Peace Conference

"Peace Conference (1919). - The first plenary session of the Conference of the Powers assembled in Paris to settle the terms of peace after the World War was held on Jan. 18 1919, more than two months after the conclusion of the Armistice with Germany; and the Conference remained in being from that date until Jan. 21 1920, when the Supreme Council met for the last time. Even then the work of the peace settlement was incomplete. What remained to be done was partly delegated to a council of ambassadors at Paris, partly left to the Premiers of the principal Powers, who continued to meet in consultation at irregular intervals during 1920 and 1921. The Conference separated before the Hungarians had decided to sign their treaty, and before the terms of the partition of the Ottoman Empire were finally agreed upon. It left the Adriatic question in such a state that io months elapsed before Italy and Yugoslavia could compose their differences. The total sum to be demanded from Germany in the name of reparation had not yet been settled, nor had the principal Powers finally agreed in what proportions this sum should be divided between them. But the events of 1920 showed that most, if not all, of these questions could be arranged without the cumbrous mechanism of a conference. An even more momentous uncertainty, the problem of the future attitude of the United States towards the treaties, would obviously be solved at Washington and not at Paris. But the most urgent difficulties of the transition from war to peace had been met, so far as diplomacy could meet them, before the Conference was six months old; and, after the German treaty had been signed, the doings of the statesmen at Paris no longer excited the same interest as before. The most important of these statesmen, except the French Premier, M. Georges Clemenceau, soon made their exit. In the last days of June 1919 Mr. Wilson returned to the United States, Mr. Lloyd George to London. Sig. Orlando had fallen from power before the signing of the treaty, and his successor, Signor Nitti, abstained from visiting Paris. In July Mr. Lansing, the American Secretary of State, withdrew, leaving Mr. Polk, his under-secretary, to act for him. In Sept., after the signing of the Austrian treaty, Mr. Balfour departed and Sir Eyre Crowe became the chief British plenipotentiary. By June 28 the main outlines of the new map of Europe were drawn; the principles which were to govern all the treaties had been laid down; Germany had been rendered powerless for evil, and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had ceased to exist.

The Secret Treaties and the Pre-Armistice Terms

The Allied and Associated Powers entered the Conference with a load of previous commitments.' The three chief European Allies had to consider many secret undertakings given at critical periods of the war. In April 1915 France and Great Britain had purchased Italy's cooperation by the Treaty of London, which gave very definite pledges regarding Istria, Dalmatia, Cisalpine Tyrol, the Dodecanese and Adalia. In May 1916 France and Great Britain had mapped out their future spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire; and in 1917 there had been consequential arrangements with Italy. In Aug. 1916 all three Powers had given pledges to Rumania regarding her claims on Hungarian territory, pledges which Rumania at least did not regard as invalidated by her subsequent Treaty (of Bucharest, May 1918) with the Central Powers. In Feb. 1917 all three had agreed with Japan to uphold her claims on Shantung. Finally there were agreements of a less definite character with Serbia and with Greece. It remained to be seen how far these compacts could be reconciled with each other and with the views of the United States, who had not endorsed any of them and was officially unaware of them up to the opening of the Conference. There remained the pre-Armistice terms which were binding on all the parties to the Conference, and which indisputably must prevail wherever they came into conflict with treaties of prior date. Drafted at Washington, on the basis of a separate correspondence between Mr. Wilson and the German Government, they had nevertheless been considered and adopted (with certain amendments) by the Supreme War Council of the Allies as the foundation of the future peace. This meant that (with the exceptions which they or Mr. Wilson had specified in Oct. and Nov. 1918) the Allies were bound to impose no terms which clashed with 1 For the preliminaries leading to the Armistice of Nov. 11 1918, under World War. See also, for points unsettled at the Peace Conference, Silesia and other appropriate headings.

Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points (of Jan. 8 1918), his Four Principles (of Feb. 11), his Four Ends (of July 4) and his Five Particulars (of Sept. 27).

This peculiar obligation was the outcome of an offer, made by Germany on Oct. 4 1918, " to accept the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of Jan. 8 1918, and his later pronouncements, especially his speech of Sept. 27," as a basis for peace negotiations. A similar offer was made by the Austro-Hungarian Government on Oct. 7. From Germany the President required, as a condition precedent to negotiations, that " the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany " should be irrevocably deposed. To Austria-Hungary he intimated that in one particular he could no longer stand by the Fourteen Points. It was no longer sufficient that the Czechoslovaks and the Yugosla y s should be guaranteed autonomy within the AustroHungarian state. These peoples must now decide what action on the part of Austria-Hungary would satisfy their aspirations.

A republican Germany and a partition of Austria-Hungary were thus indicated as fundamental conditions of the peace. The Central Empires accepted the fiat; and the European Allies then agreed to make peace with Germany "on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress and the principles enunciated in his subsequent addresses," with two qualifications. They reserved judgment on the second of the Fourteen Points " relating to what is commonly known as the freedom of the seas." They pointed out that, in their opinion, the President's demand for the " restoration " of territories invaded by Germany should be understood to include " compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air." The President accepted explicitly this meaning of " restoration," and accepted ex silentio the demurrer as to the " freedom of the seas." After the Conference had begun, he stated to some American journalists (Feb. 14 1919) that the freedom of the seas was no longer needed, as in future (with a League of Nations in existence) there would be no neutrals. It will be noted that the reply of the Allies to the President only committed them with regard to the German treaty. The armistices signed by Austria (Nov. 3 1918) and Hungary (Nov. 13) were unconditional, and the Italian Government afterwards held that neither of these countries was entitled to the benefit of the Wilsonian terms. But the legal point was not pressed by the Allies in general, even against Bulgaria and Turkey with whom Mr. Wilson had not negotiated at all. The general view was that Germany had negotiated on behalf of both herself and her Allies; and indeed the Wilsonian terms which Germany accepted made explicit references both to Austria-Hungary and to Turkey.

Purport of the Wilsonian Terms. - The general principles contained in Mr. Wilson's manifestoes were not all of the kind that a Peace Conference could enforce or promote. Some were principles of international morality; others could hardly be realized in a world which was still convulsed by national and racial animosities, by the sense of intolerable wrongs and of crushing disillusionments. The time was not yet ripe for insisting that the victors, equally with the vanquished, should abstain from " private international understandings of any kind," should throw down all " economic barriers " and should guarantee " equality of trade conditions " (most favoured nation treatment) to their former enemies. Still less could the Allies agree at that date to give " adequate guarantees " that their armaments should be " reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety " within any definite period of time. It was easier for the Allies to accept some other principles which made a strong appeal to the moral sense of mankind: as, for instance, that nations ought to be governed in their foreign policy by the rules of private honour and by respect for the common law of civilized society; that " every part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case, and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent"; and that "no special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all." These, and other similar rules, were valuable as a statement of the spirit in which the wiser heads of the Conference would approach their work. But the Conference could hardly do more for the propagation of Mr. Wilson's ideals than it did in approving the Anglo-American scheme of a League of Nations " formed under specific covenants " to ensure that " the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right." When it provided that the Covenant of the League should form an integral part of each of the new treaties, and when it made the League responsible for supervising and revising many parts of the peace settlement, the Conference loyally accepted the conception of the League which Mr. Wilson had explained in his address of Sept. 27 and in several speeches of his European tour (Dec. 1918 - Jan. 1919). The League was planned to be, as he had said at the Guildhall in London on Dec. 28, a permanent concert of Powers for the maintenance of the peace terms. It is easy now to blame the Allies for assuming that the Covenant, drafted by Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts in consultation with Mr. Wilson and Col. House, would be accepted without demur by the U.S. Senate. But their attitude towards the project of the League, when it was under discussion at the Conference, at least proves them honestly desirous of realizing Mr. Wilson's aspirations.

The territorial terms which Mr. Wilson had formulated were comparatively simple, though not always easy to reconcile with his principle of self-determination, which required that " every question whether of territory or of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship " should be settled on the basis of " the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned." Mr. Wilson himself subsequently confessed that, when he put self-determination on his programme (in spite of Mr. Lansing's fruitless objections, since revealed), he did so in ignorance of the very existence of some of the nationalities which afterwards invoked his aid. Literally and unconditionally applied, the principle of selfdetermination would have reduced eastern Europe to a chaos of privileged enclaves and economically helpless states; nor was it easy to see how it could be applied with any useful results to the German colonies or to the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire. The first of these two difficult cases was hardly met by Mr. Wilson's demand (in the Fourteen Points) that colonial questions should be settled with equal regard to the interests of the populations concerned and to the equitable claims of the Government whose title was to be determined. The solution eventually applied to both cases was that of mandates, a device first suggested by Gen. Smuts in Dec. 1918, and readily endorsed by Mr. Wilson when it was brought to his notice. As for the minor European nationalities, Mr. Wilson himself had already, before the Conference, indicated that their aspirations could not in every case be satisfied " without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world." This at least made it clear that a plebiscite would not be assumed to be in every case the one unfailing criterion of the justice of national claims.

The following is a brief summary of the territorial terms to which the Allied and Associated Powers were committed by the pre-Armistice negotiations: (1) Germany was to evacuate all Russian territory, and (2) to recognize the independence of all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations. (3) Belgium and the occupied territories of France, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro were to be evacuated. (4) Belgium was to be left in the position of a sovereign state. (5) Alsace and Lorraine were to be returned to France. (6) Poland and Serbia were to be given free and secure access to the sea. (7) The independence and territorial integrity of Poland and the Balkan states were to be assured by international guarantees. (8) The Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire were to be allowed to form a sovereign state; but the Straits were to be placed under international control, and the non-Turkish nationalities were to be allowed " an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." (9) The Czechoslovaks and the Yugosla y s within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were to determine their own political destiny. We may further mention Mr. Wilson's Ninth Point, demanding a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along "clearly recognizable lines of nationality." To this limitation of Italy's ambitions Sig. Orlando had never agreed. But his protest was not, unluckily, made public till May 1919.

Opening of the Conference

The invitations to the Conference were issued by the five principal and associated Powers, whose chief plenipotentiaries held consultations in Dec. and the early days of Jan. 1919, before they formally assembled at Paris. Mr. Wilson was in Paris from Dec. 13 to Dec. 25, in England from Dec. 26 to Dec. 31, in Italy from Jan. 3 to Jan. 6. M. Clemenceau, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino visited London early in December. Finally, on Jan. 12, there took place at the Quai d'Orsai a meeting of the Supreme War Council (a body constituted in Nov. 1917) which was attended by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing, M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino. On this occasion it was decided that only the representatives of the five chief Allied and Associated Powers (the fifth being Japan) should be entitled to attend all meetings of the Conference, and that other members should be summoned only when their special interests were involved in the discussion. The decision was taken without the other Allied and Associated Powers being consulted, but was in harmony with the practice of the Congress of Vienna (1815), and was defended on the ground that the five were " Powers with general interests." Membership of the Conference was accorded to 32 Powers in all. Enemy Powers were not admitted, and neutral Powers were only to attend, when specially summoned by the five, at sessions specially appropriated to the discussion of their claims. But all belligerents, and all Powers who had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, were entitled to appear at every plenary session. It had been originally proposed to put all " new states in process of formation " on the same footing as the neutrals with special interests. But the right of Poland and of Czechoslovakia to be represented in the Conference was conceded before the first plenary session. Croatians and Slovenians were in fact represented by the Serbians, but the enlarged kingdom of Serbia, owing to the opposition of Italy, was not officially recognized until the end of May. The five principal Powers settled the number of plenipotentiaries by whom each state might be represented, with special regard to the military importance of each Power and to the part which it had played in the war. The number of plenipotentiaries was a question of sentiment only, since no Power exercised more than one vote; but the question was not settled without some bickering. Finally five plenipotentiaries were assigned to each of the principal Powers; three apiece to Belgium, Brazil and Serbia; two apiece to Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam; one apiece to New Zealand, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay. All the Powers were allowed to make use of the panel system in choosing their plenipotentiaries, and the representatives of the British Dominions did important work on more than one occasion by virtue of their position on the panel of the British Empire. These arrangements were complete before the first plenary session (Jan. 18), which was merely asked to transact some formal business, on lines settled in advance by the Five. It elected M. Clemenceau as president of the Conference; it sanctioned the appointment of a secretariat, and also of a drafting committee on which the Five alone were represented. At the second plenary session (Jan. 25) certain of the minor Powers, Belgium and Canada amongst them, protested against the degree of control which the Five had assumed over the proceedings of the Conference. These protests were bluntly answered by M. Clemenceau; but they could not be altogether ignored. The smaller Allies were by degrees allowed a larger representation on some of the commissions and committees; and in this way a use was found for the abilities and experience of some highly distinguished statesmen, such as M. Venizelos.

Organization and Procedure

The original rules of procedure, drafted by M. Berthelot, do not throw much light on the methods of transacting business which were actually employed, and in some points they were quickly modified.' The conduct of affairs, until March 25, was in the hands of the Council of Ten, a body composed of two plenipotentiaries for each of the five Powers; it was simply the Supreme War Council adapted to new purposes. The plenipotentiaries were allowed to bring their expert advisers with them, and made free use of this permission; but the Council from the first availed itself of the power, accorded under rule 13, to refer technical questions to committees of experts. The proceedings of the Ten were secret; rule 8 provided for the publication of official communiqués, but these were usually so worded as to convey the minimum of information. Owing to the large numbers present at each session, the secrecy of the proceedings was seldom respected; and, while the unofficial reports published in the French press were severely censored, the correspondents of English and (more particularly) American papers were often successful in acquiring and transmitting important information. On Jan. 17 the Ten promised, in answering a protest from the correspondents, that the plenary sessions should be open to them, except in special cases. But these sessions were infrequent and, when they were open to the press, only transacted formal business. Those of May 6 and May 31, at which important differences of opinion became manifest, were held behind closed doors. The secrecy of the deliberations grew more complete after March 25, when the Council of Ten was superseded by the Council of Four (Mr. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Sig. Orlando). Thenceforward experts were merely summoned to answer questions; for over three weeks the only official continuously present was the interpreter (M. Mantoux); but in April Sir Maurice Hankey was admitted as secretary. The Four delegated certain questions to a council of five foreign ministers (Mr. Lansing, M. Pichon, Mr. Balfour, Baron Sonnino, Baron Makino), but this body did not become prominent until the end of June when the Four dispersed and left all current business to be transacted by the Five.

Each of the principal Powers, except France, provided its plenipotentiaries with a large staff of officials and other experts. These " delegations " served as panels from which was drawn the personnel of the innumerable commissions and committees appointed from time to time by the plenary sessions or by the Supreme Council. 2 Most of the earlier commissions were large and imposing bodies; each of the principal Powers contributed two or three representatives to each commission, while the other Powers were allowed to send, between them, five or ten. This was the constitution of the commissions on Reparations, on the Responsibility for the War, on the League of Nations, on International Labour Legislation, on Ports, Waterways and Railways, all of which were sanctioned by the second plenary conference (Jan 25). In Feb. and March five territorial commissions were constituted. On these only the principal Powers were represented. The subjects referred to them were the territorial claims of: (1) the Czechoslovaks, (2) the Poles, (3) Rumania and the Yugosla y s, (4) Greece and Albania, ' English was recognized at the Conference as of full equality with French as the official language, so that all the proceedings were bilingual. The British Dominions were recognized not only as an integral part of the British Empire delegation (being, for instance, part of the panel from which British representations on the Supreme Council were chosen), but also as states on an equality with other small independent states. Thus Gen. Botha and Gen. Smuts sometimes sat in the Supreme Council in one capacity and sometimes in the other.

2 " Supreme Council " was the generic name applied to whatever body - the Ten, the Four or the Five - happened to be in control of the proceedings.

(5) Belgium and Denmark. On Jan. 27 the Supreme Council appointed a large economic commission to draft the articles of the German treaty which related to such subjects as commercial relations, shipping, industrial property, pre-war contracts, and the liquidation of enemy debts. On Feb. 12 a naval and military committee, under Marshal Foch, was created to draft the terms relating to disarmament and the surrender of naval and military material. The Council of Four, like the Council of Ten, constantly employed expert committees, but showed a preference for comparatively small bodies which could be trusted to work with expedition.

For business not immediately connected with the making of treaties the Supreme Council made considerable use of the Armistice Commission at Spa, of the military staff of the old Supreme War Council at Versailles, and of the Supreme Economic Council at Paris. The last named of these bodies was instituted, at the instance of Mr. Wilson (Feb. 8) to advise the Conference on any economic measures of a temporary character which might be necessary to ensure: (a) that the devastated areas were duly supplied with the raw materials and other commodities required for purposes of reconstruction; (b) that the economic life of other countries which had suffered from the war was promptly revived; (c) that the pressing wants of neutral and ex-enemy countries were satisfied without detriment to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Supreme Economic Council absorbed many of the functions of those inter-Allied councils which, during the later stages of the war, had been charged with special problems of food supply and relief work, finance, shipping and blockade. It also formed special sub-sections to advise on the reorganizing of inland communications by rail and water, and on the control of the raw materials required for reconstruction. Lord Robert Cecil, representing Great Britain, usually presided at meetings of the Supreme Economic Council. Mr. Hoover, who was one of the American representatives, made himself responsible for the Food and Relief section, which had to deal with the most urgent of all the duties referred to the Council. From Feb. 17 to the end of June the activity of the Supreme Council was unremitting. It was expected to see to the revictualling of Germany under the terms of the Armistice Convention. It organized relief work among the starving populations of eastern Europe. It reorganized the derelict transport systems of Austria-Hungary and Poland. Its German duties involved negotiations with a German finance commission, and the arranging of the Brussels agreement (March 14) under which Germany was supplied with foodstuffs up to the end of Aug. 1919. It was by successive recommendations of this council that the commercial blockade of Germany was partially relaxed in Feb., March and April; the most striking of these recommendations was that subjects of Allied countries should be free to trade with Germany, subject to any restrictions which their respective Governments might desire to maintain (April 24). In April the Council undertook to supervise the economic life of the left bank of the Rhine, during the period of occupation. After the German treaty had been signed the Supreme Economic Council was still utilized by the European Allies as an agent for the purchasing of foodstuffs in America and supplying Austria with coal. The last meeting was at Rome in Nov. 1919.

The Council of Ten, Jan. 18 - March 25 1919

The first section of the German treaty to be drafted in something like its final form was the Covenant of the League of Nations, which Mr. Wilson consistently regarded as " in a sense the most essential part of the peace settlement." By the end of Jan. the American and British delegates had agreed upon a draft. This was carefully discussed in the first fortnight of Feb. by the League of Nations Commission, on which were represented not only the five Great Powers, but also Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The most prominent personages who served on the commission, after Mr. Wilson who was its president, were Col. House (U.S.A.), Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts (British Empire), M. Bourgeois (France), Sig. Orlando (Italy) and M. Venizelos (Greece). The Covenant passed its first reading at the third plenary session (Feb. 14), but was amended in details before it was finally approved by the fifth plenary session (April 28). The amendments were chiefly inspired by the wish to meet American criticism. One provided that members of the League might withdraw on giving two years' notice; another expressly guarded the Monroe Doctrine from attack. Among amendments which were considered but rejected it is enough to mention: (a) a Japanese proposal that there should be a clause declaring all members of the League, without respect of race or colour, to be equal; (b) an American proposal to forbid any discrimination " in fiscal and economic regulations " between one nation and another (which would have put an end to Zollvereins and to imperial preference); (c) a French proposal to endow the League with a general staff and with powers to supervise the process of disarmament. (See League Of Nations.) To the same period belongs the main work of the Labour Commission, which began to draft the Labour Convention on Feb. i. The Convention was intended to convince the world that the interests of labour would be better served by supporting the Allies at Paris than by helping German Socialists to draft their Labour charter in the International Conference which sat at Berne in Jan. and February. The Commission, first proposed by M. Clemenceau, had an American chairman (Mr. Gompers); among the other prominent members were Mr. Barnes (Great Britain) and M. Vandervelde (Belgium). It contained no elected representatives of labour, but conferred with a number of labour leaders who were specially invited to Paris for the purpose. Its work proceeded smoothly and swiftly. The Convention enumerates nine fundamental principles, for drafting which Mr. Gompers was responsible; but otherwise it refrains from any attempt at remedial legislation. It is mainly concerned with outlining the organization, powers and procedure of a Labour Conference (an international labour parliament) and a Labour Office (a bureau of experts). The Convention links up the Labour Conference with the League of Nations, and provides that the original members of the League shall also be the original members of the Conference. The German delegates proposed (in May 1919) that the Convention should be revised by a conference of trade unions, in the light of the German Labour charter and of the Berne resolutions. This proposal was however rejected; the Convention in its final form owes nothing to German amendments. It forms section 13 of the Treaty of Versailles, and appears in all the other treaties with enemy powers. The Labour Conference met for the first time at Washington in the autumn of 1919, but was attended by no American delegates, owing to the fact that the U.S. Senate had not yet ratified the Treaty of Versailles. (See International Labour.) The Labour Convention was not presented to the Conference until April r, and for some weeks after the third plenary session (Feb. 14) it seemed as though the Ten and their satellitic commissions were making little progress. This impression was strengthened by the temporary absence of Mr. Lloyd George (Feb. 7 - March 5) and of Mr. Wilson (Feb. 14 - March 14), who departed on urgent business of different kinds to London and to Washington respectively. For a time the Supreme Council was also robbed of M. Clemenceau; he was wounded on Feb. 19 by a French anarchist and was not seen again in public until March io. But in any case the Supreme Council was at this stage burdened with a mass of formal duties which could not be avoided or postponed. It was necessary, under the rules of procedure, to hear the views of the " members with special interests." Late in Jan. audiences were given to the claimants for the German colonies, among whom the British Dominions were conspicuous. Then came the turn of the minor Powers and the oppressed nationalities: Rumania, Greece, Czechoslovakia, the Hejaz, Belgium, the Syrians, the Druses, the Zionists, the Yugosla y s, Denmark, the Albanians, the Armenians and the Montenegrins. The ceremonial interviews rarely added anything to the case which had been already presented in writing; and all the claims, except those involving considerations of high policy, were referred, as the interviews concluded, to the five territorial commissions, and to a central commission which was appointed (Feb. 27) to coordinate the conclusions of the territorial experts. On a few questions there was substantial progress. A provisional agreement was reached as to the future of the German colonies. A Financial Drafting Commission defined the questions of finance and reparation which must be settled by the experts. Between Feb. 12 and March 3 the Military and Naval Drafting Committee prepared the first draft of the naval and military terms, and early in March Mr. Lloyd George persuaded the Supreme Council to accept the principle that all the enemy Powers should be obliged to abolish compulsory military service. By March io the naval, military and air terms were practically complete and on March 17, when Mr. Lloyd George was contemplatingranother visit to London, Mr. Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Sig. Orlando sent him a joint letter, begging that he would remain in Paris for the fortnight which, in their opinion, was the time required for completing the German treaty. Mr. Lloyd George agreed, but on condition that a more expeditious and more secret procedure than that of the Ten was adopted. He carried his point; on March 25 an official notice was issued that informal discussions by the delegates of the principal Powers would be substituted for the methods hitherto adopted. With this announcement began the period of the Council of Four. The Marquis Saonji, who might have claimed a seat in this conclave, abstained from doing so, except when Japanese interests were involved, on the ground of his ignorance of European languages.

Council of Four, March 25 - May 7. - The Four worked at high pressure to complete the German treaty. They met two or three times a day; they confined their discussions to matters of principle and high policy; they left questions of detail and all technical subjects to the experts. But there were delicate and urgent problems, not all vitally connected with the treaty, which came up at many sessions, and some of these were never finally settled at Paris. The Four could never concentrate on one subject, to the exclusion of all others, until a definite agreement was reached; for each stage in a particular discussion involved a further reference to the experts, and a longer or shorter delay until the experts were ready with their report. Hence a chronological record of their debates, if such were available, would be a bewildering document. But it is known what were the more contentious topics debated in these six weeks, and what were the main issues in each case.

(a) The guarantees for Germany's compliance with the treaty were a special anxiety to France. She asked that there should be a prolonged occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by French, British and American forces; that the Rhine bridgeheads (Cologne, Coblenz and Mainz) should be included in the zone of occupation; that the left bank should be permanently detached from Germany to form a neutral and autonomous state (" Rhineland Republic "). Great Britain and America. had offered France defensive treaties (the " Three Power Treaty ") in lieu of these cumbrous precautions (March 14).

M. Clemenceau accepted the treaties, but also pressed for the adoption of the French scheme. His colleagues would not hear of a Rhineland Republic; but they agreed that the left bank, and a deep belt on the right bank, should be denuded of fortifications (Art. 180); and, more reluctantly, that there should be joint occupation for 15 years. Still another concession was extracted from them - the last clause of Art. 429, which provides that, even at the end of 15 years, the occupation may be continued if in the opinion of the Allies France is insufficiently guaranteed against an unprovoked attack. This clause was intended to provide for the contingency of the British or the American defensive treaty being still unratified at that date.

(b) The Saar valley was claimed by France in compensation for her ruined mines. At first she had asked for complete political sovereignty on historical grounds; but this solution, which involved the subjection of 650,000 Germans to French rule, was rejected by her Allies, who would not even restore the French frontier of 1814 in this region. But they conceded to. her the Saar coal-mines in full ownership, and, not without some hesitation, agreed that for 15 years the Saar valley should be withdrawn from the control of Germany and placed under the League of Nations. At the end of that time the inhabitants were to decide between three alternatives - the status quo, union with France, union with Germany. If they voted for Germany, then France was to receive the price of the mines from Germany or from the Reparations Commission.

(c) The Reparations Clauses were also of special interest to France. Her representatives insisted passionately on " integral reparation," the assessment of the damage actually done by Germany and by her allies, and the exaction of the utmost farthing. How otherwise, they asked, could France escape bankruptcy? Many English and American experts were impressed Iby the exhaustion of Germany, the danger of driving her to desperation, the unwisdom of leaving her liability indeterminate for the many months which would pass before a complete bill for damages could be presented; and they pressed for taking in final quittance whatever sum (20 or 40 milliards of marks at most) Germany could be compelled to pay at once. The French view prevailed, but there was another battle over the categories of damage, and Mr. Wilson was persuaded only with great difficulty to admit that pensions and allowances to combatants and to their families came within the terms of his pre-Armistice conditions. There were further debates on the capacity of Germany to pay and on the sum for which she might conceivably be liable. In the end the extent both of her legal liability and of the sum to be actually paid was left for future definition. Germany was to pay 20 milliards of gold marks in cash and kind by May r 1921; and out of this sum the Allies would pay for any foodstuffs or raw materials which they considered indispensable to Germany. Two further sums, each of 40 milliards, were to be exacted later, bringing the total to 100 milliards; but this, in the words of the treaty, was only " a first instalment." The final account would be presented by the Reparations Commission before May i 1921, and would be paid off by degrees over a period of 30 years, with interest at 5 per cent. On Sept. 5 1919 the French Minister of Finance encouraged the Chamber to expect that 300 milliards might be extracted from Germany. In Jan. 1921 the European Allies agreed to exact one-third of this sum, payable with interest over 40 years, and supplemented by a tax of 12 per cent ad valorem on German exports. This was rejected by Germany, but at the end of April the Allies presented an ultimatum which was accepted.

(d) The delimitation of the western frontier of Poland was not effected without serious debates. France desired to treat Poland liberally. Great Britain was impressed with the risk of creating a new Germania irredenta to trouble the peace of eastern Europe. The experts were anxious that due weight should be given to Mr. Wilson's Thirteenth Point, which stipulated that Poland should have a free and secure access to the sea. Poland (supported by France) asked for full sovereignty over Danzig and the approaches to that city. But the population of Danzig was almost wholly German, and the frontier demanded by Poland would have left 2,000,000 Germans under Polish rule - a solution which Mr. Lloyd George considered inadmissible. Thanks to Mr. Lloyd George a compromise was at last arranged which left Danzig a free city under the protection of the League of Nations with a very exiguous degree of freedom. The Polish frontier, in this compromise, was still drawn with more regard to the economic interests of Poland than to the rights of nationalities. But, before the German treaty was signed, the frontier was again modified, and other changes were introduced, in deference to the expostulations of the German delegates; in particular it was determined that in Upper Silesia a plebiscite should be held.

(e) Shantung was demanded by the Japanese plenipotentiaries under the treaties which China had concluded with Japan in 1915, but which, according to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, had been extorted by force majeure; also under a secret agreement of 1917 with the European Allies, to which the United States had never adhered. For a long time Mr. Wilson resisted the Japanese claim, but he finally accepted (April 30 1919) a compromise which the Chinese regarded with so much disfavour that they declined to sign the German treaty. The Japanese were allowed to keep the town of Kiaochow with the adjacent district, and the right of exploiting the mines and the railways in the Shantung peninsula; but they gave an oral understanding that they would restore the sovereignty of the peninsula to China " as soon as possible." Mr. Nilson subsequently (Aug. 19) told a committee of the American Senate that he would have preferred a different solution. But the Japanese claim was pressed at a time when Italy seemed on the point of seceding from the Conference; and a second secession would have made it difficult to conclude any treaty with the Germans.

(f) The Italian claims to Austro-Hungarian territories were continually under discussion during April. They were primarily founded on the Treaty of London; but Sig. Orlando claimed Fiume also, taking his stand in this case on the right of selfdetermination which he otherwise repudiated. Mr. Wilson at first argued that the Treaty of London was incompatible with the principle, enunciated in the Fourteen Points, that " a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality " (Point Nine). But Sig. Orlando objected that Italy was not bound by this principle, against which he himself had twice protested in the Supreme War Council, when the terms of the German Armistice were under discussion. His protests had been overruled at that time, on the ground that they were irrelevant to the discussions with Germany; but he had reserved the right to dispute Point Nine, and he asserted this right to the fullest extent in April. On April 14 Mr. Wilson gave way to the extent of intimating that he would accept the northern (Brenner) frontier assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London, and would admit Italy's claim (based on the same treaty) to Lissa and Valona; but he required that Fiume, as the natural outlet for the trade of Yugoslavia and Austria, should be made a free city within the Yugoslav customs area, and he held that, as regarded Dalmatia, Italy ought to be content with guarantees for the rights of the Italian minorities living in that province. Subsequently he rejected a proposal, made by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, that Italy should be awarded Fiume in exchange for a renunciation of her treaty claims upon Dalmatia; on April 20 he declined to discuss the Adriatic problem any further; and on the 23rd he created a sensation by publishing a statement of the grounds on which he resisted the Italian pretensions. Next day Sig. Orlando left the Conference, and Baron Sonnino followed him within 24 hours. On April 29 the Italian Chamber, of ter hearing Orlando's account of the negotiations, reaffirmed his definition of the Italian claims by an overwhelming majority. On April 30 the German delegates arrived at Versailles and the Council of Four (now reduced to three) had to face the possibility that Italy would not sign the treaty; at this time was drafted the ratification clause which stipulates that the treaty shall come into force as soon as ratified by Germany and any three of the principal Powers. But on May 4 Orlando relented. He and his colleagues reached Paris on May 7, a day too late for the sixth plenary session which approved the draft treaty, but a few hours before the draft was handed to the Germans at Versailles. The Council had not surrendered to Italy on the Adriatic question, but it was left open for future discussion.

The Draft Treaty and the German Delegates

Two considerable sections of the treaty, the Covenant of the League and the Labour Convention, had been finally approved on April 28 by the fifth plenary session without much debate; the chief feature of the proceedings was that Baron Makino and M. Bourgeois expressed regret that the commission had not seen fit to accept the Japanese and French amendments. The sixth plenary session (May 6), which was held in secret to approve the treaty as a whole, revealed more serious differences. The Chinese protested against the Shantung clauses, the Portuguese against the African settlement, and Marshal Foch argued that the military guarantees for the submission of Germany were inadequate. His objection was met, to a certain extent, by the announcement, on May 7, that the United States and Great Britain were prepared to sign treaties with France, guaranteeing her against German aggression. But the session of May 6 was remarkable for the strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction among the minor Powers " with special interests " (including the British Dominions) who felt that their views had not been sufficiently considered. On May 7 at the Trianon the Conference saw the draft Meaty handed to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the principal German delegate, and heard him deliver, without rising from his chair, a sharp attack upon their dilatory methods. He stated that, in the past six months, the blockade had been responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in Germany. " Think of that when you speak of guilt and punishment." He and his countrymen accepted the liabilities to which they were committed by the Armistice and Mr. Wilson's terms. They were prepared to play their part in restoring Belgium and the devastated areas of France. But he intimated that Germany did not hope for a just peace. " We are under no illusions as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our helplessness;.. we know the power of the hatred that we encounter here." Fifteen days were allowed the Germans for preparing their reply, but the term of grace was eventually extended to May 29. The German delegates, to expedite the negotiations, transmitted their criticisms by instalments, each dealing with one topic (League of Nations, Labour Charter, Saar Valley, etc.); in some cases they tendered several notes successively on the same subject. The Supreme Council had arranged that these notes should be considered by 13 committees, each of which was specially responsible for one section of the treaty, and interim replies were returned to the Germans very promptly. Consequently much of the disputed ground had been covered in preliminary correspondence before the German counter-proposals were presented as a whole; and M. Clemenceau was able to dispatch the reply of the Allies on June 16. Both documents were polemical in character. The Germans, besides criticising many particular articles of the draft treaty, argued that its general tenor was inconsistent with the terms of the pre-Armistice agreement; and the Allies repudiated this imputation with some heat. The main criticisms of the Germans are noted below. Their counter-proposals were numerous, and only the more striking can be given here: (a) Reparation - They offered to pay a sum not exceeding zoo milliards of gold marks, partly in gold but mainly in commodities and services; but they claimed the right of appeal from the assessment of the Reparations Committee to a neutral arbitrator. They would pay the first 20 milliards by May 1 1926; but they claimed credit for all war material surrendered under the Armistice conditions, for state railways and state property ceded along with AlsaceLorraine and the colonies, and for the share of the German public debts which, as they maintained, these territories ought to bear. No definite period was fixed for the payment of the remaining So milliards, though it was stated that Germany would allocate to this purpose annually a sum equal to the average net peace budget of the empire before the war and it was stipulated that no interest should be paid. (b) Territorial. - They demanded a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine which should give the inhabitants an option between union with France, union with Germany and complete independence. In lieu of the Saar valley they offered to France fixed annual supplies of coal, pending the reconstruction of the French mines. In lieu of ceding West Poland, Danzig and Memel they offered to make Danzig, Konigsberg and Memel free ports (under German sovereignty). They demanded that Germany's claim to keep her colonies should be referred to arbitration. (c) Commercial. - They offered to the Allies " most favoured nation " treatment in German markets for a restricted number of years, upon condition of complete reciprocity; and " national " treatment to Allied goods passing over German railways (without a time limit) on the same condition. (d) League of Nations. - They offered to negotiate on this subject, taking the Allies' draft covenant as a basis. But, as conditions precedent to negotiation, they demanded that Germany should be admitted immediately to the League; that members of the League should be pledged to abstain from waging economic war; that the Allied Powers should, within two years, abolish compulsory military service and themselves disarm. (e) Occupied Territory. - They proposed that the armies of occupation should be withdrawn within six months after the signing of the treaty.

These proposals constituted a manifesto addressed to the public outside the Conference; but in some particulars they agreed with proposals which had been forcibly argued in the inmost circles of the plenipotentiaries. M. Tardieu and Mr. Wilson Harris have both stated, apparently on good authority, that the idea of mitigating the treaty in essential details was before the Supreme Council at various dates from May 23 to June 13, and that one reason for these discussions was a doubt whether the treaty, as it stood, could be enforced on a recalcitrant Germany. Mr. Lloyd George was now the spokesman of the critics; among these were counted the leading members of his Ministry, who, together with Dominion representatives, had been summoned to a special meeting at Paris on June I. He protested against the idea of maintaining a large army of occupation for a considerable time. He was now (for a short while at least) in favour of a fixed indemnity; he advocated revision of the Polish frontier and the early admission of Germany to the League of Nations. But it was hardly possible to rewrite the treaty at this stage; the dangers of further delay were too serious to be lightly accepted. On June 13 the movement for revision came to an end. Its only consequences were some concessions on secondary points. On Reparation and Military Occupation the Allies stood by their original draft. They conceded some slight changes in the Polish frontier with the object of bringing it " into closer harmony with the ethnographic division." They agreed to a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. They intimated that they were opening negotiations at once for an eventual reduction of their own armaments. They withdrew a provision for internationalizing the Kiel canal. They promised that Germany, if she complied with the terms of the treaty, should be admitted to the League of Nations " in the early future." They invited Germany to offer, within four months of the signing of the treaty, a lump sum in settlement of the whole bill for reparation, but this suggestion was not accepted.

Signing of the Treaties of Versailles, June 28. - All arrangements had been made for a general advance of the Armies of Occupation in case the German Government refused to sign the treaty, and there were a few days of suspense while Count Brockdorff-Rantzau was conferring with his colleagues at Weimar. On June 20 the Scheidemann Cabinet resigned, ostensibly because it would not consent to sign, but actually from a well-founded consciousness that it no longer commanded the confidence of the German Labour party. On June 21 a new Premier, Herr Bauer, offered to sign on conditions: he stated that the articles requiring the surrender of war criminals and those declaring Germany to be the sole author of the war must be omitted. He was told that conditions could not be accepted, and on June 22 obtained the leave of the Weimar National Assembly to sign unconditionally. Formal assurances to this effect were given on June 23 at Versailles, through Herr Haimhausen who, on the previous day, had succeeded Brockdorff-Rantzau as head of the German delegation. During the last days of suspense the German warships interned at Scapa Flow were sunk by their commanders, acting, it was stated, on orders from the German Admiralty (June 21).

The new German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Hermann Muller, and his colleague Dr. Bell signed the treaty on June 28 in the Salle des Glaces at Versailles in the presence of all the plenipotentiaries, except those of China, who absented themselves to emphasize their protest of May 6 against the Shantung articles. Before and after this ceremony several subsidiary treaties were signed: (a) Defensive treaties with France, by Great Britain and the United States, undertaking to defend France against unprovoked aggression. The British treaty was ratified by Great Britain on Nov. 20 1919, but it was not to become binding until the American treaty should be ratified;, and since American ratification was subsequently refused (see United States: History), the British treaty became a dead letter. (h) A protocol defining certain ambiguous conditions in the German treaty. (c) An agreement between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany, which defines the nature of the military occupation of the Rhineland. (d) The Polish minorities treaty by which Poland contracts with the Allies and with Germany to respect the civil and political rights of racial and religious minorities within her jurisdiction. The idea of imposing such a treaty was first laid before the Conference by Jewish associations, whose fears were excited by the reports of Polish pogroms in the winter of 1918-9; but it was also of great importance for the protection of German and other non-Polish minorities. Similar treaties were afterwards concluded by the principal Powers with Czechoslovakia, with Rumania and with Yugoslavia. The main Treaty of Versailles was ratified by President Ebert, on behalf of Germany, on July io; by the King of Italy, by King George V. and by President Poincare in Oct. 1919. But it was not till Jan. 10 1920, when Germany at last signed a protocol agreeing to give compensation for the ships which had been scuttled at Scapa Flow, that the final exchange of ratifications took place at Paris, and the state of war between the European Allies (but not the United States) and Germany was formally terminated.

Treaty of Versaille

Territorial Terms. - Germany surrenders Alsace and Lorraine to France, free and quit of all public debts (Arts. 51, 55), and accepts the arrangements regarding the Saar basin which have been described above (Art. 45-50). Luxemburg ceases to form part of the German Zollverein, and Germany renounces all rights over the railways in Luxemburg (Art. 40). Belgium receives Moresnet neutre and part of Prussian Moresnet (Arts. 32, 33); also Eupen and Malmedy (Art. 34) subject to the result of a plebiscite, which was held in Sept. 1920 and resulted in the final reunion of these districts to Belgium, by whom they had been continuously claimed since 1815. These acquisitions give Belgium some valuable forests and railway stations and a population of about 70,000 souls. The frontier between Germany and Denmark is to be settled in accordance with the wishes of the population (Art. 109); these were ascertained by plebiscites held in North Schleswig (Feb. 10 1920) and in Central Schleswig (March 14 1920) when the former district voted for reunion with Denmark and the latter voted for Germany. Under Art. 87 Germany recognizes the complete independence of Poland and surrenders Danzig together with the territories received by Prussia under the partitions of Poland (Posnania, W. Prussia) and part of Middle Silesia; in 1910 these districts had a population of 2,931,000 souls of whom 1,087,000 were Germans. Article 88 provides for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia which had been conceded on June 16 1919; the voting (March 21 1921) seemed to prove that this clause was a concession of substance, and the subsequent award of the League of Nations (Oct. 1921), in favour of Poland, was correspondingly disappointing to Germany. By Arts. 94 and 96 plebiscites are ordered for the Masurenland region of East Prussia, and the West Prussian Kreise of Stuhm, Marienburg, Marienwerder and Rosenberg; in July 1920 both plebiscites produced substantial majorities for Germany. By Art. 99 Memel with the adjacent territory (total pop. 122,000 souls) is detached from East Prussia and put at the disposal of the principal Powers, who intended that Memel should be the port of Lithuania but had not, up to May 1921, given effect to that intention. Article loo similarly assigns Danzig (pop. 200,000) to the principal Powers, who (in accordance with this Article) have recognized Danzig as a free city with an elected legislature under a high commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. But Poland will control the Vistula and the main railways within the territory of Danzig, and will be responsible for the foreign relations of the city, which is also to be brought within the Polish customs area (Art. 104).

Under Art. 156 Germany abandons to Japan her rights in the Shantung peninsula; she also renounces her concessions in Hankow and Tientsin (Art. 132), her privileges in Egypt under the Capitulations (Art. 147) and all her treaty rights in Morocco (Art. 141). By Art. 119 she renounces in favour of the principal Powers all her overseas possessions. These, in accordance with Art. 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, will be administered by mandatories of the League. The Supreme Council made, on May 6 1919, a provisional distribution of mandates for the German colonies. German E. Africa was allotted to Great Britain, by whom it was renamed Kenya Colony (July 8 1920); but on May 30 1919, Great Britain resigned the districts of Urundi and Ruanda, which border on the Belgian Congo, to be held by Belgium under a separate mandate. German S.W. Africa went to the Dominion of South Africa. France and Great Britain received a joint mandate for Togoland and Cameroon, with permission to delimit their respective jurisdictions by mutual agreement. German New Guinea. was entrusted to Australia, German Samoa to New Zealand, the island of Nauru (a rich source of phosphates) to Great Britain, the German islands in the North Pacific to Japan. But the United States subsequently announced (Feb. 21 1921) that Mr. Wilson did not agree to the island of Yap, an important cable station, being included in the Japanese mandate, and this question was one of the matters considered at the Washington Conference. (See Washington Conference.). Treaty of Versailles - Reparations and Financial and Commercial Terms. - The articles of the treaty which define the sums to be paid by Germany have been epitomized above. The annexes to the Reparations section specify some of the payments in kind which Germany is to make immediately on account of reparation: (a) She is to surrender all her merchant ships of 1,600 tons gross and upward; one-half of her merchant ships between 1,600 and 1,000 tons gross; also one-quarter of her fishing fleet and a proportion not exceeding one-fifth of her river craft. By Feb. 10 1920 she had surrendered vessels of over i,000 tons amounting to 1,824,828 tons gross. (b) She is to furnish live stock, machinery, equipment, tools and building materials for the reconstruction of devastated areas. (c) During the next io years she is to find annually 7,000,000 tons of coal for France, 8,000,000 tons for Belgium, and for Italy deliveries amounting on the average to 8,000,000 tons per annum. Also she is to make good the difference between the actual output of the French pits in the Nord and Pas de Calais and their prewar average output. But, since May 1920, her total liability for coal has been reduced to 2,000,000 tons a month. According to the Conference note of June 16 1919, the Germans might terminate this system of payment in kind as soon as they pleased after May I 1921. If Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Reparations Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way." The Reparations Commission is a body appointed, under Art. 2 33, with the duties of estimating Germany's liabilities and her capacity to pay, of insisting on the due performance of her obligations to pay in gold and in kind, and of seeing that the German scheme of taxation " is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the Powers represented on the Commission." The Commission is to consist of seven delegates representing the principal Powers, Belgium and Yugoslavia; but no more than five of these may vote at any meeting. The United States, Great Britain, France and Italy have a vote on every occasion; Japan and Yugoslavia only vote when their special interests are concerned; Belgium votes when neither Japan nor Yugoslavia is entitled to do so. On certain questions the unanimous vote of the meeting is required to make the decision valid; as, for instance, on the question of cancelling the whole or any part of the debt or obligations of Germany. The powers assigned to the Commission were severely criticised at the Conference by the German delegates, who said that they were greater than those which any German emperor had ever possessed in Germany. It remained, however, to be seen how those powers would be utilized afterwards. The Commission has considerable powers under the other treaties, being made responsible, directly or indirectly, for the execution of the Reparations clauses in each; and it was conceivable that it might remain in existence for the next 42 years, or even longer.

The financial clauses provide that Germany shall pay the costs of the armies of occupation (Art. 249). They safeguard the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of enemy assets and property within their respective jurisdictions (Art. 252) - a clause of great importance since the German assets held by Great Britain exceeded i 20,000,000 sterling, and those held by the United States exceeded $50o,000,000. On the other hand, ceded German territories, other than Alsace-Lorraine and the German colonies, are to be burdened with a due proportion of the German pre-war debt (Arts. 254, 2 55, 2 57). Germany transfers to the Allies any claims she may have to payment or repayment by Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey (Art. 261).

The most striking feature of the commercial terms is that they impose on Germany a number of unilateral obligations for limited periods of time. For five years she must grant " most favoured nation" treatment to the Allies, in respect of both her imports and her exports (Arts. 264-7). For five years goods imported into Germany from Alsace-Lorraine, up to the average quantities of the years 1911-3, are to be free from German import duties; and imports from the ex-German provinces of Poland are similarly privileged for three years (Art. 268). The Allies may impose a special customs regime on the occupied territories " to safeguard the economic interests of the population " (Art. 270). For three years Germany may not raise the import duties on certain commodities (chiefly produced by Belgium and Italy) above the lowest rates to which these commodities were liable before July 31 1914 (Art. 269).

Treaty of Versaille

Military, Naval and Air Clauses. - Germany is required to abolish universal compulsory military service (Art. 173); her army is to be reduced, by a fixed date - which was originally March 31 1920, but subsequently altered to Jan. r 1921 - to a maximum total of 100,000 officers and men (Art. 160). The great general staff and all similar organizations are to be dissolved (ib.), and associations of all kinds are forbidden to instruct or exercise their members in the use of arms (Art. 177). The standing army is to be composed of volunteers recruited on a long-service system (Arts. 173-5). The stock of arms, munitions and military equipment which Germany may provide for this army is strictly limited; and the manufacture of such materials may only be carried out in factories approved by the Allies (Art. 168). All such materials in excess of Germany's legitimate requirements are to be surrendered within two months after the treaty comes into force (Art. 169). Germany is required to destroy all fortifications on the right bank of the Rhine within a distance of 50 km. from the river, and in the whole of her territory on the left bank (Art. 180). The size of her navy is defined; she may not keep more than 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo-boats; no submarines are allowed (Art. 181). She is to surrender 8 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 50 torpedo-boats (Art. 185), all her submarines (Art. 188), all military and naval aeroplanes and dirigibles (Art. 202). Warships and submarines still under construction are to be broken up. Germany's air forces are to be entirely disbanded by Oct.

I 1919 (Art. 199). The personnel of her navy, including officers, is not to exceed 15,000, and is to be recruited on a long-service system (Arts. 183, 194). The execution of these terms will be supervised by inter-Allied Commissions of Control armed with full powers of inspection and investigation (Arts. 203-210).

Criticisms of the Treaty

One of the earliest critics was Gen. Smuts, who signed the treaty on behalf of South Africa, and on the same day issued a statement in which he spoke of " territorial settlements that will need revision " and " indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe." He said that he had signed " because the real work of making peace will only begin after this Treaty has been signed." Mr. J. M. Keynes, till June 10 the chief finance expert of the British delegation, has argued (in his book on Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in Nov. '919) that the claims of the Allies to reparation have been unjustifiably inflated by claims for separation allowances and pensions to the families of combatants, and for pensions and for compensation money paid to the wounded and disabled; and that the demands made on Germany are out of all relation to her capacity to pay. These points are naturally taken in the German counter-proposals of May 29, which accuse the Allies of desiring to fasten " a system of slave labour " upon Germany. " If," says this document, " they impose upon Germany a debt which robs her of every possibility of a future; if as a consequence every improvement of Germany's economic condition, which the German people might achieve by tireless diligence and Spartan thrift, would lead simply to this, that even greater payments for the discharge of this debt would be imposed upon us, then any delight in creative work, any spirit of initiative, would perish for all time in Germany." The experience of 1920 and 1921 showed that this prophecy was overdrawn, but it has suggested to more recent critics the reflection that the Allies might have obtained more, if they had demanded less. Experience has also shown the unreality of the terrifying picture which the Germans, and also Mr. Keynes, presented of the Reparations Commission as a despotic tribunal created " to exploit the labour of the German people for the benefit of the creditor states." Another subject which frequently recurs in the German note is that of the treatment accorded to German private property in the dominions of the Allies, in AlsaceLorraine and in the German colonies. They objected to the general policy of liquidation and of referring the expropriated persons to the German Government for compensation. They argued that, by international law, private property ought to have been respected even during the war. They complained that the Allies reserved the right to liquidate German property in their own territories for an indefinite period after the war. They pointed out that Germany could only compensate the sufferers by printing more and more paper money, in which case " Germany with her currency constantly depreciating would be forced to flood the world market with goods at ridiculously low prices." But the greatest emphasis of all is laid on the complaint that the Allies, by the terms of their treaty, are violating the " innate rights of nation." The right of sovereignty is said to be infringed by the powers of the Reparations Commission and of the International Commission appointed to control the navigation of the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, the Rhine and the Upper Danube. The seizure of her colonies is represented as meaning that Germany is denied " the right and the duty to cooperate in the joint task which devolves upon civilized mankind of exploring the world scientifically and of educating the backward races." It is further alleged that the right of selfdetermination has been consistently overridden in the territorial settlement, inasmuch as the fate of the Saar valley (for 15 years), of Alsace-Lorraine, of Danzig and Memel, has been settled without a plebiscite, and Austria is virtually forbidden to throw in her lot with Germany, however greatly the populations concerned desire this union. On the topic of self-determination the Allies showed themselves particularly sensitive in their reply of June 16 1919. This principle, as we have seen, had already caused them some embarrassment; they had not all interpreted it alike; and Mr. Wilson himself had reluctantly waived its application in certain cases which were complicated by economic or strategical considerations. On the other hand the Allies absolutely declined to discuss the categories of damage for which they were demanding reparation, and merely asserted that this part of the treaty had been drafted " with scrupulous regard to the correspondence leading up to the Armistice of Nov. 11 1918." The Austrian Treaty Negotiations. - The drafting of the Austrian treaty was begun some time before the German treaty had been signed, and the Austrian delegates arrived at St. Germain-en-Laye on May 14 1919. But there were unexpected delays in completing the first draft, which could not be submitted to the seventh plenary session until May 29. Even then the military, financial and reparation terms and part of the political terms were reserved; and in this incomplete form the draft was handed (on June 2) to Dr. Renner, the principal Austrian delegate. On the same day the Serb-Croat-Slovene state (Yugoslavia) was formally recognized by France and Great Britain, who thus at length followed the example set by Mr. Wilson nearly four months before (Feb. 5). Even in its incomplete state the draft showed the great concessions which had been made, at Austria's expense, to Italy and to Czechoslovakia. By May 29 Mr. Wilson had withdrawn his opposition to the Italian claim (under the secret Treaty of London) for a frontier which touched the crest of the Brenner Pass and gave Italy 200,000 German subjects. The draft showed this frontier. It also showed that the 3,000,000 Germans living within the historic boundaries of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia were to be included in the Czechoslovak state. Against these arrangements the Austrian delegates protested in vain. They were more successful when they claimed the German districts of western Hungary as being not only German in sentiment but also economically indispensable to Austria (" the kitchen garden of Vienna ") and her natural bulwark against unprovoked attacks from the side of Hungary. This claim was granted on July 20, perhaps the more readily because of the defiant attitude of Bela Kun, the leader of the Hungarian Bolsheviks, who was still in possession of Budapest. The Austrian delegates asked the permission of the Conference for a plebiscite in western Hungary, but were told that this formality was needless, the sympathies of the population being unmistakable. Nevertheless western Hungary was still in the hands of the Hungarian Government till the autumn of 1921. A smaller, but still valuable concession, was that which restored to Austria the important railway junction of Radkersburg, originally assigned to Yugoslavia. The draft ordered a plebiscite to be taken in the Klagenfurt basin, which was claimed on ethnological grounds by the Yugosla y s and had been forcibly occupied by Yugoslav troops. Though the administration of the basin was provisionally assigned to Austria, the Austrians appear to have assumed that the plebiscite would be so managed as to ensure the victory of their rivals at the polls; and they lodged some protests on this assumption, which in fact was falsified. When at last the plebiscite was held (Oct. 10 1920), it was found that the whole of the disputed area preferred to remain under Austrian rule.

In the course of the negotiations with the Austrian delegates it became clear that the principal Powers as a whole were far more leniently disposed to Austria than the form of the Austrian draft treaty appeared to suggest. The draft had been constructed on the same lines as the German treaty, and the effect of the Austrian reparation clauses was to convey an impression of greater severity than was in fact intended. As in the German treaty, so in the Austrian, the total sum to be demanded was left uncertain. Austria was required to pay, by May I 1921, " a reasonable sum " which would be assessed by the Reparations Commission (Art. 181); and her remaining liability was to be defined by that body after that of Germany had been fixed (Art. 179). But, out of the " reasonable sum " to be paid in the first instance, the commission were to pay for any supplies of food and raw material which it deemed essential to Austria; and the Conference soon discovered that Austria was quite incapable of paying, either in gold or in kind, for the relief that she required and received. Austria was obliged to resign all claims to the merchant shipping owned by her nationals. She was required to find a quantity of live stock for the devastated areas of Italy, Yugoslavia and Rumania. But, in 1921, the Allies decided to waive all their outstanding claims against her on account of reparation. This act of grace makes it unnecessary to dwell upon the insistence with which the Supreme Council in 1919 emphasized their right to treat the new Austria - a state of 7,000,000 souls - as the legal heir to the liabilities of the Austrian Monarchy. The chief advantage which the principal Powers derived from this attitude was that of a legal title to dispose of the severed lands of the Austrian Monarchy. These lands the new Austria renounces (under Arts. 3 6, 47, 53, 59, 89 of the treaty) in favour of the beneficiaries appointed by the Conference. Similarly she renounces the interests of the old Austria outside Europe (Arts. 95-117).

Several concessions, other than those enumerated above, were notified to the Austrian delegates between June 2 and the date of signature. (I) The Supreme Council promised to support Austria's claim to membership of the League of Nations as soon as she possessed a responsible Government which had both the will and the power to fulfil its international obligations. This promise was fulfilled, and Austria was admitted to the League late in 1920 at a session held in Geneva. (2) The Council also conceded that the property of Austrian nationals in the former territories of the Dual Monarchy should not be liable to detention or confiscation by the Governments of those territories (Art. 267). (3) They sanctioned a temporary system (to last for five years) of preferential customs duties between Austria on the one side and Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other (Art. 222). (4) They reduced from five to three years the period during which the new states could claim " most favoured nation " treatment in Austria without reciprocity (Art. 232).

The second draft of the treaty was handed to the Austrian delegates on July 20 and was practically complete. The Austrians presented their final observations on Aug. 6; the Supreme Council gave its final reply on Sept. 2. On Sept. 8 the Austrian National Assembly, while protesting against the terms, authorized its delegates to sign; and this ceremony took place at St. Germainen-Laye on Sept. 10. But Rumania and Yugoslavia refused to sign because by doing so they would have pledged themselves to accept Minorities Treaties, similar in character and intention to that which Poland had signed at Versailles on June 28, under the terms of the German treaty. The argument which the principal Powers stated in defence of the Minorities Treaties was forcibly put by Mr. Wilson at the eighth plenary session (May 31). These Powers could not be expected to guarantee the independence and integrity of the new states, unless the latter would on their side guarantee equality of rights to the minorities, racial or religious, which, under the terms of the peace settlement, were being transferred from the allegiance of ex-enemy Governments. But this argument did not fit the case of Rumania or of Yugoslavia so completely as that of Poland or of Czechoslovakia. Rumania and Yugoslavia were old states, and (though greatly enlarged by the peace settlement) denied the right of the Conference to limit their sovereignty by special stipulations. They might have accepted minority treaties applying exclusively to new territories acquired under the peace settlement; but the Minorities Treaties presented for their signature applied indifferently to old and new territories alike. Eventually they were obliged to give way; but they did not sign the Austrian treaty and the Minorities Treaties until Dec. 10 1919, after receiving an ultimatum from the Conference. The final ratification of the Austrian treaty took place on July 16 1920.

Summary of Austrian Treaty

The new Austria includes the provinces of N. Tirol and Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Carinthia, Styria (N. of the Drave), a strip of western Hungary and Upper and Lower Austria. The treaty reserves for future determination considerable sectors of the frontier on the E. and S.E., but the Klagenfurt plebiscite has settled the most important of the doubtful points in Austria's favour. Unlike Germany, Austria has been obliged to give explicit guarantees of the rights of her minorities; these guarantees may, however, be modified with the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations (Arts. 62-9). Under the military clauses the Austrian army may not exceed a total of 30,000 officers and men, and is to be constituted and recruited by voluntary enlistment (Arts. 119, 120). Stocks of guns, munitions and equipment are restricted as in the German treaty, and surplus stocks are to be surrendered, and no air forces may be maintained. A special section of the Reparations Commission is constituted to assess and to collect the payments due from Austria (Art. 179); it is to include representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; but the four first named Powers have two votes apiece, and thus constitute a majority. Besides the " reasonable sum " to be paid before May I 1921 (Art. 181), Austria is required to hand over all merchant ships and fishing-boats owned by nationals of the former Austrian Monarchy, and up to 20% of her river fleet; also animals, machinery and equipment, up to the limits of her capacity, for the restoration of devastated territories. Immediate delivery is required of specified quantities of live stock for Serbia, Rumania and Italy. Austria is made liable for so much of the Austrian war debt as is held outside the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; but she is not liable for war debt bonds which are held by other states, or by their nationals, within those boundaries (Art. 205). All transferred territories of the monarchy are to be liable for their fair share of the pre-war Austrian debt (Art. 203). Austria renounces all claims to the state property, including royal property, lying within the transferred territories; but the states acquiring such property will be debited, and Austria will be credited, with its value by the Reparations Commission (Art. 208). The commercial clauses are similar to those of the German treaty. In the clauses relating to ports, railways and rivers, it is provided that the old Danube commission shall be revived, and that the Upper Danube (from Ulm downwards) shall be controlled by a new commission on which Great Britain, France, Italy, Rumania and the riparian states will be represented (Arts. 301, 302). Austria is guaranteed free access by railway to the Adriatic through the territories and the ports which have been severed from the monarchy (Art. 311).

The Austrian treaty is supplemented by two special agreements which were signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on Sept. 10 1919. By the first of these Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia agree with the other Allied and Associated Powers to make separate payments, not exceeding in the aggregate 1,500,000,000 gold francs, as a contribution to the costs of liberating the territories which have been transferred to them from the monarchy. By the second Italy agrees to make a similar payment, in consideration of the provinces assigned to her. None of these payments was to be made before 1926.

The Bulgarian Treaty, N ov. 24 1919

The Bulgarian delegates, headed by M. Theodoroff, the Prime Minister, arrived in Paris on July 26, but did not receive the draft treaty until Sept. 19. The terms were not altogether unexpected, for M. Theodoroff had lodged objections against some of them on Sept. 2. But five weeks elapsed before the formal observations of the delegates were presented to the Supreme Council (Oct. 24). The Bulgarians demurred to the terms of the territorial settlement, which were thought by critics on the side of the Allies to be too lenient; they also complained that Bulgaria was harshly treated in not being immediately admitted to the League of Nations. They protested that Bulgaria could not afford to abolish conscription and maintain an army of volunteers, even on the small scale prescribed by the draft treaty. The Supreme Council in their reply (Nov. 3) promised speedy admission to the League, but made no other concession of substance. Further remonstrances from the Bulgarians merely led M. Clemenceau to intimate (Nov. 5) that the treaty as it stood must be either accepted or rejected within ten days. By this time M. Theodoroff had resigned office. His party had been severely defeated at a general election held in Aug., and he shrank from the invidious responsibility of signing the treaty. A new Government was formed by the leader of the Agrarian party, M. Stambolisky; and, on Nov. 13, Bulgaria's acceptance of the inevitable was notified to the Supreme Council. The treaty was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on Nov. 27, M. Stambolisky acting as the sole signatory for Bulgaria.

The general principle of the territorial terms is to restore the frontiers of 1914; but Bulgaria cedes to the principal Powers the share of Thrace which had been left to her by the Treaty of Bucharest; the Powers undertake to provide (by arrangement with Greece) outlets for Bulgarian trade on the Aegean. Certain districts are transferred (for strategic reasons) from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia; the most important of these districts contains the town of Strumitza. It is stated that further transferences of territory to Yugoslavia were considered at the Conference, but were rejected on ethnological grounds as they would have affected districts in which the Bulgarian nationality preponderates. The reparation terms are more definite than those of the German and Austrian treaties. Bulgaria is required to pay 2,250,000,000 gold francs by half-yearly instalments extending over a period of 37 years. An inter-Allied commission of three members (representing France, Great Britain and Italy) will remain in Bulgaria to see that the reparation terms are duly honoured. This body will decide how the half-yearly payments are to be raised. It will prepare a list of the taxes and other revenues which are to be appropriated to reparation. If Bulgaria makes default in respect of any instalment, the commission may assume the duty of collecting the appropriated revenues. The commission may also recommend the Central Reparations Commission to give a time of grace for any particular instalment, or to reduce Bulgaria's liability. Such a recommendation will take effect if it is endorsed by a majority of the Reparations Commission. Bulgaria must provide, by way of restitution, specified quantities of live stock for the devastated areas in Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia. She must also supply Yugoslavia with 50,000 tons of coal annually for five years. The maximum size of the Bulgarian army is fixed at 20,000 officers and men, raised by voluntary enlistment; but Bulgaria may maintain gendarmes, customs officials, forest guards and some other kinds of police and frontier guards (all armed with rifles) up to the number of 13,000. All Bulgarian war-vessels (including submarines) are to be surrendered or broken up, except four torpedo-boats and six motor-boats. No air forces may be maintained, no submarines may be built or otherwise acquired. The importation of arms and munitions is prohibited; only one munitions factory is permitted. No new fortifications may be constructed in Bulgaria.

The Hungarian Treaty, June 4 1920

The Hungarian delegates did not appear in Paris until Jan. 7 1920, and over six months elapsed before the Treaty of the Trianon was signed. But the main features of this treaty had been settled long before the Peace Conference dissolved. Except in the territorial terms it was closely parallel to the Austrian treaty. The Supreme Council had informed Bela Kun on June 13 1919 what territories would be transferred to Czechoslovakia and Rumania; and on July 20 1919 the German districts of western Hungary were promised to Austria. But some time elapsed before Hungary acquired a Government which commanded the confidence of the Allies. Late in July 1919 Bela Kun was overthrown by the Rumanians, whom he had attacked on the line of the river Theiss. The Rumanians then occupied Budapest, and permitted the Archduke Joseph to assume the title of Administrator, with the support of a number of ex-officers (Aug. 6). The Archduke applied to the Supreme Council for recognition; but the Council insisted that he should resign, and that steps should be taken to form a coalition Government (Aug. 22). The Archduke then effaced himself, but his Premier, M. Friedrich, remained in office until the Rumanians evacuated Budapest in November. At last on Nov. 24 a coalition Government was formed under M. Huszar, and M. Friedrich joined the new Cabinet as Minister for War. M. Huszar was promptly recognized by the Supreme Council (Dec. 1), in spite of the fact that the strength of his position had not yet been tested by a general election. This, however, took place early in 1920 and produced a National Assembly whose sentiments were comparatively reasonable. The draft treaty was handed to the Hungarian delegates on Jan. 15 1920, a week before the termination of the Conference; the negotiations were left to be conducted by the Council of Ambassadors. On Feb. 12 the Hungarians presented counterproposals and observations which were the reverse of conciliatory. They argued that the position of the Magyars in Hungary was an exact parallel to that of the Czechoslovaks in Bohemia, and asked why the principle of self-determination had been differently applied to the two cases. They asked that the Szeklers of E. Transylvania should be left under Hungarian rule; that all the territories which Hungary was required to surrender should remain within the Hungarian customs regime for a period of years; that no territories should be transferred without a plebiscite, or, alternatively, that better safeguards should be provided for the rights of Magyar minorities. These requests came too late for serious consideration. All the ambassadors would promise was that the League of Nations should be free to consider any minor rectifications of boundaries which the frontier commissions might recommend on ethnological or economic grounds. It is remarkable that this reply, which only involved small alterations in the draft treaty, was not transmitted until May 6. There was one Hungarian pretension with which the Allies dealt more promptly. The Huszar Government claimed that Hungary was still a monarchy, though the royal dignity was in suspense; it was no secret that many Hungarians still desired a Habsburg dynasty. But on Feb. 2 1920 Great Britain, France and Italy declared that a Habsburg restoration in Hungary would violate the fundamental principles of the peace settlement. The Hungarian royalists did not even then abandon all hope; the monarchical character of the constitution was reaffirmed by the Government on March 23. But since the signature of the Treaty of the Trianon the three states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania have combined in a " Little Entente " which avowedly exists to defeat any Hungarian project for a Habsburg restoration.

The only parts of the Hungarian treaty which call for comment are those which fix the future boundaries of Hungary and the allocation of the transferred provinces. On the N. the new frontier gives to Czechoslovakia the southern slopes of the Carpathians, mainly though not entirely populated by Slovaks. To provide Czechoslovakia with a frontage on the Danube and to secure the economic unity of the Carpathian territories, the frontier line has been so drawn as to place large Magyar populations under Czechoslovak rule. Similarly Rumania receives not only Transylvania, in the E. of which there is a compact Magyar (Szekler) minority, but also a broad strip of the Hungarian plain to the W., in which the chief towns are Magyar, in order that Transylvania's railway communications with the Danube may be adequately secured. The Banat, which is divided between Rumania and Yugoslavia, has a mixed population, predominantly Slav in the western and predominantly Rumanian in the eastern half of the province. The German element in the eastern Banat is considerable and would no doubt have preferred to remain under Hungarian rule. But the chief difficulty which the Conference experienced in dealing with the Banat was the adjustment of the conflicting claims of Yugoslavia and Rumania. For the Allies, in their secret treaty of Aug. 1916 with Rumania, had promised her the whole of the Banat, without regard to the historic claims of Serbia. At the Conference M. Bratianu pressed for the fulfilment of the secret treaty. He was met with the reply that Rumania herself had cancelled it by making peace with the Central Powers in May 1918; but he continued to reiterate his demands until the terms of the partition of the Banat were irrevocably settled by the Conference and announced to the world (June 13 1919). To this incident were due the Rumanian occupation of Budapest, the intrigue with the Archduke Joseph (which seems to have included a plan for the union of the Rumanian and Hungarian crowns) and the delay of Rumania in signing her Minorities Treaty.

Like Austria, Hungary is precluded from alienating her independence, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations (Art. 73). She is required to pay a reasonable sum, fixed by the Reparations Commission, before May I 1921; her total liability will be fixed by the same body (Arts. 163, 165) and the balance is to be paid in half-yearly instalments over a period of 30 years, unless payment is respited or remitted by the Allies. She is to surrender all her merchant shipping, up to 20% of her river fleet, and an indefinite quantity of live stock (at the discretion of the Reparations Commission) for devastated countries.

The Adriatic Question

When the Italian plenipotentiaries reappeared at Paris in May 1919 they were offered by the American delegation the so-called Tardieu Compromise, under which Fiume and its hinterland would have constituted an independent state for 15 years, and a plebiscite would afterwards have been taken to ascertain the views of the inhabitants. To this compromise, it is alleged, Sig. Orlando gave his consent; but the Yugoslav delegates insisted on unacceptable amendments, and the American attempt at mediation was dropped at that time. Subsequently the Italian poet D'Annunzio, at the head of a band of volunteers, occupied Fiume (Sept. 12) while fresh negotiations were in progress (at Washington) between Mr. Wilson and the Italian Government. In spite of this coup d'etat, which was disavowed by Italy, the American negotiations continued; by Oct. 27 Italy had agreed that Fiume should be a free state under the protection of the League of Nations and had resigned her claims on Dalmatia, while Mr. Wilson was prepared to recognize Italy's sovereignty over the Pelagosa group, Lissa, Lussin, Unie and the port of Valona. The Adriatic position was then examined more minutely at Paris by M. Clemenceau, Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Polk. These three proposed that Italy should be offered a protectorate over the Dalmatian city of Zara, but that she should be asked to abandon her demands upon the isle of Lagosta and the eastern part of Istria, and also her proposal that the city of Fiume should be made independent of the free state of Fiume. The offer did not satisfy Sig. Nitti, who intimated that Italy, in default of a more acceptable scheme for a compromise, would take her stand on the secret Treaty of London. To this Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau replied that they too were willing in the last resort to abide by that treaty, but on Jan. 14 1920 they offered new terms which were distinctly more favourable to Italy than those of Dec. 9 1919. The new terms were drafted after Mr. Polk had left Paris for Washington, and were presented to Sig. Nitti before the U.S. Government had been consulted regarding them. Accordingly Mr. Lansing intimated, on Jan. 20, that Mr. Wilson could not admit the right of France and England to modify, on their own responsibility, the only terms of compromise to which an American representative had subscribed. The French and British Prime Ministers argued, in reply, that their new proposals were actually more favourable to Yugoslavia than those of Dec. 9, and were intended to save France and England from the necessity of honouring the Treaty of London, to which, as was notorious, Mr. Wilson had always objected. But on Feb. 1 0 Mr. Wilson stated precisely his objections to the terms of Jan. 14. They gave to Italy the whole of Istria and the prospect of a future protectorate over Fiume. They also provided for the partition of Albania between Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece. Mr. Wilson stated that he could not cooperate with the European Allies if they allowed the admitted principles of justice to be overborne " by the country possessing most endurance in pressing its demands." The upshot of the controversy was that Italy and Yugoslavia were left to settle their differences, if they could, by separate negotiations, with the proviso that they must not come to terms at the expense of Albania. It took some time to reach this consummation. But on Nov. 12 1920 Italy and Yugoslavia concluded the Treaty of Rapallo, and on Jan. 2 1921 D'Annunzio's garrison at Fiume surrendered to the Italian Government. Albania, thanks to Mr. Wilson's intervention, has established an independent Government and has been admitted (Dec. 17 1920) as a member of the League of Nations. The Adriatic question was thus provisionally settled, nearly a year after the close of the Conference, but still on lines which the Conference had suggested.

The Turkish Treaty

The Turkish question was discussed at Paris in May and June 1919, but the drafting of the Turkish treaty was not seriously taken in hand until the London Conference of Feb. 1920. This delay was due partly to the hope (unhappily falsified) that the United States would join in the treaty; but also to difficulties arising out of the allocation of mandates for the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire. The twelfth of the Fourteen Points provided that these territories should receive " unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles indicated that some at least of them would be recognized as independent nations, under such mandatories as they were willing to accept. The principal claimants for these mandates were France and Great Britain, who in May 1916 had come to an understanding about their future spheres of influence (the Sykes-Picot agreement), on the basis that the French sphere should include Cilicia, Southern Armenia and Syria (with autonomy under French protection for Damascus, Aleppo, `Urfa, Deir and Mosul); that Palestine should be an international territory; and that Haifa and Mesopotamia should be in the British sphere. But Greece claimed the whole of Turkish Thrace, Smyrna (which she occupied with the approval of the Supreme Council in May 1919) and the Aegean Is.; while Italy claimed the Dodecanese (of which she had retained possession at the end of the Libyan war in 1912) and a sphere of influence on the adjacent mainland. There were difficulties connected with all these claims. The most notorious conflict of interests was that between France and the Hejaz (over the Arab districts of Syria), which came to a head in March 1920 with the proclamation by a " Syrian National Congress " of an independent Syria (to include the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia) and of Faisal, the heir apparent of the Hejaz, as the king of this state; but there were also doubts as to the wisdom of allowing Greece to assume responsibility for Smyrna, and as to the possibility of reconciling the French and Italian claims with Mr. Wilson's promise to respect the political unity of the Turkish race. The future of Constantinople was long in doubt. At last on Feb. 16 1920 the Conference of London announced that it would remain the Turkish capital; but, a month later, the Allies informed the Turkish Nationalists that this concession was conditional on their good behaviour, and Constantinople was temporarily occupied by Allied troops under the command of Gen. Milne. On April 24 the Conference of San Remo gave mandates to France for Syria, Cilicia and the Lebanon; to Great Britain for Palestine and Mesopotamia; a mandate for Armenia was declined first by the League of Nations (April 27) and afterwards by the United States Senate (May 27). At last on May 11 the draft treaty was handed to the Turkish delegates at Sevres. Its terms produced considerable excitement among the Nationalists, and it was necessary for the Allies to call upon the Greeks to make armed demonstrations both in Asia Minor and in Thrace. But at the Conference of Spa (July) the last touches were put to the treaty and on Aug. 10 it was duly signed by the Turkish delegates.

Under the treaty Constantinople is left to the Sultan, with the proviso that it may be forfeited if Turkey violates the terms of settlement, especially those by which she guarantees the rights of minorities in her territory. In accordance with the Fourteen Points the Straits are neutralized and placed under the control of an international commission. Smyrna, with about half its vilayet, is left under Turkish sovereignty, but this sovereignty will be exercised by the Greek Government, and Smyrna may be incorporated in the Greek customs area. There is to be a local legislature, which may, if it so desires, petition the League of Nations (within five years) for the incorporation of Smyrna in the Greek kingdom. Greece also receives, in full sovereignty, Thrace outside the zone of the Straits, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria. But she may not fortify the first five of these islands (owing to their proximity to the Straits); and she engages to sign a minorities treaty. Armenia is declared a free and independent state; the boundary between Turkey and Armenia is to be referred to the arbitration of the President of the United States. Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine are recognized as independent states; their boundaries will be fixed by the principal Powers, and they are to be administered by mandatories, on terms formulated by the principal Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval. The Hejaz is recognized as a free and independent state. Turkey cedes to Italy the islands of Astropalia, Casso, Scarpanto, Rhodes, the Dodecanese and Castelloryzo. The British protectorate over Egypt and the British annexation of Cyprus are confirmed. The chief feature of the military clauses is the proviso that Turkey may maintain no military forces except the Sultan's bodyguard, and gendarmes and frontier guards not exceeding 50,000 in number. The Allies waive their claims for reparation. But Turkey is to pay the costs of the armies of occupation since the Armistice of Oct. 30 1918, and to compensate civilian nationals of the Allies for loss or damage suffered in the war through the action or negligence of the Turkish authorities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.-All the treaties have been published by the Stationery Office. Supplementary documents are printed in the History of the Peace Conference, vols. i.-iii., ed. H. W. V. Temperley (1920-I), which also comments exhaustively on the German treaty, and gives an account of proceedings up to June 28 1919. Three more volumes are in preparation; these will deal with the remaining treaties. A few more documents will be found in the American Journal of International Law (and supplements) for 1919 and 1920. The German Comments on the Conditions of Peace of May 29 1919 is published (in English) by the Amer. Assoc. for International Conciliation (Oct. 1919); the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, of June 16 1919, is published by the Stationery Office: Cmd. 258 (1919). For the question of Fiume see documents published by " Adriaticus " in La Question Adriatique (1920), and the Stationery Office paper: Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question, Cmd. 586 (1920). Of books describing or criticizing the Conference the following are useful: Sir M. Hankey, " Diplomacy by Conference " (Proc. Brit. Inst. of International Affairs, 1921); H. Wilson Harris, The Peace in the Making (1920); J. M. Keynes, Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919); C. H. Thompson, The Peace Conference Day by Day (1920). Of capital importance is the series of articles by M. Andre Tardieu in L'Illustration for 1920, reprinted in his book La Paix (1921). See also R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (1921) and The Big Four and Others (1921). (H. W. C. D.)