Eleutherios Venizelos

"Eleutherios Venizelos (1864-), Greek statesman, was born at Mournies, in the island of Crete, on Aug. 2 3 1864, of a family that emigrated from Mistra (near Sparta) to Crete in 1770. His father, a merchant of Canea, took an active part in the Cretan patriotic movement and was therefore exiled by the Turks in 1866, but returned to the island in 1872. Young Eleutherios was educated in the schools of Syra and Athens, and then studied law at the university of Athens, taking his degree in 1887. Returning to Canea, he took up the practice of law, but, like most Cretan lawyers of that day, he soon was drawn into political life. In the insurrection of 1889 he was compelled to fly from the island and take refuge in Greece; after tranquillity was restored, he returned and was elected a member for Canea to the Cretan Assembly. It was not till 1897 that Venizelos came into prominence as one of the leaders of the Cretan uprising of that year, which culminated in the removal of Turkish rule from Crete (1898). Venizelos was in command of the insurgents' camp on Akrotiri, which was shelled by the united European squadrons on Feb. 21 1897. A few days later, he received at this camp the British, French and Italian admirals, who came under a flag of truce to negotiate a settlement between the insurgents and the Turks. These two incidents form the first occasion when Venizelos came into official contact with the Great Powers.

In 1898 Prince George of Greece landed in Crete as High Commissioner of the Great Powers, and a few months later, upon Sphakianakis' retirement, Venizelos became the head of the Cretan executive. He soon found himself at variance with the Prince, who inaugurated in Crete very much the same autocratic policy that his elder brother, King Constantine, subsequently adopted in Greece in '9 ' 5-7. Finally, a complete rupture took place in 1904 between the Prince and Venizelos; the Venizelist party were defeated at the polls by the personal canvassing of the Prince and the united efforts of the other Cretan party leaders, already jealous of Venizelos' rising star. Venizelos then organized a revolt at Therisso, which was partially successful but which died out after a few months, yet not until it had made the Prince's position in the island untenable. In 1905 the Prince departed, resigning his office as High Commissioner, in which he was succeeded by M. Alex. Zaimis. From 1905 to 1909 Venizelos' activities alternated between those of chief of the Cretan executive and those of leader of the Opposition. More than once during this period the Cretans came into sharp conflict with the four Great Powers; but Venizelos' wisdom and moderation prevented any rupture and maintained friendly relations with the Powers.

In 1909 the Military League at Athens, which headed a bloodless revolution against the existing political corruption and Court favouritism in Greece, found itself in need of a sound political adviser. As such, Venizelos went over to Athens at the invitation of the League three times within four months. He persuaded both the League and King George of the necessity of convening a National Assembly for the revision of the Constitution, as the only safe and satisfactory way out of the dangerous situation. The elections for this Assembly were held in the summer of 1910, and Venizelos himself (who had never ceased to retain his Greek citizenship, while in Cretan political life) headed the poll at Athens. His arrival at the Greek capital in Sept. was greeted with tremendous popular enthusiasm. Such was his unlimited mastery over Greek public opinion at that time, that at a nod from him the Royal family would have been expelled ignominiously. But Venizelos had come to Greece to establish reform and pacific progress; and little as he respected any member of the Royal family, he was fully conscious of the set-back that Greece's internal tranquillity and foreign relations would receive by a fresh change of dynasty or by the doubtful experiment of a republic. His first great work in Greece was the revision of the Greek Constitution, which was successfully accomplished in 1911. Simultaneously, he was busily reorganizing the public services, especially the army and navy, the former through a French, the latter through a British, mission. Within the short space of a year and a half he prepared the ground for the Balkan League, which had hitherto been universally looked upon as a Utopian project. By May 1912, the League was practically an accomplished fact, but a fact so successfully dissimulated that the outside world knew nothing of the League's existence. Only Russia, as the traditional protectress of the Southern Sla y s, was in the secret. Other Greek statesmen, and notably Tricoupis, had worked for a Balkan League but failed, partly, no doubt, owing to adverse circumstances, but partly also because of Greek unpreparedness for war and of the inflexibility of the Greek claims. Venizelos was, it is true, favoured by circumstances - the Balkan races just then had been drawn together in self-defence against the newly fledged tyranny of the Young Turks in Macedonia and Thrace, while the military revolt of 1909 had swept the Greek political stage clear of nearly all the corrupt parties, that hitherto had blocked the wheels of the nation's progress. But even so, the Balkan League would never have sprung into being but for Venizelos' higher vision, and his supreme courage in consenting to an alliance with Bulgaria, without a preliminary agreement as to the division of the Turkish spoils in case of victory.

When the World War broke out, Venizelos hastened, in the dark days which preceded the first battle of the Marne, to offer Greece's aid and adhesion to the Entente. This courageous offer, made at a time when the situation in France was so menacing, was never forgotten by the Allies, though declined for the moment on purely military grounds. A few months later (Jan. 1915) the Allies themselves asked for the cooperation of Greece in their plans for the Dardanelles expedition, and promised Greece, in exchange, extensive territory in Asia Minor. But Venizelos' decision to accept this offer was incontinently vetoed by King Constantine; and Venizelos was forced to resign, though supported by a strong parliamentary majority and an all but unanimous public opinion. In the general election which followed (June 13 1915), despite the desperate efforts of the King and his party, the Venizelist party were returned with a large majority. But, contrary to all constitutional requirements, three full months were allowed to pass before Venizelos was summoned to resume office, the King's illness being made an excuse. When finally Venizelos formed his new Cabinet, the Dardanelles expedition had already failed, and another crisis was at hand. In the preceding spring Serbia had driven back the Austrian armies out of her territory; but now a fresh Austrian invasion was imminent, and Bulgaria was plainly bent on revenging herself for her disasters of 1913 by preparing to attack Serbia in the flank. According to the terms of the Greco-Serbian Treaty of 1913, Greece would, in that case, be bound to come to Serbia's aid. Bulgaria mobilized her army in Sept. 1915, and on the following day Venizelos obtained the King's signature to the decree mobilizing the Greek army. Two days later, Venizelos made an important statement in the Greek Chamber, declaring that, if Bulgaria attacked Serbia, she would have to face the Greek army as well. This declaration was received by the Chamber with loud cheers. King Constantine thereupon sent for Venizelos, and, after telling him that he would never consent to Greece drawing the sword against the allies of Germany, asked for his resignation. To the Premier's remonstrance that, after the recent verdict of the general election in favour of his policy, the Crown was not entitled to refuse its sanction, Constantine replied that in matters of foreign policy he did not consider himself bound to follow the national will, feeling himself " personally responsible to God alone." In the face of this attitude, Venizelos thought it best to resign once more (Oct. 1915); and after a Zaimis Cabinet had vainly endeavoured to obtain the support of the Venizelist majority in the Chamber, the latter was dissolved (for the second time within six months) and a new election ordered for Dec. 191915. This time Venizelos, as a protest against the King's unconstitutional proceedings, called upon his party to abstain from the polls; and as a result, only 230,000 votes were cast, as against 720,000 in the previous election. In consequence of this abstention of the Venizelist electors, no Venizelist was elected, and the new Chamber consisted almost exclusively of the old politicians, whom the military revolt of 1909 had swept out of politics.

Venizelos spent that winter and spring (1915-6) in endeavouring, through the press (he founded a newspaper called the Keryx), and by public mass meetings, to force the King to see the folly of his course. But after the surrender of Eastern Macedonia to the Bulgarians (Aug. 1916) he gave up all hope of converting Constantine to his views. On Sept. 25 1916 he took ship with his leading partizans for Crete, whence he sent out his proclamation to the Greek people, calling upon all true patriots to disavow Constantine and his fatal policy and to flock to the standard of the Entente. Proceeding on to Salonika, he established there a " Provisional Government of National Defence," which was in Dec. 1916 duly recognized by England, France and Russia, though not by Italy. His call for volunteers was responded to with enthusiasm by all parts of Greece not held by Constantine's troops, and 60,000 men were soon gathered at Salonika.

When at last England and France proceeded to dethrone King Constantine, Venizelos returned to Athens a few days after his removal (June 27 1917) and took over the government of the whole of Greece. His first measure was to convoke the Chamber elected in June 1915, whose dissolution by Constantine in Nov. of the same year was considered as a violation of the spirit, if not of the strict letter, of the Constitution. Venizelos then ordered a general mobilization of the Greek army and formally declared war against Germany and her allies. His path was beset by many serious difficulties. The German propaganda had done its work so thoroughly that a large section of the community were now entirely out of sympathy with Venizelos' war policy. Nearly one-half of the officers of the army and navy were against him and the Entente. These were given their choice between adhesion to the new regime and dismissal from the service. The large majority chose the latter; and thus 1,800 officers were retired on small pensions, and became a dangerous leaven for all subversive activities against the Government. Three distinct mutinies broke out while the newly mobilized reserves were being moved to the front. A large proportion of the public officials and judiciary were also disaffected; their removal from their posts was a matter of elementary prudence for a Government engaged in a war of such magnitude.

After the Armistice of Nov. 11 1918, and the assembling of the Peace Conference at Paris, Venizelos took up the diplomatic struggle for the rights of Greece. Between Nov. 1918 and Aug. 1920 he and his colleagues of the Greek delegation were almost continuously absent in Paris or London. He returned a few times for a brief sojourn to attend the meetings of the Greek Chamber; but there could be no rest for him until the Treaties of Neuilly and of Sevres were finally signed. Never before had a Greek statesman achieved such magnificent results for his country. Never before had a representative of a small nation won such admiration or played such a brilliant part in a great international gathering. Yet no sooner was his triumph complete, than an attempt was made upon his life by a couple of young Greek naval officers (Tserepes and Kyriakos); and three months later, the Greek elections gave a crushing majority to his political opponents. Greek history is indeed full of such acts of popular ingratitude to public men, from Aristides the Just down to Charilaos Tricoupis.

Many explanations have been given of Venizelos' amazing overthrow in the hour of his greatest triumph. He himself attributed it to the war-weariness of the Greek people, that had been under arms with almost no intermission since 1912. His political enemies ascribed it to the determination of the Greek people to " regain their liberties " and to punish his " tyranny." It is, no doubt, the fact that a large section of the Greek people had been led to regard the situation in this light. The wildest stories were circulated in the press about the oppressive character of the Venizelist regime of 1917-20. Venizelos was accused of having cast 80,000 people into prison, shot several thousands of his political enemies, and dismissed 20,000 public servants. As a matter of fact, the aggregate number of persons imprisoned or interned or placed under police surveillance never exceeded 1,600. The only executions were those of military ringleaders of mutinies or military spies, after due public trial and conviction by courts-martial; the total number of these executions was 63. There were also some 9,000 dismissals of public servants for political reasons; but nearly all of these men were subsequently reinstated by the Venizelist Government itself, after they had sworn allegiance to the new order of things. When Venizelos' successors came into office in Nov. 1920 there were not more than 300 or 400 of these dismissed public officials still out of service by their own choice. There were, nevertheless, numerous acts of petty tyranny and injustice, that could be laid at the door of the Venizelist administration, during Venizelos' prolonged absence at the Peace Conference. Some of his lieutenants abused their power or failed to prevent such abuse by others. Many notorious bad characters had managed to creep into posts of influence and used their position to wreak personal vengeance or to enrich themselves at the expense of the public or the public treasury. But it may be doubted if, even so, the elections would have gone against Venizelos, had it not been for two other factors. One was the sudden death of the young King Alexander a bare fortnight before the election. This reopened the question of the succession to the throne; and although Venizelos, as a desperate makeshift, proposed Prince Paul, Constantine's youngest son, as King, the utter insignificance of this boy candidate only threw Constantine's own claim to restoration into stronger relief and gave a fresh impetus to the efforts of his party. Had Alexander lived until after the election, Constantine would hardly have succeeded in making his return good. The other factor in Venizelos' defeat was the blind over-confidence of his partizans; many Venizelists in Athens and the larger cities neglected to vote.

The total vote polled by the Venizelist party throughout Greece was actually 436,781 as against 525,642 cast for all the other parties. Venizelos himself received a huge majority in Athens and Piraeus, but was defeated by the vote of the rural population of Attica. It is evident therefore that the large majority of anti-Venizelist deputies returned to the Chamber (256 out of 369) did not in any way correspond to a real anti-Venizelist majority in the electorate at large. After the election, and Constantine's return to Athens as King, a noticeable revulsion of feeling set in, especially in provinces where the anti-Venizelist vote had been strong. But up to Sept. 1921, when the great Greek statesman was occupied in cementing his domestic happiness by a second marriage in England, and the Greek army in Asia Minor was engaged in costly military operations against Turkey by way of making up for the loss of his powerful diplomacy, Venizelos himself had taken no further steps towards a restoration of his active influence in the national politics. He had been left a widower in 1895, with two sons, Kyriakos (b. 1893) and Sophocles (b. 1895); and his second wife, to whom he became engaged in Paris in the summer of 1921, the wedding being celebrated on Sept. 15 in London, was Miss Helena Schilizzi, heiress of a Greek Chiot family established in England.

See C. Kerofilas, Eleutherios Venizelos (1915); S. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos (1921).