. on April 23; von Hipper led the way with his battle-cruisers, the ist Scouting Group, the 2nd Scouting Group and 2nd Flotilla. Behind him came the battlefleet, consisting of the 3rd, ist and 4th Squadrons, mustering 17 battleships, with the 4th Scouting Group and 1st, 6th, 7th and 9th Flotillas. In the morning of the 24th von Hipper was off the Norwegian coast when one of the " Moltke's " propellers was flung off its shaft, causing the turbine to race; the auxiliary condenser discharge was penetrated by a large fragment of metal and the engine-room flooded. Von Hipper went on to the north with his squadron, sending the " Moltke," which could still go 13 knots, back to the battle-fleet. By 7 A.M., when she had reached a position 40 m. S.W. of Stavanger, her speed was reduced to 4 knots, and she sent out a signal for help. The battle-fleet sighted her at 9:40, and the " Oldenburg " took her in tow. Von Hipper had turned back on getting the " Moltke's " signal, but hearing of the arrival of the battlefleet he turned north again and ran up as far as lat. 60° N. Nothing had been seen of the British convoy, and the battlefleet turned back with the " Moltke." Covered by the fleet she reached List (some 55 m. from Heligoland) at 6:50 P.M., where she was torpedoed by E42 (Lt. C. H. Allen), but got safely home.

A worse day for the excursion could not have been chosen. The homeward-bound convoy of 34 ships had left Norway on April 22, and at 8 A.M. on the 24th, when von Hipper was off the Norwegian coast, was within 50 m. of the Forth, while the outward-bound convoy of 47 ships was getting ready to leave the river. Not a single ship was anywhere near the Norwegian coast, and the sortie was futile. It had, however, many ramifications, and an important conference on the subject of convoys was held in the Forth on April 29, attended by the C.N.S. (Adml. Sir Rosslyn Wemyss), the D.N.I. (Rear-Adml. Sir W. R. Hall), and the Director of Plans (Capt. C. T. M. Fuller). There it was decided to alter the Scandinavian route to the northward of 61° N. so as to increase the chance of intercepting an attack on it. The incident had another interesting aspect. Up to the moment when the " Moltke " began to ask for help, no indication had been received by wireless directionals of the German fleet being at sea. Submarine J4 had seen it at 7 P.M. on April 23, but the report had not reached the c.-in-c., who was disturbed at finding the whole of the German fleet off the Norwegian coast without his knowledge. The disadvantages of relying too exclusively on wireless directionals was clearly demonstrated, and the utility of the submarines in reconnaissance work confirmed.

This was the last excursion of the German fleet, and ranks in importance with that of Jutland and Aug. 19 1916. In the north a stupendous effort was being made with the help of the U.S. navy to close the northern exit to submarines, and during the remainder of 1918 the Grand Fleet was largely occupied in escorting and covering the minelaying squadrons.

One of the last important operations in the North Sea was the bombing of the Zeppelin sheds at Tondern, near Sylt (Schleswig-Holstein), on July 19 1918. This was made by the aircraft carrier " Furious," supported by five battleships of the First Battle Squadron (" Repulse" class), and escorted by the 6th L.C.S. and a number of destroyers. The " Furious " was an immense cruiser (20,000 tons, 30 knots) of the same type as the " Courageous " and " Glorious," originally designed for Lord Fisher's Baltic campaign, and she had been converted into an aircraft carrier. The attack was made by seven aeroplanes130 H.P. single-seater " Camels " - flown off her deck, each carrying two 50-lb. or 65-lb. bombs. One machine went wrong soon after starting and was picked up. The others reached their objective and set fire to a double Zeppelin shed which was burnt out. Two got safely back; one fell into the sea and the pilot was drowned; three came down in Denmark where the pilots were interned. The attack is interesting as representing the stage of development reached by naval aircraft during the war. On Aug. 11 a coastal motor-boat and aircraft operation was carried out in the Bight on the Frisian coast supported by a strong force. A Zeppelin was brought down by the aircraft, but enemy aircraft overpowered the coastal motor-boats, three of which were sunk and three more lost.

In the Mediterranean the summer of 1918 saw one of the most brilliant exploits of the war by Comm. Luigi Rizzo, which seriously depleted Austria's already scanty tale of battleships.

The course of the war in that sea may be briefly summarized. In its main features the situation was analogous to that in the North Sea. The Straits of Otranto (40 m. wide) corresponded to the Straits of Dover, and had been closed by the arrival of the French fleet on Aug. 16 1914.

The Austrians then had three dreadnoughts (" Viribus Unitis," " Tegetthof," " Prinz Eugen ") to oppose to France's two (" Courbet " and " Jean Bart "). The torpedoing of the " Jean Bart" by the Austrian U12 on Dec. 21 1914 led to the withdrawal of the battleships; and the sinking of the a.c. " Leon Gambetta " on April 26 by Austrian U5 with the loss of 614 men had much the same effect as the loss of the " Hogue," " Aboukir " and " Cressy " in the North Sea. France withdrew her forces from the Adriatic and posted them outside the Straits.

The intervention of Italy on May 24 1915 gave the Allies eight dreadnoughts (" Jean Bart," " Courbet," " Paris," " France," " Cavour," " Giulio Cesare," " Leonardo da Vinci," " Dante Alighieri ") against the Austrian three. The situation was, however, complicated by the contiguity of three Allied forces in the same area. The French c.-in-c., Adml. Boue de Lapeyrere, exercised the supreme command, but the Duc d'Abbruzzi, c.-in-c. of the Italian fleet, directed operations in the Adriatic, where he was reinforced by four British light cruisers, twelve French destroyers and seven French submarines. When Italy declared war on Austria in May 1915 she withdrew her dreadnoughts from the Adriatic and stationed them at Taranto. The advent of the Dardanelles campaign led to the appointment of the British Adml. de Robeck as Vice-Admiral Eastern Mediterranean, and in this area and that of Egypt the French c.-in-c.'s virtual authority was actually exercised by the British admiral. In Syrian waters the responsibility was not so clearly defined. There one of the principal objectives early in the war had been the 10-m. stretch of coast road running through Alexandretta on the main road from Adana to Aleppo. It was shelled by the British cruiser " Doris " (Capt. Frank Larken) in Dec. 1914, but after the commencement of the Dardanelles operations the observation of the Syrian coast was taken over by the French. The dominant feature of Mediterranean strategy lay in the closure of the Straits of Otranto by the overwhelming force of the Allies. The Austrian fleet never dared to try and pass it, while in the Adriatic the control was enforced by the submarine, and in its narrow waters both sides were deprived by its menace of the use of their principal instrument of war.

When Serbia collapsed in 1915 under Mackensen's hammerlike blows, the remnants of the army fell back on Albania, and its transport to Corfu formed the principal naval operation of that year. An army of 110,000 men was carried 90 m. by sea without the loss of a single transport. The attempt to close the Straits of Otranto led to a repetition there of the Dover raids (June 1, July 1, Dec. 223 1916, May 15 1917, April 12-3 1918). On Dec. 9 1917 a bold attack was made by two little Italian torpedo craft (Comm. Rizzo) on Trieste, and the old battleship " Wien " (5,600 tons, 4 9.6-in.) was sunk. This was followed on May 14 1918 by a similar exploit, when Comm. Mario Pellegrini penetrated the roads at Pola with a little vessel, the " Grillo," designed to climb the net defence like a tank, and apparently torpedoed an Austrian warship. Under ViceAdml. Count Thaon de Revel, the Italian c.-in-c., the Otranto barrage was greatly strengthened, and its pressure was being severely felt by the German submarines in 1918. The conditions there were very different from those at Dover. At Dover tides were strong and depths comparatively small, varying from 16 to 30 fathoms; in the Straits of Otranto the tide was inappreciable but the depths were great, varying from 200 to soo fathoms and making mining, except in the form of a net barrage, impracticable. The Austrian battle-fleet, spurred on by Germany, sallied out on June 10 1918 to make a raid on it in force, but were met by Comm. Luigi Rizzo with two small motor-craft off Premuda I., some 50 m. from Pola. Evading a strong escort of destroyers he sent two torpedoes into the dreadnought " Szent Istvan " (" St. Stephen "), reducing the scanty number of Austrian dreadnoughts from four to three, and sending them disconsolately home. In spite of the preponderance of the French and Italian fleets there was a tendency in the Mediterranean, as in the North Sea, to think too exclusively in terms of battle squadrons. The French fleet, now mustering seven dreadnoughts, lay at Corfu, and carried out manoeuvres and target practice which would have been immensely useful if there had been an enemy to fight. Meanwhile the direction of the war against the submarine drifted largely towards Malta, where it was exercised by the British c.-in-c. (Vice-Adml. Hon. Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe). Early in the war the Mediterranean had been mapped out in geographical sectors for anti-submarine work, in much the same way as the coastal areas allotted to auxiliary patrol flotillas at home. Useful for purposes of administration and supply, the system was a vicious one strategically, for it impeded unity of command and made it difficult to establish uniformity in work affecting the whole area, such as convoy. To ensure better coordination it had been decided at Paris on Nov. 29 1917 to create an Allied Naval Council. This consisted of the naval representatives of the Allies - Sir Eric Geddes, Adml. Wemyss (British), Vice-Adml. de Bon (France), Vice-Adml. di Revel (Italy), Rear-Adml. Funakoshi (Japan), Vice-Adml. W. S. Sims (United States) - and its influence was particularly beneficial in the Mediterranean. When a possibility arose of the Russian dreadnoughts in the Black Sea being used by Germans, the situation was met by the dispatch of the " Superb " and " Temeraire " from England and of four French pre-dreadnoughts to Lemnos (Aegean).

An attack was made on Durazzo, the Austrian naval base, 50 m. from the Straits, on Oct. 2 by a considerable Allied naval force, including a number of American submarine chasers, and an enemy destroyer was sunk in the harbour. On the night of Oct. 31 - Nov. 1 1918, when the Austrian navy was already in the hands of the Yugosla y s, an Italian boat entered Pola and sank the dreadnought " Viribus Unitis." On the Syrian coast, a naval force of French and British ships had cooperated in the bombardment of Gaza on Oct. 30 1917, and had maintained the army's communications by sea from Egypt to Haifa, Beirut and Tripoli, with the loss by submarine attack of the monitor M15 and the destroyer " Staunch " on Nov. 11 1917.

 In three great river expeditions, too, the navy played an important part; one up the Dvina in the icy waters of the White Sea, another up the Tigris in the torrid marshes of Mesopotamia, and the third in the swampy creeks of the Duala in Cameroon. In the first Mesopotamia campaign, which ended with the investment of Gen. Townshend in Kut on Dec. 2 1915, the naval force consisted at first of the sloops " Espiegle " (Comm. Wilfred Nunn, 6 4-in., 2 3-pdr.) and "Odin" (4 4 -in., 2 3-pdr.), the Indian Marine paddle-ship "Lawrence" (4 4-in., 4 6-pdr.), and three small armed vessels, the " Miner," "Lewis Pelly " (a small yacht, 2 3-pdr.), and "Shaitan" (1 12-pdr. 8 cwt.) under Capt.

The war was now drawing to a close. In July 1918 Adml. Scheer was summoned to Great Headquarters and on Aug. 11 took Adml. von Holtzendorff's place as chief-ofstaff, von Hipper replacing him as commander-in-chief. In Sept. the hammer blows of Marshal Foch in France were beginning to tell, and on Sept. 18 Scheer was told to be ready to evacuate the Flanders coast. On Sept. 29 the Bulgarian front collapsed, and on Oct. 5 Germany was suing for peace. Soon immense explosions heralded the evacuation of the Belgian coast. On Oct. 17 their troops evacuated Ostend. Two days later they were in full retreat from Zeebrugge. Eleven destroyers and nine torpedo-boats succeeded in retiring safely to the Bight. The submarines left there were blown up. Scheer was anxious to continue the warfare against shipping to the bitter end, but on Oct. 21 the submarines received orders to cease the campaign and return home. He then set to work to prepare a great final sortie of the High Sea Fleet. The submarines were ordered on Oct. 22 to assemble off the Scottish coast. It was hoped to make a last great raid on the Channel while the submarines attacked the fleet on its way down. A large minefield had been laid outside the Forth to meet such a contingency, and Adml. Scheer included it unwittingly in his plan, not knowing that it had been swept up. But the plan was never to be fulfilled. Scheer saw the weapon he trusted break in his hands. On Oct. 29, when the signal was made to prepare for sea, a great clamour arose, and a mutiny broke out which reached such dimensions that Adml. von Hipper was compelled to abandon his project. The torpedo flotillas and submarines remained true, and the commodore of submarines was joined by 16 boats off Heligoland and on Nov. 8 took refuge in List. But the end was at hand. Revolution flamed up everywhere. The troops sent to quell the disturbance proved untrustworthy. The navy passed into other hands. The war was over.

Under the terms of the Armistice, ro German battleships, 6 battle-cruisers, 8 light cruisers, 50 destroyers and all submarines were to be surrendered. On Friday, Nov. 15, Adml. Hugo von Meurer arrived in the " Konigsberg " in the Forth to make the final arrangements with Adml. Beatty. On Wednesday, Nov. 20, the submarines began their sorrowful journey to Harwich, to be met by Rear-Adml. Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt 35 m. from the Essex coast. Their old enemies passed in to Harwich in dead silence. Not a sound was heard from the crowds watching them on shore or sea. On Nov. 21 the battleships of the proud German navy passed into Beatty's hands. It was a misty day, and the Grand Fleet stood waiting off the Forth in two long lines 6 m. apart. The light cruiser " Cardiff," flying Rear-Adml. Alexander Sinclair's flag, led the remains of Germany's navy up the lines.

The naval conditions of the Peace terms, signed in June 1919, comprised 17 articles and provided that the German navy was not to exceed 6 battleships of a pre-dreadnought type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo-boats, and was not to include submarines. Within two months of signature the 8 dreadnoughts still in German possession (" Oldenburg," " Thuringen," " Ostfriesland," " Heligoland," " Posen," " Westfalen," " Rheinland," " Nassau "), 8 light cruisers, 42 modern destroyers and 50 modern torpedo-boats, were to be surrendered, disarmed but with all guns on board. At the expiration of one month all German submarines building were to be handed over; such as could proceed or be towed were to be taken to Allied ports indicated; the remainder were to be broken up. No warships were to be constructed or acquired other than those intended to replace the previously specified strength, and units were only to be replaced in the case of battleships at the end of 20 years, in the case of destroyers at the end of 15. The personnel, including reserves of the fleet and coast defences, was not to exceed 15,000 officers and men.

The disposal of the German ships gave rise to lively argument. Great Britain was in favour of destroying them. France wished to add her share to her fleet. The question was complicated by the scuttling of the ships at Scapa on June 21. There were interned there 11 battleships (" Baden," " Bayern," " Friedrich der Grosse," " Grosser Kurfurst," " Kaiser," " Kaiserin," " Kronprinz Wilhelm," " Markgraf," " Prinzregent Luitpold "), 5 battle-cruisers (" Hindenburg," " Derfflinger," " Seydlitz," " Moltke," and " Von der Tann "), 6 light cruisers (" Emden," " Frankfurt," " Nurnberg," " Coln," " Dresden," " Karlsruhe," " Brummer" and " Bremse "), when at 11:15 A.M., on a signal from the " Emden," the ships were scuttled and began to sink. Only four were salved, the Baden," " Emden," " Frankfurt " and " Nurnberg." Germany did not gain much by this act. She had to hand over in default of the battleships 400,000 tons (reduced later to 300,000) of floating docks, her remaining light cruisers (" Graudenz," " Konigsberg," " Pillau," " Regensburg," " Strassburg "), to replace the light cruisers, and 42,000 tons of floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, instead of the destroyers; these were more useful than what was sunk.

The terms of peace were no mere formality. The destruction of the submarines and vessels building was entrusted to a naval section of the Inter-Allied Commission, under Vice-Adml. Sir Montague Browning (subsequently under Vice-Adml. Sir Edward Charlton), and was strictly executed. The fortifications of Heligoland were razed to the ground. The destruction of Germany's sea-power was complete. It had been achieved by economic pressure and the imminence of a great military defeat, engineered by the maritime power excited by a superior fleet. Strangled by sea-power, and with a vast military spearhead launched at her heart, Germany collapsed. The year 1920, which had been intended to see the fulfilment of her Navy Law of 1900 embodied in a fleet of 61 capital ships, 40 cruisers and 144 destroyers, saw the fabric of her naval aspirations shattered, her proud fleet sunk beneath the waves in a bleak harbour of the north, her Emperor, who had inspired its creation, a fugitive in a foreign land, and foreign admirals sitting in her capital superintending the destruction of its shattered remnants.

The fleets of the Allied and Associated Powers covered every sea, and their immense superiority is shown in the following figures: - The Grand Fleet was now almost twice as numerous as when it had steamed N. on its fateful way in Aug. 1914. Its two destroyer flotillas had increased to eight, its single light-cruiser squadron had become six. It mustered, with Rear-Adml. Rodman's squadron, 38 battleships, making with Rear-Adml, T. S. Rogers' B.S. squadron at Berehaven (" Nevada," " Okla homa," " Utah ") a total of 41 in British waters. It had 9 battle-cruisers and 39 cruisers and light cruisers, and attached to it were no less than 7 destroyer flotillas, mustering 167 destroyers (11th, Capt. Roger Rede; 12th, Capt. H. M. LevesonGower; 13th, Capt. Arthur B. S. Dutton; 14th, Capt. H. R. Godfrey; 15th, Capt. R. Rowley-Conwy; 3rd, Capt. Ed. Rutherford; loth, Capt. Berwick Curtis, and 21st), and 5 submarine flotillas (loth, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th) with 48 submarines.

The British losses had not been small. They amounted to 254 vessels, of which the greatest number had fallen to enemy submarines.

sea was kept open for the troops and trade of the Allies, and the shores of Great Britain and France were kept safe from invasion. Germany's path to the ocean was barred. It may be said that the path of German submarines was not barred, but German submarines merely attempted to do laboriously and slowly what a couple of German battle-cruisers appearing unopposed in the Channel could have done at once. And though the submarine was powerful against merchant shipping, it accomplished much less against the fleet. Not a single dreadnought was sunk by it during the war, and except in the narrow waters of the Adriatic no battle-fleet was ever kept in harbour by fear British Warship Losses.

A, Action; B, Submarine; C, Mine; D, Destruction to avoid capture; E, Block-ship; F, Internal explosion; G, Collision; H, Wreck; J, Accident; K, Unknown.

Of auxiliary craft 815 had been sunk, including 246 trawlers, 244 colliers, 130 drifters, 44 oilers, 24 motor-launches and 18 minesweepers. Of the total 289 (35.4%) had been sunk by submarine, 225 (27.7%) by mine, and 77 (9.4%) had been wrecked. The losses of the other Allied navies were not so heavy in comparison.

Comparative Naval Losses. 1 Approximate.

Though the figures give a very meagre picture of the colossal ramifications of the war, they leave ample room for comment. The submarine inflicted and suffered most of the damage done in the war. It was the most active and most dangerous service. In the North Sea Great Britain and the United States maintained a force of 46 capital ships (battleships and battle-cruisers) against the German 23, in numbers a twofold, in gun-power a threefold superiority. In the Mediterranean, France and Italy could muster 12 dreadnoughts against Austria's scanty three. What was the use of this immense superiority in battleships if it could not bring the German navy to action? The answer is that it represented the outlook of 1913, not of 1918. The French, Italian and U.S. dreadnoughts had been laid down before the war, and could not be converted into destroyers at a moment's notice.

The work wrought by sea-power, envisaged as a whole, was evident enough. German trade was swept off the sea. The of submarines. The submarine, like the mine, must be regarded as an adjunct of the capital ship and not a substitute for it. It was countered by anti-submarine flotillas and convoys working under the aegis of the battle-fleet, which except in the case of the raids on Dover preserved them immune from attack. Again, the unrestricted use of the submarine involved the defiance of neutrals, an attitude which after the experience of this war few Powers will care to adopt. Each class of ship has its virtues, and naval strength cannot be expressed in terms of any single type. The various types are complementary to one another. The capital ship represents the highest synthesis of guns, protection and speed which the level of technical knowledge can supply. The submarine can attack the battle-cruiser, but the destroyer and aircraft can drive off the submarine, and the former can be driven off by the light cruiser, which in its turn can not approach the battle-cruiser.

The fact that there was no great decisive battle has made some doubt the further use of the battleship. It is true that the opportunity lost at Jutland was never wholly redeemed. The battle in war represents the economy of the decisive blow. Vast resources of personnel and material had to be kept locked up in the Grand Fleet, which a decisive battle would have released for the war against the submarine. The German fleet remained, too, something much more than a " fleet in being," for by guarding its minesweepers from attack it kept the Bight open for its submarines and took an active part in their campaign. The Grand Fleet still barred its way to the west but in conjunction with the minefield the German ships held the door of the Baltic and exercised an active command there. But though the capital ship still retains its place in naval war its particular design and its relative status leave large room for discussion. One may well ask why millions should be spent in giving it bulges to render it unsinkable. The " Moltke " was hit twice by torpedoes and did not sink. Again, do we not strain too much after the heaviest possible gun? The " Von der Tann " had 1r-in. guns and the " Queen Mary " 13.5-in., but the former blew up the latter. These questions, however, belong rather to gunnery and tactics than to naval strategy.

The war left the world still on the horizon of other poten tialities. Submarines and aircraft never actually cooperated in a fleet action, though the value of the former in reconnaissance work was clearly demonstrated in the later stases of the war. In deep and narrow stretches of waters, however, it became almost supreme. Thus in the Adriatic the Austrian battleships dared not venture out and the Allied battleships dared not venture in.. The power of the mine was one of the lessons of the war, and the combination of a minefield supported by the heavy guns of a fleet or by forts remained insurmountable to a fleet alone; the mines prevented ships approaching the fort or fleet, and the forts and fleet prevented minesweepers approaching the mines. This problem can only be solved by capturing the forts as the Germans did at Osel in 1917, but even there three battleships were severely injured by mines. The mine must not be regarded as a purely defensive weapon. It can be and was very offensive, and at the Sound and Dardanelles was too strong for the stronger fleet.

Certain outstanding lessons remain from the war. Invasion becomes more hazardous than ever in the face of numerous and powerful aircraft, while aircraft carriers with opposing aircraft are necessarily enormous vessels and very vulnerable to attack. The truism that ships cannot engage forts was proved to be true. The power of the minefield was clearly demonstrated. Certain fallacies in evidence before the war received a severe shock. One of these used to be embodied in the expression that the sea is all one, but the war showed that the North Sea was one and the Baltic another. Maritime geography remains a dominating factor in naval war.

When the war broke out, grave doubts arose as to the advisability of sending a British army to France in the face of an undefeated German fleet. Maritime geography and the Dover Straits permitted this to be done in safety. The war was dominated by the fact that Germany's path to the ocean was barred by the solid bulk of Great Britain, and that both navies were working close to their main magazines of repair and supply. The full strength of all the combined weapons, air, sea and submarines, can only be exerted within a reasonable distance of one's own bases, and the navy fights with greatest advantage that fights in the vicinity of its great bases and industrial centres. Very different would be the conditions of a war 5,000 m. away. The development of aircraft, and the necessity of a host of auxiliary craft, tend to produce what may be called areas of maximum control for each power. Within its own area a navy tends to be supreme. The farther away it goes the heavier becomes its task. A war at a great distance would be waged under a heavy handicap, and would tend towards the conditions existent between Venice and England in the 15th century. They were too far apart to go to war.

It is barely possible for a single mind to envisage all the aspects of so colossal a war, or to gauge precisely the relative parts played in the victory by economic, naval and military pressure. But this at least may be said. If the British navy in 1914-8 had an even greater task to face than anyone dreamt of when King George had described it as the " Sure Shield " of its country at the outbreak of war, it could feel that this confidence had not been misplaced when the memorable day came for Beatty to receive the surrender of the German fleet under the Cross of St. George and the Stars and Stripes. (A. C. D.) Navies: see Ship And Shipbuilding.