History Of Afghanistan

Friday-Mosque.

The History of Afghanistan is a 2500-year tradition of strongly distrusting—and fighting—armed outsiders.

Afghanistan, often called the crossroads of Central Asia, has had a turbulent history. In 328 BC, Alexander the Great entered the territory of present-day Afghanistan, then part of the Persian Empire, to capture Bactria (present-day Balkh). Invasions by the Scythians, White Huns, and Turks followed in succeeding centuries. In AD 642, Arabs invaded the entire region and introduced Islam.

Arab rule gave way to the Persians, who controlled the area until conquered by the Turkic Ghaznavids in 998. Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030) consolidated the conquests of his predecessors and turned Ghazni into a great cultural center as well as a base for frequent forays into India. Following Mahmud's short-lived dynasty, various princes attempted to rule sections of the country until the destructive Mongol invasion of 1219 led by Genghis Khan.

Following Genghis Khan's death in 1227, a succession of petty chiefs and princes struggled for supremacy until late in the 14th century, when one of his descendants, Tamerlane, incorporated Afghanistan into his own vast Asian empire. Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and the founder of India's Moghul dynasty at the beginning of the 16th century, made Kabul the capital of an Afghan principality.

In 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of what is known today as Afghanistan, established his rule. A Pashtun, Durrani was elected king by a tribal council after the assassination of the Persian ruler Nadir Shah at Khabushan in the same year. Throughout his reign, Durrani consolidated chieftainships, petty principalities, and fragmented provinces into one country. His rule extended from Mashad in the west to Kashmir and Delhi in the east, and from the Amu Darya (Oxus) River in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south.

European Influence[edit]

During the 19th century, collision between the expanding British Empire in the subcontinent and czarist Russia significantly influenced Afghanistan in what was termed "The Great Game." British concern over Russian advances in Central Asia and growing influence in Persia culminated in two Anglo-Afghan wars. The first (1839–42) resulted not only in the destruction of a British army, but is remembered today as an example of the ferocity of Afghan resistance to foreign rule. The second Anglo-Afghan war (1878–80) was sparked by Amir Sher Ali's refusal to accept a British mission in Kabul. This conflict brought Amir Abdur Rahman to the Afghan throne. During his reign (1880-1901), the British and Russians officially established the boundaries of what would become modern Afghanistan through the demarcation of the Durand Line. The British retained effective control over Kabul's foreign affairs.

Afghanistan remained neutral during World War I, despite German encouragement of anti-British feelings and Afghan rebellion along the borders of British India. The Afghan king's policy of neutrality was not universally popular within the country, however.

Habibullah, Abdur Rahman's son and successor, was assassinated in 1919, possibly by family members opposed to British influence. His third son, Amanullah, regained control of Afghanistan's foreign policy after launching the third Anglo-Afghan war with an attack on India in the same year. During the ensuing conflict, the war-weary British relinquished their control over Afghan foreign affairs by signing the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919. In commemoration of this event, Afghans celebrate August 19 as their Independence Day.

Reform and Reaction[edit]

King Amanullah (1919–29) moved to end his country's traditional isolation in the years following the third Anglo-Afghan war. He established diplomatic relations with most major countries and, following a 1927 tour of Europe and Turkey—during which he noted the modernization and secularization advanced by Atatürk—introduced several reforms intended to modernize Afghanistan. Some of these, such as the abolition of the traditional Muslim veil for women and the opening of a number of co-educational schools, quickly alienated many tribal and religious leaders. Faced with overwhelming armed opposition, Amanullah was forced to abdicate in January 1929 after Kabul fell to forces led by Bacha-i-Saqao, a Tajik brigand. Prince Nadir Khan, a cousin of Amanullah's, in turn defeated Bacha-i-Saqao in October of the same year and, with considerable Pashtun tribal support, was declared King Nadir Shah. Four years later, however, he was assassinated in a revenge killing by a Kabul student.

Mohammad Zahir Shah, Nadir Khan's 19-year-old son, succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a liberal constitution providing for a two-chamber legislature to which the king appointed one-third of the deputies. The people elected another third, and the remainder were selected indirectly by provincial assemblies. Although Zahir's "experiment in democracy" produced few lasting reforms, it permitted the growth of unofficial extremist parties on both the left and the right. These included the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had close ideological ties to the Soviet Union. In 1967, the PDPA split into two major rival factions: the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and supported by elements within the military, and the Parcham (Banner) faction led by Babrak Karmal. The split reflected ethnic, class, and ideological divisions within Afghan society.

Zahir's cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, served as his Prime Minister from 1953 to 1963. During his tenure as Prime Minister, Daoud solicited military and economic assistance from both Washington and Moscow and introduced controversial social policies of a reformist nature. Daoud's alleged support for the creation of a Pashtun state in the Pakistan-Afghan border area heightened tensions with Pakistan and eventually resulted in Daoud's dismissal in March 1963.

Daoud's Republic (1973-78) and the April 1978 coup[edit]

Amid charges of corruption and malfeasance against the royal family and poor economic conditions created by the severe 1971-72 drought, former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973. Zahir Shah fled the country, eventually finding refuge in Italy. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as its first President and Prime Minister. His attempts to carry out badly needed economic and social reforms met with little success, and the new constitution promulgated in February 1977 failed to quell chronic political instability.

Seeking to exploit more effectively mounting popular disaffection, the PDPA reunified with Moscow's support. On April 27, 1978, the PDPA initiated a bloody coup, which resulted in the overthrow and murder of Daoud and most of his family. Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

1978-2001[edit]

Destroyed village

Since 1978, Afghanistan has experienced an unprecedented demographic catastrophe, with millions killed, wounded, or displaced. The Soviet invasion and occupation slaughtered 1,750,000 Afghans (from a range of 1.5-2 million killed).^[1][2] This is surely conservative when one considers all those killed by the Afghan Communists from 1978 to 1992. The subsequent civil wars (89-92 and 92–96) resulted in the deaths of another 400,000 Afghans (according to the Christian Science Monitor), with at least 50,000 killed in Kabul alone.^[2] The Taliban seized power in 1996, and subsequently slaughtered hundreds of thousands. According to UNICEF figures, in 5 years of Taliban rule, over 600,000 Afghans died just from Taliban restrictions on access to healthcare for women (120,000 per year).^[3] The Taliban also executed tens of thousands throughout the country, and caused potentially scores of thousands of deaths through refusal to allow foreign aid and through miscellaneous "excess deaths." In all, the Taliban was likely responsible for over 750,000 deaths (150,000 per year) on top of nearly half a million in the civil war. The turmoil in Afghanistan from 1978 to 2001 killed nearly 3,000,000 Afghans, with 5,000,000 displaced.

Anti-Soviet jihad[edit]

See also: Soviet-Afghan War

Zbigniew Brzezinski meets with the Mujahideen Taliban, 1979.^[4]

Opposition to the Marxist government emerged almost immediately. During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA brutally imposed a Marxist-style "reform" program, which ran counter to deeply rooted Afghan traditions. Decrees forcing changes in marriage customs and pushing through an ill-conceived land reform were particularly misunderstood by virtually all Afghans. In addition, thousands of members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment, and the intelligentsia were imprisoned, tortured, or murdered. Conflicts within the PDPA also surfaced early and resulted in exiles, purges, imprisonments, and executions.

By the summer of 1978, a revolt began in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and quickly spread into a countrywide insurgency. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, who had earlier been Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, seized power from Taraki after a palace shootout. Over the next 2 months, instability plagued Amin's regime as he moved against perceived enemies in the PDPA. By December, party morale was crumbling, and the insurgency was growing.

The Soviet Union moved quickly to take advantage of the April 1978 coup. In December 1978, Moscow signed a new bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan, and the Soviet military assistance program increased significantly. The regime's survival increasingly was dependent upon Soviet military equipment and advisers as the insurgency spread and the Afghan army began to collapse.

According to President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the United States began aiding the mujahidin with weapons on July 3, 1979, six months before the Soviet invasion.^[5]

By October 1979, relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to stabilize and consolidate his government. Faced with a deteriorating security situation, on December 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne forces, joining thousands of Soviet troops already on the ground, began to land in Kabul under the pretext of a field exercise. On December 26, these invasion forces killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction, bringing him back from Czechoslovakia and making him Prime Minister. Massive Soviet ground forces invaded from the north on December 27. The Soviet Union cited U.S. interference as the reason for intervention.^[6]

Following the invasion, the Karmal regime, although backed by an expeditionary force that grew as large as 120,000 Soviet troops, was unable to establish authority outside Kabul. As much as 80% of the countryside, including parts of Herat and Kandahar, eluded effective government control. An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan mujahidin (mu-jihad-en, from the root jihad, one who struggles in the service of Allah) made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers. The mujahidin began receiving more assistance in the form of weapons and training from the U.S. and other outside powers after Brzezinski's visit.

In May 1985, the seven principal Peshawar-based guerrilla organizations formed an alliance to coordinate their political and military operations against the Soviet occupation. Late in 1985, the mujahidin were active in and around Kabul, launching rocket attacks and conducting operations against the communist government. The failure of the Soviet Union to win over a significant number of Afghan collaborators or to rebuild a viable Afghan army forced it to bear an increasing responsibility for fighting the resistance and for civilian administration.

In the mid-nineteen-eighties, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, he inherited a deteriorating war in Afghanistan. He wanted out but he was boxed in by hardliners in his Politburo and military. Gradually, however, he constructed an exit strategy from Afghanistan. [6]

Soviet and popular displeasure with the Karmal regime led to its demise in May 1986. Karmal was replaced by Muhammad Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD). Najibullah had established a reputation for brutal efficiency during his tenure as KHAD chief. As Prime Minister, Najibullah was ineffective and highly dependent on Soviet support. Undercut by deep-seated divisions within the PDPA, regime efforts to broaden its base of support proved futile.

The Geneva Accords and aftermath[edit]

By the mid-1980s, the tenacious Afghan resistance movement—aided by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others—was exacting a high price from the Soviets, both militarily within Afghanistan and by souring the U.S.S.R.'s relations with much of the Western and Islamic world. Informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had been underway since 1982. In 1988, the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the United States and Soviet Union serving as guarantors, signed an agreement settling the major differences between them. The agreement, known as the Geneva accords, included five major documents, which, among other things, called for U.S. and Soviet noninterference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the right of refugees to return to Afghanistan without fear of persecution or harassment, and, most importantly, a timetable that ensured full Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. About 14,500 Soviet and an estimated one million Afghan lives were lost between 1979 and the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

Significantly, the mujahidin were party neither to the negotiations nor to the 1988 agreement and, consequently, refused to accept the terms of the accords. As a result, the civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal, which was completed in February 1989. Najibullah's regime, though failing to win popular support, territory, or international recognition, was able to remain in power until 1992 but collapsed after the defection of Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia in March. However, when the victorious mujahidin entered Kabul to assume control over the city and the central government, a new round of internecine fighting began between the various militias, which had coexisted only uneasily during the Soviet occupation. With the demise of their common enemy, the militias' ethnic, clan, religious, and personality differences surfaced, and the civil war continued.

Seeking to resolve these differences, the leaders of the Peshawar-based mujahidin groups established an interim Islamic Jihad Council in mid-April 1992 to assume power in Kabul. Moderate leader Prof. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was to chair the council for 2 months, after which a 10-member leadership council composed of mujahidin leaders and presided over by the head of the Jamiat-i-Islami, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, was to be set up for 4 months. During this 6-month period, a Loya Jirga, or grand council of Afghan elders and notables, would convene and designate an interim administration which would hold power up to a year, pending elections.

But in May 1992, Rabbani prematurely formed the leadership council, undermining Mojaddedi's fragile authority. In June, Mojaddedi surrendered power to the Leadership Council, which then elected Rabbani as president. Nonetheless, heavy fighting broke out in August 1992 in Kabul between forces loyal to President Rabbani and rival factions, particularly those who supported Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami. After Rabbani extended his tenure in December 1992, fighting in the capital flared up in January and February 1993. The Islamabad Accord, signed in March 1993, which appointed Hekmatyar as Prime Minister, failed to have a lasting effect. A follow-up agreement, the Jalalabad Accord, called for the militias to be disarmed but was never fully implemented. Through 1993, Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami forces, allied with the Shi'a Hezb-i-Wahdat militia, clashed intermittently with Rabbani and Masood's Jamiat forces. Cooperating with Jamiat were militants of Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami and, periodically, troops loyal to ethnic Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid Dostam. On January 1, 1994, Dostam switched sides, precipitating large-scale fighting in Kabul and in northern provinces, which caused thousands of civilian casualties in Kabul and elsewhere and created a new wave of displaced persons and refugees. The country sank even further into anarchy, forces loyal to Rabbani and Masood, both ethnic Tajiks, controlled Kabul and much of the northeast, while local warlords exerted power over the rest of the country.

The Taliban[edit]

See also: Women under the Taliban‎

Taliban enter Kabul airport after US departure, August 31, 2021.^[7]

The Taliban had risen to power in the mid '90s in reaction to the anarchy and warlordism that arose after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Many Taliban had been educated in madrassas in Pakistan and were largely from rural southern Pashtun backgrounds. In 1994, the Taliban developed enough strength to capture the city of Kandahar from a local warlord and proceeded to expand its control throughout Afghanistan, occupying Kabul in September 1996. By the end of 1998, the Taliban occupied about 90% of the country, limiting the opposition largely to a small mostly Tajik corner in the northeast and the Panjshir valley.

The Taliban sought to impose an extreme interpretation of Islam—based upon the rural Pashtun tribal code—on the entire country and committed massive human rights violations, particularly directed against women and girls. The Taliban also committed serious atrocities against minority populations, particularly the Shi'a Hazara ethnic group, and killed noncombatants in several well-documented instances. In March 2001, as part of a drive against relics of Afghanistan's pre-Islamic past, the Taliban destroyed two Buddha statues carved into cliff faces outside of the city of Bamiyan.

From the mid-1990s the Taliban provided sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national who had fought with the mujahideen resistance against the Soviets, and provide a base for his and other terrorist organizations. Bin Laden provided both financial and political support to the Taliban. Bin Laden and his Al-Qaida group were charged with the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, and in August 1998 the United States launched a cruise missile attack against bin Laden's terrorist camp in southeastern Afghanistan. Bin Laden and Al-Qaida have acknowledged their responsibility for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.

Taliban announcing its Build Back Better program on Afghan TV, August 29, 2021.^[8][9]

Following the Taliban's repeated refusal to expel bin Laden and his group and end its support for international terrorism, the U.S. and its partners in the anti-terrorist coalition began a military campaign on October 7, 2001, targeting terrorist facilities and various Taliban military and political assets within Afghanistan. On October 22, 2001, Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware gave a speech insisting that U.S. goals—rooting out al-Qaeda and helping establish a friendly successor government to the Taliban—would require U.S. ground troops far beyond the small number of Special Forces already in place.^[10] Under pressure from U.S. military and anti-Taliban forces, the Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and Kabul fell on November 13, 2001.

Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nations-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and governance to Afghanistan—creating an interim government and establishing a process to move toward a permanent government. Under the "Bonn Agreement," an Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, headed by President Hamid Karzai, renamed the government as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004.

Afghan war 2001-2021[edit]

See also: Afghanistan War

Operation Enduring Freedom easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly. But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring Pakistan in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by opium production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the Hamid Karzai government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and Islamic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. The insurgency controlled numerous areas and engaged in terror attacks on civilians and guerrilla warfare against American and NATO forces. Al-Qaeda terrorists—the only Arabs in Afghanistan—had been welcomed by the Taliban in 1999 and built their bases there. They have been largely destroyed or fled to Pakistan, according to the U.S. Army, having fewer than 100 people left in Afghanistan.

Seven years after the overthrow of the Taliban, America and NATO forces were still fighting Taliban forces in parts of the country, especially in the south.^[11] There was no sign that Western troops would be withdrawing from Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, commander of the United States coalition forces stated his commitment to accomplishing the mission, saying, "The United States will not leave Afghanistan until the Afghan people tell us the job is done. The war on terrorism began here in Afghanistan and it continues today. We must never forget that."^[12]

In Aug. 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. He said official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal reported.

McChrystal told Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure." By November no decision had been made on the urgent request.^[13]

The 2009 presidential election was badly tainted by fraud. Former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, the main opponent of President Hamid Karzai, pulled out of the runoff in November, and Karzai was declared reelected for another five-year term. His legitimacy and support was seriously weakened by the election frauds, but the U.S., NATO, and the UN have agreed to keep him in power.

Karzai presidency 2001-2014[edit]

Three weeks after the 9/11 attacks, on October 3, 2001, Sen. Joseph Biden, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed a billion dollars in aid to a yet to be formed Afghan interim government. The amount was almost twice as much as U.N. General Secretary Kofi Annan proposed and more than triple what the Bush administration asked for.^[14] Harmid Karzai formed an interim government on 22 December 2001 until elections could be held after the removal of Taliban rule by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. On January 10, 2002 Joe Biden arrived in Afghanistan on a four-day fact-finding visit and met with Karzai.^[15] In 2002 and 2003, when Afghan tribal councils gathered to write a new constitution, the U.S. government gave “nice packages” to delegates who supported Washington’s preferred stance. “The perception that was started in that period: If you were going to vote for a position that Washington favored, you’d be stupid to not get a package for doing it,” according to a U.S. official who served in Kabul at the time.^[16]

First inauguration of President Hamid Karzai, Dec. 7, 2004.

On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan held its first national democratic presidential election. More than 8 million Afghans voted, 41% of whom were women. Hamid Karzai was the winner and was inaugurated on December 7 for a five-year term as Afghanistan's first democratically elected president.

An election was held on September 18, 2005 for the “Wolesi Jirga” (lower house) of Afghanistan's new bicameral National Assembly and for the country's 34 provincial councils. Turnout for the election was about 53% of the 12.5 million registered voters. The first democratically elected National Assembly since 1969 was inaugurated on December 19, 2005.

The government's authority is weak; its ability to deliver necessary social services remains largely dependent on funds from the international donor community. Between 2001 and 2006, the United States committed over $12 billion to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At an international donors' conference in Berlin in April 2004, donors pledged a total of $8.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction over the three-year period 2004–2007. At the end of January 2006, the international community gathered in London and renewed its political and reconstruction support for Afghanistan in the form of the Afghanistan Compact.

With international community support, including more than 40 countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the government's capacity to secure Afghanistan's borders to maintain internal order is increasing. Responsibility for security for all of Afghanistan was transferred to ISAF in October 2006. As of November 2006, some 40,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers had been trained along with some 60,000 police, including border and highway police. American observers give them low marks for competence and loyalty to the national government.

A program called "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration" (DDR) has also helped to further establish the authority of the Afghan central government by disarming 63,000 tribal militia by June 2006. A follow-on program targeting illegal militias, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), was begun in 2005, under the joint auspices of Japan and the United Nations. The DIAG program is still ongoing.

The pro-Karzai Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara Shiites and Uzbeks that form the ruling coalition are not united, and the government they dominate is extremely weak and poverty-stricken. The Afghan government controls only 30% of the country. The country is resource-poor—there is no oil—and the only rich resource is opium poppies. There is no educated base for a competent bureaucracy, and the army is little more than an amateur collection of tribal militias. 90% of the soldiers are illiterate, making them very hard to train to modern standards.

The rebels in the southern provinces come from the Pashtuns tribes, which form 44% of the population. Only a minority of Pashtuns support the rebels. The Taliban have a significant presence in many Pashtun villages, as well as a sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan. The number of armed insurgents has grown from 3,000 in 2006 to 15,000- 20,000 in 2009. They are locals who know the hiding places in the extremely difficult terrain, and receive protection support from some Pashtun tribes. Elections for a new government held in summer 2009 were clouded by serious charges of irregularity. In September 2009 the issue was whether to expand the American military presence to engage in more nation building.

In 2014 Ashraf Ghani was elected as new president of Afghanistan and held office until the fall of Kabul in August 2021.

Nation building[edit]

Three weeks after the 9/11 attacks, on October 3, 2001, Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware proposed on the Senate floor a billion dollars in aid to a yet-to-be-formed Afghan interim government. The amount was almost twice as much as U.N. General Secretary Kofi Annan proposed,^[17] and more than triple what the Bush administration asked for.^[18] Sen. Biden, who spoke for the Democrats in Congress, wanted more than just removal of the Taliban and degrading al Qaeda. Biden wanted nation building. Biden wanted to flood the new government with cash, which ultimately corrupted the new Karzai regime, and created an anti-Western, anti-corruption, pro-Taliban resurgence and backlash.

Sen. Joe Biden advocating for boots on the ground and nation building at the Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2001.

On October 22, 2001, Sen. Biden, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gave a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations insisting that U.S. goals—rooting out al-Qaeda and helping establish a friendly successor government to the Taliban—would require U.S. boots on the ground far beyond the small number of Special Forces that the Pentagon had recommended. Biden said, "There is no way that you can, in fact, go after and root out al Qaeda and or Bin Ladin without folks on the ground, in caves, risking and losing their lives. And I believe that the tolerance for that in the Islamic world is significant, exponentially higher, than it is for us bombing."^[19] Under pressure from U.S. military and anti-Taliban forces however, the Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and Kabul fell on November 13, 2001.

Hamid Karzai formed an interim government on 22 December 2001 until elections could be held after the removal of Taliban rule by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. On January 10, 2002 Biden arrived in Afghanistan on a four-day fact-finding visit and at Bagram Airforce Base. The Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility had been prepared to receive jihadis. Bagram was a major collection point for preliminary interrogation. Sen. Biden said, "These are some real hard, hard, hard cases. But unless we gather the list of leaders which we -- I have in my pocket here...the possibility of them being able to do guerrilla kind of attacks on military here are real."^[20]

In 2002 and 2003, when Afghan tribal councils gathered to write a new constitution, the U.S. government gave “nice packages” to delegates who supported Washington’s preferred stance. “The perception that was started in that period: If you were going to vote for a position that Washington favored, you’d be stupid to not get a package for doing it,” according to a U.S. official interviewed by the Washington Post who served in Kabul at the time.^[21]

According to The New York Times, beginning in December 2002 throughout Karzai's terms of office, Karzai's office was funded with "tens of millions of dollars" of black cash from the CIA in order to buy influence within the Afghan government. TheNYT stated that "the cash that does not appear to be subject to the oversight and restrictions." An unnamed American official was quoted by The New York Times as stating that "The biggest source of corruption in Afghanistan was the United States."^[22]

Obama escalation[edit]

See also: Obama war crimes

Despite campaigning against "dumb wars," Barack Obama made escalating the troop level a high priority.^[23] In September 2009, the Pentagon pushed back against liberal Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time. Washington is debating the new report by Gen. McChrystal, the senior American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who believes a properly resourced counterinsurgency war means more forces, more time and more commitment to the development of a strong Afghan government capable of defending its own country.^[24] Some 4,000 more American trainers will arrive by November, bringing the American troop level to 68,000.

The ruling Democratic party in the United States was split three ways: a small number of hawks who agreed with Obama's decision to escalate the troop level; a large number of doves who opposed it; and a sizable group that was uneasy with the Obama troop surge but willing to loyally support his decision. Each one thousand American soldiers in Afghanistan cost a billion dollars a year; Speaker Nancy Pelosi indicated that the continued operations would be financed by borrowing.

In the first half of 2010, 250 contractors reportedly died in Iraq and Afghanistan - more than the 235 military personnel who fell during the same period.^[25]

Bowe Bergdahl swap[edit]

When Barack Obama released five Taliban commanders from the Guantanamo Bay prison in exchange for American deserter Bowe Bergdahl in 2014, he assured Americans that the enemy combatants would not be allowed to return to Afghanistan. 6 American soldiers lives were lost searching for the American deserter.^[26] Upon Bergdahl's return, Obama celebrated Bergdahl as a heroic “POW,” a designation the Pentagon never gave him. Khairullah Khairkhwa, one of the five released from Guantanamo, sat across the table from Joe Biden’s personal representative in Moscow in the spring of 2021, where Mullah Khairkhwa was part of the Taliban delegation that negotiated the terms of the US withdrawal. Mullah Khairkhwa is the mastermind of the Taliban takeover, even though the Pentagon classified Khairkhwa as too dangerous to release.

Khairkhwa assured the Biden junta that the Taliban would not retaliate against Afghans who worked with the US military or the US-backed government in Kabul. However, reports out of Kandahar and Kabul soon after the fall of Afghanistan indicate the Taliban was going door to door with a kill list to wipe out their enemies. Mullah Khairkhwa previously served as the Taliban’s interior minister prior to 2002, where he oversaw Islamist punishments, including beheadings and stonings.^[27]

All five of the terrorists in the Bowe Bergdahl swap assumed prominent positions in the Taliban interim government announced on September 11, 2021:^[28]

• Acting Minister of Information and Culture: Mullah Khairullah Khairkhah
• Defense Deputy Minister: Mullah Mohammad Fazil
• Acting Director of Intelligence: Abdul Haq Wasiq
• Border and Tribal Affairs Minister: Mullah Norullah Nori
• Acting Governor of Khost Province: Muhammad Nabi Omari^[29]

Total collapse under Biden[edit]

Democrat socialist leader Joe Biden's gift to Taliban terrorists.^[30]

When the Biden regime abandoned Bagram Airbase on July 2, 2021 without giving notice to the Afghan government and Afghan National Army,^[31] it sent a signal to the highest levels in the Afghan government that the United States would not provide the aircover and support for the Afghan army in its war with the Taliban - a mission they had prepared for 20 years.^[32] It was no surprise when the Afghan Army abandoned the field and refused to fight, and the Afghan government fell, as scripted by the Biden regime.^[33]

With the August 2021 Taliban takeover of major cities, it was clear that it was Biden who failed the Afghan war.^[34][35][36] And Billions spent by US in Afghanistan on Afghan army, at the end, rather benefited the Taliban.^[37] Planes, guns, night-vision goggles, ended up being the Taliban's new U.S.-made war chest.^[38]

Not surprisingly, The Qatari pro-terror network Al Jazeera was given exclusive access to the presidential palace by Taliban.^[39]

Even CNN had to admit that it's: "some of most dire days of his presidency."^[40]

Global media slammed Biden as a ‘joke.’^[41]

Taliban atrocities included executions,^[42] even killing kids in front of their parents.^[43] Afghans became fearful of brutal regime return.^[44]

Writer:^[45]

Joe Biden is derelict in his duty. His State Department failed to prepare adequately to get Americans and our allied Afghans out of the country in time. His Department of Defense made the decisions that left our resources and materiel to be used by the Taliban. His intelligence units were the ones he now claims — despite evidence to the contrary — never warned that the Afghan government could fall so fast.

This was a failure of many institutions of American government. But above all, it was a failure of the Commander in Chief.

Among the allies for example, Biden rattled U.K. With his Afghanistan policy.

the chaotic departure from Afghanistan has drawn comparisons not to helicopters flying out of Saigon but to an earlier debacle: the 1956 Suez crisis, in which a humiliated Britain was forced to pull out of Egypt, having failed to dislodge its nationalist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

One of the big gainers at Taliban's rise is the "tiny Qatar", capable of disproportionate intervention in their affairs not hers.^[47]

The congratulators[edit]

As in 9/11 atrocity,^[48][49] it was Arab-Islamic Palestinians who cheered on. This time Hamas officials.^[50][51][52]

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan praised the Taliban saying they "broke the chains of slavery in the country". ^[53]

Just a few days later, the Pakistani Army held a meet and greet with the Taliban at the Torkham border crossing where they took selfies with each other. ^[54]

Qatar's Al-Jazzera also celebrated Taliban rise as a win for Islamic "nation."^[55]

Fall of Kabul 2021[edit]

See also: Biden/Harris foreign policy and Rape jihad

Biden/Harris withdrawl during the Rape of Afghanistan.

On July 8, 2021, Joe Biden said from the White House, "I trust the capacity of the Afghan military, who is better trained, better equipped, and more competent in terms of conducting war."^[56] The same month the U.S. Defense Department said it was providing the Afghan Air Force 35 Black Hawk helicopters and three A-29 Super Tucanos. The United States spent $83 billion equipping and training the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), including $10 billion in aircraft and vehicles.^[57] Less than a month after Biden's statement, several Black Hawks helicopters and other aircraft were seized by the Taliban. Many of the aircraft and helicopters are armed. These A-29 Super Tucanos can fire laser-guided and other types of bombs. The Afghan government also had 50 American-made MD-530 attack helicopters, which are armed with machine guns and rockets. The Afghan Air Force had UH-60 Black Hawks and Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters, as well as C-130 and Cessna transports, and a small fleet of armed Cessnas.^[58]

As Biden withdrew American troops, the Peoples Republic of China began expanding their Belt and Road Initiative with a $62 billion aid package to Afghanistan to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).^[59]

As the impending crisis escalated, White House chief propagandists Jen Psaki said "The Taliban has to make an assessment about what they want their role to be in the international community." Her comments came as reports flowed in of Taliban fighters going door-to-door and forcibly selecting girls as young as 12 to reward as brides for the victorious jihadis.^[60]

Bodies lay strewn on the streets of Kandahar.^[61] It was a repetition of what the Taliban had done in all the other provinces to the elite counter-terrorism forces that fought alongside Americans. Panic ensued as the Kabul airport was flooded with people fleeing the Taliban terror. Some people were stampeded to death.^[62] Three young men clung to the tires of an airplane, only to fall on top of people's houses once the plane was airborne.^[63]

Once inside the city, the Taliban had all the records with names of everyone who served in the Ktah Khas (KKA) or Afghan Special Forces, and began a house-to-house search for them.^[64] The KKA counter-terrorism experts who were trained by and fought alongside Americans suffered the same fate others did in the provinces, and were summarily executed.^[65]

While the Biden regime did not inform the U.S. Afghan allies it was abandoning Bagram Airbase,^[66] Army Gen. Chris Donohue, commander of the 82nd Airborne, did inform the Taliban commander whom he had been coordinating with on August 30, 2021 that the Biden regime was abandoning the Kabul airport, according to CENTCOM commander Gen. Frank McKenzie.^[67] Donohue had refused entry to the airport of American citizens with passports to leave Afghanistan.^{[68][69][70][71]} This was done with the full knowledge of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Mark Milley.^[72]

Haqqani network[edit]

On August 18, 2021 NBC News reported that the U.S. was working with the Taliban to evacuate Americans and allies out of Afghanistan. Joint Chiefs of Staff chair Gen. Mark Milley stated, "Through the State Department, the Taliban are facilitating safe passage to the airport for American citizens, that is, U.S. passport holders." An exchange with a reporter and defense minister Lloyd Austin went like this:

Kabul airport suicide bombing, August 26, 2021. 170 dead.^[73]

Biden told George Stephanopoulos the same morning that "one of the things we didn't know is what the Taliban would do in terms of trying to keep people from getting out, what they would do. What are they doing now? They're cooperating, letting American citizens get out, American personnel get out, embassies get out, et cetera.^[75]

On August 19, 2921 VOA announced Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani had been placed in charge of security around the Kabul airport.^[76] On August 22, 2021, Haqqani told Al Jazeera, “all Afghans” should feel safe under their Islamic Emirate, and that a “general amnesty” has been granted across the nation’s 34 provinces. "If we can defeat superpowers, surely we can provide safety to the Afghan people," said Haqqani, "All of those people who left this country, we will assure them of their safety," Haqqani went on. "You’re all welcome back in Afghanistan."^[77] The Haqqani network was already executing civilians and former members of the Afghan National Army, according to the United Nations.^[78]

On August 26, 2021, after days of heightened alert from intelligence,^[79][80] a rival^[81][82][83] --to Taliban-- jihadi Islamofascistic^[84] group, known as ISIS k attacked^[85][80] Kabul airport, murdering at least 12, including at least 13 US serviceman and injuring dozens.^[85]

The masacre increased the fears of intensified jihadism.^[86]

External links[edit]

• Afghanistan Online.
• Afghan opium crop in decline.

Further reading[edit]

• Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (2009) excerpt and text search
• The book Horse Soldiers describes the previously secret 5-week campaign, materially aided by the CIA and Special Forces. [7]

References[edit]

Source = [8]