First Amendment Standing Cases

From Conservapedia
Though the requirements of standing are somewhat "relaxed in the First-Amendment context," standing is relaxed "only as relating to the various court-imposed prudential requirements of standing." Seals v. McBee, 898 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2018). Even in the First-Amendment context, plaintiffs "still must show that they satisfy the core Article III requirements of injury, causation, and redressability." Id. Here, two theories of standing are relevant: individual and associational standing.

Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 384 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (W.D. Tex. 2019).

Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that the requirements of standing are relaxed in the First Amendment context. That is true, but only as relating to the various court-imposed prudential requirements of standing. See Sec. of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1984). They still must show that they satisfy the core Article III requirements of injury, causation, and redressability. See id.; Miss. State Dem. Party v. Barbour, 529 F.3d 538, 545-48 (5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a First Amendment claim for lack of standing because there was no threat of future injury).

Seals v. McBee, 898 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2018).



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