Serbian Orthodox Diocese V. Milivojevich

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich^[1] is a United States Supreme Court case from 1976, which confirmed a legal premise known as the ecclesiastical doctrine, whereby if a court case involving one or more religious bodies depends on the ruling of an ecclesiastical body (e.g. a church or a denomination), the court must accept that ruling as prima facie valid and cannot substitute its own judgment in the matter.

Structure of the Church[edit]

The Serbian Orthodox Church is one of fourteen autocephalous Orthodox denominations within Eastern Orthodoxy. Like all Orthodox denominations it is hierarchal in structure, which means that the decisions of its highest bodies are binding on Orthodox believers, parishes and dioceses. The basis of its theology is the Bible, Holy Tradition, and canon law.

The Church is governed by the Holy Assembly, which consists of all bishops (each one overseeing a diocese) in the Church. The Assembly selects from its membership one bishop to serve as Patriarch, and four other bishops to serve (along with the Patriarch) as the Holy Synod, which handles executive matters for the Church. The Synod adjudicates any disagreements which may arise between itself and bishops, or between bishops and the Patriarch, along with claimed canonical offenses of the Patriarch; any decision of the Synod can be appealed to the Assembly, who's decision is final.

Serbian Orthodoxy in America[edit]

In the early 1900's existing Serbian Orthodox churches in North America desired to organize into a separate diocese. Through the efforts of Father Mardary, a Serbian priest, the Church created the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada in 1921.

Due to geographic limitations between North America and Europe, the Diocese would become the only one to have its own separate constitution, allowing it a measure of autonomy not granted to the other dioceses. Mardary proposed it in 1927; the Assembly approved it with only two revisions: it reserved for itself the right to appoint the Diocese's bishop and to approve any further amendments to the constitution. The diocese's constitution explicitly states that it is an organic part of the Serbian Orthodox Church and that all "statutes and rules which regulate the ecclesiastical-canonical authority and position of the Serbian Orthodox Church" are binding on the Diocese. Mardary would also create several non-profit corporations under laws governing such corporations within hierarchal religious denominations, which held title to real estate in Illinois (where the Diocese was headquartered) and other states.

Background of the Case[edit]

In 1939 the Church appointed Dionisije Milivojevich^[2] as Bishop of the Diocese. The Bishop was a controversial figure: during his tenure numerous complaints were filed challenging his fitness to serve as Bishop and his administration of the Diocese, yet at the same time the Diocese grew substantially to the point where the Bishop requested that the Diocese be elevated to the status of Metropolia, expanded to include South America, and for vicar bishops (specifically recommending Archimandrites Firmilian, Gregory, and Stefan to the positions; the former two would later enter the case as petitioners against the Bishop) to be placed under his supervision.

In response, in June 1962 the Synod sent a delegation to America to both study the proposal and to confer with the Bishop regarding the numerous complaints filed against him. The delegation returned with two recommendations: that vicar bishops be appointed and a commission be appointed to conduct a more thorough investigation of the Bishop. Both recommendations were rejected by the Assembly: instead in May 1963 the Assembly directed the Synod to institute disciplinary hearings against the Bishop (which resulted in his immediate suspension, with Firmilian as acting Bishop), and reorganized the Diocese into three separate dioceses (roughly along already existing episcopal districts) with Firmilian, Gregory, and Stefan as temporary administrators (the Bishop was assigned to one of the dioceses pending resolution of his hearing).

Almost immediately the Bishop became schismatic (as expected, accusing the Synod and Assembly of the same; in addition he claimed they were pro-Communist, as Yugoslavia -- where Serbia was located -- was under Communist rule), which started a parallel series of actions between them: the Synod and Assembly pursued ecclesiastical charges against the Bishop (ultimately removing him as Bishop, and later defrocking him), while the Bishop had the Diocese declare itself independent of the Church and filed a civil suit in Illinois Circuit Court seeking an injunction and having himself declared the rightful Bishop.

State Court Cases[edit]

Initially the Circuit Court granted summary judgment against the Bishop; however, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.

The Circuit Court did so and made four determinations:

• There was no "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" on the part of the Church to defrock the Bishop,
• The property held by the Diocese's corporations is held in trust for all members of the Diocese,
• The division of the Diocese into three new ones was "improper and beyond the power of the Mother Church to take", and
• Firmilian was validly appointed as temporary administrator in place of the defrocked Bishop.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, stating that the decision to defrock the Bishop was against the Court's interpretation of Church canon law. It denied rehearing but amended its original opinion to state the Bishop's suspension was valid, but as he was not lawfully tried within one year, his suspension was no longer valid and, as such, he was declared the rightful Bishop.

Opinion of the United States Supreme Court[edit]

The Court overturned the ruling in a 7-2 vote. The opinion was written by Justice Brennan, with Chief Justice White and Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joining.

The court determined that the "First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them." It further determined that because the Bishop controlled the church property, the only way to determine who was the Bishop was to resolve the religious dispute, a matter which it determined was outside its jurisdiction.

Concurring Opinion[edit]

Chief Justice White authored a concurring opinion, stating that although church authorities may render their opinion on ecclesiastical matters, it does not forbid civil courts from forming their own independent judgment on the matters.

Dissenting Opinion[edit]

Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, authored the dissenting opinion.

The dissent argued that the majority opinion, although long on the ecclesiastical history of the Church, was somewhat short on the procedural history of the case. It further stated that the court was being asked to determine, from two competing parties, who the real Bishop of the Diocese was, in order to determine the real claimant to real estate. (The dissent referenced a prior case, Watson v. Jones, which involved two groups each claiming to be the true congregation of a Presbyterian church in Louisville, Kentucky, and argued that the court had to decide which group was actually the one.) Moreover, it argued that if "a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them", it has to first determine what that decision actually is, and in the case of a conflict will necessarily choose one over the other. Otherwise such claims would "be resolved by brute force".

The dissent further posed a hypothetical question: if the Holy Assembly had 100 members, and required a quorum of 40 to make a decision, and defrocked a Bishop at a hearing where only 30 were present and a 16-14 vote defrocked him, if a party provided what it purported to be "a decree of a church court", was the civil court then required to accept it at face value even if the opposing party argued that it wasn't in accordance with its own rules? The dissent argued that, in such cases, "neutral principles of law" could decide if such a decree was, in fact, valid or not, without having to delve into religious matters.

References[edit]