Contras

The Contras is a label given to the various rebel groups opposing Nicaragua's FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction following the July 1979 overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Although the Contra movement included a number of separate groups, with different aims and little ideological unity, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) emerged as by far the largest. In 1987, virtually all Contra organizations were united, at least nominally, into the Nicaraguan Resistance.

The term "Contra" comes from the Spanish la contra, short for la contrarevolucion, in English "the counter-revolution." (Many references use the uncapitalized form, "contra," sometimes italicizing it.) Some rebels disliked being called Contras, feeling that it defined their cause only in negative terms, or implied a desire to restore the old order. Rebel fighters usually referred to themselves as comandos ("commandos"); peasant sympathizers also called the rebels los primos ("the cousins"). Today, many veterans remember their movement as la resistencia.

From an early stage, the rebels received financial and military support from the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), initially supplemented by Argentina. At other times, the United States Congress wished to distance itself and withdrew all support. The Contras became the center of both the struggle between Marxism and the Reagan administration and the internal struggle in the United States between progressives and conservatives, and at times between the administration and the Congress.

History

Origins

Early opposition to the Sandinistas comprised many disparate strands. Pablo Emilio Salazar (Comandante Bravo), the National Guard's most prominent field commander, hoped its escaped remnants could be regrouped as a unified force. Following his assassination in October 1979, by Sandinista intelligence, however, the Guard disintegrated. A minority formed groups such as the Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, the 15th of September Legion, and the National Army of Liberation. However, these groups were small and conducted little active raiding into Nicaragua.^[1]

Meanwhile, some of the Nicaraguan middle class, whose discontent with Somoza had led them to back the Sandinistas, soon became disillusioned with Sandinista rule. Businessman José Francisco Cardenal went into exile and founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN), centered around fellow Conservative Party exiles, with the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARN) as its armed wing.

The earliest Contras inside Nicaragua were the MILPAS (Milicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas), peasant militias led by disillusioned Sandinistas. Founded by Pedro Joaquín González, whose nom de guerre was "Dimas," the Contra Milpistas were also known as chilotes (green corn). Even after his death, other MILPAS bands sprouted during 1980-1981. The Milpistas were composed largely of the campesino (peasant) highlanders and rural workers who would later form the rank and file of the rebellion.^{[2] [3][4][5]}

Main groups

The CIA and Argentine intelligence, seeking to unify the anti-Sandinista cause before initiating large-scale aid, persuaded the 15th of September Legion and the UDN to merge in August 1981 as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN). Based in Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbor, under the command of former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez, the new FDN drew in the other rebel forces in the north. The core leadership was initially dominated by former Guardia NCOs, but MILPAS veterans rose through the ranks during the war, and Bermúdez was ultimately replaced by Milpista Oscar Sobalvarro. A joint political directorate was created in December 1982, soon led by businessman and anti-Sandinista politician Adolfo Calero.

The creation of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) and its armed wing, the Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), in September 1982, saw the opening of a second front in the war. The group was founded in neighboring Costa Rica by Edén Pastora (Comandante Cero), a former Sandinista and participant in the August 1978 seizure of Somoza's palace. ARDE consisted largely of Sandinista dissidents and veterans of the anti-Somoza campaign who opposed the increased influence of Soviet, Eastern bloc and Cuban officials in the Managua government. Proclaiming his ideological distance from the FDN, Pastora nevertheless opened a "southern front" in the war.

A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalize Indian land. They had a number of grievances against the Sandinistas, including:

• Unilateral natural resource exploitation policies which denied Indians access to much of their traditional land base and severely restricted their subsistence activities.
• Forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians from their traditional lands to relocation centers in the interior of the country, and subsequent burning of some villages.^[6]
• Economic embargoes and blockades against native villages not sympathetic to the government.

The Misurasata movement led by Brooklyn Rivera split in 1983, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth allying itself more closely with the FDN. A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.

Unity efforts

U.S. officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), under the leadership of Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, all originally supporters of the anti-Somoza revolution. After its dissolution early in 1987, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) was organized along similar lines in May. Splits within the rebel movement emerged with Misurasata's April 1985 accommodation with the Sandinista government, the formation of the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) under Alfredo César by those excluded from UNO, and Pastora's withdrawal from the struggle in May 1986.

Mediation by other Central American governments under Costa Rican leadership led to the Sapoa Accord ceasefire of March 23, 1988, which, along with additional agreements in February and August 1989, provided for the Contras' disarmament and reintegration into Nicaraguan society and politics. The agreements also called for internationally-monitored elections which were subsequently held on February 25, 1990. Violeta Chamorro, a former Sandinista ally and widow of murdered anti-Somoza journalist Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, defeated Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and became President with the backing of the center-right UNO. Some Contra elements and disgruntled Sandinistas would return briefly to armed opposition in the 1990s, sometimes styled as recontras or revueltos, but these groups were subsequently persuaded to disarm.

Human rights controversies

The Sandinista government, its supporters, and outside groups such as Americas Watch frequently accused the Contras of indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The Contras and their backers, especially in the Reagan Administration, dismissed these accusations as a propaganda campaign and accused the Sandinistas of the same crimes against humanity.

The Catholic Institute for International Relations summarized Contra operating procedures in their 1987 human rights report: "The record of the contras in the field, as opposed to their official professions of democratic faith, is one of consistent and bloody abuse of human rights, of murder, torture, mutilation, rape, arson, destruction and kidnapping."^[7]

An influential report on alleged Contra atrocities was issued by lawyer Reed Brody shortly before the 1985 U.S. Congressional vote on Contra aid. The report was soon published as a book, Contra Terror in Nicaragua (Brody, 1985). It charged that the Contras attacked purely civilian targets and that their tactics included murder, rape, beatings, kidnapping and disruption of harvests. Brody's report had been requested by the Sandinista government's Washington law firm Reichler & Applebaum and the Sandinista government had provided his facilities in Nicaragua.^[8] In a letter to the New York Times,^[9] Brody asserted that this in no way affected his report, and added that the newspaper had confirmed the veracity of four randomly chosen incidents.

American news media published several articles accusing Americas Watch and other bodies of ideological bias and unreliable reporting. The media alleged that Americas Watch gave too much credence to alleged Contra abuses and systematically tried to discredit Nicaraguan human rights groups such as the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, which blamed the major human rights abuses on the Sandinistas.^[10]

In 1985, the Wall Street Journal reported:

Three weeks ago, Americas Watch issued a report on human rights abuses in Nicaragua. One member of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights commented on the Americas Watch report and its chief investigator Juan Mendez: "The Sandinistas are laying the groundwork for a totalitarian society here and yet all Mendez wanted to hear about were abuses by the contras. How can we get people in the U.S. to see what's happening here when so many of the groups who come down are pro-Sandinista?"^[11]

In 1987, New York Times reporter James LeMoyne wrote a series of articles chronicling human rights abuses by the Sandinistas in the southeast of Nicaragua.^[12] At various times throughout the war, thousands of campesinos were uprooted from their homes with no warning and forced to move to "resettlement camps." According to the New York Times, this was due to "pervasive" support for the Contras. According to a June 28, 1987 article in the New York Times, "Refugees in Government camps in Costa Rica and peasants interviewed two weeks ago in southern Nicaragua were unanimous in accusing the Sandinistas and not the rebels of human rights violations. Many, but not all, of the refugees and peasants said they supported the contras."

After the new Chamorro government took office in 1990, several people came forward to report previously unknown killings by Sandinista forces, a phenomenon that journalist Shirley Christian observed, "rais[ed] doubts about the long-held perception by Sandinista defenders outside Nicaragua that the Sandinistas were not as brutal as their opponents." In one incident in November 1984, a Sandinista special forces unit masquerading as Contras recruited dozens of volunteers around Bijagua, then massacred them.^[13]

A 2004 article in the Washington-based academic journal, Demokratizatsiya, describes many human rights violations by the Sandinistas, both during and after their period in power, like that Sandinista security forces assassinated more than two hundred Contras commanders who had accepted the terms of the United Nations-brokered peace accords and had laid down their arms to join the democratic process.^[14] Among other sources (29 out of 103), the article uses interviews with Lino Hernández, director of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, leading opposition politicians, reports produced by the U.S. State Department during the 1980s and the conservative Washington Times newspaper.

U.S. military and financial assistance

See also the Iran-Contra Affair

A key role in the development of the Contra alliance was played by the United States following Ronald Reagan's assumption of the presidency in January 1981. Reagan accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. Following an ultimatum to Sandinista leaders in August 1981 to cease aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas, plans to support the rebels moved forward. On November 23 of that year, Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17), giving the CIA the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras would become one component of the Reagan Doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet-supported, communist governments.

Beginning in 1983, the CIA began a campaign of seaborne raids against Nicaragua's ports, carried out not by the Contras but by its own force of Ecuadorian mercenaries it called "Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets." This campaign culminated in the mining of Nicaragua's harbors in 1984. The mining provoked Nicaragua to file a suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States (Nicaragua v. United States), which challenged the legality of not only the mining, but the entire enterprise of providing training, funding, and support for the rebel forces. The case resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States on several of the counts.

The mining also triggered the collapse of Congressional support for the Contras. Unease about the CIA program had already manifested itself in the Boland Amendment, passed by the United States Congress in December 1982. The Boland Amendment was extended in October 1984 to forbid action by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Administration officials sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third-parties. These efforts culminated in the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986-87, which concerned Contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran. However, by the time the scandal broke, Congress had already approved $100 million in aid. In 1987, American public opinion was divided by the killing of American engineer Ben Linder by the Contras. On February 3, 1988, the United States House of Representatives rejected President Reagan's request for $36.25 million to aid the Contras.

See also

• Iran-Contra Affair
• Sandinista National Liberation Front
• Democratic Revolutionary Alliance

Notes

References

ISBN links support NWE through referral fees

• Asleson, Vern. Nicaragua: Those Passed By. Glad Press, 2004. ISBN 1931942161
• Belli, Humberto. Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua. Crossway Books/The Puebla Institute. ISBN 0891073590
• Bermudez, Enrique. "The Contras' Valley Forge: How I View the Nicaraguan Crisis." Policy Review (1998). ISSN 0146-5945.
• Brody, Reed. Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission: September 1984-January 1985. Boston: South End Press, 1985. ISBN 0896083136
• Brown, Timothy. The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua. University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. ISBN 0806132523
• Chamorro, Edgar. Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation. New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987.
• Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family. New York: Vintage Books, 1986. ISBN 978-0394535753
• Cox, Jack. Requiem in the Tropics: Inside Central America. UCA Books, 1987. ISBN 978-0937047057
• Cruz S., Arturo J. Memoirs of a Counterrevolutionary. New York: Doubleday, 1989. ISBN 978-0385248792
• Dickey, Christopher. 1987. With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0671532987
• Garvin, Glenn. Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and the Contras. Washington: Brassey's, 1992. ISBN 978-0080405629
• Gugliota Guy. Kings of Cocaine Inside the Medellin Cartel. Simon and Shuster, 1989. ISBN 978-0671649579
• Horton, Lynn. Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979-1994. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998. ISBN 978-0896804128
• Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. Dictatorships and Double Standards. Touchstone, 1982. ISBN 0671438360
• Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff. The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
• Moore, John Norton. The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order. University Publications of America, 1987. ISBN 978-0890939628
• Pardo-Maurer, Rogelio. The Contras, 1980-1989: A Special Kind of Politics. New York: Praeger, 1990. ISBN 978-0275938185
• Persons, David E. A Study of the History and Origins of the Nicaraguan Contras. Nacogdoches, Texas: Total Vision Press. Stephen Austin University Special Collections, 1987. OCLC 18655707
• Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion, Seven Stories Press, 1998. ISBN 1888363681

External links

All links retrieved February 17, 2022.

• "Peasants Tell of Rights Abuses by Sandinistas", by James LeMoyne, New York Times, June 28, 1987.
• "Sandinistas Uproot Villagers to Limit Support for Contras", by James LeMoyne, New York Times, June 17, 1987.
• "Turnover in Nicaragua;Nicaraguan Opposition Routs Sandinistas", by Mark A. Uhlig, New York Times, February 27, 1990.
• "Nicaragua 1981-1990: Destabilization in slow motion, by William Blum.
• "Dark Alliance", by Gary Webb, San Jose Mercury News, August 1996.
• "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations" - National Security Archive.
• US administration disregarding the UN verdict Video provided by BBC.
• When the AK-47s Fall Silent, by Timothy Brown